The Greek quagmire.

Prologue.

October, 26 th 1940, Saturday. In the hall of the Italian Embassy in Athens, the Italians and their Greek guests are commenting the performance of Puccini's Madame Butterfly finished recently. Suddenly, in the offices, the teletypes begin to tap. The officials are coming and going. They are trying to remain calm, but more than one of them, pale-faced, troubled and tense, is widening the collar of his shirt. The Italian Plenipotentiary Minister, Emanuele Grazzi, sees all that movement and breaks into a cold sweat. He knows what that movement means, or at least he understands this intuitively: from Rome the ultimatum to Greece is coming. He hopes in some hitch, in some difficulty of deciphering: he does not want to deliver to General Metaxas, Greek Prime Minister, a declaration of war right in the middle of an official reception. It would be extremely embarrassing, anyway. He is lucky, at least about this. It is late, the text is long: time is requested in order to decipher it . The Greek guests leave the Italian Legation; Metaxas is at his residence in Kefissià. He is not yet an enemy.

"You are the strongest"

He turns into an enemy at three a.m. of Monday, October 28th. The communication has been deciphered and translated. Grazzi accompanied by military attaché Colonel Luigi Mondini and by the interpreter De Salvo, gets into car and heads to the residence of Metaxas. The guard at the door confuses the colours of the flag on the fender of the diplomatic car , he mistakes the green for blue and announces to the Greek Prime Minister the visit of the French ambassador. Metaxas throws on a dressing gown and goes to the door. Seeing Grazzi, he understands. The Italian ambassador, embarrassed and uncomfortable, delivers the text of the ultimatum to him : if Greece wants to avoid the war, it has to allow Italy to occupy some strategic points in its territory. Which points? asks Metaxas, with his eyes moist with tears, while his hands were trembling slightly. Grazzi does not know what to answer, nobody has informed him and the ultimatum specifies nothing about the “strategic points”. Then, it is the war, Metaxas adds. No, answers Grazzi, not yet, perhaps we can find an agreement. But he is the first who does not believe it. An agreement? Metaxas, in three hours and at night, should warn the King, summon the Minister of Defence, consult with the Army commander, General Alexandros Papagos, make a decision without knowing well the demands of Italy. Impossible. Deeply saddened, Grazzi leaves Metaxas’ petit-bourgeois house in Kefissia. He remains in the Italian Legation until six in the morning, time to expiry of the ultimatum, waiting for the miracle. In vain. The response of Greece, through the mouth of Metaxas, is oki , no. At the moment of parting from the Italian Plenipotentiary, whom he estimates and by whom he is estimated, Metaxas had said: "You are the strongest." And, at 5.30 a.m., with half an hour in advance of the expiry of the ultimatum, "the strongest" enter Epirus. They have rations for four days and ammunition for five.

"Fuehrer, we are on the march!"

In tone and form, Mussolini’s ultimatum to Greece looks like the ultimatum sent by Hitler, a few months before, to Norway and Denmark. But behind Hitler's ultimatum there were a plan - even though drawn up in haste - and a powerful army ready for action; behind Mussolini’s ultimatum, there are unrealistic plans, weak forces, and too many contradictions. An example? While they think to bring the war in the Balkans, in Italy 600.000 men are demobilized. The old plan for the invasion of Greece (Guzzoni-Pariani plan: intervention with at least eighteen - twenty divisions), is set aside. Now the rising star is Lt General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, commander of Italian troops in Albania, convinced that 8 or 9 divisions are enough. The old organic plan is replaced by "a big sudden attack" in Epirus, followed, in a second time, by the march towards Athens. In other words: we begin, let's see and hope well.

Mussolini is enthusiastic about Visconti ‘s plan; Count Galeazzo Ciano ( Minister of Foreign Affairs and Duce 's son-in- law) too; Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio( Chief of the General Staff) less, but he does not oppose with the necessary firmness. According to the Count Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino , Deputy of the King of Italy in Tirana, the Albanians are eager to fight and the Greeks are downhearted. And so on October 15th, in Rome at Palazzo Venezia, during an hour and half meeting, it is decided to invade Greece. And without prior consultation or without having invited to the meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Air Force and Navy. Strange decision, in truth. Greece is a fascist Country, or nearly so. General Metaxas, Prime Minister and holder of the power since 1936, admires Mussolini. Greece is a "bare bone", according to a previous Duce ‘s statement and a so poor country to the point of "not being coveted by us", according to Ciano. Metaxas, it is true, does not trust in the Italians and, while he declares himself neutral, hangs out with the British, but he still does it very carefully and with great caution. After all, with the Italians in arms on the border, whom should he direct to?

Strange decision, therefore. And based on false information, too. The Greeks do not expect an attack, they have little desire to fight, many generals are or will be on our side; the government, at the first blow, will collapse: this is believed and this is repeated in Rome and Tirana. It is believed that Greek notables and militaries are ready to marry, upon reasonable compensation, our cause; Grazzi’s honest and prudent relationships are underestimated and it is given credit to improvised or disqualified informants; the attitude pro-German expressed by Greek senior officers is mistaken , who knows why, for a pro- Italian stance. Actually , it is long time that the Greeks are on the alert. They are mobilizing. Metaxas is suffering for the excesses of his daughter Lulu, he is tired and sick, but is determined, in case of war, to give up no inch of Greek land to the Italians. The whole Country is at his side, the whole Army is loyal to him and to the Nation, Great Britain has given its support( in words, for the moment). Nebil Dino, an important Albanian with connections in Athens, fascist, avowed optimistic, informer much heard by Jacomoni, suddenly changes his tune and attitude and he says to Deputy, who is about to depart to Rome: be careful! The Greeks are ready, their morale is high, they will fight. But, arrived in Rome, Jacomoni has not the courage to express this point of view in front of Mussolini. He try to do it with innuendos and half-sentences, but eventually gives up: "The morale of the Greeks?" asks for the second time the leader of Fascism, during the famous meeting of October 15th, evidently dissatisfied with the responses earlier received from the Deputy. "Very depressed," answers Jacomoni. Just what the Duce wishes to hear. Some time before, the famous journalist Curzio Malaparte, in Greece for a reportage, had confided to Grazzi: Ciano sends you these words : you can write whatever you want, but he will do all the same the war to Greece. This was the atmosphere in Rome.

The Germans, however, curb the Italian intentions. They are developing Barbarossa, the invasion of the USSR , and, for this reason, they do not want complications in the Balkans. They would prefer a political solution. Mussolini is aware of it, Ciano too; but, for both , Italy is a Great Power who must have free hand in the Mediterranean and Balkan area . Would Italy have to do nothing? And what's more, when the Germans, without informing their ally, have extended their protectorate on Romania, Balkan region and, therefore, according to the agreements between Italy and Germany, falling within the sphere of Italian influence? When Mussolini becomes acquainted with the German intervention in Romania, he does not take it kindly. He yells and shakes: is this the right habit? Who does Hitler think he is? the master of the world? At the words, the Duce makes follow the facts. A few days after the German occupation of oil fields of Ploesti in Romania, he decides to invade Greece. Now, doing a personal pique as the main reason for the triggering invasion of Greece is perhaps simplistic, but surely Mussolini’s desire not to be outdone by Hitler played a leading role in the ill-fated Italian campaign in Greece. When, on October 28th, Hitler comes to Italy in order to meet the Duce in Florence, Mussolini welcomes him at the railway station with a triumphant, it is unknown how much pleasant( for Hitler): " Fuehrer , we are on the march!"

"He is crazy!"

Over time, in Rome the idea to invade Greece was at first stroked and then set aside, resumed and put aside again, abandoned and again revived. Once occupied Albania, the Italian troops had arisen , weapons in hand, almost immediately to the Greek border, but just as quickly, they had backed off, perhaps due to a German stop . After those events, Mussolini had expressed several times his estimation to Metaxas, reassuring him about the Italian intentions; but, at the appropriate time, he had ridden the tiger of the Chameria, making this region on the Greek-Albanian border- unknown to the vast majority of the Italian people- a unredeemed land, eager to escape the Greek domain and join with Italy. And in order to "make” Chameria “free”, Italy was preparing invasion plans. These plans were limited if compared to those of Lt General Alfredo Guzzoni(18-20 divisions), but they were always plans of invasion. A bit unrealistic, if you will. Major- General Carlo Geloso, charged to prepare them, had predicted the use of eleven divisions; the General Staff, nobody knows the reason why, had reduced them to eight, plus one on reserve. But for Visconti Prasca they were more than enough. When the Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio had known the Duce ’s intentions , he had blurted out: "He is crazy!" The Italian press campaign for the independence of Chameria put the Greeks on the alert. Without many proclamations and flying low, they began to mobilize. And they had continued to mobilize, even when Chameria had disappeared from the Albanian and Italian newspaper headlines (the Germans had made it clear they did not like Italy’s attitude about Greece) and the Duce’s priorities seemed now Yugoslavia, now Egypt, now even Nice and Corsica. But how to trust in those who were speaking in a way and were acting in another way? How to trust in those who were claiming to have no hostile intentions, and then were sinking an old destroyer, the ' Helli , and in addition in a sacred place, the island of Tinos and on the day dedicated to the Assumption? How to trust in those who, against all evidence, had turned an ended badly bandit, Daut Hoxha, in a sort of Cesare Battisti 1of Chameria? How to trust in those who were rejecting any serious dialogue and were describing Greece as a kind of British aircraft carrier in the Aegean Sea?

