PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL
History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II
VOLUME I
HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3 DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
PCN 19000262400 Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal
HISTORY OF U. S. MARINE CORPS
OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II
VOLUME I
. by
LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANK O. HOUGH, USMCR
MAJOR VERL13 E. LUDWIG, USMC
HENRY I. SHAW, JR.
Historical Bmnch, G-3 Diuisiwz, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps :I,ibrary of Congress C!atalog Card Ko. 58-60002 Foreword
With t,he recent completion of our bistoricnl monograph project,, the Marine Corps historical program entered a new phase. This book is the first of a projected five-volume series covering completely, and we hope definitively, the history of Marine operations in World War II. The fifteen hist,orical monogmpl~s published over n period of eight years have served to spotlight the high points in this broad field. The basic resea~rch which underlay their preparat,ion vi11 be utilized again in this project. But a monograph by its very nnt,ure aims at, a limited obje&ve, and in its comxntm- tion on B single bat,tle or campaign necessarily ignores many related subjects. All too oft,en it has been dificult~ to avoid conveying the impression that the specific operation under discussion was taking place in a vuc~um. Thus, while mu& valuable &tory has been writt,en, the st,ory as R wlrole remains untold. This lack the present project aims to rectify. The story of individual b;rttlrs or rnmpaigns, now isolated between tire covers of separate publications, will be, l;w&y rewrittrn and woven tog&her in an att,empt to show events in proper relation to exh other and in correct perspect,ivo to the war as a whole. In addition, new mat,erial, especially from .Jalmnese sources, which has become available since the \wit,ing of the monographs, will be integrated into t,be story. Only ~lren t,he broad pict,ure is awibd~le can tbo significance of the Marine Corps’ cont,ribnt,ioo t,o t,lx final victory in tlw Pacific be fairly evnluated. Non a word about Vo111me I wbicb sket,cbes briefly the development of the Marine Corps’ nmphibions mission from its incept,ion and then carries t;he story of World War II t,broupb Guadnlc;~n;~l. ;Yis logistirnl officer of t,he 1st Marine Division, I was privileged to take part, in this, our first, eflort t,o st,rike back at, the Japa~ncse. Looking rearw;uxl from the vantage point of Inter years when our mxt,eriel superiority was “rorwlwlmin~, it, is dificult, t,o visualize tlrose lean first, months in tlw Pacitiv ~~lwn there ws nerer enon,ob of anything, and Allird st,ratrgy of girirrp top prio&y to Europe meant that there would not, be for some time to rome. Tbns “or initial offensive quickly and richly esrned the nickname “~l’Wlt~i”11 Slloest~ring.” But, t;he shoestring held during those early criticrrl days n4wr it,s holding nppenred lri,~lrly questionnble; and when it, did> the nlt,imnte outcome of t,he,WRI ’ in the Pwrific ceased to remxin in doubt.
R. McC. PATE Preface
This book covers Marine Corps participation through t,he first precarious year of World War II, when disaster piled on disaster and there seemed no way to check Japanese aggression. Advanced bases and garrisons rere iso- lated and destroyed: Guam, Wake, and the Philippines. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, “t,he day t,hat will live in infamy,” seriously crippled the U. S. Pacific Fleet; yet that cripple rose to t,nm the t,ide of the entire mar at Midway. Shortly thereafter the U. S. Marines launched on Guadalcan4 an offensive which was destined t,o end only on the home islands of the Empire. The oountry in general, Rnd the Marine Corps in pnrt,icular, r&wed World War II in a b&ter state of praparedness than had been the case in any other previous conflic,t,. But that is a comparat,ive term and does not merit mention in the same sentence with the degree of Japanese preparedness. What the Marine Corps did bring into the var, however, was the priceless in- gredient developed during the years of peace: the amphibious doct,rines and techniques that made possible the trans.Pncific ndvance-and, for that mat,ter, the invasion of North Africa and the European continent. By publishing t,his opernt,ional history iu a durable form, it is hoped to make the Marine Corps record permanently available for the study of mili- tary personnel, the edific,ntion of the general public,, and the contemplation of serious scholars of milituy hist,ory. This initial volume was planned and outlined by Lieutenant Colonel Harry W. Edwards, former Head of t,he Hist,oricxl Branch, G-3 Division, Hend- quart,ers, U. S. Marine Corps. Much of the original writing was done by Lientemmt Colonel Frank 0. Hough, formerly Head of the Writing Section, Hist,orical Branch. Three historical monographs, Lieutenant Colonel Robert, D. Heinl, Jr.% The Defense of Wake and Xarinr.s at Xid,roay, and Major .John L. Zimmerman’s The ~~uadalmnlrl Campaign3 IRR adnpt,ed t,o the needs of this book by Major Verle E. Ludwig, who also cont,ributed considerable origi- nal writ,ing of his own. Mr. Kennet,h 717. Condit wrote the chapter on landing craft development aud shared, with Colonel Charles W. Harrison and Major Hubard I). Iiuokkil, t,he aut~horship of the chapt,rr tre;Lt,ing the evolution of amphibious doct,rine. The bnildq of I’wilic out,post, garrisons, the opening I~OV~Sof the W:W, and the rword of Marines in the defense of the Philippines were written by Mr. Henry I. Sbnw, *Jr. The final editing was done by Colonel Harrison, present Head of t,he Historical Branch. A number of the leading participants in t,be a&ions described have con- mented on preliminary drafts of pertinent portions of this manuscript,. Their valueble assist~ance is gratefully acknowledged. Special t,hanks nre due to t,hose people who read and commented on t,be ent,ire volume: l&utenant General Edward A. Craig, I?. S. Marine Corps, Retired; Dr. .John ;\Iiller, Office of t,hr C,hief of Military Hist,ory, Department of t,he Army ; Captain Frederick Ii. Loomis, Ii. 9. Navy, N:~val History Division. Ofice of tlw Chief of Naval Operations, Department of t,he Navy; and (~‘olonel H&l. who initict,ed the original program of monographs dealing with &rine actions in World Wxr 11. Mrs. Edna Clem Kelley and her successor’ in the Administrative and I’m- duction Section of t,he Historical Bmncb, Miss Kay I’. Sue, ably handled t,he exacting duties involved in processing tlre volume from first drafts tlrrougb final printed form. The many preliminary typescripts nod the JxGnst~alting task of typing the final manuscript, for the printer were done by Mrs. Miriam R. Smallxwod and Mrs. Billie J. Twker. Most of the maps wxe prepared by tire Reproduction Section. Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia. However, we are indebted to the OtIice of t,he Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for permission t,r, use Maps Nos. 3. 14, 15, 20, 21, and 2.3-27. which were originally draft,ed by its Cartographic Branch. Officinl Defense Ikpwtmrnt~ photogr;\phs bavr been used t~hroughont~the test.
1% W’. SNEDEKER WAJCIHCENF.RAL, u. 8. MARI&-ECORPS ASSr8~ANTCHIXF OF WTAFF.IF-3 Contents
PART 1 INTRODUCTIOX TO THE MARTNE CORPS
CHAPI‘F.R PACX 1. Origins of a, Mission 3 2. Evolution of Modern Amphibious Wnrfuy 1920-3941 8 3. Dcvrlopment of Landing Craft,. 23 4. Marine Occupation of Jrelrtnd 35 5. Thr Marine Corps 011 the Eve of Wa,r. 47
PART II WAR COMES
1. Prrver Situat,ion in the Pacific...... 59 2. JapanStrikes ...... 70 3. Thr Sorrthcrn T,ifcline...... 84
PART III THE DEFENSE OF WAKE
1. Wa,ke.in the Shadow of War ...... 95 2.. The Emmy Strikes...... 106 3. Wake Under Siege ...... 121 4. The Fall of Wnkf ...... 132 .5. C’onclusions ...... 1.50
PART 1V MARINES IN THE PHTLlPPI~ES
1. China and Luzon ...... 155 2. Bnt,aan Prelude ...... 172 3. The SiPge and Cnptnre of C’orregidor ...... 154
PART V DECTSION AT MlDWAY
1. Setting t,hc S&y: E&.rly Naval Operations 205 2. Japanese Plans: Toward Midwny and t,be Kort,h Pacific 214 3. hlidaay Girds for Bat,tle 216 4. Midway Venus the Japanese, 4-5 .June 1942 221 5. Batt,le of t,he Carrirr Planes, 4 June 1942 226 PART VI THE TURNING POINT: GUADAXIANAL
CHAPTER PAGE I. Background and Preparations 235 2. Guadalcanal, 7-9 August 1942 254 3. Tulagi and Gavut,n-Tanambogo 263 4. The Bat,& of t,hr Tenaru 274 5. The B&e of the Ridge 294 6. Act,ion Along t,he Matanikan 310 7. Jspa~nese C?ount,eroffensivc 322 8. critical November 341 9. Final Period, 9 December 1942-9 February 1943 359
APPENDICES
A. Bibliographical Notes 375 B. C~xlronolog>- 382 C. Marine Task Organizntion and C’ommand I,ist,s 387 D. Marine C~asualties 395 E. First, Marine Division Operat,ion Order-Gusdalcanal 396 F. Milit,ary Map Symbols 399 G. Guide to Abbrevist,ions 400 H. Unit, Commendat,ions 404
Index 413
1LLUSTRATIONS
C:ontinental Marines 6 Marincs of Huntington’s B&t&n 6 Marines in France in World War I 12 Bandit-Hunting Patrol in Nicaragua 12 Experimental Amphibian Tractor 25 Early Version of 1,anding Craft 25 Air Evaruat,ion of Wounded in Nicaragua 49 Army Light Tank Landing at, New River, K. C: 49 Pearl Harbor A&k 72 .Japanese Landing on Guam 72 Japanese Patrol Craft, Lost at, Wake 135 Japanese Naral Troops Wbo Took Wake 135 Japanese on Bnt,nan 174 Aerial View of C?rrcgidor Island 186 Effect of Japanese Bombardment of Clorrrgidor 186 An Army B-25, One of Doolit,tle’s Raiders 208 Ja,pancsr Can% Shoho 208 II,LUSTKI1TIONS--Continucrl
(!anmlmagrd lmkout ‘I’mrrr nt SWld ISliLUd ...... Japanese (‘ruisrr Mi~wna ...... Crude Sk&b Mnp of Gundnlrarml ...... Eqnipmmt~ for the 1st Marine Division ...... Murinc Rnidcrs and thr Cww of the Snbmarinr Argonaut ...... The Original Hmdrrson Field ...... Unloading Supplies nt Guadalcnnal ...... Tulagi Island ...... Tannmbogo nnd Gnvrrt,u Islnnds ...... Marine Commnr~ders on Guadnlcarml ...... LVT Bridge Built, hy Marine Enginrrrs ...... Solomons Nat,ives Guide a Patrol ...... BOmm Antinircrnft, Guns of tbr 3d Drfcnsc Bnt,talion ...... 105mm Howit~zrr of the 1 I t,ll Mnrin~s ...... Rnidrrs! Ridge ...... ~Iarincs of tlw 211 Rnidm Battalion ...... The Pagoda at IImderson Field ...... (ladus Air Forcr Planes ...... Five Blasted J~~pnncse Talks ...... hlarinr Light, Tanks...... Japnncsr Torpedo Planr ...... lNavnl Gunfire support, ...... :37mm Guns of t,bc Ammirnl Division ...... 1st Division Marinrs Lravc Guadelrannl ......
1 F. ‘l’lrc I’mmrtcv, 1% A11gust 1’34% 287 x COhTENTS
MAPS+Cont,inued PAGE 17. Battle of t,he Tenaru, 21 August, 1942 289 18. The Perimeter, 12-14 Scpt,ember 1942 300 19. Edson’s Ridge-First Phase, 12-l? Sept,ember 1942 304 20. Edson’s Ridgo~Final Phase, 13 Scpt,rmbrr 1942 307 21. hlat~anikau Action, 24-27 Soptcmbrr 1942 314 22. Matonikati Offensive, 7-9 October 1942 318 23. October At,tacks on t,he Perimeter Map Srct,ion 24. Push Toward Kokumbona, l-4 Kovembu 1942 344 25. Koli Point, 4-9 November 1942 Mnp Section 26. Bat,& Area, Dewmber 1942~Jnnnary 1943 Map Sect,ion 27. XIV Corps Plan-~~-First January Offensive 1’fa.p Section 28. Capt,urc of Kokumbonn and Advance t,o t,he Poha Riwr, 23-25 January 1943 .CIap &&on 29. Final Phase, 26 January-9 February 1943 370 PART ONE
Introduction to the Marine Corps PART ONE
Introduction to the Marine Corps CHAPTER 1 Origins of a Mission
In a sense, Marines may be said to have combat they became the ship’s small-arms existed in ancient times when the l?hoeni- fighters: sniping from the fighting tops, cians, and subsequently the Greeks and and on deck spearheading boarding parties Remans, placed men aboard their ships in close action or repelling enemy board- for the specific purpose of fighting, in ers. Ashore they guarded naval installa- contrast to the crews who navigated them tions, both at home and abroad, and upon and the rowers who propelled them. How- occasion fought on land beside Army com- ever, Marines in the modern sense date to ponents. Amphibious-wise, they were Seventeenth Century England where, in available as trained landing parties, either 1664, a regiment of ground troops was to seize positions on hostile shores, or to raised specifically for duty with the fleet protect the lives and property of nationals as well as ashore. This unit bore the some- in foreign countries. Both the British what ponderous title: “Duke of York and and IT. s. Marines have seen much such Albany’s Maritime Regiment of Foot.” service. Over a period of many decades of ex- At the time of this writing the Marine pansion and evolution, during much of Corps is 181 years old, according to its which nobody knew for certain whether own reckoning, though its service has not it belonged to the Army or the hTavy, this been continuous. Marines celebrate their basic unit developed into the corps known Corps’ birthday on 10 November, this being today as the Royal Marines. the date in the year 1775 when the Con- By the time of the American Revolution, tinental Congress authorized the raising the status of the 13ritish Marines had of two battalions of Marines for the Con- jelled firmly. Thus, when the American tinental service. The scanty records ex- Colonies revolted al;d began setting up tant show nothing to indicate that those their own armed services, they modeled battalions were actually raised, but many these much along the lines of the similar Marines were recruited for service on components of the mother country, these board the ships of the infant Navy where being the forms with which they were most they performed creditably in all the major familiar and which suited them best tem- sea actions of the Revolutionary War, peramentally. This was true of the Con- staged two important amphibious land- tinental Marines and to an even greater ings in the Bahamas, and ashore partici- degree of the Marine Corps, reactivated pated in the Trenton-Princeton campaign under the Constitution in 1798. under General Washington. In the days of wooden, sail-propelled The Continental Marines, like the Navy ships the functions of the Marines became and all but a minuscule detachment of the well defined. At sea they kept order and Army, passed out of existence following were responsible for internal sec(mity. In the close of the Revolutionary War. How-
3 4 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL ever, foreign pressures brought the Navy at top level, as well, and over the years back into existence in 1798 under the re- the two organizations developed a very cently adopted Constitution, and on 11 close and most cordial relationship that July of that year the Marine Corps was exists to this day, despite the strange evo- reactivated as a separate service within lutionary divergence that set in between the naval establishment. them: Since that date Marines have fought in The transition of navies from sail to every official war the United States has steam began evolutionary developments had—and scores of obscure affairs that which profoundly altered the nature of lacked official blessing but in which, to all shipboard duties, and temporarily quote the eminent Marine writer, John W. threatened both corps with extinction. Thomason, Jr., “. . . a man can be killed From this the Royal Marines emerged as dead as ever a chap was in the .4r- burdened with a miscellany of often in- gonne.”’ They have served as strictly congruous duties never envisioned in the naval troops, both ashore and afloat, and old days, and considerably emasculated by participated in extended land operations lack of a single mission of overriding im- under Army command, notably in the portance. That the eflect on the U. S. Creek-Seminole Indian Wars of the 1830’s, Marines w-as precisely the reverse resulted the Mexican War, both World Wars, and from the fundamental difference in the in Korea. problems facing the txvo nations which All over the world, Britian’s Royal Ma- required L’. S, Marines to carve out a spe- rines were seeing much the same type of cial mission for themselves, though they service. For a century or more the courses traveled a long, uneven road in bringing of the two corps ran parallel, and they this to full fruition. were as functionally alike as it is possible The basic problem that confronted the for any two military organizations to be. early steam navies was that of obtaining Individual members of these services had fuel. Sail-propelled men-of-war, on so many interests in common that, as one which all naval experience and tradition British writer put it, they had a tendency up to that time was based, could operate to “chum up” 2 when ships of the two na- at sea almost indefinitely, putting in only tions put in to the same ports. Even the to replenish provisions and water, readily present [“. S. Marine emblem (adopted in available at nearly any port of call any- 1868 ) derives from that of the Royal Ma- where in the world. But sufficient coal rines; though at a glance they appear en- to support large-scale steamship opera- tirely different, the basic motifs of both tions could be obtained only from well are the fouled anchor and globe: the East- stocked basesl and a fleet’s operating ern Hemisphere for the British, the West- radius thus became limited by the loca- ern for the L;. S. Much in common existed tion of such bases, If an enemy lay be- yond that radius, the fleet might as well ‘ Capt J. W. Thomason, Jr., l%r Bauon.ets ! ( Xew York : Charles Scribners Sons, 1955 ed. ), be chained to a post so far as getting at xiv. ‘ LtCol M. Rose, RMA, A Short Hi8tor~ of the “ LtCol R. 1). Heinl, Jr., “What Happened to Ro~al Marine8 ( Deal, England: Depot Royal the Royal Marines ?,’” U&’XI Proceedings, Febru- Marines, 1911 ), 22. ary 1!349, 169. ORIGINS OF A MIS SIOAT 5 him was concerned, unless the source of It would seem, particularly with bene- supply could be projected farther in his fit of today’s hindsight, that the Marine direction. Corps would be the logical choice for the To the British Empire, on which “the development of this mission. However, sun never sets;’ this posed no serious prob- this was not so apparent at tile time. Ma- lem; it had, or could build, all the bases it rines had never participated in tl~is type needed without leaving its own territory. of operation on anything resembling the But the United States, with few outlying scale envisioned, and they comprised a possessions, had genuine cause for con- very small unit as compared to the blue- cern. In order to give the fleet signifi- jackets. One school of thought con- cant operating range in the Pacific, the tended that the advanced base function Navy in 1878 set up a coaling station in should be performed entirely by Navy Samoa, and in 1887 the government con- personnel under command of naval offi- cluded a treaty with Hawaii permitting cers, in the interests of unity and other the establishment of another at Pearl considerations.’ The controversy, strictly Harbor. on the theoretical level, waxed warm and But the United States had no deep- sometimes acrimonious, giving rise at seated interest in the Far East during this length to one of those perennial efforts to era, and no serious apprehension of an at- eliminate the Marines altogether.G tack from that direction. The Navy’s However, the advent of the Spanish- principal concern lay in the possibility American War found the Navy wholly of being obliged to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean or South At- unprepared to cope with the advanced lantic. As early as 1880, far-sighted base problem. It was the Marine Corps naval officers began turning their thoughts that promptly organized an expedition- toward this mission. The cost of main- ary bzt.talion, including its own artillery taining permanent bases in those areas component, for the seizure of Guanta- would have been prohibitive, so the prob- namo Bay, Cuba, in order to enable the lem boiled down to devising a plan for U. S. Fleet to operate indefinitely in the seizing advanced bases when and where Caribbean waters. At Key West this strategy dictated their need and develop- unit underwent training in minor tactics, ing these as quickly as possible to with- basic weapons, and musketry, and then stand attack. The scattered, under- landed in the target area on 10 June 1898, strength U. S. Army of that era could not ten days before the first Army troops ar- supply sutlicient trained ground troops on rived ofl the coast of Cuba. There the the short notice necessary to make such Marines quickly secured a beachhead and operations effective, so the Navy faced successfully defended it against a nu- the problem of developing ground merically superior enemy. troops of its own for service with the fleet.’ $For detailed discussion of this controversy, ‘E. B. Potter (ed ), !f’he United States and see W. H. Russell. “The Genesis of FMF Doc- World flea Power (New York: Prentice-Hall, trine: 1879–1809,” M(7 Gazette, April–July 1951. 1955 ), .577-578, hereinafter cited as 7’. S. & Sea ‘ Lt(M R. D. Heinl. .Jr., “’l’he Cat with More l’otc<,r. than Nine Lives,” ~“NA’I Proceeding.?, June 1954.
ORIGIN’S OF .i MI SSIOX 7
So expeditiously and etliciently was this waii followed shortly.a Aclditional ad- ol)eration condllcted tllnt its eontriblltion vanced bases were established iu tl~e Pllil- . . totlle speedy and decisi~ecllllllil]atioll of Ipplnes themselves as soon m the situation the war would be ditlicult to evaluate. permitted. This also grextly strengtllel~eci tbe Ma- This increasing consciousness of the rine Corps’ ‘cl ainl to tile hTavy’s amphibi- hTavy’s widespread commitments ancl re- ous mission, x c1ainl tllntj gained still fur- sponsibilities brought about tl~e evolu- ther strength by .Idmiral Dewey’s subse- tion:wy developments which culminate] quent statenlent tlmt if a similar Marine in the early 1940’s in the amphibious as- component liad served with his fleet at sault cloctrines and tecbuiques “which fi- Manil:t 13:~y, tile wl~ole painful and pro- nally made possible what, Major Creuera] tracted I>hilippille Insurrection might ,J. F. C. Fuller has czlled ‘the most, far- nave been avoided. -reaching tactical innovation of [World Tile Sp:lllisl~-.\llleric:lll l~ar signa]ize(l ~~:lr II].? ‘? s elllergeuce of tbe ITllited States as a world
power. Possession of tile I’bilil)pines bombardment for a courtesy salnte and hurried Ci\lH?(l tile Navy, to reappraise tile wl~ole out to the Cy71arlcstot1to apologize for his inabil- Far E:lst situntlou. The 17SS (’ilc/r/e,s- ity t{) return it for lack of anmlunitim. He ton. convoying A!rnly troops to lhniln, l)roml)tly surrendered the island npon being ap- paused en rollte to seize tile Spanish is- prised of the facts. 8 I~rior to the Sl)anish W;ar, the question of laIId of ~TIIam to serve ;1s an advallce(l the annexation of Hawaii had been under ne- coaling station>: and al)l~exation of H:I- gotiation off and on for many years between that government and the I’nited States. In a 7Seizure of Guam reqllirc(l no lnntling force. treaty signed in 1875, Hawaii had been de- The Spmish governor had not learned nbour the clared “an American sphere of influence. ” declaration of war and mistook the token mml ‘Qnotedin [:. S.& Sc3a Potccr,587.
448777 O—58—2 CHAPTER 2
Evolution of Modern Amphibious Warfare, 1920-1941
J!Y.4ZJ?LI”DE I’EL(ll’i7f A’lVI’Y nlit the formation of a perrmment ad- The success of the Gu:~lltal~amo Bay wmced base force. Made up of two regi- operation auc{ tl~e very real possibility ments, one of coast artillery, mines, that tile l~niteci Stilt13S” l)ew position in searchlights, ell.gilleers, conlmullicators, world affairs might lead to repetitions of and other specialists for fixed defense, essentially tile same sitll~tion led nigh - fin{l the other of infantry and field ar- level naval strategists to beconle inter- tillery for mobile defense, the ndwmced ested in establisl)ing a similar force on a base force totallecl about 1,750 officers and permanent basis: a force capable of seiz- men. In ,Tanuary of 1914 it was rein- i?lg an(l defending :idvallced I)ases which forced by a small Mariue Corps aviation tile fleet could utilize in tile proseclltion of (detachment, and joiuecl the fleet for m:v naval war in distal~t waters-waters con- neuvers at Culebra.z 13ut the analogy be- ceivably mucl~ more distant tl~an the Ca- tween advanced base traiuillg and tile :lm- ribbean. This in tllrn led to tile setting phibious assault techniques that emerged up of a class ill tile fllll(lanlel]tals of ad- in Worlcl War II is easily overdrawn. vanced base work at Newport> Rhoc]e Prior to World War I the primary inter- klmd in 1901. I)uring the winter of est was in defense of :1b:lse against ellenly 1902-1903” a Marine batt:llioll engaged i~~ attack. There was no serious contem- advanced base (Iefence ~xercises ~11t]le is- plation of large-scxle landings against land of (“ulebr:l in tile ~aribbe:l~l ill com heavily defended areas. junction with the annual maneuvers This all but exclusive concern for the of the fleet. Expeditionary services in defense of bases was clearly borne out ~uba :md Pamma ~)revent wl al] immedi - by the writing of Major Earl H. Ellis. ate followup to this early base defense El] is, one of the most brilliant young instruction, but in 1910 a pern]anent ad- Marine staff officers, was among the vanced bnse school was organized at XTew farsighted military tl~inkers v-ho saw the I.ondon, Connecticut. ii ye:~r later it, prospect of war between the United was moved to Plliladelpllil.l States and .Japan prior to World Wzr 1. By 1913 sufficient progress had been hound 1913, he directed attention to the umde in xdvanced base instruction to per- 2Annuul Rrport of tltc .Vojo~ Cm?cral Com- ‘ .J. A. Isely and P. A. Crow], ‘Z’}/c [’. S’. .Va- n[undnkjt of tltc Marine Corps, 1,91~ (lVashing- vitles and Anlpltil)ious War (Prin(wton : Prince- ton : ,GPO, 1914). Hereinafter all annual re- ton I’niversity F)ress, 1!)51 ), 21–22, hereinafter ports from the Office of the Commandant will cited as Marines nnd Amph ibicws li~ar. be cited as CMC AnRept ( year).
8 EVOLUTION’ OF MODERA- ANPHIBIOVS TVARFARE, 1W20–1941 9 problems of a future Pacific conflict. To landing of Marines in that country. Ex- bring military force to bear against peditionary service in these two Caribbean Japan, Ellis pointed out, the L-nited republics WM to constitute a heavy and States would have to project its fleet continuing drain on Marine Corps re- across the Pacific. To support these sources which might otherwise have been operations so far from home would re- devoted to advanced base activities. quire a system of outlying bases. The expansion of the Marine Corps to Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines, about 73,OOO officers and men during which were the most important of these, World War I served as a temporary stimu- we already possessed. Their defense lant to the Advance Base Force. In spite would be of utmost importance and of the demands for manpower resulting would constitute the primary mission from the sending of an expeditionary force of the Marine aclvanced base force. to France, the Advance Base Force was Ellis discussed ili considerable detail maintained at full strength throughout the troops which would be required and the war. By the Armistice it numbered the tactics they should employ. 6,297 officers and men.’ In addition to the bases already in the possessiol~ of the United States, Ellis foresaw the need of acquiring others held by ,Tapan. To the. Marine Corps would Marines returning from overseas late in fall the job of assaulting the enemy-held 1919 picked up where they left off three territory. .iltllough he did not discuss years before. At Quantico the Advance the problems involved nor take up the Base Force, redesignated the Expedition- tactics to be employed, Ellis fore- ary Force in 1921, stood ready to occupy shadowed the amphibious assault which and defend an advanced base or to restore was to be tile primary mission of the law and order in a Caribbean republic. Marine Corps in World War 11.3 In that year it included infantry, field The infant Advance Base Force was cli- artillery, sigrml, engineer, and chemical verted to other missions almost as soon m troops, and aircraft. .4 similar expedi- it was created. Hardly were the Culebm tionary force was planned for San Diego, maneuvers of 1914 completed when the but perennial personnel shortages pre- Marines were sent to Mexico for the seizure vented the stationing of more than one of lTera Cruz. The next year they went infantry regiment and one aircraft squad- ashore in Haiti, and in 1916 unsettled con- l’on tl~we durily the 1920’s.: ditions in Santo Domingo required the Nothing seemed clmnged, but delegates of tl~e Cxreat Powers, meeting at Versailles 3Earl H. Ellis, “Naval Bases” (MS, n. d.). to write the peace treaty ending World The date and origin of this MS and to whom War I, had already t:aken an action which it was addressed are obscure, but it appears was to lmve far-reaching consequences for that the work is either a lecture or a series of lectures with the following divisions: “l. Naval Bases ; Their Location, Resources and ‘ I.tCol C. H. Metcalf, A Ht.storv of M c United Security; 2. The Denial of Bases; 3. The Security States Marine Corps (New York: Putnam’s. of Advanced Bases and Advanced Base Opera- 1939) , 45+460, 472. tions; 4. The Advanced Base Force.” ‘ CMC AnRepts, 1921–29. 10 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL a future generation of Marines. In the Marines shared Ellis’ views. “The seizure general distribution of spoils, the former and occupation or destruction of enemy German island possessions in the central bases is another important function of the Pacific had been mandated to the Japa- expeditionary force>” he stated in a lecture nese. At one stroke the strategic balance before the Naval War College in 1923. in the Pacific was shifted radically in “On both flanks of a fleet crossing the favor of Japan. That country now pos- Pacific are numerous islands suitable for sessed a deep zone of island outposts. submarine and air bases. .411 should be Fortified and supported by the Japanese mopped up as progress is made. . . . The fleet, they would constitute a serious ob- maintenance, equipping and training of stacle to the advance of the United States its expeditionary force so that it will be Fleet across the Pacific. in instant readiness to support the Fleet Earl Ellis was one of the first to recog- in the event of war,’> he concluded, “I nize the significance of this strategic shift. deem to be the most important Marine In 1921 he modified his earlier ideas and Corps duty in time of peace.” 7 submitted them in the form of Operations The 1920s, however, were not the most Plan 712, “.kdvanced Base Operations in favorable years for training in an~phibi- Micronesia.” In this plan Ellis stressed ous operations. .kppropriations for the the necessity for seizing by assault the armed services were slim, and the Navy, bases needed to project the Fleet across whose cooperation and support was neces- the Pacific. He envisioned the seizure of sary to carry out landing exercises, was specific islands in the Marshall, Caroline, more intent on preparing for fleet surface and Palau groups, some of which were actions of the traditional type. Still, a actually taken by Marines in World l~rar limited amount of amphibious training II. He went so far as to designate the was carried out in the first half of the decade. size and type of units that would be nec- During the winter of 1922, a reinforced essary, the kind of landing craft they regiment of Marines participated in fleet should use, the best time of day to effect maneuvers with the Atlantic Fleet. Their the landing, and other details needed to problems included the attack and defense insure the success of the plan. Twenty of Guantanamo Bay, Cubaj and the island years later Marine Corps action was to of Culebra. In March of the following bear the imprint of this thinking: year, a detachment of Marines took part To effect [an amphibious landing] in the face in a landing exercise at Panama, and a of enemy resistance requires careful training battalion of Marines and sailors practiced and preparation, to say the least; and this along a landing on Cape Cod that summer. Marine lines. It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantry men or artillery men of high Panama and (hlebra both witnessed morale; they must be skilled water men and landing exercises early in 19!24, with a jwlgle men who know it can be done—Marines Marine regiment participating. This set with Marine trainin~.” of exercises was the high point of train- The Commandant, Major General John A. Ifijeune, and other high ranking ‘ Maj(;en J. A, Lejeune, “The United States Marine Corps,” MC Gawttc, December 1923, ‘ OPlan 712, AdvBOps in Micronesia, 1921. 252–253. EVOLIJTION OF MODERN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 192&l!Ml 11
ing reached in the twenties. It marked Whatever the shortcomings of the work the advent of serious experimentation in amphibious doctrine and technique dur- with adequate landing craft for troops ing the 1920’s, the Marine Corps scored and equipment. However, it was most a major triumph when its special interest notable for the great number of mistakes in the field became part of the official made in the course of the exercises, such military policy of the United States. as inadequate attacking forces, insufficient ~okt Action of the Army and Navy, a and unsuitable boats, lack of order among directive issued by the Joint Board of the the landing party, superficial naval bom- Army and Navy in 1927, stated that the bardment, and poor judgment in the stow- Marine Corps would provide and main- age of supplies and equipment aboard the tain forces “for land operations in support single transport used.8 of the fleet for the initial seizure and The last landing exercise of the era was defense of advanced bases and for such a joint Army-Navy affair held during the limited auxiliary land operations as are spring of 1925 in Hawaiian waters. It essential to the prosecution of the naval was actually an amphibious command campaign.” post exercise, undertaken at the insistence Further, in outlining the tasks to be of General Lejeune to prove to skeptical performed by the Army and Navy in Army officers that the Marine Corps could “Landing Attacks Against Shore Objec- plan and execute an amphibious operation tives,” this document firmly established the landing force role of the Marine of greater than brigade size. A force of Corps: “Marines organized as landing 42,000 Marines was simulated, although forces perform the same functions as only 1,500 actually participated. It ran above stated for the .4rmy, and because more smoothly than had the previous of the constant association with naval exercise, but still was handicapped by a units will be given special training in the lack of adequate landing craft} conduct of landing operations.” II Even this meager amphibious training came to an end after 1925. New commit- ACTIVATION OF THE ments in Nicaragua, in China, and in the FLEET MARINE FORCE United States guarding the mails served to disperse the expeditionary forces. By The recognition of a mission did not create the doctrine nor the trained forces 1928 the Commandant announced in his to carry it out, and, in 1927, neither was at annual report that barely enough person- hand. In January 1933 the last Marine nel were on hand at Quantico and San had departed from Nicaragua, and with- Diego to keep those bases in operatitm?” drawal from Haiti was contemplated. Troops were now becoming available for ‘ kfarinea and Amphibious War, 30-32. training in landing operations, but before ‘ 13riGen Dion Williams, “Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force,” MC Gazette, September any real progress could be made, one pre- 1926, 76-+%; LtGen M. B. Twining ltr to ACofS, liminary step was essential. A substan- G–3, HQMC, 25Jan57; BPlfm JA&Nav IMercise, tial permanent force of Marines with its 1925, Problem No 3, Blue MarCor ExpedFor, 8Jan25, “ The Joint Board, Joint Action of the Army ‘0 (7MC AnRept, 1928. and Navg (Washington: GPO, 1927), 3, 12.
EVOLUTION OF MODERN AMI’HIB1OCS WARFARE, 192@1941 13 own commander and staff would have to 1. The force of marines maintained by the be organized for the purpose, otherwise major general commandant in a state of readi- training would be constantly interrupted ness for operations with the fleet is hereby designated as fleet marine force ( 1?. M. F.), and by the dispersal of the troops to other as such shall constitute a part of the organiza- commitments. tion of the United States Fleet and be included No one recognized this more clearly in the operating force plan for each fiscal year. than the Assistant Commandant, 13riga- 2. The fleet marine force shall consist of such dier General ,John H. Russell. He as- units as may be designated by the major general sembled a statl at Quantico to plan the commandant and shall be maintained at such strength as is warranted by the general person- organization of a force which could be nel situation of the Marine Corps. rapidly assembled for service with the 3. The fleet marine force shall be available Fleet. In August of 1933 he proposed to to the commander in chief for operations with the Commandant that the old “Expedi- the fleet or for exercises either afloat or ashore tionary Force” be replaced by a new in cuunec Liun with fleet problems. The com- body, to be called either “Fleet Marine mander in chief shall make timely recommenda- tions to the Chief of Naval Operations regarding Force,” or “Fleet Base Defense Force.” such service in order that the necessary arrange- The new force, while an integral part of ments may be made. the LTnited States Fleet, would be under 4. The commander in chief shall exercise the operational control of the Fleet Com- command of the fleet marine force when em- mander when embarked on vessels of the barked on board vessels of the fleet or when en- Fleet or eng~ged in fleet exercises afloat gaged in fleet exercises, either afloat or ashore. or ashore. When not so embarked or en- When otherwise engaged, command shall be directed by the major general commandant. gaged it would remain under the Major 5. The major general commandant shall de- General Commandant. tail the commanding general of the fleet marine R uss e 11’s recommendations were force and maintain an appropriate staff for promptly approved by the Commandant him. and by the Chief of h’aval Operations. 6. The commanding general, fleet marine The designation “Fleet Marine Force” force, shall report by letter to the commander in chief, United States Fleet, for duty in con- (FMF) was preferred by the senior naval nection with the employment of the fleet marine staffs, and the Commandant was requested force. At least once each year, and at such to submit proposed instructions for es- times as may be considered desirable by the com- tablishing “appropriate command and mander in chief, the commanding general, fleet marine force, with appropriate members of his administrative relations between the com- staff, shall be ordered to report to the com- mander in Chief and the Commander of mander in chief for conference.~3 the Fleet Marine Force.’; 12 The decision However significant the creation of the became otlicial with the issuance of Navy FMF may have been in terms of the fu- Department General Order 241, dated 8 December 1933. ture, its initial form was modest enough. This c{irective could well be called the The Commandant, was obliged to report Magna Carta of the Fleet Marine Force. in .kugust 1934 that the responsibility for It stated: maintaining ship’s detachments and gar- risons abroad, and performing essential 12 cNo Itr to CNIC, lz&3p33 ; Marine.s and Amphibious War, 33–34. u Sa~y Dept GO 241, 8Dec33. 14 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL guard duty at naval shore stations, pre- Chief of Naval Operations for “tempo- vented the Marine Corps from assigning rary use . . . as a guide for forces of the component units necessary to fulfill the Navy and the Marine Corps conduct- the mission of the FMF. At this time the ing a landing against opposition.” 15 In total number of officers and men in the mimeographed form it was given rela- FMF was about 3,000.’4 tively limited distribution within the Navy, but wide distribution within the “THE BOOK” COMES OUT Marine Corps. Comments were invited. With the creation of the FMF the Ma- The doctrine laid down in this remark- rine Corps had finally acquired the tacti- able document was destined to become the cal structure necessary to carry out the foundation of all amphibious thinking in primary war mission assigned to it by the the United States armed forces. The Joint Board in 1927. The next order of Navy accepted it as official doctrine in business was to train the FMF for the 1938 under the title of Fleet Training execution of its mission. Publication 167, and in 1941 the War De- But the training could not be very effec- partment put the Navy text between tive without a textbook embodying the Army covers and issued it as Field JIan- theory and practice of landing operations. ual 314. No such manual existed in 1933. There Remarkable as it was, the Marine am- was a general doctrine by the Joint Board phibious doctrine was largely theory -when issued in 1933, and, though it offered it was first promulgated at Quantico in many sound definitions and suggested 1934. To put the theory into practice, general solutions to problems, it lacked major landing exercises were resumed. necessary detail. They were held each winter from 1935 In November 1933, all classes at the Ma- through 1941 on the islands of Culebra rine Corps Schools were suspended, and, and Vieques in conjunction with fleet ex- under the guidance of Colonel Ellis B. ercises in the Caribbean, or on San Clem- Miller, Assistant Commandant of the ente off the California coast. .4 final ex- Schools, both the faculty and students ercise of the prewar period on a much set to work to write a manual setting forth larger scale than any previously at- in detail the doctrines and techniques to tempted was held at the newly acquired be followed in both training and actual Marine Corps base at New River, North operations. IJncler the title, Tentative Carolina, in the summer of 1941. These Manual for Landing Opevotiomsy it was fleet landing exercises provided the prac- tical experience by which details of land- issued in ,January 1934. ing operations were hammered out. On 1.4ugust 1934, the title was changed In light of its importance, here might be to Manua7 for Naval Ouerseas Operatiom as good a place as any to consider briefly and some clmnges were effected in the the more basic aspects of this doctrine as text. A few months later this publica- conceived in the original manual and mod- tion, now retitled Tentatike Landing Op- erations M amuzly WM approved by the K NavDept, Tcntf7tiue Lf7ndin~ Operations Manual, 1935, hereinafter cited as !Z’entattve ‘4 CM(7 AnRept, 1934. Landinf7 Operations Monunl. EVOLUTIOX OF MODERN AMPHH310US WARFARE, 192&1941 15 ified by experience in fleet exercises up to a problem that required resolution.16 They the outbreak of the war. Amphibious op- simply defined the “attack force” as all the erations and ordinary ground warfare forces necessary to conduct a landing op- share many of the same tactical principles. eration and added that the attack force The basic difference between them lies in commander was to be the senior naval of- the fact that the amphibious assault is ficer of the fleet units making up the at- launched from the sea, and is supported by tack force. His command was to consist naval elements. While water-borne the of the landing force and several naval com- landing force is completely powerless and ponents, organized as task groups for the is dependent upon the naval elements for support of the landing. These included, all its support: gunfire, aviation, transpor- among others, the fire support, transport, tation, and communication. In this ini- air, screening, antisubmarine, and recon- tial stage only tie naval elements have the naissance groups. The commanders of the capability of reacting to enemy action. As landing force and of the several naval the landing force, however, is projected task groups operated on the same level onto the beach, its effectii-eness, starting under the over-all command of the attack from zero at the water’s edge, increases force commander throtlghotlt the opera- rapidly until its strength is fully estab- tion. lished ashore. This initial command concept was des- tined to undergo a number of modifications COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS and interpretations which will be discussed in this history as they occur. The first im- This basic difference between land and portant change did not come about until amphibious operations created a problem toward the close of the Guadalcanal cam- in command relationships which has paign?’ plagued amphibious operations from earli- est times. During the initial stage when NAVAL G UNFIR.E 8UPPORT only naval elements have the capability of reacting to enemy action it has been There is nothing new in the concept of generally and logically agreed that the using the fire of ships’ guns to cover an over-all command must be vested in the amphibious landing of troops during its commander of the naval attack force. It most vulnerable phase: before, during, and has, however, not been so generally agreed after the ship-to-shore movement. Our in the past that once the landing force is established ashore and capable of exert- ‘e Unless otherwise noted the material in the ing its combat power with primary reliance remainder of this chapter is derived from !Fen- on its own weapons and tactics that the tative Landing Operations llanua~; FTP–167, landing force commander should be freed Landing Operations Doctrine, L7. S. A’avv (Wash- ington: Office of the CNO, 1938) and changes 1 to conduct the operations ashore as he sees & 2 thereto : 1st MarBrig ltr to CMC, 5Jun39 and fit. encl ( a ) thereto ; 1st MarBrig Flex 6 Rept, The authors of the Tentative Landing “Notes from Critique for Makee Learn Problem Operations Manualj writing in 1934, evi- at Culebra, 1415 Feb40 ;“ 2d MarBrig Minor Landing Exercises Rept, San Clemente Island, dently did not foresee that this particular Calif, 17Apr–6May39. aspect of command relations presented ‘7 See Part VI of this history. 16 PEARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAL
own history contains many examples of the tiring ships , inexperienced in such this technique, notably: two landings of work, untrained, and wholly unfamiliar LT. S. troops in Canada during the War of with the tactical maneuvers of the troops 1812 (York and Niagara Peninsula, sum- they were supporting. Not until 1941 mer 1813 ) ; General Scott’s landing at were trained Marine artillery officers with Vera Cruz in 1847 during the Mexican Marine radio crews substituted, the naval War; several amphibious operations dur- officers then serving in a liaison capacity. ing the Civil War, e. g., Fort Fisher in (lther considerations of a naval nature 1865; and Guantanamo Bay during the served as further limiting factors on the Spanish-American War in 1898. NGF support concept. The necessity for However, the evolution of modern the support ships to have a large propor- weapons posed difficult problems of a tion of armor-piercing projectiles readily technical nature, and the much belabored xvailable with which to fight a surface Gallipoli operation seemed to indicate action on short notice restricted the ac- that these were insoluble. High- cessibility of and limited the amount of powered naval guns, with their flat tra- bombardment shells carried. In turn, the jectory and specialized armor-piercing probability of enemy air and submarine ammunition, proved no true substitute for action once the target area became known land-based field artillery, and much study caused much apprehension in naval minds and practice would be required to develop and dictated the earliest possible depar- techniques which would make them even ture of the firing ships from the objec- an acceptable substitute. tive. An example of this apprehension Nevertheless, a rudimentary doctrine at work came to the fore early in the concerning naval gunfire support evolved Guadalcanal campaign.’s during the years between 1935 and 1941. Furthermore, tradition dies hard in But it evolved slowly and none too any service. The traditional belief that clearly. Experimentation indicated that warships exist for the sole purpose of bombardment ammunition, with its sur- fighting other warships dates far back in face burst, was better suited to fire mis- history, with one of its leading exponents sions against most land targets, while the great Lord Nelson with his oft-quoted armor-piercing shells could be employed flictum: “A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.” to good effect against concrete en)place- This supposed vulnerability of surface ments and masonry walls. The types of vessels to shore-based artillery remained ships and guns best adapted to pertorm very much alive in the minds of naval specific tire nlissions-c]ose support, deep planners. So they dictated that support support, counterblttery, interdiction, ships should deliver their fires at maxi- etc.—were detennil~ed. .Incl some prog- nlum range, while traveling at high speed ress was made ill fire observation tecl~- and maneuvering radically—not exactly nique. conducive to pill-point markmanship.ls Three types of observel’s ~vele l)rovided In sum, these considerations,” the starting con- for: aerial, shipboard and, once the first cept of naval gunfire support with which we waves bad lal~ded, s]lore tire coutrol par- ties. For the greater part of this period ‘mSee Part VI, Chap 2, of this history. the latter were nmcle up of personnel of “ ,Warines and Amphibious War, 38. EVOLUTIOX OF MODERN- AMPHIBIO[l S WARFARE, I!ZW1941 17 entered World Mrar II, added UP to this : a bom- naval gunfire and artillery. Most impor- bardment of very short duration, delivered by tantly, it included rendering direct fire ships firing relatively limited ammunition al- support to the landing force until the lowances of types often not well suited to the purpose, from long ranges while maneuvering artillery was ashore and ready to fire. at high speeds. Obviously, the best that could For this air war, employment of Ma- be expected would be area neutralization of rine squadrons on carriers was considered enemy defenses during troo~ debarkation and ideal but, due to a limited number of car- the ship-to-shore movement, followed by a lim- riers, was not always a. practical possibil- ited amount of support on a call basis, with this, ity. Planners even considered moving too, to be withdrawn as soon as field artillery could be landed.’” Marine planes ashore in crates and as- sembling them, after the ground troops ilrea neutralization-that was the basic had seized an airfield. concept, with deliberate destruction fire Hence, the Tentative Landing Opera- ruled out. A blood bath would be re- tions Manua7 called for the Navy to carry quired to explulge this from “The nook.’” most of the initial air battle. Marine .4Z~ SUPPORT pilots, however , might be employed with Navy air units. Actually, in order to exer- As the Marine Corps developed the var- cise Marine air, most of the early training ious techniques contributing to a smooth landings had to be scheduled within landing operation, it had to give more round trip flying distance of friendly air- and more consideration to the fast fields, Although by 1940 Marine carrier growth of military aviation as a powerful training operations were becoming rou- ,arm. tine, the heavy reliance upon Navy car- Even the original Tentative Landing rier air over Marine landings lasted Operations Manual considered the vulner- throughout the war. able concentrations of troops in trans- As noted before, close coordination of ports, landing boats, and on the beach air with ground received great emphasis and called for a three-to-one numerical in the Marine Corps. Even in Santo superiority over the enemy in the air. Domingo and Haiti and later in Nicara- I,ater, in FTP-167, the ratio was increased gua, Marine pilots reconnoitered, strafed, to four-to-one, primarily to wipe the and bombed insurgent, positions, dropped enemy air threat out of the skies and supplies to patrols, and evacuated secondarily to shatter the enemy’s beach- wounded. Th,e Tentative Landing Oper- head defense and to cut off his reinforce- ations Manual incorporated this team- nlents. work into its new amphibious doctrine, Considerable emphasis was placed, how- and the landing exercises of the late 30’s ever, on direct, assistance to the troops developed aviation fire power as an im- themselves. This included such support- portant close ground support. weapon. By ing services as guiding the landing boats 1939, Colonel Roy S. Geiger advocated and to the beach, laying smoke screens, and other Marine Corps leaders conceded that providing reconnaissance and sl)otting for one of the greatest potentials of Marine aviation lay in this “close air support..’) ‘“ NNI–67,~’at.ffl~t~oflrc in .~t)fph ibious Op ,, EVOLUTION OF MODERN .4JIPHIBIOUS WARFARE, 192&1941 19 ing radio-equipped “observers’> on the each transport and its accompanying front lines to control air support for the troops would be tactically self-sufficient troops. But the Leathernecks were al- for the assault landing, and the loss of one ready in the war before the first standard- ship would not be a crippling blow. To ized Navy-Marine Corps instructions on expedite their debarkation the Marines their employment appeared.25 Also at generally went over the side via cargo nets that time, on Guadalcanal certain infan- rigged at several stations on the ship. try officers were given additional duty as To solve the second major problem in regimental ‘{air forward observers.” the ship-to-shore movement, that of con- They were coached on the spot by aviators trolling and guiding the landing craft to of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.2e their proper beaches, the Tentative Land- ing Operations Manual provided for: (1) THE SHIP-TO-SHORE marking the line of departure with buoys MO VEiWEZVT or picket boats; (2) a designated control The ship-to-shore movement was vis- vessel to lead each boat group from the ualized by the Tentative Landing Opera- rendezvous area to the line of departure, tions Manual in a manner which resem- towing the boats in fog, smoke, or dark- bled closely a conventional attack in land ness, if necessary; (3) wave and alternate warfare: artillery preparation, approach wave guide boats; (4) each boat to carry march, deployment, and assault by the in- a signboard with its assigned letter and f antry. It stressed that this movement number indicating its proper position in was no simple ferrying operation but a the formation; and (5) for a guide plane vital and integral part of the attack itself to lead the boat waves in. and demanded a high order of tactical The system for the control of the ship- knowledge and skill. to-shore movement was still substan- The two major problems in the ship-to- tially the same as prescribed in the Ten- shore movement are the speedy debarka- tative Landing Operatiom Manual when tion of the assaulting troops and their the Marines made their first amphibious equipment into the landing boats and the landing of World War II at Guadalcanal control and guiding of these craft to their on 7 August 1942. assigned beaches. To facilitate the first, COMBAT UNIT LOADIiVG the Tentative Landing Operatiom iKan- ual directed that each transport on which “Combat unit loading” of transports is combat units were embarked should carry the key to amphibious logistics as devel- as a minimum sufficient boats to land a oped by the Marine Corps. This is a prac- reinforced infantry battalion,” Thus tical process designed to make supplies wnd equipment immediately available to ‘s USN, CSP-1536, 5Sep42. the ussault troops in the order needed, dis- w 1st MarDiv, Final Report on Guadaleanal regarding to a large extent the waste of Operation, 1Ju143, Phase V, Annex D, OPlan 2-42, cargo space which results. In contrast 5. The directive on appointing air forward ob- servers was dated 20d.42. is commercial loading which is equally z?This general concept that tI’OOPS and their landing craft should be transported together out. the war, although at times it was necessary to the objective area remained valid through- to deviate from it. 20 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL practical in utilizing every cubic foot of ability of ships sometimes entangled plan- cargo space available but prevents access ning procedures. .4s a result, there was to much of the cargo until the ship is no ideal approximation of wartime com- unloaded. bat loading. Highest priority items for combat unit loacling vary somewhat with the nature SHORi? PARTY and problems of a particular operation. One of the most serious problems en- Relative priorities must be worked out countered in early landing exercises was with minute care. The responsibility for congestion on the beaches as men and sup- handlingt his was given to a Marine offi- plies piled ashore. To keep such a situa- cer designated transport quartermaster tion reasonably in hand requires a high (TQM) aboard each amphibious assault degree of control; control difficult to ship. He had to know not oilly the weight achieve under such circumstances, even and dimensions of each item of Marine when the enemy remains only simulated. gear carried but had to familiarize himself .kssault troops must push inland with all with the characteristics of the particular speed not only to expand the beachhead, ship to which he w7asassiagned: exact loca- but also to make room for following units tion and dimensions of all holds and stor- and equipment to land and to provide age spaces in terms of both cubic feet and space in which personnel assigned strictly deck space, This familiarity required at beach functions can operate. times accurate remeasurement of holds To solve this problem the Tentai%ve and loading spaces as modifications, not Latiing Operations Manual provided for shown in the ship-s plans, had often been a beach party , commanded by a naval made in the ship’s internal structure. Ini- officer called a beachmaster~ and a shore tially, the Ten!atiw Lmdin.g (lperation.~ party, a special task organization, com- Mwnuai directed that, the TQM shoulcl be manded by an officer of the landing force. an officer of the unit embarked, but such The beach party was assigned primarily were the variations in ships that it subse- naval functions, e. g., reconnaissance and quently proved more feasible to assign z marking of beaches, marking of hazards Marine officer, thoroughly familinr witli to navigation, control of boats, evacuation Marine gear, permanently to a particulitr of casualties, and, in addition, the unload- ship with which he would become equally ing of material of the landing force from familiar through experience. the boats. The shore party was assigned Practical experience with combat load- such functions as control of stragglers and prisoners, selecting and marking of ing between 19S5 and 1941 generally con- routes inland, movement of supplies and firmed the soundness of the doctrines set equipment off the beaches, and assignment forth in the Tentative Landing Opera- of storage and bivouac areas in the vicin- tions iVanud. Application of these doc- ity of the beach. The composition and trines in tile fleet landing exercises was strength of the shore party were not set limited, however, by se~-eral factors, forth except for a statement that it would chiefly the lack of suitable transports. contain detachments from some or all of In addition, an uncertainty at times as to the following landing force units: medi- ports of embarkation and dates of avail- cal, sLipply, working details, engineers, E~Tc)LCTION1 OF }fODERN’ A~fPHIBIOCS WARFARE, 192&1941 21 military police, communications, and Major General H. M. Smith, the land- chemical. The beach party and the. shore ing force commander at the New River party were independent of each other, but exercise in the summer of 1941, reported the Tentative Landing Opera tion-s Jfan- that “considerable delay in the debarka- ual enjoined that the fullest cooperation tion of troops and supplies was caused by be observed bet~veen the beachmaster and lack of personnel in the Shore and Beach the shore party commander, and the per- Parties . . . . Roughly, the supplies ex- sonnel of their respective parties. cept for subsistence it was possible to It was not indicated from what source land . . . were insufficient to sustain the “working details” for the shore party forces engaged for more than three would come, but in practice, since there days.” 30 was no other source, the policy of as- General Smith, who had a. deep respect signing units in reserve the responsibility for logistics, was determined to correct for furnishing the labor details quickly these deficiencies. “It is evident,” he re- developed. This in effect, however, tem- ported to Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, porarily deprived the commander of his Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, reserve. “that special service troops (labor) must NTOrealistic test of the shore ancl beach be provided for these duties in order to party doctrine took place during the early prevent reduction of the fighting strength fleet landing exercises. Although some of battalion combat teams . . . . The material w-as landed on the beach, it gen- present doctrine results in clividecl author- erally consisted of rations and small quan- ity between shore party commanders.>> tities of ammunition and gasoline. Not He recommended that “the beach and shore party commanders be consolidated until 1941 were adequate supplies avail- into one unit, a Shore Party, under con- able and the maneuvers on a large enough trol of the landing force.” 3’ scale to provide a test of logistic proce- Solution to the problem of divided au- dures. The results were not encouraging. thority came from a joint board of Army, “In January of 1941 . . . the shore party Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard for a brigade size landing . . . consisted officers appointed by Admiral King. Its of one elderly major and two small piles recommendations closely followed those of ammunition boxes,” wrote a Marine of- of General Smith and were accepted in ficer who “suffered” through those years. toto and published on 1 August 19452as ~~Theship-to-shore movement. of fUel WUS Change 2 to PTP 167. The principal a nightmare. We had no force level changes were: (1) joining together of the transportation, [no] engineers and no sup- beach and shore parties under the. title porting maintenance capability worthy of Shore Party, as a component of the land- the name. In short, the combination of ing force; (2) designating the beach part y tlm parsimonious years aild our own commander as the assistant to the shore apathy had left LIS next to helpless where party commander and his acivisor on logistics were concerned.” 