DOCSLIB.ORG

The Greek Quagmire

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Greek Quagmire The Greek quagmire. Prologue. October, 26 th 1940, Saturday. In the hall of the Italian Embassy in Athens, the Italians and their Greek guests are commenting the performance of Puccini's Madame Butterfly finished recently. Suddenly, in the offices, the teletypes begin to tap. The officials are coming and going. They are trying to remain calm, but more than one of them, pale-faced, troubled and tense, is widening the collar of his shirt. The Italian Plenipotentiary Minister, Emanuele Grazzi, sees all that movement and breaks into a cold sweat. He knows what that movement means, or at least he understands this intuitively: from Rome the ultimatum to Greece is coming. He hopes in some hitch, in some difficulty of deciphering: he does not want to deliver to General Metaxas, Greek Prime Minister, a declaration of war right in the middle of an official reception. It would be extremely embarrassing, anyway. He is lucky, at least about this. It is late, the text is long: time is requested in order to decipher it . The Greek guests leave the Italian Legation; Metaxas is at his residence in Kefissià. He is not yet an enemy. "You are the strongest" He turns into an enemy at three a.m. of Monday, October 28th. The communication has been deciphered and translated. Grazzi accompanied by military attaché Colonel Luigi Mondini and by the interpreter De Salvo, gets into car and heads to the residence of Metaxas. The guard at the door confuses the colours of the flag on the fender of the diplomatic car , he mistakes the green for blue and announces to the Greek Prime Minister the visit of the French ambassador. Metaxas throws on a dressing gown and goes to the door. Seeing Grazzi, he understands. The Italian ambassador, embarrassed and uncomfortable, delivers the text of the ultimatum to him : if Greece wants to avoid the war, it has to allow Italy to occupy some strategic points in its territory. Which points? asks Metaxas, with his eyes moist with tears, while his hands were trembling slightly. Grazzi does not know what to answer, nobody has informed him and the ultimatum specifies nothing about the “strategic points”. Then, it is the war, Metaxas adds. No, answers Grazzi, not yet, perhaps we can find an agreement. But he is the first who does not believe it. An agreement? Metaxas, in three hours and at night, should warn the King, summon the Minister of Defence, consult with the Army commander, General Alexandros Papagos, make a decision without knowing well the demands of Italy. Impossible. Deeply saddened, Grazzi leaves Metaxas’ petit-bourgeois house in Kefissia. He remains in the Italian Legation until six in the morning, time to expiry of the ultimatum, waiting for the miracle. In vain. The response of Greece, through the mouth of Metaxas, is oki , no. At the moment of parting from the Italian Plenipotentiary, whom he estimates and by whom he is estimated, Metaxas had said: "You are the strongest." And, at 5.30 a.m., with half an hour in advance of the expiry of the ultimatum, "the strongest" enter Epirus. They have rations for four days and ammunition for five. "Fuehrer, we are on the march!" In tone and form, Mussolini’s ultimatum to Greece looks like the ultimatum sent by Hitler, a few months before, to Norway and Denmark. But behind Hitler's ultimatum there were a plan - even though drawn up in haste - and a powerful army ready for action; behind Mussolini’s ultimatum, there are unrealistic plans, weak forces, and too many contradictions. An example? While they think to bring the war in the Balkans, in Italy 600.000 men are demobilized. The old plan for the invasion of Greece (Guzzoni-Pariani plan: intervention with at least eighteen - twenty divisions), is set aside. Now the rising star is Lt General Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, commander of Italian troops in Albania, convinced that 8 or 9 divisions are enough. The old organic plan is replaced by "a big sudden attack" in Epirus, followed, in a second time, by the march towards Athens. In other words: we begin, let's see and hope well. Mussolini is enthusiastic about Visconti ‘s plan; Count Galeazzo Ciano ( Minister of Foreign Affairs and Duce 's son-in- law) too; Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio( Chief of the General Staff) less, but he does not oppose with the necessary firmness. According to the Count Francesco Jacomoni di San Savino , Deputy of the King of Italy in Tirana, the Albanians are eager to fight and the Greeks are downhearted. And so on October 15th, in Rome at Palazzo Venezia, during an hour and half meeting, it is decided to invade Greece. And without prior consultation or without having invited to the meeting the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Air Force and Navy. Strange decision, in truth. Greece is a fascist Country, or nearly so. General Metaxas, Prime Minister and holder of the