Operations in Libya
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House of Commons Defence Committee OPERATIONS IN LIBYA Written Evidence This is a volume of submissions, relevant to the inquiry into Operations in Libya, which have been reported to the House but not yet approved for publication in final form. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that it is not yet an approved final record of the written evidence received by the Committee. List of written evidence 1 Ministry of Defence 2 Commodore Steven Jermy RN 3 Professor M J Williams 4 CJA Cope, Political Editor, Warship World Magazine 5 Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign (KOFAC) 6 Mike Young, Decision Workshops Ltd 7 Raytheon UK 8 Patrick M Lavender 9 Admiral Sir John Woodward and colleagues OL001 Written evidence from the Ministry of Defence On 24 February the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force started evacuating British Entitled Persons from Libya, following widespread protests and fighting across the country. Over the next two weeks almost 1000 persons were evacuated from locations across the country. Shortly after the evacuation was complete, the security situation deteriorated significantly. On the evening of 19 March UK Armed Forces, along with their US and French counterparts, launched military operations in Libya with the aim of protecting the civilian population of Benghazi from an imminent attack by Colonel Gaddafi’s forces. By 31 March NATO had assumed effective command of all operations to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1970 and 1973 as Operation Unified Protector (OUP). Committing military forces to Libya averted an imminent humanitarian catastrophe in Benghazi and has saved countless lives since. The UK continues to make a significant contribution to the NATO mission in Libya under the national operational name of Op ELLAMY. Q1. The effectiveness of the ongoing mission to protect civilians in Libya. 1.1 When the UK and its allies commenced military operations Colonel Gaddafi’s forces were hours away from inflicting a humanitarian catastrophe on Benghazi, and Misrata was besieged with snipers and under heavy artillery attack. Hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians were fleeing the country. 1.2 NATO’s intervention in Libya has saved countless lives and is helping bring democracy to a country that has suffered tyrannical rule for 42 years. The Libyan people are now free to choose their own future. The Alliance has achieved considerable successes and continues to enforce a no fly zone and arms embargo. So far Coalition aircraft have flown over 21,000 sorties - 8,0001 have been strike sorties - and destroyed over 5000 targets. The UK contribution has been significant and we continue to play a leading role on the military, diplomatic, and humanitarian fronts. Militarily, we have flown a fifth of all strike sorties, launched over a 150 helicopter missions from HMS OCEAN, helped enforce the maritime embargo, and cleared Misrata port of sea mines. 1.3 NATO’s actions in Libya have severely degraded the former regime’s offensive capabilities and significantly limited their ability to threaten innocent civilians. What is left of the Gaddafi’s regime is isolated domestically and internationally. Those towns and cities now under the control of the National Transitional Council (NTC) are slowly beginning to return to normality. 1 Figures correct as at 1 September 2011 1.4 There still remains a job for the UK, NATO, and our Arab partners to do in Libya. The Prime Minister and NATO Secretary General are clear that operations will continue until all attacks and threats of attack against civilians have ended. Q2. The extent and success of coordination of efforts with French and US forces. 2.1 UK personnel are involved at all levels of the NATO command process and continue to shape the strategic and operational direction of the campaign. 2.2 OUP is being co-ordinated through the existing NATO command structure. The UK is playing a pivotal role in the North Atlantic Council and influencing operational planning in the SHAPE military headquarters. The day to day running of the operations is being conducted from NATO commands in Poggio and Naples for the air and maritime components respectively. 2.3 Co-operation between the UK and France, both militarily and at the political level, has been exemplary and contributed significantly towards developing the level of co-operation and interoperability envisaged in the UK/French Defence Co-Operation Treaty, which was signed in November 2010. 2.4 The US contribution to OUP has been vital to the operation’s success. The US has not only provided a significant contribution but made available a number of niche capabilities, particularly Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets, which other Allies do not have. Q3. The costs of the operation and its implications for other UK operations. 