29 wcG LantPhibFor PrelinlRept to CinCLant on 2’BriGen V. H. Krulak ltr to ACofS, G–3, New River Exercise 4–~2Aug41, 27 Aug41. HQMC, 5Mar5’i. “ Ibid. 22 I’E.IRL HARBOR TO GCADALC.4NAL naval matters; anti (3) transferring the Force Atlantic Fleet prepared a detailed responsibility for unloading boats at, the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) beach from the. naval element to the land- covering all phases of logistics. Issued as ing force element of the shore party.3z Force Genera] Order No. 7-42, SOP for Marine Corps Headquarters solved the Supply and Evacuation, it served as the labor force problem by adding a pioneer basic guide to combat loading and shore (shore party) battalionof 340tlicwrsan(l party operations during the Guadalcanal 669 enlisted men to t}le marine division.x’ operation.35 This change occurred on 10 January 1942, By 7 December 1941 the Marine Corps too late for the personnel concerned to had made long stricles towards amphib- gain practical experience in large-scale ious preparedness. It had n doctrine exercises in the techniques of handling which had been tested in maneuvers and vast quantities of sllpplies or to test the founcl to be basically sound. Many of adequacy of the strength and organization the errors in implementation had been provided. .>t Guadalcanal this lack came recognized and corrected; still others were close to having serious conseqllences.:’~ awaiting remedial act,ion when war broke General Smith was not content merely out. But the simuh~ted conditions of the to submit his shore part-y recomn~enda- nmneu\7er ground were now to be aban- tionsto Adn~iral King. .\t his direction, doned. The Marines and their doctrine the logistics staff of the Amphibious were now to submit to the ultimate test 3’Ibid. of war. a Marine Corps T/O D–94, 10Jan42. 8’ See Part VI of this history. ‘5Krulak, OP.cit.; Twining, op. C~~. CHAPTER 3 Development of Landing Craft IA7TRODUCTION Another item of equipment tried out in 1924 was the Christie “amphibian tank.” The amphibious warfare doctrine la- Afloat, this unusual machine was driven boriously developed by Mmines between by twin-screw propellers at a rated speed the two World Wars could never have of seven knots. On short, as a tractor, it been successfully executed without special could make 15 mph; or, where good roads equipment to trxnsport the assaulting were available, the remountable tracks troops and their supplies from ship to could be removed, and on w-heels it could shore and to land them on an enemy- do 35 mph. It functioned well enough on defended beach. land and in the sheltered waters of rivers, No one was more aware of the need But in the open sea, under conditions that for such equipment than the Marines. must be realistically anticipated for an as- Shortly after the end of World War I sault landing, it proved so unseaworthy they induced the Navy to undertake de- that the Marine Corps directed its atten- sign studies on two landing craft, one for tion to other types. personnel and one for materiel. Troop The construction of these types of Barge A, as tile first of these types was amphibious equipment constituted a be- called, was tried out at Culebra in the ginning, however humble, towards the winter of 1923–24. ii shallow draft, solution of the problem of transporting twin-engined, 50-foot craft with a rated troops and equipment from ship to shore. speed of about 12 knots and a carrying But a shortage of funds made it impossible capacity of 110 fully equipped Marines, to follow up these developments until it had good beaching qualities and could 1935, when appropriations became more retract from the beach with aid of a stern plentiful as a result of the naval expan- anchor. Three years lmter the second sion program begun in the first Roosevelt type, a 45-foot artillery lighter, was built and tested. Equipped with two parallel administration. hinged ramps in the stern, it could be LANDING BO.4T8 beached successfully stern-to and 155mm guns and other pieces of heavy Marine With the publication of the Tentative equipment unloaded. It lacked a power Landing Operations .Ifanual in 1934 and plant, however, and had to be towed by the resumption of landing exercises the another craft.1 following year, work on the landing craft ‘ LtGen K. E, RoclwY ltr to ~CofS, G-3, IIGEB, 21Ju13&both in War Plans Sec HQllC 21Jun57; 2dLt W. 11 Trundle rept on experi- files, folder “Landin~ Boats and Earges, lWl- ments with Beetle Roat to CG,llarcmtlxped~or, 1939,” herehmfter cited as War I’7an.s Files, 3~lar24; Senior llIember, BoatCorn ltr to Pres, 1924–$9. 23 4487’77 O—58—3 \Y:ls ll?sullwd. Three types of lm:~ts for Tests of these a})l)rovecl types were co])- landing olwmtions were collten)l)l:~te(l by (ll~cte(l :\t (’:llw 31:\y, Se\v ,Jersey, in tile Wrine pl:tlll]ers of tile nli(l-tllirties. Sllmnlel’of 1!):16. 13ut tile experilllents fell These il~clu(led fast, small, su~f boiits to short of tile oligillal intelltionl “to test :1s lift tbe leadil]g Nwves; st:~n(l:trcl h’:~vy wicle:1 w~riety of forms M wns pr:lcticable,’? bo:~ts :~nd life bo:lts of nlercl~allt ressels bec:llw .illdre}v Ili~gills, :~ Sew orle:llls for the bulli of troops: :Lild b:llges Nn(l bo:~t bllilder Tyitll :i plonlisil~g clesign, cle- ]igllters for ]le:~vy l)l:lteri:~].’ clilled to sllblllit :1 bid. In 1926 IIiggins Steps to solve tl~e first pl’oblem, p]w IL:tddesigl)eda sl)e(’i:ll sll:lllo\vclr:lft er:tft vision of speei:ll trool) lan(lil]g l)oiltS, l~ere (’:llled the L’//wlY/for tile use of trappers initiated in 19;).5. T]le 3Ltrine and XT:LVj- :tlld oil {lril]ers :tlong tbe lolver Mississippi officers who txckle(l tl]e problenl that ye:lr :lncl Gulf Const. It lmd :1 tunnel stern to hnd to st:lrt pretty H1llcI1from scmtcll, for [)rotect the l)ropeller :tnd a q)ecial tyl)e Troop 13:uyge~i, :Ll)rolllisillge:lrly develop of l)OIV> cn]lecl by Higgil~s a ‘%poonbi]l,” mellt, fell victinl to tl\e size :md \l-eigllt re- wllicb eililble(l it to run well up on low strictions il]ll)ose(l by nar:l] sbil)s ill those b:tnlm :~nd be:lclles nn(l retrxct easily. In clays. N:tvy thinking nnd planning fol’ 1934 tlke illlelltorh:td visitecl (~u:~nticoto the develo])lllent of ampllibiolls eq~lipl]lent interest ll[:tril~es in his boat, and tbe N:tvy was restricted by the types of slli])s tl)ell J\-:tsnow- p:lrticlll:lrly anxious to test it serving the fleet. Troop tr:\nslxjrts were with other comp:tmble types of small practically nol~existent, so it \\-:~spl:umed (’1’;lft.~ ns ml emergency me:umre to lift M:lrine The four bo:~ts \vllicb sllow-e(l up at Cape landing forces in l)t~ttlesllil)s:tll(lcrllisers. lhy for the test \Yereof two general types. A length of 30 feet, tbe size of chvits on Tl~e sw ski if, x k)o:~temployed by At]:tnt ie these ships, :lncl a weight of five tons which coast fisbernlell, NW rel)resentecl by tl~e was the maximun~ ulp:lcity of tile clnl”itsj 13xy Heacl, Red Bank, ancl Freeport boats. were therefore inlposed ns basic require- This type :~ppe:tred in theory to ofler a so- ments for all new hnding croft. Iutio]l to tlie landin~ crxft problem, as it In an effort to explore tbe suitability of \Y:ls nornu~l]y l~~unclled :md landed existing comnlerci:ll cr:lft for l:lllclillg op- tllrctllgll tlke he:lvy sllrf of tbe lLtlillltiC emtions, tbe AT:l~Ty,nt tile reqllest of tile beacbes in fishery work. Tl~e other bo:~t, Marine (Torps, ngreed to test ns wi(le n x se:~ slecl built by tile ~~reenport 13:tsin ancl wriety of snl:~ll cw~ft flwm tile yrds of (yonstru(tioll (’omp:tny, wws z bi~b speed priv~lte builclem M tile limited funds n\7lil- rraft Ilot lIONIH1lIY employee] in surf nor able would permit. Bicls werp :L(lveltiseci, l:llldecl oil lxwclles. Tbe test be:@ com- and nine replies were receive({, four of l)risin,g re~)resentntives of tile Navy gen- er:~l lil~e, ll~~reitu of (’onstructioll and Re- which met with tile :Ipl)roval of tile M:t - rine Corps Equil)nlellt IIwrd :ln(l were ]):lir, llurwu of Itllgineeri]]gj tile Coast (}[utr(l, :Lntl tile Il:lrille (’orps, rel)ortecl ncceptecL3 tl~:~tnone of tbe bents \vere wholly sntis- ‘CMC to (Mief 13uC&R, 24 XOV36, Xl emlorse- f:wtory. They elinlillitted tbe sea sled ell- ment to (l)]llin~h ltr t{) (’X(). lK)ct36, Ii’ar Z’latt.< J’ilcs, 1.924-39. ‘ .hst Chief Bu(’< ltr to Higgins Industries, ‘Ibid. 21( )ct36, SS2–3 ( 1.3) BuShips files. 26 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL they tended to dig in when retracting. They do not permit the rapid debarkation They were so high forward that Marines of troops at the water’s edge.” 8 debarking had to drop 10 feet from the By 1938 a beginning had been made bow to the beach. They were, moreover, towards the solution of the lancling craft all unsuitable forlow-ering mldhoisting.G problem. As a result of the early experi- In the light of the drawbacks revealed ments the Marines had proved to their by tests, the Bureau of Construction and own satisfaction what they had suspected Repair undertook the construction of a all along—that none of the standard Navy boat embodying all the best features of the boats could be adapted satisfactorily for fishing craft.’ This was the beginning of the landing through surf of troops or a long and unsuccessful effort by the BLI- heavy equipment. Nor were the experi- reau to develop a satisfactory landing mental models based on commercial craft, craft. The ~’Bureau Boat” in various though superior to hyavy boats, a satis- forms showed up regularly at Fleet Land- factory means for landing of assault ing Exercises from 1939 through 1941, but waves on a defended beach. These results, efforts to get the “bu~s>) out of its design though negative in character, at least were abandoned in 1940. cleared the way for concentrating develop- Experiments with standard ~avy ships’ ment on specially designed landing craft. boats proceeded simultaneously with the The fruitful line of development came development of special types. From the into view with the re-entrance of Andrew first they proved unsatisfactory. After Higgins into the picture. In October five of them foundered in a four-foot surf 1936, about a year after declining to bid at San Clemente during Flex 3, efforts on the experimental landing boat contract, to adapt standard Navy boats for beach Higgins had written the Navy offering hmdings were abandoned. The fact was his E’weka as a troop landing craft. As that, having been designed for other pur- funds for the purchase of experimental poses, none of them were suitable for boats had been exhausted, the Navy was beaching operations. As the Command- unable to purchase the Higgins craft at ing Officer of the 5th Marines concluded: that time.g “hTavy standard boats are totally unsuited A year later Commander Ralph S. for landing troops of the leading waves, McDowell, who was responsible for land- even under moderate surf conditions. ing craft development in the Bureau of They are in no sense tactical vehicles, Construction and Repair, learned of the lacking in speed and maneuverability and Eureka boat. He wrote Higgins inviting are extremely difficult to handle in surf. him to visit the Navy Department and discuss this boat if he ever came to llTash- “ CG1st llarBri~ Flex 4 Rept, 12Mar38; BriGen ington. Higgins and his naval architect V. H. Krulali ltr to Head HistBr, G–3, HQllC, l~eb57, w/attachedcomments. 7C~lC to Chief BuC&R,24NoT36,2d endorse- “CO .5th Mar Flex 3 Rept, 26 FeVd7. ment to CominchItr to CNO,140ct36, ~t’arPian.s ‘ .4sst Chief BnC&R ltr to Higgins Industries, Files, 19$?4-5’9. 210ct36, S82–3 (15) BuShips files. DEYELOPMEST OF L.%XDIXG CRAFT 41a - caught the first train for Washington. share tile Marines’ enthusiasm for the They spent about a week in McDowell’s Higgil~’s ]~z<~el,{(. “The Higgins . . . bo:lt, office working out, a conversion of the is too heavy. . . . l’he speed is too slow. standard Eureka into a landing craft. .\s . . . All the Higgins boats have 250 horse- funds for tile purclutse of experimental power with accompanying excessi~e gaso- boats had been exhausted, the Navy De- line collsluuption for the speed ob- partment at first refused to l)urchase the tainedj” 13]~e reported to his bureau. Higgins craft. But after the inventor 1)aggett’s pl’eferellce was for n modified ot?ered to build a boat for ]ess tlmn cost, Bureall boat, lxlilt by the Welin Company. the Department relented, founcl the neces- The otl~er I]ureall types and the fishing sary funds, and gave Higgins :L contract, boats he found unsatisfactory, and as the for one boat. Higgins deli~ered it to hTor- Marine (“orps iLnd the Bureau were in folk in 30 days.’” :tgreenlel~tl oll this point at least, these The Zllrekw was tested in surf at CYiLft were discarded. Hampton Roads in the spring of 1938” h-either the Marine Corps nor the BLL- and made its first maneuver appearance at reau of Construction tLnd Repair was to Flex 5 in 1939 where it competed n~linst lii~~e the last word at Flex 5. The Com- several Bureau boats and the by now llmll(ler .~tlallt ic Sq~ladrol~, as represented venerable fishing craft. Marines were en- b-y his I.allding Boat. De~elopnlent Board, tl~usiastic about its performance. “The l’ecommencled further tests for the Bureau Higgins boat gave the best. performance a]lcl F.’uvehf{ craft. Accordingly at Flex 6 under all conditions. It has more speed, the following year the drama was re- more lll~llletl~er:lbility, handles easier, and enacted. .~gaill the Nlarines declared the lands troops higher on the beach,” re- E~lteka to be “the best so far designed.” ported the commanding officer of the 1st The .itlantic Squadron, shifting slightly Battalion, 5th Marines. “It also has from dead center, clecided that the Hig- greater power in backing off the beach; gins “was the best a]l-around boat for the not once was the boat observed having purpose intended . . . [but] the Bureau difficulty in retracting.” “ w:ts alnlost :ts good. ” 14 I.ieutelmnt (’omn~al~der R. B. Daggett, By 1940 money for nawLl purposes was the representative of the Bureau of Con- beginning to be nlore plentiful, and the strllction and Repitir at, Flex 5, did ]Iot liTavy was now will illg to purchase landing ‘0 Capt Ralph S. Mcl)owell, USX, interview by “ 1,(’dr R. R Daggett memo to Chief BuC&R, HistI\r, G–3, HQMC. 19.Jnn.77 : Asst Chief 13Feb39, encl to (Thief BuC&R ltr to CNO, BuC8ZR ltr to Higgins Industries, 210ct36, S%2–3 16Feb39, Wa/+ Pla}t.s FilQ& l.W&W. ( 1.3) BuShips files. 14~olllment~ & Re~~mlllen~atiO1lS of Umpires “ LCdr G. H. Rahm ltr to CX(), 7Juu38, S8A3 and Observers, Flex 6, .January-March 1940; Ex- (15 j BuShips tiles. I)erimental Landing Boat Group Officer ltr to “ CO 1/5 Flex 5 Rept No 14 to CG 1st MarBrig, ComLantRon, 10Mar40, Wu v Plms Files, 15Mar39. 19~o–~1. 28 1’l;.\IL1/H. IRBOR TO GUADALCAATAI, craft in quantity. But ill view- of tlw tile Af:iril]e ( ‘orps procllre a ra]nl~-bow fact that the Fleet JVaSlmable to make a ;M-foot fil(jvl~(. [rlwll receivil~g tile al)- clear-cut recollllllellfl:~ti{)ll fol’ either the [)roval of Marine Corps I lea(lq~larters, 13ure:l~l or IIiggills types, the A“aly let Most+ an(t I,illselt went to Ne\v orleans contracts for the first (i+ landing craft 011 to assist 11iggills, ~vllohad ilgreed to make a fifty-fifty basis.” it 1)1’Ototyl)e, coll~el’t illg a St;1ll(iilrd ;~fi- Tile question was tillal]y settle(l ill Selk foot Z:’I//eJOUinto a lanlp-bow boat at l~is temlwr 1940. The Xavy \\-:lsnow coll- o\Yllexlwnse, vprting large nlercllal]t snips for Ilse tls on 21 May, inforllml tests were con- troop transports. These shills \vele ciucte(l on l,ake l’ol}tcll:lltrtlill. The new equipped wit]i (lilVitS (w[)al)le of lulllcllil]g craft, l)lwved to be seal~ortl~y. She 36-foot boats, al~(l as tl~e l’~~,cl,{ of 36- beaclw(l and rvtrwcte(l witl~ ease, and foot length llil{l twiw tile c:ll)arity of tile wl~ile otl tl~e beach tlw ranlp was lowered 30-footer tl~el~ ill service :111(1COUI(ln)ake tIle sanle spee(l v-itho(lt an ilwrease in :111(1persol~llel a]l(l a light truck were de- Ilorsepowelj the Sary LZGIITZ~’I-i,~ AN1) i?A RGE,V With the failure of Boat Rig A, the Marine, Corps turned its attention to de- The design of a successful tal)k lighter proved a Iol+q-erand more difficult process veloping a self-propelled lighter designed than did the development of tile persom specifically for landing tanks and heavy nel landing craft. The o1d -L-fOOt ar- equipnlellt throllgh the suff. In Decem- tillery lighter, developed in 1927, was ber 1935 the Conlmandant requested the considered to nave a limited ~lsefulness Bureau of Construction and Repair to for lanfling heavy equipnlent in the later design such a craft. It was to be capable stages of a]] ol)erationj but tile Marine of landing the 9,500–pound Marmon- (;orps hol)ed to obtain a lighter, self-pro- Herrington tank which the Marine Corps pelled craft particularly sllitetltol:lll(lillg \vas then considering. Negotiations tanks d~wing tile early stiiges.’” dragged on for more than a year, until As a stop-gap measure, Marines at in April both the Marine Corps and the Quantico came up with a device to adapt Bureau had agreed upon x design. .% the stanchwd Navy 50-foot motor launch M-foot craft, it made its first appearance for landing light vehicles and artillery. at a fleet landing exercise in 1938.22 “Boat Rig ii,” this contraption was called. The Marines reported it to be “a distinct It consisted of a platform fit.tecl within improvement over previous experimental the hull of the boat, together with a port- designs. It is self-propelled, has suffi- able ramp by means of which tl~e vehicle cient speed, and is sound and practicable could g-o ashore over the bo]v when the in construction. It is equally adaptable craft beached. The ramp was carried for landing artillery and is an efficient into the beach broken down, where it was rargo carrier.:”3 assembled and hitched up for debarkation. A M-footer, built at the. Norfolk h-avy This completed, it would be disengaged Yard in the autumn of 1938, showed up at and left on the beach to accotnn~odate the Culebra the following winter for Flex 5. next boat, coming in. The ramp could be It was used successfully in transporting assembled and nlade ready for use by ashore tanks and trucks of the types then eight, men in about 10 minutes. 011 sub- standard in the Marine Corps. I~Ilder the sequent trips, it took about four lninutes conditions encountered at Culebra in 1939, to connect, the ramp to the boat. Under both the 38- a]ld M-foot lighters were ideal conditions vehicles up to five tons j ud~ed to be “. ..e Higgins 36-foot boats. N’one of these vessels was The Mimine Corps first took notice of experiencing any difficulty. The Higgins tank the “.illi~ltor” in 1937, when Rear Ad- lighter was maneuvering around in sharp turns miral Edward C. Ifalbf us, Commander, into the sea, through the wave troughs. We then [after Bureau lighter turned Wckl Battleships, 13attle Force, IJ. S. Fleet, opened the engines up to 1,900 r. p, m. and pro- Showecl Major C~eneral I.ouis ~fcCarthy ceeded past Little Creek to Fort Storey. The I.ittle, then commanding the Fleet Marine lighter took no w:iter except a little spray. Per- Force, a picture of the strange vehicle ap- f ormanee was excellent in all respects. The pearing in Life magazine. General I~ittle lighter was beached in the surf and the lank ran off onto the beach dmpite poor hand]in~ by the was quick to grasp its potentialities and coxswain who finally allowed the lighter to sent the picture and accompanying article broach to. Iu spite of this the ~essel had such to the Commandant. He, in turn, passed power and retraction qnalities [asl to get back it along to the Equipment Board at into deep water. Quantico.= AS far as comlmrison of characteristics of the types of tank lighters are concerned, it may be The Marine Corps hacl not forgotten the stated that in the May 25 tests there was no old Christie amphibian, of such bright comparison. .s’ promise and disappointing performance. As a result of these tests, the Bureau Here appeared to be a possible answer. hastily notified all yards to shift to the The Board dispatched its secretary, then Higgins type. Thl~s the Ili.ggins 50-footer Xfajor ,John Iialuf, to Florida to see the became the standard tank lighter of the vehicle perform and to consult with Mr. hTavy, the prototype of the I.(7M (landing Roebling. I{aluf was favorably in~- craft, mechanized ) m the, Marines knew it pressed, ancl on this basis the Equipment in World War II, and as they knom- it to- Board reported to the Commmdant that <6 day in enlarged form. . . . subject boat has possibilities for use in landing troops and supplies at points not accessible to other types of smcdl boats.” In May 1938 the Con~mandant Another vehicle which was to play a cited this opinion in recommending to the vital role in the amphibio{ls operations of Navy that “, . . steps be taken to procure World War H was the amphibian tractor a pilot model of this type of amphibious ( amtrack, I.VT). It was built in 1935 by boat for further tests under service condi- Donald Roebling, a wealthy young in- t ions and cluring Fleet I,anding Exercise ventor living in (lenrwater, Florida. The ~To. ~.~~ 36 “Alligator,” as Roe.bling called his cre- Both the h’avy Board and the Bureau ation, was a track-laying vehicle which of Construction and Repair endorsed the derived its propulsion afloat from flanges recommendation unfavorably on the fixed to the tracks, essentially the l}rin- grounds of economy. The boat clevelop - ciple of early pacldle-wheel steamships. Originally illtenclecl as a ~ellicle of mercy, % Linscrt Interview; LtCol V. J. Croizat, “The for rescue work ill the Everglades, the “.kl - Marines’ Amphibian. ” MC Gazette, June 1953, 4z–43 ( cr~i~at takes his inforn,ation from ligator” was destinecl for fitme as an im I,insert ). strument of war. w (NC ltr to Senior Member, NavDept ContBd for Dev of Landing Boats, 18May36, War Ptmts ‘4Ibid., 163. I~iles, 1924–39. DEVELOPMENT OF LANDING CRAFT 33 ment program was at last well under way, Quantity procurement of LVT (1) did and it seemed unwise to divert any of the not, halt further development of anlphi- limited appropriations to x purely experi- bian tractors. By October 1941, the mental project, CNO concurred in the prototype of LVT (2) had put in an ap- recommeuclation of the Boarc{.3T pearance, but volume production of the Marine interest in tile amphibian tractor new moclel was delayed by the entry of persistecl, however, and in October 1939, the L’nited States into the war. To General Moses visited Roebling at his shop achieve maximum output,, the design of in Clearwaterj Florida. He inspected the LVT ( 1) was “frozen” shortly after Pearl 1atest moclel tractor, and persuaded Roe- Harbor and the vehicle put into mass bling to design a model including clesirecl production.” military characteristics.3s This early LVT ( 1) was unarmed, In January 1940, Roebling had com- though capable of mounting machine pleted the new design. ikn appropriation guns. The Marines, now that they had was secured from the Bureau of Ships, made a start, wanted sometking more: an and work started on the first. military armored, turreted m o cl e 1 capable of model of an amphibian tractor. In NO- mounting at least a 37mm gun and serving vember the completed machine was as the equivalent of a seagoing tank in delivered at Quautico where it was demon- landing operations. At Clearwater in strated for the Commandant and a large January 1940, Roebling sketched a tur- party of high ranking officers of the Army reted version of the LVT, the plans for and hTavy.sg It measured up in every which Major Linsert, Secretary of the respect save one. Its aluminum construc- Equipment Board, ]ater completed.” tion was not considered rugged enough Nothing more was done about the for hard military use. Still the tractor armored LVT until June 1941, when the was so impressive in e~ery other respect Commandant recommended that such a that the Navy contracted with Roebling vehicle be developed, using the existing for 200 of the machines constructed of LVT as a basis. The new vehicle should steel. As Roebling did not have the facili- be’’ . . . capable of sustained point-blank ties for mass manufacture, he subcon- combat against shore-based weapons . . . . tracted the act~lal const,rllctiou to the It should be able to approach a defended Food Machinery Corporation which had beach from the sea, land, over-run enemy a plant in nearby Dunedin. The first ve- weapons, destroy them, and continue op- hicle, now designated 1,VT (1) (Landing erations ashore to support our ground Vehicle Tracked), came off the assembly troops.” ‘3 Armor protection again9t .50 line in July 1941.40 caliber machine-gun tire and an armament ml~id., and endorsements thereto. Tracked, ‘“History of Landing Vehicle Tracked,” = Pres MCEB ltr to CMC, 29 Aug-10, 2455–13@– lDec45, hereinafter cited as LVT Hist.; Da~~ctt 20 HQMC files ; Linsert Intcru-irw; Croizat, OP. Interview. cit. 4’LVT Hist. 39Lin.swt Interview; Croizat, op. cit. 4’Croizat, op. cit. 4 Chief BuShips ltr to Cdt 5th Naval Dist., “ CMC ltr to CNO, 27Jun41, and CA-O 1st en- 6Dec40, 2455–13G60 HQiklC tiles ; SecXav dorsement thereto to Chief BuShips, 13Ju141, ContBd for the Dev of Landing Vehicle, 2435–130–20 HQMC files. 34 lw:L\RL H.kRBOR TO GUADALCAN.4L inc.luding a 3’inlm antitank gun and three duction, and the first vehicle rolled off the .30 caliber machine guns would be re- assembly line in August 1943.44 quired to accomplish this mission. The The, craft, clescribecl here were, of course, Chief of Na\7al (operations approved the only a few of the wide variety of boats project ancl directed the Bureau of Ships ancl beaching ships that performed yeo- to perfect a desigl~. man service in all theaters during World B~~re:~uel~gilleers beg:lll de}elolJ1ne~~t in War II. These ranged in size from the cooperation with Roebling and the engi- big lumbering LST (Landing Ship, neersof the Food Machinery Corporation. Tanks, ”or “Large, Slow Target”), orig- But theirs wasnot to be the first armored inated by the British, to the Arn~y-devel- LVTconlpleted. l~orlcillg illdel>ellclelltly oped DIXW, an amphibious truck and at its own expense, the Borg-Warner propeller-driven afloat. B L1t Marines Corporation procluced model “Al,” the first ttlrretecl:~l~~pllibi:~l~tr:~ctor. Design work played no notable part, in the development on the Roebling-Food Machinery moclel, of any of these, and none had appeared 1,1’T (A ) (1) W-:Mnot completed until ~e- during the period covered by this volume. cember 1941, and tl~e prototype did not They will be described in subsequent vol- emerge from the Food Machinery plant umes as they came to play their part in until June 1942. It was an LVT (2 ) hull the tactical picture of Marine operations. mounting a 3’imn~ gun in a standard light tank turret. It was quickly pllt in pro- “ I,VT His+; Croizat, op. cit. CHAPTER 4 Marine Occupation of Iceland’ “It has been said,” wrote Winston sistence. Icelancl perched on the flank of Churchill, “’J~7hoever possesses Iceland these shipping lanes, which were under holds apistolf irmlypointed at England, heavy attack by (3erman submarines. America, and Canada.”)z At the timeof Hostile air and naval bases on the island which he wrote, the “pointed pistol” would almost certainly render the north- threatened most immediately the British ern route unusable, and put pressure, per- lifeline: the northern con~~oy route be- lmps intolerable pressure, on the longer tween Great Britain and the Western and more vulnerable southern route. Hemisphere, upon which the island king- At the outbreak of the war Iceland en- dom was dependent for most of the mate- joyed the status of autonomous parlia- rials to sustain its war effort as well as mentary monarcl~y, sharing the same king much that was needed for its very sub- with Denmark. When the Nazis overran the latter nation in April 1940, the Ice- ‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in this landic Parliament voted to take over the chapter is derived from the 1st Mar13rig ( Prov ) executive power of the Danish King and Rept of .kctivities 16Jun41–25Mar42, 26 Mar42; to assume control of foreign affairs. The 6th Mar ( Reinf ) Repts of Activities 25May– strategic island became, for all practical 30Nov41, 13Dec41 ; 5th DefBn Repts of Activities purposes, a completely independent re- 7Jun41-28Feb42, 27 Feb42: Correspondence files dealing with Marine occupation of Iceland; public ‘—and a wholly defenseless one J. L. Zimmerman, Notes and MSS on Marine without even the pretense of an army or occupation of Iceland (located at XTRMC, Job navy. This state of affairs gave rise to 14051, Box 9, Folders 129–130), hereinafter cited considerable concern in London and as Zimmerman iKSS; Gen O. P. Smith, Diary Washington, more genuine concern than and A“arrative covering the occupation of Ice- land, hereinafter cited as SmitlL A“arratioe; it caused initially among the insular- S. Corm and B. Fairchild, “The Framework of minded Icelanders. Hemisphere Defense,” MS of a forthcoming To the British the threat appeared very volume in the series United States Armu in World desperate indeed. Early in May they de- War II (located at OCMH ), hereinafter cited as termined to occupy Iceland, and the need Hewzisphere Defense; B. Fairchild, MS chapters titled “Planning the Iceland Operation: The for speed and secrecy fused decision and Army’s First Task Force,” “Establishing the Ice- at,‘t’lon.~ There was no time to stand on land Base Command,” and “Bermuda and the North Atlantic Bases,” part of a forthcoming ‘On 16 May42 the Parliament announced that volume of the same series; W. L. Langer and S. E. I{heland would not renew its union with T)em Gleason, The Undeclared War (A’ew- York : mark and in 1944 the island became in name as Harper & Brothers, 1953), hereinafter cited as well as i%ct a republic. Undeclared War. 4J. R. M. Butler, Grand S’t?wtcgy: Volume 2 TV. S. Churchill, !/’he Grand .4 Uiance ( Bos- 11—Histor~l of tltc Second W’ortd War ( London : ton: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 138. HMSO, 1957), 262. 36 PEARI, HARBOR TO GLIADALCANAL ceremony; despite Churchill’s bland as- to tile home islands, seriously threatened sertion that the ?dritish occupation of Ice- ~~-]tl~ invasion :Illd (Il)c{er ]le:lyv :lir :lt. land was etiectecl “with the concurrence tack. The prospect of llritisb withdrawal of its people,’> s they lmcl, in fact? not caused sonw alal.nl among tile Ice]al~ders been consulted beforehand. “is the atti- and led to diplomatic soundings of the tude likely to be adopted by the Icelandic American positiol). Government toward such an ‘invasion’ on 18 I)ecember 1!)40 tl~e 1celandic was in some doubt they were not informed Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Stefans- of the proposed expedition. ” ~ Indeed the sou, arranged a l)l’iVilte n]eet illg with tlle first inkling the natives had that anything I?. S. Consul (+elleral, I_lertel E. lKlllli- out of the ordinary was afoot came when 1101111.After firm ass(lrances that his early-rising fishermen discovered a Brit- proposal was strictly m)otlicial, the Mill- ish destroyer nosing up to a jetty in the ister suggested to I population of about 120,000 at the time 27Most of the information on Iceland’s climate of the occupation. AIOllg its 2,300 miles and terrain was taken from Col L. P. Hunt, “Re- port of two-day reconnaissance of Iceland, June n In a hurricane on l&Jan@ wind velocities 1’2-13, 1941,” 18Jun41. of over 125 mph were recorded. It did an enor- ‘g “Ollr reception by the British has been mous amount of damage. Ships were driven on splendid. They have placed at our disposal all the rocks and huts and other lmildings which of their equipment and have rationed us for ten were not firmly anchored were blown away. (10 ) days to cover the Iwiod of disembarka- Paige, op. cit. tion.” BriGen J. Marston ltr to MGC, 11 Ju141. 42 PE.4RL HARBOR TO GU.ADALCANAL commander, ~lajor General H. O. Curtis, power.” The various units, which were to provide the ~arines with the distinc- spread out over a good part of the coun- tive polar bear shoulder insignia of the tryside around Reykjavik, were also re- British force. General llarston accepted sponsible for 10C:L1defense of their biv- for the brigade ancl noted later that: ouac areas, a responsibility that grew to The mutual cooperation directive worked, to include long segments of coastline when the entire satisfaction of the British Com- the British units defending these possible mander and the Brigade. The British complied landing points were later relieved. with our requests and we complied with theirs. The machine guns and 3-inch guns of It was as simple as that. A British commander the 5th Defense Battalion were integrated less sympathetic than General Curtis might have upset the applecart but under that talented otli- into the British antiaircraft defenses cer no incident of conflict Occurred.n around the airfield and hzrbor and re- mained a part of this system for the rest In their new camps the filarines made of the Marines’ stay. As a result, the 5th their first acquaintance with the ~Lssen hut, an introduction that was to ripen Defense spent most of its time performing into familiarity that rarely reached the the duties for which it was constituted; friendship stage. ln the months to come its state of training was good and it im- the men of the brigade were to build and proved as a result of a steady round of maintain roads and construct defenses; gun watches and drills and frequent they were to become very practiced at the though unproductive enemy aircraft art of the stevedore; but most of all they alerts. In contrast, the men of the 6th were to become efficient builders of the Marines and its reinforcing units had ubiquitous Nissen hut. The hut itself reason to think that they were on one party, “was an elongated igloo covered with cor- gigantic and never-ending working rugated iron roofing and lined with and the re~iment labelled itself a “labor beaver board” 30 designed to accommo- regiment” in its August report to General hfarston. date about 14 men. It was possible to A welcome break from the steady grind erect several huts in combination to ac- of labor details occurred on 16 August commodate larger numbers of men or for when Prime &Iinister Churchill visited use as officesj mess halls, recreation rooms, lceland en route to 13ngland following his and classrooms. famous Atlantic conference with Presi- For the first week ashore the hfarines dent Roosevelt. He was accompanied by were fully occupied gett,in~ their camps an imposing array of h@ British rank: established and then they were fitted into Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the EIritish scheme of cletense. Initially, First Sea I,ord; General John Dill, Chief the brigade’s primary mission was to of the, Imperial General Staff: and Air serve as a mobile reserve although its lack (’hief Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman, of transportation meant thilt most of its Vice Chief of Air Staff. After paying mobility would be dependent on foot their respects to local officials, they at- ‘9 MajGen J. Marston ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, “ Iceland B’orre memo IF/168/l/G to CG, 1st 31 Jan57. MarBrig, 16,Ju141 ; 1st MarBrig OpOrd No 3–41, ‘0 i3rnitlL iVarra tive, 34. 16,JuM1. MARINE occupation OF ICELAND 43 tended a large joint British-American in service of the selectees, Reserve oflicers, military review held in their honor. of and the National (Am-dsmen still left the this event Churchill wrote later: “There problem of restriction on territorial serv- was a long march past in threes, during ice—a problem which was to remain with which the time ‘United States Marines7 the Army until Pearl Harbor brought a bit so deeply into my memory that I could declaration of war.” “ not get it out of my bead.’? 32 There was really not too much trouble The reason for the continuous round taking care of the first Army contingent of camp construction W:lS two-fold. to arrive, a small force of about 1,000 First, somebody had to build the camps men built around a pursuit squadron and to accommodate the expected influx of an engineer battalion. Their convoy b-my troops; neither the British nor the made port on 6 August and the units, Icelanders were in a position to clo so. which came under Marston’s command, The process of simple elimination gave moved into a camp set up for them by the Marines the job. Second, it soon be- the Marines. Howe~’er, preparations for came apparent thfit the h’farines them- the arrival of a second Army echelon of selves were going to stay for a while and brigade strength due in mid-September a good part of their time had to be spent meant that every Marine available had to preparing their own facilities for the on- turn to on camp construction. It was set of winter. the difficulties attendant upon the raising A common, indeed, official, belief tlmt of this second force that led to the de- the Marines were going to be relieved in cision to hold the Marines in Iceland.3A ~September by Army troops held strongly The commander of the Army troops of for about a nlontb after the brigade ar- the September echelon was senior to Gen- rived in Iceland. There were numerous eral Marston; according to the original e.widenres that, this was the intention of occupation plan, the principle of unity of the top planners when the concept of the command was to hold in Iceland, and Marine Corps furnishing the initial oc- under it the senior officer present, regard- cupation troops was first broached. By less of service of origin, would have as- mid-August, however, it became eviclent sumed operational control over all .lmeri- that the Army would not be able to pro- can troops. Acording to this concept, vide enough men to relieve the brigade Army Major General Charles H. 130ne- and that, the lack of readily available steel would simply have superseded C~en- troops would make the role of those who eral Marston and all hands woldd have did arrive one of reinforcement rather carried on as before. But in the interim than relief. The British, who were sup- between June and September, the Army posed to return to their home islands, had Chief of Staff, General George C. Mar- to stay on to bolster the defenses. The crux of the .irmy;s dilemma was the fact “ Ntfltfytc Plat/nin~, ;1. that not all of its men were available for “ AG memo to ACofS, War Plans Div, 6Sep41. In order to field the force that finally reached assignment; ‘(the passage of legislation Iceland in September, the Army had to draw in August 1941 permitting the retention on posts and stations all over the U. S. AG WrnO to Army commanders concerned, 14Aug41 32Churchill, OP. cit., 449. (located at TAGO ). 44 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL shall, had decided that unity of command But it was a losing fight, Marshall did not go far enough, at least as far as stated that he had no intention of estab- Iceland was concerned. He determined lishing a precedent and remained ada- that if General Bonesteel was to have mant, The Commandant did not learn of full responsibility for the American occu- the proposed change until it was prac- pation, then he should also have full ad- tically an accomplished fact, and the sup- ministrative as well as operational control port he received from the (3NO was luke- over all the troops in Iceland. warm. The actual transfer of command Such a transfer of the Marines from took place on 24 September and General Navy control could be effected by execu- Holcomb w-as directed to report to the tive order, as had been done by President Secretary of War on all matters pertain- Wilson in the case of the Marines serving ing to the brigade.37 in France in World War I. Unfortu- The resultant administrative difficulties nately, from the Marines’ point of view, did not prove to be as bad as Holcomb and this transfer involved a great deal more many others had feared. The change- than a simple change of command, It over was more of an annoyance than it brought them under the Army’s adminis- was a definite hindrance,; after all, as one trative and disciplinary system which dif- battalion commander commented later, fered considerably from that of the Navy “while administration difficulties may be and with which they were unfamiliar. bothersome they can be handled.” 38 In The Commandant, who had seen the the course of trying to master Army pro- system at work in W’orld War 1, protested cedures, General Marston wrote the As- vigorously. On 4 September he wrote istant Commandant: Admiral Stark: They have a tremendous amount of paper work The proposed change will not only necessitate which the Marine Corps seems able to avoid. a complete revision of this plan [unity of com- The barrage of force orders coming out of staff mandl but would introduce many administrative sections is appalling. Of course we are getting difficulties, with no corresponding advantages along all right but it will be months before we in so far as command relations are concerned. are “oriented in the new direction . . . If the A complete change of the administrative system future develops another situation similar to that would again be required when the First Marine of this Brigade in Iceland, I hope that you will Brigade is detached from the Army.= be able to have the transfer deferred with at least two months notice so that the officers con- And again on 5 September: cerned can get themselves oriented in prepara- In view of the existing situation in Iceland tion for the jump.” and the probable nature of other operations to One of General Bonesteel’s first acts as be conducted by the Navy elsewhere, the pro- the Commanding General of the new Ice- posed plan has many undesirable ramifications. If carried to its logical conclusion, it will mean, land Base Command was to send a letter at best, frequently shifting Marine units from of appreciation to the 1st Marine Brigade the Navy to the Army and back again, with (Provisional) which extended his “sin- much administrative grief. It will probably change our concept of command relations in 3’Presidentialdirective to SecWar and Seth’av, joint operations.~ 22Sep41. 88MajGen W. A. Worton ltr to CFIC,lFeb57. = MGC memo for Adm Stark, 4Sept41. 3’llriGen J. Mar&n ltr to BriGen A. A. “ MGC memo for Adm Stark, 5Sep41. Vandegrift, 100ct41. MARINE OCCUPATION OF ICELAND cere thanks for the splendid assistance I)art ies “in order to get in a minimum [given] inthe preparationof the various amount of train ing. ” ‘i The 3d Battalion, campsites and in numerous other ways encamped in a pass that lay right in the prior to and during our arrival in Ice- path of winter winds howling out of the land. The an~ount of hard and extended mountains near Hvalfjordur, was forced labor involl-ed is fully recognized and to “button-up” for the winter almost as deeply appreciated,” ‘0 soon as it shifted in September. The onrush of winter made it necessary The lack of adequate unit training has for all troops to devote a good part of been emphasized by some critics of the their time to camp maintenance and Marines’ employment in Iceland. Train- weatherizing. And as supplies continued ing did not stop; it was hampered and to come in for the depots being built up curtailed by the weather and the require- near Reykj avikl working parties had to ments of working details, but it did go on be provided to empty ships as well as to despite all the very real obstacles. The constrllct the storehouses needed to pro- men, trained and indoctrinated as am- tect the equipment. Days rapidly short- phibious assault troops, however, were ened until there were only four hours of perturbed when they heard the news of a sort of hazy daylight to accomplish Pearl Harbor while huddled around the necessary functions. stoves in their N issen huts. Were they With the continued requirements for to be left forgotten in the wrong ocean? camp construction and preparations for Once the war broke out in earnest the an arctic winter, the bri~~de was not able Navy, too, did not view with favor the em- to conduct a satisfactory training pro- ployment of a Marine Brigade on a de- gram. fensive mission in Iceland. The Marines Every possible opportunity was seized were needed in the Pacific and pressure by unit commanders, however, to improve was put on the Army to get them relieved. the state of readiness of their men. Many Plans were laid to send a convoy with of the specialists, of course, like the 8,000 men from h“ew York on 15 January cornnlunicators, engineers, and service to provide the brigade’s relief and return personnel received considerable on-the-job transportation. But, like so mnny pre- training. J$rhile large-scale exercises vious false starts, this was not to be. Sev- were not, possible, sm:Lll units operated to- eral of the ships in this convoy were gether as the press of construction al- diverted elsewhere and the resulting troop lowed. In particular, a considerable lift was only enough to relieve one battal- amount of r:tnge firing of crew-served ion. General Marston picked 3/6, which weapons was accomplisl~ed. Il%en the ~d cheerfully turned over its wind-blown Battalion of the tjth &Iarines was moved billets to the Army troops and embarked to ii camp too far away from Reykj avik to on 28 January. The battalion left Ice- make it feasible t o use its men for working land on the 31st and reached New York part ies, tl]e commanders of 1/6 and 2/6 on 11 February. agreed to alternate ill fllrnishing working A start had been made and the brigade begin negotiations to turn over its camps, 40CG, IBC Itr to CG, 1st MarBrig ( J?rov ), 27 Sep41, quoted in Zimmrrmun Mfltl, I’older 129. “ Gen O. P. Smith ltr to ~CofS, G–3, 7Feb57. 46 PE~RL H.4RB0R TO ~UADALCANAL defense mission, and heavy equipment to trained regulars and reserves. The bri- the Army. The convoy carrying the final gade bad relieved no appreciable number relief put into Reykjavik on 3 March, and of British troops, which had been the orig- the Marines began loading out the follow- inal purpose of the ~imericau occupation. ing day. .It 1010 on 8 March, General There is no concrete evidence that the Marston closed his (.71> OIL shore and Germans ever seriously considered attack- opened it on board the USS McCa.u’7ey; ing Iceland, although it is conceivable, at, noon that date the brigade returned even if somewhat unlikely, that the knowl- to the j urisdict ion of the 3Tavy. It is in- edge of the presence of the brigade might teresting to note that this is the only in- have deterred such an attack. The mili- stauce in World War 11 where a Marine tary value of the Iceland occupation unit was “detached for service with the stemmed from rigorous service in the field. ,Lrmy by order of the. President.:’ In the In the many scattered and detached posts, nutny joint, operations thzt followed, all heavy responsibilities fell on the shoulders Ser},ices adhered to tl~e priucil)]e of unity of the young company grade oflicers of conunanc]. General Bonesteel recog- and hT(XOs. .fdversity developed and nized the Marines’ dislike for the “de- strengthened leadership. Once the bri- tached service” concept but in a final let- gade reached Iceland there m-as a n~ini- ter to (}eneral Mal’ston commended the mum rotation of officers and men. This brigade whose “every officer and enlisted stability of personnel gave the command- man gaye his whole heartecl sl~pport and ers an opportunity, seldom afforded in cooperation to our efforts to a much peacetime, to develop teamwork and unit greater extent than mere compliance with esprit de corps. ITpon return to the instructions impliecl.:’ 4’ Iynited States, almost all ranks received a The brigade landed at, h“ew York on promotion and all units of the brigade ~ZS~l:lrch aI~cl was immediately disbanded. were drawn on heavily to provide leaders ‘The 5th Defense Battalion ~~-asordered for newly activated units, The 6th Ma- l-o Parris Island, the 6th Marines to the rines furnished large drafts to the raider Second Division at Camp F.lliott, nnd the and parachute battalions, as well as to :Supportiug units to their l)arent organiza- nnits of the 2d Division. tions wherever those might, be. The military know-how, discipline, and Thus lmssed into l~istory an nncomfort- qualities of leadership developed in Ice- :Ible and at times f rust ratil~g mission, the land were invaluable in providing cadres military value of which was not, clearly of experienced Marines around which to :~ppare~lt at the time. The Mariue Corps’ fornl these new units. As a result, the (expansion pro~ram in late 1941 ancl early 6th Regiment, which sailed from San 19+! was admittedly haml)ered by the ab- Diego for h’ew Ze&nd in late October sence of such a sizeable body of w-ell- 19+2, contained only a very small percent- age of “Icel:~lld Marines.>? The iflilitary = CG, IBC ltr to CG, 1st MarBri K(Prm’), lMar42, quoted in Zimmerman 11S’S’, Folder 130. wealth lmd been shared. CHAPTER 5 The Marine Corps on the Eve of War 1 THE INEVITABLE CONFLICT: ing a foundation for the expansion of our DEFENSIVE EXPANSION national resources and industry. On 8 September 1939, seven days after Hitler’s While war came to Europe in Septem- armies crossed into Poland? the President ber 1939, the LTnited States did not for- officially declared a limited national emer- mally enter the struggle against the Axis gency. As the rising tide of Nazi aggres- Powers for another 27 months. The sion swept over Europe in 1940 and 1941, formal declarations of war did not, how- Americans awakened more and more to ever, pro ject the nation directly from a the peril and supported increasingly the state of isolation and indifference into national policy of strengthening our active belligerency. Although the United armed forces. States declared its neutrality—our aim As of 30 June 1939, two months before being to avoid conflict while guarding Hitler’s armies launched their BZitzhwieg, against totalitarian penetration of the Marine Corps strength stood at 19,432 of- Western Hemisphere—we were gradually ficers and enlisted? of whom 4,840 (in- drawn deeper and deeper into short-of- cluding aviation components) were as- war operations in support of Great signed to the Fleet Marine Force. FMF Britain and her allies, ground forces were organized in two units Initially, the Administration moved optimistically designated “brigades,>’ each with caution. In the years following the in actuality an understrength infantry “war to end all wars,” disappointment in regiment 4 reinforced by skeletonized sup- the League of Nation’s failure and the porting elements: 1st Brigade based on world-wide depression of the 1930’s had the east coast (Quantico ), 2d Brigade served to increase our isolationist tend- on the west coast (San Diego). Each encies. Aware of the national sentiment,z brigade had the support of a Marine air- President Roosevelt initiated a program craft group of corresponding numerical for gradually increasing the armed serv- ices, strengthening our bases, and develop- designation, and FMF aviation further boasted a scouting squadron (VMS-3) ‘ Unless otherwise noted the nraterial in this based in the Virgin Islands. chapter is derived from ~,lfC .lnRe@s, 193% However, conversion of international 1941. tension into armed conflict in Europe re- ‘ The Roper Poll in September 1%39 showed that extreme interventionist sentiment was sulted in a marked quickening of United limited to Z.Syo of the total population; 37~o preferred to have nothing to do with the }varring 3Table DGB–220@DJP’ prepared by PersAcct nations. R. E. Sherwood, h’oosecclt and Hop- Sect, RecordsBr, E’ersDept, HQM(3, 26Now54. kins, .-in Intimate History (New York : Harper 45th and 6th MarRegts of WW1 fame, based and Brother, 1948 ), 128. on the east and west coasts respectively. 47 48 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCAN’AL States defense efforts. And from that months passed before either division could point on the Commandant’s Annuzl Re- be built, up to authorized strength. ports reflect a steady succession of upward Growth of Marine Aviation kept pace revisions in personnel planning until by with that of the g-round forces, and again 30 November 1941 total strength stood at that, pace looked faster on paper than it 65,881, the number, give or take a few, was in actuality. Simultaneously with with which the Marine Corps would enter the conversion of the two brigades into the war against the Axis Powers a week divisions, the east coast and west coast later at Pearl Harbor. FMF aircraft groups, based at Quantico But of greater significance than the and San Diego respectively, were acti- increase in over-all strength was the grow- vated as the 1st LLnd!2c1Marine Aircraft ing proportion of that strength repre- Wings (Jf.~W). ~~ut, as with the divi- sented by the Fleet Marine Force. Fiscal sions, bringing them up to authorized 1940 saw the numbers of the Corps’ strik- stren.g!ll proved no overnight process. ing arm more than doubled : from 4,525 to Inltlally, each could boast, only ~ single 9,749; and this figure in tllrn had more aircraft group of mixed composition, than tripled by 30 h’ovember 1941, reach- designated M.lC~-11 and MAG-21 respec- ing 29j532. One factor largely responsible tively. On the eve of Pearl Harbor, FMF for this impressive increme was nlobiliza- air personnel numbered 2,716 otlicers and tion in No\-enlber 1940 of the entire Or- enlisted out of a total aviation strength ganized Marine Corps Reserve, both of 5,911.C These were divided among the ground and air, thus making available a two wings and the detached squadron in large number 5of officers and men, at least the Virgin Islands. The 1st MAJJ7 had partially trained, for incorporation into remained based at Quantico. But the the FMF with a minimum of delay. conling of war found the 2d MAW scat- This increased strength made possible tered far and wide, with a squadron at organization of a unit larger than the Wake Island: a detachment at Midway Marine Corps hzd ever operated before: Island, and the balance of the wing at the triangular division, consisting of three Ewa> on Oahu, T. H.’ infantry regiments, an artillery regiment: ThoLIg-h the two divisions and two supported by engineer> reconnaissance, wings comprised the N1arine Clorps: prin- , considerations of im- and signal units plus medical and other cipal striking arm service troops. Thus on 1 February 1941 ‘ Tbe two groups were identical in composi- the brigades stationed on the east coast tion hut slightly unequal in strength. Each and west coast ~vere officially activated contained 2 fighter, 2 scout-bomber, 1 observa- as the 1st Marine I)ivision and 2d Marine tion, and 1 utility squadrons. MAG-11 had 100 operational aircraft to 90 for MAG-21. The Division respectively. T’o efiect the nec- l’ir,qin Islands detachment operated 8 utility- essary expansion, cadres were drawn from scouting planes, bringing the total of FMF air- existing units around which to build and craft of all types to 198. Altogether, Marine train new units of the same type. This Ayiation included 13 Squadrons and 204 opera- tional planes of all types. proved a S]OWand ]aborious process, and ‘ “AciI~lillistr:ltive History of U. S. Marine Corps in World J1’:lr II” (MS in HistBr Ar- ‘ Total of 5,241 officers and enlisted, chives ), 1W hereiuaf ter cited as .4@nLinHis t. 50 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL armament consisted of antiaircraft and air stations, a naval ammunition depot, coast defense guns.8 The first four of a naval supply depot,12 and 18 other new these, with consecutive numerical desig- installations ranging in character and lo- nations, were activated during fiscal 1940. cation from David Taylor Basin, Car- By the time of Penrl Harbor the number derock, Maryland, to Naval Magazine, had reached seven with two more in proc- Indian Island, Washington. Further- ess of formation.g more, garrison detachments were detailed Concurrent with increased numbers to twelve stations overseas, as will be dis- came increased responsibilities. The cussed subsequently. Navy, too, was expanding at an unprece- Simultaneously with filling the Navy’s dented rate, diverting more Marines from demands, the Marine Corps assumed ad- the FMF to perform the Corps’ tradi- ditional security problems of its own as tional functions: security of naval instal- existing bases expanded and new ones lations ashore and service afloat. By 30 were established. (See below.) Thus, Sovernber 1941, ships’ detachments had the period under discussion saw the acti- grown to 68, manned by a total of 3,793 vation of seven new guard companies of Marines.’” a non-FMF character: at Quantico, San Ashore the Navy’s stepped-up training Diego, Dunedin (Florida), and Bremer- programs, particularly in naval aviation, ton (Washington). created more and more bases, security of which imposed a serious additional drain GRO WTZ/ OF MARIATE TRAZNING on Marine man power. In fiscal 1940 the A.VD OPERA TZONAL BASES Corps was called upon to provide guard detachments at four new naval air sta- Inevitably the problems of housing, tions in the Continental United States and training, and equipping rapidly expand- three in U. S. overseas territories.” The ing manpower imposed increasing pres- following fiscal year added another four sure on the Corps’ existing facilities, pegged as these were to peacetime needs and the economy of depression years. ‘ The genesis of the defense battalion was at- tributable to two factors : (a) the acceptance Following World War I, activities of the advanced base concept and its logical tac- strictly Marine Corps in nature had been tical requirements; and (b) during the pre- concentrated generally at the recruit train- World War II period, while the nation was ing depots at Parris Island and San apathetic towards rearmament and/or military expansion, an increase in Marine strength, un- Diego~3 and at the operational bases at der the guise of a defense force, was politically Quantico and San Diego, where the East more acceptable. ‘ CNO ltr to CMC, 9Dec41, Encl (a). o NAS Cape May, N. J.; Miami, Fla. ; CorPus mCompilation from muster rolls closed Christi, Tex.; and Quonset Point, R. I. ; NAD 30Nov41 (located at Unit Diary Sect, HQMC ). Burns City, Ind. ; NSD, Oakland, Calif. “ NAS Key West and Jacksonville, Fla. ; “ Generally, all recruits from east of the Mis- Tongue Point, Oreg. ; Alameda, Calif. ; Sitka and sissippi were trained at Parris Island, all from Kodiak, .41aska; and San Juan, Puerto Rico. \vest at San Diego. THE M.4RINE CORPS ON THE EVE OF W.4R 51 Coast and West Coast components of the throughout the war and thus accomplish Fleet Marine Force were stationed. FMF their basic missions. aviation was based nearby at MCAS, Much of San Diego’s success in its pri- Quantico, and NAS, San Diego. mary mission was owed to the activation Marines first laid eyes on Parris Island of nearby Camp Elliott in mid-1940 to early in the Civil War when they partici- furnish advanced training and serve as a pated in the naval expedition which base for West Coast elements of the FMF. seized adjoining Port Royal. This served Until then San Diego had housed both as an important naval base throughout of those activities, and with the speed- the war, but the Navy did not begin con- ing-up expansion program they were be- struction of installations on the island ginning to get in each other’s way. The proper until 1883. The first record of a first FMF units began the transfer early separate Marine detachment setting up in 1941 and greatly eased the pressure; there permanently occurs in June 1893. though, as will be seen, Camp Elliott The post did not begin functioning, how- itself was eventually pressured out of ever, in its present capacity until &’ovem- existence. ber 1915 when the East Coast Marine re- Quantico, acquired by the Marine Corps cruit depots were transferred there from Norfolk and Philadelphia. immediately following U. S. entry into Retained as a permanent base after World ?Var I, found its difficulties less World War I, Parris Island continued its readily resolved. During the interim be- role as the point of initial contact with tween wars, this post assumed a position military life for all newly enlisted Ma- of paramount importance in the develop- rines from the East. Partly for this rea- ment of Marine amphibious doctrine and son, its facilities were maintained at a techniques, and in the training of Marine fairly high level during the lean years of officers and technicians. The passage of the 1920’s and 1930’s. Nevertheless, the years saw additional educational units flood of recruits soon overflowed existing move in until the Virginia base became facilities and forced a rapid expansion. the center of higher learning for the Ma- Thus in 194041, even as the full train- rine Corps. ing program continued and was intensi- Advent of the national emergency soon fied, new barracks, a new post exchange, made it apparent that, no practicable phys- and a new rifle range were added to those ical expansion would enable Quantico to already operating at full capacity. continue these activities, all rapidly grow- The Recruit Depot, San Diego, which ing and intensifying in scope, and at the had operated as such since August 1923, same time serve as home base for east experienced similar problems and arrived coast FMF units, especially when opera- at similar solutions. As events proved, tional forces were to reach division size. both of these bases managed to keep Parris Island, hard pressed to keep abreast of the expansion program abreast of its own problems, could do 52 PEARL HAR~OR TO GUADALCANAL little to relieve the presure. Clearly the (’ivilian contractors pushed construction situation called for construction of an en- of permanent buildings so effectively that tirely new and extensive base for FMF soon varions specialized training and operations on the eastern seaboard. This schooling facilities and other units began required Congressional approval, which transferring to the new base from both was obtained on 15 February 1941. Q(lantico and Parris Islmnd. The 1st Ma- The site selected lay in the New River- rine Division, however, had long since Neuse River area of the 3Torth Carolina departed beyond the seas by the time coast. The surveying and purchasing of Marine Barracks, New River, reached the land began immediately. By the end of stage of development where the powers April this preliminary work had been tlmt be saw fit to dignify it, late in 19+2, completed, and construction of Tent with the nan)e Catnp I.ejenne. Camp #1, Marine Barracks, Ne~v River l,ike tile division, the 1st Marine Air- commenced. The isolated location of the craft, Wing began outgrowing its Quan- area made development an enormous task. t ico facilities long before it achieved full to the site was aln~ost Transportation st rcngt h. Even while development pro- nonexistent, electric power lines were gressed at Sew River, the Marine Corps either lacking or greatly overloaded and obtained authorization for a new air able to provide but a fraction of the curr- base nearby. Cunningham Field, Cherry ent needed. .4nd the necessary labor Point, North (’aro]ina, was designated a could be obtained only by offering special Marine Corps Air Station for develop- inducements to workers. Both the Marine nmnt purposes on 1 December 1941, and Corps and civilian contractors approached work begs n on what, would become by these problems to such good effect that by comn~issioning day, 20 May 1942, a vast the summer’ of 1941 the fiw-fronl-com- new base capable of hand] ing the greater pleted camp had reached a stage of devel- l)art of a completely bnilt-up Marine air- opment that mrrde it available for rise. (Oraft wing.l: The fledgling 1st Marine Division, still (h the west coast, (‘amp Elliott, less understrength, ~4 moved in shortly after its Ilanlpered than Quantico by :1multiplicity return from maneuvers in the Caribbean. ot’ activities, proved capable initially of There it participated in a series of an~- llillldlillg tile vastly increased ]O:Ld of acl- phibious exercises, one with the Arnly>s I-anced train ingl though the camp was ex- 1st Infantry ~)ivision, the fiLWt of four lm])ded :Lnd developed to many times its .krmy divisions to receive sLIch training original size in the I)rocess. Its 29,000 jointly with Marine units or under the acres housed the, 2d l~arine I)ivis ion from direction of llarine oficers. its activation m~til its departure for the hen of the Marine division pitchecl in Pacific. It also t)6iCillllE? the home of the to improve camp conditions while continu- Marine (’orps’ tirst tank training center ing their intensive training for combat. and tile infantry training center for ‘4While the table of organization listed three, )\nnlerwus replacenlent drafts. the 1st MarDiv had only tw-o infantry regiments at this time. “ Affrnit?Hist, 159. THE MARINE CORI’S OX THE EVE OJ!’ W.$R 53 tlie Savy to guard against .Japanese ag- gression in the Pacific. However, the German ofielisive in the spring of 1940 During the years between wars, the per- served to jolt Americans from their com- vasive spirit of pacifism which led to re- placency. Germ:ul troops overran Den- peated attempts by this country to cooper- mark, Norway, the I~ow Countries, and ate in reduction of naval armaments and France. President Roosevelt recognized in international treaties militated against the danger in this and caused a shift in adequate defense preparations, as did our military policy to provide greater budgetary restrictions. Such peace as securitl~ ill tile .Itlantic. these measures :~cl~ie~’edl}l’oved~ll~easy at Dur& the sunmler and fall of 1940, best, but the fact that the U. S. lived up Congress stepped up the procurement of to its agreements, whereas some other na- :LiL’CL’ilft, mobilized the reserves, passed tions did not, contributed toward making selective service legislation and launched olw defense program a shadow of what the t~~o-ocean navy building program. it might, have been. This was particw ]tut completion of these measures would larly serious in the Pacific, N will be seen. take time, and we had no assurance that But in 1939%41, with war flaming through the Axis partners would sit idly by and Europe, the more immediate danger lay in enjoy the fruits of their initial aggression. the Atlantic. where Hitler’s submarines appeared nearly invincible. To in~plement the rearmament program, In the fall of 1939 the United States I’resident Roosevelt adopted the policy armed forces were barely adequate for the of i~idi]lg ];ritain and RLlssi:L(after rTLLlle defense of the Western Hemisphere. As 1941) while cent inuing diplomatic rela - long as the national sentiment did not tions with Germany and ,Jap:Ln. ~f~ith sanction total rearmament and military indnst ry expanding and the armed forces expansion, the administration wtLs forced ilicmasing in size and equipment, the .kd- to rely on existent means and a partial nlinistration did every tl~ing short of war mobilization of both nmnpower and mate- to bolster Britain’s tottering position. rial. I?nfortunate]y, the. ln]l in military In the fall of 1940 ~ritain and the operations in F,urope during the winter I“nited States completed negotiations of 1939-1940 seemed to justify public \vhich culminated in one of the most ex- lllXLth~ and n~ade the problem of rearma- t raordinary military deals in history. ment more ditlicult for the l’resiclent. and Briti~in, hol(ling numerous Caribbean pos- his military planners. sessions, desperately needed additional Britain’s historical donlillance of the convoy vessels to l)rotect her vital Atlantic Atlantic sea 1anes h:Ld gi veil us a false supply 1ine against, submarine depreda- sense of security there, an(l pernl itted the tions; the U. S., possessor of numerous United States to commit a major part of o~erage destroyers, wished to Strengthen defense of eastern ap~)roaches to tl~e main- ‘“ Unless otherwise noted the materinl ia this lancl and the Pananla C’anal. 5 DefBns (Pacific) ------4, 399 How thin the Marine Corps hacl to 2d MAW ( elements) ( Pacific) ______733 spread its manpower in order to fulfill 2d MarDiv (elements) ( Pacific) ------489 its many commitments is indicated by the Total ------5,621 table that follows showing the distribu- Total above categories ______64, 641 tion effective 30 November 1941, on the Total strength Marine Corps _____ 65, 881 eve of Pearl Harbor. The fact that the figures qnoted do not. add up to total n Quantico, Parris Island, San Diego, Camp Elliott, New Ri~7er. Corps strength is accounted for by omis- 2’ -lth Mar ( Philippines), 801; 1st SepBn sion of minor categories in~rolving indi- (Philippines), 725; Ist MarBrig (Prov ) (Ice- viduals or small groups of men. land ), 3,972. PART TWO war Comes CHAPTER 1 Prewar Situation in the Pacific SUMMARY OF NEGOTIA TIONS ‘ dated islands awarded Japan as its share of the spoil of C~erman possessions lost in In the late years of the 1$X11Century and 11’orld War I. In 1934 the Japanese the early decades of the 20th, ,Japan set served notice that they would no longer out to gain more territory. Consistently abide by the limitations of the J~Tashing- following a policy of encroachment in ton Naval Disarmament Treaty of 1922. Asia and the Pacific, and retreating only Finally, in 1937, Japan attacked China when confronted with the threat of supe- and horrified the world with the excesses rior force, the ,Japanese Empire steadily comtnitted by her soldiers in the infamous grew in size and strength. Warning sig- Rape of N’ankingo But still there was no nals of an impending clash between ,Japan effective military action to curb this ramp- and the Western nations with extensive ant aggression. interests in the orient became increasingly In this period Japan was not without emdent. In the 1930’s when these nations supporters. Germany and Italy, bent on were gripped by economic depression and similar programs of territorial aggran- their military expenditures were cut to dizement in Europe and Africa, made the bone, Japan struck brazenly. common cause with the Japanese. These In 1931 Japanese troops invaded Man- “his” powers signed a mutual assistance churia and no concerted international mil- pact in 1937, ostensibly aimed at the Com- itar~ effort was made to halt, the seizure. munist Cominform, but in essence as a An ineffectual censure by the I~ague of show of strength to forestall interference Nations, far from discouraging ,Japan, with their plans of conquest. In August emboldened her to further action. An- 1940. after the outbreak of war in Europe grily, the Japanese delegates stalked out and the fall of France, Germany forced at Geneva and gave formal notice of in- the Vichy Government to consent to Jap- tention to withdraw from the I~ague. anese occupation of northern Indo- China. The country thickened its curtain of se- The three predatory nations combined crecy which shrouded the I,eague-man- again in less than a month, this time in ‘ Unless otherwise notecl the material in this the Tripartite Treaty of 27 September seethm is derived from Senate I)oc No. 244,79th which promised concerted action by the Congress, 2d Session, Report of the Joint Com- Axis in case of war with the United States. mittee on the Investigation of tile Pearl Harbor A ttudc (Washington : GPO, 1946), hereinafter The United States, traditionally a cited as Pearl Harbor Rept and the Committee’s friend of China and a supporter of an record of 39 volumes of hearings and exhibits, “Open Door” policy in Asia, strongly op- hereinafter cited as IIearings Record; G. N. posed ,Japanese moves to establish hegem- Steiger, A History of the Far East (Boston : Ginn and CO., 1944). ony over the strife-torn Chinese Republic. 59 60 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL While the political sentiment of the ma- achieve a peaceful solution of the threat- jority of ~mericans in the late 1930’s ening situation in the Pacific. It was WOUIC1 condone no direct military inter- not Konoye, however, who called the turn vention, the government and the nation in Imperial policy, but the Japanese were openly sympathetic to the ~hinese Army. And the Army adamantly re- cause. Both moral and legal embargoes fused to consider any concession that agy~inst munitions shipments to Japan might cause it to lose face. were put into effect and increasing .&fter Germany attacked Russia in June amounts of material aid given to China. 1941, the longtime threat of Soviet inter- American pilots, including members of vention in ,Japan’s plans for expansion the armed forces, were permitted to volun- was virtually eliminated. The Japanese teer to fly for the Chinese Air Force Army moved swiftly to grab more terri- against the ,Japanese.2 tory and to add to its strength. Southern By early 1941 ,Japan was hurt in pride$ Indo-China was occupied and conscripts purse, and potency as a result of .lrnerican and reservists were called Lip. ln the face political and economic measures taken to of this fresh evidence of ,Japanese in- halt its expansion. In March a new Am- transigence, President Roosevelt froze all bassador, Admiral Nomura, was sent to ,Japanese assets in the lJnit.ed States, ef- Washington to negotiate a settlement of fectively severing the last commercial ,Tapanese-American differences. He was contact between the two nations. confronted with a statement of four prin- In October the Army forced the ~onoye ciples which represented the basic An~eri- cabinet to resign and replaced it with a can posit ion in negot iations. These were: government entirely sympathetic to its (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and position.’ The new premier, General the so~ereignty of each and all nations: Toj o, sent a special representative, Saburu (2) Support of the principle of noninterfer- I In considering the negotiations in their en- tage of choice of time and place of at- tirety the conclusion is inescapable that Japan tack rested with the aggressor. Japan in- had no concessions to make and that her pro- tended to strike during a period when gram of aggression was immutable.” most of the resources in men and material of the British Commonwealth were being JAPANE8E WAR PLAN 7 devoted to the defeat of the European Both the United States and ,Japan had Axis partners. The Netherlands, which developed plans for war in the Pacific existed only as a goverlllnent-in-exile, long before December 1941. Each nation could contribute quite a few ships but only a small number of men to a common de- ‘ lfcari?]~,$Record, Part 12, Exhibit No. 1: 165, fense force. And the ITnited States, most 6Pearl Harbor Rept, 49, certainly Japan’s strongest enemy, was ‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in this heavily committed to support the Allies section is derived from Peurl Harbor Rept; in Europe and the Near East. Moreover, Hcari?t~s Record, Part 13, Exhibits 8–81), Japan- that nation was only partially mobilized ese Records; USSBS ( Pac ), NavAnalysisDiy, for war. (“ampaigns of the Pacific War ( Washington: GPO, 1946 ), hereinafter cited as Campaigns of The initial ,Japanese war concept did tlte Pacilic War. not envisage the occupation of any terri- PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL tory east of Tarawa in the Gilberts. -Ml Islands. The approach route lay well operations beyond the limits of the South- north of the search areas patrolled by ern Resources Area were designed to es- American planes based at Midway and tablish and protect a defensive perimeter. Wake and out of normal shipping lanes. The cordon of strategic bases and islancl The tentative clay of attack, X-day, had outposts was to stretch from the Kuriles been set for a Sunday, 7 December (Pearl through Wake Atoll to the Marshalls ancl Harbor time). Japanese intelligence in- Gilberts and thence west to the 13ismarck dicated that most of the Pacific Fleet Archipelago. The islands of Timor, Java, would be in port on a weekend. Tallies cmd Sumatra in the East Indies were to of the ships present at the Pearl Harbor be seized and ,Japanese troops were to oc- Naval Base received from the Japanese cupy the Malayan Peninsula and Burma. consulate at Honolulu were transmitted The major force which might prevent to the attack force as late as 5 December. or delay the accomplishment of the ,Japa- Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the strik- nese plan was the ITnited States Pacific ing force commander, received orders Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. Recogniz- from Yamamoto on 2 December confirm- ing the threat posed by the American ing the chosen date. There was still time naval strength, the Commander in Chief to turn back; if the approaching ships of the ,Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral had been discovered prior to 6 December Isoroku Yamamoto, directed that a study they had orders to return. N’o one saw be made of the feasibility of a surprise them, however, and the carriers arrived aerial attack on Pearl, timed to coincide at their launching point right on schedule. with the outbreak of war. In February At midnight of 6-7 December, the Jap- 1941 the first staff considerations of the anese Combmed Fleet Operation Order projected raid were begun, but the actual No. 1 informed its readers that a state of details of the operation were not worked war existed with the United States, Great out until September when it seemed in- Britain, and the h-etherlands. creasingly obvious to the ,Japanese high command that war was inevitable and that A.lf ERZCA,V WAR PLAN ‘ they needed this bold stroke to insure the success of initial attacks. A nation’s war plans are never static. On 3 November the Chief of the Naval The constantly changing world political General Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano, scene demands continual reevaluation and appro~ed the draft plan, and on the 5th amendment. In the 1930>s,American war commanders of fleets and task forces were given their assignments. (lrders were is- sUnless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Pearl Harbor Rept; sued to selected task force units to begin ATavy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL- moving singly and in small groups to 46), 26iMay41 and Appendix I, ,Joint Army -h’avy Hitokappu Bay in the Kuriles on or about Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, quoted in full 15 November. Ten days later a striking in Hearings Record, Part 33, Exhibit No. 4; force, its core six large fleet, carriers trans- MarCorps Plan C–2, Rainbow No. 5, 5Jun41, Plans & Policies Div Files; M. S. Watson, Chief porting the pick of the Japanese Navy’s of fltaff: Prexar Plans and Preparation%— planes and pilots, sortied from the se- Zrnited S’tates .4rf?zy {n World War II (Wash- cluded anchorage bolmd for the Hawaiian ington: HistDiv. DA, 1950) ; S. E. E1orison, 63 plans were concerned primarily with of the Axis partners would bring imn~e- courses of action to be taken in the event diate declarations of war from the others. of a conflict in one theatre and against By insuring action on two widely sepa- one nation or a contiguous group of na- rated fronts, the Axis could expect at the tions. In these so-called “color plans,” very least a decreased Allied capability to each probable enemy was assigned a sepa- concentrate their forces. The .Unerican- rate color designation; ,Japan became British conversations ended on 27 March Orange. With the advent of the Axis with an agreenlent (A13C–1 ) which was coalition, American military men began to have a profound effect on the course of thinking in terms of a true world war. World War II. Its basic strategical de- .% these new plans evolved they were c ision, which never was discarded, stated given the name Rainbow to signify their that: concept of a multi-national war. Since Germany is the predominant member of The United States was deeply involyed the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European in the war in Europe soon after its out- area is considered to be the decisire theatre. break, if not as an active belligerent, then The principal United States military effort will be exerted in that tbeatre, and operations of as the arsenal of the democracies. Bv . United States forces in other theatres will be the spring of 1941 American naval ves- conducted in such a tminner as to facilitate that sels were convoying shipments of war ma- effort . . . If Japan does enter the war, the teriel at least part of the way to Europe Military Strategy in the Far East will be defensive.’ and they were actively guarding against German submarines a Neutrality Zone The defensive implied in the war that extended far out into the Atlantic. i~gai]~st ,J:~l):~]~was not to be a holding The intent, of these measures and others act ion, however, but rather a strategic de- similar to them was clearly to support fensive that contemplated a series of tac- Britain in its war against Germany, Italy, tical offensives with the Pacific Fleet as and their satellites. There v-as little ques- tl~e striking force. .i new .imerican war tion where the, sympathies of the majority l)lan, Rainbow 5, was pronlulgated soon of Americans lay in this struggle and none after the end of tile .illleric:lll-l;~itisll at all regarding the position of their talks. .%lmost tile whole of tile Pacific government. \VilS made an .Inlerican strategic responsi- On 29 ,January 1941, ranking British bility al]d the .irmy’s primary mission and American statf officers met in Wash- lmder tile plan was cooperation with and ington to discuss joint, measures to be sllpport Of the fleet. taken if the United States should be A listing of the contemplated offensive actions of Rainbow 5, which included the forced to a war with the Axis Powers. rapture of tile (’arolil]e and Marshall Is- It was regarded as almost, certain that lal~ds, would be interesting but academic. the outbreak of hostilities with any one T]le success of tile ,Japanese raid on Pearl 1{arbor forcecl a drastic revision of strat- The Risino Sun in tlc Pacific lf131-i4pril19.j2— Hi,?tory of U}litcd S’tutcs .Nural Opcration~ in egy which etiect ively postpo]led amphib- TI’orld Ti’ar II ( Boston : Little, Brown and Cmn- pany, 1948), hereinafter cited as Ri.sif)q ~~(n in nI’ara 13 of AB(.’--1 quoted in Hearil?g8 Rec- tl[ e Paci@. ord, I’art 33, 9.58. 64 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL ious assaults in the Central Pacific. C’er- Group. A blueprint, for base expansion taiu defensive nleasures which were nlen- in the Pacific had been laid out in the re- tioned in the plan, however, were inlple- port of the Navy’s Hepburn Board, a lnented prior to the outbreak of war and Congressionally authorized fact-finding in most of them Marine forces figured group which, in t~e spring of 1938, made prominently. a strategic study of the need for addi- Some of the Marine defense hnttalions, tional {Tnited States naval bases. The tailored to meet tllenee(lsof garrisons for potential utility of Midway, Wake, ,John- isolated island olltposts, w-ere alreacly in ston, and Palmyra was recognized,ll and the Pacific by tile time Rail) bow 5 was surveys were conducted and plans made published. The plan called for the cle- for the construction of base. facilities, air- velopment of bases, primarily air bases, at fields, and seadromes during 1939 and ~~idway, tJol)l~ston, Palmyra, $iamoa, and 19M. The responsibility for developing Wake. .111 of these islands, which were garrison plans and locating coastal and Imder control of the N“avy, were to lmve antiaircraft gun positions was given to ll:trilleg:lrrisolls. Gll:lIYl,illtllecellterof Colonel Harry K. Pickett, 14th Naval Dis- tl~e ,Japanese-helcl Mariauas, which had trict Marine Officer and Commanding long hacl a small Marine barracks cletacll- Officer, Marine Barracks, Pearl Harbor ment, was decisively written OHin the war Navy Yard. The fact that Colonel Pickett plan : its early capture by the Japanese personally surveyed most of the base sites was conceded. The rest of the islands insured active and knowledgeable cooperat- were placed in a category which called for ion at, Pearl Harbor with requests from defense forces sufficient to repel major the islands for men and materiel to imple- attacks. nlellt the garrison plans. The purpose of est ah]ishing bases on .Uthough they were popularly referred these islands was twofold. Samoa was to to in the singular sense, a custom that will help protect tile mutes of colllllltll]ic:ttioll be continued in this narrative, each of the to the Southwest Pacific; Johnston, Pal- outposts was actually a coral atoll encom- myra, Wake, and Midway were to serve as passing varying nunlbers of bleak, low- outguards for the Pacific, Fleet’s home port at Pearl. (See Map 1, Map Section) HQMC, 29Dw43; CO, :M DefBn ltr to OIC, HistDiv, HQMC, 4Feb44 ; MD, 1st DefBn, MARZZVE GARRISONS ‘0 PalnlyraIs, Annual Rept of .$ctivities. 1.Ju143: Hist of the 7th DefBn, ’21Dec4!2 ; Ist SanloanBn, The Navy did not start cold with its ad- MC’R. Anfiual Rept of .irtivities, LTu142; I.tCol vance base development schen]e for the R. L). Heinl, T//c Dcfc)/.!c, of Wake (Washington : HistSet,, I’nbInfoDiv, HQMC, 1947), hereinafter four island outposts of the Hawaiian cited as Drfcnsr of Wa7:c; I,t(’olR. D. Heinl, .Ilaril(r,s at J[idway ( Washington : IIistSec, ‘0{unless otherwise noted the material in this l’nb Inf{jI)iv, HQMC, 1948), hereinafter cited ns section is derived from VSO Serial 070412, .lfaf-ittcs a t.11i{ltru,ij. 23.Jnn41, “i’olicy re~arcling employment of Mar- “ House I )OC A-o. 61, 76th Con~ress, I st Ses- ine Defense Battalions in the I’acifi(, Are:i” si(m. “Report on the X~ed of .i(lditi~ni~l A’:tval ( located at XRMC) : CXO Serial 091812, Rases to Defend the (’omt of the United States, 25 SeIAl, ‘“Enlploynwnt of Marine Defense Bat- its Territories nnd I’{k+sessions” ( Hepburn talions” ; cO, 1st I)efBn ltr to OIC, HistI)i~, Board Rel)t ), 3Jan:l!l, p(~.wiw. PREWAR SITCTATION IAT THE PACIFIC 65 lying sand islands within a fringing reef. land since 1903. Most construction, like Each atoll had at least one island big the passenger hotel on Wake and the quar- enough to contain an airstrip; Midway ters for the airline’s and cable company’s had two. The lagoons within the reefs personnel, was of little military value. were all large enough to permit the dredg- Midway, which had the most ambitious ing and blasting of seaplane landing base plan, was also the first outpost sched- lanes and anchorages for small cwrgo uled to receive a Marine garrison-the 3d ships; Midway’s and Wake’s were also Defense Battalion which arrived at Pearl slated for development as forward bases Harbor on 7 May 1940. The bulk of the for the Pacific Fleet’s submarines. Civil- battalion remained in Hawaii for the next ian contractors were hired to build the na- eight months while reconnaissance details, val base installations, but until war actu- followed by small advance parties, did ally broke out, most of the work on the the prelim~lary work on supply and de- island defenses was done by the men who fense installations?’ On 27 January were to man them, Marines of the lst, 3d, 1941, in the face of the threat posed by and 6th Defense Battalions. ,Tapan’s aggressive actions, the Chief of The organization of the defense battal- Naval Operations ( CNO) directed that ions varied according to time and place the rest of the 3d Defense Battalion be of employment, but by late 1941 the stand- moved to Midway, that detachments of ard T/O called for a unit, with more than 900 men assigned to a headquarters bat- the 1st Defense Battalion be established tery, three 5-inch coast defense gun bat- at Johnston and Palmyra, and that the teries, three 3-inch antiaircraft batteries, 6th Defense Battalion, then in training at a sound locator and searchlight battery, a San Diego, move to Pearl Harbor as a re- battery of .5o caliber antiaircraft machine placement and reserve unit for the out- guns, and a battery of .30 caliber machine posts?’ guns for beach defense. Midway was the On 15 February, the same day that the only outpost that actually drew an entire 3d Battalion began unloading its heavy battalion, although Wake originally was equipment at Midway, an advance detach- slated to be garrisoned by one. On ,Tohn- ment of the 1st Defense Battalion left San ston and Palmym the habitable area was Diego on the Enterprise. At Pearl Har- so limited that it was impossible to accom- bor the detachment left the carrier and modate more than a small defense detach- transferred to a small cargo ship that ment. steamed on to the southwest for 800 miles Some development work had been done on Wake and Midwayt the two northern ‘2 BriGen A. R. Pefley notes on draft manu- islands, before the arrival of the naval script, 14Jan57. Since all fresh water had to be distilled, the capacity of the distillers set the contractors’ construction crews. In 1935 limit for the size of the island garrison. In terms Pan American World Airways had set up of water consumption each contractor’s w-ork- way stations for its Clipper service to the man took the place of a Marine. Adm C. C. Orient on both Midway and J1’uke and a Bloch ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, 7Jan57. ‘3 CNO Serial 0618, 17 Jan41, “Establishment relay station of the trans-Pacific cable had of Permanent Marine Defense Forces at John- been in operation on Midway’s Sand Is- ston, Midway, and Palmyra Islands.” 66 rlMR1, HARBOR TO GUADAI.CANAL to reach tiny Johnstonwhere on 3 March rotation for the men at the outlying posts, two 5-inch guns, six Marines, and two replacing those that had been longest “in naval corpsmen were set ashore. After a the field” with men from Pearl Harbor. few days layover to help the caretaker de- In midsummer a group of 1st Defense tail get set up, the rest of the advance Battalion personnel was sent to Midway party (3 officers and 45 enlisted men) to start the relief of the 3d Battalion and went on to Palmyra, approximately 1,100 on 11 September the 6th Defense Battal- miles south of Oahu. ion arrived to take over as the atoll’s gar- After the remainder of the 1st Defense rison, The 3d Battalion returned to Battalion arrived at Pearl, small reinforc- Hawaii for a well-deser~-ed break from ing detachments were gradually added to the gruelling monotony and work of the southern outpost garrisons as the is- building defenses. lands’ supply and qwwtering facilities By August 1941 the work on the naval were expanded. On tJohnston and Pal- air base at Wake was well along and the myra, as at Midway, the civilian contrac- need for a garrison there. was imperative. tors’ crews and construction equipment An advance detachment of the 1st De- were heavily committed to the naval air fense Battalion arrived at the atoll on base program, and only occasionally 19 .$ugust and immediately began the could the Marines borrow a bulldozer, now familiar process of backbreaking truck, or grader to help out in their own work to dig in guns, dumps, aid stations, extensive schedule of defense construction. and command posts. Again the contrac- For the most part, the garrisons relied on tor’s men and machines were largely de- pick and shovel to get their guns emplaced voted to work on the airfield and the ancl to dig in the ammunition magazines, lagoon, and the Marines had to get along command posts, and fire direction centers with the hand tools organic to the unit. necessary for islancl defense. In late October reinforcements from the Duty on the small atolls was arduous parent battalion made the 2,000-mile trip and dull with little relief from the monot- from Hawaii to bring the garrison L~pto ony of a steady round of work and train- a strength of nearly 400 men. The unit ing. When a few hours off was granted, scheduled to be the permanent garrison there was no place to go and little to do; on Wake, the 4th Defense Battalion, ar- the visible world shrank to a few uninvit- rived at Pearl Harbor on 1 December, too ing acres of dunes> scrub brush, and coral late to reinforce or replace the Wake De- surrounded by seemingly endless stretches tachment. A most important addition to of ocean. The visits of patrol planes, sLlp- the atoll’s defenses did arrive, however, ply ships, and even inspection parties before war broke. Twelve Grumman were welcomed. t-rider the circumstances, Wildcats of Marine Fighter Squadron morale at the isolated l>osts remained sur- 211 flew in to the airstrip off the Enter- prisingly high, helped perhaps by the prise on 4 December. prospect of action. Just before the Japanese attacked, the In so far as possible, the 14th hTaval strength of defense battalion personnel on District attempted to follow a policy of outpost duty and at Pearl Harbor was: PREWAR SITLTATIC)XIX THE PACIFIC 67 ~cwlHwb~r Johnston Pdmyr~ }~idwa~ wake off ilnl 0s I ml-iv-’ ml, ‘- C)fi ‘ ;n~ ‘-;;- ~n, ———.— ——— I_ — I lstDefB1l______20 i 241 i 71 155 7! 151 !-... -. ------16 406 3d DefB1]------40 I 823 ------...... 1 ______4th De fBt)______38 780 ______6thDefBl~______4 17 ------33 810 -.- . . . ______~:!: ‘-----‘----- ‘----- ‘----- For armament the outposts reliecl a headquarters company, an infantry com- mainly on the organic weapons of the de- pany, and an artillery battery as well as a fense battalions: 5-inch naval guns, small detail which had the mission of or- 3-inch antiaircraft gIuIs, and .30 ancl .50 ganizing and training a battalion of caliber machine guns. Midway had, in ,? amoan reservists, addition, three 7-inch naval guns still to The islands of American Samoa had a be mounted ancl CLfourth gun at Pearl native population of almost 10,000 which Harbor waiting to be shipped. The COUICIbe drawn upon as a labor force and breakdown of weapon strength showed: ‘4 for troops to back up a regular gmrison. This was not, the only significant differ- ~lidw.a~Johnston P~lmYrawake ence between the outpost atolls and Samoa, however. The terrain of Tutuila, which 5-inch guns.. _ 6 2 4; 6 was by far the largest and most heavily 3-inch guns... 12 4 41 12 populated of the islands, was nlountain- .50 cal MGs -- 30 8 8! 18 ous and heavily forested, and its 52 square .30 cal LfGs. 30 8 S! 30 miles contained a number of areas that could be converted into camps and supply Although the list of weapons was impos- depots. There was room for training ing, the garrisons were not strong enough areas and small arms ranges. The fine to man them adequately; the standard de- harbor at Pago Pago, site of the U. S. fense battalion of 1941, moreover, in- hTaval Station and headquarters of the cluded no infantry. naval governor , could be used by large In contrast to the garrisons of the Pearl vessels. This combination of harbor, el- Harbor outposts, the 7th Defense Battal- bow room, ancl an indigenous labor force, ion slated for duty at Tutuila, main island plus its location along tlie snipping route of American Samoa, was a composite in- to the Sol~thwest Pacific, made Tutuila fantry-artillery unit. The battalion was a vital strut egric base. (See Map 3) organized at San Diego on 16 December During the” spring and early summer 1940 -with an initial strength of 25 officers of 1940, Major Alfred R. Pefley of and 392 enlisted men. Its T/O called for Colonel Pickett’s staff made a thorough survey of Tutuila and prepared a detailed “ ComFourteen Rept of Status of DefBns as- plan for its defense. On 29 XTovember the signed to the 14th A-D, lDec41 (located at NRNC ) . Personnel figures include naval nledi- CNO directed that, defense plans based on cal personnel assigned to the defense battalions. Pefley’s recommendations be implemented 68 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL immediately. Tl~ella~’al got’erllor \\-:~sall- It was midsummer before the first Sa- thorized to begin construction of coast cle- moan Marine was actually enlisted, but fense and antiaircraft gun positions. many natives voluntarily took weapons Most of the guns to be mounted were al- training on an unpaicl status, continuing ready in storage at the naval station and a practice begun by the naval governor in the Bureau of (lrdnance was directed to November 1940.” The first native recruit provide the ammunition cLnd additional was enlisted on 16 .~ugust 1941 and the weapons still needecl.l~ 1st Sanloal~ Battalion, Marine Corps Re- The primary purpose of raising the 7th serve, was a going concern by the time Defense Battalion was the manning of the war broke. The authorized strength of four 6-inch naval glu]s an(l six 3-inch the battalion was 500 enlisted men, but antiaircraft guns provided for in initial this figure could never be reached because defense plans. The wisdom of including of the great number of men needed as infantry in the battalion and makin~ pro- laborers on essential base construction. vision for reinforcement by trainecl Sz- There was one factor of the defense moan reserves can hardly be questioned. picture at Tutui]a that, matched the situ- Tutuila was far too large an island to be ation at Midway, ,Johnston, and Palmyra. adequately protected by CLrelatively few None of these islands had, at the onset big guns, most of which were concen- of war, any land planes. The Marine air trated around Pago Pago harbor. Small squadrons which were scheduled to join beach defense garrisons were needed all the defenders were either still in the around the island shorelines to check States or else based on Oahu, waiting for enemy raiding parties. It was intended the signal that the airfields were ready that most of the Samoan reserves would for use. That part of Marine Air which be equipped and trained with rifles taken was in the Hawaiian Islands was based at from naval stores and used in the beach Ewa Field, located approximately four defenses where their knowledge of the air miles west, of Pearl Harbor. Just terrain would be invaluable. prior to the Japanese attack, the units An advance party of the. 7th Defense stationed at the field were Headquarters Battalion, which left the States before the and Ser\Tice Squadron of Marine Aircraft unit was formally activated, arrived at Group 21 (IWAG-21) ; Marine Scout Pago Pago on 21 December 1940. The Bomber Squadron 232 ( VMSB-232 ) : rest of the battalion made the 4,500-mile Marine Utility Squadron 252 (VMJ- voyage from San Diego via Pearl Harbor 252 ) ; and the rear echelon of VMF-211, in March, arriving on “the 15th. The next which had moved forward to Wake. Op- months were busy ones as gLms were em- erational control of the Marine planes in placed and test fired, beach defenses were the Hawaiian area was exercised by the constructed, miles of communication lines Commander .\ircraft, Battle Force, Pa- were laid, and trails were cut which would cific Fleet.” enabh? quick reinforcement of threatened landing points. ‘“ (+OVof Amer%moa ltr to C~O, 1~1’ebll, “~sta~lishn]ent of Native Insular Force. ” “ CNO serial 054430, 29 Nov40, “Defense of ‘7 2dLt B. Hollingshead, “The ,Japanese Attack American Samoa, ” on 7 December 1941 on the Marine Corps Air PREW.IR SITI”.ITIOX IX THE P.\(’IFIC 69 Aside from the Marine forces in the Station at Ford Island. Marines pro- N’estern Pacific assigned to the .Isiatic vided the guard (169 men ) at the YTaval Fleet,” the only sizealde Marine units in .%mm~ulition Depot at Lualualei in the the Pacific not already accounted for were hills northwest of HonoILdu. The defense guard detachments on Oahu and the Xi battalions which were ql~artered in or near Engineer Batt alien (less Companies C the navy yard were under the operational and D) which had been sent to Oahu to control of the Commanding Officer, Ma- establish an advance amphibious training rine Barracks, Colonel Pickett. base for the, 2d Marine Division. There There were an :Idditional 877 Marines was a 485-n~an Marine Barracks at the present in Pearl Harbor on 7 December Pearl Harbor X’avy Yard and 102 men as members of the guard detachments of assigned to the barracks at the XTavalAir the battleships and cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.” In all, there were more than Station at E\Vii, ():11111. Territory of Hn\~nii” (31S, HistL)i~, HQM(’, .Jiinll:]ry 1!)43), 3-8. here 4,500 Jlarines on Oallu that first day. inafter cited ?IS f;lr~f .Vo)lo(lroph. The other squmlrons nssigned to 31.4{+–21 were either i~t “ The strength of most hlarhle units on Oahu sea }Yith lhe X:lvy’s (.iirriers or still in the V. S. is listed in Hca/”inys Record, Part 24, Exhibit “ See I’rtrt IV, “31arines in the I’hi]ippines,” A“(). 40. “Location of regularly assigned tom- for the Imew:ir situation in (’hin:l Nnd the I’hilip- lutrnding officers of shil)s I)resent during the pilles, ,Tapanese attack of ‘i December 1941.” CHAPTER 2 Japan Strikes PEARL HARBOR’ nese two-man submarines which had the extremely risky mission of penetrating the Perhaps no action in American mili- Pacific Fleet’s stronghold. The midgets tary history has been so thoroughly docu- were transported to the target on board mented, examined, and dissected as the large long-range submarines, part of an Pearl Harbor attack. Investigation has undersea scouting and screening force followed investigation; a host of books which had fanned out ahead of the enemy have been written on the subject, all in an carriers. Not one of the midget raiders effort to pin down the responsibility in achieved any success; four were sunk and the welter of charge and countercharge. one ran aground. The issue of, -what indivic]uals or set of The Japanese attack schedule allowed circumstances, if any, should bear the the Americans little time to evaluate the blame for the success of the Japanese raid significance of the submarine sighting. has not been, and may never be, finally The first enemy strike group was airborne decided. On one point, however, there and winging its way toward Oahu be- has been unanimous agreement—that the fore the Wa~d fired its initial spread of courage of the vast majority of defending depth charges. The Japanese carrier troops was of a high order. force had turned in the night and steamed The first inkling of the Japanese attack full ahead for its target, launching the came not from the air, but from the sea. first plane at 0600 when the ships were ap- At 0637 on 7 December, more than an proximately 200 miles north of Pearl hour before any enemy planes were Harbor. A second strike group took off at sighted, an American patrol bomber and 0745 when the carriers had reached a posi- the destroyer Ward attacked and sank an tion 30 miles closer to the American base. unidentified submarine in the restricted waters close to the entrance to Pearl Har- Although a radar set on the island picked bor.’ This vessel was one of five Japa- L~pthe approaching planes in time to give warning, the report of the sighting was 1 Unless otherwise noted the material in this believed an error and disregarded, and section is derived from l’rarl Horbor Rcpt; the ,Japanese fighters and bombers ap- Hrarin.qs Record, Part 13, Exhibits Nos. 8–8D, peared unannounced over their objectives. Japanese Records, and Parts 23 and 24, Hear- ings and Exhibits of the Roberts (’orumission ; The enemy plan of attack was simple. MarFor, 14th ND .Jnl, December 1941 ; EIW Dive bombers and fighter planes would Monograph; Col H. K. Pickett ltr to BriGen C. D. Barrett. 22Dec41 ( located at NRMC, Job preyious false reports, it was considered neces- 6608, Box 25) ; Risinq Surf i)t t7tr Pffcific. sary to check the report. The air attack started 2 “’Unfortunately, the radio report sent to the before ~erification was received.” Adm C. C. 14th N. D. was not clear, and in view of many Block ltr, op. cit. 70 JAPAN STRIKES 71 strafe and bomb the major Army and The Americans did not take their beat- Navy airfields in an attempt to catch de- ing lying down. The first scattered shots fending aircraft on the ground. Simul- from sentries ashore and watch standers taneously, the battleships moored to pil- who manned antiaircraft guns on board ings along the shore of Ford Island ship flashed back at the enemy even be- would be hit by high- and low-level bomb- fore the bugles and boatswains’ pipes ing attacks. The shipping strike groups sounded “Call to Arms” and “General included large numbers of dive and hori- Quarters.” The ships of the Pacific Fleet zontal bombers, since the Japanese antici- were on partial alert even in port and pated that protective netting might pre- most of the officers and men were on vent their lethal. torpedo bombers from board. Crew members poured up the lad- being fully effective. In all, &21 planes ders and passages from their berthing took part in the raid, while 39 fighters compartments to battle stations, While flew protective cover over the carriers to damage control teams tried to put down guard against a retaliatory attack that fires and shore up weakened bulkheads, never materialized. gun crews let loose everything they had At 0755 the soft stillness of Sunday against the oncoming planes. In many morning was broken by the screaming cases guns were fired from positions whine of dive bombers and the sharp chat- awash as ships settled to the bottom and ter of machine guns, At half a dozen crewmen were seared with flames from different bases around the island of Oahu fuel and ammunition fires as they con- Japanew planes signaled the outbreak of tinued to serve their weapons even after war with a torrent of sudden death. Pa- receiving orders to abandon ship. On trol bombers were caught in the water at many vessels the first torpedoes and bombs Kaneohe Naval Air Station, across the trapped men below deck and snuffed out island from Honolulu; closely parked the lives of others before they were even rows of planes, concentrated to protect aware that the attack was on. them from sabotnge, were transformed The reaction to the Japanese raid was into smoking heaps of useless wreckage at fully as rapid at shore bases as it was on the Army’s Whee]er and Hickam Fields, board ship, but the men at the airfields the Marines’ air base at Iihva, and the and the navy yard had far less to fight h’avy’s Ford Island air st~tion. The at- with. There was no ready ammunition at tack on the airfields had barely started any antiaircraft gun position on the is- before the first bombs and torpedoes were land; muzzles impotently pointed sky- loosed against the sitting targets of “battle- \\,ard~~,hiletrucks were hurried to muni- ship row.>’ Within minutes most of the tions depots. Small arms were broken battleships at the Ford Island moorings out of armories at every point under at- had been hit by one or more torpedoes tack; individuals manned the machine and bombs. If the Japanese had drawn guns of damaged aircraft. The rage to off after the first fifteen minutes of their strike back at the Japanese was so strong attacks, the damage done would have been that men even fired pistols at the enemy terrific, but the enemy planes kept on planes as they swooped 10VVto strafe. strafing and bombing and the toll of ships, At Ewa every Marine plane was planes, and men soared. knocked out of action in the first attack. 448777 0—5.s-6 JAPAN STRIKES 73 The men of IWIG-21 recovered quickl~ ~Yithin the same half IIollr that, wit- from their initial surprise and shock ancl liessed the, loss of l~wa’s planes, the possi- fOLl@t back with what few rifles aIIc{ nla- bility of effective aerial resistance was chine guns they hacl. Salvageable guns cal~celed ol~t by simil:tr enemy :Itt:tcks all were stripped from {lan~aged planes anti over OallII. ~orcl island’s seaplane ramps set LIp on hastily in~provisecl mounts; one and rlll~ways were made a shambles of scout-bomber rear machine ~Ll11 ITa s wrecked aIId burning aircraft in the open- mannecl to swell the vol[une of antiair- ing stase of tl~e ,Japanese assault. craft fire. Although the .groul) conlmancl- The Marines of the air station’s guard detach- er, I,ieutenant (?olonel Claucle :1. Lark in, had been wounded almost as soon as he ment nlal~l~e(lrifles Ind mlchine gmls to arrived at tile field tlmt morning, he con- beat otf fllrther enemy thrusts, but the tinued to coordinate the efforts to meet clire bombers had done their job well. further enemy attacks. There was no need for them to return. The Two ,Japanese dive. bombers streaked ferns of all attacks became the larger ships over the field from the direction of Pearl in the harbor. Harbor at 0835, dropping light fragn~en- The raid drew alltomatic reactions from tation bombs and stratil~g tile Marine gun tile few Marines ill tile navy yarcl who saw positions. A few min~~tes after the the first enen)y planes diving on the ships. bombms left, the first of a steady proces- Wllile the guard bugler broke tl~e n~ajor- sion of enemy fighters attacked Ewa as ity of the men of the barracks detachment the ,Japanese began ~ssembling a cover ancl the 1st ancl 3d Defense Battalions out force at nearby Barber”s Point to protect of their qllarters, the early risers were al- the withdrawl of tl~eir strike groups. The ready runl~ing for the armories and gun Marine machine g~u]s accounted for at least one of tile ellenly planes aild claimecl sheds. By 0801 when Colonel Pickett or- another probable. Two and three plane dered the defense battalion machine-gun sections of fighters orbited over the field, ~(YNUpS to nl;Iu tliei r Iyeaponsj eight of the and occasionally dived to strafe tile gull- g[lns lmd already been set L~p. More nla- ners, until tl~e last elemel~ts of the .Jap:t- clline gIIIIS were IIastily pllt in position l~ese atta(k force Ilea(le(l ollt to sea arollu(l i~ll(ln~el~were detailecl to belt the anllnuni- 0945. tion needed to feed them, while rifle a]n- Three of tl~e Marine airn~e]~v-ere killed during the attacks, a fourtl~ died of n~llnitioil was issued to the hundreds of \~OLUldS;13 woumled nlen were treated in men assembled on the barracks’ parade the group’s aid station. Flanlw denlol- gllmnd. Pickett ordered the 3-inch anti- ishecl 33 of tile -47 pl:mes at tl~e thld: :11”1 aircraft, gIIlls in tile defense battalions’ but two of tile remainder sutiere(l Ill:Ijor reserve sup])l ies to be taken out of storage damage. The sole bright note in the pic- aIId en)l)lace~l 011 tl~e parade. IIe dis- tnre of destrll(tion lvas tl~e fact that 18 of ]Jatc]le(l trllcks and working parties of the VMSB-231’S planes \vere 011 boi~](1 tl~c hzingtoN, sclle(ll]led for a tly-otf to Mi{l- A{ Engineer ~;:~ttilli~]~ to I~Llalualei, ~~ way, and thereby save(l fron~ tl~e enenl?- miles llp in tile hills, to get the necesmry gllns. :1-inch shells. The Marine engineers also 74 PEARL H.lRBOR TO G~AD.ALCA~AL sent their heavy earth-moving equipment get ship sunk; four battleships, three to Hickam Field to help clear the runways. cruisers, three destroyers, and three auxil- Thirteen machine guns were in action iaries damaged. Most of the damaged by o&20 and the gunners had zlready ac- ships required extensive repairs. Ameri- counted for their first enemy dive bomber. can plane losses were equally high: 188 During the next hour and a half the fire aircraft totally destroyed and 31 more of twenty-five more .30’s and .5o’s was damaged. The N’avy and Marine Corps added to the yard’s :mtiaircraft defenses, had 2,086 officers and men killed, the Army 194, as a result of the ~ttack: 1,109 men and two more planes, one claimed jointly of all the services survived their wounds. with the ships, were shot down. The Balanced against the staggering .hneri- 3-inch glms were never able to get into ac- can totals was a fantastically light tally tion. The ammunition trucks did not re- sheet of .Tapanese losses. The enemy car- turn from the I,lmlualei depot until 1100, riers recovered all but 29 of the planes they more than an honr after the last Japxnese had sent out; ship losses amounted to five aircraft had headed back for their carriers. midget submarines; and less than a h~Ln- By that time the personnel of all Marine dred men were killed. organizations in the navy yard area had Despite extensive search missions flown been pooled to reinforce the guard and from Oahu and from the Enterprise, antiaircraft defense, to provide an infam which was less than 175 miles from port try reserve, and to furnish the supporting when the sneak attack occurred, the enemy transport and supply details neecled to striking force was able to withdraw ml- sustain them. detected and unscathed. In one respect In the course of their attacks on battle- the Japanese were disappointed with the ship row and the ships in the navy yard$s results of their raid; they had hoped to drydocks, the enemy planes had strafed catch the Pacific Fleet’s carriers berthed and bombed the Marine barracks area, and at Pearl Harbor. Fortunately, the urgent nine men had been wounded. They were need for Marine planes to strengthen the cared for in the dressing stations which outpost defenses had sent the Lexington Pickett had ordered set up at the begin- and the Enterprise to sea on aircraft ferr-y - ning of the raid to accommodate the flow ing missions. The Enterprise was return- of wounded from the stricken ships in the ing to Pearl on 7 December after having harbor. Many of these casualties were flown off VMF-211’S fighters to Wake, and members of the Marine ship detachments; the Lexington, enroute to Midway with 102 sea-going Marines had been killed dur- VMSB-231’s planes, turned b’ack when ing the raid, six later died of wounds, and news of the attack was received. Had 49 were wounded in action.3 either or both of the carriers been sunk The enemy pilots had scored heavily: or damfiged at Pearl Harbor, the outlook four battleships, one mine layer, and a tar- for the first months of the war would have been even more dismal. The Japanese suc- ‘ Casualty fi,mres were compiled from records furnished by Statistics Vnit, PersAcctSec, cess had the effect of delaying the schedule PersDept, HQMC. of retaliatory attacks and amphibious op- JAPAN STRIKES 75 erations in the Central Pacific that had from attacks by any means, but their posi- been outlined in Rainbow 5. .i complete tions were markedly stronger. reevaluation of Pacific strategy was nec- essar y. The critical sitmction facing the outpost The Washington Naval Disarmament islands was clearly appreciated and an at- Treaty of 1922 provided for the mainte- tempt was nmde to get reinforcements to nance of the status quo in regard to forti- Wake before the ,Japanese struck; it did fications and naval bases in certain areas of not come in time. The tiny atoll ~~ils one the Pacific. American adherence to these of the first objectives on the enemy time- terms through the 14-year life of the table of conquest} Midway was more for- treaty had the practical effect of weaken- tunate; when the Lexington returned to ing the defenses of the Philippines and Pearl on 10 December with its unde.liveyecl preventing the development of Guam as a load of Marine scout bombers, they were naval stronghold. The Hepburn Board of orclerecl to attempt an over -lvat er flight to 1938 recommended that Guam be heavily the atoll. On 17 I)eeember, ten days xfter fortified and garrisoned, 7 but Congress the originally scheduled fly-otl, 17 planes failed to authorize the expenditure of the of VMS13-231, shepherded by a mcval pa- necessary funds. IJnhappily, the planners trol bomber, successfully rnacle tl~e 1,137- of Rainbow 5 had to concede the capture mile flight, from Oahu to Midway. It was of the island in the first stages of a war the longest single-engine landplane massed with the Japanese. It was almost as if flight on record, but more important it they could look over enemy shoulders and market] il vital addition to Midway’s de- see the terse direction to the commander fensive potential. of the Japanese Fourth Fleet to “invade The outpost islands needed men and Wake and Guam as quickly as possible” 8 materiel as well as planes. Rear Admiral at the onset of hostilities. (See Map 2) (laude C. Rloch, Commandant of the l+ltb Guam was a fueling station for naval Naval District, gave the reslJonsibility for vessels making the long run to and from organizing aucl equipping these reinforce- the Orient, a relay point for the, trans- ments to (’olonel Pickett,. On 13 Decem- pacific cable, the site of a naval radio sta- ber, all Marine ground troops in the clis- tion, and a stop for Pan American clip- trict were placed under Pickett as Con~- pers. Assigned to protect its 20,000 manding OfIirer, Marine Forces, 14th natives and its 228 square miles of rugged, Naval District. The necessary reinforce- junglecl terrain was a token force of 153 ments to be sent to Midwayl Johnston, znd Palrnyra were drawn from the lst, 3d, and “ Unless otherwise noted the material in this 4th Defense %ttalions. By the month’s section is derived from Maj O. R. Lodge, The Re- end the first substantial increments of men, cwptare of Guam ( Washington : HistBr, G–3 Div, guns, and equipment hacl been received at HQMC, 1954), 7–9; Capt G. J. McMillin, USN, each of the outposts.~ They were not safe OflRept to the CA-O of the Surrender of Guam to the Japanese, llSep45; T. Wilcls, “The Japa- ‘ For the detailed story of the defense of Wake nese Seizure of Guam,” MC Gazette, July 1955. see Part 111. ‘ Hepburn Board Rept, op. cit. ‘ CO, MarFor, 14th ND ltr to MGC, 5Jan42, nHrariasn Record, Part 13, Exhibit No. S-C, Development of outpost garrisons. CombFlt OpOrd N“o. 1, 5Nov41, 475. 76 PE.4RL H.IRBOR TO GUADALCAXAL Marines. Backing them up was a Guam- few local Japanese were rounded up and anian infantry unit, the 80-man Insular interned. Force Guard, and a volunteer native That night a native dugout landed near naval militia with 246 ill-armed znd ill- Ritidian Point on the northern cape of the trained members.’ The island’s govern- island, and the three men in it were cap- ment departments and naval station ac- tured. They claimed to be Saipan natives tivities were manned by 271 regular Navy sent over to be on hand as interpreters personnel. A naval officer, Captain when the Japanese landed. These nati17es George J. McMillin, was both island gov- insisted that the Japanese intended to land ernor and garrison commander. the next morning (9 December) on The war threat was so real by October beaches near Agana. Captain MciMillin 1941 that all women and children of U. S. suspected a trick. He believed that by citizenship were evacuated from Guam. this ruse the Japanese sought to draw the On 6 December the garrison destroyed all Marines out of their prepared positions in its classified papers and like other Pacific the butts of the rifle range at Sumay on outposts awaited the outcome of the U. S.- Orote Peninsula. He decided not to allow Japanese negotiations in Washington. this information to cause a shift of his The word came at 0545 on 8 December (7 major defensive force from a position December, Pearl Harbor time). Captain which guarded important Apra Harbor. McMillin was informed of the enemy at- By guess or knowledge the Saipan na- tack by the, Commander in Chief of the tives had one of the landing sites located Asiatic. Fleet. In less than three hours accurately, but they were off on their time. Saipan-based Japanese bombers were over The 9th brought no landing, but the the island. bombers came back to give Guam another The initial enemy target was the mine pounding. The Insular Force Guard was sweeper USS Penguin in Apra Harbor; posted to protect government buildings in this small ship’s 3-inch and .50 caliber Agana, but the rest of the island’s garri- guns were the only weapons larger than son remained at their assigned posts. .30 caliber machine guns avail able to the Lieutenant Colonel ~$’illiam K. Mcxulty’s Guam garrison. Under repeated attacks, 122 Marines of the Sumay barracks con- the Penguin went to the bottom, and her tinued to improve their rifle range de- survivors joined the forces ashore. The fenses, and the 28 Marines who were as- attack continued throughout the daylight signed to the Insular Patrol, the island’s hours with flights of bombers hitting the police force, kept their stations in villages various naval installations and strafing througllout Guam. roads and villages. The island capital, After the Japanese bombers finished for Agana, was cleared of civilians, and the the day all was quiet until about 0400 on 10 December. At that time flares burst ‘ The members of the Insular Force Guard over Dungcas Beach north of Agana, and were in the U. S. Government service and re- some 400 Japanese sailors of the 5th De- ceived W l)ercent of the pay of corresponding fense Force from f$aipan came ashore. ratings in the U. S. Navy. The native militia ser~ed \vithollt pay and had no arms e~~ept While the naval landing party moved into .Ag:tll:t \vhere it cl:~shed with the Insular obsolete and condemned rifles, RAdm G. .J. Mc- Millin ltr to CMC, 3XOT52. Force Guard, elements of the Japanese ,JAPAN STRIKES 77 RI TIDIA N POINT TUMON BA )’ &J, CAEIRAS OROTE ENINSULA PAGO BAY YONA o 7 r BANG{ POINT FACPI POINT TALOFOFO BAY ?&gI.. (-) dJMATAC.“:MT BOLANOS JAPANESE CAPTURE &J4(.) / OF GUAM cocos Isd 10 DECEMBER 1941 SCALE I ~ STATUTE MILES I MAP 2 78 IWARL IIARBOR TO GUADALCANAL South Seus Detmhd Force (approxi- During the two clays of bombing and in mately 5,500 men) 10,Ilade separate 1alld- the fighting on 10 December, the total gar- ings at ‘rLllllOll Bay in the north, on tile rison losses were 19 killed and 4!2wounc]ed southwest coast near Merizo, and on the including four Marines killed ancl 12 eastern shore of the island nt Talafofo wounded.12 The civilian population suf- Bay. fered comparable but undetermined casu- At .~gana’s l>lxz1 the lightly-armed alties. The .Japanese evacuated .kmerican Chamanians, comn~andecl by Marine First members of the garrison to prison camps I,ielltenant (’harles S. Tocld, stood off the in ,Japan on 10 ,January 19+2, ancl the enrly ,Jnpanese attacks, bl:t their rifles and enemy naval force that had been present machine gulw dicl not provide enol~gh fire- zt the sl~rrender settlecl down to duty as power to I101cIagainst a coordinatec~ ~ttfick occupation troops. by the Dun.gcas 13each landing force. FIRST A TT.4 PK ON M ll?WA Y “ Captain McMillin, aware of the over- whelming superiority of tile enemy? de- Part of the Japanese striking force cidecl Ilot to el]danger tile li~-es of the tlloll- which raided Pearl Harbor wzs a task unit sands of civilians in his charge by further of two destroyers and a tanker which pro- and fruitless resistance. “Tl~e situation ceeded independently from Tokyo Bay to was simply hopeless,>’ he later related.11 a separate target—Midway. The mission He surrendered the islanc{ to tile ,Japnnese of the clestroyers was implied in their designation as the Midway Neutralization naval commander shortly after 0600, ancl Unit: they were to shell the atoll’s air base sent, orders to the Marines at Sunlay not, on the night of ‘i December while the ,J~p- to resist. Tile word clid not reach all de- znese carrier force retired from the Ha- fenders, however, al}cl scattered fighting waiian area. (See Map 10, Map Section) continued throughout tl~e day as the DawIL of 7 December found five sea- enemy spread ollt to complete occupation planes of Midway’s patrol bomber squad- of tile island. Illlt this an)ounted to only ron (VP-21 ) aloft on routine search mis- token resistance. Tl~ere was no clmnce sions; two other (Dutch) pat rol bombers tlmt the determined ,Japanese might be had just taken off for Wake, next leg of driven off by a force so small, e~”en if the their journey to the Netherlands East defenders CO1lId ha~e regroll])ecl. Guam Indies. On the Sand Island seaplane had fallell, and it would be t~vo and a half ramp two more P13Ys ( C’atalina patrol years before the I“nited States was in a n Marine casualty figures were compiled from position to win it back. records furnished by the Statistics Unit. PersAcctSec, PersDept, HQMC. ‘0This reinforced brigade, commanded by ‘3 C“nless otherwise noted the material in this MajGeu T’omitara Horii, had been organized in section is deri~ed from HearinOs Records, Part X’ovember 1941 to take part in the capture of 24, Exhibit A’o. 34, “History of Action Occurring GnanI and to move on from there to seize Rabaul at Midway 7—31Dec41 as Compiled from Official in the 13isumrcks. It was built arolmd the 144th Dispatches and Correspondence,” Exhibit Xo. 35, InfRegt and reinforced by ~lnits of the .TaImnese C(), XAS, Midway Itr to CinCPac, Action of .Z5th T)ivision. MIT)iv, WD, Order of 13attIe for 7Dec41, n. d., and Exhibit No. 36, CO, 6th DefBn Jalmaese Armed Forces, 131ar45, 122. ltr to ComFonrteen, Rept of action on the night ‘1 McMillin Surrender Rept, op. cit. of 7Dw41, 121)ec41 ; Moriues at .lfid~cay. JAP.4N STRIKES 79 bombers) were warming up to guide in did not want to risk premature disclosure v&fS~-231 ~Y]lic}l ~vas schedtlled to fly of defensive positions. It was also er- off the Lecmkgton that day. .4t 0630 roneously believed that friendly ships (0900 Pearl Harbor time) a Navy radio were in the area, and there were strict operator’s signal from Oahu flashed the orders against illuminating or firing first news of the Pearl Harbor attack. A without specific orders.” few minutes later a dispat.:h from .4d- The apprehension of these observers miral B1oc11confirmed this report and di- was justified. The Japanese destroyers rected that current war plans be placed in Akebono and Llshio had left their tanker effect. Shi?iya at a rendezvous point some 15 Commander Cyril T. Simard, the Is- miles away and made landfall on the xtoll land Commander, recalled the Dutch at about 2130. By the time Lieutenant PBYs (which were then put to use Booth had been cautioned about his search- by VP–21 ), established additional air lights, the two enemy ships had their guns search sectors, and ordered Lieutenant trained on Midway and were ready to Colonel Harold D. Shannon’s fith Defense make their first tiring run. The firing Battalion to general quarters. The re- began at 2135. mainder of the day was spent in prepara- The first salvos fell short, but as the de- tion for blackout, and in issuing ammuni- stroyers closed range on a northeast course tion, digging foxholes, and testing com- the shells begin to explode on Sand Is- munications. All lights and navigational land. The initial hits struck near Bat- aids were extinguished after it was learned tery A’s 5-inch seacoast guns at the south that the i5ew%gton, with VMSl?