DOCSLIB.ORG

General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks of February 1941 by JOHN S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks of February 1941 by JOHN S General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks of February 1941 by JOHN S. KOLIOPOULOS The Anglo-Greek talks of February 1941 are one of the most con- troversial issues in the historiography of World War II. The talks were held in Athens to discuss Britain's decision earlier in that month to help Greece against a possible German attack, and to agree on a line of defense which could be reasonably expected to check the enemy ad- vance. In addition to the strength of the forces required to hold the enemy and the allocation of these forces, the representatives of the two 'countries were obliged to take into account two important factors: (a) the attitude of Yugoslavia; and (b) the time factor. In accordance with the agreement reached late on February 22, the British would send to Greece, in addition to their air force units already operating in the country, five squadrons of aircraft and land forces equal to four divisions. The British troops would arrive in three installments, and would be deployed on a line to the west of Salonika, running from northwest to southeast along Mt. Vermion and Mt. Olympus, the "Aliakmon line," as it was called. The Greeks, on the other hand, would provide four additional divisions (thirty-five battalions) from Thrace and eastern Macedonia for the defense of the Aliakmon line, and one division in reserve at Larissa. By the same agreement, Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, undertook to approach Yugoslavia in order to enlist its military cooperation with Britain and Greece. A week later, disagreement arose over the timing of the withdrawal of the Greek forces from their advanced positions in northeastern Greece. Eden and the other British representatives maintained that, according to the agreement of February 22, the Greeks were required to commence the withdrawal of their troops immediately after the agreement, irrespective of Yugoslavia's attitude. General Alexandros Papagos, Chief of the Greek General Staff, on the other hand, maintained with equal force that it had been agreed that the Greek decision to withdraw should be held over until a reply had been received from Yugoslavia to Eden's ap- proaches. It is essential to note in this connection that the Aliakmon line abandoned Salonika, the port city of northern Greece—and the only safe and effective means by which Yugoslavia could be supplied by Britain in time of war—to the enemy.' 'The principal sources until the opening of the British archives at the Public Record Office have been: A. Eden, The Reckoning (London, 1965); A. Papagos, The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941 (Athens, 1945—English edition, Athens, 1949); 28 JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA A recent study has attempted to solve the problems of the interpreta- tion of these events, as well as related problems such as the broader question of the motives behind Britain's decision to help Greece against the Germans early in 1941, 2 bypointing out that, "on balance, history must support Papagos's version of exactly what was agreed on at Tatoi." 3 This conclusion has been based on ample archival evidence and par- ticularly on the British record of the Tatoi conference. A safer conclusion might have been possible if Greek General Staff papers had been ac- cessible. Unfortunately, the papers concerning the Anglo-Greek talks of 1941 have been out of reach, their fate still a mystery, assuming, of course, that they were not actually lost during the evacuation of the Greek government in April 1941? Nevertheless, the issues involved, and par- ticularly Papagos's position and attitude at the conference and afterwards, might be approached with the assistance of available Greek sources, and an effort could be made to see these issues in the light of Greek strategy and tactics as well as Anglo-Greek relations at the time. This approach, although it may not add much in the form of conclusions, might perhaps provide additional insights or at least a broader perspective. Such ques- tions as Greek war plans, and priorities and aims in 1940-1941 and prior to the Italian attack on Greece, are not irrelevant to the problem at hand; on the contrary, they may go a considerable way in explaining Papagos's attitude at the conference of February 1941. Anglo-Greek relations since the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936 were friendly and left little to be desired, at least from the point of view of British interests.' Britain could rely on a friendly Greece in an emergency in the Mediterranean, avoiding at the same time any inconvenient com- mitments which would arise from an alliance with Greece. In April 1939, in place of something more concrete and binding, the British government publicly guaranteed Greece's independence: it was a solemn and face-saving gesture, but empty of any substantive commitments. Several months earlier, in October 1938, the British government had turned down a proposal by loannis Metaxas, the Greek dictator, for an W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III (Boston, 1950); L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. I (London, 1970); C. Buckley, Greece and Crete (London, 1952); and F. de Guingand, Operation Victory (London, 1947). 