power since 1936, admires Mussolini. Greece is a "bare bone", according to a previous Duce ‘s statement and a so poor country to the point of "not being coveted by us", according to Ciano. Metaxas, it is true, does not trust in the Italians and, while he declares himself neutral, hangs out with the British, but he still does it very carefully and with great caution. After all, with the Italians in arms on the border, whom should he direct to? Strange decision, therefore. And based on false information, too. The Greeks do not expect an attack, they have little desire to fight, many generals are or will be on our side; the government, at the first blow, will collapse: this is believed and this is repeated in Rome and Tirana. It is believed that Greek notables and militaries are ready to marry, upon reasonable compensation, our cause; Grazzi’s honest and prudent relationships are underestimated and it is given credit to improvised or disqualified informants; the attitude pro-German expressed by Greek senior officers is mistaken , who knows why, for a pro- Italian stance. Actually , it is long time that the Greeks are on the alert. They are mobilizing. Metaxas is suffering for the excesses of his daughter Lulu, he is tired and sick, but is determined, in case of war, to give up no inch of Greek land to the Italians. The whole Country is at his side, the whole Army is loyal to him and to the Nation, Great Britain has given its support( in words, for the moment). Nebil Dino, an important Albanian with connections in Athens, fascist, avowed optimistic, informer much heard by Jacomoni, suddenly changes his tune and attitude and he says to Deputy, who is about to depart to Rome: be careful! The Greeks are ready, their morale is high, they will fight. But, arrived in Rome, Jacomoni has not the courage to express this point of view in front of Mussolini. He try to do it with innuendos and half-sentences, but eventually gives up: "The morale of the Greeks?" asks for the second time the leader of Fascism, during the famous meeting of October 15th, evidently dissatisfied with the responses earlier received from the Deputy. "Very depressed," answers Jacomoni. Just what the Duce wishes to hear. Some time before, the famous journalist Curzio Malaparte, in Greece for a reportage, had confided to Grazzi: Ciano sends you these words : you can write whatever you want, but he will do all the same the war to Greece. This was the atmosphere in Rome. The Germans, however, curb the Italian intentions. They are developing Barbarossa, the invasion of the USSR , and, for this reason, they do not want complications in the Balkans. They would prefer a political solution. Mussolini is aware of it, Ciano too; but, for both , Italy is a Great Power who must have free hand in the Mediterranean and Balkan area . Would Italy have to do nothing? And what's more, when the Germans, without informing their ally, have extended their protectorate on Romania, Balkan region and, therefore, according to the agreements between Italy and Germany, falling within the sphere of Italian influence? When Mussolini becomes acquainted with the German intervention in Romania, he does not take it kindly. He yells and shakes: is this the right habit? Who does Hitler think he is? the master of the world? At the words, the Duce makes follow the facts. A few days after the German occupation of oil fields of Ploesti in Romania, he decides to invade Greece. Now, doing a personal pique as the main reason for the triggering invasion of Greece is perhaps simplistic, but surely Mussolini’s desire not to be outdone by Hitler played a leading role in the ill-fated Italian campaign in Greece. When, on October 28th, Hitler comes to Italy in order to meet the Duce in Florence, Mussolini welcomes him at the railway station with a triumphant, it is unknown how much pleasant( for Hitler): " Fuehrer , we are on the march!" "He is crazy!" Over time, in Rome the idea to invade Greece was at first stroked and then set aside, resumed and put aside again, abandoned and again revived. Once occupied Albania, the Italian troops had arisen , weapons in hand, almost immediately to the Greek border, but just as quickly, they had backed off, perhaps due to a German stop . After those events, Mussolini had expressed several times his estimation to Metaxas, reassuring him about the Italian intentions; but, at the appropriate time, he had ridden the tiger of the Chameria, making this region on the Greek-Albanian border- unknown to the vast majority of the Italian people- a unredeemed land, eager to escape the Greek domain and join with Italy.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • M7t'j¡.T7tór.ITL-Taav, 01Tou -~Sptut -To L:Tpa't