-231 still end of the island, and subsequent rounds on board, had been diverted to seek the en- bracketed the island’s power plant, a re- emy’s Pearl Harbor striking force. inforced concrete structure used also as the .4ir searches returned late in the day command post of a .50 caliber antiaircraft without having sighted any signs of Japa- machine-gun platoon. One round came nese ships or planes, and the atoll but- through an air vent and exploded inside toned up for the night with all defensive the building. The Japanese ships then positions fully manned. At 1842, a Ma- suspended fire while they closed on the rine lookout saw a flashing light some dis- atoll for a second firing run. tance southwest of Sand Island, but it In the island’s power plant First Lieu- quickly disappeared, and it was about tenant George H. Cannon, although se- 2130 before the one operational radar on verely wounded, directed the re-establish- Sand began picking up what seemed to be ment of wrecked communications and the surface targets in the same general direc- evacuation of other wounded. He refused tion. Simultaneously two other observ- evacuation for his own wounds until after ers, equipped with powerful 8x56 night Corporal Harold R. Hazelwood had put glasses, reported seeing ‘fshapes>’ to the switchboard back in operation. Can- seaward. non died a few minutes after reaching the Shannon’s searchlight battery com- mander, First Lieutenant Alfred L. Booth, ‘4 LtCol .%. L. Booth Itr to CMC!, 27 Jan48, here- requested permission to illuminate, but his inafter cited as liooth; LtCol L. S. Fraser ltr to request was turned down. Senior oficers CMC, hereinafter cited as Fraser. 80 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL aid station, but for this action l~e received Marine batteries kept up for five minutes posthumous award of the Medal of Honor. before the Japanese succeeded in knocking He was the first Marine so honored in out the searchlight. Although some ob- World War H. servers believed that the Uilcio had also Meanwhile the enemy ships openecl fire been hulled, results of this Marine fire again, this time at closer range, and Com- have never been determined.’G Both Japa- mander Simard ordered Slmnnon to en- nese ships retired soon after the light was gage targets of opportlluity. .Japanese shot out and a Pan American clipper shells set the roof of tl~e seaplane hangar captain flying overhead that night en route on Sand ablaze, 1ighting Ilp the tzrget for from Wake reported seeing an intense fire the enemy gunners , and accurate sall”os on the surface of the sea and the wakes of struck the Pan .tmericau radio instalhl- two ships on the logical retirement course tion, the island launciry, and adj scent of the destroyers. Both enemy ships, shops. .it 2153 the Marine searchlight however, returned to Japan safely, despite crews got Shannon’s orders to illuminate, my damage tlmt might have been done by but by then only the light on the south end the Marine guns. of Sand could bear on the ships. This The enemy fire had cost the 6th Defense light silhouetted the .4 Ze60no about 2,500 Battalion two killed and ten wounded; ‘7 yards south of the island, before z near two men from the naval air station were miss from one of the destroyers put it out killed and nine wounded. Material dam- of commission. Crewmen reacted inlme- age on Midwav. was not too severe and was diately to get the light back in zction and confined to Sand Island: the airfield on on target, but 13attery k’s t5-inchers stayed Eastern Island was not touched. The sea- silent because comn~unication damage had plane hangar had burned, although the prevented passing of Shannon’s command frame was still intact, and one plane was to open fire.” lost in the flames. Another PRY was 13nt Captain ,Jean H. Bllckuer, coln- badly damaged by shell fragments, and mancliug Battery D’s 3-incl~ antiaircraft fragments also caused minor damage to a gl~ns, could now see the large ,Japauese number of buildings. The ~lrrison had battle flag on the .llwbono’s foremast, ancl stood OR its first ““Japanese attxck, but l~e.ordered his g~~nsinto action. Splashes there was little comfort in this. The de- conlcl not be made out, altllougb illun~in:t- fenders estimated-correctly-that the tiol~ was excellent, and 13nckl~er’s fire con- enemy would be back sooner or later with trolmen were positive that the sl~ells were x much more serious threat. either passing throllgl~ the ships’ super- With the outbreak of war, completion structures or into their hulls. Battery B of the coastal and antiaircraft defenses of (First I.ieutenant Rodney 31. Halldley) Midway took first priority and Marines on llasterl~ Island now aclcled its 5-inch were treated to the welcome and unusual fire to tile battle and .50 caliber macl~ine gUnS openecl up on tl~e targets wl~ich were ‘“ The C7,S1!io, evidently a ~ery lucky ship, was the only enemy vessel that took part in the Pearl well within range. This firing from the Harbor attack that was still afloat on V–J Day. “ Casualty figures were compiled from records “ Boot}~ ; J’r({scr; (:01 L, A Hohn ltr to CMC, 17 ~as~lalty fig~lres were compiled from records 3f.)Jan48. furnished by Statistics l-nit, I’ers.kcctSec, tJ~PAN STRIKES 81 sight of the civilian contractor% heavy submarines in the first month of the war. equipment turned to on dugout and bat- It was too close to the Pacific Fleet base at tery construction. Authorities at Pearl Pearl and too limited in area to make it a Harbor were determinedtoget reinforce- prize worth risking an amphibious as- merits to the atoll and within a week after sault, but its strategic location, like an ar- VMSB-231 made its historic long flight rowhead pointing at the .Japanese Mar- from Oahu, two batteries of the 4th De- sha]ls, made damage to its air facilities fense Battalion with additional naval 3- well worth the risk of bombardment at- inch and 7-inch guns for coast defense tempts. The airfield on the atoll’s name- were being unloaded. On Christmas, the sake, .Johnston Island, was only partially Brewster Buffaloes of VMF-221 flew in completed on 7 December, but temporary from tl~e ,Yaratogti wbicll had been rushed seaplane handling facilities were in oper- out to Pearl from San Diego after the ation at Sand Islet, the only other land ,Japanese attack. This carrier had taken area within the fringing reef. There was part in the abortive attempt to relieve no permanent patrol plane complement, Wake. The next day the island received but ,Johnston was an important refueling another contingent of 4tl~ Defense Bat- stop and a couple of PBYs were usually talion men, the ground echelon of VMF- anchored in the lagoon. 221, and much needed defense materiel The news of the outbreak of war cre- when the seaplane tender Tan@er, which ated a flurry of activity on Johnston, and had also been headed for Wake, unloaded the civilian contractor’s employees turned at Midway instead. By the end of Decem- to at top speed to erect additional earth- ber the atoll, which was now Hawaii’s works around the Marine guns and to pre- most important outpost, had for its garri- pare bomb shelters.zo No Japanese ship or son a heavily reinforced defense battalion, submarine made its appearance on 7 De- a Marine scout-bomber and a fighter cember, perhaps because the first day of squadron, and VP-21’S patrol bombers. war found the Indianapo7i.y and five de- Midwmy was in good shape to greet. the stroyer minesweepers at ,Jollnston testing ,Japanese if they came back, and the pas- the performance of the Higgins landing sage of every month in tbe new year boat on coral reefs.” T1~ese ships were made the atoll a to~lgher nut to crack.ls THE SO [TTHER.V O UTI’0ST8 “ ()fficial Dispatches and Correspondence,” Exhibit No. 28, “History of the Action Occurring at John- Tiny ,Johnston Island, set off by itself ston Island 7–31Dec41, As Compiled from Offi- in the open sea southwest of Hawaii, cial Dispatches and Correspondence,” Exhibit No. 31, CO, XAS, PalnlyraIs ltr to ConlFonrteen, proved to be a favorite target of ,Japanese 24 Dec41,, and Exhibit N-o. W, CO, NAS, John- stonIs ltr to C’omFourteen, 19Dec41 ; (’0, NAS, ‘SSee Part V, “The Battle of Midway” for the JohnstonIs ltr to CornFourteen, 22 Dec41 ; Mar- story of the eyents leading up to the decisive GarFor, Pac File C–1455–41H, “Defense-Fortifi- urrval action which took place at Miclway in June cation Johnston Island,” 12 Sep41–13Jun43 ; Mar- 1942. GarFor, Pac File (1–1455–40–15, “Defense-Forti- ‘0 Unless otherwise noted the material in this fication Pahoyrrr Islands,” 26 Sep41–30Jun43. section is derived from Hea Ving8 Rf’cord, Part 24, mCO, NAS, JohnstonIs, Progress and Read- Exhibit No. 27, ‘“History of Action Occurring at iness Rept, 15Dec41. Palruyrn Island 7–311)ee41, As Compiled from “ H(,uri)?.qs Record, I’ar’t23, 758–75!3. 82 1’E.4RL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL immediately recalled toward Pearl to seemed doomed.?”2 The Japanese ccm- form part of the extensive search pattern tinued to tire for ten minutes at this well- for the enemy carrier force, and .John- lighted target and they hit several other ston’s defense rested with its own slim buildings. The 5-inch glms delivered garrison. Major Francis B. I,oomis, The Southern Lifeline STRATEGIC REAPPRAISAL’ cific to New Zealand and Australia were still in Allied hands. The responsibility In December 1941 reverse followed re- for holding open the lines of communica- verse in the fortunes of the Allies in the tion to the Anzac area 2 rested primarily Pacific. The Japanese seemedtobeevery- with the U. S. Pacific Fleet. On 31 De- where at once and everywhere successful. cember that fleet came under the command Setbacks to the enemy schedule of con- of the man who was to direct its opera- quest were infrequent and temporary. tions until Japan unconditionally sur- On the Asian mainland Hong Kong fell rendered—.kdmiral Chester W. Nimitz and Japanese troops advanced steadily (CinCPac). down the Malay Peninsula toward Singa- As soon as he arrived at Pearl Harbor, pore. In the Philippines Manila was evac- Nimitz was given a dispatch from Ad- uated and American-Filipino forces re- miral Ernest J. King, the newly ap- treated to Bataan and Corregidor for a pointed Commander in Chief, United last-ditch stand. To the south the first States Fleet (CinCUS, later abbreviated ~Japanese landing had been made on as CominCh). King’s message outlined Borneo, and superior enemy forces pre- Nimitz’s two primary tasks as CinCPac. pared to seize the Netherlands East He was to use his ships, planes, and men Indies. The capture of Wake and Guam in: gave the Japanese effective control over the Central Pacific from the China coast (1) Covering and holding the Hawaii-Midway line and maintaining its communications with to Midway and Johnston. (See Map 1, the west coast. Map Section) (2) Maintaining communications between the By the turn of the year only the sea west coast and Australia, chiefly by covering, area between the Hawaiian Islands and securing and holding the Hawaii-Samoa line, the United States and the supply route which should be extended to include Fiji at the earliest possible date.a from the States through the South Pa- Although the Japanese had severely ‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in this damaged the Pacific Fleet in their Pearl section is derived from The War Reports of f7en- Harbor raid, they had concentrated on eral of the Army Qcorge C. fifarshall—~eneral of the ArTny H. H. Arnold—Fleet Admiral Ernest ‘ Anzac is actually the abbreviation for Aus- J. King ( Philadelphia & ATew York: J. B. Lip- tralian and Sew Zealand Army Corps used in pincott Company, 1947), hereinafter cited as War WW I, but the term was so understandable and Rep@rta; FAdm E. J. King and Cdr W. M. White- easy to use in reference to the two Conlmon- hill, Fleet .~dnliraz Ki~lq: A .Naval Record ( hTew wealth nations that it was adopted in the Pa- York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 1952) cific War and applied frequently to the geo- hereinafter cited as King’8 ~awzl Recwd; k’tra- graphic area in which they lay. te~ic I’la?tning. ‘ King’s Naval Reccwd, 353–354. 84 THE SOUTHERN LIFELINE 85 ships rather than installations, and the re- with the strategic direction of the war, pair facilities of the navy yard were vir- subject only to the review of the political tually untouched. Round-the-clock work heads of state. The necessity of present- promptly restored to operation many ves- ing a united American view in CCS dis- sels which might otherwise have been lost, cussions led directly to the formation of for good or long delayed in their return to the United States ,Joint Chiefs of staff fleet service. But Nimitz’s strength was (JCS) as the controlling agency of Amer- not enough to hazard a large scale am- ican military operations. phibious offensive, even with the addition On 9 February 1942, the first for- of reinforcements sent from the Atlantic mal meeting of General George C. Mar- Fleet. In the first few months of 1942, shall (Chief of Staff, ~Jnited States Allied strategists had to be content with Army), lJieutenant General Henry H. defensive operations. The few loca] at- ,Arnold (Chief of the ilrmy Air C’orps), tacks they mounted were hit-and-run raids ~dmiral Harold R. Stark (CIJO), and which did little more than boost ]lome. Admiral King ( CominCh ) took place, front and service morale at a time when ~xcept for the combination of the offices most news dealt with defeat and sur- of CominCh and C~O in the person of render. Admiral King which took eflect on 26 From 22 December to 14 January, the March (.4dmiral Stark became Com- political and military leaders of the mander CT. S. Naval Forces Europe) and United States and Great Britain met in the addition of ~dmiral ~villiam D. Washington (the .4RCADIA Confer- I~ahy as chief of Staff to the President ence ) to chart the course of Allied opera- on 20 July, the membership of the JCS tions against the .4xis powers. The remained constant for the duration of the Americans, despite the enormity of the war. As far as the Marine Corps was Japanese attack, reaffirmed their decision concerned their representative on the JCS of ABC–1 that Germany was the pre- was Admiral King, and he was consist- dominant enemy and its defeat would be ently a champion of the use of Marines at decisive in the outcome of the war. The their greatest potential—as specially Pacific was hardly considered a secondary trained and equipped amphibious assault theater, but the main strength of the .41- troops.’ lied war effort was to be applied in the European, African , and Middle Eastern 4 On 13.4pr51, before a subcommittee of the areas. Sufficient men and materiel would Senate Committee on Armed Services, Gen Hol- comb stated that he was called in during the be committed to the battle against Japan ARCADIA conferences and “sat as a member to allow the gradual assumption of’ the of that group.” Later “ , . . a formal organi- offensive. zation occurred in which I was not included. However, because of my intercourse with Ad- One result of the .4 RCAL)IA meetings miral Stark I was in on nearly all of the dis- was the organization of tile Combined cussions that took place.” This intimate rela- Chiefs of Staff (CCS), a supreme mili- tionship changed, however, when Stark was re- tary council whose members were the lieved m CNO on 26Mar42. An interesting sequel to this story of the “exclusion” of the Comman- chiefs of services in Great Britain and the dant. from the JCS was revealed by Gen Holcomb United States. The CCS was charged when he further related how after a dinner party 86 PEARL H.4RBOR TO G~.4DALC.4hTAL On 10 ,January 19+2, the CCS, acking Burma. Ch 1 March ABDA C’ommand with the approval of Prime Minister was formally dissolved. Churvhill ancl President Roosevelt, set up Although this first attempt at, unified a unified, inter-Allied command in the .Mlied command was short-1 ived and un- successful, it set a pattern which governed }vest.ern Pil(’ifiC to control defensive opera- operational control of the war through its tions against tl~e ,Japanese along a broad . . remammg years. This pattern amounted sweep of positions from Burnla through to the selection as over-all commander of I.uzon to NTew Guinea. l’l~e commander a theater of an otlicer from the nation hav- of ABDA (.\l~lericall-Brit isl~-I)t~tcll-.i~~s- ing the most forces in that particular tralian ) forces holding the barrier zone theater. His principal subordinates were was the British Conlmancler in Chief in appointed from other nations also having India, General Sir .ir~llibitld P. Wavell ; interests and forces there. Realistically, his ~iBD.1 air, naval, and ground conl- the CCS tried to equate theater responsi- manders were respectively an F.nglish- bility with national interest. Ch 3 March man, an .imerican, and u Ihltchnlun. But the Conlbined (“l~iefs approved for the .illD.k ~OIllllliillCl h:td 110 chance tO StOp western Pacific a new dividing 1ine which tile ,Japanese in the East Indies, Malaya, cut through the defunct ABDA area. or the Philippines. Wavell’s forces were Burma and all Southeast Asia west of a beaten b:wk, cut ofi, ordefeatecl before he north-south line between ,Java and Su- could be reached by rein forcen~ents that matra were added to Wavell’s Indian could make a significant difference in the command ancl the British Chiefs of Staffs fighting-. By the end of February Singa- were charged with the strategic direction pore had fallen :uld the .%BI).I area was of this theater. The whole Pacific east split by an enemy thrust to ,Sumatra. of the new 1ine was given over to Americ- Wavell returned to India to muster troops an .JCS control. to block ,Japanese encroachment into The ,Joint Chiefs divided the Pacific into two strategic, entities, one in which at the white House in ~lul~1$)43,the PresicJent, the hTavy would have paramount interests, associating hiulself with the Jlarine corps, had said to him contideutially: “you lmow, the first the Pacific Ocean Area ( POA), and the thing You know we are ~oin~ to he left out of other in which tile Army would be the things. Tt’e are not represented on the .Joint dominant service, the Southwest Pacific how would You like to be chiefs of Staff . . Area ( SWPA). (See Map 1, Map Section a meud)erof the ,TointC;hiefsof Staff?’ Holcoulb replied that he Ivould like it very much but for boundary. ) NTaval planners had suc- didn’t know how the .Joiut Chiefs WOUIC1feel cessfully insisted in ,J(TS discussions that about it. That was the last, however, that Hol- all positions sn(h as New Caledonia, the conlh e~er heard of this matter directly or offi- N-ew I1ebricles, and N’ew Zealand which cially. Semite Committee on Armed Services, Wd Wngress, Heariu~s on S. 667, “.~ Bill t(, guarded tlle 1ine of (,ol]llllllllic}~tio]ls from Fix the l’erw)nu~l Stren~th of the [-nited States Pearl H:ld)ol” to .~nstralia must he con- JIarine ( ‘tjrljs :Iu(i t{) lllilk+? the (’{)llllllandant of trolled by the Navy. Ill ternls of the air tile Marine (’orIM :1 I’erlnane]lt }Ienll)er of the age, the ,1(’S divisiol~ of the Pacific gave .Jl}int (’hiefs of St~lfi” ( Il”ashiugtou : G1’( ), 1951 ), 34-13(;. the .irnly operational responsibility for THE SO~THERN I>IFEI.INE 87 an area of large land masses lying rela- S.4.I1OAIV BA)S’TZOiV 5 tively close together \vhere land power The concern felt in Washington for the supported by shore-based air could be de- security of the southern route to Australia cisive. Tothe Navy the,JCS assigned the was acute in the days and weeks immedi- direct ion of the war in a vast sex area with ately following the Pearl Harbor attzck. widely scattered island bases where the I)espite world-wide demands on the troops carrier plane reigned supreme. and equipment of a nation just entering The American commander in the Phil- the war, (leneral Marshall and Admiral ippines, C~eneral Douglas MacArthur, was King gave special attention to the need the ,Toint (.’hiefs’ choice. to take over direc- for holding- positions that would protect tion of SWPA operations; Admiral hTi~n- .iustralia’s lifeline. Garrison forces, most itz was selected to head POA activities. of them provided by the h-m-y, moved Formal almollllcement of the new set-u]) into the Pacific in substantial strength to ~vas not ma(]e llntil Mac.frthllr had es- guard what the Allies still held and to caped from (’orregidor and reached safety block further ,Japanese advances. 13e- in .fustralia. On 18 March, with the con- tween ,January and April nearly 80,000 sent of the Australian government, Mat’- .lrmy troops left the States for Pacific Arthur was announced as Supreme (Yonl. bases. mander of the SWP.k (CinCSWPA) An infantry division was sent to .%us- The ,JCS directive outlining missions for tralia to take the place of Australian both Pacific areas was issued on 30 March, units committed to the fighting in the and the confirmation of hTimitz as Com- Middle East. At the other end of the mander in Chief of the POA ( Cin(’PO.1) lifeline, a new division was added to the followed ou 3 xipril. By CCS and ,JCS Hawaiian Island garrison. Mixed forces of infantry, coast and antiaircraft artil- i~greernent, both commanders were to have lery, and air corps units were established operational control over any force, regard- in early February at Canton and Christ- less of service or nation, that was assigned mas Islands, southwest and south of Pearl to their respective theaters. Harbor. At about the same time a New Nirnitz still retained his command of Zealand ground garrison reinforced by the, Pacific Fleet, in addition to his duties American pursiiit planes moved into the as CinCPO.%. The fleet’s striking arm, Fiji Islands, and a small garrison was its carriers and their supporting vessels, sent to the French-owned Society Islands st:l.yerl under h“imitz as Cin CPac no mat- to guard tile eastern approaches to the ter where they operated. In the final supply route. In March a task force of ana]ysis, however, the major decisions on employment of troops, ships, and planes ‘ Unless otherwise noted the material in this section ~vere made in Washington with the advice is derived from HqDeFor Rept of Sanloan GruAdv13 Facilities, 100ct42 ; 2d Mar- of the theater commanders. MacArtllllr Brig AnRept, 16.J11142; Xl MarBrig Diary, was a sllbordirli~te of Marshall :{lld re- 23 Dec41–30.JunW ; CG 3d Mar13rig ltr to CMC, ported through l~in~to tl~e ,JCS; an iden- loSep43 : 3d MarBrig Brief of Ops, 21Mar42- 31.\ug43 ; M.\G-13 War Diary, lMar42-31May43; t icill command relationship existe(l be- Hist of the 7th DefBn, 21DecW; S’tratc>~ic tween Nimitz and King. Plan?? iblg. 448777 0—58—7 88 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANA1, almost division strength arrived in New principal units assigned to the new con~- Caledonia and the ,Joint Chiefs sent addi- mand were the 8th Marines, the 2d Bat- tional.irmy garrison forces to Tongatabu talion, I(kh Marines, and the 2d Defense in the Tongs Islands, south of Samoa, Battalion (dispatched by rail from the and north to Efate in the hTew Hebrides. east coast). (;olonel (later Brigadier By the end of March 1942 the supply General ) Henry L. Larsen was named route to Australia ran through a corridor brigade commander. A quick estimate of burgeoning island strong points and was made of the special engineering the potential threat of major On 19 January radar picked up signs of minutes the results of hours of pick and numerous ships, and observation stations shovel work. on the island’s headlands soon confirmed General Larsen took immediate steps the arrival of the 2d Brigade. flfter his arrival in American Samoa to While still at sea, General Larsen had ascertain the status of the defenses in received orders from the liTavy Depart- Western (British) Samoa, 40 or so miles ment appointing him Military Governor northwest of Tutuila. On 26 January the of American Samoa and giving him re- brigade intelligence officer, I.ieutenant sponsibility for the islands’ defense as well Colonel William L. Bales, flew- to Apia, as supervisory control over the civil gov- the seat of government on the island of ernment. As soon as the ships dockecl Upolu, to confer with the New Zealand antiaircraft machine guns of the 2d I)e- authorities and make a reconnaissance of fense Battalion were promptly unloaded Upolu and Savaii, the two principal is- and set up in the hills around Pago Pago lands. The New Zealanders were quite harbor. The %h Marines took over beach anxious to cooperate with the Marines defense positions occupied by the 7th I)e- since they had a defense force of only 157 fense Battalion and immediately began men to guard two large islands with a improving and expanding them. The combined coastline of over 250 miles. artillerymen of 2/10 and the 2d Defense Bales, whose investigation was aimed pri- set up their guns in temporary positions marily at discovering the feasibility of while they went to work on permanent developing either or both of the islands emplacements. Navy scouting amphib- into a military base, reported back that ians of a shore-based squadron ( VS-I- Upolu’s harbor facilities, road net, and D14 ) attached to the brigade soon were several potential airfield sites made it aloft on a busy schedule of antisubmarine readily susceptible to base development. and reconnaissance missions. He found, on the other hand, that Savaii The airfield on Tutuila was only 10 had no safe major anchorages and that its per cent completed when Larsen arrived, lava-crusted surface did “not offer air- but he directed that construction be field sites that could be developed quickly pushed around the clock, work to go on by the ,Japanese or anyone else.” ‘ On through the night under lights, He also his return to Tutuila, I,ieutenant Colonel detailed the brigade’s engineer company Bales reported to General I.&rSell that: to assist the civilian contractors in getting the field in shape. For the 2d Brigade’s In its present unprotected state, Western Samoa is a hazard of tirst magnitude for the de- first three months in Samoa, its days were fense of American Samoa. The conclusion is tilled with defense construction. There unescapable that if we don’t occupy it the Jap- w-as little tinle for any combat training anese will and there may not be a great deal of time left5 not intimately connected with the prob- lems of Samoan defense. The work was h~aval authorities in 117ashin@on and arduolls, exacting, and even frustrating. Pearl Harbor recognized the desirability since the brigade had urrived during the 7LtCol W. L. Bales ltr to CG, 2d MarBrig, rainy season and the frequent tropical 8Feb-A?, Rept on Recon in Western Samoa, 8. rainstorms had a habit of destroying in “Ibid., 10. 90 PE-4RL HARBOR TO G~ADALCANAL of occupying Western Samoa and ex- son. To exercise overall authority, tended their interest to include Wallis “Headquarters Samoan Area Defense (LTea) Island, a small French possession Force was established on Tutuila. Major 320 miles from Tutuila on the western General Charles F. B. Price, who was ap- approaches to Samoa. Negotiations were pointed to this command, arrived with his entered into with New Zealand regarding staff at Pago Pago on 28 April from the the defense of Western Samoa, and the States. On 8 May the 3d Marine Brigade Free French government in regard to the convoy arrived off Apia and General Bar- occupation of Wallis. In March warn- rett assumed military command of lJTest- ing orders were sent out to I,arsen’s bri- ern Samoa. At the end of the month, the gade and both marine divisions to be 8th Defense Battalion (Reinforced) un- prepared to furnish troops for the garri- der Colonel Raphael Griffin moved into soning of Western Samoa and Wallis.g Wallis. h’egotiations for the use of land and other More than 10,000 Marine ground troops facilities in Western Samoa were com- were stationed in the Samoan area by the pleted on 20 March when I,arsen and a beginning of ,June, and reinforcements ar- h’ew Zealand representative signed an rived in a steady flow-. Marine air was agreement giving the Americans responsi- also well established. General Larsen’s bility for defense of all the Samoan is- interest and pressure assured that Tu- lands. This group, together with Wa]lis, tuila’s airfield was ready for use on 17 was now considered a tactical entity and March, two days before the advance eche- a new Marine brigade was to be organized lon of MAG–13 arrived. The new air to occupy the western islands. group, organized on 1 March at San Di- .4s an advance force of this new garri- ego, was earmarked for Price’s command. son, the 7th Defense Battalion was sent Initially the group commander, Lieuten- to Upolu on 28 March, and a small de- ant Colonel Thomas J. Walker, Jr., had tachment was established on Savaii. In only one tactical squadron, TTMF-lll, op- the States, the 1st Marine Division at New erating from Tutuila’s airfield, but VMO- River, North Carolina, organized the 3d 151, a--scout-bomber squadron, joined in Marine Brigade on 21 March with Briga- May with the arrival of the 3d Marine dier C~eneral Charles D. Barrett in com- Brigade convoy. The amphibians of the mand. Its principal units were the 7th Navy’s VS-1-D14 squadron were also put Marines and the 1st Battalion, llth Ma- uncler Walker’s command and sent for- rines. The 7th”s 3d Battalion and Bat- ward to operate from ITpoILl and Wallis tery C of 1/11 were detached on the 29th while the airfields projected for those is- to move overland to the west coast for lands were rusbec] to completion by naval further transfer to Samoa as part of the construction battalions. garrison for Wal]is. General Larsen I,ike the rest of the garrison forces in meanwhile had been directed to organize the South Pacific which were rushed out the 8th Defense Battalion on Tutuila, as to plug a gaping hole in Allied defenses, the major element of tile Wallis garri- General Price’s defense force was never called upon to conduct the island defense ‘ CMC Serial 003A7S#2, 20iWn42, Defense of Western Samoa and Wallis Islnnd. for which it was organized. Samoa might THE SOUTHERN LIFELINE 91 .-, “o m N o 0 0 —al z a ii 0 u 92 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL well nave become a target for enemy at- for learning tile fundamentals of teanl- tacks, but, the decisive Battle of Midway work in combat operations. As the need forced tl~e ,Japanese to curb their soaring for defense construction was met and the ambition.’[’ ,Samoa became a vast ad- danger of ,Japanese attacks lessened, Sa- vanced combat training camp instead of moa became a staging area through which a battlegrolmcl. Most of the units com- replacements and reinforcements were ing there after the arrival of the 2d Bri- funnelled to tl~e amphibious otiensives in gade drelv heavily on the recruit depots the Solomous.’2 Units and individuals for their personnel:’ and for these MR- paused for a while here and then moved rilles Samoan clnty was an opportunity on, ulore jungle-wise and combat ready, to meet the ,Japanese. ‘0Cattlpai.vn.s of the Puriik War, 3. See Prrrt V, “Decision rrt Midway” and especially Chap- “ From Decerntmr 1942 to .July 1943 Samoa ter 1, “Setting the Stage—Early Naval Opera- w:is the training center for all Marine replace- tions” for events leading up to the Midway ment battalions raised on the east coast of the battle. u. s. ~. lv. Condit, G. Dirrmond, and E. 1’. “ At least 407. of the 3d MarBrig initial com- Turnbladh, Marine Corps Ground Training in plement wrrs straight out of boot camp. 3d Mar World War II ( Washington : HistJ3r, G–3, Brig AnRept, 6Sept42, 9. HQMC, 1956), 181–186. PART III The Defense of Wake CHAPTER 1 Wake in the Shadow of War 1 In tile strategic context of 1940 and By 18 April 1941, Admiral Husband E. 1941, the importance of lVake, both to Kimmel. Commander in Chief, l:. S. Pa- tile ITllited States and ,Japan, was con- citic Fleet, becan)e fearful that the de- siderable. 9.5 96 PEARL HAREOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL rine, first aucl last> is an infantrynml.~ had been prepared in Tokyo.’[’ But it v-as Within and ttbcmt the structure of sllc]l Ilot until Noveulber lM1 tl~at detaile~l il~- lixhtly lleltl but secure bases, tl)e l’acific stn~ctious for commanders within tile Fleet would ply, awaiting tile nlonlent (’0/llb~)/<{?F/@@t ~~el’e fol’nllll:lted and iS- when battle could be joined witl~ el]enly suecl. I]] these instruetiolls, Iyake was ]Mval forces—’bto get at naval forces witl~ (lismissed in a single phrase : naval forces,’-~ as Admiral Kimmel put it—in decisive action for control of the Forces of the I’ourth Fleet: Defend the South Seas Islands. patrol, main- sea. tain surf ace c~(}llll)lllnieations, capture ;is tniglit be expected, the .Jap:lllese con- Wake . . . .“ cept of strategy ill the (Yeutr:d l’acific was Wake would be strictly a local opera- to seize or neutralize tile few advanced tion. By .4dmiral Inouye’s scheme, 450 ITnited States bases west of the Hawaiian special naval landing force troops could, Islands as quickly as possible after the in a pinch, turn the trick.lz olltset of war. For this ptqose ,Japauese forcesi lltlle~larsl]alls: lllci(x:troli]les (the FINAL PZLEPARATIONE, FourthF?eet) were or~animd along lines AUTUMN, 1941 ‘3 resembling an -Imerican amphibious force.’ Commanded by Vice .ldmiral On 23 ,Ju!le 1941 the Chief of Naval ,Nariyoshi Inouye, the Fourth fi’leet was operations directed that, elements of the composed of ampl~ibio~ls ship])illg, n few 1st Defense 13attalion, FMF, be estab- old cruisers, destroyers, submarines, shore- lished at Wake “as soon as practicable.” based aircraft, and a ,Japanese version of This directive (as eventually modified) OIW own Fleet Marine Force: the special naval landing force.g Fleet headquarters ‘0 USSBS(Pac), NavAnalysisDiv, lnterroga - were at Trnk, w]lere Admiral Inou-ye’s flag ticws of Japanese O~ciat& 2 vols (Washington: GPO, 1946 ), “Japanese Naval Planning,” I, 176, flew in the light cruiser Ku.~h{tna.9 hereinafter cited as 7,’SSBS’ Iwterroflations with The war missions of .idn~iral Iuouye subject or interviewee. and his fleet had been decided gel~era]ly in “ Campaif7n8 of tke Pacific War, 47. “ USNBS I?lterrogafions, “Japanese Capture of 1938 when the basic East Asia war plans Wake Island,” II, 371, hereinafter cited as Cap- ture of Wukc. ‘ Zi)i(?, “ Unless otherwise noted the material in this “ CinCI’ae ltr to CNO. 1&kIm41, “Defense and section is derived from CO 1st DefBnDet Wake, Development of Wake Island. ” Rept to CMC, 18 Mar46, hereinafter cited as ‘ ATIS ( SWPA) Doc No. 17895A, “Full trans- ZR’rcrcu.r Iik’pt;Col P. A. Putnam Rept to CMC, lations of answers to questions concerning attack 180ct45, hereinafter cited as Patnam Rept; ht- on Wake Island,”’ hereinafter cited as Wake f(}rmal reports by key subordinates to Cols Dev- Attack. erenx and Putnam on which the official reports ‘ The special naval landing force ( SNLF, sonle- are largely based, hereinafter cited as (omccr’s times contracted to S1,F ) ~~ere ,Japanese Navy MInbc ) Rept; ships’ logs of the U. S. naval ves- personnel organized for service and duties in limited land oper:ltions similar to those per- sels concerned ; .L’ol ,J. P. S. Deverenx, !/’he Sto~~~ formed by U. S. Marines. Throughout the war, of Wake Zstamd ( l’hiladelphia : J. P. Lippincott they g$ve an outstilndiug account of themselves. (’ompany, 1947), hereinafter cited as Derc’re!{c ‘ Walic Attack, h’tory. WAKE IN THE SH.4DOW OF WAR 9’7 w x S \ “x 98 P1~L4RLHARROR TO GU~D.4LCANTAL specified that, tile following units sbonld tauces varying from 30 to 1,000 yards. compose the defensive garrison : Tile beaches and much of tile terrain in- Four 3-inch antiaircraft batteries land were covered with coral boulders, Three fi-inch searoast batteries some large enough to conceal several men. Approlmiate automatic weapons The interior lagoon, although atfording Oae S(’R–268fire-c(jT~tr(~l radar, and one SCR- sufficient surface and deptl~ for seaplanes, 270R search ra(ltir. (’ was studded w-itb coral heads and foul (UNO’S “as soon as practicable” was ground which l~ad to be dredged before trauslatecl into immediate action by the sl~ips could enter the single channel be- Pacific Fleet. .%bout 1 .%ugust Y1ajor tweel~ Wilkes and Wake Island. Despite l~wis .A. Holln with five officers and 173 Wake’s limited land area, its coastline ex- enlisted Marines and sailors from the 1st ceeded 21 miles. Au excellent vignette Defense llattalion commenced loading the of Wake in 1941 was given by Colonel I~SS R~gu7us, a twenty-year-old “Hog Is- 13ayler: land” transport which would carry the Wake is by no means the bare sandy spit one battalion advance detail to Wake. Regw thinks of when atolls are mentioned. Consid- ZU.Ssailed on 8 August, and arrivecl off erable areas of it are covered by woods, and Wake on 19 August. Weapons and camp though the trees are small, their thick foliage equipment, were lightered ashore, and by and the scrubby tangled underbrush provided Walking in these jungles the time the Regu7m departed on 22 Au- admirable cover . was difficult but not impossible . .“ gust, a camp facing the lagoon had been In August 1941, Wake was in rapid set up on a site near the west end of J1’ake+s west leg. To distinguish this transition from its past solitude to the camp from the one west of Heel Point mechanized modernity of an outlying air housing the 1;200 Pacific Naval Air Base base. Patrol plane facilities and a con- contract workmen, the Marine camp was crete ramp, the result of Pan American’s designated as Camp One. The civilian pioneering, were already available on establishment became known as Camp Peale.’i .Just inshore of Peacock Point Two. (See Map 4) along the west, leg of Wake Island a nar- Wake, as it appeared to the Marines of row airstrip, 5,oOO by 200 feet, had been the 1st Defense Battalion, was a Wshaped chopped out of the dense growth. A atoll composed of three islands: MTake Is- main roadnet of packed coral was taking land prope~,” the body of the V; and shape rapidly as the contractor’s work- Wilkes and Peale, the two tipends. Its land mass consisted of some 2,600 acres ‘“ Lt(’ol W. L. J. Bayler, Last Man ofl Wake of sand and coral. offshore, heavy surf Island ( Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1!}13), 62, roared continually against a coral reef hereinafter cited as Last Man ofl W’alw Istund. “ In 1933, with Savy cooperation, Pan Anleri- which surrounded the whole atoll at dis- can .iirways began de~reloprnent of a staging and refueling base on Peale to service its big clippers “ CNO Itr to C’inCPac, 23 Jun41, “EstablislL- on the run to the Orient. .\t the time of this rnent of defensive garrison on Wake Island. ” narrative m:ljor facilities included, in addition ‘$ To prevent confusion, lVrrke IsIan(l, as dis- to those mentioned above, a powerful radio sta- tinguished from the entire atoll, }vill herein- tion, a pier, and a small but excellent hotel for after be entitled “Wake Island, ” wbererrs the overnight i]c{’[>llirl)o I8 Capt W. S. Cunningham, USN, transcript of through Wake, but no aviation ground recorded interview, “History of Wake Island De- crews were available there to service the fense,” 9Jan46, 3, hereinafter cited as Cunning- big airplanes. Some 3,000 gallons of gas- hanz Interview. oline for each of these planes therefore *’ “Resident Officer-in-Charge” was LCdr Greey’s official designation. With four enlisted had to be manhandled and hand-pumped Navy radiomen to maintain his communications, he was, until the arrival of Maj Hohn’s de- 20 Devercux Story, 25. tachment, sole naval representative on Wake. *’ Wwr Reports, 67. 100 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL by tile Marines.22 This they did in udcli- During October ancl November prog- tion to their normal duties, and the fueling ress on and about the airstrip, by now tasks came at all hours of the day or uigl]t. a going col~cern, indicated that there was It was ironic that many of these aircraft, room on Wake for the aviation compo- which cost Wake so many man-hours of nent of fighters necessary to balance and vital defensive preparations, would be round out the defense force. Commander, trapped on the ground by the initial .Japa- Aircraft Battle Force, had determined l~ese attacks on Clark and &Tichols Fields that this was to be Marine Fighter in the Philippines. Squadron 211, supported in its independ- .Uthougb this servicing of .irmy planes ent, role by a provisional service detach- represented the heaviest single additional ment drawn from Marine Air Group 21, to which VMF-211 was assigned. To es- duty imposed Llpon the Marines, they were tablish the ground facilities required to also required to act as stevedores in the maintain this squadron, Major waiter time-consuming and exhausting process of L. J. Bayler from the staff of IMAG-21, unloading ships which arrived at the atoll. together \vit]l a detachment of ~~ Ma. This work was required lmt il the channel, rines commanded by Second Lieutenant berthing and turning facilities inside the Robert ,J. Condermany were dispatched lagoon could be completed. These ad(li- from Pearl on 19 November in USS tional duties hampered defense work dur- W~ightj an aircraft tender which was also ing the autumn of 1941; but fortunately bringing out, the prospective Island Com- the detachment needed little combat train- mander and commanding officer of the ing because it contained a number of “ol(l Naval Air Station. Marines” of tile best type.” On 2 No- While the Wtiqht plowed westward vember, two weeks after Major I)evereux’s bearing VMF-21 1’s ground components, arrival, the Wake garrison was augmente(l tile air echelon of that squadron, consist- by a draft from tile parent ] st l)efense ing of the squadron commander, nine of- ficers and two enlisted pilots,” had on the Battalion. This group included 9 officers and 200 enlisted men who arri~~ed fronl “ This detachment, like a similar one organ- Pearl on board tl)e llSS (’a.ytor. This ized for the Marine air component at Midway. brought the tot:l] ~f:~rille strength 011 had been pro~isionally made up from key per- sonnpl representing each squadron in MAG-21, Wake to 15 officers and 373 enlisted inasmuch as, at the time of organization, firm Marines. decision hacl not been made as to which squad- rons fr[an thiit group would be assigned to which “ Tankers would lnunl~bulk aviation gas into islands. Wake aviation’s ground detachment, tank stornge ashore: 31arine working parties therefore, included personnel not only fron] \vouldl)(~m~)this g:isf)line into 50-~allondrums VME’–211 but from H&S Sq–21 and VMSB-231 and transfer the drunis to dispersed fllel dUUIpS; and –232. (X3 NAG-21 Rept to (2}1(3, 23Dec41, finally, on arrival of l)lanes the same gasoline ‘“ l’he I)ilots of VMF-211’S Wake detachment would again be pnmlwd by the same means into were: Maj I’aul A. l’utnam ( commanding), a lone tank-truck for delirery to the aircraft. (’apts Henry T. Elrod, Herbert C. Frueler, Frank When time pressed—as it usually di(l-31arines (’. Th:lriu ; 1stLt George A. Graves; 2dLts Rob- reinfor(jed the truck by pumping directly from ert. .J. (“onderma]l (in command of advance tlo-gallon drums into the Fortresses. (Ietail and grollrid Inaintenance, but also a pi- 2’ DeucreIIx Story, 27’. lot ), (.’arl R. Davidson, Frank J. Holden, John WAKE IAT THE SHADOW OF WAR 101 afternoon of 27 hTovember received secret stand is tf~ ren]ain so at least until this Force verbal warning orders to prel)are for enl- has returned to Hawaiian oI)erating area. Therefore I am sending this tirst report via guard barkation on board a carrier. SLIA or- naiil (m this ship, rather than by air mail after ders had been expected by the squadron landing . . commander (though not by the pilots, vir- You t~ill recall that I left one plane at Ford tually all of whom carried little more Island. The Admiral at once gave me a plane than toilet articles and a change of clothi- to replace it, from VF–6 ; ancl he nia(le it plain ng ), and few preparations were required. to me and to the wl]ole ship that nothing should be overlooke(l nor any trouble spared in order The squadron had only to fly tl~e 12 new to insure that I will get ashore with 12 air- F4F–3 (Grumman Wi]dcat ) fighters l)lanes ill as near l)erfect condition as possible. from 13wa Mooring Mast (as that air st a- In)mediatt=ly I ~vas given a full complement of t.ion was then designated) over to Ford mechs and all htinds aboard have continually Island, the naval air base in the middle vied with each other to see who could do the ]nt)st for me. I feel a bit like the fatted calf of Pearl Harbor, for further transfer by being groomed for whatever it is that happens air to the flight deck of the LTSS Eriter- to fatted calves, but it surely is nice while it fwi.w. This was a routine operation for lasts and the airplanes are pretty sleek and Marine pilots, and except for their un- fat too. l’hey ha~e of course been checked and familiarity with the new aircraft, and the double checked from end to end, and they have also heen painted so that all 12 are now of fact that, one plane’s starter misbehaved,” standard blue and gray . the morning flight of 28 hTovember onto The Admiral seems to be most determined to the l?n.ter~~~~e went off without incident.” maintain secrecy regarding the position and ac- The best description of VMF-21 1’s voy- tivity of this Force. There has been a continu- age to Wake is contained in a personal ous inner air lntrol cluring daylight, and a full squadron has made a long search to the front letter, composed on the e~’e of the squad- and fl,anks earh morning and evening. They are ron’s debarkation, from Major Paul A. armed to the teeth and the orders are to attack Putnam to Colonel Claude ii. Larkin w-ho any Japanese vessel or aircraft on sight in order commanded MAG-21, Excerpts are to pre~ent the discovery of this Force. quoted: My orders, however, are not so direct. In fact I have no orders. I ha~e been told informally &r SEA, by lesser members of Staff that I will be given December .?, 1.941. orders only to fly off the ship and go to the land, DEAR C’OLONELLARKIN : and that there will be nothing in the way of It is expected that we will go ashore to- instructions other than to do what seems ap- morrow morning. l’he extreme secrecy under propriate at the moment. Of course I shall go which we sailecl is still in effect and I under- and ask for orders and instructions, but it seems unlikely that I shall be given anything F. Kinney, l)avid D. Kliewer, Henry G, Webb; detinite . . TSgt William J, Hamilton, and SSgt Robert O. This is written Wednesday forenoon. Should Arthur. I receive any orders at variance with the fore- ‘o A hint as to the importance of the squad- ~oing, I will add a postscript. Otherwise I ron’s mission might have been drawn at this thiIlk of nothing further of importance or in- time from the fact that. ~vhen this starter trou- terest at this time. . . ble develolml, the pilot of this defecti~e plane was flown by a torpedo plane to the carrier When the Enterprise had reached a where a brand-new F4F—3 from an E~/tcrpri!w point approximately 200 miles northeast squadron was issued to him. “ Maj. P. A. Putnam ltr to CO MAG-21, of Wake, the squadron, from a materiel 3Dec41. standpoint, was “as far as possible ready 102 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL for combat, service;’ according to Major passage of airplanes over them, even when Putnam. However, he added, it was: pushed by hand, could cause serious plane . . . seriously handicapped by lack of expt?ri- damage. Fueling still depended on hand ence in the type of airplane then used. It is pLlmps and n~an power. No shelters or believed that the squadron was excellently aircraft revetments existed, and the new trained and well qualified for war duty in a planes were somewhat puzzling to pilots general sense, but it was unfortunate that the and mechanics who had no instruction new type of airplane, so radically different from the type in which training had been conducted, manuals. Major Putnam began imme- had been received too recently to permit fanlil- diately to negotiate for the construction iarization in tactical flying and gunnery.ze of revetments,30 and he also began a train- Onthe morning of 4Decemberthis force ing program to be carried on in conjunc- was met by a h-av-y PEY sent out from tion with the daily dawn and dusk pa- Wrake,” and the ~&lF-211 aircraft took trols which started on the morning after off from the Entwprk and followed this VMF-211 arrived. plane to the atoll. Within less than two These patrols, executed by four air- hours the last F4F–3 had pancaked on the craft, circled the atoll approximately 50 narrow strip at Peacock Point,. miles out, and pilots combined this duty Major 13ayler had arrived on 29 No- with navigation and instrument training. vember and already was busy setting up Instrument practice was particularly im- airbase communication facilities. com- portant because Wake had no electronic mander Clmningharn had succeeded Ma- homing or navigational aids suitable for jor Devereux as Island Commander, and tighter operations , and the atoll was a I.ieUkIlallt Conderman and his 49 head- small mark for pilots to locate through a quarters and service personnel were wait- floor of intermittent clouds.3’ ing to greet the squadron, but the aircraft Other changes had taken place since the operating facilities at Wake were hardly arrival of the Wtight. Commander in a finished stage. The landing strip, although sufficient in length, was too nar- 3““Backed by a written request from the Com- row to permit safe operation of more than mander, Aircraft Battle Force, a request was made through the Island CoInmander to the Ci- one airplane at a time. Takeoffs or land- vilian Contractor’s superintendent on the morn- ings by section were thus impossible. ing of 5 December, asking for the immediate Parking was extremely restricted, and all construction of bunkers for the protection of areas about the hardstand mat were in aircraft, and outlining various other works to follow. Great emphasis was put on the fact sL~chrough and unfinished condition that that speed, rather than neatly finished work, was required. Howerer, an inspection that = Putna?a Rept, 13. afternoon revealed a young civil engineer la- “On the day before, to the surprise of the men boriously setting out stakes with a transit and on Wake, a 12-plane squadron of PBY’s had three rodmen. It required an hour of frantic glided down onto the lagoon, anchored, and rushing about and some very strong language commenced a daily series of long-range air to replace the young engineer and his rodmen searches to the south of Wake. These seaplanes, with a couple of Swedes and bulldozers.” Put- however, were recalled from Wake on 5 Decem- ?Iarn Rpt, 6. ber. The PBY which assisted VMF-211 with its “ HistSec, HQiMC interview with lstLt J. F. navigation was from this squadron. La8t man Kinney, 23 Ju145, 4, hereinafter cited as Kiowae~ off Walce Island, 29. In.tcrriew. WAKE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 102 Cunningham had brought with him Com- craft. Only the crews of the 5-inch sea- mander Campbell Keene, eight Navy of- coast batteries were at or near authorized ficers, and 58 bluejackets who comprised strengths, and they also were devilled by tl~e initial detachnlent of the Naval Air lmending minor shortages of tools, spare Station. All these personnel, like the parts, and miscellaneous ordnance items.” .irmy Air Force communication detach- l’eale Island’s base development and de- nlent 32 of olle officer and four soldiers, fensive organization were the most ad- were without arms or field equipment. vanced in the atoll. Although Battery In spite of the eflorts, men, and equipment B, the 5-inch seacoast unit at Toki Point, consigned to Wakej the situation was had been fully organized only after the still grim 011 6 December 1941. The arrival of personnel on 2 November, its ground defenses, embodying the complete position was in good shape. Much the artillery of a defense battalion, had been same could be said of Battery D, 3-inch emplaced during 12-hour working days, antiaircraft, set up near the southeast end and some protective sandbagging and of the island. All emplacements had not camouflage accomplished. But to man been completely sandbagged, but there these weapons the 1st Defense Battalion were adequate personnel shelters plus un- detachment had only 15 otlicers and 373 derground stowage for 1,400 rounds of enlisted men, although the 1941 T/O 3-inch ammunition. Telephone lines, al- called for 43 officers and 939 men. This though not buried, linked all positions meant that one 3-inch antiaircraft bat- with the island command post. Work on tery 33~,as elltirel~ Without personnel! and Wake Island was not far behind. Bat- that each of the other two batteries could tery A, the 5-inch seacoast unit at Pea- man only three of its four guns. Thus cock Point, was completely emplaced and only six of the twelve 3-inch guns on the well camouflaged although it lacked indi- island could be utilized. Only Battery vidual shelters. Battery E, (3-inch anti- D had its full allowance of fire-control aircraftt), although working with only 43 equipment. Battery E had a director but Marines, had completely emplaced, sand- no height finder, and it had to get alti- bagged and camouflaged two guns and the tude data by telephone from Battery D. director, and work on the third gun was There were not half enough men to em- nearly completed by 6 December. Tele- ploy the ground and antiaircraft machine phone lines (with important trunks guns. There was no radar, despite plans doubled or tripled) connected all units on for its eventual provision, and the search- Wake Island, but the wire was on the light battery did not have sound locators surface. with which to detect approaching air- “J$Tilkes Island was the least devel- oped,” reported Captain Wesley McC. “ Commande(Lby Capt Henry S. Wilson, USA. Platt, the local commander: This detachment manned an Army Mrways ~ommuuication Service radio van to assist B– . . . At the outbreak of war, weapons . . 17’s en route westward. had been set W. All were without camouflage ‘3This was Btry F. For this battery, how- or protection except the .50 caliber machine ever, the necessary fire control equipment had not yet arrived ; so, even with full gun crews, “’ File, dispatches received from Wake, 7–23 its effectiveness would have been slight. Dec41. hereinafter cited as Wake File. 448777 0—5s—s 104 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL gUUS. which h:ld been emplaced. All brush east 1st Defense Battalion 13 officers, 373 enlisted of the new channel had been cleared. The re- detachment : maining brusl] west of the new channel was VMLI-211 and attach- 12 officers, 4!) enlisted thick and ils a result of . this [the] ments: . .50 caliber machine guns had been placed U. S, Naval .\ir Sta- 10 officers, 58 enlisted fairly close to the w’ater line. The beach it- tiou : (without arms ). self dro~)lwd abruptly from 2>fi to 4 feet just Army .\ir Corps : 1 officer, 4 enlisted above the high water mark.~’ (without arms). In addition to four .50 caliber lY.A and USS !Z’ritOn : 1 enlisted (without arms, landed for four .30 caliber machine guns, Platt had medical attention). two sezrclllights and one 5-inch seacoast TIIus there were only 449 Marines on the battery (I.) wl}icb was set up at Kuku atoll W11Owere equippecl and trained for Poill~. The four 3-inch guns destined for combat. Battery F were parked on I$rilkes with- Supplies on Wake, although aggravat- out personnel or fire control gear. Wire ingly short, in many particular items, communications were in between the is- were general]y adequate. The Marines land command post and all units.3’ had a X)-day sL~pply of rations, and the Wake, intended primarily as a patrol civil ian workers l~ad a six-month supply. plane base for P13Y’s, “the eyes of the h~o natural water supply existed, but a Fleet,” had no scouting aircraft after the suilkient number of evaporators were in PBY’s departed on 5 December, and only service. Ammunition and aviation ord- the most primitive facilities for any type nnllce supplies initially could support of aircraft operations. Its defending limited operations, but would not with- fighter squadron was learning while stand a protracted defense. Medical sup- working, and these planes had neither plies were those normal for a remote, armor nor self-sealing fuel tanks. In ad- outlying station and could thus be con- (Iition, their naval type bomb racks did sidered adequate.3g In addition to the not, match the local supply of bombs.3i naval medical equipment and personnel on Exclusive of the 1,200 civilian contract Wake, the contractor’s organization oper- employees, the military population of ated a fully-equipped hospital in C’amp Wake (almost twenty per cent of whom Two.’n were without arms or equipment) totalled But since November, when dispatches 38 officers and 485 enlisted men: 3’ had warned that the international situa- tion demanded alertness, the atoll was as = LtCol w. }IC~, Platt reply to HistSec, HQMC questionnaire, 10Mar47. ready for defense as time and material ‘“ Ibid., 2. available permitted. Mrhen this warning “’(.’apt Frueler, squadron ordnance officer, at arrived, Major Devereux, then the island this moment was devising homemade nmdiflca- comnl:lnder, asked whether the civilian tions of the troublesome bomb lugs. BY 8 De- \vorkers should be turned to tasks dealing cember two 100-pound bombs could be precari- ously swung onto each aircraft, though hardly more direct 1y with military defense, but in any manner to inspire pilot confidence in he was told not to revise work priorities. clean release or assurance that return to base Small-arms ammunition was nevertheless could be accomplished without dangling armed bombs. 3’ Maj. W. L. J. Bayler Rept, 9-10. “ Devereux Rept. ‘0 C’unninqham Irt.terciew, 3. WAKE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR 105 issued to individual Marines, and ready- On the morning of Saturday, 6 I)ecem- service ammunition was stowed at every ber, Major Devereux found time to hold gun position. A common ‘l,J’’-line (so- the first general quarters drill for the en- cmlled) which augmented normal tele- tire defense battalion. ‘T’all to Arms” was phone circuits, joined all batteries, com- sounclecl, and all gun positions were mam mand posts, observation posts, and other ned (to the extent which personnel short- installations with which the commander ages permitted ), communications tested, might, need contact, cluring battle,’] and and simulated targets were “engaged.’> “ primitive “walky-talkies” formecl a radio The drill ran smoothly, and Major Deve- net established to parallel wire communi- reux granted his men an almost unheard- cations between comnmnd posts on Wake Island, Wilkes, and Peale. Atop the 50- of reward: Saturday afternoon off, and foot steel water tank at CUmp One, the holiday routine for Sunday. highest point on Wzke, Major I)evereux His timing of this “breather” was better had established a visual observation post than he knew. linked by field telephone to the command post. This OP, with a seaward horizon of u Prior to the outbreak of war, no opportunity had been found for test firings, calibration, or about nine miles, was the only substitute other gunnery exercises after emplacement of for radar. weapons on Wake. The first actual firing was in combat against the Japanese. Ctf??ninghorn 4’ Maj W. 1,. J. Iiuglev h’cpt, 3, Interview, 3. CHAPTER 2 The Enemy Strikes’ The Pmn American Airways Philippine Arms.’ Gunnery sergeants broke out their Clipper which had spent the night of 7-8 men and made sure that all had their am- December at Wake re-embarked passen- munition. The Marines then piled into gers shortly after sunrise on Monday ‘ trucks which rushed them to the battery 8 December, taxied into the calm lagoon, areas. By 0735 all positions were manned and soared toward Guam. Ashore break- and ready, the planned watch was estab- fast was nearly over, and some Marines lished atop the water tank in Camp one, were squaring away their tents prior to and defense battalion officers had held a falling out for the day’s work. Major brief conference. Devereux was shaving. In the Army Air- The dawn air patrol was up before the ways Communications Service radio van news came from Pearl,5 but aviation per- near the airstrip, an operator was coming sonnel took hurried steps to safeguard the up on frequency with Hickam Field on new Wildcats still on the ground. The Oahu when at 0650 a frantic uncoded Philippine Clipper was recalled ten transmission cut through: Oahu was under minutes after its takeoff, and it circled enemy air attack. back down to the lagoon. But in spite of Captain Henry S. Wilson snatched the these measures, things were not running message and rushed to Devereux’s tent. smoothly at the airstrip. VMF-211 had The major tried unsuccessfully to reach been on Wake only four days and could Commander Cunningham by telephone, hardly call itself well established. Air- and then called the base communication craft revetments still being dozed would shack. There, a coded priority 3transmis- not be ready until 1400 that day, and suit- able access roads to these revetments like- sion from Pearl was being broken down. wise were unfinished. Existing parking Devereux ptit down the telephone and areas restricted plane dispersal to hazard- ordered the field music to sound “Call to ously narrow limits. As Major Putnam stated it: ‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material in chap 2 is derived from Devereux Rept; l’utnarn Re@; The Squadron Commander was faced with a ( oflcer’s name) Repts; Bayler Rept; Deveveu% choice between two major decisions, and in- StOrg. evitably he chose the wrong one. 1~’ork was ‘By east longitude date ; this was the same as Sunday, 7 December east of the date line. 4Cdr Cunningham, who immediately recalled ‘At this time relative priorities in dispatch the Philippine Clipper, has since stated that it traffic were as follows : Urgent (to be used only was he who ordered the defense battalion to gen. for initial enemy contact reports ), Priority, eral quarters, but it appears that this action had Routine, Deferred. Thus a priority dispatch already been taken prior to his issuance of any presented a considerably more important trans- order. Cunningham Interl?iew, 4. mission than it now wo~ld. ‘ Kinney Interview,, 3. 