'Martin van Creveld, "Prelude to Disaster: the British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940-1941," Journal of Contemporary History, IX(1974). 'Ibid. pp. 85-86. 4Col. A. Korozis, The Wars, 1940-1941: Successes and Responsibilities (in Greek), Vol. I (Athens, 1978), pp. 7-8. Col. Korozis was a Staff Officer and very close to Papagos. He maintains that, in April 1941, Papagos's personal papers, as well as a number of General Staff papers, were withdrawn at Papagos's orders and put into safe hiding. 'Anglo-Greek relations during 1935-1941 have been the subject of the author's Ph.D. dissertation at the University of London (1972), published under the title, Greece and the British Connection, 1935-1941 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977). General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks 29 Anglo-Greek alliance. Britain needed a friendly, not an allied, Greece, so as to avoid both offending the Italians and undertaking undesirable commitments.' The war led to closer Anglo-Greek cooperation, but also sowed seeds of future discord, which had to do with different strategic considerations, if not interests. British planners were interested in Greece mainly as an air and naval base from which air attacks could be launched against Italy and communications in the Aegean Sea controlled. Greek strategy and war preparations, on the other hand, had been directed to- ward covering a static defensive war against Bulgaria; so much so that, until April 1939, when Italy occupied Albania and posed a direct threat to Greece, Greek war planning was concerned exclusively with defense against Bulgaria. In April 1939, the Greek General Staff was caught off-guard and facing the wrong enemy. There was no mobile expedi- tionary force; the air force lacked modern equipment; A. A. defenses were poor; and coastal defenses were non-existent. Considerable funds— and pride—had been invested on the elaborate fortifications sealing off Bulgaria, the line which was named after Metaxas. Papagos later admitted that the Greek government had stated that the single aim of Greek military preparations was to deal with Bulgaria in the event of a Greek-Bulgarian war, with the initiative being left to the enemy. The aim was also in accord with Greece's obligations arising from the Balkan Pact of 1934, of which Greece was a member. "Never had the Government," he goes on to say, "considered the possibility of a war against Italy as an aim of our military preparations." Greece even lacked a plan covering the Italian danger.' As was to be expected, the Italian occupation of Albania sounded the alarm, and, on May 4, 1939, the General Staff produced the first war plan covering both Italy and Bulgaria, Plan IB. The new plan, after taking into account the help that Greece might reasonably expect from its Balkan partners in the event of a Bulgarian attack, as well as what help Greece might hope to receive from Britain, divided Greek ground forces into two lines of defense. Thus, the fully mobilized forces of Greece were allocated as follows: five divisions and two brigades to the Albanian sector, six divisions and one brigade to the Bulgarian one (not including the forts garrisons), and five divisions and one brigade as general reserve, of which the Albanian sector received two divisions, while the rest were stationed in the Salonika area.' This allocation, which clearly favored the defense sector facing Bulgaria, has been defended by Papagos as satisfying the need to hold Bulgaria at all costs in order to enable Turkey to come to Greece's as- sistance.° But the preoccupation, as we shall see, hardly explains by 'Foreign Office correspondence relating to Metaxas's proposal and its recep- tion at the Foreign Office in PRO, F0371/22362. Papagos, The Greek Army and its Preparadness for War, 1923-1940 (in Greek, Athens, 1945), pp. 253-326. 'ibid., pp. 327-328; Korozis, I, pp. 611-613. 9A. Papagos, The Greek Army, p. 328; Korozis, I, p. 613. 30 JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA itself the emphasis laid by the Greek General Staff on the defense of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, and on static defensive warfare in general. What seems to have been the case, besides Greece's obligations arising from the Balkan Pact and its alliance with Turkey, was the deep-rooted, if understandable, Greek fear of Bulgaria, as well as a state of mind—the Maginot mentality of the Greek General Staff in the interwar period.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • M7t'j¡.T7tór.ITL-Taav, 01Tou -~Sptut -To L:Tpa't