1 Journalist, politician, congressman in the Austrian Parliament, born in Trento at those times part of the Austrian Empire, advocate of the administrative autonomy of the Trentino region, when WWI bursts he enlisted in the Italian Royal Army. With the rank of Lieutenant, he was assigned to the Alpini corp. Taken prisoner by Austrian troops, he The more Mussolini raises his voice with Greece, the more Berlin is worried: the only way to avoid troubles in the Balkans - and troubles to Barbarossa , above all– is the political and diplomatic way; the only way to avoid making Greece an ally of Great Britain is the dialogue. Is it possible that nobody , in Rome, understands this? It is possible. In truth , a political intervention was attempted by the Italians, not with Greece, but with Bulgaria. Sofia had old scores to settle with Athens, it demanded an access to the sea: what better ally? On October 18th Mussolini writes to King Boris, communicating to him his intention to invade Greece and promising to the King heaven and earth. A little late, actually. The Germans answer by the mouth of King Boris is: thanks, but there is no deal. Mussolini is livid with rage. He gets upset with "the rulers without liver," incapable, according to him, to seize the opportunities of history and he takes refuge in Visconti Prasca’s optimistic certainties. With more than a touch of malice, the Duce writes to him: someone in the Staff has tried to bump you off, but I have not listened to them because I trust in you. In other words: pay attention: or you win quickly, or you pack your bags.

The surprise

Once taken the decision, for Mussolini is very important to keep the Germans and the Greeks in the dark until the last moment. Surprising them, in other words, is his goal. With the Germans, he succeeds. Let that be quite clear: the German embassy officials in Rome are neither blind nor deaf. They notice an unusual coming and going in the corridors of the power, they perceive a certain excitement in the top leaders, they know the lines of the Italian plan of invasion, they are aware of the tendencies, strongly favourable to the war, of Count Ciano and of the Deputy Jacomoni, but ,strangely, they do not take all this seriously. Because they see the issue as Germans, they cannot believe it. For them, the idea of invading Greece with a handful of divisions – and in addiction on the eve of the winter bad season- belongs to science fiction, not to reality. So, the secret of the invasion, for them, remains a secret. Since we are in Italy, this is a kind of miracle. One thing is keeping at bay the embassy officials, an other issue is keeping Hitler at bay. And about this , Mussolini signs a kind of masterpiece. He writes to Hitler a letter in which he says and does not say, alludes and denies, affirms and denies again. And, moreover, he makes send the letter late. Hitler is not in Berlin but in Hendaye, on the French - Spanish border , engaged in talks with Francisco Franco. The letter passes from hand to hand and reaches the right one when it's too late. Hitler smells the danger, but he expects to resolve that issue in person, when, shortly thereafter, he will meet the Duce i n Florence. He does not make it on time. The Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel at the Nuremberg ) trial (1945-1946 will say: " We lacked the time: when we arrived to Florence, the damage was already done”. Hitler, for his part, will write (long after the events , to tell the truth): if there had not been Mussolini’s impetuous action in the Balkans, we would have invaded the Soviet Union one month before and we would have win the war. From the German point of view, the Duce 's idea to invade Greece is really a bright idea!

Deceiving the Greeks is a bit more complicated. The Greek ambassador in Rome had made a good job and had collected reliable information; general Papagos, the Greek commander in chief, will also be an old fashioned military commander , but it is not unprepared; the Greek Army is not a modern army, but the Italian one is no better; the Italian insistence on the question of Chameria reveals to Greeks the direction of a was trailed, charged of high treason and executed in Trento ( July, 12, 1916). Battisti is considered a national hero in Italy possible attack and allows them to prepare the appropriate countermoves. In short, the much hoped surprise lives in the Duce ‘s imagination only, and, perhaps, in Lt General Visconti Prasca’ s imagination. In order to make the enemy not suspicious, the Italian Air Force is forbidden to make reconnaissance flights over areas selected for the attack. Useless precaution. General Francesco Pricolo, at those times chief of Italian Air Force, has written : "I believe that the Greeks were aware of our plans since the month of September." It was true.

Returned to Albania eased from his own doubts and weighed down by five million Lire to use for buying and bribing Greek notables and militaries, Jacomoni gets to work. Nobody does not know where those millions end up. They end up perhaps in the wrong pockets, perhaps in the pockets of those who , wearing the Greek uniform , but speaking another language, on October 25th attack an Italian frontier post, killing , according to the announcement, six people. The Italian bulletins report of unknown assailants, certainly British or Greeks. General Papagos convenes the Italian military attaché in Athens, Colonel Mondini, and reiterating the absolute strangeness of the Greeks at that issue, glosses: "If the attackers, as you say in your reports, are unknown, have you the crystal ball to guess their nationality ?” The next day, in Santi Quaranta -renamed in honour of Ciano’s wife, Porto Edda - three bombs explode close to the headquarters of the Italian Legation. Mussolini has the excuse to begin the operations. He had said: we need to legitimize the intervention with a mise -en-scene : few will believe it, but "for reasons of metaphysical nature, we will able to say that it was necessary to come to a conclusion." Exact words. The '"incident", dictated by "metaphysical" reasons, prologue to the Italian "breath - taking speed" attack on Greece will be the only thing, in that unfortunate campaign, which will succeed perfectly.

The doubts.

In Albania, returns also Visconti Prasca . At Palazzo Venezia in Rome, during the meeting of October 15th, he had rejected the idea of a significant strengthening of the deployment of Italian forces. He had said: Before all, we end our job in Epirus, then we will discuss about the reinforcements. Why such an attitude? Was he afraid, if he had received reinforcements, to be replaced by some more high-ranking colleague? Or does he really believe that he can win? The command of the forces of Albania had given him the responsibility of two Army Corps, and for this reason, he had received, according to the rules on that time, the right to the rank, but not to the degree , of General (“ Generale d'Armata "). For him, that one was a unique opportunity: if he had succeeded, nobody could deny the fourth star to him . And why not the Marshal rod? Did Visconti Prasca refuse the reinforcements because of this reason ? Maybe yes, maybe not. But, sometimes, even the personal ambitions affect the choices. And perhaps also they engraved on Visconti Prasca's choices. But, once set foot in Albania, Visconti Prasca has second thoughts and asks reinforcements: two infantry divisions and two artillery groups, immediately; later, three mountain divisions. The Italian Staff agrees. It announces the sending of the artillery by the end of October, but it fixes for mid-November the sending of the infantry divisions. It is as if Rome were saying: did you promise a quick victory in Epirus and did you subordinate this victory to the sending of reinforcements? Now, do it on your own: win and then we will send to you the reinforcements. " The rivalries among generals are worse than those ones among women." Word of Galeazzo Ciano, a deep connoisseur of both.

The absolute certainty.

Rome, November 18th. Mussolini has scheduled a meeting with the provincial delegates of the Fascist Party. There is much expectation. Things are not going well in Greece; in Italy people seem to have lost enthusiasm, the confusion is palpable, the atmosphere is heavy. What is the Duce going to tell ? After a political-military premise riddled with clichés (Greece is the servant of Great Britain; our troops are proceeding slowly, because the valleys of Epirus are narrow; the division Julia is granitic), and after having pointed out that the Greeks hate Italians, although , for the delegates , the reason remains a mystery because the Chief of the Fascism does not explain this Greek’s attitude, Mussolini addresses to the present comrades and asked them if anyone remember the speech he has pronounced in Eboli, five years before. Silence. "I said," proclaims with a solemn voice Mussolini, "That we would have broken the Negus’ s back ." And he continues: "Now with the same absolute certainty , I repeat absolute , I tell you that we will break Greece’ s back . In two or twelve months it does not matter. The war has just begun. We have men and means sufficient to destroy the Greek resistance. " A speech with much effect and a sentence to deliver to the history. The applause is thunderous. As the bombs on our soldiers.

Full mess!