    - 'O &p z La-rp«-n¡y r)~ ' A. ll amiyo~ d~ M7t'J¡.t7tÓ r.IT L-taav, 01tou -~ Sptu t -to l:Tpa't;"l)­ ye:¡ov rij~ '0¡;.6. o<; ¡;.tpapzLwv 1< . ~ 1-: ::: 1 \ :' Avno:tpo7tO pLxov 7tup o ~6 ).ov f. v Spáae: L. 4 'O :cfwOu ::- ou?yl~ 'A. J ( ,.p~?;~ 11ni -r,,ij 1<. l{!'lñ:li (lmoOt.v r.i ptanptX) Jl.a.! -rtoií ft: tt~pylou A. llM:ztoo (tia--<.rn(JÜt;, 3t~l&.). 5 l. Soldados griegos de permiso tras la for freedom. lnstitute 0( the Greek 3. El generalísimo Alex. Papagos en Papaconstantinou, The Battle of Greece campaña de Albania dan una cálida bien· Parliamen~Atenas , 2005. Bobostitsa, Cuartel General del grupo divi· 1940-1 94 1, Keramikos, Atenas, 1966. venida a los australianos en Atenas. 2. El Comandante General R. Scobi y el sional K. Th. Papaconstantinou, The Battle 5. El primer ministro A. Korizis con marzo 1941. Del libro 60 years alter the secretario general del EAM D. Partsalides of Greece 1940-1941 , Keramikos, K. Kotzias (detrás a la izquierda) y George end of World War 11: Greeks and (segundo por la izquierda). (Cortesía del Atenas, 1966. A. Vlahos (sin sombrero, derecha). Th. Australians in the common struggle IWM). 4. El rey jorge 11 desayunando sobre un Papaconstantinou, The Battle of Greece peñasco en Kleisoura, Th. 1940-1941 , Keramikos, Atenas, /966. POÚTICAS DE LA IMAGEN FOTOGRÁFICA ~ Fotografía y política: Grecia 1940-1944 Procopis Papastratis es catédrático de Historia de la Procopis Papastratis Panteion University de Atenas. Es autor de British policy towards Greece during the Second World War 1941-1944 (Cambridge University Press, /984; 2' edición, 2008).
    [Show full text]
  • Contribution of Greece to the Victory of the Allies During Ww Ii
    CONTRIBUTION OF GREECE TO THE VICTORY OF THE ALLIES DURING WW II Lt Colonel of Engineering Panayiotis Spyropoulos Historian of the History Directorate of Hellenic Army General Staff The peninsula of Greece has, since antiquity, been a point of confrontation be- tween East and West, as it constitutes an area of utmost strategic value, situated on the flanks of the main axis of operations in East-West direction and vice-versa. Who- ever occupies Greece can effortlessly with his forces harass the flanks or even the rear of troops operating along the aforementioned axis, control the sea line of com- munication from Gibraltar to Suez, and block from the west the sea route from the Black Sea to Propontis (Marmara) Sea, the Hellespont (Straits), the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The geo-strategic value of Greece has been dramatically enhanced during the XXth century, due to the rapid technological development of war equipment (as per the quote of sir Halford Mackinder on the «Heartland»). During the 2nd World War, Italy launched the attack against Greece, without informing its ally, Germany. Berlin was enraged by the Italian action and considered it «totally incoherent» and mistimed, because it was initiated just before wintertime, a season unsuitable for mountain operations, as well as just before the elections in the (still neutral) USA, providing Roosevelt with even more convincing arguments for go- ing to war. Moreover, it criticised the Italians refraining from any seaborne operation, a fact that facilitated the British in debarking on Crete and other islands, significant for their strategic importance; while they left them the margin to deploy in Thessalo- nica.
    [Show full text]
  • The Unsettled Debate: Monarchy and Republic in Spain and Greece in the Interwar Years*
    ■ Assaig] ENTREMONS. UPF JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY Barcelona ﺍ Universitat Pompeu Fabra Número 6 (juny 2014) www.entremons.org The Unsettled Debate: Monarchy and Republic in Spain and Greece in the Interwar Years* Enric UCELAY-DA CAL (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) abstract The following essay examines the political development in Spain and Greece between the World War I and World War II, comparing these two Mediterranean countries and placing them in a broader European and global context. The conflict between the supporters of monarchy and republic as forms of government was extremely important in the political debate in both countries, and shaped their history in a quite remarkable way. The discussion of these intricate dynamics will help to appreciate the problems that Spain and Greece faced at that time, and can also contribute to a deeper understanding of some key features of the historical change in these two countries. resumen El siguiente ensayo examina el desarrollo político en España y Grecia en el período entre la Primera y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, comparando estos dos países mediterráneos y situándolos en un contexto europeo y global más amplio. El conflicto entre los partidarios de la monarquía y la república como formas de gobierno fue muy importante en el debate político de ambos países, influyendo en su historia de una manera muy notable. La discusión de estas dinámicas complicadas ayudará a apreciar mejor los problemas a los que España y Grecia se enfrentaban en ese momento, contribuyendo asimismo a una comprensión más profunda de algunas de las características clave del cambio histórico en estos dos países.