106 THE ENEMY STRIKES 107 t)rogressiug sinlultaneously on six of the ~aw- manne(l. Marine units and the Islan{l tective bunkers for the airplanes. and while Commander hastily set up command posts. none was available for immediate occulmncy, all Commander Cunningham located his CP would be ready not later than 1400. Protection and camoutlfa~e for facilities were not available in (’amp Two, and ~MF-211>s remained but could be made ready within 24 hours. Fox- ill the squadron otfice tent. Aviation per- holes or other pre~ared positions for personnel sonnel l~ad to stick with their jobs of belt- did not exist but would be completed not later ing extra ammunition and transferril]g than 1400. To move the airplanes out of the bulk fuel into more dispensable drums. regular parking area entailed grave risk of damage, and any damage meant the complete At 0900 the four-plane combat air patrol loss of an airplane because of the complete ab- returned to base. The planes were re- sence of spare parts . . The Squadron Conl- fueled while the four pilots 7 took a smok- mander decided to avoid certain damage to his ing break, and then clambered back into airplanes by moving them across the rough F4F’s 9 through 12 and took off again to ground, to delay movenlents of material until some place could be prepared to receive it, and scout the most likely sectors for enemy to trust his personnel to take natural cover if approach. Shortly nfter this the pilot of attacked.” the Pht%pp;ne Cl~pper, Captain ,J. H. Thus VMF-211’S handful of pilots and Hamilton, reported for duty to Major mechanics spent the morning dispersing Putnam at VMF-211’S headquarters, He aircraft as widely as possible in the usable lmd orders from the Island (’ommznder parking area, relocating the squadron to make a long-range southward search radio installation from its temporary site witl~ fighter escort. These orders, how- to a covered one, and arming and servic- ever, were later cancelled.s ing all aircraft for combat. While VMF-211’s combat air patrol Atl 0800, only a few hours after tile made a swing north of Wake at 12,000 blazing and dying Arizona had broken out feet, 36 twin-engined ,Japanese bombers her colors under enemy fire at Pearl Har- were flying northward toward the atoll. bor, Morning (Volors sounded on Wake. This was Air Attack Force No. 1 of the Defensive preparations hummed. Trucks Z’zwnty-Fow’th .+lir Flotilla, based at Roi, delivered full allowances of ammunition 720 miles to the south.’ As the enemy to each unit, tl~e few spare individual group leader signalled for a gliding let,- \wapolls in Marine storerooms were spread as far as they would go to the un- ‘ There were: Capt Elrod, who had relieved armecl Air C’orps soldiers ancl N“aval blue- Maj Putnam on statiop, and 2dIl Davidson in jackets, and gas masks and helnlets of one section, and lstI.t Kinney and TSgt Hanlil- ton in the other. World War I vintage were distributed to 8Orders were changed and the clipper took tl~e battery positions. Watches were set off for Midway at 12.10 that afternoon to evacu- at fire control instruments and guns, while ate certain PAA personnel plus all passengers. the balance of personnel worked on fox- Mr. H. P. Hevenor, a government official who holes and filled the few remaining sand- missed the plane, was marooned on Wake and eventually ended up in Japanese hands. “It bags. Tl~e 3-il~cll antiaircraft batteries struck me m a rather drastic lesson in the were specifically directed to keep one gun, wisdon~ of punctuality,” conunented Col Dere- pll~s :all fire control instrunlents, fully reux. Dcvercaz Storg, 58. “ Notes on Eneu)y Interviews, n. d., hereinafter “ Putnam Rept, 8. cited as Enetny Notes. 108 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL down in his 10,000-foot approach, he notecl For a second time within less than ten that tl~e south coast of’ the atoll was minutes the airstrip was bombed md masked by a drifting rain squall at about strafed. By 1210 the strike was over. The 2,000 feet. The three ,Japanese divisions, enemy planes turned awmy and com- in 12-plane VS, dropped rapidly down into menced their climb to cruising altitude. the squall and emerged a few seconcls later “The pilots in every one of the planes were almost on top of the J?Take airstrip. grinning widely. Everyone waggled his First Lieutenant William W. Lewis, com- wings to signify ‘Banzai’.:’ 1’ manding Battery E at Peacock Point, saw The enerily attack burned or blasted these planes at 1150, and he grabbed a seven of the eight F4F–3’s from propeller “J’’-line telephone to warn Devereux. to rudder, and the remainil)g Wildcat sLls- ,Just as the major answered, a spray of tained serious but not irreparable dam- bright sparks began to sail through the air age to its reserve fuel tank. A direct ahead of the enemy formation. One civil- bomb hit destroyed Major Bayler’s air- ian thought “the wheels dropped off the ground radio installation, mncl the whole ~irplanes.” But the planes had not come aviation area flamed in the blaze from to lose their wheels. ,Japanese bombs were the 25,000-gallon avgas tank which had falling on Wake. been hit in the first strike. Fifty-gallon Lewis, an experienced ant iaircraft fuel drums burst into flame. VMF-211’S artilleryman, had not only complied with tentage, containing the squadron’s surety the commanding oflicer’s directive to keep stock of tools and spares, had been riddled one gun manned, but had added another and partially burned. Worst of all, 23 of for good measure. Within a matter of the 55 aviation personnel then on the seconds he had two of Battery E’s 3-inch ground were killed outright, or wounded so severely that they died before the fol- guns firing at the Japanesejlo and .50 lowing morning, eleven more were woun- caliber guns along the south shore of ded but survived. At one stroke, VMF- NTake quickly took up the fire. A tight 211 had sustained nearly 60 per cent pattern of 100-pound fragmentation casualties. Nearly 50 per cent of the bombs and 20mm incendiary bullets struck ground Cre}vmen }Tere dead. Three pilots the entire VMF-211 area where eight (Lieutenants George A. Graves, Robert ‘0 Battery E, it will be recalled, had no height wounds but remained on duty. In Camp finder but was supposed to rely for this data on telephonic information from Battery D on “Account by h’orio Tsuji, a Japanese observer Peale. Without waiting for word from Peale, during the raid. ATIS ( S~PA), Enemy Pub- Lt Lewis made a quick estimate of target alti- lications ATo.6, “Hawaii-~lalaya Naval Opera- tude, cranked it onto his director, and had the tions,” 27N1ar43,27–3S, hereinafter cited as battery in action within a matter of seconds. Hatoaii-Malaw ATavOp8. THE ENEMY STRIKES 109 Two and the adj aceut Pan Americau area, in a reefer box at Camp Two, and mble- the hotel and other Seill)l:lne facilities bodied aviation personnel turned their were afire, the PhiZi~~jine ~v7~]I]Mr hacl re- atte,ntion to tlle airplanes and to the gaso- ceived a few stray machine-gun bullets, line tires. The three planes still able to and some ten civilian employees of P.f.l fly were sent up on combat air patrol. In l~ad been killed.” The el~enly did not lose tl~e sky they would be safe from another n sin~yle bomber altl~ough “several” were surprise raid. Crews and officers re- damaged by antiaircraft fire.ls ‘1’he Ma- organized and reallocated jobs. Seconcl rine combat air patrol, well above tl~e raid I.ieutenant John F. Kinney became engi- and momentarily scouting to the north, neering oficer to replace First I.ieutenant had not made contact. These pilots re- Graves w-ho had been killed.’5 Kinney’s turnecl for landing shortly after the at- principal assistant was Technical Ser- tack, and by a final stroke of ill fortune geant William ,J. Hamilton, an enlisted Captain Henry T. El rod damaged his pilot, and these two men begin salvaging propeller seriously on a mass of bomb tools and parts from burned planes. debris. Their etforts immeasurably aided future Wake’s defenders were most concerned operations of VMF-211. Captain Her- that this first raid had struck almost be- bert C’. Freuler reorganized the ordnance fore they knew that enemy planes were section, 1.ieutenant David D. Kliewer took overhead. The rain squall had helped the over tl~e radio section, and (“aptains Elrod ,Japanese, but the atoll’s lack of early- and Tharin supervised construction of in- warning equipment was almost as bene- dividual foxholes, shelters, and infantry ficial to the enemy. The garrison needed defensive works ill the VMF-211 mea. radar, but none was avail able. Tllrougll- Otl~er work included mining the airstrip out the siege the ,Japnnese planes coll- at 150-foot intervals with heavy dynamite t inued to elude the most vigilant visual charges to guard against airborne land- observation, and with the sound of their ings. Furrows were bulldozed through- engines drowned by the booming surf they out tile open ground where such landings }vould often have their bombs /lTy:lybefore might take place, and heavy engineering they were spotted. equipment was placed to obstruct the run- Damage control began at the airstrip as Way at all times when friendly planes soon as the, enemy departeci. ~’asualties were not aloft. Plans called for continua- went to the one-story contractor’s hos- tion of the dawn and dusk reconnaissance pital which had been taken over as the flights, and for the initiation of a noon island aid station,l~ tile dead were placed combat air patrol as well. It was hoped tlmt these patrols could intercept subse- = Cun.ning7tawIntrrview, 5. quent enemy raids. “ JICPOA Item ATO4986, Professional note- book of Ens T. Nak:unnra, LJA’, 1941-1943, assisted by his civilian colleague, Dr. Lawton 2.3Feb44, hereinafter cited as 3~aka)}~ura A’otc. M. Shank, the contractor’s surgeon, whose cool- 6001<. ness and medical efficiency throughout the siege “ The battalion surgeon of the 1st DefBnDet, won high praise. Lt (jg) Gustave M. Kahn (MC j, USN, was ably “ Iiinney Interview, 4, 110 PEARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAL Elsewhere on the atoll new defense took off at 0545 over Peacock Point. They woqk progressed just as rapidly.le Em- rendezvoused in section over the field and placements, foxholes, and camouflage then climbed upward to scout 60- to 80- were improved at all battery positions. mile sectors along the most probable routes A Navy lighter loaded with dynamite sur- of enemy approach. At 0700 the fighters rounded by concrete blocks was anchored finished their search without sighting any in Wilkes channel to guard this dredged enemy planes and then turned back toward waterway. Telephone lines were re- the atoll. There the defense detachment paired, key trunk lines were doubled shifted to Condition 2 which required that wherever possible, and every possible at- only half the guns be manned, and that tempt was made to bury the most impor- fewer men stood by the fire control in- tant wires.” Construction of more du- struments. This permitted Marines to get rable and permanent command posts and after other necessary work around their shelters began before the day ended in a positions. At the airstrip Lieutenant Kin- cold drizzle. Working that night under ney continued work on Elrod’s plane, and blackout restrictions, aviation Marines the squadron’s engineering problem made and volunteer civilians completed eight it evident that hangar overhaul andblack- blast-proof aircraft revetments. The out facilities had to be set up. Major Put- atoll’s four operational planes were thus nam decided to enlarge two of his new relatively safe within these. revetments plane shelters for this purpose. Entrance when 9 December dawned bright and ramps were cut below ground level, and clear, and Captain Elrodk plane also, was the revetments were roofed with “I” in a bunker undergoing repairs to its pro- beams, lumber, and lightproof tarpaulins. peller and engine. These expedients allowed extensive over- General quarters sounded at 0500, 45 haul and maintenance at all hours, and minutes before dawn, and the defense provided maximum protection for planes commander set Condition 1. This readi- and mechanics. ness condition required full manning As the morning wore on, men began to of all phone circuits, weapons, fire con- work closer to their foxholes and to keep trol instruments, and lookout stations. a wary eye skyward. A dawn takeoff The four F4F-3’s warmed up and then from the nearby Japanese-mandated Mar- shalls could bring a second Japanese “ Approximately ten per cent of the civilian bomber raid over Wake at any time after workers volunteered for military or defensive 1100. This “clock-watching” was justi- duties, and some attempted to enlist. Many of fied. Disgustingly prompt, enemy planes these men served with heroism and efficiency throughout the operation. from the Twenty-Fourth Air Flotilla at “ “Surface lines could not seem to stand UP Roi arrived at 1145.” Marine Gunner although they were all paralleled. We wanted to H. C. Berth spotted them first from the bury them, but we could not do so by hand . . . water tank OP, and he shouted the warn- considering the scarcity of men to do the work. ing over the “J’’-line circuit. Seconds We could not obtain permission to use the ditch later the air-ground radio (again in opera- diggers of the contractors. . .“ LtCol C. A. 13arninger reply to HistSec, HQMG question- tion with makeshift equipment ) passed naire, l!3Feb47, 8-9, hereinafter cited as Barn- inger. = Enerng Notes, 1. THE ENEMY STRIKES 111 this alarm to the combat air patrol, and scored a direct hit on the radio station. battery crewmen rushed to general quar- This destroyed most of the Navy’s raclio ters. Soon three bursts of antiaircraft gear.’” Meanwhile the antiaircraft guns fire, the new alarm signal, “ were explod- continued to fire into the tight ,Tapanese ing from all sectors, and Wake stood by formation, and five bombers were sn~ok- for its second attack of the war. ing by the time Peale Island was hit. A The leading ,Japanese planes ap- moment later one of these planes burst proached from the southeast at 13,000 into flames and blew up in the air. That, feet, and antiaircraft batteries on Peale was Wake)s second certain kill. The Island and Peacock Point opened fire just others limped away still smoking.zl before the first bombs were released. The hospital burned to the ground Minutes earlier the combat air patrol had — while the two surgeons saved first the made contact with one flank of the ,Japa- nese planes south of Wake, and Lieu- patients and then as much medical sup- tenant Kliewer and Technical Sergeant plies and equipment as they had time to Hamilton managed to cut off a straggler. salvage. Camp Two and the Naval Air They shot it down despite hot return fire Station were now as badly wrecked as the from a top turret, and as the enemy plane aviation area had been on the previous spun away in flames the ground batteries’ day, and four Marines and 55 civilians 3-inch shells began to burst among the had been killed. But the defenders had ,Japanese. The Marine fighters broke con- learned some lessons, and the Japanese tact and withdrew. were not to have such an easy time here- The first sticks of bombs exploded after. Major Putnam summed it up: around Batteries E and A on Peacock The original raid . . was tactically well con- Point and damaged a 3-inch gun in the E ceived and skillfully executed, but thereafter Battery position and a range tinder at their tactics were stupid, and the best that can Battery A. Other bombs crashed along be said of their skill is that they had excellent the east leg of Wake Island and into flight discipline. The hour and altitude of their arrival over the island was almost constant and Camp Two. There direct hits destroyed their method of attack invariable, so that it was the hospital, the civilian and Navy bar- a simple matter to meet them, and they never, racks buildings, the garage, blacksmith after that first day, got through unopposed. . . .2’ shop, a storehouse, and a machine shop. Defenders spent that afternoon collecting The falling bombs then straddled the wounded, salvaging useful items from channel at this tip of Wake and began to blasted ruins, and moving undamaged in- rain down on Peale Island. They made st allations to safer spots. These jobs were a shambles of the Nayal Air Station to become painfully familiar on succeed- }Thich was still under construction, and ing afternoons. “ Wake did not have an air raid alarm, and ‘0 CO NAS lVake Rpt to CornFourteen, 20- this traditional three-shot signal was the only Dec41, 1–2. alternative. Defenders tried to make an alarm = A ,Japanese report indicates that 14 of these system with dismounted auto horns wired to bombers were damaged by antiacraft fire during storage batteries, but it never worked. Last Man this attack. Nakamura&’otebook. Off l~ake Island, 65, 122. * Putnam Rept, 10. 112 PEARL HARFK)R TO GUADALC’AN.4L The ,JapaIwse attac~ on llattery 13 at Enlplacements were dug at the new site, Peacock Point and along tile islal~d’s east sandbags refilled, and the guns readied for leg SUfZgeSted to ~~ajor Devereux that act ion. By 0500, just, in time for dawn tl~e e]lenly wollld I)lal] tl~eir raids ill a general quarters, the battery was in posi- lo~ic:ll seqllell Marine was killed. Four others were GEi’Vl?i’lZ,Y OF THE RELIEF wounded, and one civilian sust ainecl E.rPKI)lTIoN 28 shock. But materiel-wise, Battery 1, was After the Pearl Harbor attack, Presi- in serious slmpe. All fire control instru- dent Roosevelt warned the American peo- ments except tile telescopes on (hm 2 had ple to be prepared for the fall of Wake. been blasted away ordamagedbeyondre- Yet before the Arizona’s hulk stopped pair, the gun tubes were dented, firing burning, plans were underway to send re- locks were torn off, and traversing and lief to the atoll. But with much of the elevating racks were burred and distorted. Pacific Fleet on the bottom of Pearl Har- Equipment loss at Battery F, organizing bor, little assistance could be provided. that morning, was less serious. C)ne gun Wake, like other outer islands, }vould was dmnaged from blast and flying de- stand or fall on its own Lmless it could be bris. In adclition, the 60-inch searchlight augmented from the meager resources on Wilkes hacl been knocked end over end. then at Pearl Harbor. Marine forces on This seriously damageci the light’s deli- oahu included two defense. battalions, the cate arcs, bearings, and electronic fittings. 3d and 4tl~~’ elements of the Ist Defense .\fter this raid Major Devereux again Battalion, and miscellaneous barracks and ordered Battery 1? to displace. This time ships’ detachments. Any personnel sent it would set. up north of tile airstrip and to relieve Wake would have to come from near the lagoon in the crotch of Wake. these, units, and that. meant that other im- Tile dummyguns at Peacock Point, dam- portant jobs would have to be slighted. agedby this third raid, }~ere reflu-bished There was a limited source of equipment during the afternoon of 10 I)ecember, and including radar and other supplies at Battery E’s unnla]illed fourth gun was de- Pearl Ikbor in the, hands of the Marine tached for antiboat emplacement else- Defense Force quartermaster; and fighter where. z’; Battery E’s new position would be most :~ci~:~l]t:~ge(~l~s,the battery coln- = ITnless otherwise noted the material concern- ing the Relief Expedition is derived from a mag- lnander reasoned: azine article by LtCol R. D. Heinl, Jr., “We’re Most all bonlbing runs were nlade from the Headed for Wake,” MC Ga#ette, June 1946. east or west and the bon)hs ~vere dropped alon~ mThis battalion, which during 194–1943 ex- the length of the island. In this l)osition the ecuted more overseas displacements than any Japanese must make a ron for the battery alone other defense battalion in the Fleet Marine and most of the bombs would be lost in the ~orce, plllled out of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, lagoon.” during late October 1941, moved secretly through the Panama Canal, and arrived at Pearl Harbor That, night the battery personnel sweated on Monday 1 December. On 7 December the bat- through their second displacement, and talion manned a 3-inch battery at the INavy Yard, and also served some antiaircraft machine guns. 2’ This 3-inch gun, which figured conspicuously Since it had just completed this oversea move- in the later defense, was located south of the ment, and had its equipment ready for service, airstrip and the VMF-211 area. the 4th was a logical choice for its eventual “ Leu%j 2. role in the attempt to relieve Wake. PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCAATAL aircraft, needed almost as much as radar, return to original battery positions. The were already en route from San Diego on CinCPac statl wanted to make a complete board tl~e IJSS ,~aratoga.:+() new study of the Pacific situation before on 9 December ‘1 Admiral Kimrnel’s it sent, this relief off to Wake.33 Besides, staff decided to send relief to IITake in a the task force had to await the arrival of task force built around this carrier, Cruis- the 17anztoga. er Division 6 (cruisers Aston”a, Mkneapo- Cin(7Pac finally decided to make the 7Li, ancl ,Ymn Framwko ), the nine destroy- attempt to reinforce Waket and em- ers of Destroyer Squadron 4, the seaplane barkation of certain units of the 4th De- tender Tangier, wllicll would carry troops fense Battalion began two days later, on and equipment, and the fleet oiler i17eC7WS. 12 December. By this time the Wake de- These ships would comprise Task Force fenders had sent, a partial list of their most 14, While it sailed for Wake, Task Force critical needs, and Pearl Harbor supply 11 built around the USS Lexington,, would activities filled this as best they COUIC1. make diversionary strikes in the vicinity l-’hese important items, which were loaded of Jaluit some 800 miles south of Wake. in the Z’~mgie/’ at pier 10 in the Navy A third task force, commanded by Vice l-ard, 3’ included an SCR–270 early-warn- .Idmiral Halsey in the carrier Enterprise, ing raclar unit and an SCR–268 radar set would provide. general support by com for fire control. Also stowed on board ducting operations west of ,Johnston Is- were 9,000 rounds of 5-inch ammunition, land.32 12,000 of the :1-incl~ shells with 30-second Men and equipment to aid Wake would time fuzes, more than tlmee million rounds be drawn from the 4th Defense Battalion, of belted ammmlit ion for .50 and .3o cali- and on 10 December this unit wus alerted ber machine guns, quantities of grenades, for immediate. embarkation. The destina- ammunition for small arms, barbed wire, tion was not announced, but it did not re- antipersonnel mines, and additional engi- quire much imagination for rumor to cut neering tools. (Nher equipment. would en- through military secrecy. “l$re’re going able the men at Wake to repair their to Wake” was the word that circulated all bomb-damaged weapons. This included day while the batteries prepared to mount three complete fire control and data trans- out. By nightfall the personnel and mission systems for 3-inch batteries, equipment were squared away, and units needed replacement equipment, for the groped about in the blackout to assemble atoll’s 5-inch guns, electrical cable, ord- their gear for loading. But in the midst nance tools, and spare parts. of this work came orders to knock off and Units of the 4th Defense Battalion em- barked for this expedition includecl J3at- ~ These planes comprised VMF-221. The k’ar- tery F with ;J-inch guns, Battery B with atoga had departed at maximum speed on 8 De- 5-inch guns, a provisional machine gun de- cember (9 December on Wake). Ship’s Log USS Sara fogfr, December 1941, hereinafter cited as tachment drawn from Batteries H and I, S(Ira togu log. 3’ Throughout this section dealing with the re- “ Notes of interview by Capt S. E. Morison, lief attempt, west longitude dates and local times USNR, with RAdm C. H. McMorris, 13 Jan47, are used. hereinafter cited as McMorrt,Y l?Itw-wicw. “ CinCPac OPlan 3941, 15Dec41, 2. “ CSS Tangier log, December 1941. THE Eh’EMl’ STRIKES 115 and a headquarters section (Irawl] fronl trouble, bnt they knew that Wake’s de- the Headquarters aud Service Battery of fense was ill better shal)e. mey estin}ate(l tile defense battalion. First ,1.ieutenant that this atoll was defen(led by abol~t Robert D. IIeinl, ,Jr., commanded this 1,000 troops and 600 laborers. Wakens force when it completed emb~rkation oll figl~ter planes wele aggressive, a]l(l tl~e 13 I)ecember, but tile command passed to flak from tile island was at least pronll)t (;olol~el I1. S. Fassett jl~st l)riortothe de- :uld deternlined. Iletweell the Marine partureof the task force two days later.” planes anti tl~is flak tl~e l“~renfy-FoT/tt?/ After loading, the Tan,gier moved to tile Air F70ti77a sILrely had lost five of its upper harbor W where Rear Admiral planes, not counting four nlore “smokers” Fletcher’s Cruiser Division 6 waited for tl~at the Wake defenders fervently hoped the Sarcltogu. The carrier came into fuel never made it back to Roi. on the 15th, ‘i and the task force sortied This T(wnt,y-Fo(ot?~ .4 i~ F70ti71a was late that clay an(l set course for Wake. con~posed of Aijz Attack- Fo?wes One and Three. Force Orw flew sllore-lmsed bombers, and Force Z’Atee operated approximately 15 four-engined patrol .Idnliral Inouye, conm]andillg tile ,JalNl- bombers (probably Kawanishi 97s). llese Fow?fi F~eet at ‘rruk; had set numer- Force {)ne based o]~ Roi, while Fome ~’?~we. which was also bombil~g or scout- ous projects and operations ill nlotion on ing I}aker, IIow1 alldl N“auru> and ocean 8 December. (Xurrellt war l)lalls callwl Islands, flew out of Maj uro Atoll 840 for him to capture and develop Wake, nliles south of Wake. The commander Guam, and certain Crilbert islands includ- of this air flotilla had the mission of ing Makln an(l Tarawa. By 10 Decel]l- softening Wake for capture, and he her, wl~en Guam fe]l, Illouye could check was going about it in a creditable fasl~- otl all these jobs ex(.ept tl~e o])e ilt Wake.’~” ion. First he struck the airstrip to clear l)espite its small size this atoll was giving ol~t tl]e tighter plalles~ a]ld then l]e figured tile admiral all(l his peol)le at Truk al]d to come back with the sky to himself and Kwajalein some monlel~ts of \vorry. Tl~e finish otf his job. ~Subsequent targets had other islands lmd fallen to tllenl witl~ little been the Xaval .iir Station, seaplane f/l- rilit ies, allcl other installation. With “ Col Fassett was to beconle Island Conv these missions acconlplisbecl, the pilots of mander at ll”ake when the relief force arrived t l~e Z’(ren t~j-~ot[ttJt .Iit Floti17a could at the atoll, (’onlFourteen orders to ~o] Fassett. lfil)ec~l. settle down to tlle nletl~odicxl bl~siness of ‘“ Tan,qicr log, op. cit. taking out tile antiaircraft ;Ind seacoast ‘7 The A’aratofla arrived in the Hawaiian area batteries. Thus tile raid of 1(OI)ecember (luring the nixht of 14 December, but she could concentrated on Peale where poor lxnnb- not enter the harbor until next d:ly when the antisubmarine nets were oljened. Saratoga log, ing and Battery 1)’s fire l~eld the ,Japanese ““ Exvel)t as other~vise noted material in this to no gains, and on lVilkes \vl~ere bombs se(.tion (lealinx ~vith Japanese (}per:]tions is de- set OHtile dynamite caelle. rived from t’([pf 1(I’c of Itra?ic; lf”al~c .1 ttcrk; ~lfter tl~ose three strikes tile ,Japanese Yltkatrl vra A-otf’bool; ; Encolu A’otrx. 3’ C’amPu i~ns of tlt~ I’ocifi(’ War, 47. decided Nrake v-as ri~)e for a lal~dillg, and 116 PEARL HARBOR TO GLIADALCANAL the job went to Rear Admiral Kaj ioka included light machine guns, grenade who commanded Destroyer .qqucvlron 6 launchers, and possibly small infantry can- in his new light cruiser I’ubari. Kaj ioka non. It is likely that assault troops were planned to land 150 men on Wilkes Island embarked in the two old destroyer-trans- to control the dredged cl~annel, and 300 ports (Patrol pra~t 32 ad ,33), while men on the south coast of Wake Island to the garrison and base development eche- capture the airfield. An alternate plan lon was assigned to the medium-size trans- called for landings on the north and ports. The assault shipping from Truk northeast coasts, hut the admiral hoped arrived at Roi on 3 December, and on 9 to avoid these beaches unless unfavorable Decenlber 41t]le force sortied on a circui- winds kept his men away from tl~e south tous route for Wake. side of the atoll. ‘llle ,Japanese expected The ,Japanese expected no American that a landing force of only 450 men surface opposition, but they nonetheless would face a difficult battle at Wake, but screened their approach with customary this force was tile largest that .kdmiral caution. Two submarines scouted 75 Kajioka could muster at this early date in miles ahead of the main body, and these the war. 13ut if things l~it a snag, de- boats were to reconnoiter Wrake prior to stroyer crews could be used to help storm the arrival of the task force.” Specifi- the beaches. The naval force at Admiral cally they would try to find out whether Kaj.ioka’s disposal included one light the atoll defenders had any motor torpedo cruiser (the fl~gsl~ip ), two obsolescent boats. Behind these submarines, and 10 light cruisers for fire support and cover- miles forward of the main body, a picket ing duties, six destroyers, two destroy el- destroyer maintained station from which transports, two new transports, and two it would make. landfall and conduct a fur- submarines.40 The l’qwnty-Fo~jrth .4iT ther reconnaissance. Ships of the task FlotWa would act as his air support. force neared T$’ake on the evening of 10 Wake was so small that the admiral did December. The weather was bad with not consider carrier air necessary. high winds and heavy seas, but there was The 450 men of the landing force com advantage even in this. The squalls pro- stituted Kaj ioka”s share of the special vided a natural screen behind which the naval landing force personnel assiyned approach would surely remain unde- to the Fourth F/eet. It is probable that tected. Reports from the submarines and they were armed with the weapons typical the screening destroyer indicated that to a ,Japanese infantry unit of company Wake was not aware of the Japanese ap- or battalion size, mld that their weapons proach, and zt 0300 on 11 December the ‘0 Yubari; !Z’atsuta and !l’cnrim (2 old light 4’ Capturo of Wake, II, 373 lists this date as 8 cruisers, comprising Cruiser Division 18) ; Oitt’, December, but other dates from this authority Hayate, Mutst{ki, Iii.saragi, Morh izuhi and are consistently one day behind, and it is there- l’a~oi (6 older destroyers, comprising Destroyer fore probable that the date of 9 December is Division 29 and 30) : Patrol Ihmts 32 and 33, correct. so-called (actually old destroyers converted into 4’ The submarines were scheduled to arrive at light troop-carrying craft with missions similar Wake prior to dawn, and it is therefore not to the American APD ) ; and firoago Mart{ and clear how they expected to make a visual re- Konryu Mum, both medium transports. connaissance that would be of much value. THE EA’13MY STRIKES 117 task force made landfall and prepared to position :approxirnately 8,000” yards south disembark the landing force. From Kaji- of Peacock Point. There she turned west- okz’s flagship Wake was barely visible ward and comn~enced a broadside run par- while the admiral led ]lis force to bonl. allel to the south shore of Wake. The bardment and debarkation stations five or other enemy ships followed generally six miles otf the atoll’s sollth shore. along this course but kept approximately 1,()()o yards further to seaward. Al- THE .4 TTi?M P2ED L.4NDING3 though the ,Japanese were not aware of it, 11 DECEMBER the Yutvzri was being tracked along this In spite of Wake’s black silent appear- course by the 5-inch guns of Battery B on ance to the ,Japanese, the atoll defenders Peacock I’oint. The camouflage had been had spotted the enemy, I~ookouts re- removed from battery positions so that ported ships in sight just prior to 0300, the gLIns could train.44 and as the shadowy outlines drew closer A few minutes later, the Yubccni and the Devereux decided they formed an enemy other two cruisers ( Z’atwta and Ten.ryu.) force which included cruisers, destroyers, opened fire at area targets along tl~e south and some auxiliaries. The g~rrison went shore of Wake. These salvos laddered the to general quarters, and Devereux ordered island from Peacock Point to the vicinity Major Putnam to delay the takeoff of his of Camp One. The high-velocity 6-inch four airplanes until after the shore bat- shells w-llich hit near Camp One ignited teries began to fire. And these batteries the diesel-oil tanks between the camp and were ordered to hold their fire ASl]ntil they Wilkes (’hannel, and only a repetition of received orders to open up. Major Dev- I)e~7ereux’s order to hold fire restrained ereux reasoned that, the enemy force could I~ieutenants Clarence A. Barniuger and outgun his defense force, and thzt prem:t- ,John A. McAlister, respectively com- ture firir)g would only reveal the location manding the 5-inch batteries at Peacock and strength of the seacoast batteries and and Kuku Points, from returning fire. rob them of a chance to surprise the The otl~er .Japanese ships, following the enemy. cruiser and destroyer screen, maneuvered Meanwhile the enemy force was having to take stations for their various missions. trouble, with the bad weather that had After completing l~er initial firing run screened its approach. Assault troops the Yuhuri, apparently accompanied by found it difficult. to make their transfer to the two destroyer-transports, reversed sea-tossed landing craft, and some of these course in a turn which closed the range on craft overturned or became swamped in Wake. By this time it was daylight, and the high wales. By dawn at 0500, the by 0600 these ships were some 3,500 yards fla@~ip Yuba.ri, still in the van, reached a south of Battery A on Peacock Point.45 ~ Cdr Cunningham’s postwar report states 4’ Baminger, 4. that Maj Devereux wanted to illuminate the 4’ The range finders on the 5-inch guns of enemy force with searchlights and to open fire Btrys A and L had heen rendered inoperative by much sooner, but that this request was denied. previous bombings, and ranges therefore had to CI/Y/)?i~/fllLa?n I}t trr~iru>, 7. Deyereaux denies be estimated, This resulted in considerable this, and he is sapported by ~irtually all other variance among the later reports of this action. records of the action. These discrepancies undoubtedly were aggra- 118 J?EARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAL Battery A, with no range finder, had esti- transports, and the light cruisers Tatsuta mated the. range to these ships, and the and Terwyu which had broken off from the range section personnel were plotting the Yubari at the west end of her first firing target while the gun section crews stood run. These cruisers and transports by to fire. The order to tire came from steamed north at a range of about 9,000 Devereux’s command post at 0615, and tile yards southwest of Kuku Point while the guns at Peacock I’oint opened tireoll the clestroyers (probably Destroyer Division Yubari and the ships witl~ her while Bat- !29 consisting of the Huyate, (Xte, and tery L engaged the other enemy ships either the Mutszdi or Mochizuki)’7 within range of Wilkes Island. Battery headed directly for shore and opened fire. A’s first salvo went over the ,Japallese flag- At about 4,000 yards from the island they ship, and Lieutenant %rnin~~er ordered executed a left (westward) turn, and the the range. dropped 500 yards. This fire li?cryate lecl them in a run close along the from the beach caused the cruiser to veer shore. At that point Battery L opened away on a zig zag course, and to concen- fire. At 0652, just after the third two- trate her fire on the Battery A guns. Her gun salvo, the Hayate erupted in a violent shots straddled the Marine positions ils she explosion, and as the smoke and sprccy pulled away rapidly. Barninger adjusted (Irifted clear, the gunners on Wilkes could as best he could for the evasive tactics of see that she had broken in two and was the ,Japanese ship, ancl his guns soon sinking rapidly. Within two minutes, at scored two hits. Both shells entered the 0652, she had disappeared from sight.” cruiser at the waterline amidships on her This prompted such spontaneous celebra- port side, and the ship belcllecl steam and tions in the Battery L positions that a smoke as she slackened speed. Two more T’eteran noncommissioned officer had to re- shells then caught her slightly :aft of these mind the gun crews that other targets re- first wounds, and she turned to starboard mained. to hide in her own smoke. A destroyer Fire then shifted to O;te, next in line then attempted to lay smoke between the behind the Hayate. This destroyer was troubled cruiser and the shore battery, but now so close to shore that, Major Devereux it was chased away by a lucky hit from l~ad difficulty restraining his .30 caliber a shell aimed at the cruiser. The Yubari machine gun crews from firing at her. A continued to fire at Peacock Point until 5-inch gun scored one hit before the om her 6-inch guns could no longer reach the shore wind carriecl smoke in front. of the island. Then, listing to port, she limped target. With this concealment, the de- smoking over the horizon.4fi stroyers turned to seaward away from Meanwhile Battery I. had opened up Battery L. Marines fired several more from Wilkes on the three destroyers, two salvos into the smoke, but they could not spot the splashes. Some observers on vated by the long dispersion pattern characteris- tic of these flat trajectory naval weapons. Wilkes thought they saw the Oite transfer a The Btry A conm)amter,whose conunentsare the source of this account of action against ~dnl “ Wake Attack. Kajioka’s flagship,believes that his guns scored ‘SPlatt, op cit., 3. The Ha@e thus was the two more hits on the cruiser before she got out of first .Japanese surface craft sunk during the war range. Barninger, 45. by C. S. naval forces. THE EA-EMY STRIKES 119 survivors and sink, but reliable enemy rec- command post, and put. C~LmTwo out. of ords indicate only that she sustained action with a {Iisabled recoil cylinder. damage.4g Lieutenant. JVoodrow W. Kessler, the bat- Battery IJ now shifted fire to the trans- tery conmlander, continued his duel with porw Kongo .V~ru and Kon~yu .Uuru only one gun, and used personnel from then steaming approximately 10,000 yards GLm Two to help keep up the fire.. Ten south of Wilkes. One shell hit the lead- rounds lilter a shell caught the Ya.yoi in ing tmnsport., and this ship LLISOturned to her stern :Lnd set, her afire. Kessler then seaward ancl retired behind a smoke shifted his fire to tl~e second ship which screen which probably was provided by was maneuvering to lay a smoke screen the two fleeing destroyers, Their course for the il]jured Y<~yoi. Under this con- wtrried them past the transport area. By cealment all three destroyers reversed this time civilians on Wilkes had joined course and retired southward out of the de.fensive eff ort.s as volunteer ammuni- range. tion handlers, and the battery next en- The Japanese force was now in full gaged a cruiser steaming northward 91000 retirement. .kt 0700 Admiral Kaj ioka or- yards off the west end of the island. This dered iL withdrawal to Kwajalein. Bad was either the Tenryu or the Tatsuta; but weather and ~cc~lrate Marine fire had whatever her identity, she hurried away completely wrecked the admiral’s plan to trailing smoke after one shell struck her take Wake with 450 men. But command- near the stern. The departure of this ers on the atoll took immediate precau- ship, at about. 0710, removed the last tar- tions to guard against a dangerous relax- get from the range of Battery L. In a ation of defenses. They reasoned that the busy hour, this unit had fired 120 5-inch ,Japunese might have carrier aircraft shells which sank one destroyer, damaged ready to continue the attack which the another, and inflicted damage to a trans- ships had started. and Major Putnam was port and a light cruiser. ~wo Marines already aloft with (Taptains Elrod, Freu- had sustained slight wounds. ler, and Tharin to reconnoiter the area Meanwhile the other half of the ,Jap- from 12,000 feet. Wl~en this search lo- ,anese destroyer force (D e.~troyer Division cated no enen~y aircraft or carriers, the .~(~) ran into its share of trouble :LS it Marine. pilots turned southwest to over- moved west of Kuku Point on a north- tnke the retiring ,Japanese task force. westerly course. Led (probably) by the The fliers found the enemy little. more Yuyoi, these three destroyers at 0600 than an hour’s snil from Wake.l and they steamed within rat~ge of Battery II’s swept down to attack. 5-inch gLLns on Peale. The Marines Captains E] rod and Tharin strafed and opened fire on t.l~e leading ship, and the bombed two ships (probably the cruisers .Japanese promptly raked Peale with re- Ten~yu and Tatsuta ) ,50 and got their turn salvos whic]l scored hits in and about tile positions of Batteries B and D. This planes damaged by heavy antiaircraft tire shelling destroyed communications be- ‘0 The VMP pilots were not sure about the tween Battery R’s gLms and the battery identification of their targets, but a consultation of all available sources of information seems to 4’ Enemy Notes, 1. substilntiate this ;~ccount of the action, 448777 O—5~9 120 PEARL HARBOR TO GU.4DALCAXAL from these two targets. But the Terwyu the destroyer Hayate was sunk by shore suffered bomb damage to her torpedo bat- batteries and the destroyer Kisamgi by tery, and the Tatsuta.’.~topside radio shack the VMF-211 bombs. Two more destroy- was hit. (Tnptain Freuler landed a 100- ers, the Oite and tl~e Yuyoi, were damaged pound bomb on the stern of the transport as was a destroyer-transport. The trans- Kongo Maru, and saw his target flare up port Kongo M aru was bombed and set with gasoline fires. After dropping their afire. .M1 three cruisers ( Yubati, Tatsuta, two bombs each, the fliers hurried back to and Tenryu ) received injuries from air or Wake to rearm. surface attacks.52 Two fresh pilots, I~ieutenant Kinney ,Japanese personnel casualties can be and Technical Sergeant Hamilton, substi- fixed only approximately. Assuming that tuted for two of the original fliers during the two sunken destroyers were manned one of these shuttles between the atoll and by crews comparable to those required by the enemy ships, and the air attacks con- similar U. S. types (about 250 officers and tinued for a total of 10 sorties during men per ship ), it would be logical to claim which the Marines dropped 20 bombs and approximately 500 for these two losses fired approximately 20,000 rounds of .50 with the fair assumption that few if any caliber ammunition.51 The destroyer survivors escaped in either case. Person- Kisara.gi, probably hit earlier by Captain nel losses on the other seven ships dam- Elrod, finally blew L~pjust as Lieutenant aged are not known, but it must be Kinney nosed over at her in an attack of assumed that casualties did occur .53 his own. One of the destroyer-transports a1so sustained damage from the air 5’The widely-credited claim, originated in strikes. good faith, that dive-bombing attacks sanli a This action was not all “ducks in a bar- cruiser off ~J’akecannot be supported. Ml three rel’> to the Marine fliers, and any damage cruisers returned to 11’akeless than two w+eeks later to support the tinal attack on the atoll. to the scanty Wake air force was a serious The officially established occasion of the loss one. ,Japanese flak cut. the main fuel line of each is as follows : ~uhari {Philippine Sea, in F.lrod~s (3rumman, and although he 27 Apr4A) : Tenr~u ( Bismarck Sea, by submarine managed to get back to the atoll he demol- action, 18Dec42) ; Ta.tsuta (off Yokohama, by ished his plane in a crash landing amid submarine action, 13May44). As indicated in the boulders along Wake’s south beach. the text the violent explosion and sinking of the Kisaragi, combined with recognition inexperi- Antiaircraft fire pierced the oil cooler and ence, probably accounts for the cruiser claimed. one cylinder in Captain Freuler~s plane. OiW StatisticalSee, “Naval Losses of All Na- He returned to the field safely, but he fin- tions,” (located at NHD ), 5Feb46, Table VIII. ished his approach on a glide with a dead = In a letter dated 22Nov51, Capt Tashikazu engine that could never be repaired. Ohmae, leading Japanese naval student of WJ3T II, puts Japanese losses for this phase of the Accurate assessment of enemy losses in Wake operation at “nearly .500,” Ohmae letter this first landing attempt is not possible. cited in Robert Sherrod, History of Marine ,Japanese records indicate, however, that Carps Aviation in World War 11 (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952 ), 41, hereinafter “CO VMF-211 Rept to CO MAG-21, 20Dec41. cited as Marine Air History. CHAPTER 3 Wake Under Siege ] ,Scarcely had tile VMF-211 planes re- gan this displacement after dark. Sand- turned to the field before it was time for bags nt the old position could not be re- Lieutenants Davidson and Kinney to fly claimed, and cement bags and empty arr- the only two serviceable fighters on the munition boxes had to serve this purpose early midday combat patrol. It was at the Ilew locztion. The work was then nearly 1000, almost time for the finished by 04L5, and Battery D again .Japanese bombers to arrive, and the was ready to fire. Marines soon spotted 30 of these enemy On 12 December the Japanese came to planes coming out of the northwest work early. Two four-engine Kawanishi at 18,000 feet. Davidson downed two of patrol bombers arrived from Majuro at these aircraft, and Kinney turned a third about 0500 and bombed and strafed Wake homeward with smoke trailing behind it. and Peale Islands. Bombs hit the airstrip Then the fliers pulled away as the enemy but caused little damage. Captain Tharin, formation entered tile range of tile Wake v-ho had just taken off on the morning guns . reconnaissance patrol, intercepted one of This antiaircraft fire splashed one the big flying boats and shot it down. bomber in the water off Wilkes and After this raid the It’ake defenders Went damaged three others. Bombs hit close to on with their work. Reach defenses were Battery I) on Peale, and others exploded improved on l~illtes, and the ordnance of- on Wake. There were no Marine casual- ticer, Gunner ~~arold C. ~orth, serviced ties, and damage was slight, but the pat- Battery L’s battered 5-inch guns. At the tern of the attack convinced I)evereux that ai rfielcl Lieutenant Kinney managed to the Japanese had spotted the position of patch LIp one of T7X1F–%21’S cripples, and Battery D. As soon as the attack el~ded this broug-ht the stren@h of the Tvake air he ordered this unit to displace from the force up to three planes. Such work con- neck of Toki Point to tile southeastern tinued for the remainder of the day. To end of Peale.z Marines and civilians be- the surprise of everyone on the atoll, the ‘ L’nless otherwise noted the material in ~ha~) peated twice in the next 20 minutes. The sig- 3 is derived from L)crereN.r Rcpt;P/(tnot>t Rcgt; nificance of these signals has not been estab- ( oficer’s Nmnf, ) Repts. esl)ecially lstI,t ,1. F. A“intzey hk’pt, Major IV, L. ,T. ,?uylcr Rept,and lished. Japanese submarines were operating in LtCol B. D. God bol 121 122 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GUADALCAN.4L enemy did not arrive for the usual noon the sun behind him. He strafed the Jap- raid.3 anese boat with his .5o caliber guns, and This freedom from attack was a wel- then dropped his two bombs as he pulled come and profitable interlude for the gzr- out of his glide. Seither bomb hit., but risen. Captain Freuler,wh ohadbeenat- Kliewer estimnted that they exploded tempting since the opening of the war to within fifteen feet of the target. Bomb devise some means of employing welder’s fragments punctured his wings and tail oxygen to augment the dwindling supply as he made his low pull-out, and while he for the fighter pilots, finally managed, at climbed to cruising altitude he saw the great personal hazard, to transfer t,l~egas enemy craft submerge in the midst of a from commercial cylinders to the fliers’ large oil slick.’ oxygen bottles. Without this new supply After their various activities on 12 De- the pilots could not have flown many more cember, the atoll defenders ended the day high altitude missions. with a solemn ceremony. A large grave Another important experiment failed. had been dug approximately 100 yards Marines tried to fashion a workable air- southwest of the Marine aid station, and in craft sound locator out of lumber. It was this the dead received a common burial “a crude pyramidal box with four un- while a lay preacher from the contractors curved plywood sides,” by Major Deve- crew read simple prayers. reux’s description. It was too crude to Next, dn~7the ,Japanese did not bother be of any value; it served only to magnify Wake at, all, and Marine officers thought the roar of the surf. it possible that Kliewer’s attack on the That evening IJieutenants Kinney and enemy submarine lmd brought them this Kliewer and Technical Sergeant Hamilton day of freedom. The. til~y atoll, fre- readied Wake’s three planes for the final q(lelltly concealed by clouds, was a diffi- patrol of the day. Kliewer drew a plane that was always difficult to start, 4 and his ‘ The fate of this submarine is not kno\~7n. takeoff was delayed for nearly fifteen Enemy records are not clear. But after the fall of l~>ake, Kinney and other pilots were ques- minutes. While he was climbing to over- tioned by a Japanese officer who asked them if take the other fliers he spotted an enemy they knew anything about a Japanese submarine submarine on. tl~e surface some 25 miles that had disappeared in the vicinity of the atoll. southwest of the atoll. He climbed to This led Kliewer to believe that wmcussion from his bombs had finished off the submarine. The 10,000 feet and maneuvered to attack with Japanese list two of their submarines ( RO–66 and ROP62 ) sunk 25 miles southwest of Wake 3From 12 December until about 20 December, on 17 Dec 1941, RO–66 was lost not to enemy another day on which the enemy did not raid action but, to disaster, the Japanese said. The JVake, the recollections of surviving defenders cause of the 10SS of RO–62 is not known, and it sometimes are confused beyond any possible therefore may be assumed that there was some reconciliation. This condition is acute for the confusion as to the date. And since the Wake period of 12–14 December inclusive. Sources Marines had trouble remembering exact dates reconstructing the events of those dates arrive iu their postwar reconstruction of specific events, at few compatible accounts. This volume at- it may be that Kliewer’s bombs sank the RO– temps to draw the best possible compromise from 62 MilHistSec, SS, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Stud- these conflicts. ies in WWH No. 116, The I.JN in W’WII, Feb- ‘ Last Man off Wake Island, 120. ruary 1952 (located at OGMH ). were killetl :\lltl one wounded, :1lld n direct hmb llit in ail ;~iq)lniie Ye\-etiiielit fill- idled oti aiiotlier figllter pl:iiie, lea\-iiig tile atoll‘s a\-iat ioii niiit only one plane tliat c~ollltl fly.!’ Lieutellant Kinney, I’MF- %I l‘s engineering ofker, spriiitetl for tile revetinent where he w-as joined by Tech- iGal Sergeant TI:mlilton tint1 ,~Gtion M:tchinist’s Mate First (‘lass ,James F. Hesson, l’SS,10 his two assistants. Ik- spite tlie fire rear’ end of the plane, islletl the mbelierable feat of removing tlie unclain- aged engine fiviii tlie fuselage ;ii1d drag- ging it clear. Thwiiig his iiiori!ing patrol fliglit of 15 I)ec+eiiiher, Rlajor Putiinni sighted another shnarine southwest of Wake. ISut it ap- J>eilre served nurkings of that color on Thtcll airplanes iii Hawaii in late 1041. Pnt- i~ain‘s emniiintion of the craft cansed it to slibiiierge, Ilowe\-ei*, :incl Marines late1 took sipiticxnt notice of this -\vllell the regular bonlbing raid did not arrive tlli\t th)-. This seeniecl to :itlcl credence to the tlieory that snbiii:ii~iiies m-eye pr*oricliiig n:ivig:~tion:~l “k?illllS” for the bonlbcrs. 13nt the Kawa~iislii flying bOiltS I Four to six of these fo~lI.-niotor,e~l l)lilllt’S ciiiiie over at :lhllt 1800, xiid one civilian was killed v-lien tlie 1)lanes iii:\de il Stl’ilfillg 1’1111 illOllg tllf? :ItOll. ’ Kin t?oy I tt tc’rr-ictr, 4. ’ On this date hot rations cooked in the con- tractor’s gillley were delivered to all battery l)O- I” Ht~ss011 \YilS :I Xavy ariation instrnlllent lY’- sitions by il “ChUt*li \VilgOIl." This service (em- ~MiIYIli\II Wilt OYe’I to T’JIF-211 f1’0111 the K\‘;1T’:ll tinuecl for as long :is lwssible thereafter. It was Air Station after the first ilttZlC’l< ll;lcl l)l:yced one of Jlr. Teters’ 11lany contributions to the cle- SllCll lli\\vOC UlllOIIg the tighter S(lllildrOII’S fmse. ground 1)ersonnel. He turned out to be MI ont- ” Et,cttry Soft s. 1. StilIldiIlg general ;ir-iation Inaintemnce 11~111. 124 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL Their bombing was less etfective. They But experience had taught the atoll de- apparently tried to hit Battery D cm Peale fenders not to expect ~ rest after this day- Island, but most of the bombs fell harm- light raid was over. The flying boats had lessly into the lagoon and the others become almost as persistent as the shore- caused no damage. based bombers, and at 1745 that afternoon Meanwhile defensive \vork continued one of the Kawauisllis came down through during every daylight hour not inter- a low ceiling to strafe Battery D on Peale rupted by such bombing raids. Another Island. Poor visibility prevented the aircraft was patched up, personnel shel- Marines from returning fire, but the at- ters for all hands had been completed in tack bacl caused little damage. The plane the VMF-211 area, and at Peacock Point dropped four hea~y bombs, but these fell Bzttery A now- had two deep under- l~armlessly into the lagoon. Marines who ground shelters with rock cover three feet were keeping score—and most of them thick.” And before nightfall on 15 De- were-marked this down as Wake’s 1(M cember the garrison completed its destruc- air raid. tion of classified documents. This secur- After this attack Wake had an uneasy ity work began on 8 December when the night. It was black with a heavy drizzle, Commandant of the 14th Naval District and maybe. this put sentinels on edge just ordered Commander Cunningham to de- enough to cause them to “see things’’-al- stroy reserve codes and ciphers at the hTa- though no one could blame them for this. val Air Stationllz but codes remained in- At any rate lookouts on R7ilkes passed an tact in the VMF-211 area. Now Major alarm at (E200 tl)at they had sighted 12 Rayler and Captain Tharin shredded ships, and everybody fell out for general these classified papers into au oil drum quarters. Nothing came of this alarm and and burned them in a gasoline fire.” postwar ,Japanese and IT. S. records im On the l(lth tlie ,Japanese made anot]ler ciicate that there were no snips nt all daylight raid. Twenty-three bombers around Wake that night. from Roi came out. of the east at 18,000 At 0600 on 17 I)ecember I,ieutenant feet in an attempt to bomb Peale Island I Wake, however, and the defenders con- .it 105012’7 bombers from Roi came in sidered its activity ominolls. It lv!lS al- from the northwest at about 18,000 feet. most directly overhead at about 25,000 feet They worked over the VNIF–211 area when first sighted. Well beyond antiair- south of the airstrip, finished off the Ma- craft or fighter range, it flew northwwt rines’ messhall and tentage at ~amp Onel along the axis of the atoll, and then turned and struck the Pan.Lir area. Batteries D south, presumably returning to Roi. De- and F, hit four of these bombers, and ob- fenders believed this to be ~ photo-recon- servers on the atoll saw one of them splash naissance flight. after its crew bailed out, over the water. Next morning the defenders continued llomh damage at Camp One was serious, their routine work, trying to add to their but elsewhere it was slight, and there were defensive installations before the bombers no casualties. were due. This was a routine now fa- December 20 dawned gloomily with miliar to them. After being cleared from heavy rain, and ceilings viere low and visi- morning general quarters, the men went bility poor all day. This wide weather about their work until the midday raid front apparently dissuaded the Japanese sent them to gun positions or to cover. from attempting their usual noon visit, After that raid was over, the men cleaned but it did not stop a U. S. Navy’ PBY up after the bombs or went ahead with which arrived that day and provided ~~~ake with its first physical contact with their other duties. Then late in the after- the friendly outer world since the start of noon they had to take time out to deal the war. This plane landed in the lagoon with the flying boats. At night they could at 1530 to deliver detailed information usually sleep when they were not on sentry about the p] tinned relief and reinforce- duty, or standing some other type of ment of the atoll. These reports coll- vwtch. Following this pattern, crew tained good news for nearly everyone. n~embers of the various batteries had com- ~~11 civilians except. high-priority workers pleted their sturdy emplacements, and were to be evacuated. fl Marine fighter everybody had contributed to the con- squadron (VhlF-221 ) would ff y in to re- struction of primary and alternate posi- inforce VMF-211j which was aglin down tions for beach defense. They had built to a single plane. And the units from the more beach positions than they could pos- Ath Defense Battalion would arrive on the sibly man, but many of these were to be T’angier to reinforce the weakened detach- manned only under certain conditions.’O ment of the 1st l)efense 13attalion. The The shortage of trained fighting men was rBY fliers had a copy of the I“ang$er’s loa(ling plan,” and this list made the ship so critical that a well coordinated ,Jap- seem like some fabulous floating Christ- anese landing attack would require them mas package that was headed for the atoll. to be everywhere at once. That night, Commander Cunningham, indicate that the memories of the survivors have Majors Devereux and Putnam, and Lieu- xhnost unanimously transposed the events of 17 and 18 December. “ (’apt J\’. S. (lmniughmu, I-SN, ltr to Capt ‘“ LtCol A. A, Poindexter reply to Hist Sec. S. E. Morison, USNR, 7Feb47 ; Mc310rrti Inter- HQMC questionnaire, 8Apr47. ricw, 2 ; (’inCI’ac 01’lan 3$41, 15Dec41. WAKE L’NDER SIEGE 12’7 tenant Commander Greey prepared re- ti ve, Platoon Sergeant, Johnalson E. ports to seucl back to Pearl IIarbor. Wright, and wounded the, range officer Major Bayler, his mission long since com- and three other Marines. pleted, would carry the papers back as he NOW there was only one firing director complied with his orders directing him to luechanisrn left. on the atoll, and it be- return from Wake biby first available Gov- longed to Battery E located in tile crotcl~ ernment air trallsl)o!>t:ltioll.” Mr. Heve- of Wake Island. But Battery E had no nor, the Bureau of the Budget oflicial who height finder, although Battery I) still had had missed the Philippine Vlipper on 8 one of these. T]lus tile two ;l-incl~ batteries December, i~lso planned to leave on the had only enough fire control equipment P13Y, but, someone pointed out that he for one battery. Because of Battery E’s could not travel in a Naval aircraft, with- more desirable location, and because. it had out parachute and Mae West, neither of escaped damage since its move to this spot, which w-as available. So Mr. Ilevenor Major Devereux decided to maintain it as missed another plane. his primary antiaircraft defense of the At 0700 next morning, 21 December, the atoll. Thus by taking over Battery D’s PRY departe~l. Within less than two height, finder, certain other fire control hours, at 0850, 29 ,Tapauese Navy attlck gear, one gu]], ancl the necessary personnel, bombers, covered by 18 fighters, lashed Battery E became a fully manned and ful- clown at Wake through the overcast and ly equipped four-gun battery. Two other bonlbed and strafed all battery positions. Battery D gul)s ~vere shifted to a new po- These were planes from (7urrier Division 2 sition on Peale Island where they could (Soryu and Hi,yu), called in by the ,Japa- assume beach-defense missions, and the nese to help soften Wake>s unexpected fourth gun remzined at the original bat- toughness.” Due to the low ceiling, the tery position. Ihunmy guns also were attack was consummated before the 3-inch mounted there to create the, impressio~l batteries could get into action, but the .50 that the battery was still intact. As a fur- caliber antiaircraft machine guns em ther measure of deception, Battery F on gaged the enemy. The attack caused little Wilkes, also reduced to two guns, would damage, but its implications were ominous. open fire by local control methods whene- Only three hours later, 38 of the shore- ver air raids occurred. Battery D was based By 22 December VMF-211 again had tire from the ,Japanese plane wounded the two airplanes capable of flight, and C’ap- Marine pilot in the back and shoulder. tain Freuler and T~ieutenant Davidson Freuler pushed his plane over into a steep took them up for morningpatrol. David- dive, managed to shake off l?is pursuer, and son had been out nlmost an hour and was dragged the shattered, scorched F4F into covering the northern approaches to Wake the field for a crash landing. In the words at 12,000 feet when he spotted enemy of Lieutenant Kinney> whose shoestring planes coming in. He called Captain maintenance had kept VMF-211 flying for Freu]er, who YVaSthen south of the atoll, fifteen days: ‘(This left us with no air- and the Marines began independent ap- planes.>’ In spite of the Marine squad- proaches to close with the enemy. The ron-s Iast blaze of heroism, the enemy dive Japanese flight consisted of 33 carrier at- bombers came on in to strike at all battery tack planes (dive bombers) escorted by six positions. But the atoll pilots were not fighters, all from the Soryu-Hiryu carrier much impressed by the work of the Jap- division. The fighters were at 12,000 feet anese naval aviators. ‘(We who have been and the dive bombers at 18,000. The fight- used to seeing only the propeller hub are a ers were of a sleek new type, the first Zeros bit taken aback by their shallow dives and to be encountered over Wake. their inaccuracies,” Lieutenant Barninger Captain Freuler dived his patched-up said. The Japanese bombs did not cause F4F–3 into a division of six fighters, much damage, and there were no casual- downing one and scattering the others. ties on the ground. Coming around quickly in a difficult op- But now that, carrier air was being posite approach, Freuler attacked another brought to bear against them, the Wake of the Zeros and saw it explode only 50 defenders concluded that it would not be feet below. This explosion temporarily long before the Japanese came back with engnlfed the (2rumrnan in a cloud of a bigger task force and a better anlphib- thunes and flying fragments. The Marine ious plan. Ground defense preparations plnne was badly scorched, its manifold- intensified that afternoon. VMF-21 1’s pressure dropped, and the, controls reacted effect ives—less than 20 officers and mell— sluggishly. As tl~e captain turned to look were added to the defense battalion as for the atoll, he saw I,ieutenant Davidson infantry, Peale Island completed its beach attacking the dive bombers. The lieuten- defense emplacements, and Captain Platt ant was diving at a retreating bomber, but drew up final detailed orders for his de- a Zero was behind him closing on the Ma- fense of Wilkes. Platt ordered Marine rine Grumman. This enemy fighter prob- Gunner McKinstry, who commanded Bat- ably downed Davidson, because the lieu- tery F, to tire on enemy landing boats as tenant did not return to the atoll. long as his guns could depress sufficiently, Meanwhile a. Zero got on Freuler’s tail and then to fall back to designated posi- while he took in Davidson’s plight, and tions from which his men would fight as riflemen. There these men from the 3-inch lnnd, some of tl]ese men were slated to be battery would be joined by the personnel ewwnnted to Honolulu : however, the entire gun crew offered to stay on the island and ~er~e ~vith from Battery L. After that it would be the battery. ” LtCol B. I). GOdb07d Rept, 1~, an infantry fight. “.All that can be done WAKE VSDER SIEGE 129 is being done,” notecl one of the Wake with the .Vaizaru Special Landing Force ofhcers. “bl~t there is so little to do with.””