It is not yet six in the morning of October 28th, as we have seen, when Italian troops entered Epirus. It is raining, it is cold and in the sky there are low and black clouds . The warplanes cannot fly. Moreover, the next day, it is unknown whether because of bad weather or because of other reasons, the occupation of Corfu, originally planned by the invasion plan, is cancelled. Nasty business: with the island in Greek hands, the troops of the “Grouping of the Shoreline”, namely the Italian forces on the far right of the deployment and adjacent to the sea, have the flank dangerously exposed and are subject to the threat of enemy landings. The Italian aircraft , forced to the ground, cannot support the advance of the infantry or hit strategic targets. In short, we start badly. The advanced columns of the Italian divisions ( Siena , Ferrara , Centauro ) enter the Epirus region like the fingers of a hand, from right to left, from the coast towards inland. For the moment, there is even no trace of main Greek forces. The splendid Alpine Division Julia , commanded by Major- General Mario Girotti, operating in the Pindos sector , is heading to Metsovon Pass , for ensuring control of it and , at the same time, it is acting as a link between the front of Epirus and the Parma Division , which is occupying a wide front (in defensive of the town of Koritza) in western Macedonia. For reaching the Metsovon Pass, the Julia division must get around the imposing mass of Smolikas. Will it be able to do its task with a poor weather like that and under those conditions? When, two days before, the weather has got worse, Lt General Carlo Rossi, commander of an Army Corps, had proposed to postpone the invasion: he had not been listened. The answer had been: If the weather is very bad for us, it will be even for the Greeks. With this difference, however: we had to move forward, the Greeks could wait. Advancing is slow and difficult. We sink into the mud. The puttees of our soldiers, impregnated with earth and water, become heavy. The mules and horses are toiling, they are splashing the mud at every step, their hoofs are flaking. The artillery is struggling along, the rain is making sodden the uniforms, the first snow is falling on the hills, the wind is blowing incessantly. The rivers of this Greek area - the Voiussa, the Kalamas, the Serandàporos- usually streams without water and importance, now are swelling and are foaming down the valley; there are no shelters worthy of this name and, in the area of operations, the troops have to settle down in the open or under makeshift shelters. Visconti Prasca telegraphs to the Duce , announcing the progress of the advancing and the march "at the head" - that only he sees- of the our artillery. Mussolini replies by praising his work and promising reinforcements, starting with the Bari division , that is no more needed at Corfu, and he authorizes him to call from Yugoslavia the Venice division for using it in Macedonia. And he warns: hurry up and get busy. Hurry up? On 31st October, while the official Italian bulletins are speaking of "regular" conduct of the operations, the Siena and the Grouping of the Shoreline reach the Kalamas river , the division Julia reaches the Sarandaporos river. And they work hard to cross them. The Siena has got few pontoons and the Julia is too wide open; supplies are slow to arrive or do not arrive at all. For lack of trucks our divisions were trained to walk forty kilometres a day on foot, but the food, ammunition, medicines, do not walk on foot. The brave Alpini of Major- General Girotti are presaging, in their own way, the coming storm. They are cursing that vile weather, they are eating biscuits and canned foods, not a warm meal; they are soaked to the bone and they are realizing to have a task that is beyond their strength. Although brave, they are too few for parading around the Smolikas, taking over the Metsovon Pass and simultaneously securing the link with the other forces, deployed to their hips. And with a filthy weather, in addition. And, on time, on the first clear day without rain, the storm breaks out. The Greeks, until that moment, shifty, attack. And they beat hard. On November 1st, at eight a.m. , in the sector of Koritza (i.e. in Western Macedonia), Papagos launches the right wing of his army against the Italians. He wants to reach the river Devoli and , then, the Morava massif, the two natural ramparts around which is based the Italian defence. If he succeeds and goes beyond them, nothing can stop him up to Koritza. And, once in the plain of Koritza, he can take the Italian forces in Epirus from behind. The three Italian divisions in western Macedonia - Parma , Venezia and Piemonte - taken by surprise, scatter, such as scatter and take to their heels, despite the intervention of the police, the Albanian auxiliary battalions, which so much well Jacomoni had spoken of. The Greeks advance on the heights, beating the ridges, hitting the enemy by mortars, launching their regiments of cavalry, mounted on sturdy ponies at ease on mountain trails, against the poorly defended Italian positions. And they strengthen, with the delivery of three divisions and a regiment of Evzones , their deployment in Epirus.

The Julia division is in the middle of the meat grinder. Its links with the two fronts – the Macedonian and the Epirote - are off. The warfront looks like a revolving door: on the one side, the Italians are advancing on Kalamas and in Epirus; on the other side, in the opposite direction, the Greeks are advancing in Macedonia. In between, the pivot of the manoeuvre, the Julia , claims no longer anything and idles. Behind the division, enemy forces begin to infiltrate. The general Quirino Armellini records in his diary: "Hell of a mess!"( Babilonia completa!) No expression could be more effective. General Pricolo, sent by Mussolini to have a glance, asks Visconti Prasca whether he know something about the Julia , where it is, whether it has advanced. Answer: The Julia ? I have no news, but at this time the division will undoubtedly have reached the Metzovon Pass. But is he the commander of Italian troops, or is not? If, five days after the invasion, he does not know where is the Julia , who else should know it? But there's more. Required, from Rome, to take stock of the situation, Visconti Prasca answers: "Situation Epirus not worrying." Not worrying? Arrived in Koritza, exhausted, with long beards, with their uniforms in tatters, but firmly clutching their own rifle, the Alpini of the Julia , abandoned the previous positions and withdrawn after having opened a passage through the Greek forces behind them, ask , beg almost, something to eat. Months later, many of those men, from losers become winners, will share their rations with the hungry Greek population.

"Greeks, stop right here!"

The first heads fall off. On November 9th, Visconti Prasca is deprived of the command, promoted in half and sent to lead the Eleventh Army. He is replaced by General Ubaldo Soddu, Undersecretary for War and Deputy Chief of Staff, in his spare time, a composer of music film. "You'll see," he says to Visconti immediately after rotation "We will succeed together , we will win together and we will become Field Marshals ." The personal ambitions again. But two days later, Visconti Prasca is permanently removed from the 11th Army at the head of which Major-General Carlo Geloso comes back in Albania. In Italy and in Epirus the Italians try to run for cover. The Army - Corps are doubled (from two to four); the demobilization under way in Italy is stopped and it is given priority to send men, weapons, materials, vehicles, and quadrupeds to the Balkan. Soddu endeavours to bring order to the chaos in Albania. The bridgehead on the Kalamas (Epirus front) and the defensive line in Koritza (Macedonian front) are reinforced ; units just landed from ships or aircraft were sent to close the holes of our deployment, now here now there. In this way, the divisions already hasty rebuilt in Italy, just set foot in Albania, without heavy weapons, without trucks and lorries, are dismembered and almost none of them is able to re-form, to regain their officials and , with them, the esprit de corps. An offensive? We should count ourselves lucky if we stay where we

are.

And we do not remain where we are, actually. On 14 November, the Greeks attack again. In the Macedonian sector they aim to dislodge us from Devoli and to outflank the Morava massif; in the Epirus, the Julia is invested again in line on the tragic bridgehead of Perati. In this last area, the key is the garrison at Erseke, where an Italian regiment, the 1st Riflemen (Bersaglieri ), under command of Colonel Azzaro, serves as a point of suture between the armies of the two fronts. Lt General Gabriele Nasci, commander of the Ninth Army, talking on the phone with his subordinate, mentions the possibility of a retreat in some safer locations. Is this an order or just a thinking out loud? Be that as it may, colonel Azzaro withdraws, does not inform the division Bari and opens a wide corridor( about twenty kilometres ) between the two armies. The Greeks do not take advantage immediately of this mistake, but now the damage is done, even if the reinforcements launched into the hole (a battalion of frontier guards and two of Camicie Nere ) are able to limit the damage. It's raining, sometimes it is snowing . The heavy Greek mortars do non stop of hammering our positions; in the field hospitals lacks everything; the airport of Koritza is under attack. Exposed to enemy fire, the Alpini come down from the German planes Junkers : many of them, blood stained, are immediately re-embarked on the same aircraft and sent back to Italy. At the front, there are many acts of heroism , the soldiers and officers are trying to hold on, they charge bayonet, senior officers at the head. In one of these assaults, falls colonel Luigi Zacco. It will not be the only one. The bastion of the Morava is being outflanked by the Greeks. Resisting? Withdrawing? Soddu asks Rome for advice and from Rome he receives only evasive responses and Mussolini and Badoglio’s invitation to procrastinate. Soddu, left alone, decides to withdraw. The Greeks launch on forward and advance into the void. In front of them, in long columns, the Italians, under the stunned and disbelieving eyes of the Albanians, are , quite in order, abandoning Koritza, directed to an other more secure position, of which one of the main bastions should be Pogradec. But Pogradec is taken by the Greeks by a surprise attack prepared by one of their generals, Georgios Tsolakoglou, and completed, in a manoeuvre as much reckless as daring, from their élite troops, the Evzones . From bad to worse.