    [Show full text]
  • Lakes of Northern Greece
    Lakes of Northern Greece Travel Passports are spelt correctly and match the names on your You may need to renew your British Passport if passport. Your flight ticket is non-transferable and you are travelling to an EU country. Please ensure non-refundable. your passport is less than 10 years old (even if it has 6 months or more left on it) and has at least 6 Departure Tax months validity remaining from the date of travel. Flight Taxes are included in the price of your EU, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino holiday. or Switzerland valid national identification cards are also acceptable for travel. For more information, please visit: Baggage Allowance passportchecker We advise that you stick to the baggage allowances advised. If your luggage is found to be Visas heavier than the airlines specified baggage If you’re a tourist, you do not need a visa for short allowance the charges at the airport will be hefty. trips to most EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Your EasyJet ticket includes one hold bag of up to Norway and Switzerland. You’ll be able to stay for 23kg plus one cabin bag that can fit under the seat up to 90 days in any 180-day period. in front of you, (maximum size 45 x 36 x 20cm, including any handles or wheels). If you book an For all other passport holders please check the upfront or extra legroom seat you can also take an visa requirements with the appropriate embassy. additional large cabin bag on board. For more For further information, please check here: travel information visit www.easyjet.com to the EU Greek Consulate: 1A Holland Park, London W11 Labels 3TP.
    [Show full text]
  • Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War
    Fascist Italy's Aerial Defenses in the Second World War CLAUDIA BALDOLI ABSTRACT This article focuses on Fascist Italy's active air defenses during the Second World War. It analyzes a number of crucial factors: mass production of anti- aircraft weapons and fighters; detection of enemy aircraft by deploying radar; coordination between the Air Ministry and the other ministries involved, as well as between the Air Force and the other armed services. The relationship between the government and industrialists, as well as that between the regime and its German ally, are also crucial elements of the story. The article argues that the history of Italian air defenses reflected many of the failures of the Fascist regime itself. Mussolini's strategy forced Italy to assume military responsibilities and economic commitments which it could not hope to meet. Moreover, industrial self-interest and inter-service rivalry combined to inhibit even more the efforts of the regime to protect its population, maintain adequate armaments output, and compete in technical terms with the Allies. KEYWORDS air defenses; Air Ministry; anti-aircraft weapons; bombing; Fascist Italy; Germany; radar; Second World War ____________________________ Introduction The political and ideological role of Italian air power worked as a metaphor for the regime as a whole, as recent historiography has shown. The champions of aviation, including fighter pilots who pursued and shot down enemy planes, represented the anthropological revolution at the heart of the totalitarian experiment.1 As the Fascist regime had practiced terrorist bombing on the civilian populations of Ethiopian and Spanish towns and villages before the Second World War, the Italian political and military leadership, press, and industrialists were all aware of the potential role of air 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Extremism in the 1920S and 1930S: Do German Lessons Generalize?G 
    Political Extremism in the 1920s and 1930s: Do German Lessons Generalize?G ALAN DE BROMHEAD, BARRY EICHENGREEN, AND KEVIN H. O’ROURKE We examine the impact of the Great Depression on the share of votes for right- wing extremists in elections in the 1920s and 1930s. We confirm the existence of a link between political extremism and economic hard times as captured by growth or contraction of the economy. What mattered was not simply growth at the time of the election, but cumulative growth performance. The impact was greatest in countries with relatively short histories of democracy, with electoral systems that created low hurdles to parliamentary representation, and which had been on the losing side in World War I. he impact of the global credit crisis and Great Recession has been Tmore than just economic. In both parliamentary and presidential democracies, governments have been ousted. Hard economic times have increased political polarization and bred support for nationalist and right-wing political parties. All this gives rise to fears that economic hard times will feed political extremism, as it did in the 1930s. Memories of the 1930s inform much contemporary political commentary, just as they inform recent economic commentary. But exactly what impact the interwar depression and economic crisis had on the electoral fortunes of extremist parties has not been systematically studied.1 Many of our intuitions about the links between The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 73, No. 2 (June 2013). © The Economic History Association. doi: 10.1017/S0022050713000302. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
