General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks of February 1941 by JOHN S. KOLIOPOULOS The Anglo-Greek talks of February 1941 are one of the most con- troversial issues in the historiography of World War II. The talks were held in Athens to discuss Britain's decision earlier in that month to help Greece against a possible German attack, and to agree on a line of defense which could be reasonably expected to check the enemy ad- vance. In addition to the strength of the forces required to hold the enemy and the allocation of these forces, the representatives of the two 'countries were obliged to take into account two important factors: (a) the attitude of Yugoslavia; and (b) the time factor. In accordance with the agreement reached late on February 22, the British would send to Greece, in addition to their air force units already operating in the country, five squadrons of aircraft and land forces equal to four divisions. The British troops would arrive in three installments, and would be deployed on a line to the west of Salonika, running from northwest to southeast along Mt. Vermion and Mt. Olympus, the "Aliakmon line," as it was called. The Greeks, on the other hand, would provide four additional divisions (thirty-five battalions) from Thrace and eastern Macedonia for the defense of the Aliakmon line, and one division in reserve at Larissa. By the same agreement, Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, undertook to approach Yugoslavia in order to enlist its military cooperation with Britain and Greece. A week later, disagreement arose over the timing of the withdrawal of the Greek forces from their advanced positions in northeastern Greece. Eden and the other British representatives maintained that, according to the agreement of February 22, the Greeks were required to commence the withdrawal of their troops immediately after the agreement, irrespective of Yugoslavia's attitude. General Alexandros Papagos, Chief of the Greek General Staff, on the other hand, maintained with equal force that it had been agreed that the Greek decision to withdraw should be held over until a reply had been received from Yugoslavia to Eden's ap- proaches. It is essential to note in this connection that the Aliakmon line abandoned Salonika, the port city of northern Greece—and the only safe and effective means by which Yugoslavia could be supplied by Britain in time of war—to the enemy.' 'The principal sources until the opening of the British archives at the Public Record Office have been: A. Eden, The Reckoning (London, 1965); A. Papagos, The Battle of Greece, 1940-1941 (Athens, 1945—English edition, Athens, 1949); 28 JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA A recent study has attempted to solve the problems of the interpreta- tion of these events, as well as related problems such as the broader question of the motives behind Britain's decision to help Greece against the Germans early in 1941, 2 bypointing out that, "on balance, history must support Papagos's version of exactly what was agreed on at Tatoi." 3 This conclusion has been based on ample archival evidence and par- ticularly on the British record of the Tatoi conference. A safer conclusion might have been possible if Greek General Staff papers had been ac- cessible. Unfortunately, the papers concerning the Anglo-Greek talks of 1941 have been out of reach, their fate still a mystery, assuming, of course, that they were not actually lost during the evacuation of the Greek government in April 1941? Nevertheless, the issues involved, and par- ticularly Papagos's position and attitude at the conference and afterwards, might be approached with the assistance of available Greek sources, and an effort could be made to see these issues in the light of Greek strategy and tactics as well as Anglo-Greek relations at the time. This approach, although it may not add much in the form of conclusions, might perhaps provide additional insights or at least a broader perspective. Such ques- tions as Greek war plans, and priorities and aims in 1940-1941 and prior to the Italian attack on Greece, are not irrelevant to the problem at hand; on the contrary, they may go a considerable way in explaining Papagos's attitude at the conference of February 1941. Anglo-Greek relations since the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936 were friendly and left little to be desired, at least from the point of view of British interests.' Britain could rely on a friendly Greece in an emergency in the Mediterranean, avoiding at the same time any inconvenient com- mitments which would arise from an alliance with Greece. In April 1939, in place of something more concrete and binding, the British government publicly guaranteed Greece's independence: it was a solemn and face-saving gesture, but empty of any substantive commitments. Several months earlier, in October 1938, the British government had turned down a proposal by loannis Metaxas, the Greek dictator, for an W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III (Boston, 1950); L. Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Vol. I (London, 1970); C. Buckley, Greece and Crete (London, 1952); and F. de Guingand, Operation Victory (London, 1947). 'Martin van Creveld, "Prelude to Disaster: the British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940-1941," Journal of Contemporary History, IX(1974). 'Ibid. pp. 85-86. 4Col. A. Korozis, The Wars, 1940-1941: Successes and Responsibilities (in Greek), Vol. I (Athens, 1978), pp. 7-8. Col. Korozis was a Staff Officer and very close to Papagos. He maintains that, in April 1941, Papagos's personal papers, as well as a number of General Staff papers, were withdrawn at Papagos's orders and put into safe hiding. 'Anglo-Greek relations during 1935-1941 have been the subject of the author's Ph.D. dissertation at the University of London (1972), published under the title, Greece and the British Connection, 1935-1941 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977). General Papagos and the Anglo-Greek Talks 29 Anglo-Greek alliance. Britain needed a friendly, not an allied, Greece, so as to avoid both offending the Italians and undertaking undesirable commitments.' The war led to closer Anglo-Greek cooperation, but also sowed seeds of future discord, which had to do with different strategic considerations, if not interests. British planners were interested in Greece mainly as an air and naval base from which air attacks could be launched against Italy and communications in the Aegean Sea controlled. Greek strategy and war preparations, on the other hand, had been directed to- ward covering a static defensive war against Bulgaria; so much so that, until April 1939, when Italy occupied Albania and posed a direct threat to Greece, Greek war planning was concerned exclusively with defense against Bulgaria. In April 1939, the Greek General Staff was caught off-guard and facing the wrong enemy. There was no mobile expedi- tionary force; the air force lacked modern equipment; A. A. defenses were poor; and coastal defenses were non-existent. Considerable funds— and pride—had been invested on the elaborate fortifications sealing off Bulgaria, the line which was named after Metaxas. Papagos later admitted that the Greek government had stated that the single aim of Greek military preparations was to deal with Bulgaria in the event of a Greek-Bulgarian war, with the initiative being left to the enemy. The aim was also in accord with Greece's obligations arising from the Balkan Pact of 1934, of which Greece was a member. "Never had the Government," he goes on to say, "considered the possibility of a war against Italy as an aim of our military preparations." Greece even lacked a plan covering the Italian danger.' As was to be expected, the Italian occupation of Albania sounded the alarm, and, on May 4, 1939, the General Staff produced the first war plan covering both Italy and Bulgaria, Plan IB. The new plan, after taking into account the help that Greece might reasonably expect from its Balkan partners in the event of a Bulgarian attack, as well as what help Greece might hope to receive from Britain, divided Greek ground forces into two lines of defense. Thus, the fully mobilized forces of Greece were allocated as follows: five divisions and two brigades to the Albanian sector, six divisions and one brigade to the Bulgarian one (not including the forts garrisons), and five divisions and one brigade as general reserve, of which the Albanian sector received two divisions, while the rest were stationed in the Salonika area.' This allocation, which clearly favored the defense sector facing Bulgaria, has been defended by Papagos as satisfying the need to hold Bulgaria at all costs in order to enable Turkey to come to Greece's as- sistance.° But the preoccupation, as we shall see, hardly explains by 'Foreign Office correspondence relating to Metaxas's proposal and its recep- tion at the Foreign Office in PRO, F0371/22362. Papagos, The Greek Army and its Preparadness for War, 1923-1940 (in Greek, Athens, 1945), pp. 253-326. 'ibid., pp. 327-328; Korozis, I, pp. 611-613. 9A. Papagos, The Greek Army, p. 328; Korozis, I, p. 613. 30 JOURNAL OF THE HELLENIC DIASPORA itself the emphasis laid by the Greek General Staff on the defense of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier, and on static defensive warfare in general. What seems to have been the case, besides Greece's obligations arising from the Balkan Pact and its alliance with Turkey, was the deep-rooted, if understandable, Greek fear of Bulgaria, as well as a state of mind—the Maginot mentality of the Greek General Staff in the interwar period.