The front of Epirus is in motion. The hole opened because of the abandonment of Erseke puts the Bari in trouble and the Julia under fire again. At Perati, where we have established a bridgehead and, where, according to the famous Italian song, the "Best of Youth end up in its grave", the Alpini resist as long as is possible, but at some point, attacked in force, they are forced to withdraw. The Siena division also withdraws and along with it, the Ferrara and the Centauro. This latter, during its withdrawal , leaves into the mud many of its light tanks, dreaded -for no reason, however- by Papagos: the Greeks will put them back in order and will use them against us. Threatened with encirclement, our troops withdraw from Epirus in Albania on a new line in defence of Gjirokastra, Saranda- Santi Quaranta and Permeti. General Geloso would like to narrow further the front, leaving some other part of Albanian territory, but for the moment, he is not allowed to do it. A single hammer blow has been enough to shatter the Italian military deployment both in Macedonia, and in Epirus and to open the whole Albania to the Greeks. The conquest of Koritza is a burning humiliation for the Italians, a source of pride for the Greeks. The whole Country is decked with flags. Metaxas speaks on the radio, responding with facts to the absolute certainty of Mussolini. In London, in the House of Peers, Lord Halifax speaks inspired words of admiration for the bravery and for the fighting spirit of the Greeks. The news of the Italian defeat goes around the world. Papagos is on the cover of " Time ". And in those days, in Menton, France, at the entrance of the town, an irreverent sign warns: "Greeks, this is France: stop right here and not go any further!" ( Grecs, arretez- vous! Ici France !)

Christmas gift.

The hunt for culprits of the disaster is opened. Badoglio, abandoned by everybody, harshly attacked by the newspaper directed by Roberto Farinacci, Il Regime Fascista, is fired. Foreseeing the storm, he had tried to cover himself, noting on the official journal of the Staff: I had said that invading Greece with less than twenty divisions would have been a madness. He had said it, certainly (14th October to Mussolini), but the next day, he had endorsed Visconti Prasca’s operation, not opposing firmly to it. Actually, at times he seemed totally support it. Removing Badoglio from power means to attribute responsibility for the disaster to the Staff, not to Mussolini or Ciano. Mussolini, however, goes further. According to him, not only the generals, but also the soldiers are wimp. While at Christmas in Rome is snowing unusually , he comments : this snow will bump off the goods for nothing and it will fortify the Italian race. Roughly on the same days in an unusually cold Athens, Metaxas writes in his diary: who knows how are suffering my soldiers at the front!

At the front also the Italians are suffering. In the mountains of Albania it is snowing almost every day; a chill wind is blowing ice and frost in the face to our soldiers; the first frostbites begin to be registered. From the knee down, the leg swells and becomes at the first dark, then purple, then black; the feet become numb: without no emergency surgery, the fate is marked. In the field hospitals there is little or nothing to treat and therefore the military doctors are forced to amputate. Thousands of young men, who, full of confidence and enthusiasm, had left Italy will come back marked in spirit and body, disabled and without prospects. Those soldiers, stoic, brave, tenacious , would deserve more than the Duce’s dismissive comments on the race; perhaps they would deserve, if not a public commendation, at least the acknowledgement of the suffering and sacrifices that, under conditions entirely improvised, they are doing ,day after day, to save whatever possible. But Rome is silent. Only the voice, broken-winded and unreal, of the war bulletins is heard. At the front, our troops resort to every possible mean to avoid the dreaded and insidious "white death". They wrap their feet and legs up in the cat skins , goat skins, rabbit skins, mule skins ; they get rid of woollen home- produced gloves arrived from Italy : these gloves get soaked, freeze and tighten hands in a deadly grip. They extract the still throbbing brain of dead mules, they put it under their helmet to keep their head in warm and then they eat it. Uncooked. The uniforms seem to be made of cardboard: they thicken and stiffen, give no shelter from the cold and do not retain body heat. The home-produced sewing thread is not strong enough; the beards become bushy and uncultivated, sometimes the breechblock of the weapons stalls because of the cold and when it happens, the Greeks, as if they were aware of this, attack; the snow covers the hollows, the trails, the peaks: finding on the maps the places is very difficult. Many units lose their orientation and fall under enemy blows. To be less visible during the day, our soldiers urinate on their helmets or rub them with mud; they have little to eat: the Alpini of the Julia , before their withdrawal to Koritza, will not touch food for days. Here come the Christmas gifts: three dried figs and two cigarettes. The convictions are less steady. Most are convinced of final victory, but many cannot but note the confusion, the approximation, the ease with which the invasion was prepared and carried out. The first days they are believed to arrive in Athens in two weeks, but time is going by, Athens is far, the weeks become months. Some begin to wonder: why? For whom? Meanwhile, all around, the Albanians, with their attitudes, with their looks, their behaviour, seem to express their disdain and their disbelief towards the Army -the Army of a "Great Power" - almost put to flight and ridiculed by the soldiers of a tiny nation. And that attitude hurts our soldiers , perhaps even more than the cold, than the ambushes, than the mortar bombs rained down from who knows where, than the starvation rations, than the lice and the dirt. But they try to hold on.

The Greeks also have their troubles. They are suffering because of the cold and discomfort like the Italians ; they are infested with lice, but they are fighting for a purpose and for their homeland. Their supply lines are long and difficult, but, unlike ours , they work and the units on the foremost part, when it is possible, are alternated. The front of Epirus and the front of Macedonia are communicating and, in case of need, they allow the movement of troops from one side to another. The first British aid comes: elite troops, a lot of materiel, warplanes. The whole Country is close to its soldiers, Metaxas is a hero worthy of Pericles or Alexander the Great. But he, "the man of no", more and more tired and troubled, has no illusions. He had told the King the morning of the delivery of the ultimatum by Grazzi: sooner or later, the Germans will come, but the honour demands that we go on. He does not suffer the humiliation of seeing the Germans enter Greece as winners. On January 29 he will die of septicaemia. The last words in his diary had been for his wife: "Nana is feeling better". In Italy the hypothesis of a poisoning is advanced. Guilty the perfidious Albion, of course. “La legnata”

About General Ugo Cavallero, people could say everything and its opposite, but not that he was stupid. When he takes the place of Badoglio, he inherits a situation which is on the verge of a collapse. It gives to himself, then, two immediate objectives. The first: to put some order in the flow of reinforcements to Albania, trying to keep intact the divisions; the latter: to gain numerical superiority and erecting a "wall" on the defensive line of the river Skumbini to stop the Greeks’ momentum. He needs time. Time that Rome, however, does not seem willing to give him. The Germans are increasingly restive. Hitler is not satisfied with how things are going, he offers to Mussolini his soldiers, he does not spare criticism and sooner or later he will intervene. Mussolini thunders: we should hurry, we should attack and attack again, there need a few victories to arise a very compromise prestige. However, those who attack again are the Greeks. At first they conquer the town of Himara, on the Albanian coast, sweeping away a tired Julia and an unlucky Siena , mistakenly bombed by our planes; then, anticipating Cavallero’s counteroffensive towards Porto Palermo and Himara, they point to Klisura, take the town and slot in for a fortnight of kilometres in the Italian deployment. In Athens and in the whole of Greece, the flags are waving back to the Meltemi wind ; in Rome, the official bulletins speak of "local attacks" and the leaders of Fascism, to set the example , are about to reach the front.

Also the British are moving. Churchill wants to give breath to Great Britain, bombed from the sky and under threat of invasion: the war in Greece can serve the purpose. In order to keep away, also, Italians and Germans from Crete . The Greeks, however, are demanding, or if you prefer, they are realistic: they demand no less than nine divisions, with adequate air support. The British, for the moment, offer less : a couple of regiments and about sixty tanks. Also in this case the Greeks’ answer is oki , no. Those forces, poor and inadequate, would not have served for anything in the event of a German attack from Bulgaria and, if they were accepted, they would have closed the door, permanently, to any reconciliation , even if rather unlikely, with Germany. Everything as before, anyway. On the one hand Cavallero continues to build his "wall"; on the other side Papagos keeps up the pressure on our troops. We are in trouble, the Greeks are in trouble. They, too, are tired and exhausted, even they begin to feel the weight of months of fighting in extreme conditions. General Markos Drakos, commander of the front of Epirus, in preparation for an offensive, suggests the need for a rotation of his troops: in response he is replaced. As had been replaced Soddu, when, in mid-December, in despair, had suggested a political conclusion of that issue.