~ i~um ber ThIo; and the transport Tenyo Jlwu. and the float-plane tender Kiyo- K,VEMY PLANS .4ND .4 PTZOiVS. li((.~()~ also joined the force. Troop re- 11–21 DEOl?iJIBF.R 25 ]learsals began on 15 December, but Ad- miral Inouye still was not, convinced that Wake defenders were correct in assum- l~is force was large enough, and he asked ing that the Japanese soon would be back the Commander in Chief of the Combined with a stronger effort than the one which Fleet to send him more ships. lMd failed for Rear Admiral Kajioka. The Illouye’s sllperior officer, llo\v appar- adnliral began to mull a few plans for ently convinced that Wake would be hard his next It tack while he withdrew toward to crack, sent to the Fourth F’?eet admiral Kwajalein on 11 December, and he had the fleet carriers ii’oryu and Hiwu of Crar- l]is statf in conference on 13 December tiflr Z)ivi.vion ~, heavy cruisers Aobo? Fu- while his battered fleet still was anchoring tl[taka, Kako, and Kimugasw of (7rw%er ill that Marshall atoll. Rear Admiral I)ivision 61, heavy cruisers Tone and OhW- Kuniori Marushige, who had commanded urna of Crukr DiL*Lw?on 8, and a task (’~wit~er Division 18 (including the light force screen of six destroy ers.” The com- cruisers ~~Ltwta and ~erwyu as well as mander of the Combined Fleet assigned tile flagship J’ubari), analyzed the causes over-a]l command of this Wake task force of failure as follows: The landing attempt to Rear .$cbniral Koki Abe, commander of had failed, he said, because of the vigorous Cruisey” Lh’cixion 8. Rear Admiral Kaji- seacoast artillery defense, tighter oppo- oka retained his command of the amphib- sitiol~, adverse weatl~er> and because of im ious force. sutliciel~t ,Japallese f owes and means. Plans for the second attack against the But, .idmiral Kajioka was more inter- .’lmerican atoll called for more softening ested in the success of the next operation, t~p than l~rake had received previous to and so was Fowth Fleet Commander l 32 and 33) would run aground on the the island and to look out for L-. S. sur- south shore of the atoll near the airstrip, face forces. and the approximately 1,000 men of the With these final plans issuecl, the in- special naval landing force ~“ lvoLdd tl~en vasion force well rehearse], and carriers be carried to the beach in four to six lancl- Sory71jand IFiryu on their way down from ing bcrrges. T\~o of the~e woLdd land on north of Midway, the operation against Wilkes Island, two on Wake Island be- Wake w:ls re:uly to go. At 0900 on 21 tween the airstrip :uld (Uamp one, ancl the December Aclrniral Kajioka cleared Roi other two probably provided for would with t]le ships of his amp]libious force and put their troops ashore just west of Pea- lleaclecl back up toward the American-held cock Point.’” If these special landing atoll. force troops ran into serious trouble on the atoll, the naval force WOLIICIsend in 500 Z’HE RELIEF ATTEMPT, men organized from ships’ lan[] ing forces. 1,5–t?.j DKIJEMRER “ .lnd if this combined force failed to sl~b- Now the U. S. commanders taking help due the at 011 clef enc~ersj more help woulcl to Wake were in a race with Admiral be sent, by means of an tI1tinlate rcncl des- Kajioka, even if they did not know it. perate expedient. The clestroyers of the .idmiral Fletcher’s Task Force 14 sortied task force would be beached, and their f 1om Pearl Harbor in two task groups on crews would swarm nshore. ikclm irnl 15 and 16 I)cwember,32 rendezvoused Inonye W:LS determineci that this second southwest of Oahu during the afternoon attack should not f ail. o f t]lis second day, and sailed westward to- The possibility of l.~. ~. na17al surface ward Wake. Fletcher’s force was to ar- intervention w-as taken irito consideration. rive at tl~e atoll on 23 December (east This possibility liad been clkimissed duril~g ]ongitude time). There the pilots of planning for the attack of 11 I)ecember Major Verne ,J. McCaul’s VMF-221 because the ,Japanese reasoned tl~at tile woLdcl fly in from the carrier ,~m’atogc~ shock of Pearl Harbor would immobilize llmerican surface ~l~erations for some while tl~e Tangier anchored off Wilkes time. But now the tJapanese assumed that chan]lel to unload supplies, equipment, [~. S. surface opposition was probable. To and the Marines from the W Defense guard against SLICIIthreat, the four heavy Battalion.’3 After taking wounded men cruisers of fltwi.wr Di/vMon 6 WOUIC1act as a covering force east of Wake. If a “ Prin(ilml sources bearing on the Relief Ex- pedition are: CinCPac OPlan 39-41, 1.5Dec47 ; major surface action developed, Rear .&{l- Mc:Mf,rris Interview; Saratoga log; LtCol R. D. miral Abe would enter the tight with Heiul, ,Jr., “We”re Headed for Wake,” MO Ga- ~’ruiser Divisio/2 $’ and conduct the battle. wtte, .June 1943. As on the first attempt, submarines would ‘“ l)atw in this section are either west or east longitude as apI)licable to the location of events precede the invmion force to reconlmiter identified by dates. Where confusion is Imssible the type of date will be indicated. “ Wake .4ttack, 2. 33Troolm and equipment would be transported 30HistSec, HQMC interview with CM J. P. S. to the atoll on lighters, and if the !f’a??.qier were Devereux, 12 Feb47, 8, hereinafter cited as seriously damaged by enemy action she would be I)wx?reux Interview. run aground so the cargo would not be lost. WAKK: I: XI)ER SIEGE 131 and certain civilians on board, these ships to patrol around Rongela]) in the Mar- then would return to Pearl Harbor. shalls until tile relief exl)eclition reached But the advance was aggravating]y slow. Wake. (’in(xPac wanted to avoid any pos- The old fleet oiler ,yecl~e.s, in the train with sibility of one IT. S. force, conf[lsing the Tangier, could not manage more than another for tile ellemy.:’-i Three days later, 12 knots, and the fleet’s zig-zag evasive on the 21st, i]ltelligence information which tactics further slowed the rate of advance. had been arriving at Pearl Harbor indi- To the Marines and seamen in this first cated that a large force of shore-base(l westward sally of the war> the waters be- ,Japanese planes was building LIp h] the yond Oahu seemed very lonely and on~i- Mxrsl~alls, and tl}at enemy surface forces 11OUS,and there was no contact, either might be east of Wake where they could friendly or enemy, to vary the tense detect tl~e approach of Fletcher’s Task monotony of the run. Each day on the Force 14. Other reports indicated the Tangier began with general quarters and presence of ,Japanese carriers, including then lapsed into normal shipboard routine. possibly the ,Yoryu, northwest of tile atoll. Marines received sLlch training aud in- Fletcher’s mission, now about 650 miles struction as could be fitted into this sched- east of JVake, appeared to be growing ule, and part of this educational program more hazardolls with eac]l hour. Qin~Pac included lectures by the few radar techni- ordered the carrier I.ezington. ancl other cians on board. ships of Task Force 11 over from the The few available maps and charts of sout Ileast to give Fletcher closer support .~s Wake received intense study. In antici- By 0800”on 22 Decenlber, Task Force 14 pation that Wake’s 3-inch guns might have was within 515 nliles of Wake, and .4d- to deliver direct fire on ships or ground n~iral Nlet,cher in the cruiser Astoria kept targets, improvised sights were clesi~ned Up on the news about his race by n\onitor- and constructed in the ship’s machine ing the Cin(;Pac radio nets. ominous re- shops. The oficer commanding the nKL- ports of .Japanese surface operations chine-gun detachment contrived with the around the atoll continued to filter in at ship”s force to construct special slings with Pearl Harbor, hut conditions at Wake were which his .50 caliber antiaircraft machine unchanged. Fletcher decided to refuel. gLllIs could be hoisted from ship to barges Although his destroyers still had a reason- while remaining ready to ward off possible able supply of oil, it might not be enough enemy attacks during unloading. “ The 5- if they llacl to fight. But this very act of inch seacoast men stayed in practice by fueling, which took most of the day, kept standing their share of watches on the them out of the fight. By the time the after 5-inch gun of the Tangier. Al] M:~- U. S. ships moved on toward Wake, Ad- riue antiaircraft machine guns were set up miral Kajioka was only about 50 miles and manned on the superstructure. from the atoll with his amphibious force. On 18 December CinC’Pac ordered IT. S. Fletcher had lost the race. submarines which were patrolling in the “ Paraphrased file of CinCPac dis~}atchescon- vicinity of Wake to move south out of the cerning wake relief, l)wen]her 1941. area. These boats of Task Force 7 were “ IlJic7. CHAPTER 4 The Fall of Wake’ .At Wake, 23 December began with inter- where offshore. By this time all units nlittent rain squalls, and shortly after 0100 had sent their men to general quarters, the defenders saw a succession of vivid, ir- and at (’amp one. ~Second I~ieutenant regular flashes beyond the horizon north Poindexter loaded his scanty mobile re- of Peale Island. Men on the atoll could serve unit of eight Marines 2 and four .30 hear nothing above the rain and the boom caliber machine gLms into their truck, re- of the surf, but it was obvious that the ported his actions to the command post, flashes were not signals or se:lrchlightsc and moved out, toward Peale Islancl. Butj They were too brilliant and irregular for the word from Kessler lmd convinced that. Olcl fleet-duty hands were reminded Deve~eux that if the enemy were landing, of night battle practice at sea. Was there they were not doing it on Peale Island. a naval battle, or were the ,Japanese com- He pllt a damper on the genertcl a]arm, ing back ? Tile defenders conld only a]d ordered tl~at Poindexter be inter- guess. cepted when his trnck passed t]~e com- By this time the Marines were used to mand post. He held the mobile reserve seeing lights, even though these were um there to await developments. uwml. But at 0145 came a more urgent alarm. The word over the “,J’’-line an- l~cnmced that the .Jctpanese were landing I)evelopments were not long in coming. Major I)evereux at, Toki Point on Peale. Admiral Ka j ioka’s amphibious force had alerted all units and then telephoned at last sighted the atoll’s faint outline, Lieutenant Kessler at Toki Point for ad- and the ships were reducing speed. Mo- ditional information. Tl~e Battery II ments later, in the worcls of a ,Japanese commander told Devereux that he could “combat corresponclent’> W11Owas moved see lights in the distance but, that there to poetry by this amphibious venture, The beach was no landing in progress. “The honorable., first order of ‘CHAR(+E’ positions had been manned, Kessler adclecl, was given, and tl~e daring officers ancl men, because boats were “believed” to be sonle- with white sashes, bravely went down to ‘ ~nless otherwise noted the niaterial in ~hall the surface of the sea. ” 3 4 is deri~wlfron) ~)crercur RcPt; 1’/{t)la))lKrflt: (O~cer”s name ) Repts, especially LtCol W. McC. 2This unit. along ~vith a few Marines from P2att Rcpf, lstI.t .J. .L Mc.lli. $fcr Rcpt, M(: C. FL. SU1)l)lY and a(lI1liIlistr:ltit)rl sections and 15 Xtivy 3[rKitl str?l Rcpt; Dc??rreft,r IH t 132 THE FA1,L OF WAKE 133 .ipprO~im:lte]~ 800”of the Af’i\’~~ t~oops The balal~ce of the Tdwno company pre- were distributed betlveell the tl}-o de. sunmbly would back up the other two stroyer-trans]Jorts.4 The other 200” pre- companies on Wake Island. At about the sumably were enlbi~rked on board one or time the premature landing alarm was more of the transl)orts or the float-plane sounded on the atoll, the amphibious force tender Kiyolawa, and the 500 sailors of was putting landing craft over the side. the provisional reserve force apparently The weather was giving them trouble, but were to remain at their normal duties un- at about 0200”the A’NLF troops clambered less calledto reinforce the landingeffort.’ down into these craft. “The hardships en- T’he 21aizutw Second ,Tpecial lVU ual Land- countered in lowering the landing barges ing Force, now brought to full strength were too severe even to imagine,;’ reported by reillforcenlellts from Saipallj was es- correspondent Ibushi. ‘(Now we, the hTa- sentially a ,Japanese version of the bat- val Landing Force, on the barges which talion landing team (13LT). Its three we were in, must charge into enemy ter- rifle companies had numerical design:~- ritory and carry out the final step of se- tions but were more commonly identified curing a landing point after touching the by the names of their commanders. TILLS shore. ” r the Ist (’ompany, comman(lecl by Lieu- As the landing craft pitched through tenant Kinichi (-cllida, NVWoften called tl~e breakers, the destroyer-transports tile L7C11MCLut(it. Similarly, the W and turned to make their final runs onto the Jd ~otnp~fnie(~\\ere styled respectively tile reef south of the airstrip. These vessels, Tdwno unit and the Ztaya unit. Patrol ~oath 32 and 33, mounted the reef The Uchtia and Ztoya compamks would in a smother of breakers and foam, and assault Wake Island while 100 “picked went aground near the west end of the air- men’> of the Takmo unit seized Wilkes.O strip. Two of the landing barges scraped bottom as they approached the reef near “This reporter,’” as he later said of himself, (’amp one, and still there was no sign that “ . . . TY:lS able to ha Ye the honor of taking the the atoll defenders were ~wake. But sud- first step al)on the island as a man of letters denly tracers pencilled from the beach at the cal)tnre of Jyake Island . . was so heroic Wilkes Island xnd .50 caliber slugs splat- that e~en the gods wel)t. ”’ Ha waii-.![a~ayu X(I /.- tered through the gunwales of one barge. CJ[AS, 32. ‘ One :lccount says 300 ]aen of this force \vere Then a searchlight from Wilkes flared on on the two destroy er-translwrts. At this time to silhouette the picked men of the Talca.no all SNI.F units attached to the Fourth l’leet unit landing on that island. It was then were com’entrated for the seizure of \v:ike in 0245, and the battle for Wake was on. much the same manner that 1’. S. Fleet Marine Force units would have been employed. (See Map 5, Iifap Section) 5 The exact nlunber of .Jal)anese troops who fon,ght on Wake 1]:1s not been determined. .kdm THE DEFENL3E OF hlorison” (ites Marine estimates that “at least 1,~()() tro{)l)s l:illded e:,rly ,)n the ~:+rd,j, ~~ndthat ~$7AKE ISLA,~D others came ashore after the surrender. Risin.q since 0215 Marines had been confident S//}/i)) thc I’acilic, 245. G Itaya’s male and that of his company ap- tl~at a landing against, tl~em was in prog- pears in one Japanese source as “Itatani.” Hawaii-Ma7ayu A“avOp.s, 28. ‘ Ibid. 1:34 1’lMRL HARBOR T() GUADALCANAL c-ess. l~iglltst’{}ulclbseell otkhorel~ortll above tl~e surf, and Marine Gunner Mc- of Peale Island and all along the south Kinstry opened fire with a .50 caliber ma- coasts of Wake an(l Wilkes Island. At chine gun at, a dark shape near the beach about 0230 3L~rines on Peacock Point, below. Ten minutes later Captain Platt thought they could see the out] ines of two requested permission to illuminate the barges headil~g iilong the coast towar{l the beach with his 60-inch searchlight., and airfield, but these evidently were the pa- the landing was discovered. Two barges tlolcraftl lw~dillgi llto\v:lrclt llereef. By could be seen on the beaches at Wilkes, now Major Devereux, Major Potter, his the lights also revealed the patrol craft executive officer, a radioman, and a aground off Wake. switchboard operator in the defense de- Neither of the 5–inch batteries which tachment command post were swamped by commanded the south approaches to reports of sounds, lights, and shapes. As Wake’ could bear against the landings. l~e collected this information and relayed Terrain masks likewise prevented them reports to Commander (’unningharn, from firing at Patrol Craft 3.2 and 33 on l)evereux saw that the greatest tllLX2ilt was the reef}” The only weapon larger than developing along the south coast of tile a machine gun that could engage these de- atoll, and he dispatcl)ed Lieutel)aut Poiw stroyer-transports, already beginning to dexter>s eight-man mobile reserve to de- spew OLLttheir human cargo, was the 3-inch fensive positions betlveen (’amp one and gun emplaced on the rise between the beach tile airstrip. road and VMF-2117S hard-stand parking Poindexter’s men had not left tl~e truck, area. But this gun was not manned. and the lieutenant, had then) transported Realizing the importance of this weapon, down the island and into position within Second Lieutenant Robert M. Hanna, in 15 minutes. The area into which the-y command of the antiaircraft machine guns movecl was just west of the road junction about the field, gathered a scratch crew ]lear the west end of the airstrip. There consisting of one Marine, Corporal Ralph this small force commanded the south J. Holewinski, and three civilians” and shore roacl as well as the critical beach closer to the fact. Excepting the variances con- section south of the field. The ]ieutenant c,ernin~events during these dark early hours of reported that this area was being bom- the battle, ~larine accounts agree generally as to barded when he reached his defensive po- events after daylight. sitions, but there were no signs of a ‘ Btry.4 (Peacock Point) andBtry L (Wilkes). landing. ‘0One of the advantagesof the Navy 5“/51 for seacoast defense missions was that it had 360° But at 02358 defenders on Wilkes re- train, as contrasted to the limited traverse of ported that they coLIld near barge engines the l~~mmfield guns used bY the Army for this role. In this instance, however, terrain masks, 8 The Japanese list (MM as the official time of slight thongh they were, prevented either A or their landing, Statements of Marine officers do L from bearing. not. agree. Some say the landings came at about “ lstLt R. M. Ha?ma Rept to CO, 1st DefBnDet, 0130, while others place the time almost an hour lloct45, 2. Of these three civilians, two (Paul later. In his official report, Devereux gives Gay and Bob Bryan ) were subsequently killed the time of landing on Wilkes at 0215, but his in action, and the third, Eric Lehtola, was published narrative says 0120. Yet a subsequent wounded. Hanna states that they fought with study convinced him that the time of 0235 was “exceptional gallantry.” 136 PEARL HARBOR TO GTJADALCANT.4L raced to this gun. Major I)evereux also machine guns were in the Peacock Point realized the critical importance of holding area. At the battery positions gun crews this area, and he ordered Major Putnam stood by their weapons and manned such and the 20 men of VMF-211 to form an lo~i~l perimeter defenses as their meager infantry support. between the 3–inch gun strength permitted. and the enemy landing. Lieutenant Hanna and his jury-rigged All defense units on Wake Island were crew quickly got the 3–inch gun into ac- disposed to meet the enemy. Hanna and tion. They laid the weapon by estimate the VMF-211 “infantrymen” held the and “Kentucky windage”;’ and fired their left flank south of the airfield parking area. first round at Patro7 ~~r(~~t J3 wllicb was To the west, and squarely in the path of less than 500” yarcls away. The shell hit the enemy’s initial rush toward the west the bridge of the destroyer-transport, and end of the field, were Second Lieutenant wounded the captain, the navigator, and Kliewer and three aviation Marines. They five seamen. Two other sailors were killed. guarded one of the generators which was While men of the Uchida and Ztaya units wired to detonate the mines buried in the swarmed off the ship, Hanna and his crew airstrip. At the road junction farther fired 14 more rounds into the superstruc- west Poindexter’s mobile reserve was ture and hull of the craft. Finally it burst already firing its four machine guns east- into flames, illuminating the landing area. ward along the beach at Patrol Craft 32 “The scene was too beautiful to be a battle- ti’here the enemy troops had revealed them- field,” reported a ,Japanese observer on selves by injudicious use of pyrotechnic board the cruiser Yubari.’4 signals. At Camp One four .30 caliber Flames from this ship lighted Patrol machine guns were manned for beach de- Cr[(~t 32 farther west along the beach, and fense by Battery 1’s gun shed crew and the Hanna shifted his fire to this vessel. Naval Air Station sailors who had been Three-inch shells hulled this transport-de- serving as lookouts on the water tank OP. stroyer, and crews from both these ships Behind this general line, two .50 caliber joined the SNLF’ troops landing on the machine-gun sections (each of two guns) island. This added possibly 100 extra men to the battle ashore, and Hanna>s gun guarded the airstrip. One section held already was seriously threatened by the the west end of the. strip near Lieutenant, l~chida unit which had made the beach Kliewer’s generator, and the other section assault. Major Putnam’s aviators fought was located on the east end of the strip.lz ofl these early attempts to silence the 3-inch These two sections could command the gun, but the ,Japanese continued to attack. length of the field, and could partially in- Alternating between creeping infiltration terdict movement across the field. other tactics and screaming rushes, the Vchida “ ‘These two sections had been sited to provide troops drove the Marines back on each side antiaircraft fire as well as final protective fire along the airstrip. This conformed with defense ‘3 These 3-inch Army antiaircraft guns were battalion practice, but the light of hindsight equipped only for indirect fire at aerial targets, prompted Devereux to wish that he had moved and they had no sights or other fire control equip- these sections closer to the beach where they ment to facilitate direct sighting by local control. could have been tied in with the general line. ‘4 Hatcaii-Malaya Na.vOp8, 33. THE FAI.1, OF WAKE 137 of the gun until the defenders were in a debarkiltiou commenced. The explosion position whic]l T)evere(lx later described inflicted llexvy cas~m]ties, hut some 7’5 to as “a box-shaped tiling. ” Here they con- 100 enemy splashed ashore and entered the tinued to hold. lmderbrush east of (’amp One. This heavy But farther west .Japanese troops had gro~vth llortll of t}le ro:~d soon bec:~nle :~ reached the south shore road between the sort of no man’s 1and into which the ,Jap:~- mine field generator and I,ieutenant Poim nese continued to infiltrate and expand dexter% small mobile reserve, and by the their beachhead. light from the burning patrol craft l?oin- All this Poindexter managed to report dexter could see these enemy cross the road back to Major Devereux in a final message and disappear into the brusl~ beyond. from Camp One before wire communica- The lieutenant was directing machine- tion was lost. But shortly after this a gun fire into this brush area when he panicky civilian who had managed to pick hem-d other firing from the direction of his way through the brush from Camp One Camp One. He left Gunnery Sergeant to Devereux’s command post brought in T. Q. Wade in charge of the reserve force reports-t ota]l y untrue-that Camp One and headed toward the camp. There he was being overrun and that he had seen found that two large landing craft had ,Japanese troops bayoneting the machine grounded on the reef some 30 yards off- gunners of the mobile reserve. shore southeast of the camp.’s Four ma- The loss of communications was not chine gLms from Camp One fired at the localized at Camp One. Devereux’s com- barges, but the rounds ricocheted off. This mand post had lost contact with Lieuten- fire evidently discouraged the craft from ant, Hanna, the VMF-211 infantrymen, attempting a landing at this point, how- the CP of the .50 caliber machine-gun batt- ever, because they backed off the reef and ery near the airstrip, and Battery A at nosed about as if seeking a better site. Peaccwk Point. The tactical line to While these, two boats floundered about Wilkes Island also went out at this time, in the surf, Lieutenant Poindexter formed but the “J’’-line, which lay north of the two teams of grenadiers to move down to airfield, still linked the defense battalion the water;s edge and 10b hand grenades CP with that of Captain Platt on Wilkes. into the barges. One team consisted of Nobody knows exactly what caused this himself and Boatswain’s Mate First (Yaw communications failure, but the nature of ,James E. Barnes, while the other consisted lhe trouble suggests that it might have of Mess Sergeant Gerald Cam, and a civil- been caused by a single break. The loca- ian, R. R. Rutledge, who had served as an tion of this major break, if there was one, Army officer in France during lf70rld must have been near the battalion com- War I. The machine guns, suspended fire, mand post where lines were close together. and the grenadiers attacked. By this But all Wrake survivors hold the opinion time the ,Japanese had 1anded a short dis- that the Japanese cut the lines; and they tance farther east, and Boatswain’s Mate point out that the Wilkes “J’’-line did not Barnes managed to throw at least one go out until some time after this failure grenade inside a barge just as the enemy of the line south of the field. Thus de- “ Lewis. fenders believe that the lines were being 138 PEARL HAREMIR TO GUADALCANAL cut as the enemy attack progressed in- one of the civilians, and Major Devereux land. Devereux tried tocontncthisN Take directecl them toward Hanna’s position. Island positions by radio, but this inter- By this time the Japanese had made at island net, never had been reliable, and the least two penetrations through the Marine sets characteristically failed to function “line” along the south eclge. of Wake Is- that morning. ‘I’here were no comn~uni- land, and it is possible that the enemy was cations personnel in the command post to also landing inside the lagoon in rubber trouble-shoot lines, ‘G and for the renmin- boats. Several defenders speak of seeing der of the battle Del’ereux had no com- red flares rising from within the lagoon, munications with his defensive line along and after the surrender Marine working Wake’s south coast. parties found rubber boats on these in- It was now obvious to De~ereux at his terior beaches. If these landings were “blzcked-out” CP that fights were in prog- taking place, it is probable that they oc- ress all along the west leg of Wake Is- curred on the north beaches of ~~TakeIs- land, and that he must sacrifice a defensive land’s west leg.” From such sites the men unit, from some other area to reinforce his landing in rubber boats could join up with efl’ort in the critical zone. Lieutenant those landing on the south beaches. Lewis’ Battery E in the crotch of Wake Captain (lodbold on Peale Island was Island could not be disbanded. It was the one of the defenders who saw these red only completely equipped and up-to- flares inside the lagoon, and he lmd Bat- strength 17 antiaircraft, battery on the tery B at Toki Point send a two-man atoll. Battery B’s 5-inch guns’ on Peale patrol down the interior coast of that Island also should remain manned for pos- island to investigate. Godbold then sent sible missions a~~inst enemy ships, But a three-nian patrol from his own battery down the outer coast of Peale. These two Captain Goclbold’s Battery D might be patrols met at the southeast end of the used as infantry. This unit had two 3- island without encountering any enemy. inch guns, but no fire control equipment; The captain then established a three-man md Peale Island did not appear to be outpost to cover the bridge between Peale threatened. Two officers and some 40 men and Wuke Islands. from this battery became the atoll reserve, ~l~dat 0300 Major Devereux ordered God- n Although Japanese sources do not mention such interior landings the evidence to support bold to send one gun section (about nine them is generally convincing. The rubber boats men) from this reserve force to the aid did not enter the lagoon through the channel be- of Hanna% untrained crew. Corporal t\yeeIl ]Vilkes and JVake Island, beeause this Leon Graves brought these men around uarrow channel was covered throughout the bat- tle. Devereux surmises that the boats entered from Peale Island in a truck driven by the lagoon at the open end of the atoll between Kuku and Toki Points. Such landings would ‘e ~lSgt R, 31. .Junereply to Hk+tSw, HQNIc’, explain, without necessarily ruling out infiltra- questionnaire, 11}1ar47,2. tion, the early presence of individual Japanese “ “Up-to-strength” was a relative term on at various points along the lagoon shore. One ~’ake. The 1941 tables of organization allowecl Japanese source does mention that red rocket such batteries two officers and 75 enlisted men. flares were to be used as a signal that “We have .lt this time Battery E had two officers and succeeded in landing. ” Huwaii-,Vala~/u NarOps, about 50 men. .5>,‘.’, ‘rHE FAr,rJ OF JY.lKE 139 Bui interior landi Ilgs or 110, tile Wake however, by enemy nmcl~ine-gun a]~d (Iefendel’s lu~d tl~eir lMnds full. ,Japalwse s]ll:~ll-i~~ms tire which killed one Marine cr~~isersbegan to bombard the atoll”s main and l)illned C1O]VUthe others. zo .ifter a island at about (1330. ‘1’he landings com time (+raves witll(lrew his unit northward tinued in spite of the fact that Battery F. tow:ud tile con~]tland post where it later l~ow tiretl ail’ bllrsts over the. beaches, and l)articilmted in defensive efiorts coln- etlemy infantry colltil~ued to pless closer mallded by Major Potter. to Hanna’s ?-inch gun south of the air- ItJ is not clear what sort of an enemy strip. The VMF-211 troops still held, force Corporal (irawxs encolmtered in tile but their part ial perinlet er was being com- Peacock triangle, or how the ,Japanese got pressed tighter a]}d tighter around tile there. There are indications that a land- gun. This action was now little more ing n~lgl~t ha~~ebeen made in that area, than a battle for ~jreservation of tile with barges coming in on tile south coast weapon and tl]e ~f:lrillesillvol~red. Major between IIattery A o]) Peacock Point and l’l~tlmm’s men could l~ot check the ,Jap- tile IIann:~-TMF-211 position. Dev- anese pelletratiojl farther to the west, nor ereux said after the war that, he believed could they prevent the enen]y fronl mov- a landing took place at this point, but the ing behind them or into tl]e island tri - IIlatter never has been confirmed. ~$ ome anxle above Peacock Point. .Ind the ,Jal}- .Jalml~ese accou]lts, incllldiug those of al}ese Jvantecl to concentrate in this tri - Captain Koyama and a correspondent,” al]gle so tl~ey could launch an attack u1) mention a landil~g “near the southeast tip tl~e islal~d’s east leg. The ~IIF–211 of Wake” to overrun Battery A, which troops coldd only hope to cling to the nlust l~ave been l’el~~eulbered from the ac- slight hillock of their positiol~j and stay tiol~ of 11 I)ecen~ber-especially by men there as long as possible.l!i in the cruiser J’vbari. 13ut Captain Ko- Meallwllile (Voporal (iraves and his de- yan]a also il~sisted that tl~e ,Japanese made t:lClld gllll S(~llit(l frolll Battery 1) were only t\vo barge lal~dil~gs with a. total of trying to reach Htilllla~s 3-inch gun. four barges. .~ud these are accolmted for Devereux had tol(l thenl to detruck at the by the, landings l~ear Camp (he ZUC1at road jmlction sou)e 600 yards below tl~e lVilkes Island. l)iscoul~tillg a third barge el~d of tile strip a]ld west of Peacock Point. From there they were to go lan(lingj this force nll~st have been built through the llllderbrusll to the gun posi- up by tl~e rubber boat landings within the tion. nut tile squa(l detlllcked consi(l- lilgoon, or by wholesale infiltration behinc] tl~e position held by Putnam and Hanna. erab]y short of this jlll~ctioll—l)r~b:~bly less than 200 yarcls below the stril). Fronl But at a]]y rate, T)everellx soon learned there the men struck out throug]l tile brush from (’orpora] Graves tl}at there was an in the general directiol~ of the, H:lnl~:t- ‘“ C(J1 ])elereux suggests that some of the ~’MF-211 area. mley were SOO]lstopped, nlachine. gun fire ~vhich swel)t throuxh the I’ea- rock triangle might haye tome from friendly “ Kinncu Intrrrirw, At about this time Maj Wf3ilI)(JI]S. He points out that Marines had .30 or Putnam, already \Yf~un(le(l, told his men, “This ,fiO caliber machine gun sevtions on Yirtually the is as fur as we go. ” Six hours later, when the entire l)erimeter of the triangle. island fell, they still held. “ Capture of Tfrul:r, 11, 372. 140 I’E.\RL H.\ I{ROR TO GU.kI).\LCAN.kL euenly force in the triallg]e. And fronl along tile road, bllt tile enenly now at- there the .Tapanese thretrtened the entire tempte(l to infiltrate around tile strolls eilstel’11 rim of tile atoll. Ikttery E was point. Mc:ina]ly contartecl another n~:b now receiving light mortar and lollg-rxllge chine gun positim~ son~e 400 yal’ds to tile nlachil~e-gun tire, and Battery .~ likewise south on tile atoll’s f3ilSt shore, and these began to receive enemy mortar fire.” In two sections alternated in firing at the’ the face of this, Captain Rarninger armecl enemy. l~is range section with two .30 caliber n]:l- This .Japanese force probably was the chine gu]~s and formed an infantry mlt- Zt([ya unit. This reinforced company post line on the l~igl~ ground behind his evidently infiltrated behind the Putnam- 5-inch guns. Hannz position at the 3-inch gun while tile The enemy fire against Battery E Uchid{t co~npatiy remained near the bearll seemed to come from the thick brush o]~ to deal with that weapon which had fired tile other side of a]] inlet southwest of the on the patrol craft. The enemy at first battery position. I)irect 3-inch fire into had trollble ]ocating Mc.?Mm]ly’s gLm sec- this xrea silenced one automatic weapon, tion, bllt before daylight they were all but this dicl not seem to ease tile pressllre around the position. Mc.Lnally’s nlen con- much. Lieutenant Lewis then sent i~ tinued to ]lold, how-ever, and the corporal’s patrol of approximately 10 men under reports to I)evereux gave the major his ,Ser~eant Raymon C~ragg to investigate. only link with tile action south of tile conl- Gragg went out to tile road north of the nlancl post. airstri])l and l)atrolled to the soutl~west By 0500, a half hour before dawn, it along this lo:ld. Witllill 50 yards of tl~e was clear that the Japanese had a superior battery Gragg’s lx~trol ran ilito heavy force. firmly established on the atoll, and .Japal~ese tire wl~icll fol’ced tlw lfaril~es to that the enemy was free to infiltrate almost (leplo-y. .Inswering tile euwny fire, the at will around and between the isolated patrol held here until the surrender. positions of the defenders. At this time At about 0430 the .50 caliber nmchine- Commander Cunningham sent his mes- gwn section at tile east end of the airstrip, sage, ‘tEnemy on island issue in doubt.>’ 23 still in co~l~l~l~illic:~tioi~\vitll Devereux, re- But actually there was little doubt, al- l)orted that the .Japanese \vere attacking in though the defenders were far from ad- company strength up the road from Pe:l- mitting it at that point. The 500 defend- cock Point. ~orporal Winford .J. Mc- ers on the atoll were then outnumbered ap- ~lnally, in charge of the six MiLrilles and proximately two to one by the enemy; but what was worse., the Marines had their three civilian volunteers at this l)ositionj mission and their own atoll against them. was trying to hold the ,Jal)anese south of “1.ittle W:lke” has a vulnerable shore line tile airstrip. Fire from tl~e .50 caliber gull i~bout !21miles in length, and the defenders position had halted the enemy a(lvance had insufficient men to man even a mini- mtml of their antiaircraft and seacoast “ Rarninger’s report also slm:lks tjf tx,c:lsi(jnal guns and at the same time the beach de- fire from 4’:1 small tield piece, ” Lt (’01 C. .1. Barninflfr I<(pt.6. This mrry have been ;i 70m]]L fenses. (h Wake Island alone, nearly howitzer of the type or~rrnic to ,J’apanese infantry btrttnlicms. “ wake File. -— ... .-— THE FALL OK }\ .%KYj 141 half of the 200 defenders had to remain at This was repulsed by close-in fighting with Batteries A and E, and another 15 Ma- submachine guns and grenades, but the rines manned machine guns and search- ,Japanese came back again at dawn. This lights at Heel Point where the island’s enst time the enemy made a shouting bayonet leg crooks toward Camp Two. T1lus OnlY charge against, the Marines, but again about 85 men could oppose the enemy land- Kliewer and his men, now aided by the .50 ing force, and half of these were nmclline- caliber machine guns at the west end of gun crewmen. Marines serving as rifle- the. airstrip, managed to halt the attack. men against the enemy on Wake Island Enemy pressure against McAnally’s ma- numbered between 40 and 45. chine-gun position east of the airstrip also When Cunningham sent his message, increased during the hour before dawn. Major Putnam still held the position The Marine strong point now had been around HannaJs .ggn, but the ,Japanese now- located, and the defenders were under had these Marines surrounded. Here. the heavy xttack by small-arms fire and gren- defenders had sustained a number of cas- ades. McAnally’s gunners already had ualties, including the death of Captain broken LIp a number of enemy rushes by Elrod.z4 Camp One also continued to holding their fire until it would be most hold, and Lieutenant Poindexter had re- effective, but these 10 men could not ex- joined his small mobile reserve force near pect to hold out for long against the the road junction west of the airstrip. reinforced company opposing them. There at first dawn the Marines were taken This was clear also to Devereux at the under heavy fire from the brush off their command post, and at 0530 he directed left (north) flank. Light mortar shells lIn jor Potter, who until now’ had assisted began to fall around the gun positions, and in the command post, to assemble every one of the .30 caliber weapons was put out l~eadquarters, service, supply, or casual of action. In danger of being outflanked ~~arine in the command post a~a, includ- here, Poindexter ordered a withdrawal to ing (Xorporal Graves$ detached squad from Camp One where he would consolidate for ~~attery ~j and to form a final defensi~’e his final stand. The unit displaced by sec- line approximately 100 yards south of the tion in 150–yard bounds, and arrived at command post. This force of approxi- Camp One shortly after daybreak. There mately 40 men would take up positions Poindexter organized his defenders along astride the north-south main road. Dev- a semi-circular line facing seaward and ereux then telephoned Captain Godbold on to the southeast. In this line he had about Peale and directed him to truck his entire 40 riflemen and 10 machine guns. Rattery ~, plus the few .50 caliber gun- Lieutenant Kliewer and his three Ma- ners, to the battalion command post for rines had survived the night beside the immediate employment as infantry. With mine field generator, but a heavy Japanese these orders, the atoll’s final reserve, total- attack threatened them just before dawn. ling approximately 30 oficers and men, was committed. 24The Japanese sustained at least 62 casualties By 0600 McAnally’s position was nearly trying to take this gun position, and one of them was Lt Uchida, the company commander. surrounded and under continual in fan- 142 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GUADALCANAL try25 attack. Cnless he was to lose these Meanwhile Second Lieutenant Robert personnel, Major Devereux had no alter- W. Greeley had reached the command post native but to pull them back. This he did with the first 20 men from Battery D. shortly after 0600, when McAnally was There Major Potter, trying to piece out ordered to ~vit.hdraw northward and join and extend his sparse line to the right Major Potter’s line. (west), directed that the reinforcements be After Captain Godbold’s reserve force placed on that flank around the edge of the left Peale Island, First Lieutenant Kessler clearing originally dozed out to prepare became commander there since his Bat- for the north-south leg of the airstrip. tery B was all that remained on the island. Captain Godbold arrived with other re- In the light of dawn Kessler could see on inforcements at about 0700,27 and these Wilkes a line of .Tapanese flags across the men joined those already emplaced by center of tile island, and a large enemy Greeley. This line now turned to the right flag waving from the approximate position (north) to refuse the flank along the edge of Marine C~unner McKinstryk provi- of the clearing. Potter’s line, now con- sional 13attery F. This he reported to taining about the equivalent of a rifle Major Devereux, who could only conclude platoon, thus extended from near the that Wilkes, which had been silent since beach, across the two roads south of the about 0300~had shared the f~te which now CP, and to the airstrip clearing where it appeared imminent for Wake Island. made a northward turn. Thus a gap of Above the brush znd slight rise of approximately 450 yards existed between ground which topped the west, leg of Wake the skirmish line and the shore of the Island, Kessler could also see the super- lagoon. This gap the defenders would structure of Patrol Craft 39. observing attempt to cover by fire. that the ship appeared intact, Kessler at By daylight the atoll defenders could 0600 requested Major Devereux’s pernlis- make out the large task force which sup- sion to fire on it. Although the line of ported the landing operations. There fire and intervening partial mask 2e made were then 13 ships at various positions this hazardous, the request was approved, around the island (the four cruisers of (‘~ utlser lli~ THE -FIGHT OiV to fire into the landing area with their WILKE,T [8LAND 3-inch shells cut for muzzle-burst, but the attack came on up the beach so rapidly “At this time,” states a Japanese report, that these guns soon were unable to depress “Wilkes Island was the scene of a fierce sufficiently to engage the ,Japanese. and desperate battle. ” 30 Here at 0245 Gunner McKinstry had crossed to the Gunner McKinstry fired the first shots in 3-inch guns to direct this air-burst fire, the battle of Wake when l]e saw barges but it soon became apparent to him that approaching to land at a point just west the position could not hold. The enemy of the new channel. After this first burst continued to expand their beachhead, and from gun 10 (see Wilkes map) a Marine a strong force near Battery F was throw- searchlight flashed on to reveal the 100 ing grenades in among the Americans. men of the Z’akano unit coming throug]l The gunner removed the firing locks from the surf and onto the beach. But by tl~is the 3-inch guns, and then directed his men time the Wilkes detachment was complete- to retire to their designated infantry posi- ly disposed to repel a landing, thanks to tion on the right flank of McAlister’s line the earlier and erroneous report of a land- beyond the road. ing on Peale Island. (See Map 6) ,Tapanese tried to pursue this withdrawal, but McKinstry’s men When that false alarm sounded, Cap- drove them back. tain Platt ordered two Battery I. gun sec- McKinstry and Mc.Uister now were in tions (each about the size of a rifle squad) to positions on the lagoon side of the is- good position to protect themselves and to guard tile road to Wake Island, but there land, and pulled the, remainder of Battery was little to st.ol) the ,Japanese from mov- L personnel back to defensive positions along the road near the new channel. Ex- ing farther west and spreading out over al1 of Wilkes Island unless fire from ma- tra ammunition i~ndgrenades were issued, and the Battery F personnel were in- th ine-guns 9 and 10 could aid the main de- structed to fire against any landing for as fense line to keep the enemy bottled up long as they could, and then to pull back around the abandoned 3-inch guns. Gun 9 was already delivering flanking fire across the road to join the men of Battery IJ. Thus the Battery I. position, com- :Lgainst these ‘,Japanese, and the enemy manded by I,ieutenant Mc.klister, was advance was temporarily checked. The well prepared when the ,Japanese barges Takallo troops now turned their attacks hit the beach near that defensive site. to knock out this machine gun, but its posi- The searchlight beam 1asted for only t ion was well prepared and well camou- a minute in the face of the ,Japanese at- flaged. .~]thOLlg]l nearly surrounded, the tack, but McKinstry continued to fire at Marines on this gun continued to hold and the landing craft he could see on the beach, to repel attacks which kept up until dawn. and McAlister sent two men down toward Meanwhile (’aptain Platt, in his CP be- the beach to linrl grenades at the ,Japanese. l~i]ld the fornler I)ositions of Battery IJ, was haying tile same sort of comn3unica- ltl~enlv. fire killed one of these men and wounded the other. Battery F then began t ions trouble tl~atplagued Major Devereux 011Wake Island. By 0300 the captain had lost contact with every position except that THE FALL OF WAKE 145 / 146 J?EARL HARROR TO Gl_’.kDALC.4NAL of the beleaguered men cm (;LIu 9. From dered his line to open fire. One enemy them he learned that the enemy were bnild- was killed and the others sought cover be- ing up pressure to extend their beachhead hind a large coral rock near the beach. farther inlancl. At about WOO Captain Mc.%lister’s men continued to fire into I’latt moved out to the Gun 11 position this area to keep the .Japanese pinned near the beach, and from there he crept down while Gunner McKinstry and Pri- through the brushto a~’:lntagel~oil~texst vate First Class ~Villiam (’. Halstead of ~IL1n10. It was now about 0500, ancl worked their way out to this rock and fin- Platt decided quickly thathemust mount ished oft the rest of the patrol. a cou]lterzttack if the ,Japanese were to be Metinwhile Platt’s counterattack had prevented from staging daylight attacks surprised the other flank of the penetra- which ~vould enable them to overrun GLU19 tion, and the Japanese at that point were and spread out into the interior of the in trouble. Obviously they had expected island. no opposition from the west, and their He hurried back to Gun 10 and orderecl light machine guns had been sighted for l’latoon Sergeant Raymond L. C’oulson fire to the east against the Mc.klister-Mc- to round up the .30 caliber machine-gun Kinstry line. Platt’s attack carried the (*rews ancl searchlight personnel from Marines into the former position of Ilat- Knku Point, plus anyone else he could tery F, and the Japanese were driven back 1ay hold of, and assemble them at Gun 10 toward the beach and toward the Marine for the counterattack. In 2,5 minutes defense line by the island road. Coulson was back with the two machine- It was now daylight, ancl Mc.ilister gun crews ancl eight riflemen-about a could see this Marine attack on the far sq{md in al1. ‘1’hese men the capt aiu led side of the ,Japanese position. When his back through the underbrush toward the men finished mopping up the enemy ,Japanese. i~~oulid the rock near the beach, the lieu- ‘1’he Marines crept and crawled to with- tenant gathered 24 Marines into a skirmish in 50 yarc]s of the ,Japanese. Platt then line of his own and launched a counter- placed his two machine guns on each flank att:lck from his side of the battlefield. The of ]lis line of departure, and ordered the men of the Ya.kono [andi~z,qjorve panicked. gnlillers to fire their short bursts close to Organ ized resistance evaporaterl in front the ground so this tire wo~lld not endanger of tile two Marine attacks, and the forces the Afr.ilister and M~Kinstry line farther of Platt and McAlister soon joined. to the east. By this tinle dawn w-asbreak- .~bout 30 .Japanese fled to sl]elter around il~g, and Platt quickly drew up his skirmish tile Marine searc]digllt truck southeast of 1il]e of eight Marines. He signalled tl~e tl]e 13attery F gul}s, and there the Marines l~mclline guns to open tire, and then he led under l’latt ill](l M(:.~lister flnslled them his riflemen forward against tile 100 n)en out :I]ld killed tljenl. The T,(i’l(r{o ur?;t o~] of tile TaAano unit. l~il kes l)ad bee,) (lest royed. At almut this time 01] tile other si[le of Mc.ilister counted four officer and 90 en- the .Ja]mllese position, I,ielltenant McAl- listed bodies while his men policed up the ister Ilad ol)serl-ed il six-nlan eneluy patrol battlefield and removed the flags the Jap- ]novi)~g tolvard his 31arilles, and lle or- anese had placed in the ground to mark THE FAI,I, OF WAKE 147 their front lines. Two wounded Japanese action against the Marines suddenly were captured. The other four Japanese— ceased. if the Talcano unit actually included an Platt moved the men forward again in a even 100—were not accounted for. Ma- dispersed formation, and near the old rines found several small maps of Wake channel he saw three men advancing from in the effects of the dead Japanese, al~d the other direction. Two were obviously Marine positions were marked accurately Marines, Platt decided, but the figure in on these maps. The photographic mis the rear was a ,Japanese officer armed with sions over the atoll had obviously paid off a large sword. The captain moved for- well. ward and soon recognized Major Devereux By 0800 Captain Platt had reorgmized who told him that the island had been his Wilkes defenders, and he again tried surrendered. It was then shortly after to establish contact with Wake Island. He 1330. Platt’s force did not get a chance was able to contact the motor pool at Canlp to help in the tighting on Wake Island, but One where Poindexter’s force had nmn- it had given sL~cha good account of itself aged to hold throughout the night, but in earlier action that a Japanese officer was he cou]d not g-et through to Devereux It l)rompted later to make this estimate of the defense battalion (3P. At about noon the Wilkes fighting: “In general, that part the men on Wilkes observed Japanese land- of the operation was not successful.;’ 3’ ing boats headed for ~$rake Island and sev - ernl ships approaching toward Wilkes TliE ,vL’lL’RK:TZ)K12 .I.VD AFTER channel. Platt ordered McAllister to get Prior to moving down the road toward his 5-inch guns into action against these the Japanese, who were still receiving de- vessels, but the gun crews found that the termined small-arms fire from the few Ma- ~veapons were beyond use. The training rines south of the command post, Major mechanism on Gun 1 was wrecked, ancl the I)evereux passecl word of the surrender to Gun 2 recoil cylinder had been riddled by all nnits in communication with his com- bomb fragments. mand post. These were Batteries A and Wilkes had been under attack by the dive E on Wake Island, Battery B on Peale, bombers which had arrived over the atoll and other small detachments including at about ()’700,but sign language interroga- those at IIeel Point, and some of the .50 tion of the }vounded prisoners indicated calil)er positions on Wake Island. Com- that the enemy planned no more landings munications with Battery A had been re- against this section of the atoll. Platt de- stored ilt about daybreak. All units were cided to go find the enemy. He ordered ordered to destroy their materiel as best Ylc.klister, McKinstry, and (’oulson to they could prior to actual surrender. ro(lnd up all the men and to strike out east These instructions were carried out with all possible thoroughness. At Battery E toward the old channel. Dive bombers at~attenlpt Ivas nla(le to damage tile ~;-inch attacked this route. column as it, moved antiaircraft gLIns b-y stuffing blankets into down the island, and a destroyer movecl tl~e muzzles and then firing a round or two. in to open L~pfrom 2,000 yards. one Ma- Illen this failed to produce appreciable rine, Private First (“lass Robert I.. Ste- vens, was killed by this bonlhing, but tl~e 148 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL results, the firing locks were removed and he and Malleck walked on toward the smashed, and grenades were rolled down ,Japanese. the muzzles to explode inside and damage Near the hospital Devereux and the ser- the rifling. .411electrical fire control data geaut were halted by a Japanese rifleman receivers were smashed, electric cables wl~o motioned for them to throw down chopped up, and the battery commander tl~eir arms and helmets. Then the soldier fired twenty rounds of .45 caliber ammuni- took them to the hospital where the ,Jap- tion through the delicate optical and elec- anese already were in charge. They had tro-mechallical parts of the height finder killed one patient and wounded another and director. After completing these while capturing the hospital, and now they measures, Lieutenant Lewis assembled the had all the patients outside trussed up with men of Battery E and marched them under telephone wire. Commander (hnning- a white flag to the battalion command ]lam Arrived by truck while Devereux was post. explaining his mission to an English- At Battery A, the 5-inch firing locks speaking tJapanese officer, and the Marine were broken and buried, and all gun tele- major turned over his surrender duties to scopes smashed. The range keeper was the island commander. A “It was a difficult thing to do,” Kliewer During the advance, particularly as he reported later, “but we tore down our guns neared the airfield and retraced by day- and turned ourselves over.?’ ‘+2 light the scenes of IIis fighting during the Shortly before 1115 the surrender party, lli~ht, I,iel~tenant Poindexter counted ap- now west of the airstrip, came upon the proximately 80 enemy dead. rear of a Japanese skirmish line facing After assuring the surrender of this westward and evidently engaged in a fire force, Major Devereux led the Japanese fight against, Marines in the brush beyond toward Camp One, still held by nlachine- the west end of the strip. After some con- gun sections of Poindexter’s group. There fusion during which the .Japanese tired on the Marine prisoners watched a Japanese the. surrender group, Major Devereux climb up the water tank and cut down the passed through the lines and made contact .Irnerican flag which had been flying there with Lieutenant Poindexter. The lieu- throl~ghout the battle. tenant’s mobile reserves, in ignorance of The surrender group, followed by ap- the surrender, had retaken the ground be- proximately 30 Japanese, then crossed tween Camp One and the west end of the Wilkes channel by launch. No Marines strip during the morning’s fighting. l}~hen were to be seen when Devereux landed at Devereux came L]pon Poindexter, the 30- about 1300, and the party began walking odd Marines in this force had just com- cautiously westward. At this time the pleted a steady eastward advance from enemy destroyer began firing on the island, Camp One, fighting their way forward but this fire. was soon checked by a Jap- along the beach with the edge of the brush anese signalman who flagged the ship to to their left. ~‘+peclal“ naval landing force silence. At 1330, almost midway between troops were in the thick brush to the north, tile new and old channels on Wilkes, Major but they had not attempted to attack the Devereux saw “a few grubby, dirty men Marines. I)ivided into tlwee lo-lnan who came out of the brush with their rifles squads, Poindexter’s improvised platoon ready . . .79 These were Platt’s Marines had advanced with two squads in assault. who lmd almihilated the Z’akano landing one on the seaward side of the road and tjarty on Wilkes and now were advancing the other north of the road. The support eastward to repel what they thought was squad protected the exposecl left flank by adv:mcing in rear of tl~e left assault squad. still another landing. Thus all resistance had been silenced, and Wake now was in “ lstLt D. D. h“liewer Rept. Japanese hands. CHAPTER 5 Conclusions The defense of Wake was the first war- Lack of radar and other early-warning time operation conducted by the Marine equipment. severely handicapped Marines Corps in defense of an advanced naval during preliminary aerial bombardment, bzse. It wasalsot.h efirst combat test of and it would be difficult to overstate the the Marine defense battalion, although the seriousness of this shortage. It enabled strength of the Wake detachment was the initial ,Tapanese raid to destroy over grently reduced. The main reason for the half of VMF-211’s fighters on the ground, fall of Wake seems obvious. The enemy in and the same lack of early warning con- greatly superior strength, supported by tinued to hamper the effectiveness of those ample surface and air forces, was able to fighter planes which remained in opera- effect a lodgement on the atoll and then to tion. Thus the VMF–211 pilots never had apply his ground superiority to over- a chance to plan effective fighter intercep- whelm the dispersed defenders in detail. tion against the enemy bombers, and the Had it been possible for U. S. surface ,Japanese could proceed quite methodically forces to intervene, or for substantial re- with their program for the aerial soften- inforcements to reach Wakej the results ing of Wake. might hnve been entirely different. But This lack of early warning and the military lessons of some value still may be shortage of aircraft can be lumped to- gether as matters of air defense, and air drawn by a survey of certain specific rea- defense depends upon coordinated em- sons why the defense was handicapped. ployment of fighter aircraft, antiaircraft These factors were interacting, of course. artillery, and the essential warning sys- No single one of them can be clearly iso- ten~s. But, on Wake only the antiaircraft lated within the framework of events artillery-undermanned and partially op- which brought military defeat to the atoll, erational though it was—could be consid- ,Japanese procedure for the reduction ered f~llly and consistently effective, and and seizure of Wake, if not executed with l~obody ever expected antiaircraft weapons the skill or standards that U. S. forces alone to defend an advanced naval base later attained, was nevertheless orthodox. a~r 1.50 CONCLUSIONS 151 done until the last (lrumman was cle- the ground given up during the confused stroyed by massed enemy fighters on 22 hours of darkness. December. After that, landing oper:~- -ifter the ,Japanese had landecl in force tions against lt~ake COLIMproceed. on the south coast of Wake Island, it ap- Once tile ground combat began, the fum pears that the coast artillery and antiair- damental weakness of the defense bat- craft, missions of Batteries B and D, re- talion concept as it then existed became spectively, had become of secondary im- starkly underlined. The unit had no in- portance in light of the serious enemy fantry component to act as an effective ground threat. The military reader might mobi 1e reserve. Most garrison personnel wonder why all available personnel from were tied to weapons and battery positions, Batteries B and D, with whom Devereux and Major Devereux could muster only a was still in communication, were not early fraction of his n]anpower against the ill- in the battle brought down to the vicinity vac{ers even after enemy intentions becanle of the airfield and employed, together with apparent. On Wake Island, for example, sllch few other available Marines, as a mo- only about 85 of $200Marines were readily bile reserve to ~C)Unterattack the main Jap- available to check the assault landing of anese beachhead. This was partially ac- a thousand ,Japanese. Militarily speak- complished at 0530” on the final morning ing, there is something pathetic in the when (Taptain Crodbold was directed to spectacle of I,ieutenant Poindexter and his bring the personnel of his battery (D) “mobile reserve>’ of eight men and four to the command post for employment as machine guns dashing by truck from one infantry. By this time, however, it was threatened point to another in the face of too late for such a small number to influ- sLIch f ant ast ic odds. ence the outcome of the battle. In this True, at that time trained infantry was connection, Major Devereux later pointed almost as scarce as radar. But the fault out that because of the partial failure of lay in the defense battalion tables of or- communications he never had anything ganizat ion. Later this omission was cor- like. a clear picture of the situation during rected, and Midw:~y had both infantry and the final ,Japanese attack. For several 1ight tanks. Had even one Marine in- hours he was in doubt as to the location of f ant ry company reinforced with tanks the main enemy landing and hence did not been on Wake, it is possible that the gal.- consider himself justified in stripping rison might have, thrown the ,Japanese Peale Islznd of LLlldefenders. back into the sea. This is borne out by .4s alluded to above, another major les- what happened on Wilkes Island, where son to be derived from this phase of the Captain Platt was able to annihilate twice operation was a re-emphasis of Admiral his numbers of the enemy by shrewd, co- ~Iahan’s famous dictum that “(~ommuni- or(linated counter-attack. And after clay- cations dominate war.” The partial fail- lig]lt On ~~:lke Is]zlld, Poindexter, with ure of col~~l~lullic:~tiolls,which occurred tile makeshift defenders of Camp One shortly after the ,Japanese landing. isolat- added to his “mobile reserve,” had :is- ed the defense detachment commander sumed the offensive, driven bi~ck the ,Jap- from most of his subordinate units then in anese to his front, and regained most of act ion. .is a result he not only lost control 448777o—5~11 152 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL over much of the battle, but he also-and tional. Enemy dive bombers on 23 De- perhaps more important to this case—be- cember had completely disab-led one 5-inch came unavoidably deceived as to the prog- battery (Wilkes) and largely destroyed ress of the situation. In ignorance of the fire control instruments of the remain- what happened on Wilkes or at Camp One, ing two. Without airplanes, fire control he surmised that all was lost in those areas. instruments, radar, spare parts, and per- Buried telephone lines and reliable field sonnel to bring the defense to full strength radios would have prevented this failure Wake could not carry on. The only of communication, and the surrender de- answer was surrender. This took place cision would not have been made at that fifteen days after the initial attack, and it particular stage of the action. The Wake was eleven hours after the fighting com- garrison, however, had neither the per- menced on shore before Wilkes Island sur- sonnel to dig by hand, nor the machinery rendered. to dig by mechanical means, the many During this period the Marines sus- miles of ditches which would have been tained almost. 