    - 'O &p z La-rp«-n¡y r)~ ' A. ll amiyo~ d~ M7t'J¡.t7tÓ r.IT L-taav, 01tou -~ Sptu t -to l:Tpa't;"l)­ ye:¡ov rij~ '0¡;.6. o<; ¡;.tpapzLwv 1< . ~ 1-: ::: 1 \ :' Avno:tpo7tO pLxov 7tup o ~6 ).ov f. v Spáae: L. 4 'O :cfwOu ::- ou?yl~ 'A. J ( ,.p~?;~ 11ni -r,,ij 1<. l{!'lñ:li (lmoOt.v r.i ptanptX) Jl.a.! -rtoií ft: tt~pylou A. llM:ztoo (tia--<.rn(JÜt;, 3t~l&.). 5 l. Soldados griegos de permiso tras la for freedom. lnstitute 0( the Greek 3. El generalísimo Alex. Papagos en Papaconstantinou, The Battle of Greece campaña de Albania dan una cálida bien· Parliamen~Atenas , 2005. Bobostitsa, Cuartel General del grupo divi· 1940-1 94 1, Keramikos, Atenas, 1966. venida a los australianos en Atenas. 2. El Comandante General R. Scobi y el sional K. Th. Papaconstantinou, The Battle 5. El primer ministro A. Korizis con marzo 1941. Del libro 60 years alter the secretario general del EAM D. Partsalides of Greece 1940-1941 , Keramikos, K. Kotzias (detrás a la izquierda) y George end of World War 11: Greeks and (segundo por la izquierda). (Cortesía del Atenas, 1966. A. Vlahos (sin sombrero, derecha). Th. Australians in the common struggle IWM). 4. El rey jorge 11 desayunando sobre un Papaconstantinou, The Battle of Greece peñasco en Kleisoura, Th. 1940-1941 , Keramikos, Atenas, /966. POÚTICAS DE LA IMAGEN FOTOGRÁFICA ~ Fotografía y política: Grecia 1940-1944 Procopis Papastratis es catédrático de Historia de la Procopis Papastratis Panteion University de Atenas. Es autor de British policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (Cambridge University Press, /984; 2' edición, 2008).
    [Show full text]
  • Contribution of Greece to the Victory of the Allies During Ww Ii
    CONTRIBUTION OF GREECE TO THE VICTORY OF THE ALLIES DURING WW II Lt Colonel of Engineering Panayiotis Spyropoulos Historian of the History Directorate of Hellenic Army General Staff The peninsula of Greece has, since antiquity, been a point of confrontation be- tween East and West, as it constitutes an area of utmost strategic value, situated on the flanks of the main axis of operations in East-West direction and vice-versa. Who- ever occupies Greece can effortlessly with his forces harass the flanks or even the rear of troops operating along the aforementioned axis, control the sea line of com- munication from Gibraltar to Suez, and block from the west the sea route from the Black Sea to Propontis (Marmara) Sea, the Hellespont (Straits), the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The geo-strategic value of Greece has been dramatically enhanced during the XXth century, due to the rapid technological development of war equipment (as per the quote of sir Halford Mackinder on the «Heartland»). During the 2nd World War, Italy launched the attack against Greece, without informing its ally, Germany. Berlin was enraged by the Italian action and considered it «totally incoherent» and mistimed, because it was initiated just before wintertime, a season unsuitable for mountain operations, as well as just before the elections in the (still neutral) USA, providing Roosevelt with even more convincing arguments for go- ing to war. Moreover, it criticised the Italians refraining from any seaborne operation, a fact that facilitated the British in debarking on Crete and other islands, significant for their strategic importance; while they left them the margin to deploy in Thessalo- nica.
    [Show full text]
  • Lakes of Northern Greece
    Lakes of Northern Greece Travel Passports are spelt correctly and match the names on your You may need to renew your British Passport if passport. Your flight ticket is non-transferable and you are travelling to an EU country. Please ensure non-refundable. your passport is less than 10 years old (even if it has 6 months or more left on it) and has at least 6 Departure Tax months validity remaining from the date of travel. Flight Taxes are included in the price of your EU, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino holiday. or Switzerland valid national identification cards are also acceptable for travel. For more information, please visit: Baggage Allowance passportchecker We advise that you stick to the baggage allowances advised. If your luggage is found to be Visas heavier than the airlines specified baggage If you’re a tourist, you do not need a visa for short allowance the charges at the airport will be hefty. trips to most EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Your EasyJet ticket includes one hold bag of up to Norway and Switzerland. You’ll be able to stay for 23kg plus one cabin bag that can fit under the seat up to 90 days in any 180-day period. in front of you, (maximum size 45 x 36 x 20cm, including any handles or wheels). If you book an For all other passport holders please check the upfront or extra legroom seat you can also take an visa requirements with the appropriate embassy. additional large cabin bag on board. For more For further information, please check here: travel information visit www.easyjet.com to the EU Greek Consulate: 1A Holland Park, London W11 Labels 3TP.