    [Show full text]
  • Registration Certificate
    1 The following information has been supplied by the Greek Aliens Bureau: It is obligatory for all EU nationals to apply for a “Registration Certificate” (Veveosi Engrafis - Βεβαίωση Εγγραφής) after they have spent 3 months in Greece (Directive 2004/38/EC).This requirement also applies to UK nationals during the transition period. This certificate is open- dated. You only need to renew it if your circumstances change e.g. if you had registered as unemployed and you have now found employment. Below we outline some of the required documents for the most common cases. Please refer to the local Police Authorities for information on the regulations for freelancers, domestic employment and students. You should submit your application and required documents at your local Aliens Police (Tmima Allodapon – Τμήμα Αλλοδαπών, for addresses, contact telephone and opening hours see end); if you live outside Athens go to the local police station closest to your residence. In all cases, original documents and photocopies are required. You should approach the Greek Authorities for detailed information on the documents required or further clarification. Please note that some authorities work by appointment and will request that you book an appointment in advance. Required documents in the case of a working person: 1. Valid passport. 2. Two (2) photos. 3. Applicant’s proof of address [a document containing both the applicant’s name and address e.g. photocopy of the house lease, public utility bill (DEH, OTE, EYDAP) or statement from Tax Office (Tax Return)]. If unavailable please see the requirements for hospitality. 4. Photocopy of employment contract.
    [Show full text]
  • General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks of February 1941 by JOHN S
    General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks of February 1941 by JOHN S. KOLIOPOULOS The Anglo-Greek talks of February 1941 are one of the most con- troversial issues in the historiography of World War II. The talks were held in Athens to discuss Britain's decision earlier in that month to help Greece against a possible German attack, and to agree on a line of defense which could be reasonably expected to check the enemy ad- vance. In addition to the strength of the forces required to hold the enemy and the allocation of these forces, the representatives of the two 'countries were obliged to take into account two important factors: (a) the attitude of Yugoslavia; and (b) the time factor. In accordance with the agreement reached late on February 22, the British would send to Greece, in addition to their air force units already operating in the country, five squadrons of aircraft and land forces equal to four divisions. The British troops would arrive in three installments, and would be deployed on a line to the west of Salonika, running from northwest to southeast along Mt. Vermion and Mt. Olympus, the "Aliakmon line," as it was called. The Greeks, on the other hand, would provide four additional divisions (thirty-five battalions) from Thrace and eastern Macedonia for the defense of the Aliakmon line, and one division in reserve at Larissa. By the same agreement, Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, undertook to approach Yugoslavia in order to enlist its military cooperation with Britain and Greece.
    [Show full text]
  • John S. Koliopoulos Unwanted Ally: Greece and the Great
    JOHN S. KOLIOPOULOS UNWANTED ALLY: GREECE AND THE GREAT POWERS, 1939-1941 Greece’s international position and national security, from the spring of 1939 when the Axis powers initiated a policy of outright conquest in Europe until the German invasion of the country two years later, have, until recently, been examined mainly from the point of view of contemporary official Greek policy, leading thus to the development of a semi - official Greek historiography1. Most of the governing as­ sumptions and premises of this historiography grew out of both war­ time rhetoric and the post - war requirements of Greek policy, to be­ come in time axiomatic. Some of these assumptions and premises are: a) that Greece followed, before the' Italian attack, a neutral policy towards the great European powers; b) that the Italian attack was unprovoked ; c ) that Anglo - Greek cooperation was subsequent — and consequent — to the Italian attack ; d ) that the Greek Government, although resolved to resist a German attack, did everything to avoid it, and e) that the German invasion was unprovoked and undertaken to rescue the defeated Italians in Albania. In this paper I propose to examine these assumptions in the light of evidence newly made avail­ able, and see particularly whether Greece followed a really neutral policy until the Italian attack, and whether the Greco - Italian war was, until Germany decided to intervene and extinguish the poten­ tially dangerous conflict in the Balkans, more than a local war loosely connected with the strategical interests of Britain and Germany. Greece’s foreign relations before World War II were first put to the test in April 1939, on the occasion of the Italian occupation of Al­ bania.