In Rome, Mussolini is speaking about when things will change. He says: in the spring we will attack and there will win. His generals examine, so , two hypotheses to give a legnata , a "blow with a stick ", to the Greeks: an offensive toward Koritza or an offensive in the direction of Klisura. It is chosen Klisura and it is made a mistake. Double mistake, in addition. The offensive towards Koritza would allow, whether successful, to connect our offensive with that one, imminent, of the Germans ; if we had attacked Klisura, our offensive would be reduced to a local action, with little strategic value. And, second mistake, we go to clash there where the Greeks are stronger. The weight of the attack, preceded by an intense artillery fire and at the presence of the Duce himself - received with demonstrations of enthusiasm when he has arrived in Albania at the controls of a military aircraft - it is up to General Gambara. His task is to break through the centre, while, at his flanks, two other army corps must keep immobilized the Greeks. Mussolini wants to see the advance of our troops. He takes place in the observatory of Komarit. Beside him, someone indicates a small hill: it is the Monastery hill, an important strategic point, someone adds . The Duce nods. And around the Monastery hill, a furious fight turns on. The Italians attack, attack again, but they do not make progress. From his observation point, the Duce shakes his head: if an offensive does succeed in the early hours, it does not succeed any more. After days of attacks and counterattacks, on March 14 Cavallero puts his cards on the table: if between now and tomorrow we will not make it, we have to renounce. And so it happens, exactly. In that spring offensive , the Italians leave thousands of men on the battlefield. And this is not all: Klisura remains in the hands of the Greeks and Mussolini has nothing to show for something. When everything will be over, that defeat will turned into a victory. According to Cavallero, it was "the victorious offensive on March ... that, advocated and directed by you, Duce , brought a terrible shocks to the compactness of Greek army, broke its resistance and made impossible any further effort." Mussolini, for his part: " Between the Vojussa and the Ossum , on the fronts held by IV, VIII, XXV Corps, was broken the back of the enemy ..."

For its part, Papagos, eager to finish the job quickly and to throw us overboard, launches attacks on attacks, often senseless. The "wall" of Cavallero holds out. But there is another problem for the Greeks. Very serious this time: Germans are on the war footing and from March 1 st they are gathering troops at Bulgarian border. The conflict is widening. The British aid to Greece is no longer symbolic (three divisions have arrived) and in Yugoslavia, a military coup overthrows the pro-German regime, changing the game and increasing the confusion. In the mountains of Albania the snow is melting. A huge written that praises the Duce becomes visible again. In Italy all the newspapers close to the regime interpret this fact as an omen of certain victory. Hitler does not want to humiliate Mussolini. He writes to him: we are going to intervene and we can win, but on one condition: that the Italian troops hold out in Albania. Mussolini assures. And he does not notice or he does not pretend to notice that his ally is making fun of him.

On April 6, the armoured divisions of Field Marshal Wilhelm List cross the Bulgarian border and enter Greece.

Epilogue.

In Kefalonia, the Italians have demanded the surrender of the island to the local authorities, barricaded in the town hall of Argostoli. At the first request for surrender, the answer is, to put it mildly: "Go to hell!" Second request, and second answer: "Every Italian who asks the surrender will be immediately shot." Third attempt and third answer: "If you do not know what it means “to go to hell”, come in and we will show it to you." Then, the conditions: "We will surrender only to a high-ranking German officer." This is what captain Antonio Corelli tells in the pages of the novel in which he is the star together with his mandolin. Apart from the language, perhaps less colourful and a bit more "diplomatic ", so it went a bit everywhere. The Greeks did not want to surrender to the Italians: they had not been defeated by them, but by the Germans. Marshal List seemed to accept this point of view, Mussolini not. On April 20 when the armistice was signed, there was no mention in the text to Italy and Italians. Hitler intervened, the ceremony was repeated, the text was revised and Mussolini had his share of glory and territorial compensations. Mussolini did not spend any word for the Greeks. Hitler-can we say it ? - was more magnanimous: he defended the Duce and his mad enterprise, but declared that the Greek soldiers had fought with valour and bravery. He added: "Greece has fought so valiantly that the esteem of his enemies cannot be denied to it. "For his part, Churchill said, more or less, this:" Hence we will not say that Greeks fight like heroes, but that heroes fight like Greeks " For Greece difficult times came. But also times during which the Greeks and the Italians, at first suspicious and resentful toward each other, learned, little by little, to understand each other ; times came during which the Greeks were able to distinguish between those who oppressed, destroyed, deported and who shared with them part of their food rations. And times of choices also came : tragic as Kefalonia; full of hope, when Greeks and Italians joined themselves in the resistance to the common enemy. If you go to Greece and you happen to talk about these far away events, there will always be someone who, honestly and without malice, raising his eyes to heaven, will comment: "What they made do to you !" That's right: not "What have you done!", but "What have you been forced to do." There is no better historical opinion.

To read

Mario Cervi, Storia della guerra di Grecia , Oscar Mondadori, 1969 Louis de Bessières, Captain’s Corelli mandolin , De Felice, Renzo , Mussolini l'Alleato: Italia in guerra 1940–1943 . Torino: Rizzoli Martin Gilbert , The Second World War: A Complete History Keegan, John, The Second World War . Penguin Mario Rigoni Stern, Quota Albania , Einaudi, 1971

To see :

Captain’s Corelli mandolin , by John Madden, 2001

The events in short.

October 12, 1940: German troops settle in Romania with the aim, not too secret, to "protect" the oil fields of Ploesti. October 15: in Rome it is decided to invade Greece. At the meeting, chaired by Benito Mussolini, are attending the Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano, the chief of General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Deputy of the King in Albania, Count Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino, the commander of Italian troops in Albania, Lt General Count Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, the Deputy Chief of Staff army, Lt general Mario Roatta. Oddly are excluded General Francesco Pricolo , Chief of Air Staff, and Admiral Cavagnari, Chief of Staff of the Navy. October 25: "unknowns" attack an Albanian border post. According to Italian sources, there are some victims. Three bombs explode in the Italian Legation in Saranda-Porto Edda: there are no victims. October 26: in Athens is represented Madama Butterfly by Giacomo Puccini, at the presence of the composer's son. The performance is followed by an official reception at the Italian Legation. At night the encrypted telegrams with the text of the ultimatum to Greece begin to arrive.