3.1 We currently estimate that the net additional cost of Op ELLAMY is in the region of £110 million from the start of the operations in mid-March to mid-September. In addition, we estimate the cost of replenishing munitions expended over this period may be up to £130 million. These figures are slightly lower than those announced by Secretary of State to Parliament in June (£120 million and £140 million respectively) but are not the final figures. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has confirmed the net additional costs of operations in Libya will be met in full from the Reserve. 3.2 Maintaining our contribution to operations in Libya has meant we have had to prioritise our forces so we can meet other operational commitments. In addition to Libya we are heavily committed in Afghanistan and have numerous non-discretionary tasks both at home and overseas. We will need to prioritise some capabilities if Op ELLAMY endures beyond September. However, the risks are judged manageable and, where possible, mitigation actions are already in place; we are quite clear we can manage what we are being asked to do. Q4. How have capability decisions taken in the SDSR and subsequent policy documents affected our contribution in Libya. 4.1 The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) set out the need to retain high- readiness forces, which provide for the possibility of a military response to a wide range of potential crises, alongside continuing to fulfil our standing commitments. 4.2 Events in Libya have confirmed the validity of the SDSR decision to adopt an adaptable posture with flexible forces. The outstanding performance of our Armed Forces on Op ELLAMY demonstrates the UK remains able to project power and influence at speed. 4.3 The SDSR was based on a thorough and realistic assessment of capabilities our Armed Forces require to meet the threats we face now and in the future. The difficult decisions to gap or reduce capabilities that might have been used in Libya, such as Carrier Strike, were necessary to move towards a balanced and affordable equipment programme. 4.4 We have always been clear that we would bear some additional risk in the short term but, as set out in the SDSR, we retain a broad spectrum of capabilities that enable us to project power in an effective and timely manner. Where capability gaps do exist they can be mitigated by working with allies and through over-flight and basing rights. We recognise there are certain deficits in some strategic enablers that NATO, nor we, are able to provide without the support of the US. The operations in Libya are proving that the decisions taken in the SDSR were right. The capability delivered by Tornado and Typhoon in Libya simply could not have been delivered by Harrier from our existing carriers. Q5. The implications of this operation for the outcomes of the SDSR. 5.1 Recent events in Libya demonstrate: firstly, the SDSR’s recognition of the uncertain world we live in was right; secondly, the consequent importance of the UK adopting an adaptable posture with flexible forces. In particular, the SDSR set out the need to retain high- readiness forces, including air and naval operations, that provide for the possibility of a military response to a wide range of potential crises. 5.2 The financial pressures on the Government have not diminished and unless we were to make even greater reductions elsewhere, Defence must contribute to the broader Government deficit reduction not least because our national security depends on our economic stability. Q6. The effectiveness of NATO command structures in the preparation and conduct of operations in Libya. 6.1 NATO has proven its ability to deliver a robust and credible response to new security challenges. The NATO command structure has proved largely sufficient for the nature of current operations in Libya. 6.2 What NATO has undertaken is challenging due to the large land area covered, the speed with which the operation had to be mounted, and the very complex situation on the ground. This generated some initial teething problems and we recognise it took some time to achieve full capability. 6.3 NATO has embarked on a lessons learnt exercise, which we are contributing to. Allies have agreed the use of the NATO Crisis Management Process was generally successful. Q7. The "end game": what would a successful outcome look like and how do current operations contribute to achieving this? 7.1 Success is achieved when the conditions set out in UNSCRs 1970 and 1973 have been met and the Libyan people are free to choose their own future. An indicator of this will be a situation on the ground across the whole of Libya where the civilian population no longer requests or needs NATO support in enforcing the UNSCR 1973 to protect them. 7.2 Given that the threat to Libyan citizens emanated from the former Libyan Government, a successful resolution to the operation in this case must include the formation of a new legitimate, representative, and inclusive governing authority, which protects rather than attacks its own citizens.