    [Show full text]
  • John S. Koliopoulos Unwanted Ally: Greece and the Great
    JOHN S. KOLIOPOULOS UNWANTED ALLY: GREECE AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1939-1941 Greece’s international position and national security, from the spring of 1939 when the Axis powers initiated a policy of outright conquest in Europe until the German invasion of the country two years later, have, until recently, been examined mainly from the point of view of contemporary official Greek policy, leading thus to the development of a semi - official Greek historiography1. Most of the governing as­ sumptions and premises of this historiography grew out of both war­ time rhetoric and the post - war requirements of Greek policy, to be­ come in time axiomatic. Some of these assumptions and premises are: a) that Greece followed, before the' Italian attack, a neutral policy towards the great European powers; b) that the Italian attack was unprovoked ; c ) that Anglo - Greek cooperation was subsequent — and consequent — to the Italian attack ; d ) that the Greek Government, although resolved to resist a German attack, did everything to avoid it, and e) that the German invasion was unprovoked and undertaken to rescue the defeated Italians in Albania. In this paper I propose to examine these assumptions in the light of evidence newly made avail­ able, and see particularly whether Greece followed a really neutral policy until the Italian attack, and whether the Greco - Italian war was, until Germany decided to intervene and extinguish the poten­ tially dangerous conflict in the Balkans, more than a local war loosely connected with the strategical interests of Britain and Germany. Greece’s foreign relations before World War II were first put to the test in April 1939, on the occasion of the Italian occupation of Al­ bania.
    [Show full text]
  • The Establishment and Development of the Metaxas Dictatorship in the Context of Fascism and Nazism, 1936–41
    23tmp09a.qxd 04/04/2002 14:43 Page 143 9 The Establishment and Development of the Metaxas Dictatorship in the Context of Fascism and Nazism, 193641 MOGENS PELT In October 1935, Italy launched a fully-fledged attack on Abyssinia, threatening Britains position in Egypt and the supremacy of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean. Three years later, in 1938, Germany established her dominance over Central Europe in a series of short-of-war operations, incorporating Austria and the Sudetenland into the Reich by Anschluss and the Munich agreement. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia dealt a fatal blow to the French security system in south-eastern Europe, la petite entente with Prague serving as its regional power centre. While the credibility of France as a great power almost completely eroded overnight, Vienna and Prague suddenly provided ready-made platforms to an invigorated and resurgent Germany to project her power into south- eastern Europe, and to rearrange that area in line with Berlins plans for a new European Order. This, in turn, gave a boost to national vindication in the revisionist states, Bulgaria and Hungary, while it generated shock waves of national insecurity and internal instability in the status quo states, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. On 10 October 1935, only a week after the beginning of Mussolinis African enterprise, a military coup détat in Greece reinstated the monarchy, which had been abolished in the wake of the First World War, and some ten months later, on 4 August 1936, King George II established what was meant to be a permanent dictatorship under the leadership of General Ioannis Metaxas, a prominent royalist.
    [Show full text]
  • West European Politics the Transformation of the Greek Party
    This article was downloaded by: [Harvard University] On: 11 July 2010 Access details: Access Details: [subscription number 915668586] Publisher Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37- 41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK West European Politics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713395181 The transformation of the Greek party system since 1951 Takis S. Pappasa a Politics at the Aristotle University, Thessaloniki, Greece To cite this Article Pappas, Takis S.(2003) 'The transformation of the Greek party system since 1951', West European Politics, 26: 2, 90 — 114 To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/01402380512331341121 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380512331341121 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.