Oct. 28: at three a.m. , the Italian Plenipotentiary Minister in Athens, Emanuele Grazzi, until then kept in ignorance of everything, or nearly so, delivers the ultimatum to Metaxas. The ultimatum is rejected. October 28: In advance of the expiry of the ultimatum, the first Italian troops enter Epirus. After weeks of nice weather, since two days it is raining and it getting cold. October 29: the occupation of the island of Corfu is cancelled. In the area of Epirus are arrayed, from the coast to inland, the "Grouping of the shoreline”, the divisions Siena, Ferrara, Centauro and, in the area of the Pindo , the Alpine Division Julia . In Koritza's area, namely in Western Macedonia, is arrayed the Parma division with the Piemonte division as reserve. Soon, in the Epirus will come the Bari division, which was originally intended to occupy Corfu and, in the sector of Koritza, the Venezia division, moved from the Yugoslav border. The Piemonte division will be sent to the forefront almost immediately. October 31: The Siena division reaches the Kalamas, the Julia r eaches the Sarandaporos, usually unimportant rivers, now horribly bloated and violent. And difficult, very difficult to be forded. November 1: the Greeks, until then far elusive in Epirus, attack violently in Western Macedonia , overwhelming the Italian defences. On the following days , the Italian divisions withdraw and they line up on the Devoli river. November 3: some squadrons of British warplanes under the command of the Commodore d' Albiac arrive in Greece November 4: general Alexandros Papagos, commander in chief of the Greek army, strengthens the Epirus sector with two divisions and a regiment of Evzones . Also in this area, the Greeks are beginning to push. November 7: the Julia division, threatened with encirclement, must withdraw to Koritza. November 9: Visconti Prasca is replaced by General Ubaldo Soddu, Undersecretary of War, and assigned to command of the XI Army. November 11: Visconti Prasca is deprived of the command of the XI Army and placed in "unlimited leave." General Carlo Geloso, who, time before, had been replaced by Visconti, takes his revenge and returns to Albania in order to command the XI Army. November 10 to 12: six Alpine battalions arrive in Albania. November 12: some British torpedo bombers attack the Italian fleet at Taranto, damaging two battleships. November 14: new Greek offensive in Western Macedonia. Papagos’ troops are pointing to Devoli river and to the Morava massif. November 17: the Italian garrison of Erseke leaves its positions, opening to the Greeks the whole Ossum valley and exposing the flank of Eleventh Army. 18 novembre: Mussolini declares : “We will break the Greece’s back ”(Spezzeremo le reni alla Grecia.”) November 18: the Julia must relieve , at the forefront, the division Bari , overwhelmed by the Greeks. On the Bari division will pin the unflattering epithet of " Divisione scappa scappa" ( Roughly: Run off Division). November 20: the bridge of Perati, held by the Julia , is hit by massive enemy forces. November 21: Hitler writes to Mussolini: the Italian initiative has had "unpleasant psychological consequences" (read: you are cutting a poor figure), and "very serious military consequences" (read: the defeat which you are suffering by the Greeks and the delay of Barbarossa ). November 22: the Italians leave Koritza. The Italian radio announces: general Soddu is continuing to prepare the conquest of Greece. In a Greek cartoon, Mussolini on horseback and all his soldiers are put to flight by a single evzone i n traditional costume. November 26: Marshal Pietro Badoglio resigns from Chief of General Staff. On December 4th , after having, in previous days, informed the King, Mussolini dismisses Badoglio with these words: "Okay, from this moment you are at liberty." In his place is called the much talked about General Ugo Cavallero. November 28: The Evzones of General Georgios Tsolakoglou take Pogradec and take away to Soddu one of the bastions which supports the new Italian defence. December 4: the front is under pressure, Soddu calls by phone General Alfredo Guzzoni, in Rome, advancing the hypothesis of a political solution. December 7: Gjirokastra, in Albania, is evacuated. December 11: von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, sends a circular letter to his ambassadors, explaining the attitude to keep and the responses that have to be given to the press about the situation in Albania. December 29: general Ubaldo Soddu is recalled to Rome and the command of the Italian troops in Albania is assigned to general Ugo Cavallero. January 5: The Greeks, anticipating an Italian counteroffensive, attack in the direction of Klisura. January 16: the Greeks enter Klisura. January 13: in Athens take place Anglo-Greek talks at the highest military levels. January 18: on the eve of departure to Salzburg where he will meet Hitler, Mussolini tells: "If someone, on Oct. 15, had anticipated what actually is happening, I would have made shoot him " January 19 to 20: meeting Hitler-Mussolini in Salzburg, Austria. January 29: the General and Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Metaxas dies because of a blood infection caused by a glandular abscess . In his place, the King appoints Alexandros Koryzis. February 22: Visit of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in Athens. Topic of the talks: the attitude of Great Britain. Since they foresee a German intervention, the British propose a line of defence on the river Aliakmon and on the central Greece's massifs. The plan contemplates the waiver to defence Thessaloniki, Greece's second city. Papagos is in the opinion of a resistance on the Metaxas line , close to Bulgaria. Differences of opinion will make almost vain the contribution of the UK. February 23: Mussolini in Rome, at the Teatro Adriano , promises: "Soon it will be spring and, as dictated by the season, our season, will come the best bit. I say that now will come the best bit and it will come in each of the four cardinal points " March 1: German troops under the command of Field Marshal Wilhelm List settle in Bulgaria, with the consent of King Boris. The Bulgarians begin an anti-Greek mobilize . March 2: personally piloting a three-engined S79, Mussolini leaves Bari to Albania. He wants to attend the upcoming Italian offensive towards Klisura. Landed in Albania, the Duce is welcomed with enthusiasm by the soldiers and officers. March 2: Eden is in Greece again. The Greek divisions deployed to the Bulgarian border have not yet begun to retreat towards the Aliakmon river line. March 9: preceded by an intense artillery fire, the Italians attack in Desnizza Valley, the door of Klisura, but without significant results. It is fought violently around hill 731. March 16, 1941: the offensive towards Klisura is suspended. The " legnata " has not been inflicted. March 21: Mussolini leaves Albania. March 21-April 6: the British forces (the First armoured Brigade , the Sixth Australian division and the Second New Zealand division ), complete the deployment on the Aliakmon line. March 25: Yugoslavia joins the Tripartite Pact Italy-Germany-Japan. March 27: in Yugoslavia an anti-German coup, turns the tables: the ruler is being removed, the young King Peter II is being placed on the throne, and power is being given to general Simovic, pro-British. April 6: the operation " Marita ," the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, starts. April 9: the troops of Field Marshal List, enter Thessaloniki. April 10: Italians are moving from the north in the direction of Yugoslavia. April 12: Papagos orders the Greek division of Western Macedonia and Epirus to withdraw in order to escape from the Germans. April 13: taking advantage of the Greek withdrawing , the Italian Front of Albania advances. The Greeks resist tenaciously, but only to delay the advance of Cavallero's troops. April 14: troops of the Venezia division occupy Koritza. At the front of Epirus, are recaptured Klisura and hill 731. April 18: the XI Italian army comes into Gjirokastra; the Germans are manoeuvring in the direction of Yanina, and they are preparing to close the circle. The Greek army is routed. April 18: the Greek Prime Minister Koryzis commits suicide. April 19: at the pass of Thermopylae, British, Australians and New Zealander units temporarily stops the Germans, allowing to the bulk of the troops to reach the southern harbours of Greece and sail to Crete. April 20: at Larissa, against the wishes and orders of Papagos, General Georgios Tsolakoglou surrenders to the Germans. The surrender document does not mention the Italians, whom the Greeks refuse to surrender to. April 23: the signing of the surrender is replicated, this time in the presence of the Italians April 27: the Germans come into Athens. April 28: The British of the General "Jumbo" Wilson embark from the harbours of the Peloponnese and Attica, and leave Greece. The Greeks applaud and render honours to them.

The protagonists.

The Greeks

Ioannis Metaxas (1871 - 1941)

After having fought for his Country against the Turks, after having studied in the German military academies and having participated in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, he is promoted to general and appointed to the top of the Greek army. At the outbreak of World War I, he pronounces for non-intervention of Greece and he is opposed to the English campaign in the Dardanelles, ordered by Churchill, made and concluded with a resounding failure. The day after the election victory (1916) of Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, decidedly pro-war, Metaxas puts on alert the army to carry out a coup, but he can not realize his intentions, because the King, Constantine I, dismisses him. Metaxas, convinced monarchist , follows King Constantine into exile. He comes back in Greece in 1920 with the king and he participates in political life, continuing to do so even when, in 1922, is hereby established the Republic. The name of the party that he founds was the "Party of Free Thinkers." In '36-the monarchy was restored a year before-Metaxas has his chance. Prime Minister and interim Minister of Defence , he takes advantage of unrests in the Country to proclaim a state of emergency and to deprive the Parliament of power. In August of that year, he concentrates many powers in his hands. Aided by the powerful police chief Mavroudis, he abolishes the political parties, imposes strict censorship, bans strikes and unrests and silences any opposition. In the same time, he introduces the eight hours workday , enacts some measures to improve conditions for workers, establishes the Fund for Social Security, charges the state for the debts of farms. In this way he gains consent. Still far from the consent, however, like that which, in Italy, has got his idol Benito Mussolini. In foreign policy, especially after the Italian conquest of Albania, Metaxas approaches, although cautiously, the Great Britain. On October 28, he rejects the Italian ultimatum. On 29 January 1942, while his soldiers under the command of General Papagos are winning a battle after other, hit by an abscess to the pharynx, then degenerated into paraglandular abscess, he dies of a blood infection . Was Mussolini's rush of blood to the head which marked Metaxas's destiny. This middle class outlook man , born in Ithaca as Odysseus, but without the spirit and character of Odysseus, honest and patriotic, smart and very suspicious , monarchist and anti- communist, emotional and ruthless, marked by poor health and family problems, was able to find, at the decisive moment, the strength and courage to resist an unjust and unjustified action. From dictator of the province, probably destined to a premature political end, anonymous and inglorious, he became the very symbol of pride, proud and honour of the Greek people. For many people he has become a myth. He never said so dry, oki , no, to Grazzi, but yet he is known to history as "the man who said no." And the Greek national holiday, the equivalent of our June 2, is celebrating on October 28. And even today, this day, for all Greeks, is not the day which celebrates the entry of Greece in World War II: even today, that day is "the day of no."