    [Show full text]
  • Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 7 the Titles Published in This Series Are Listed at Brill.Com/Yme Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 7
    Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 7 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/yme Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 7 Editor-in-Chief Oliver Scharbrodt Editors Samim Akgönül Ahmet Alibašić Jørgen S. Nielsen Egdūnas Račius LEIDEN | BOSTON issn 1877-1432 isbn 978-90-04-29889-7 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-30890-9 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents Preface ix The Editors xv Editorial Advisers xvii List of Technical Terms xviii Islams in Europe: Satellites or a Universe Apart? 1 Jonathan Laurence Country Surveys Albania 13 Olsi Jazexhi Armenia 33 Sevak Karamyan Austria 41 Kerem Öktem Azerbaijan 62 Altay Goyushov Belarus 79 Daša Słabčanka Belgium 87 Jean-François Husson Bosnia and Herzegovina 114 Aid Smajić and Muhamed Fazlović Bulgaria 130 Aziz Nazmi Shakir Croatia 145 Dino Mujadžević
    [Show full text]
  • 'Something Is Wrong with Our Army…' Command, Leadership & Italian
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies ‘Something is wrong with our army…’ Command, Leadership & Italian Military Failure in the First Libyan Campaign, 1940-41. Dr. Craig Stockings There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was an Italian military disaster of the highest order. Within hours of Mussolini’s declaration of war British troops began launching a series of very successful raids by air, sea and land in the North African theatre. Despite such early setbacks a long-anticipated Italian invasion of Egypt began on 13 September 1940. After three days of ponderous and costly advance, elements of the Italian 10th Army halted 95 kilometres into Egyptian territory and dug into a series of fortified camps southwest of the small coastal village of Sidi Barrani. From 9-11 December, these camps were attacked by Western Desert Force (WDF) in the opening stages of Operation Compass – the British counter-offensive against the Italian invasion. Italian troops not killed or captured in the rout that followed began a desperate and disjointed withdrawal back over the Libyan border, with the British in pursuit. The next significant engagement of the campaign was at the port-village Bardia, 30 kilometres inside Libya, in the first week of 1941. There the Australian 6 Division, having recently replaced 4 Indian Division as the infantry component of WDF (now renamed 13 Corps), broke the Italian fortress and its 40,000 defenders with few casualties. The feat was repeated at the port of Tobruk, deeper into Libya, when another 27,000 Italian prisoners were taken.
    [Show full text]
  • A Day of Memory, Hope, and Glory at Ground Zero Nix Turkey Ground Blessing Bid for EU Ceremony for the Inclusion New St
    s o C V ΓΡΑΦΕΙ ΤΗΝ ΙΣΤΟΡΙΑ Bringing the news w ΤΟΥ ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΥ to generations of e ΑΠΟ ΤΟ 1915 The National Herald Greek- Americans N c v A weekly Greek-AMeriCAn PubliCAtion www.thenationalherald.com VOL. 18, ISSUE 889 October 25-31 , 2014 $1.50 Cyprus Will A Day of Memory, Hope, and Glory at Ground Zero Nix Turkey Ground Blessing Bid for EU Ceremony for the Inclusion New St. Nicholas By Constantinos E. Scaros TNH Staff and Constantine S. Sirigos NICOSIA — European Union NEW YORK – The images of the member Cyprus will oppose any ground blessing service of the progress in Turkey’s ongoing new St. Nicholas Shrine at talks to join the 28-nation bloc Ground Zero on October 18, in response to a Turkish gas presided over by Archbishop search in waters where Cyprus Demetrios of America, will be - has already licensed companies come iconic for the Greek-Amer - to drill, an official said. ican community. The move is one of several First and foremost, since it new measures that the Cypriot was a day to mourn the loss of government unveiled after ac - those Greek-Americans who cusing Turkey of stepping up its perished on 9/11, there was the violation of the small country’s moving scene of their relatives sovereign rights by dispatching bearing vessels filed with water a research ship off its southern from the pools of the nearby coast. 9/11 Memorial, which they Cypriot President Nicos poured into the crystal bowl on Anastasiades will also lodge a the on the altar.
    [Show full text]