    [Show full text]
  • Haifa 12/12/02 FREEDOM OR DEATH: the Jews in the Greek Resistance Steven Bowman, University of Cincinnati Visiting Profe
    Haifa 12/12/02 FREEDOM OR DEATH: The Jews in the Greek Resistance Steven Bowman, University of Cincinnati Visiting Professor, University of Haifa “Better one hour of freedom than 40 years of slavery and prison” Rigas Pheraios (1757-1798) Neither the Greek Government nor the Greek people accepted the surrender of their trapped and exhausted armies in April 1941. Nor did the people of Crete who fought alongside the remnants of the Greek army and the British Expeditionary Force accept the German invasion and subsequent occupation. Resistance continued from the victory over the Italians and was the Greek response to the Axis invasions. Resistance took many forms. Urban resistance emphasized gathering of information, refusal to volunteer for labor in Germany, occasional acts of sabotage, demonstrations and protests, sympathy with and assistance to British prisoners of war; even survival was an act of resistance. Rural resistance, in the main, consisted of hiding food and offering sanctuary and assistance to escaped British POWs and to resistance fighters. Eventually the rural population contributed its sons – and daughters – to the new vision of Greece imposed by EAM-ELAS. The mountains however have justly claimed the historical high ground for resistance. It was to the mountains, as traditionally among the klephtes of the Ottoman period, that men and women ran from the occupying authorities and planned their attacks. The mountains, as Leon Uris described them, were angry, indeed as angry as a swarm of bees whose pastoral life was disturbed by rabid wolves. The resistance in Greece began as a continuation of the war against the Axis forces that had invaded, conquered, and occupied Greece.
    [Show full text]
  • Grossomanides Elected New AHEPA Leader Gentleman James Poll
    o C V ΓΡΑΦΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ Bringing the news ΤΟΥ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ to generations of ΑΠΟ ΤΟ 1915 The National Herald Greek Americans c v A weekly Greek AmericAn PublicAtion www.thenationalherald.com VOL. 14, ISSUE 720 July 30 - August 5, 2011 $1.50 In Washington Trip, Grossomanides Elected New AHEPA Leader Venizelos Says Greece New Officers Will Follow Karacostas’ Coming Back Again Focus on Youth WASHINGTON – New Greek Fi - newspaper Kathimerini reported nance Minister Evangelos that he was buoyed by his meet - By Constantine S. Sirigos Venizelos, in an address at the ing with Geithner and IMF Man - TNH Staff Writer Peterson Institute for Interna - aging Director Chirstine La - tional Economics here, said garde, which he described as NEW YORK – Greek America’s debt-crushed Greece is deter - “positive,” and said: “All of us largest organization, AHEPA, mined to restore itself and that together - the IMF, the IIF (an put its continued dynamism on the government’s goal “is to re - international banking agency,) display at its 89th annual meet - turn to positive growth and cre - the American government, the ing, this one in Miami Beach’s ate primary surpluses by 2012,” European Union, the European Fontainebleau Hotel, naming an ambitious benchmark many Central Bank - need to send a Dr. John Grossomanides of analysts said is impossible to strong and clear message: We Westerly, R.I. to replace two- reach. Greece, suffering under have a program, we trust in its term leader Nicholas Karacostas $460 billion in debt and a deficit implementation and its as Supreme President, the high - of more than 10%, is relying on prospects, and we will collec - light of a week of work and the so-called Troika of the Eu - tively achieve our goals.” recreation and the celebration ropean Union-International Venizelos provided no details of Hellenic heritage during Monetary Fund-European Cen - about the meetings, but he ap - AHEPA’s 89th Annual Supreme tral Bank for rescue loans to stay peared satisfied and suggested Convention.
    [Show full text]
  • Front Matter
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-84489-5 — A Concise History of Greece Richard Clogg Frontmatter More Information cambridge concise histories A Concise History of Greece Now reissued in a fourth, updated edition, this book provides a concise, illustrated introduction to the modern history of Greece, from the irst stirrings of the national movement in the late eighteenth century to the present day. As Greece emerges from a devastating economic crisis, this fourth edition offers analyses of contemporary political, economic and social devel- opments. It includes additional illustrations, together with updated tables and suggestions for further reading. A new concluding chapter considers the trajectory of Greek history over the two hundred years since the beginning of the War of Independence in 1821. Designed to provide a basic introduc- tion, the irst edition of this hugely successful Concise History won the Runciman Award for a best book on an Hellenic topic in 1992 and has been translated into thirteen languages, including all the languages of the Balkans. richard clogg has been lecturer in Modern Greek History at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies and King’s College, University of London; Reader in Modern Greek History at King’s College; and Professor of Modern Balkan History in the University of London. From 1990 to 2005 he was a Fellow of St Antony’s College, Oxford, of which he is now an Emeritus Fellow. He has written extensively on Greek history and politics from the eighteenth century to the present. His most recent book is Greek to Me: A Memoir of Academic Life (2018).