Alèxandros Papagos, ( 1883-1955)

Cavalry officer with studies abroad (Brussels, Ypres), fought in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, participating in the siege of Yanina (Ioanina) and in the campaigns in Macedonia. In 1917, when the king was exiled by Venizelos, Papagos was removed from the army, but he returned in 1920 when the Monarchy was restored in Greece and he was assigned to Asia Minor. Again removed in 1922, when in Greece was proclaimed the Republic, he is readmitted in the ranks in 1927 as major general. In 1934 he was commander of an army corps, the following year he was Chief of the Staff and minister in the governments of Kondynis and Demertzis. In 1936 he sided with Metaxas, in whose government he became Minister of War. A year later, as Chief of the Staff, he attempted to restructure and reorganize the armed forces. Commander in chief of the Greek army during the war against Italy, not only he stopped the Italian advance into Epirus, but he defeated the enemy on several occasions and advanced in Albania. There are clamorous successes and "Time", the prestigious American magazine, devotes to him its cover. Nothing he can, however, against the divisions of the German Field Marshal Wilhelm List, that entered Greece on April 6, 1941. He remains in Greece, even when the government fled to Crete. In July 1943 he was detained, with his entire staff, as a hostage at the disposal of SS. Along with other dignitaries from various detention camps in Europe, Papagos in 1945 is in South Tyrol, at first in Villabassa- Niederdorf, then around the Braies-Prags lake , where the Wehrmacht, on the eve of the arrival of the Americans, had carried all the distinguished hostages, after having removed them, with a surprise action, from the control of SS. Back home, he took the reins of the royalists against the Communists during the civil war. At the head of the Hellenic Party Group , which he founded, won the elections and occupied the post of prime minister from 1952 to 1955, when he died. A neighbourhood of Athens - Papagou - named after him. It has been written that general Papagos was an old-fashioned and very conservative officer, who did not want to risk anything, who advanced only when the flanks of his army were covered, who detested risky moves or attacks. He was not a Rommel. And if, during the war against Italy, he had had faced an army otherwise organized and led, he would be defeated in short order. Perhaps it is true. But Papagos was not at all naive and he proved it extensively , before mobilizing less conspicuously, then making mass where the Italians were weaker, then taking a victory after another. He was not Rommel, but during those events, he shone like Rommel.

Georgios Tsolakoglou (1886-1948)

About his decision to surrender to the Germans against the orders of Papagos, he wrote: I had to choose: either keeping fighting risking a massacre or giving up. I made my choice: I have never regretted, indeed, I am proud of it. Tsolakoglou recited an important role during the war against Italy, designing, for instance, the conquer of Pogradec and conducting other relevant actions, but he is known especially for having led, from April 1941 to December 1942, a collaborationist government . After the war, he was arrested, tried and sentenced to death. The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He died in prison of disease, in 1948.

The Italians

Ugo Cavallero (1880 - 1943)

After graduating in mathematics, he began his military career, distinguishing by intelligence, application, skill and knowledge of foreign languages (German and English). During World War I, in the aftermath of Caporetto, we find him at the head of office operations of the Supreme Command; in 1918 he works at plan that will lead to the defeat of Austria in Vittorio Veneto. For "exceptional merits", he was appointed general thirty- eight years old and, in 1919, he represented Italy in the inter-committee in Versailles. In 1920 he leaves the army to take the general direction of Pirelli; he is elected deputy in 1924, a year later a senator and , from 1925 to 1928, he occupies the post of Secretary of War. He gets the title of count. As he had done with the army, he leaves the policy to become president of Ansaldo, the great Italian shipbuilding and engineering industry. Recalled to duty, he commands the Italian troops in East Africa from 1937 to 1938. He is much talked about , as he has been during his time spent outside the army. There are those who accuse him of inventing fake success in battle to advance his career. However, in 1940 he was appointed general of the Army Corps with backdating of the appointment to '34 and nominated for the merits of war, commander of the Army. In 1940, replaces Marshal Pietro Badoglio as Chief of General Staff, commands the troops in Albania and he is able to slow down at first, then to stop the Greek advance. He will fail to carry through any offensive, however, before the German intervention. Appointed Marshal of Italy in 1942, at the fall of Fascism he was arrested and charged with preparing a fascist plot. He Commits suicide on September 14, 1943, just days after the signing of the armistice with the Anglo- Americans.

Ubaldo Soddu, (1883-1949)

He takes part in the war in Libya (1911) and, during the First World War, he earns two silver campaign medals . In 1936 he was promoted Lieutenant General and assigned at command of the Grenadiers of Sardinia. He makes a rapid career, even political. In 1939 he was appointed Undersecretary for War and a year later, Deputy Chief of General Staff (virtually the deputy of Pietro Badoglio). He maintains both positions during the early days when he is sent to command the Italian troops in Albania in place of Visconti Prasca. Later these assignments will be taken off and assigned to General Alfredo Guzzoni. He received his appointment as commander of the Army Corps on November 29 , but he was replaced a month later. Man easy either to exalt or to get dejected, he tried to bring order to the chaos of Albania, trying to prevent the Greeks from advancing. His failure costs him the place and the coveted promotion as Marshal of Italy.

Sebastiano Visconti Prasca (1883-1961)

Bankrupt author of the "big coup " in Epirus, which would have to throw open to Italy the doors of Greece, General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca belongs to a branch of the noble and prestigious Milanese Visconti family. Supporter of the blitzkrieg - certainly fit for the very powerful German army, less for the worn Italian army of those days- he is the author of a memoir, I attacked Greece ( Io ho aggredito la Grecia ), in which he defends his actions and insists, with more than a justification, about the low contribution of Italian Air Force, especially in the first phase of the advance. Before assuming command of Italian forces in Albania, in replacement of General Carlo Geloso, considered an "expert" in the sector, Visconti Prasca was military attaché in Belgrade, from 1924 to 1929, then in Paris and, in 1938, in Berlin . He also commanded the Italian occupation Corp in the Saar. Probably the experience of military attaché in Germany decisively inspired the book " Io ho agredito la Grecia ", in which , as we have seen, Visconti Prasca extols the blitzkrieg . He is replaced after a few days after the invasion. He does not take it well and he storms the General Staff with more than an appeal. His appeal, like many others, should have been examined for precise instructions of Mussolini after the victorious war . It never happened, because of the fall of Fascism and of subsequent events. After the armistice, Visconti Prasca joins the Resistance, he is captured and interned in a concentration camp in Germany. After the war, he asked, without success, the review of the pending appeal to the President Luigi Einaudi.

The forces on the battlefield.

The eight Italian divisions deployed at the beginning of the invasion (Siena, Ferrara, Centauro, Julia, Parma, Venezia, Bari, Piemonte) plus the "Grouping" of the shoreline were, gradually, placed side by side, over time, by the divisions Taro , Arezzo, Trento, Cuneense, Pusteria, Pinerolo, Lupi di Toscana, Brennero, Modena, Legnano, Acqui, Cuneo, Alpini Speciale, Puglie, Casale and Cacciatori delle Alpi. The Messina and Marche divisions came after the event. In short, we started with a hundred thousand men, including services, we ended up with nearly half a million men. Almost all Alpini. Opposed to our forces were in the forefront, according to the Greek General Staff, four divisions (against six) on October 28, seven (against ten) on November 14, eleven (against fifteen) on November 30, thirteen (against twenty-five ) on January 15.

Both Visconti Prasca, and Papagos have insisted, in their memoirs, on the numerical superiority of the Italian army over the Greek one: Visconti to justify the goodness of his plan, Papagos to emphasize his own merits and those of the army that he commanded . But was there really this superiority? Was a Greek division more relevant , numerically, than an Italian division? To increase the number of divisions, or to distribute promotions or to boast an army of "great power", the Italian divisions were "binary", i.e. they were formed by two regiments of combat troops. The Greek ones were, instead, structured on "ternary" basis, i.e. on three regiments. An Italian division, therefore, in general, even if reinforced by detachments of "black shirts" ( Camicie Nere), had fewer fighters than a Greek division. In Albania, for having the overall superiority we needed a little time; the relative superiority - i.e. the superiority in some areas or in some sectors of the front at certain moments or at certain stages of the conflict- we did not have almost never. And this not only for the third regiment present in several Greek divisions , but because Papagos knew better to use his soldiers, identifying, from time to time, the sector where we were weak and the sector where it was necessary "to do mass." And there was who defined him an old general... The artillery was roughly equal in terms of guns and mortars. The Greeks, however, used theirs in a masterly way (if one may say so, speaking of instruments of death ..), camouflaging it, concealing it , moving it quickly and sending observers behind enemy lines for improving the shot. Our soldiers could hardly find from where were coming the bombs. When they could do it, they could not react, because the Greeks had already moved elsewhere. We must not forget that the war in Greece and in Albania was being fought mostly in the mountains, and often some operations had, as a theatre , inaccessible areas. In this difficult environment, the tactical use of Greek artillery was even more profitable, because it disoriented the enemy, unable to clearly distinguish the origin of the shots. In other words, the bombs could not arrive from a single direction, but from all directions. We could not know, in other words, where the Greeks would have struck and from where and when. A bad situation, therefore, both from a military standpoint, and psychologically.

