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Europe Between Interests, Institutions and Ideas

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Europe Between Interests, Institutions and Ideas The London School of Economics and Political Science Europe between Interests, Institutions and Ideas: Crisis cooperation during the 2011 uprisings in Libya Inez Freiin von Weitershausen A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London 2016 1 Contents Declaration ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 Abstract .............................................................................................................................................................. 6 Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................................... 7 Acronyms........................................................................................................................................................... 9 Tables and Figures ......................................................................................................................................... 11 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 13 1. Research questions and case selection .................................................................................................... 15 2. Method......................................................................................................................................................... 18 2.1 Answering the What- Question .......................................................................................................... 18 2.2 Answering the Why-Question ............................................................................................................ 19 2.3 Limitations ............................................................................................................................................ 21 3. Contributions .............................................................................................................................................. 22 4. Structure and findings ............................................................................................................................... 24 1. Interests, Ideas and Institutions in EU crisis response ............................................................................ 28 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 28 1.1 Cooperation and EU member states ................................................................................................ 28 1.2 Explaining cooperation ........................................................................................................................... 32 1.2.1 Formulating interests: material factors, roles and ideas ............................................................. 32 1.2.2. Choosing a course of action: interests, institutions and ideas .................................................. 42 2.2.2 Institutions and coordination in EU crisis response .................................................................. 45 2.3 Analytical framework .............................................................................................................................. 48 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 51 2. Prelude: Europe, Libya and the Southern neighborhood before the uprisings ................................... 52 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 52 2.1 EU initiatives toward the Southern Neighbourhood ......................................................................... 53 2.2 Europe's Relations with Libya: Between Alienation and Rapprochement ..................................... 54 2.3 The EU-3 and Libya ................................................................................................................................ 59 2.3.1 Energy relations ................................................................................................................................ 59 2.3.2 Military and security affairs ............................................................................................................. 61 2.3.3 Migration management .................................................................................................................... 65 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 66 2 3. Border Protection and Migration Management ........................................................................................ 67 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 67 3.1 Course of action ....................................................................................................................................... 68 3.1.1 Cooperative initiatives ..................................................................................................................... 69 3.1.2 Instances of Unilateralism ............................................................................................................... 72 3.2 Explanations ............................................................................................................................................. 75 3.2.1 Interest formation ............................................................................................................................ 76 3.2.2. Taking action .................................................................................................................................... 79 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 81 4. Humanitarian Assistance and consular support ........................................................................................ 82 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 82 4.1 Courses of action ..................................................................................................................................... 83 4.1.1 Cooperative initiatives ..................................................................................................................... 83 4.1.2 Instances of Unilateralism ............................................................................................................... 89 4.2. Explanations ............................................................................................................................................ 90 4.2.1 Interest formation ............................................................................................................................ 91 4.2.2. Taking action .................................................................................................................................... 93 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................................... 95 5. Restrictive Measures ...................................................................................................................................... 97 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 97 5.1. Courses of action .................................................................................................................................... 98 5.1.1 Cooperative initiatives ..................................................................................................................... 99 5.1.2 Instances of unilateralism .............................................................................................................. 104 5.2 Explanations ........................................................................................................................................... 106 5.2.1 Interest formation .......................................................................................................................... 106 5.2.2. Taking action .................................................................................................................................. 109 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 111 6. Diplomatic recognition ............................................................................................................................... 112 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 112 6.1. Courses of action .................................................................................................................................
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