    [Show full text]
  • The Establishment and Development of the Metaxas Regime in The
    23tmp09a.qxd 04/04/2002 14:43 Page 143 9 The Establishment and Development of the Metaxas Dictatorship in the Context of Fascism and Nazism, 193641 MOGENS PELT In October 1935, Italy launched a fully-fledged attack on Abyssinia, threatening Britains position in Egypt and the supremacy of the Royal Navy in the eastern Mediterranean. Three years later, in 1938, Germany established her dominance over Central Europe in a series of short-of-war operations, incorporating Austria and the Sudetenland into the Reich by Anschluss and the Munich agreement. The dismemberment of Czechoslovakia dealt a fatal blow to the French security system in south-eastern Europe, la petite entente with Prague serving as its regional power centre. While the credibility of France as a great power almost completely eroded overnight, Vienna and Prague suddenly provided ready-made platforms to an invigorated and resurgent Germany to project her power into south- eastern Europe, and to rearrange that area in line with Berlins plans for a new European Order. This, in turn, gave a boost to national vindication in the revisionist states, Bulgaria and Hungary, while it generated shock waves of national insecurity and internal instability in the status quo states, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. On 10 October 1935, only a week after the beginning of Mussolinis African enterprise, a military coup détat in Greece reinstated the monarchy, which had been abolished in the wake of the First World War, and some ten months later, on 4 August 1936, King George II established what was meant to be a permanent dictatorship under the leadership of General Ioannis Metaxas, a prominent royalist.
    [Show full text]
  • The 1940 Epic It Is True That We, the Greeks, Sense a Particular Feeling Of
    The 1940 Epic It is true that we, the Greeks, sense a particular feeling of emotion, whenever we recall in our memory the glorious events of 1940. Indeed, those great and enlightening events have sealed with indelible glory the historic evolution of the Hellenic Nation. The Hellenic Nation is exceptionally proud for the great "NO", which the people as one person said to the enemy in the early morning hours of the historic day of the 28th of October 1940. The League of Nations, to which all nations have entrusted their hopes for an enduring peace, had literally lost any substantial authority following the insularity-drawn withdrawal of the USA from the Organisation, followed by Italy in 1935, Germany in 1939, and for long suffered by the antagonism of the "peace loving" remaining Western Democracies, mainly the United Kingdom and France that failed to timely realise the potential of the war at hand. It was the beginning of a campaign that most people tend to call as the "Epic", which covers one of the most glorious chapters of the age-long Hellenic history; evidencing two of the elements, which in general are considered as ingredients of true history: major events and an "aroma" of that time. The events themselves have already been recorded by historians and contemporary people interested in history can easily reach them and draw right conclusions; on the other hand, future historians can be also assisted in case they decide to reconstitute them, even after the passage of centuries. The "aroma", however, that the protagonists of history have felt, i.e.
    [Show full text]
  • Dodecanese Campaign from Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia
    Create account Log in Article Talk Read Edit View history Dodecanese Campaign From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia The Dodecanese Campaign of World War II was an attempt by Allied forces, mostly Navigation Dodecanese Campaign British, to capture the Italian-held Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea following the Part of the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre of Main page surrender of Italy in September 1943, and use them as bases against the German- World War II Contents controlled Balkans. The Allied effort failed, with the whole of the Dodecanese falling to Featured content the Germans within two months, and the Allies suffering heavy losses in men and Current events ships.[3] The operations in the Dodecanese, lasting from 8 September to 22 November Random article 1943, resulted in one of the last major German victories in the war.[4] Donate to Wikipedia Contents 1 Background Interaction 2 Initial Allied and German moves — The Fall of Rhodes Help 3 Battle of Kos About Wikipedia 4 Battle of Leros Community portal 5 Naval operations Recent changes 6 Aftermath Map of the Dodecanese Islands (in dark blue) Contact Wikipedia 7 In popular culture Date September 8 – November 22, 1943 8 References Location Dodecanese Islands, Aegean Sea Toolbox 9 Sources 10 External links Result German victory What links here Territorial German occupation of the Dodecanese Related changes changes Background [edit] Upload file Belligerents Special pages Further information: Military history of Greece during World War United Kingdom Germany Permanent link II and Mediterranean and Middle East theatre of World War II Kingdom of Italy Republican State of Page information South Africa Italy The Dodecanese island group lies in the south-eastern Aegean Sea, and had been Data item Greece under Italian occupation since the Italo-Turkish War.
    [Show full text]