Our Air Force , even though had antiquated models, was significantly more powerful than that of the Greeks, even when the latter was reinforced by the squadrons of d'Albiac. He could not, however, be used as it should have -at least in the first, crucial moments of the invasion - because the bad weather avoided the planes to take off from Italian and Albanian airports. The situation became, in some moments, tragicomic. The Fourth Air Force Group, based in Apulia, was not connected by radio with Albania. The orders were travelling in one direction and another, through messengers boarded on planes in constant motion in either direction: the provisions came and went, of course, in the improper delay. Other times, we were very close to the tragedy. When Italian planes bombed by mistake the division Siena, for instance, or when Count Ciano, in command of his flight , made a short trip on Thessaloniki: the ship used for the repatriation of our nationals was nearly hit.

Even the Ala Littoria - the Italian airline- seemed to work intermittently. Shortly before the invasion, Grazzi was summoned to Rome for urgent communications: the plane of Ala Littoria intended to bring him in the capital did not show up either at the appointed time limits nor in the following days. It was then announced the arrival of an official from Rome. No one saw him. Grazzi never knew what were those communications until he received the encrypted telegrams with the ultimatum to Greece. But on the circumstances of this delay have played political factors which will be discussed later.

We were not without tanks. The Italian Division Centauro, pompously called "armoured", was equipped with them. They were small tanks - real "sardine cans" - with only two machine guns, but nonetheless able to annoy or to play an important role if the terrain had allowed. But it did not allow. They could not climb the mountain trails or move easily in the mud. And the mud and mountain warfare characterized almost all stages of the conflict. When, in November, Papagos attacked successfully in Western Macedonia and in Epirus, many tanks were abandoned, recovered by the Greeks, put back into operation and used against us. Paradoxically, the cavalry was more effective than tanks. The Greeks rode ruffled strong horses, accustomed to move on mountain trails. The Greek cavalry's raids were unexpected and terribly effective.

The communication lines -of vital importance when it is at war, in every age and in every land- were difficult. They were difficult for the Greeks, forced to make flow to the frontline men, materials, weapons, medicines, food, through a country almost devoid of roads worthy of the name; they were difficult - much more- for us. We had, in fact, available only one road: the sea. And by sea we would pour into Albania what the Greeks were making flow, albeit with difficulty, by land. When our battle fleet was damaged in Taranto harbour, the sea was not any more nostrum (ours). Or at least it was not just as before. And the difficulties increased.

Food and medicines arrived little by little. The alpini of Julia, anchored to the Pindo's mountains , were first reduced to biscuit , and then they suffered from hunger. Since the trucks were scarce, the Staff had had the brilliant thought to train the divisions to walk considerable distances. General Mario Roatta had boasted of the good results achieved: forty kilometres a day. A record. But the food, medicines, weapons, the mail had not been trained to move on foot and, with all due respect to General Roatta, insisted on staying in the places of departure. Until a ship or an airplane is not sent to take them to the places of destination. Greece was not far away from Italy. Grottaglie, in Apulia, the town where the Duce was following the course of the conflict, was closer to Albania than to Rome: yet, in some ways, it was as if we were fighting a war in the other side of the globe.

The Italian field hospitals were makeshift and lacked everything. Deputy Jacomoni's wife, volunteer nurse, was impressed by the high number of deaths from gangrene due to lack of disinfectant. Sometimes also the bureaucracy complicates the situation. Visconti Prasca asks trucks "essential for defence and offense." More than six hundred of these vehicles already earmarked for Albania and already on travel to the port of Bari, were sent back to Turin, no one knows for what mysterious reason.

Policy and diplomacy.

The political preparation, to say the least, was disastrous. We have already alluded to the belief, quite arbitrary and far-fetched, of a defection of the Greeks, for money or for other reasons. The millions Lire delivered to Jacomoni, other than buying generals and officers, would have also be used to finance actions behind the lines, acts of sabotage, propaganda events and so on. They went, instead, into the pockets to individuals who did not sabotage, did not attack, did not propagate, simply received and disappeared. Corrupting officials or army officials then, within just under a couple of weeks, was virtually impossible. Virtually, nothing was attempted in the months before the invasion to determine whether such action was feasible. Nothing was attempted, because things were not clear. Mussolini wanted one day Greece , the day after Yugoslavia, the day after Corsica. A few days before the fateful meeting on October 15, Badoglio had noted: "Greece is fading." In short, we accelerated and braked, we threatened and flattered, the confusion was increasing, and no one knew what to do. And we gave credence to the most extravagant items ("The Greeks will give up at once"), although without any confirmation.

Grazzi was always kept in the dark about the decisions that were being taken in Rome . Maybe in Rome they did not trust in him or, perhaps, his relationships - honest, accurate, careful, documented, not at all triumphalistic - were not appreciated neither by Mussolini nor by Ciano. "I asked", Grazzi wrote in his memoirs, L'inizio della fine "( The Beginning of the End), "The reason for this attitude: perhaps they thought we were idiot or, perhaps, they believed we were in bad faith. So, why do pay for and maintain in place idiots or traitors? "Yeah, why?

Grazzi heard rumours of war, of course, but as Rome was silent, he thought to a final waiving of the intention to invade Greece. When he delivered the Italian ultimatum to Metaxas , by him estimated, our minister would have wanted to confess to him that he had not heard anything for a long time. He could not do it, obviously, and all that absurd situation made him deeply indignant. Back in Rome, he sought to make hear his voice in alto loco : he was advised to "take a vacation." Strangely, the only one who sympathized with him has been Metaxas.

The attitude towards Bulgaria, then, was a kind of masterpiece. Instead of trying in time to understand the intentions of King Boris, we waited until the last minute when the machine of the invasion could not be stopped. The cases are two: or Bulgaria was essential for the success of the campaign, or it was not. In the first case, we needed to think about and decide on the basis of the response received; in the second case, it would have been better not even try to consult King Boris. Perhaps Mussolini took King Boris's consent for granted , maybe considered as natural and automatic a Bulgarian intervention after the start of the conflict, regardless of the official responses. Things turned out differently, and Papagos could call back the divisions from the Bulgarian border for using them against us. And, unlike us, he was able to use this long-peaceful sector, the Bulgarian sector, to make rest his soldiers.

Germans did not like an Italian intervention in the Balkans . They, indeed, pressured the King of Bulgaria so that he refused to enter war, but they did not intervene just as firmly with the Italians. They underestimated the intentions of the Duce, not believing a conflict when in Italy we were demobilizing: if they really made a mistake, they paid it dearly. Hitler, in the last days of his life, will link the Italian intervention in the Balkans to the failure of Operation Barbarossa .

Certainly Hitler, in those moments, was speaking pro domo sua , in his own interest, but surely, Mussolini's initiative made him nervous. When he saw the Italians involved in the Greek quagmire, when he realized the repercussions of those events on public internationally opinion , he offered troops (one division) and, for this purpose, he made prepare the 'Operation Cyclamen”. Mussolini refused , perhaps convinced to win with his own forces, perhaps for giving no satisfaction to the ally. Cyclamen was then discarded and the German General Staff, sensing the worst, sketched the broad outlines of Operation Marita, the full-scale invasion of the whole Greece. The plan was later extended and modified after the events in Yugoslavia.

In short, improvisation and superficiality, along, of course, to the enemy's bravery, immobilized us in the Greek quagmire.

The fallen

According to official figures of the Italian Defence Ministry, reported by Mario Cervi in the work cited above, the Greek war cost to our army 13,755 dead, 50,874 wounded. 12,368 frozen, 25,067 missing (for the most part, according to the Ministry, they fell on the field).

The Greeks, according to official sources, had 13,408 dead and 42,485 wounded, the Germans 1323 killed and 3411 wounded , the British, including dead, wounded and prisoners, lost over 15,000 men.

The figures reported by Martin Gilbert are : 15,000 Greek fallen, 13,755 Italian, 3712 British and 2232 German.

From 10 to 17 May 1941, the then King of Italy Vittorio Emanuele III, visited Albania and one of the landmarks of that war: Monastery hill. That knoll on which so much blood had been shed did not hit him a lot: his adjutant, General Puntoni, did not report any note on his diary.

In this way, the King of Italy paid homage to the fallen of the war in Albania.

The summary map .

The dotted green line indicates the displacement of the Greek-Albanian border after the Greek army's counterattacks . (from: . www.historynet.com/military-history-quarterly-battle-maps -) -)

The maps with details of operations are from: . ( from: http://www.lasecondaguerramondiale.it/images/imgfoto/greciait9.jpg