20 per cent casualties, but necessary to bury the telephone lines. they exacted a heavy toll from the Jap- Perhaps one. of the fundamental reasons anese. Nearly 500 enemy had been lost for the state of the Wake defenses in the abortive landing attempt of 11 De- stemmed from the fact that base develop- cember, the defenders on Wilkes Island ment had consistently received priority accounted for nearly 100 in their defeat of over defense preparations. That the de- the Tahmno unit, and Poindexter counted fensive installations were in as good a con- approximately 80 enemy bodies during his dition as they were when the Japanese morning attack from Camp One. Give the struck may be credited to the tremendous Hanna-VMF-211 position credit for at efforts of the small Marine garrison. least 20 more kills, and this would bring All things taken into account, however, the Wake total to 700 enemy. Others must the decision to surrender Wake was rea- have lost their lives on Wake Island land- sonable, especially when considered in light of the civilian situation and the fact ing beaches and elsewhere on the island, that relief was no longer in prospect. Ma- although the figure probably would not be rines who fought through the Pacific cam - great. But in earlier action the atoll anti- paigns would later see many examples of aircraft and fighter plane fire had downed a totally unreasoning enemy who never 21 enemy aircraft and claimed credit for surrendered but was always defeated. At damaging another 11; the same time, insensibly, some might come Based on this record, Major Putnam’s to believe that unyielding refusal to sur- final VMF-211 report of 21 December render was the proper role of a defender. would truthfully state that “AN hands Of course this was neither true nor logical. have behaved splendidly and held up in Wake had exacted a full and more than a manner of which the Marine Corps may honorable toll from the Japanese, but its well tell. ” defensive resources had been exhausted. ‘ A Japanese source says that 51 planes, in No fighter aircraft remained. Only one addition to those shot down, were damaged by antiaircraft battery was effectively opera- flak over Wake. i?akamura iVotebook. PART W Marines in the Philippines CHAPTER 1 China and Luzon ..-. ,–, .- .,#. – ,. In the first few months after Pearl Har- Iuacue-”’ nas Iascea ror aDouL mree montns as com- bor, it seemed that nothing could stop the pared with our speedy victories in Malaya, Dutch Japanese. One by one, the western out- East Indies, and other areas in the Philippines. As the Anti-Axis powers propagandize about this posts in the Far East were overwhelmed. battle as being a uniquely hopeful battle and the Allied ground troops, in desperately un- first step toward eventual victory, the rest of equal contests, were forced to retreat, fight, the world has concentrated upon the progress of and retreat again; at sea and in the air the battle tactics on this small peninsula. Hence, the pitifully few ships and planes which the victories of these operations do not only mean the suppression of the Philippines, but will also had survived the initial onslaught were have a bearing upon the English and Americans hoarded against the surety of further en- and their attitude toward continuing the vvar.1 emy advances. A grim holding battle was Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma joined along a line protecting Australia was right: the outcome of the battle did and N’ew Zealand and their South Pacific have a direct bearing on the .411ied atti- lifeline to the States. Yet, despite its tude toward vigorous pursuit of the war. strategic importance, this vital defensive Perhaps in no instance since the defense action gave first place in the news to the of the .41amo stirred Americans in another outcome of a hopeless struggle hundreds of century did an unsuccessful battle carry miles behind the enemy’s forward posi- within its waging and its ending the source tions. of so much national pride and dedication. For almost five months, two names— Bataan and Corregidor—dominated the THE AHAD O W OF TJTAR2 headlines, taking fire in the minds of the On 26 .July 1941, shortly after Japan oc- Allied peoples as symbols of courage and cupied military bases in Indo-China, Pres- devotion to duty. To the Japanese, who ident Roosevelt authorized the mobiliza- realized that they could starve out the em- tion of the Philippine Army. The War battled defenders at little cost to them- selves, it became imperative that the issue 1 HistSec, G–2, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Studies in be decided forthwith in battle. On the WW1l No. 1, 14th Army Ops, 2 vols., n. d. (lo- eve of the all-out offensive that brought the cated at OCMH ), 141–142, hereinafter cited as Ii$th Army Rept. end on Bataan, the Japanese commander, 2 Unless otherwise noted the material in addressing his combat leaders, clearly this section is derived from Adm T. C. Hart, stated the importance of the isolated strong Narrative of Events, AsFlt Leading UP to War and ~rom 8Dec?41 to 5Neb42, written before points in the eyes of the world: llJun42 (located at NHD), hereinafter cited as The operations in the Bataan Peninsula and Hart Narratirc; Adm T. C. Hart, Supplementary the Corregidor Fortress are not merely a local Narrative to Hart Xarratiw, 80ct46 (located at operation of the Great East Asia War. This NHD) ; Gen J. C. Wainwright, Rept of Ops of 155 156 PEARL HARBOR TO GIJADALCANAL Department, which had requested this The divisions had never operated as such move, followed through with a directi%re in field maneuvers and were scantily pro- organizing a new command, ~TSi4FFE vided with arms and equipment.. In order (United States Army Forces in the Far to mold an effective fighting force from East), which included all American Army the Philippine Army, MacArthur needed and Commonwealth troops in the Philip- just about everything in the military sup- pines. To head USAFFE the Army ply catalogs, but most of all he needed called out of retirement its former chief of time—time for training, time for materiel staff, General MacArthur, who had served and men to reach the Philippines from the as Military .4dvisor to the Commonwealth United States. Government since 1935. He was given The instructors and cadres needed for rank as a lieutenant general and with char- training the Philippine .4rmy were drawn acteristic energy tackled the enormous job from the, Constabulary and the regular of putting the Philippines into a state of Army units available to US.4FFE. Most readiness against attack. of the 22,000 U. S. Army troops in the The bulk of USAFFE’S troop strength islands were serving in Coast Artillery was drawn from the Philippine Army regiments, the Army .4ir Corps, or the which was, in July 1941, an army in name Philippine Division, sole regular infantry only. It consisted of the islands’ police division in the islands. Over half of these force, the 6,000-man Philippine Constab- men were members of crack Philippine ulary, a token air force and inshore naval Scout units.s The regulars suffered, too, patrol, and ten territorial reserve divis- from a general lack of up-to-date weapons ions. Since the start of the Common- and equipment,4 but they were well trained wealth% defense training program in 1936 to use what they had. about 110,000 Filipinos had received a few The Tt’ar Department supported Mac- months of basic military instruction, but Arthur’s requests for additional troops most of these reservists had no experience and supplies to the fullest extent possible in light of the country’s world-wide com- with crew-served weapons and only rudi- mitments; USAFFE received priority in mentary knowledge of their own pieces. almost every man power and materiel category. More than 7,000 men, mostly ~SAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands 1941–42, 10Aug46 (located at TAGO), herein- members of service and air units, and the after cited as VSAFFE-USFIP Rept; Annex VIII to USAFFE-l?SFIP Rept, MajGen G. F. ‘ The Philippine Scouts was a U. S. Army Moore, Rept of CA Cored and the Harbor De- organization in which the enlisted men were fenses of Manila and Subic Bay, 19 Feb41– native Filipinos and most of the officers were 6May42, 15Dec45 (located at TAGO ), hereinafter Americans. The Scouts had and merited a high cited as Moore Rf’ut; BriGen S. L. Howard, “Re- reputation for fielding units with good morale, l)ort of the operation, employment and supply of excellent discipline, and a consistently superior the old 4th Marines from September, 1941 to the level of combat readiness. surrender of Gorregidor, May 6. 1942,” 26 Sep45, 4 At the outbreak of the war, “the Philip- hereinafter cited as Howard Rept; Ihth Army pine Division, less than two-thirds strength, had Rept; L. Morton, The Fall of the Ph itippines— only three ( 3 ) new- 37mm automatic firing can- l~nited States Army in World War II (Washing- non, three (3) 81mm mortars per infantry regi- ton : OCMH, DA, 1953), hereinafter cited as Fall ment and no (0) 60mm mor tars...” of the Philippines; Ri8ing Sun in the Pacific. US.4FFE- USFIP Rept, 94. CHINA AND LUZON 157 major portion of the ~Tnited States’ heavy cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aux- bomber strength reached the Philippines iliaries, was certainly no match for the prior to the outbreak of war. Much more Japanese fleet, nor was it intended to be. was promised and planned, but the Jap- The U. S. Pacific Fleet, based at Pearl anese surprise attack effectively cut off the Harbor, was the American striking force, flow of reinforcement. It also forced a re- and war plans envisaged its fighting ad- vision of MacArthur’s defensive strategy. vance to the Philippines if the Japanese In view of his healthy reinforcement attacked. prospects, the USAFFE commander had The Asiatic Fleet’s major shore installa- adopted an aggressive defense plan that tions were located at Olongapo on Subic conceded the enemy nothing. He did not Bay and at Mariveles and Cavite within expect the Japanese to attack before April Manila, Bay. Since denial of Manila Bay 19425 and by that time he considered that to the enemy was a key point in war plan- his air and ground strength would be such ning, the activities of the 16th Naval that he could successfully hold his posi- District (Rear .4dmiral Francis W. Rock- tion against any attacking force. He was well ), the shore establishment supporting confident that the Philippine Army, when the Asiatic Fleet, were closely coordinated adequately trained and equipped, would with IJSAFFE’S defensive preparations. be a match for the Japanese. Contact mines were laid to connect with The Commander in Chief of the U. S. controlled mine fields of the Army’s har- Navy’s Asiatic Fleet (CinCAF), Admiral bor defenses, completely closing Manila Thomas C. Hart, was in substantial agree- Bay. (h Corregidor, site of the prospec- ment with Mac.4rthur% philosophy of an tive command post for the defense of aggressive defense. He recommended that Luzon, protected installations for naval in the event of war his fleet units remain headquarters, a radio intercept station, and based at Manila Bay and fight the Jap- a torpedo replenishment depot were pre- anese in Philippine waters. The Navy pared and equipped. Large quantities of Department, however, adhered to its long- fuel and ammunition stored at.Cavite were est ablished plan that the major ships of moved to dumps away from the naval base the fleet would retire to the south at the to lessen their vulnerability to bombing. imminence of war, to a base of operations (See Maps 7 and 8, Map Section) in the h’etherlands East Indies or Malaya, If the Japanese attacked, the most dan- where they could cooperate with Allied gerously exposed elements of the Asiatic naval units.’ Hart’s slim collection of Fleet were those stationed in China: seven Yangtze River gunboats; Colonel Samuel 5Gen J. ~. l~ainwright, General Woinw>right’.s L. Howard’s 4th Marine Regiment at fi’tor~, R, Considine, ed. (Garden City, N. Y. : Shanghai; and the Marine embassy guard Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946), 13, here- inafter cited as Wa.inwright’s fltorg. detachments at Peiping and Tientsin. 6 After the war, in supplementary comments to his original report, Adm Hart agreed that the turned down sooner he might well have made a Navy Dept decision was the best that could have better dispositionof his fleet units; he had acted been made considering the situation at the time. on the assumption that his proposal would be He added, however, that if his original proposal accepted until it was disapproved in late No- of 270ct41 to continue to base at Manila had been vember. 158 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GIJADALCANAL .kdmiral Hart had begun making informal Two President liners, the Machkon and proposals that his China forces be with- the Harrison, were chartered to transport drawn early in 1941, and after. July, when the Marines, attached naval personnel, and he was “entirely convinced that the war their supplies and equipment; provision was coming,”’ 7 he followed up with em- was also made to evacuate some American phatic official recommendations that his civilians from Shanghai on the same ships. men be gotten out before it was too late. After it reached the Philippines and un- Japanese war preparations were so evident loaded, the Harrison was to return to by 1 September that the American Consul- North China and pick up the embassy General at Shanghai, the commander of guards and their gear at Chinwangtao. the Yangtze Patrol, and Colonel Howard All signs pointed to the necessity for haste jointly recommended that all naval forces in the withdrawal. in China be withdrawn. Hart naturally The Japanese were replacing their sea- concurred and further recommended to the soned troops around Shanghai with re- Navy Department that the troops be evacu- cruits, and large numbers of special ated in late September when the transport armored landing barges which had previ- 17endemon made a routine call on Chinese ously been seen near the city disappeared; ports to pick up short-timers and other intelligence pointed to movement south- returnees. ward of both veteran units and landing Hart’s request was turned down as far craft. Intelligence also indicated that the as withdrawal on the Henderwon was con- ,Japanese .4rmy was eager to take over the cerned. He was told, however, that joint International Settlement, by force if nec- State-Navy conferences would be held essary, and that it was only being re- within a couple of weeks time to consider strained by the Nipponese Navy’s desire the problem of a withdrawal and its for an “incident” which would seem to effect on negotiations for a settlement of justify such action. Several attempts were Japanese-American differences. Despite made to manufacture incidents, but the CinCAF’s protest that this “was not, a Marines refused to knuckle under to the question that could be delayed for weeks pressure, and Colonel Howard initiated but must be acted upon immediately,” 8 prompt action which kept the American he did not receive permission to withdraw defense sector clear. A copy of a Japanese the gunboats and the Marines until 10 No- warning order was obtained which stated vember, “embarrassingly late” as he later that “in the event of war the 4th Marines noted.g Five of the gunboats were able to would attempt to break through [our] reach Manila without hindrance once lines ;“ “ ample evidence of this belief was clearance to leave was given.l” seen in the increase in size and number of the patrols in the city and in the construc- ‘ Adm T. C. Hart ltr to CLMC, 100ct56, herein- after cited as Hart Cow~menta. Americans; it was captured on 8 December. The ‘ Quoted in Howard Rept, 1. Tutuila at Chungkiug was turned over to the ‘Hart Na?-ratice, 29. Chinese Nationalist Government under lend-lease ‘0 The smallest of the gunboats, the Wake, was since it could not get downstream through the stripped and left at Shanghai to be used as a sta- Japanese blockade. tion ship and radio outlet for the remaining “ Howard Rept, 3. CHINA AND LUZONT 159 tion of concrete blockhouses on all roads the river were alive with flag-waving leading out of Shanghai. Chinese as a power lighter took the Ma- Both the Madison and Harti~on needed rines downstream to their ship. At 1400 to be converted to troop use after their the Harrison weighed anchor and sailed arrival at Shanghai, an{dthe first ship was for the Philippines, marking the end of a not ready until 27 November. By 1600 colorful era in Marine annals. that date, the Madison with half the regi- AS soon as the Ham”son cleared the ment and half its equipment on board Whangpoo River, machine guns were sailed for Olongapo. While this forward broken out and manned for antiaircraft echelon, the 2d Battalion and half of the defense, and blackout regulations were put Regimental Headquarters and Service into effect.13 Flights of Japanese aircraft Companies, was loading out, a message was checked the liner regularly as it moved received from CinCAF to expedite the out into the China Sea, but there were no evacuation. Even though the conversion incidents, and contact was made on the work on the Eation was three days short 29th with submarine escorts dispatched by of completion, the decision was made to .Admiral Hart. On 30 November and 1 clear Shanghai the following day with the December the two transports arrived at rest of the regiment and its remaining Olongapo where the troops disembarked. equipment. Only a few supplies were unloaded at the Despite the short notice and the harass- naval station, ostensively because CinCAF ing tactics of the Japanese, 12 the Regi- had issued orders that the ships must pass mental R4 and Quartermaster, Major through the mine field into Manila Bay by Reginald H. Ridgely, Jr., was able to load nightfall on the clay of arrival. Actually, all organizational gear, over 500 tons, by Admiral Hart had given oral orders to his 1300 on the 28th. At 0900 that morning, staff that the Marines were to be landed the regiment assembled at the 1st Batta- with field equipment only, because it was lion’s billet, formed up behind its band, his intention that: and marched down Bubbling Well-Nank- . . . they would get into the field, near Olon- ing Roads to the President Line’s dock on gapo, as soon as they could. We [Hart and his the Bund. Thousands of cheering people staff] all knew that they had been cooped up in Shanghai through all those years where condi- lined the route of march, and the banks of tions for any sort of field training were very poor—and we thought that not much time re- “ “All supplies had to pass through the Japa- mained.1’ nese Sector on the way to the Customs dock. About 3:00 p.m. ~ovember 27th they closed While the regiment’s heavy equipment the Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek to traffic was unloaded at Manila and trucked to and our trucks were delayed nearly an hour Olongapo, the Ha&on was readied for before contact could be made with the Japanese a return voyage to pick up the Marines Admiral to get this bridge reopened to traffic. Customs officials ostensibly at the instigation from Peiping and Tientsin. It was al- of the Japanese were insistent that our supplies pass through the Custom House, but we @nored UA’o special defensive arrangements were such orders and loaded them on lighters. The made by the 4th klar elements on the President Japanese instigated three strikes during the Madisow. CWO C. R. Jackson ltr to CMC, night by the laborers loading the lighters.” 100ct56, hereinafter cited as Ja@cson. Ibid., 4. “ Hart Comment8. 160 PEARL HARROR TO GUADALCANAL ready too late, however, to rescue the machine guns and several Tommy guns North China Marines. The Japanese war and BARs had already been broken out plans had been activated, and the carrier of their cosmoline packing. Despite their task force that would strike Pearl Harbor clesperate situation the Marines were was at sea en route to its target. The ready to fight. troops, ships, and planes that would be Huizenga and a Japanese captain held sent against the Philippines were concen- an armed parley where the lieutenant was trated at Formosa, the Ryukyus, and the given time to communicate to his superior Palaus with orders to begin their attack at Tientsin, Major Luther A. Brown, the on X-Day—8 December 1941 (Manila enemy’s demand that he surrender the de- Time) .’5 tachment. Orders soon came back to offer no resistance and the Marines were 8 DECEMBER 1941” stripped of their weapons. Later in the When the dawn of the first day of the day they were returned under Japanese Pacific War reached the China Coast, the guard to the Marine barracks at Tient- attack on Pearl Harbor was over and the sin.” troops in the Philippines had been alerted The situation of the detachments at Tientsin and Peiping was similar to that to their danger. At the Chinwangtao docks, Second Lieutenant Richard M. Hui- of the one at Camp Holcomb; Japanese zenga was supervising the stockpiling of troops surrounded their barracks in supplies for the expected arrival of the strength and demanded their surrender. President I?arrison. A truck driver Since the embassy guard was not required brought him word that the radio at his to maintain a continuous watch on Cin- railhead, Camp Holcomb, was full of news CAF’S command” radio circuit, ‘8 the first of Pearl Harbor. Although the Japanese word that the senior Marine officer, Colo- made half-hearted attempts to stop him on nel William W. Ashurst, had of the out- his three-mile drive back to the camp, break of hostilities came from the Japa- Huizenga was able to get through to his nese. He was given till noon to make his unit. He found the 21 Marines of the c1ecision whether to fight or not and was loading detail surrounded, at a respectful allowed to communicate by radio with distance, by a cordon of Japanese troops. CinCAF and by phone with Major The men, under Chief Marine Gunner Brown. In a sense .4shurst had been given William A. Lee, were setting up a strong a Hobson’s choice: he could surrender or point amid the boxcars of supplies; two he could let his troops, fewer than 200 of- ficers and men, be overwhelmed. If dis- ‘5Carn~aignsof the Pacific War, 2G27, 50. “ Unless otherwise noted the material in this cipline and spirit would have won the day, section is derived from Hart Narrative; US AFFE-USFIP Rept; l~th Army Rept; How- “ MIS, G–2, WD, Escape Rept No. 665, Capt a rd Rept; 4th Mar Jnl and Rec of Events, R. M. Huizenga, 12Ju145. 8Dec41–2May42, hereinafter cited as ~th Mar ‘8 LtCol W. T. Clement Rept to CMC, “Dis- Jni; Capt A. F. Metze Rept to CMC, “Surren- positions and employment of U. S. Marines on der of U. S. Marine Forces in North China,” the Asiatic Station during the initial stages of 23Aug42; Fall of the Philippines; Rising Sun in the war,” 6Apr42, hereinafter cited as Clement the Pacific. Rept. CHINA AND LUZON 161 Ashurst could have opened tire on the be- A cacophony of sound broke the still- siegers—his men had already demon- uess at Olongapo when the alert reached strated at ~amp Holcomb that they were the naval base at 0350; the bugler of the willing to take on hopeless odds. But guard blew “Call to Arms ;“ the steam there was no purpose in fighting if the end whistle at the power plant blasted a recall result could only be useless bloodshed. signal to PBY crewmen; and the ship’s In the absence of instructions to the con- bell at the main gate clanged continu- trary, Colonel Ashurst took the only sen- ously.” Companies immediately mus- sible course open to him and ordered his tered in front of their wooden barracks men to lay down their arms. A strong and in the streets of tent areas and were possibility existed that if no resistance put to work setting up machine guns for was offered the embassy guards would be antiaircraft defense and digging individ- considered part of the diplomatic entou- ual protective holes. Colonel Howard rage, entitled to repatriation. As the initiated the first moves in what was to be initial treatment of the Marines was rela- a hectic period of redisposing, reorgan- tively mild and they repeatedly received izing, and reinforcing the regiment which informal assurances from the Japanese lasted throughout the month of December. that they would be exchanged, few at- When the 4th Marines arrived from tempted escape. JJThen these rumors Shanghai its strength stood at 44 officers proved false, the opportunity had and warrant officers and ’728 enlisted men; passed.lg organic naval medical personnel raised the By the time Ashurst’s report of his de- total strength to 804. The regiment “had cision to surrender reached Hart in Ma- been permitted to dwindle by attrition” 22 nila, the Philippines were in the thick of in China so that it consisted only of Head- the war. The first news of the Japanese quarters Company, Service Company, and attack was picked up at 0257 by a radio two battalions—the battalions short one of operator at CinC.4F Headquarters who, their rifle companies and the companies recognizing the technique of the sender, each short one of their three rifle platoons. vouched for the reliability of the now By utilizing the members of the regimen- famous message, “Air raid on Pearl Har- tal band and absorbing the Mwrine Bar- bor. This is no drill.” n The duty of- racks Detachment, Olongapo, Howard ficer, Marine Lieutenant Colonel William was able to form some of the missing pla- T. Clement of Hart’s staff, immediately notified the admiral who sent a war alert “ Capt E’. W. Ferguson, Personal Experiences to all fleet. units. Minutes later, by a com- 8Dec41–6May42, n. d., hereinafter cited as Fer- guson. bination of intercepted official and com- u Howard Reptj 8. As the threat of war with mercial broadcasts and the spreading of .Japan increased, Adm Hart initiated a policy of the word by the first agencies notified, the withholding replacements from Marine units in Almost all of the men held back were report had reached all major USAFFE China. assigned to the 1st SepMarBn at Cavite. Hart headquarters. felt that if by some mischance he was unable to get the -lth Mar out of China he “could at “ Huizenga, op. cit.; MIS, G–2, WD, Escape least stop sending any more Marines there until Rept No. 666, Capt J. D. McBrayer, Jr., 12Ju145. someone bawled us out most vociferously. They m Glement Rept. never did.” Hart Comments. 162 PDARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL toons. In keeping with previous orders :Lcy, at least in the air, was established from Admiral Rockwell, he sent the 1st conclusively.” 2’ Battalion by tug, lighter, and truck to Except for 16 B–17’s at Del Monte on Mariveles to relieve the Marine detach- Mindanao, the bulk of FEAF’s strength ment there. The men of the Mariveles in first-line planes was stationed at fields guard had been taken from the other ma- in central Luzon. Dawn of the 8th found jor Marine unit in the Philippines, the 1st most of these planes airborne, waiting to Separate Marine Battalion at Cavite. engage or evade ,Japanese attackers. But The battalion was organized to function the land-based naval fighters and bombers either as an antiaircraft or an infantry of the ,Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet, unit, but its primary mission was the anti- charged with making the main air assault, aircraft defense of the naval installations did not appear at dawn. The enemy plan in the Cavite-Sangley Point area. Its had called for such a surprise attack, firing batteries, 3-inch guns and .5o caliber timed to coincide with the start of opera- machine guns, had been on partial alert tions in Malaya and at Pearl Harbor, but since 14 October and as the threat of war thick clouds and heavy fog delayed the grew stronger the guns and their crews take-off from Formosa of the major attack had reached a high- degree of readiness. formations. It was noon before the enemy On 4 December, the battalion’s one long planes could reach their targets, Luzon’s range radar set and the necessary operat- airfields, and the ,Japanese pilots very ing personnel were assigned to reasonably assumed that with the. loss of I; SAFFE’S control and moved to a posi- surprise they would be met in force.z~ tion on the west coast where the radar But this was not to be, for “shortly could scan the approaches to Manila from after 1130 all American aircraft in the the south; 2’ the set was one of two operat- Philippines, with the exception of one or ing in the Philippines on 8 December. two planes, were on the ground.” 27 The When the battalion commander, Lieuten- fighters were refueling after their fruit- ant Colonel John P. Adams, passed the less morning patrols o; awaiting a warn- word of the Pearl Hmbor attack there was ing of imminent attack; the bombers were little left to be done but to “cut fuzes, arming for an offensive mission against going into the last stage of readiness.!’ ‘~ Formosa. By an incredible chain of cir- Rut the Marine guns were not to see ac- cumstances, compounded by poor com- tion. The Japanese reserved their first munications, a woefully inadequate air day of attack for their primary target, warning system, and a generous amount MacArthur’s Far East Air Force (FEAF). And when that day was over, “ HistSec, Japanese Research Div, GHQ, F13C, Japanese Studies in WWI1 No. 11, Philippines tl~e ,Japanese figured that, their “supren~- .4irOpsRec, lFeb52, 7, hereinafter cited as Philippines AirOp8Rec. = LtCol H. L. Davis ltr to CMC, 310ct56. w Ibid. 24lstLt If”. F. Hogaboom, Personal Experiences “ W. S. Craven md J. L. Cate ( eds. ), Plans and 140ct41–6May42, n. d., 1–2, hereinafter cited as Early Operations’, January 195’9 to August Hogaboom. This narrative was published in the 19&-The Army Air Forces in World War II MC Gazette, April 1946, under the title, “Action (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1948), Report—Bataan.” 209. CHINA AND LUZON 163 of pure bad luck, the Japanese were given second day of the war, but fog over a sitting target. After” a day of violent Formosa prevented the take-off. .41- action, when all concerned tried to make though the weather was again bad on the up for what hindsight calls mistakes, the 10th, the enem~y naval squadrons were on strength of the FEAF had been reduced their way to their targets by midmorn- by half. The way was open for the Japa- ing.ao Radar and glound observers nese to begin landing operations.2a spotted the incoming flights, but to no The enemy had in fact made his first avail. Mrhen the outnumbered American landing by the time of the main air at- interceptors rose to greet the raiders, the tacks. A small force came ashore at dawn enemy fighters swarmed all over them, not on Batan Island midway between Luzon giving as good as they got, but more than and Formosa and immediately began making up for their losses whenever they work to set up an air base on an already downed one of the few remaining planes existing strip to accommodate the rela- of FEAF. tively short-ranged Army fighters. The The Japanese bomber groups were head- next day elements of two fighter regi- ing for the best protected area in the Phil- ments of the Japanese 5ti~ .4ir Group ippines; almost all of the antiaircraft were using the field and flying reconnais- units in USAFFE were concentrated near sance and strike missions over northern Manila. But the gunners below had an Luzon, site of the next planned landings. insoluble problem; they had plenty of ammunition, but very little of it was fused THE FIRST DAYS “ so that it could reach above 24,000 feet. On 9 December only a few enemy bomb- After a few false starts the enemy learned ers attacked, but these planes filtering that they could bomb from heights of through the early morning darkness 25,000 feet with relative impunity. There reached Nichols Field outside Manila un- was a limited supply of mechanically- scathed whew their bombs increased the fused ammunition which could reach damage and added to the toll of Ameri- 30,000 feet, but there were not enough can planes. An all-out attack on the Ma- such rounds to materially increase anti- nila Bay area had been planned for the aircraft defenses. The gunners of the 1st Separate Marine ~ See Graven and Gate, OP.cit., 201–213 and Battalion at Cavite scored a kill on 10 J’all of the Philippine, 79-90 for an examina- December when they downed an over- tion of the contradietor~ statements and chro- eager dive bomber that strayed from the nology of misadventures that marked what may pack over Nichols Field, lured by the tar- well have been the blackest day in the history of the Army Air Corps. get of two PBY’s taking off from Sangley n Unless otherwise noted the material in this Point. But that was the end of it. The section is derived from Hart Narrative; three-inch batteries turned back the first i7LSAFFE-L7S171P Rept; Moore Rept; RAdm flight of bombers, which came in too low, F. W. Rockwell, Narrative of Naval Activities in the Luzon Area, lDec41–19Mar42, lAug42 but all subsequent flights approaching the (located at NHD ), hereinafter cited as Roclc- well Narrative; Howard Rept; -&?h Mar Jnl; MHistSec, G–2, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Studies l~th Army Rept; Fall of the Philippines; Rising in WWI1 A-o. 13, A’avOps in the Invasion of the Sun in the Pacific. Philippines, 15May46 (located at OCMH), 7. 164 PlOARLHARBOR TO GUADALCANAL naval base stayed well out of range and T-ations. On the night of the 10th Hart the gunners were helpless spectators to the ordered most of the remaining ships of the destruction that followed.” Asiatic Fleet still in Manila Bay to sail Stick after stick of bombs rained down south to comparative safety. The next on the naval base as successive flights of day he advised the captains of all mer- bombers criss-crossed the area laying a per- chant ships in the bay to get their vessels ceptible pattern. Fires sprang up every- out while they still could; fortunately, where as small dumps of ammunition and only one merchantman out of 40 was gasoline were hit and the old town of caught, by enemy bon~bers.34 The strong- C’avite was soon a raging mass of flames. est element of Hart’s fleet, his 29 subma- All the ships that could possibly get away rines, continued to operate from the bay from the, yard headed out into the bay, but for a short while, until Japanese control the bombers caught and fatally damaged of the air made this base untenable. By a submarine and a mine sweeper. Every- the year’s end only the submarine tender one feared that the ammunition depot, (7anogws and a small collection of yard which still had large quantities of powder craft, motor torpedo boats, and auxiliaries and ammunition in it, would be hit, but remained in Manila>s waters. the bombers missed their most promising In the judgment of a naval historian of target. Still, the fires being blown to- this period the Asiatic Fleet was “sadly ward the depot from (%vite might touch inadequate>’ and therefore “unable to pre- it off,32 and the rescue parties searching vent the enemy from landing wherever he amid the flaming ruins for the hundreds of chose, or even to delay his efficient time- civilian casualties were in constant danger. table of conquest.” 35 Nor were FEAF Long after the raid was over, into the or the ground troops of 7JSAFFE able to night and the early morning of the next do the job. In some instances there was a clay, the fires raged and Admiral Rockwell temporary delay when planes hit the land- ordered all personnel to evacuate the base. ing forces, but nowhere were the Japan- Only a small group of men from Lieuten- ese stopped and forced to turn back. On ant Colonel Adams’ battalion and a few 10 December two combat teams from the Manila firemen remained. These volun- gd For~no,ya Reginten,t of the J8th Divi8ion teers localized the fire and were able to came ashore at Aparri in northern Luzon save the commissary stores; the ammuni- and It Vigan on the northwest coast. tion depot soon was out of danger.33 Their mission, which was to secure air- Admiral Hart had watched the air at- fields for use by Army planes, was success- tack from the roof of his headquarters ful. In a day the Japanese, despite the building in Manila and had seen the end loss of several ships to American bombers, of Cavite as a base of operations. Rock- were firmly established ashore and in prac- well’s damage report confirmed his obser- tical control of the northern tip of Luzon. The one Philippine Army division in the “’ Hogaboorn, 3. 3’LtCol J. V. Lyon ltr to CMC, 310ct5t3. area, the llth, was responsible for the de- ‘8 LtCol J. W. Keene, Narrative and tactical dispositions of the 1st SepMarBn at Cavite, 3’ Hart Comments. *26Dec41, n.d. = Rising S7un in the Pacific, 181. CHINA AND LUZON 165 fense of the island north of Lingayen Gulf armor plate to prevent penetration.)’ 38 and was of necessity spread so thin that The enemy attacked again on the 13th, it could offer no effective resist ante. this time bombing from altitudes beyond The same situation held true in south- the range of the Marine automatic ern Luzon where the defending forces, two weapons. The few hits scored were all in Philippine Army divisions, were com- the town of Olongapo; there was no dam- pletely unable to cover all possible landing age to the naval station and only a few beaches. On 12 December, when a Japan- Marine casualties. The Filipinos who ig- ese convoy carrying the advance assault nored the air raid warning suffered heav- detachment of the 16th Division, staged ily; a bomb hit right in the midst of a from the Palaus, reached Legaspi in south- large group of townspeople who were eastern Luzon, there was nothing to op- ‘(standing under a tree watching the per- pose their landing. The troops were formance,” 37killing 22 and wounding at ashore, had taken their airfield objective, least as many more. Although alarms and were moving north by nightfall. In were frequent thereafter, the Japanese did all there were less than 10,000 enemy troops not attack again until the 19th and then ashore at this time, but they had behind their aim was bad and they liberally them the rest of the Fourteenth Army and plastered the bay with bombs. command of the SeLLand air to insure its During this period, while the original arrival on schedule. Japanese landing forces were advancing The heavy air attacks of the 8th and toward Manila, top-level discussions were 10th were only harbingers of further held between Hart and MacArthur and aerial assaults. Reinforced by Army their staffs regarding employment of the fighters and bombers operating from 4th Marines.’s On 2’0 December, Mac- newly-seized airfields, the naval planes of Arthur formally requested that the regi- the Formosa-based l?leuenth AiT FZeet ment be assigned to his command “as de- spread out over Luzon seeking new targets. velopments of the Navy plan can make it The first turn of Olongapo and the 4th available.” 3g Admiral Hart concurred Marines came on 12 December, the day and directed Howard to report to that marked the end of effective U’. S. air USAFFE for such employment as Mac- support. A flight of ,Japanese fighters followed = Houxzrd Rept, 9. the PBY’s based at Olongapo into their “ Jackson. anchorage after the flying boats had made 38Although the -war plan for the Philippines had long called for the available Marines to be a fruitless search for a supposed enemy assigned to the defending ground forces under carrier task force. The enemy pilots Army control, CSAFFE made no effort in the caught the seaplanes at their moorings and first few days of the war to contact CinCAF regarding his Marine forces. After a reminder destroyed them all. As the Japanese from Hart, “there came back a request to send strafed the naval station Marine machine one battalion into Manila City to guard USAFFE gunners attempted to bring them down; Headquarters. Feeling that it would be a Colonel Howard noticed that the tracers wrong use of the best infantry available, [Hart issued] no order to that effect.” Hart Comments. of Company H’s .30’s seemed to be CCbounc- 3’ Copy of CG, US&’FE ltr to CinCAF, 20Dec41, ing off these planes indicating sufficient in ~th Mar Jrtl, 237; Cteme?tt Rept, 6. 166 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL Arthur might deem necessary in the de- men ashore and effecting a juncture with fense of Luzon.’” In a covering memo to JTigan-Aparri landing forces which had Rockwell, he pointed out that the assign- driven down from the north. Resistance, ment of the Mb Marines was the sole althou:h sparked by the 26th Cavalry of commitment that he had made and that the Phdlppine Scouts, was spotty and in- he had verbally made it clear that it was effectual, and the ,Japanese soon proved his policy that excess naval personnel be that the partially-trained men of the organized and equipped and then “fed up Philippine .4rmy were not yet a match into the combat areas on shore with the for their troops. Covered by the Scout Fourth Regiment of Marines. A com- ‘cavalrymen, the Filipino reservists fell mand exercised over them by the Army back in disorder to reorganize in positions would normally be via C. O. Fourth below the ilgno River. Marines.” 4’ The enemy was ready to drive on Manila The Kavy Department had directed from the north. Hart on his departure from the Philip- On the 24th, the last major assault ele- pines to place all naval personnel, nluni- ment of the Fourteenth Army, the 16th tions, and equipment at the disposal of Division from the Ryukyus, landed at IJSAFF13. Rockwell, W11Owas to relieve Lamon Bay only 60 miles cross-island Hart as senior naval officer in the Philip- from Manila. Here the story was much pines, nominally retained independe~t the same as Lingayen Gulf. The enemy status, He adhered firmly, however, to overwhelmed scattered, ill-trained troops the principle of unity of command and and made good his beachhead. The Amer- cooperated closely with MacArthur.s ican South Luzon Force began to fight headquarters. a delaying action along the roads lead- On 22 December, the reinforced ,Japa- ing to Manila. The decision, however, nese 48th Dz%iaion landed in Lingayen had already been made to declare the capi- Gulf. It was the logical landing point tal an “open city,>’ and the troops were for any force whose objective was Manila, headed for the 13ataan Peninsula. for the gulf stood at the head of a broad 13ataan, northern arm of Manila Bay, valley leading directly to the capital. The had long been considered the ultimate landing was expected and it was resisted, stronghold in a defense of Luzon. While but the combined eft’orts of .kmerican air, it was held, and with it the fortified islands submarine, and ground forces could not across the mouth of the bay, no enemy prevent the ,Japanese from putting their could use the harbor, and it was possible to gain succor from friendly naval forces mAccording to the Hart Narrative, 45, one which might break through a blockade. plan considered for the employment of the 4th MacArthur had rejected the concept of a Mm entailed the brigading of the regiment ( re- ‘inforeed by a naval battalion from Marive]es ) static, last-ditch defense when he took and a constabulary regiment under a Marine over USAFFE and had expected with the brigade commander. The Marines were to fur- forces underway to him from the States nish officers and XCO’S to the Constabulary unit, and trained Philippine Army divisions to Time did not permit the execution of this scheme, 4’ CinCAF memo to ComSixteen, 22 Dec41, in be able to repulse or contain enemy land- ~th .tfar Jri 1, 239. ing attempts. When the Japanese won CHINA AND LUZON 167 control of the sea and air, however, he lost made a final call on Hart, Howard was told all chance for successful execution of his to destroy the Olongapo Naval Station orders to “attack and destroy” 42any land- when he pulled out. ing force, and he was forced to adopt the Mariveles at the southern tip of Bataan only course of action that would save his had been designated the assembly area and army: a desperation withdrawal to Ba- transshipment point for the Marine units taan. He made the fateful decision on 23 and their supplies. The 1st Battalion had December and the following day prepara- already spent two weeks in bivouac near tions to effect it were begun. the base weathering a series of air attacks Basically the withdrawal plan called for and furnishing guard details, unloading Major General ,Jonathan C. Wainwright’s parties, and dump construction crews. North Luzon Force to fight a series of Two men were killed and three wounded delaying actions in the central island plain on 24 December during a bombing raid which would allow the South Luzon Force that struck shipping in the harbor. It (Major General George M. Parker, Jr.) was an inauspicious portent for the recep- to reach the peninsula. Then Wain- tion of the forward echelon of the regiment wright’s units would pull back to 13ataan, which left for Mariveles at 2200 that night. join forces with Parker, and stand off the Shortly after the truck convoy had enemy. In the time gained by the delayi- cleared Olongapo, Colonel Howard re- ng actions, USAFFE would make every ceived warning from naval headquarters effort to augment the supplies alre?dy of an impending Japanese landing, and gathered in scattered dumps on B ataan “sounds of motors could be distinctly with food, ammunition, weapons, and heard from seaward” 43in Subic Bay. All equipment from instdations in the available men manned beach defense posi- Manila area. tions, but fortunately the report proved The role of the 4th Marines in this plan false and the motors turned out to be those was laid out for Colonel Howard in a of American torpedo boats. Early on series of conferences which took place in Christmas morning a message from Rock- Manila on 24 December. Admiral Hart, well’s new headquarters on Corregidor who was preparing to leave for Java the ordered Howard to expedite evacuation following day, informed the Marine com- and destruction lest the regiment be cut mander that the 1st Separate Battalion off by advancing Japanese troops. The would be added to his regiment as soon Philippine .krmy’s 31st Division had as it could clear Cavite and that he was pulled back to Bntaan from its coastal to report immediately to MacArthur for positions northwest of Olongapo on the duty. At LTSAFFl? headquarters, amidst 24th and the Marines’ north flank was now the bustle attendant, on its move to Cor- open; a threat also existed to seaward, regidor, Howard got a cordial welcome since the Army’s coast defense troops were from his new chief and then received withdrawing from Fort Wint in Subic orders to moye the 4th to Corregidor and Bay. Motorcycle patrols ranging north take over its beach defenses. In a meeting of the base could find no sign of the enemy, with Admiral Rockwell, after he had however, and the movement of men and 42Wainlrrigli t’s Story, 28. “ Hotcard Rept, 11. 448777 o—!i~lz 168 PEARL HARROR TO GUADALCANAL supplies was completed without undue made the seven and a half mile voyage haste. .4t 1410 Howard’s new CP opened from Mariveles’ docks to North Dock on outside Marive]es, and the fate of “The Rock.)’ Olongapo was left in the hands of a demo- lition detail under Captain (later Major) THE FORTIFIED 11.!!LANDS ‘8 Francis H. Williams. The four islands that guarded the mouth Using charges improvised from 300- of Manila Bay were fortified in the decade pound mines, Williams set out with his prior to J$’orld War I before air power demolition gang to do a good job of eras- changed the concept of coastal defense. ing the Naval Station from the face of the Most of the powerful 14- and 12-inch guns globe.” “ They sank the hull of the old were sited in open emplacements for the armored cruiser Rochester in the bay and purpose of repelling an invasion from the blew up or burned everything of value sea. Disarmament treaty obligations and except the barracks which closely bordered drastically reduced defense expenditures the native town.45 The last supplies were in the period between the wars allowed loaded early Christmas evening, and the little concession to be made to the threat rear echelon pulled out with darkness. of air attack. Some antiaircraft guns were Christmas also saw the completion of added to the fort’s defenses, however, and destruction at Cavite where a Marine dem- a start was made toward providing under- olition party from the 1st Separate Bat- ground bombproof shelters, especially on talion blew up or fired all remaining Corregidor (Fort Mills). ammunition stocks and destroyed the sub- Corregidor was at its closest point just marine damaged in the 10 December air a little over two miles from the tip of raid. The naval radio station near Sang- Bataan Peninsula. The island was tad- ley Point was already a shambles, for in pole-shaped, three and a half miles long a raid on 19 December enemy bombers leveled the buildings and set afire large and one and a half miles wide at its head. quantities of gas and oil scattered in This wide area, called Topside, loomed dumps throughout the surrounding area.” high above the rest of the island, its 500- Lieutenant Colonel Adams received orders foot cliffs dropping sharply to a narrow on 20 December to evacuate the Cavite beachline. Most of the coast defense bat- area, and for the next fe~v days men and teries and permanent quarters were located supplies were trucked to Mariveles; the here, and the only access routes to the top Christmas day demolition detail was the from the western shore were two ravines, last element to leave.47 .James and Cheney. East of Topside, After darkness fell on 26 Decembw, the along the neck of land that connected the first Marines to move to Corregidor, 14 tadpole’s head and tail, was Middleside, a officers and 397 men of Adams’ battalion, plateau which held several more battery UFergw$on, 3. positions and permanent buildings. A * The town’s natives later burned their own houses and the barracks was consumed in the ‘8 Unless otherwise noted the material in this resulting fire. section is derived from Moore Rep t; Howard ~ Hogaboom, 4. RePt; ~tltMar Jnt; Philippine AirO@3ee; Fall 4’Keene, op. cit., 10. of the p?L@@W8. CHINA AND LUZON 169 third ravine, Ramsay, which led from the was considered impregnable to enemy at- southern beaches to Xliddlesidej was a crit- tack.” 4’ The island which seemed most ical clefensive point. (See ~~ap 8, Map vulnerable to assault was Carabao (Fort Section) Frank) which lay only 500 yards from the .4 logically-named third distinctive por- shore of Cavite Province. However, since tion of the island, Bottomside, consisted of some of its guns were capable of firing in- the low ground occupied by the industrial land and most of its shoreline was ringed and dock area and the native town of San with precipitous cliffs, the job of taking Jose. The nerve center of Luzon’s de- Fort Frank promised to be quite a task. fenses was an extensively -tunnelled hill, General Moore later noted that “the fort- Malint,a Hill, which rose directly east of resses were not designed to withstand a San Jose. The headquarters of Mac- landing attack from adjacent shores sup- Arthur, Rockwell, and Major General ported by overwhelming artillery em- George F. lloore, commanding the forti- placed thereon ;“ 50and that of his big guns fied islands, were all eventually located in only the turrets of Fort. Drum, the 12-inch “the tunnels and laterals that spread out mortars, and two 12-inch long-range guns beneath the hill. From Malinta the long, were capable of all-round fire. A tabula- low, narrow tail of the island bent away tion of the major coast defense armament to the east; a light. plane landing stript of the forts shows: Kindley Field, had been built along the —- spine of the tail. h’umberof Guns Tspe The other three island forts, Hughes, Mills Hughes Drum Frank Drum, and Frank, complemented the de- —— fenses of Fort Mills, and Marines served 14” guns. -..... -. — 2 4 2 as part of the beach defense troops on all 12” guns ------8 — . . but the last named. Caballo Island (Fort 12” mortars...... 10 4 — 8 Hughes), a quarter-mile square in area, 10” guns ------2 — — — — stood less than two miles from Corregi- 8“ guns...... 2 6“guns ------5 2 4 dor; its low-lying eastern shore rose 155mm guns-. . . -_ 19 3 — 4 abruptly to a 3S0-foot height, which con- 3“ guns ______10 21 1 — tained most of the battery positions. Four miles south of (laballo was the ‘(concrete battleship,” Fort Drum. Tiny El Fraile The forts had in addition a small number Island bad been razed to water level and on of 75mm beach defense guns. For anti- its foundation a steel-reinforced concrete aircraft defense, including tied-in bat - fortress had been erected with sides 25- teries on southern Bataan, there were 17 to 36-feet thick, and a. top deck 20-feet searchlights, 40 3-inch gunsj and 48 .50 deep. Two case-hardened steel gun tur- caliber machine guns.51 rets, each sporting a pair of 14-inch guns, M:trilles fronl the 1st Separate Bat- were mounted on the deck and the sides talion ~vere able to add a few .50 caliber of the fort boasted four 6-inch gun case- “ .voorf, Rq)t,4. ments. Its garrison could be completely 60Ibid., 9. contained within its walls, and %he fort 5’Ibid., Annex C. 170 PEARL HARROR TO GuADALCANAL machine guns and a battery of four 3-inch to some men was the vision of a Gibraltar, guns taken from Cavite to the antiaircraft and they talked knowingly of the (non- defenses, but the primary function of the existent ) intricate underground system of battalion was now that of infantry. It defenses.54 was reorganized and re-equipped at Mari- At 080029 December, Colonel Howard veles to fill the role of the missing battalion reported to General Moore for orders as of the 4th Marines; the formal change of Fort Mills’ beach defense commander and title to 3d Battalion, 4th Marines came then started out to make a reconnaissance on 1 January. of the island. His men, temporarily With the exception of Batteries A and quartered in Middleside Barracks, were C and the radar detachment of Adams’ battalion which remained on Bataan, the startled to hear the air raid sirens sound whole of the 4th Marines moved to Cor- shortly before noon. No one paid too regidor in successive echelons on the nights much attention to them as Corregidor had of 27 and 28 December. Enough rations never been bombed, but soon their trust- for 2,000 men for six months, ten units ing attitude changed. “All hell broke of fire for all weapons, two years supply loose,” and as one 1st Battalion officer of summer khaki, and the medicines and described the scene, “there we were—the equipment to outfit a 100-bed hospital ac- whole regiment flat on our bellies on the companied the move. Fortunately, the lower deck of Middleside Barracks.” 55 Quartermaster, Major Ridgely, dispersed The Japanese planes, 40 bombers of the these supplies in small, scattered dumps as 5th Air Group with 19 covering fighters, they arrived and they emerged relatively attacked at 1154. For the next hour a unscathed from the first Japanese air raid parade of Army aircraft flew the long on Corregidor. axis of Corregidor dropping 200- and 500- Many of the Marines in the bamboo pound bombs from 18,000 fret, and dive jungles surrounding Mariveles, who had bombers attacked the antiaircraft bat- to shift camp constantly to avoid bombing teries, strafing as they plunged down. .&t and sleep “on the ground near a foxhole or 1300, the Army planes gave way to the some convenient ditch into which [they] Navy and bombers of the Ele~enth AiY could roll in the event of an air attack>’ w Fleet continued to attack until 1415. None looked forward to moving to The Rock. of FEAF7S few remaining fighters, which They had “watched the Jap bombers steer were being saved for vital reconnaissance clear of its antiaircraft barrages” and it missions, took to the air, but Corregidor’s had been pointed out to them “that Cor- gunners exacted a good price from the regidor’s antiaircraft was so good that the enemy—13 medium bombers fell to the Japs had not even dared to bomb it— 3-inchers and the .50 calibers shot down yet !’) 53 An additional lure of the island four of the dive bombers in a vivid demon- w Statement of Lt ( jg) R. G. Hetherneck in Cdr stration of the folly of flying within reach T. H. Hayes Rept on MedTactics, 4th Regt USMC, 7Dec41-6May4’2, 15Feb46, 79, hereinafter cited as of these guns. But the damage done by Hayes Rept. the enemy was considerable. “ LtCol R. F. Jenkins, Jr., Personal Experi- ences 28Dec41-6May42, n.d., 1, hereinafter cited “ Ibid. as Jenkins. = Ibid. CHINA AND LTJZON 171 Almost all of the barracks and head- panics, commanded by Major Stuart W. quarters buildings and a good half of the King,” bivouacked in Government Ravine, wooden structures on the island were bat- on the southern shore of the island below tered, set afire, or destroyed. .4 thick pall Geary and Crockett Batteries. of black smoke and clouds of dust obscured h“ot all of Adams’ battalion was as- the island from observers on 13ataan, and signed to the Middle Sector; besides the the detail left to load out Marine supplies units left on Bataan, the 3d Battalion wondered at the fate of the regiment in furnished most of the other special de- the center of this maelstrom. 56 The tachments. One platoon (1 officer and 28 casualty score was miraculously low, only men ) with four .50 caliber machine guns one man killed and four wounded. With a and a second ( 1 officer and 46 men) with single exception, bombs used by the Japa- four .30’s left for Fort Hughes on the nese did not penetrate all the way through 30th to bolster the antiaircraft and beach to the bottom deck of the concrete bar- defenses; the !i!dBattalion added ten men racks, but, the building, shaken repeatedly and four more .30 caliber machine guns by hits and near misses, was a shambles. to the beach defenses on 3 January.s8 Fort In all, the island’s defenders suffered about Drum got a section of 15 men and two .50’s 100 casualties, and 29 December marked to augment its crew. A third antiaircraft the end of “normal” above ground living platoon with six .50’s (1 officer and 35 for The Rock’s garrison. men ) was directly assigned to Fort Mills’ As soon as the air raid was over, Howard air defenses and attached to a simila.rly - assigned beach defense sectors to his bat- equipped battery of the 60th Coast Artil- talions, and the troops moved out to their lery which was emplaced near the Topside new bivouac areas before dark. The 1st parade ground. Battalion, 20 officers and 367 enlisted men By 1 January the pattern had been set under Lieutenant Colonel Curtis T. for the Marines’ duties on Corregidor. Beecher, dreti a possible enemy landing The men were digging in, stringing barbed point—the East Sector which included wire, emplacing their 37mm7s, mortars, Malinta Hill and the island’s tail. The and machine guns, and tying-in for a co- beaches of Ilottomside and most of Mid- ordinated and protracted defense. Ahead dleside (Middle Sector), up to a line in- lay more than four months of waiting and cluding Morrison Hill and Ramsay Ra- preparation for a battle, months in which vine were occupied by Lieutenant Colonel more than one survivor likened life on :Idams’ battalion with 20 officers and 49o Corregidor to existence in the center of a men. The defense of the rest of the shore- bull’s eye. line of Corregidor was the responsibility “ Hozta?”ti Rept, 14 lists Maj (then Capt ) Max of the !ild Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel W. Schaeffer as commander of the regimental Herman R. Anderson) which mustered 18 reserve at this point; howe~~er, the contemporary otlicers and 324 enlisted men. A general muster rolls at HQMC and survivors’ comments reserve of 8 officers and 183 men, formed indicate that Maj King held this position until 17Feb4 when Maj Schaeffer took over and King from the Headquarters and Service Com- became ExC) of the beach defense force at Fort Hughes. “ Lyon ltr, op. cit. CHAPTER z Bataan Prelude DRA WING THE B/l TTLE LINES ‘ landecl on I.ingayen Gulf beaches on 1 ,January, was selected by Homma as his The Japanese did not confine their oper- Bataan assault force and reinforced with ations in the Philippines to Luzon, but an infantry regiment from the 16th Di- December landings on Mindanao and Jolo vision and tank, artillery, and service Islands were made primarily to secure troops from army reserves. (See Map 7, bases for further attacks against Borneo. Map Section) Here again the hastily mobilized Philip- The necessary reorganization of the pine .irmy reservists and Constabulary 65tA Brigcrde for combat and its movement troopers were no match for the assault into jump-off positions gave MacArthur forces, and the enemy mzde good his lodg- time to establish an initial defense line. ment. Offensive operations in the south, On 7 ,Jauuary he reorganized his forces however, were limited by the fact that into two corps and a rear area service General Homma did not have sufficient command. Jtrainwright was given I Phil- troops to press a campaign on two fronts. ippine Corps with responsibility for hold- The main strength of the F’ouvteenth ing the western front, and Parker became Arm y remained on Luzon to win control 11 l?hilippine Corps commander with his of Manila Bay. troops manning defenses on the Manila The original Japanese operation plan B:LY side of Bataan. More than /30,000 for Luzon had contemplated its occupa- men were now bottled up on the peninsula tion by the end of Janumy and had pro- al]d some 503000 held positions on or near vided for a mop-up force of one division tile il~itial defense line. These were im- and one brigade with a small air support pressi~’e figures, and in paper strength unit. Shortly after Homma’s troops en- t]~e Bataau c]efenders outnumbered the tered Manila on 2 January, he received Fowtem fh A?rny which had about, 50,000 orders to expedite the withdrawal of the troops under its command. 48th Divi,yioYt and the ~t]l Air Group Military superiority depends, however, which were needed to reinforce stepped-up on many other factors besides relative operiitiolls against Java and on the -ksian troop strength. The conglomerate Amer- mainland. In short return for these troop ican-Filipino forces, completely cut off losses Homma got the 65tA Brigude from from effective relief, had limited supplies Formosa, originally assignecl to mop-up of ratious, medicines, weapons, ammuni- and ~)olice dl~ties. The brigade, which tion, and equipment. By contrast, the enemy’s control of the sea and air gave ‘ [’nless otherwise noted the material in this the ,Japanese an unmatchable resupply section is derived from (7SAFFE-1 “SWIP Rept; 1 ;tll .4 ~rjtu Bept; Fun Of the Philippine. and reinforcement potential. Even when 172 BATAAN PRELUDE 173 the Fourteenth. A~my’s fortunes were at its deepest point and 25 miles wide at its their lowest ebb, the enemy troops could base, the peninsula tapered to an average reasonably expect rescue and relief. width of 15 miles. Numerous streams, 0115 eJaIILl:Wy &~aC.bthUL’, iLL ‘a move to ravines! and gullies cut up the interior conserve dwindling food stocks, had cut all and thick jungle growth blanketed every- troops on Bataan and the fortified islands thil]g. A spine of mountains running to half rations.’ This order was un- l~orthwest to southeast split 13ataan doubtedly the most significant given in roughly in half. The dominant. features the campaign. It prolonged the fighting in tl~e north were Mt. Natib (4,222 feet) for weeks, until Ilataan’s defenses e~-entl~- and its companion Mt. Sih_mganan (3,620 ally collapsed. Men sapped by malnu- feet ), and in the south, Mt. Bataan (4,70() trition and its attendant diseases, for feet ),, which commanded the Mariveles which there were no medicines, could area. .Ilthough numerous trails criss- resist no more. crossed the peninsula, only two motor In launching their initial attack on Ba- roads existed, one running along the coast taan the ,Japanese did not expect that the and the other over t;:. saddle between the reinforced 65th Brigade would have much mountain masses. The western coast line troub]e defeating the American-Filipino was uneven with many promontories forces. The enemy was flushed with his formed by mountain ridges; the eastern coast was more regular and open but be- successes and “completely ignorant con- came hilly and rugged in the south. (See cerning the terrain of Bataan Peninsula.>’ 3 lisp 7, Map Sedion) Homma’s intelligence otlicers had under- The final defense line selected by estimated Mac.irthur’s strength by half, I“SAFFE was midway down the penin- had given their commander a distorted sula, anchored on the towns of Bagac and picture of Filipino morale, and had formu- Oriol~, and generally along the trace of lated an altogether incorrect estimate of the cross-peninsula motor road. It was the c{efensive situation on ~ataan. The the necessity of covering the preparation Fourteenth Army stafl had: of this area for defense and the need to use . . . optimistically presumed that, considering the road as a supply route as long as pos- its position relative to (’orregidor Island, the sible that dictated the occupation of the enemy would offer serious resistance at the initial defense line. Stretching across the southern end of the penins~,la with ~fariyeles as peninsula just above the point where it a nucleus, withdrawing later to Corregidor Island. Taking this for granted, the threat of narrowed, this position had a grave nat- enemy resistance was taken lightly.4 ural \veakl\ess. The corps boundary ran Bataan Peninsula was an ideal position along the hTatib-Silanganan mountain from tile viewpoint of a force col~lmitted maw which pierced the defenses and pre- to a last-ditch stand. Thirty miles long at vented liaison or even contact between l~aillwright’s and Parker’s men. The 2 “Actnally, the tr(wl}s on Bataan recei~-ed .Japanese attempt to crack this defense about one-third ration. ” 1’A’.IFFE-US’FI1’ Rcpt, line eventually involved landings far be- 42 3 l~th .irnlyRcpt, 90. l~ind the front ‘and brought the Marines 4Ibid., 91. at Mariveles into action. BATAAN PRELUDE 175 THE .NA VAL BA TTALZON ‘ crewmen from the submarine tender Canopus, 80 sailors from the Cavite Naval Although the farthest distance from the Ammunition Depot, and 120 general rear boundaries of the corps areas to the duty men from Cavite and Mariveles. southern shore of Bataan was only ten He was also assigned approximately 120 miles, the defensive problem facing Brig- Marines, members of Batteries A and C adier C~eneral Allan C. McBride’s Service which had remained behind on Bataan Command was acute. J$’ith a relatively under naval control when the rest of the few men McBride had to guard over 40 1st Separate Battalion (now 3/4) had miles of rough, jungle-covered coast line moved to Corregidor. against enemy attack. A successful am- The men of First Lieutenant William F. phibious thrust which cut the vital coastal Hogaboom’s Battery A had originally supply road could mean the prompt end been slated to provide replacement and re- of the battle for 13ataan. To protect the lief gun crews for Battery C (First Lieu- east coast he had the newly-organized 2d tenant Wrillard C. Holdredge ) whose 3- (Constabulary) Division; on the west inch guns were set up in a rice paddy coast he had a motley composite force of between the town of Mariveles and the service troops and planeless pursuit squad- section base. But on 5 January Hoga- rons converted to infantry, backed up by boom had received instructions from a a few elements of the 71st Division and USAFFE staff officer, “approved by naval a Constabulary regiment. Responsibility authorities on the ‘Rock’,” G to move his for the security of the naval reservation unit to the site of MacArthur’s advance at Mariveles remained with the Navy. In order to provide protection for CP on Bataan where the Marines were to furnish the interior guard. This as- Marive]es and support the Army in the signment was short-lived, however, since defense of the west coast, Admiral Rock- well on 9 January directed Captain John Commander Bridget needed the men to serve as tactical instructors and cadres for H. S. I)essez, commander of the section the naval battalion, and on 14 January he base. to form a naval battalion for ground directed Hogaboom to report back to combat. The senior naval aviator remain- Mariveles. To replace Battery A, ing in the Philippines, Commander Fran- TTSAFFE detached two officers and 47 cis ,J. Bridget , was appointed battalion men from the 4th Marines 7 and sent commander and he immediately set about them from Corregidor to Bat.aan where organizing his force. For troops he had they guarded the advance headquarters about 480 bluejackets including 150 of his until the end of the campaign. own men from Air ~ .4siatic Fleet, 130 The most serious problem Bridget faced 5Unless otherwise noted the material in this in forming his battalion was the lack of Se(+tiOnis derived from RO~hwell Narrative; 16th ground combat training of his blue- NavDist War Diary, 8Dec41-19Feb42 (located jackets. As the commander of the Can- at NHD) ; Clement Rept; Cdr F. J. Bridget Rept Opln, naturally an interested spectator, to CornSixteen, Action at Longoskawayan Point, 9Feb42 (located at NHD ), hereinafter cited as noted: Brid@ Rept; C’a!lt E. L. Sackett, USN, “History of the USS Carmpus,” 28 Apr47 (located at NHD), ‘ Hogaboom, 5. hereinafter cited as Cmop?Ls Hist; Hogaboom. ‘ ~tb Mar Jnl, 26S. 176 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL . . . perhaps two-thirds of the sailors kuew oped and fixed Parker’s defenses and were which end of the rifle should be presented to probing for weak spots preparatory to an the enemy, and had even practiced on a target all-out assault. It was inevitable that range, but field training was practically a closed book to them. The experienced Marines were they found the open and highly vulnerable spread thinly throughout each company in hope left flank. By 22 January Parker’s posi- that through precept and example, their qualities tion along the slopes of Mt. Natib had been would be assimilated by the rests turned and all reserves with the exception Even after the formation of the naval of one regiment had been committed to battalion, the primary responsibility for contain the penetration. In order to pre- antiaircraft defense of Mariveles still vent the defending forces from being cut rested with the Marine batteries and only off, USAFFE ordered a general with- a relatively fewmen, mostly hTCO’s, could drawal to the Bagac-Orion defense line, be spared to help train the bluejacket to be completed by the 26th. companies. Holdredge’s 3-inchen re- The enemy advancing along the moun- quired at least skeleton crews and Hoga - tainous west coast did not contact Gen- boom’s unit, after its return from eral J$rainwright’s forward positions until L’SAFFE control, was directed to mount 15 ,January. By that date, Homma, im- and man nine .50 caliber machine-gun pressed by the lack of resistance in this posts in the hills around the harbor. sector, had already ordered the $2(W In- Therefore, in both batteries the majority, ~antry of the 16th Division to reinforce of men available for ground combat were and exploit the drive, strike through to sailors; Battery A joined one officer and the Bagac road junction, and gain the rear 65 bluejackets on 16-1’7 ,Tanuary and a of Parker)s corps. Although I Corps had Navy othcer and 40 men joined Hol- been stripped of reserves to back up the dredge’s battery on the 18th and 19th? sagging eastern defense line, Wainwright’s Throughout the naval battalion, training front-line troops were able to stand off the was confined to fundamentals as Bridget initial Japanese assaults. When Homma’s strove to qualify his men as infantry. AS was the case so often in the Philippines, fresh troops attacked on the 21st, however, the time for testing the. combat readiness they effected a lodgment behind the front of the jury-rigged battalion came. all too which eventually made withdrawal toward soon. Bagac mandatory. The local Japanese commander, encouraged by his success, de- LO NGONKA M7AYAN POINT ‘“ ‘0 Unless otherwise noted the material in this In opening his stack on Bataan, General section is taken from USAFFE–USFIP Rept; Homma committed the main strength of Ihth .lrmv Rept; hth Mar Jnl; Clement Rept; the 63th Brv”gad~ along the front of Bridget Itept; Ifogaboom; Btry A, US NavBn, Parker’s II Corps, figuring that the more Xarrative of events, 2Feb42; 2dLt M. E. Peshek ltr to CO, 2/4, “Report of operation of Marine open terrain along the east coast gave him Detachment sent to Bataan on 25 January 1942/’ a greater opportunity to exploit successes. 2Feb42; GunSgt H. M. Ferrell ltr to CO, 1/4, By 11 January the ,Japanese had devel- “Temporary Duty of Mortar Platoon, vicinity of Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands, from 8 Canopus Hist, 14. ,January 25, 1942, to .Tanuary 30, 1942, inclu- ‘ Col W. F. Prickett Itr to CMC’, October 1956. sive, ” 31,Jan42 ; Fall of the Philippines. IMT.4AN PRELUDE 177 tided on a shore-to-shore amphibious as- the scene of action, sent one bluejacket sault which would hit the Bataan coastal platoon under Lieutenant (junior grade) road about four miles below Bagac. Leslie .4. Pew- directly to Pucot while he Embarking after dark on the night of led a second platoon himself in a sweep 92–23 ,January, the enemy’s 900-man land- through the ridges south of the hill. Pew’s ing, force ($d Battalion, ZOth Infantry) platoon deployed as it approached the hill- started out for its objective. It never top, attacked through scattered rifle and arrived. En route two launches of the machine-gun fire , and secured the high battalion’s boat group were discovered and ground without difficulty. The Japanese sunk by an American torpedo boat I’ and offered only slight resistance and then it is possible that these attacks were in- faded out of contact. strumental in scattering the remainder South of the hill Hogaboom ran into a of the landing force. In any event, the platoon from Battery C which had had a enemy boats lost their bearings completely brush with the Japanese and taken a couple in the darkness. Instead of landing on of casualties, but again the enemy had the objective, two-thirds of the unit landed disappeared. The story of light firing at Q,uinauan Point, eight miles south of and no firm resistance was much the same Bagac. The remainder of the battalion, from the rest of the probing patrols which 7 officers and 294 men, came ashore at Bridget ordered out on the 23d; the Japa- Longoskawayan Point, a finger-like prom- nese evidently were still feeling out the ontory only 2,000 yards west of Mari - situation and were not as yet disposed to veles. (See Map 7, Map Section) make a stand or an attack. At dusk the The Longoskawayan landing force was patrols assembled on the mountain and not discovered immediately, and the enemy set up a defense line along its crest and the had time to advance along jungle-matted ridges to the south facing Lapiay and cliffs and reach Lapiay Point, the next Longoskawayan Points. promontory to the north. The Japanese During the day Bridget had called on patrols headed inland from Lapiay for the Service Command for reinforcements Mt. Pucot, a 617-foot hill which com- but few men could be spared as most re- manded both the west coast road and the serves already had been committed to con- landing site, The first word of the pres- tain the larger landing force at Q,uinauan ence of the enemy in his defense sector Point. For infantry he got the 3d Pur- reached Commander Bridget at 0840 on suit Squadron and 60 men from the 301st 23 ,January when the small lookout detach- Chemical Company whom he put into a ment he had posted on Pucot was driven holding line above Lapiay Point and on from its position by enemy machine-gun the north slope of Pucot; for fire sLLppOrt fire. lle received one 2.95-inch mountain pack Bridget immediately phoned Hogaboom howitzer and crew from the 71st Division. and Holdredge, directing both oflicers to BY nightfall the chemical company had Hogaboom, closestto send out patrols. tied in with the pursuit squadron on its right and with Battery A atop Pucot on “ CoinhlTBron+, Rept of Act of ~’SSPT-34 on its left; platoons from Battery C, the Air, the night of 22–23Jan42,27~eb42 (located at NH~), 1. Asiatic Fleet Company, and the Naval 178 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL Ammunition Depot Company held the rest The Marine officer ordered a withdrawal of Pucot?s crest and the southern ridges to the previous night’s positions. which blocked off the landing area from The source of the mortar and howitzer Mariveles. ‘z None of the naval battalion fire was Longoskawayan Point where a units was at full strength and none of the patrol led by I.ieutenant Holdredge had platoons strung out along the ridges was encountered the main body of Japanese. strictly a Navy or a Marine outfit. Sailors His two-man point had surprised an enemy predominated but Marines were present all group setting up a field piece in a clear- along the line, mostly as squad leaders and ing and opened up with a rifle and a BAR, platoon sergeants. The composition of dropping about a dozen men around the that part of the battalion which got into gun. The Japanese reaction was swift, action became even more varied as the agreeing with the B.AR-man’s evaluation battle shaped up, and eventually about a that the surprise fire “ought to make them third of the men on the front-line were madder’n hell. ” 1s The patrol fell back, drawn from the Marine batteries. fighting a rear guard action until it cleared Bridget’s men got their first real taste the area of the point’s tip, and then it of the blind fighting of jungle warfare on retired to the ridges. After the day% the 24th. Hogaboom led a patrol down action Hogaboom and Holdredge com- the bluff above Lapiay Point and ran head- pared notes and estimated that they faced on into an enemy machine gun firing from at least 200 well-equipped enemy troops heavy cover. Grenades thrown at the gun in strong positions; they informed Bridget exploded harmlessly in a tangle of lush of their conclusion that it would take a vegetation which screened it from view; fully-organized battalion with supporting the men were being fired upon and they weapons to dislodge them. were replying, but sound rather than sight (h the morning of 2!5 January, was the key to targets. When reinforce- USAFFE augmented Bridget’s force by sending him a machine-gun platoon and ments arrived later in the day an attempt an 81mm mortar platoon from the 4th was made to establish a holding line across Marines on The Rock. The two mortars the point, but the Japanese opened up with immediately set up on a saddle northwest a second machine gun and steady rifle fire. of Pucot and, with Hogaboom spotting for Then they began dropping mortar and them, worked over the whole of Lapiay howitzer shells among Hogaboom’s group. and Ixmgoskawayan Points; direct hits were scored on the positions where the fin officer of who knew many of the sur- “ 3/4 ,Japanese had been encountered the day vivors of this action, later wrote an article de- scribing the battle. He maintained that the Army before. A midafternoon patrol discovered detachments mentioned never joined, although that the enemy had evacuated Lapiay, but they may have been assigned, and that the purely it was soon evident where they had gone. naval companies were not ~med as such, Instead Holdredge led a combined force of several the sailors who could be s~)ared joined one of the platoons against Longoskawayan Point Marine onits. While this story is quite credible, in this instance the conternl]orary llrid(~pt Rept and ran into a hornet’s nest. He himself has b?en used as a guide. See I,tcol W, F. was among those wounded before the pla- Prickett, “Naval Battalion at ]Iariveles,’” Jff’ Gawtle, ,June 1930, MM:]. 1’ Quoted in Hogatmom, 10. BATAAN PRELUDE 179 toons could extricate theinselves. Again skawayan. Bridget again authorized a the naval battalion occupied blocking posi- withdrawal to the night defense lines on tions on the ridges east of the points for the eastern ridges. night defense. The solution to the problem of elimina- During the action of the 25th, USAFFE ting the Japanese beachhead arrived late had changed the command structure in the that afternoon. Colonel Clement, who rear service. area and given the corps com- had come over from Corregidor to advise manders responsibility for beach defense Bridget on the conduct of the Longo- throughout 13ataan. In addition, Mac- skawayan action, had requested reinforce- Arthur had granted permission for the ments from I Corps. Wainwright sent in 12-inch mortars on Corregidor to support the regular troops needed and the 2d Bat- Bridget’s battalion. Shortly after mid- talion of the 57th Philippine Scout Regi- night, the giant mortars, spotted in by an ment relieved the naval battalion, which observer on Mt. Pucotj laid several rounds went into reserve. The 4th Marines’ mor- on Ixmgoskawayan Point. The daylight tars and machine guns were assigned to hours were spent in light patrol action the Scouts to support their operations. while the battalion was readied for a full- The oddly-assorted platoons of Bridget’s scale attack on the 27th. General Wain- battalion were not committed to action wright sent a battery of Philippine Scout again, but they had done their job in con- 75mm guns to support the drive. taining the Japanese though outnumbered At 0700 on 27 January the mountain and outgunned. howitzer, the Marine mortars, the Scout The Scouts spent 28 January in develop- 75%> and Corregidor’s 12-inch mortars ing the Longoskawayan position. On the fired :1 preparation on Longoskawaym, 29th they attacked in full strength with and a skirmish line of ‘:~bout 200 men, some all the support they could muster, The 60–75 of t,hem.Marines, started to advance. mine sweeper Quail, risking an encounter The enemy reoccupied his positions as soon with’ Japanese destroyers, came out from as the supporting fire lifted, and the Mariveles and cruised offshore while Com- jungle came alive with bullets and shell mander Bridget spotted for the 12-inch fragments. T!le right and center of the mortars and the 75mm guns, The ship line made little progress in the face of closed from 2,200 to 1,300 yards firing heavy machine-gun fire, On the left point-blank at Japanese soldiers trying to where the goiilj{ was a little easier a ~dp hide out in the caves and undergrowth soon opened through which Japanese in- along the shores of the point.14 Ashore filtr:tt ing groups were able to reach the the Scouts, supported by machine-gun and reserve’s positions. mortar fire from the landing flanking the lltring the resulting hectic fighting, the point, did the job expected of them and enemy opened up with mortar fire to smashed through the enemy lines. By herald a counterattack; fortunately, the nightfall organized resistance had ended 4tb llarines> 81’s were able to silence this and the cost of taking Lapiay and Long- fire, but it was soon obvious that the naval “CO USS (Wail Rept of Act at Longoskawayan battalion was in no shape to advance Pt morning of 29Jan42, 30Jan42 (located at farther or even to hold its lines on Longo- NHD) , 1. 180 PEARL HARROR TO GUADilLCANAL oskawayan had been counted. Bridget’s the Japanese offensive sputtered to a halt unit had lost 11 killed and 26 wounded in in front of the Bagac-Orion line. The action; the Scout casualties were 11 dead initial enemy advance on Bataan had not and 27 wounded; and the Japanese had been made without cost, ,and the casualty lost their entire landing force. rate now soared so high that the attack- During the next few days patrols, aided ing troops were rendered ineffective. On by ship’s launches armored and manned 13 February Homma found it necessary by crewmen from the Canopu-s, mopped to break contact, pull back to a line of up the area, killing stragglers and taking blocking positions, and to regroup his bat- a few prisoners, but the threat to Mari- tered forces. The lull in the Fmwteenz% veles was ended. Similar action by ade- Army’s attack was only temporary, how- quately supported Scout units wiped out ever, as Homma was promised replace- the Quinauan Point landing force by 7 ments and reinforcements. When the February. The major Japanese attempt second phase of the battle for Bataan to reinforce the beleaguered troops on opened, the scales were heavily tipped in Quinauan was beaten back by the com- favor of the Japanese. bined fire of artillery, naval guns, and the The detachment of Canopus crewmen, strafing of the four P40’s remaining on the sailors from the Cavite Naval Ammu- Bataan. Elements of an enemy battalion nition Depot, and the majority of the gen- which did get ashore on a point of land eral duty men, nine officers and *27 en- just above Quinauan on 27 January and listed men in all, were transferred to the 2 February were also finished off by the 4th Marines on Corregidor on 17-18 Feb- scouts. ruary. Commander Bridget and his naval By 13 February the last survivors of the aviation contingent moved to Fort Hughes amphibious attempts had been killed or on the 30th where Bridget became beach captured. The make-shift beach defense defense commander with Major Stuart W. forces which had initially contained the King of the 4th Marines as his executive landings had barely managed to hold their officer. Battery C of 3/4 remained at own against the Japanese. They had had Mariveles to man its antiaircraft guns, to overreach themselves to keep the enemy but Battery A rejoined the regiment, with off balance and prevent a breakthrough most of its men going to Headquarters while the troops of I and II Corps were (lornpany to augment the regimental falling back to the Bagac-Orion position. reserve. (hce that line was occupied and Wain- The assignment of the sailors of the wright could commit some of his best naval battalion to Colonel Howard’s com- troops in sufficient numbers and with ade- mand accentuated the growing joint- quate support, the Japanese were finished. service character of the Marine regiment. Discolu-aged by their amphibious fiasco, Small contingents of crewmen from the enemy never again attempted to hit the damaged or sunken boats of the Inshore coastal flanks of the .&merican-Filipino Patrol also had been joined and over 700 positions. Philippine Army air cadets and their offi- At the same time the survivors of the cers were now included in the 4th’s ranks. landing attempts were being h(luted down, These men, most of whom had never had .n. BATAAN PRELUDE 151 any infantry training, were distributed severity of the enemy shellings from Cavite throllghout the companies on beach de- was not great enough to be effective in fense and in reserve where the experienced halting the construction and improvement Marines could best train them by example of beach defenses on Corregidor. and close individual instruction. No com- Trenches and gun positions lined the pany in the regiment retained an all- shores of Bottomside and the ravines lead- Marine complexion. ing to Topside and Middleside from the The arrival of reinforcements on Cor- beaches. Barbed wire entanglements and regidor and Caballo came at a time when mine fields improvised from aerial bombs the Japanese had stepped up their cam- were laid across all possible approaches. paign against the fortified islands. On 6 The ordnance stores of the island were February, the first enemy shells, fired by 105mm guns emplaced along the shore of searched to provide increased firepower Cavite Province, exploded amidst the for the 4th Marines;’ and guns were sited .lmerican positions on all the islands, to insure that any landing force would be The reaction was swift and the forts re- caught in a murderous crossfire if it at- plied with the guns that could bear. The tempted to reach shore. counterbattery e x c h a n g e continued The thoroughness of the regiment’s throughout February and early March, preparations was indicative of its high occasionally waning as the Japanese were state of morale. The men manning the forced to shift. to new firing positions by beach defenses, and to a lesser extent their gunners on Forts Frank and Drum. The comrades in the jungles of Bataan, never limited number of planes available to completely abandoned hope of rescue and Homma made enemy bombers infrequent relief until the very last days of their visitors during this period, and the Jap- ordeal.ls Even when General MacArthur anese concentrated on reducing the island was ordered to leave the Philippines to defenses with artillery fire. In the first take over a new Allied command in the week of March, the American commander Southwest Pacific, many men thought that on Fort Frank received a demand for its he would return, leading a strong relief surrender with a boast that the Cavite coast was lined with artillery and that: force. The senior commanders in the Philippines and the Allied leaders knew . . . Carabao will be reduced by our mighty artillery fire, likewise Drum ; after reduction the truth, however, and realized that bar- of C’arabao and Drum our invincible artillery ring a miracle, Luzon was doomed to fall. will pound Corregidor into submission, batter Only a few key men could be taken out of it, weaken it, preparatory to a final assault by the trap by submarine, torpedo boat, or crack Japanese landing troops,id The surrender note was unproductive ‘7One source of beach defense guns was the for the enemy, but it was prophetic regard- sub-caliber 37nlm’s which were used for practice tiring by Corregidor’s big guns. These were dis- ing the fate of ~orregidor. mounted from the gun tubes and turned over to Until the Japanese were ready to renew the Marines. LtGen S. L. Howard interview by their assault on Bataan in late March, the HistBr, G–3, HQMC, 26(M%3, hereinafter cited as How’ard Interview. ‘“ Quoted in Ui3’AFFE-USFIP Rept, 40-41. MMaj T. E. PU1OSltr to CMC, 300ct56. 182 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL plane; the rest had to be left to accept their fate, The Fourteenth Amy set 3 April as D- On 11 March, the day before MacArthur day for its reuewed of~msive on Bataan, and his party started the first leg of their and General Homma foresaw ‘(no reason journey to .4ustralia, he created a new why this attack should not succeed.;’ ‘2 He headquarters, Luzon Force, to control the could well be confident since he had re- operations on Bataan and appointed Gen- ceived the infantry replacements needed eral Wainwright to its command. On 20 to rebuild the 16th Division and the 65t?~ March, the. War Department notified Brz’g(/de, and he ld been sent the lth Di- Wainwright of his promotion to lieutenant vision from Shanghai. In addition, InY- general and of the fact that he was to be peria7 Headquarters had allotted him a commander of all forces remaining in the strongly reinforced infantry regiment Philippines. To take the place of from the (!?Ist Division, originally slated US.4FFE, an area headquarters, United for duty in Indo-China. His artillery States Forces in the Philippines strength had been more than doubled and (USFIP), was created. now included far-ranging 240mm howitz- To take his place on Bataan, Wainwright ers. Two heavy bomber regiments had appointed the US.AFFE Artillery Officer, been flown up from Malaya to increase ma- Major General Edward P. King, Jr. King terially his mastery of the air. drew an unenviable task when he took over Once the enemy attack was launched, the T.uzon Force, for the volume of Japanese pressure on Bat aan’s defenders was relent- preparatory fire on Bataan and on the less. In less than a week the issue had been island forts indicated the start of a major decided. The physically weakened Ameri- cans and Filipinos tried desperately to effort. To meet this attack, King had stem the Japanese advance, but to no avail. troops who had already spent two weeks By 7 April the last reserves had been com- on a diet of ~/8of a ration on top of two mitted. A growing stream of dazed, dis- months of half rations; they were ready organized men, seeking to escape the in- to fight but “with not enough food in their cessant bombardment at the front :u]d tile bellies to sustain a dog.” “ The LTSAFFE onrushing enemy, crowded the roads and Surgeon General, on 18 February, had ac- trails leading to Mariveles. Only isolated counted Bataan’s defenders as being only groups of soldiers still fought to hold the 5570 combat efficient as a result of “debil- ,Japanese back from the tip of the penin- ities due to malaria, dysentery, and general sula. Under these circumstances, General malnutrition.?’ 20 These same men were King decided to seek surrender terms. His now a month further along—on the road to aide recorded the situation in his diary: exhaustion and collapse and were destined 8th [April]. Wednesday. The army can not to meet a fresh and vigorous enemy assault. attack. It is impossible. Area is congested with stragglers . General King has ordered all “ W’ain~crifll~t’sStor~, 7& The ration was cat to Y( On 2 jMarch according to [’S.~FFE’–t~~~’11’ “ ~Tl,lessother~yise {Ioted the material in this RegM entry for that date. section is derived from 1’,S.4FFE-liSFIP Rept : 20Quoted in Diary of Maj .4. C. Tisdelle, Aide l~tll .Ar>ll y Rcpt: I’ll lt of tllr PI(ilippincs. to MajGen King, entry of 18Feb42. “ l~th .lrm?i l?rpt. Appendix 4, 17. BATAAX PREL1’DE 183 tanks thrown [blown?] and arms destroyed, and of small craft dodged its way to the north is going forward to contact the Japanese and try dock of Bottomside. Everything that to avert a massacre.” could float was pressed into use by frantic Near midnight on the 8th a severe earth- refugees. Some of the arrivals, however, quake tremor was felt on Corregidor and such as the nurses from Bataan’s hospitals, l;ati~:~i~, and soon thereafter the Mariveles were under orders to report to Corregidor. harbor was shaking violently from man- Specific units that could strengthen The made explosions, as King’s orders to de- Rock’s garrison, antiaircraft batteries and stroy all munitions dumps were carried the 45th Philippine Scout Regiment, had out. To an observer on The Rock it seemed also been called for. Only the AAA gun- that: ners from the Mariveles area, including the 4th Marines’ Battery C, managed to . . . the southern end of Bataan was a huge conflagration which resembled more than any- escape. The Scout regiment was pre- thing else a volcano in violent eruption . . . vented from reaching the harbor in time white hot pieces of metal from exploded shells by the jammed condition of the roads. and bombs shot skyward by the thousands in By noon on 9 April, General King had every conceivable direction. Various colored found out, that no terms would be given flares exploded in great numbers and charged off on crazy courses much the same as a sky rocket him; the Japanese demanded uncondi- which has run wild on the ground.z’ tional surrender. With thousands of his men lying wounded and sick in open air All night long the water between 13ataan general hospitals and all hope of success- and Corregidor was lashed with falling ful resistance gone, King accepted the in- debris and fragments from the explosions. evitable and surrendered, asking only that Through this deadly shower a procession his men be given fair trcmtment. The ‘3Tisdelle, op. cit. battle for Bataan had ended, and more “ “’l’he Epic of Corregidor- LCdr T. C. Parker, than 75,000 gallant men began the first of Bataan, December 24, 1941-31ay 4, ltM2~’ [~S’A”I Procccdinas, January 1943, 18, hereinafter cited more than a thousand days of brutal as Parker. captivity. 44s777 0—.5s-13 CHAPTER 3 The Siege and Capture of Corregidor THE JAPAA7ESE PLANfl ‘ plan. In mid-April a severe outbreak of malaria in the ranks of the .@h Division, On 9 April the victorious Fourteenth Homma’s chosen. landing force, severely Amy paused on the shore of I%taan with hampered attack preparations, but am- its next target.—Corregidor—dead center phibious training and rehearsals continued in its sights. Many enemy staff officers, despite the temporary decrease in the both in Tokyo and on Luzon, wanted to division’s effective strength. Emergency launch an immediate amphibious attack, supplies of quinine tablets were flown to taking advantage of the army’s success Luzon in time to check the spread of the on Bataan. The dearth of landing craft disease and restore fighting trim. in Manila Bay, however, effectively served The Fourteenth Army was obsessed, with to postpone the operation. Most of the the need for deception and secrecy and .Japanew landing barges and boats were stringent security measures were taken located in Lingayen Gulf or Subic Bay to conceal the preparations for the attack and had to he moved past Corregidor’s on Corregidor. A consistent effort was guns to the designated staging areas on made to create the impression that Cavite the eastern coast of Bataan. (See Map Province was the Japanese amphibious 8, Map Section) base and that Forts Frank and Drum were On the night of 14 April the first small the targets. Landing craft maneuvered group of boats slipped by The Rock, hug- off Cavite’s shores while the army’s air ging Bataan’s shore while the enemy and artillery pounded the defenses of the shelled and bombed the island’s north southern islands. Two battalions of the coast to prevent their discovery. 2 Because 16th D~v&wn feigned preparations for an they were forced to follow this method of attack on Frank and Drum, but there was moving a few boats at a time and these little doubt at USFIP Headquarters that only at night and behind a curtain of pro- Corregidor was the primary Japanese tective fire., the tJapanese took more than objective. three weeks to assemble the necessary Every day in April, starting with the assault craft. day Bataan fell, an increasingly heavier The need for extreme caution in making concentration of enemy artillery pieces the risky passage into Manila Bay was found firing positions in the peninsula’s not the only factor which acted against j ungled hills. At least thirty-seven bat- rapid execution of the ,Japanese assault teries, whose weapons ranged from 75mm mountain guns to !MOmm howitzers, cov- ‘ Unless otherwise noted the nlaterial in this ered Corregidor with a continuous pattern section is derived frwn Iltlf .irwu Rept; Philip- of fire that reached every position and pit!e .4ir0p81tec; Pall of tile Pili/ippineLI ‘ ltl, Mar tJnl,W-1. knocked out the major portion of the 184 THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 185 island’s de fenses.s Nine Japanese bomb- ante of Sate’s unit which was scheduled ing squadrons, capitalizing on the gradual to make a concurrent attack against Ram- weakening of antiaircraft fire, were over- say Battery hill. Throughout the whole head to add their bombardment to the at- operation the artillery on Bataan, op- tack preparation. erating under army control, was to deliver The enemy Jth Divtiion was reinforced preparatory and supporting tires, and in for the assault with two independent en- daylight hours the army’s air squadrons gineer regiments to man the transport were to fly close support missions, and support landing craft as well as The _@h Division had three infantry a tank regiment and three mortar bat- battalions in reserve for its attack but did talions to provide additional firepower. not expect that they would be needed. The The actual landing operation was to be Japanese were confident that their prepar- made in two stages with Colonel Gem- atory bombardment had knocked most of pachi Sate’s 61st Znfan.try Re@rnent (two the fight out of Corregidor. Every ter- infantry battalions, a tank company, a rain feature on the island was plotted and mountain artillery battery, and mortar registered on artillery target maps and units) designated the initial assault force. any signal for support from the assault Sato was to land his unit in successive forces would call down a smother of ac- waves, battalions a b r e as t along the curate fire on the defenders. The enemy beaches between Infantry and Cavalry felt certain that dusk of 7 May would see Points on the night of 5 May. After es- their assault troops in control of Cor- tablishing a beachhead, he was to send most regidor. of his men against Malinta Hill while the remainder of the regiment drove across the LIFE OAT A BULL’S EYE 4 tail of the island to isolate and contain the During the 27 days between the fall of defenders east of Infantry Point. The Bataan and the assault on Corregidor, plan called for the 61st Regiment to be in life on The Rock became a living hell. The possession of Malinta Hill by dawn, ready men in the open gun pits and exposed to support a second landing. beach defenses were subjected to an increas- Twenty-four hours after Sate’s force ing rain of shells and bombs, It became landed, the division’s main assault effort virtually impossible to move about the would strike beaches between Morrison and Battery Points, near James Ravine, 4Unless otherwise noted the material in ttds and at the neck of the island. This second section is derived from .!7S.4FFll-uSFIPlte~t; Moore Rept; lth Mar Jnl; Hayes Rept; Capt C. landing force, four heavily reinforced in- B. Brook, USN’, Personal Experiences 8Apr- fantry battalions, would have the assist- 6 May 56, n.d., hereinafter cited as Brook; Maj H. E. Dalness, USA, “The Operations of the 4th ‘ Many survivors and a number of accounts Battalion (Provisional ) 4th Marine Regiment of this siege credit the .Japanese with having in the Final Counterattack in the Defense of as many as 400 artillery pieces firing on the Corregidor 5-6 May 1942,” AdvInfOff Course fortified islands by 5 May. The figure of 37 194%50, The InfSch, Ft. Benning, Ga., herein- batteries (approximately 150 pieces ) represents after cited as Da tn(’8.s; Ferfw 80n; ~cakin 8; only the enemy artillery units listed in 14t/tArmu lstLt O. E. Saalman, IJSA, Personal Experiences l?ept, 187 as part of the Corregidor attack 12Apr-6May42, n,d., hereinafter cited as organization. Saalman. THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 18’7 island by daylight; enemy artillery spot- stained from perspiration and dirt. Their gaunt, ters aloft in observation balloons on Ba- unshaven faces were strained and emaciated. Some of them were already suffering from beri- taan and in planes overhead had a clear beri as a result of a starvaflon diet of rice for view of their targets. The dense vegeta- weeks. We did what we could for them and then tion which had once covered most of Cor- put them to work on the beach defenses.’ regidor was stripped away by blast and fragmentation to reveal the dispositions of The sailors from Mariveles, mostly Howard’s command. The tunnels through crewmen from the now-scuttled Cizn.opus, Malinta Hill, their laterals crowded with were kept together and formed into a new headquarters installations and hospital 275-man reserve battalion for the regi- beds, offered refuge for only a fraction of ment, the 4th Battalion, 4th Marines.a the 11,000-man garrison and the rest of Not only was the designation of 4/4 un- the defenders had to stick it out ~ith little usual, but so was its makeup and its per- hope of protection from the deadly down- sonnel. Only six Marines served in the pour. battalion: its commander, Major Francis Most of the escapees from Bataan were H. Williams, and five NCOS. The staff, ordered to join the 4th Marines, thus add- company commanders, and platoon lead- ing 72 officers and 1,173 enlisted men to its ers were drawn from the nine Army and 18 strength between 9 and 12 April.5 The Navy officers assigned to assist Williams.g majority of the Army combat veterans, The four rifle companies were designated however, “were in such poor physical con- Q, R, S, and T, the highest lettered com- dition that they were incapable of even light work,” ‘ and had to be hospitalized. panies the men had ever heard of. An- The mixed collection of infantry, artillery, other boast of the bluejackets turned Ma- aviation, and service personnel from both rines was that they were ‘the highest paid American and Philippine units assigned to battalion in the world, as most of the men the beach defense battalions was in little better shape than the men who had been ‘ Jenkins,~~. committed to the hospital under Malinta * Most survivors of 4/4 refer to the battalion as having had approximately 500 men in its Hill. The commander of 1/4’s reserve, ranks. Strength breakdowns of the 4th Mar First Lieutenant Robert F. ,Jenkins, Jr., exist up through lNlay42,howe~er, and nowhere who received a typical contingent of Ba- do they support the larger figure. The S–3 of taan men to augment his small force com- 4/4 is certain that the total strength of the bat- mented that he: talion on 6 nay was no more than 350men. Maj O. E. Saalmanltr to CMC, 220ct56, hereinafter . . . had never seen men in such poor physical cited as Smlrnan1956. condition. Their clothing was ra~~ed and 9Survivors of 4/4 are unable to agree on the identity of the man who served as ExO of the ‘ The former sergeant major of 2/4 believes battalion; at least five Army or Navy officers that the reghnent joined substantially more men have been mentioned. In addition,the possibility than this figure which appears in the regimental that a hlarine who was closely connected with journal. He recalls that the 2d 1% “picked up 4/4 was de facto ExO was brought out by one for rations, and on the crudest rolls, at least 600 of the NC(M who recalls that “Major Williams men” and believes that the other battalions did alwaYs considered Gunner Joe Reardon [QMClk the same. Jac%xon. Joseph J. Reardon] as his Executive Officer and ‘ Wainuwight’s Story, 87. Adjutant.” MSgt K. n’. Mize ltr to CMC, 1Nov56. 188 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL were petty officers of the upper pay late March, Williams’ battalion was organ- gra ales.” 1° ized at the inception of the period of The new organization went into bivouac heaviest enemy fire and spent part of every in Government Ravine as part of the regi- day huddled in foxholes dug along the mental reserve. The reserve had here- trail between Geary Point and Govern- tofore consisted of men from the ment Ravine. *2 Any let-up in the bom- Headquarters and Service Companies, re- bardment would be the signal for small inforced by Philippine Air cadets and groups of men to gather around the Army Marines from Bataan. Major Max W. officers and Mlrine NCOS for instruction Schaeffer, who had replaced Major King in the use of their weapons and the tactics as reserve commander, had organized this of small units. Rifles were zeroed in on force of approximately 250 men into two flcxating debris in the bay and for most tactical companies, O and P. Company of the men this marksmanship training was O was commanded by Captain Robert their first since 11’avy boot camp. When Chambers, ,Jr. and Company P by Lieu- darkness limited ,Japanese shelling to tenant Hogaboom; the platoons were led harassment and interdiction fires, the by Marine warrant officers and senior sailors formed eager audiences for the NCOS. Army 13ataan veterans who gave them a A good part of Schaeffer’s men had pri- resum6 of enemy battle tactics. Every mary duties connected with regimental man was dead serious, knowing that his supply and administration, but each after- chances for survival depended to a large noon the companies assembled in the extent upon how much he learned. “The bivouac area where the troops were in- chips were down; there was no horse- structed in basic infantry tactics and the play.>’ ‘3 employment of their weapons. Despite To a very great extent the record of the the constant interruptions of air raids and 4th Battalion in the fighting on Corregidor shellings, the Marines and Filipinos had was a tribute to the inspirational leader- a chance “to get acquainted with each ship of its commander. During the try- otherl familiarize themselves with each ing period under enemy she]lfire and others’ voices, ancl to learn [the] t,ean- bombilig when the battalion’s character work” 11 so essential to effective combat was molded, Major Williams seemed to be operations. Frequently, Major Schaetier omnipresent; wherever the bombardment conducted his company and platoon com- was heaviest, he showed up to see how his manders on reconnaissance of beach de- men were weathering the storm. When fenses so that the reserve leaders would be on separate occasions Battery Crockett and familiar with routes of approach and ter- then Battery Geary were hit and set afire, rain in each sector in wllicll they might lie led rescue parties from 4/4 into the tight . l’esulting holocausts of flame, choking While Schaeffer’s ul~it had had some smoke, and exploding ammunition to time to train before the ,Japanese stepped rescue the wounded. He seemed to have up their bombardment of the island in ‘2 Dr. (’, E, Chonn ltr to CMC, 12Nov56, herein- ‘“ Brook, 1. :Ifter cited as Chunn. “ Ferga30n, lo. ‘3 Dalness, 7. THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 189 an utter disregard for his own safety in There were many more casualties than we had the face of any need for his presence. suffered in the previous five months.la Survivors of his battalion agree with About three days prior to the Japanese startling unanimity that he was a giant landing, Lieutenant Colonel Beecher re- among men at a time when courage was ported to Colonel Howard that defensive commonplace. installations in the 1st Battalion% sector Raw courage was a necessity on the forti- were: fied islands after Bataan’s fall, since there ,.. practically destroyed. Very little defen- was no defiladed position that could not sive wire remained, tank traps construct~ with be reached by ,Japanese 240mm howitzers great difficultyhad been rendered useless, and all firing from Cavite and Bataan. The my weapons were in temporary emplacementsas bombers overhead, increasingly bold as the original emplacements had been destroyed. I told Colonel Howard at this time that I was gun after gun of the antiaircraft defenses very dubiousas to my ability to withstanda land- was knocked out, came down lower to pin- ing attack in force. ColonelHoward reported the point targets. Counterbattery and anti- facts to General Wainwright, who, according to aircraft tire silenced some enemy guns and Colonel Howard, said that he would never sur- accounted for a number of planes, but render. I pointed out to Colonel Howard that I had said nothing about surrender but that I was nothing seemed to halt the buildup of merely reporting the facts as it was my duty preparatory fires. to do?f On 28 April Howard issued a warning to The increase in the fury of the Japanese his battalions that the next day would be bombardment with the coming of May, a rough one. It was the Emperor’s birth- coupled with the frequent. sightings of day and the Japanese could be expected to landing craft along the eastern shore of “celebrate by unusual aerial and artillery Bataan, clearly pointed to the imminence bombardment.”’4 The colonel’s prophecy of an enemy landing attempt. The last proved to be a true one, and on the 29th one successful effort to evacuate personnel observer noted that even “the kitchen sink from the island forts was made on the came over.”’5 The birthday celebration night of 3 May. The submarine Spear#tsh marked the beginning of a period when the surfaced after dark outside the mine fields enemy bombarded the islands without let- off Corregidor and took on a party of of- up, day and night. The men manning the ficers and nurses who had been ordered beach defenses of Corregidor’s East Sector out., as well as a load of important USFIP found it: records and a roster of every person still . . . Imactically impossible to get any rest or alive on the islands.’s The 4th Marines to repair any damageto our positions and barbed wire. Our tield telephone system was knocked “ Jenkin8, 15-16. ollt ; our water supply was ruined (drinking “ BriGen C. T. Reecher ltr to Mr. G. J. Berry, water had to be hauled from the other end of the 17Mar50 (deposited by Capt G. J. Berry, USMCR, island in large powder cans) . . Corregidor was in the USMC Archives, 300ct56 ). enveloped in a cloud of smoke, dust, and the “ Submarines were the beleaguered garrison’s continuous roar of bursting shells and bombs. only contact with Allied bases outside the Phil- ippines during most of the siege. Although the “ ~tk Mar .Inl, 392. subs brought in rations, antiaircraft ammunition, ‘5Parker, 20. and medical supplies on scattered occasions, the 190 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCAATAL sent out their regimental journal, its last reduced. Casualties mounted as the men’s entry, dated2 May, the list of the five men foxholes, trenches, and shelters crumbled who had been killed and the nine who had lmder the fire. L-nit leaders checking the been ~vounded during the day’s bombard- strrte of the defenses were especially vul- ment. nerable to the fragments of steel which To one of the lucky few who got ordels swept the ground bare. By the Japanese- to leave on the A’pear$sh the receding is- itppointed X-Day (5 May) the 1st Battal- land looked “beaten and burnt to a ion had lost the commander of Company A, crisp.>’ lD In one day, 2 May, USFIP esti- Major Harry C. I.ang, and Captain Paul mated that 12 240mm shells a minute had A. Brown, commanding Company B, had fallen on Correg-idor during a five-hour been hospitalized as a result of severe con- period. On the same day the ,Japanese cussion suffered during an enemy bombing flew 55 sorties over the islands dropping attack.” Three Army officers attached to 12 1,000-pound, 45 500-pound, and 159 the Reserve Company, an officer of Com- 200-pound bombs.’” The damage was ex- pany B, and another of Company D had all tensive. Battery Geary’s eight 12-inch mortars were completely destroyed as was been severely wounded. one of Battery Crockett’s two 12-inch guns. Despite the damage to defenses it had so The enemy fire also knocked out of action laboriously constructed, the 4th Marines two more 12-inch mortars, a 3-inch gun, was ready, indeed almost eager, to meet a three searchlights, five 3-inch and three ,Japanese assault after days and weeks of .50 caliber antiaircraft guns, and a height absorbing punishment without a chance to finder. Data transmission cables to the strike back. On the eve of a battle -which guns were cut in many places and all com- no one doubted was coming, the regiment ~nunication lines were damaged. The was perhaps the most unusual Marine unit beach defenses lost four machine guns, a ever to take the field. From an under- 37mnl, and a pillbox; barbed wire., mine strength two-battalion regiment of less fields, and rm~iboat obstacles were torn than 800 Marine regulars it had grown apart. until it mustered almost 4,000 officers and The logical landing points for an assault men drawn from all the services and 142 against Corregidor, the entire East Sector clitlerent orgtmizations.zz Its ranks con- and the ravines that gave access to Topside tained 72 Marine officers and 1,368 enlisted and Middleside, received a special working over so steady and deadly that the effec- “ Beeeher ltr to Rerry, op. cit. “ The last complete contemporary breakdown tiveness of the beach defenses was sharply of strength of the 4th lMar by component units is contained in -$th .11({wJ)tt, 390. It was corrected amount that they COU1(lcarry was only enough through 1 May. .4 slightly earlier list dated for stop-gap relief. For the interesting story of 28 Apr42, detached from the journal book but un- the diversified subn)arine actions in support of mistakably once part of it, has an interesting USAFFE-USI!’lP see, T. Roscoe, United S’tatcs appendix which gives the units from which at- ~ubrrlrrri?le t>pf>ratio)(s in world Wcrr II ( An. tached personnel originated. It shows that 26 napolis: U. S. Na~-al Institute, 1949). 23-39, Navy, 104 American and Philippine Army, 9 ‘“ Parker, 22. Philipl)ine Scout, and 3 Philippine Constabulary ‘0 Philippine .iirOpsRcc, Plate 8. organizations furnished men to the 4th Mar. THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 191 Marines, 37 Navy officers 23and 848 blue- The units that actually met the Japanese jackets, and 111 American and Philippine at the beaches—1/4, 4/4, and the regimen- Air Corps, Army, Scout, and Constabulary tal reserve—had such a varied makeup that officers with 1,455 of their men. it deserves to be recorded: 24 I 1 HqCo I SerCo 1stBn 4th Bn Servicecomponent —— —— — .— off En] Off Eal off Enl off Enl ——- ——___. _—_— —__ . ——— —. ,—— —— ~ I USMC &USMCR ------14 80 6 63 16 344 1 5 USN (MC & DC)______3 7 ------1 3 13 2 6 USN------16 ______1 1 78 16 262 USER. - ...... ------...... 21 ------...... 30 --. -.— ------USA------1 1 ------26 286 9 2 Philippine Insular Navy ------...... 4 ______._:_. ----- Philippine Army Air Corps ______6 83 ------7 217 Philippine Scouts ------______...... 1...... 33 Philippine Army ------22 Philippine Constabulary ------1 1 — — — Totals ------25 211 7 65 53 1, 024 28 1 275 THE JAPAA7E8E LA NZ31iVG2’ May. Twodays earlier theregimental in- telligence journal had noted that: The area chosen by the Japanese for their initial assault, the 4th Marines’ East There has been a distinct shifting of enemy Sector, was a shambles by nightfall on 5 artillery fire from inland targets to our beach defenses on the north side of Corregidor the past 24 hours.% “The five Marine officers, two Navy doctors, and 96 Marine enlisted men previously captured This concentration of fire continued and in China and on Bataan have been omitted from intensified, smashing the last vestiges of these figures. “The lMay42 listing of regimental strength a coordinated and cohesive defensive zone does not indicate the tactical breakdown of Hq and shaping 1/4% beach positions into an and SerCos into Cos Oand P. The figures shown, irregular series of strong points where a therefore, include a number of regimental staff officers, probably two-thirds of the total, and a few machine guns and 37mm’s were still few enlisted men who did not serve in Maj in firing order. A pair. of Philippine-. Schaeffer’s command. One officer and five en- Scout-manned 75mm guns, located just listed men have been deducted from SerCo’s USMC Strength and added to that of 4/4. 26cTn~eHs otherwise noted the material in this i94kFebruary 1947, hereinafter cited as BaM- sertion is deri~-ed f mm U8AJ’FE- 1T8FIP Rept; win .Narratiw’; Fall of the Philippines; K. Uno, Moore Rept; Ihth Army Rept; Howard Rept; Corvegidor: 181e of Delwion (China : Press Bu- MG H. M. l?erreIl, Personal Experiences 5-6 reau, Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters, May42, n. d., hereinafter cited as Frrrell; September 1942) ( located at OCMH), herein- Jenkiws; H. W. Baldwin, “The Fourth Marines after cited as Isle of Delusion. at Corregidor,” MP Gamtte, in 4 parts November m4th }far R–2 Jnl, 8Dec41–3May42, last entry. 192 PEARL HARROR TO GUADALCANAL east of North Point, which had never re- of Company B under First Lieutenant vealed their position, also escaped the de- Alan S. Manning, who had taken over structive tires. Wire lines to command when Captain Brown was wounded.2s The posts were ripped apart and could not be machine guns and 37mm’s of Captain Noel repaired; “command could be exercised O. Castle’s Company D wera emplaced in and intelligence obtained only by use of commanding positions along the beaches foot messengers, which medium was un- on both sides of the island; the company’s certain under the heavy and continuous mortars were in firing positions near Ma- artillery and air bombardment.”’7 linta Hill. Along the northern side of the hogback At about 2100 on 5 May, sensitive sound ridge that traced its course from Malinta locators on Corregidor picked up the noise Hill to the bend in Corregidor’s tail, Com- of many barges warming Llp their motors pany A and the reserves of 1/4 waited dog- near Limay on Bataan’s east coast. Warn- gedly for the Japanese to come. There ing of an impending landing was flashed was no sharp division between unit defense to responsible higher headquarters, but the sectors, and the men of the various units lack of wire communication kept the word intermingled as the bombardment demol- from reaching the men in the foxholes ished prepared positions. Along the bat- along the beaches of the East Sector. They tered base and sides of Malinta Hill, a did not need any additional advice of en- special target for enemy the, were the men emy intentions anyway, since the whole of Lieutenant Jenkins’ Reserve Company. regiment had been on an all-out alert every Next to them, holding the shoreline up to night for a month, momentarily expecting Infantry Point, was a rifle platoon organ- Japanese landing barges to loom out of ized from 1/4’s Headquarters Company; the darkness. The men of 1/4 had with- Captain Lewis H. Pickup, the company stood some pretty stiff shellings, too, as commander, held concurrent command of they waited, but nothing to compare with Company A, having taken over on the the barrage that began falling on the death of Major Lang. The Ist Platoon un- beach defenses manned by Harris’ 1st Pla- der First Lieutenant William F. Harris toon at about 2245. defended the beaches from Infantry to The Japanese had begun to deliver the Cavalry Points, the landing site selected short preparatory bombardment designed in Japanese pre-assault plans. Master to cover the approach of Colonel Sate’s Gunnery Sergeant John Mercurio’s 2d Pla- assault waves which was called for in their toon’s positions rimmed the gentle curve operation plan. If Sate’s boat groups of land from Cavalry to North Point. Ex- adhered to their schedule they would ren- tending from N’orth Point to the tip of the dezvous and head in for the beaches just as island’s tail were the foxholes and ma- the artillery fire lifted and shifted to the chine-gun emplacements of First Sergeant west, walling off the landing area from NToble W. Well’s 3d Platoon. American reinforcement efforts. The regi- Positions along the top of the steep ment would be ashore before the moon rose southern face of the East Sector)s domin- near midnight to give Corregidor’s gun- ant ridge were occupied by the platoons ners a clear target. In two respects the ‘“ Ut+lAFFE-USFIP Rept, 77. %LtCol R. F. Jenkins ltr to CMC, 300ct56. THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 193 plan miscarried, and for a while it. was Sate, who landed with the first waves, touch and go for the assault troops. sorely needed his gd Battalion’s strength. The artillery shoot went off on schedule, This straggling battalion which began but Sate’s first waves, transporting most of heading shoreward about midnight suf- his IstBattalion, were carried by an unex- fered much more damage than the first pectedly strong incoming tide hundreds of waves. The remaining coast defense guns yards to the east of the designated landing and mortars on Corregidor, backed up by beaches. Guides in the oncoming craft the fire of Forts Hughes and Drum, were unable to recognize landmarks in the churned the channel between Bataan and darkness, and from water level the tail of Corregidor into a surging froth, whipped the island looked markedly uniform as by shell fragments and explosions, The smoke and dust raised by the shelling ob- moon’s steady light revealed many direct scured the shoreline. The 61at Regiment’s hits on barges and showed heavily bur- 2d Battalion, slated to follow close on the dened enemy soldiers struggling in the heels of the Ist,was delayed and disrupted water and sinking under the weight of by faulty boat handling and tide currents their packs and equipment. Still, some until it came in well out of position and men reached shore and Colonel Sato was under the full light of the moon. able to organize a drive toward his objec- When the Japanese preparatory fires tive, Malinta Hill. lifted shortly after 2300, the troops along Individual enemy soldiers and machine- the East Sector beaches spotted the scat- gun crews infiltrated across Kindley Field tered landing craft of the Ist Batt&ion, and through the rubble of torn barbed 61st heading in for the beaches at North wire, blasted trees, and, crater-pocked Point. The few remaining searchlights ground to Denver Battery, a sandbagged illuminated the barges, and the island’s antiaircraft gun position which stood on tail erupted with fire. Enemy artillery relatively high ground south of Cavalry knocked out the searchlights almost as soon Point. The American gunners, whose as they showed themselves; but it made weapons were out of action as a result of little difference, since streams of tracer the bombardment, were unable to beat back bullets from beach defense machine guns the encroaching Japanese who established furnished enough light for the Scout 75’s themselves in a commanding position with near North Point and 1/4’s 37’s to find tar- fields of fire over the whole approach route gets. A Japanese observer on Bataan de- to the landing beaches. Captain Pickup’s scribed the resulting scene as “sheer massa- first word that the ,Japanese had seized cre,?’ 29but the enemy Ist Battalion came in Denver Battery came when he sent one of close enough behind its preparation to get Company D’s weapons platoon leaders, a good portion of its men ashore. Although Marine Gunner Harold M. Ferrell, to es- the Japanese infantrymen overwhelmed tablish contact with the battery’s de- Mercurio’s 2d Platoon, the fighting was fenders. Ferrell and one of his men found fierce and the enemy casualties in the water the battery alive with enemy soldiers dig- and on the beach were heavy. Colonel ging in and setting up automatic weapons. Ferrell immediately went back to his de- “ Quoted in Isle of Delusion, 17. fense area west of Infantry Point and PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL brought up some men to establish a line this time or how- many casualties the 61st “along the hogsback to prevent the enemy Zn~an.try’s assault companies had suffered, from coming down on the backs of the men but it was plain that the enemy at Denver on the beaches.;> 30 Battery outnumbered the small force try- Pickup came up shortly after Gunner ing to contain them, and ,Japanese snipers Ferrell got his men into position and con- and infiltrating groups soon began to crop sidered pulling Lieutenant Harris’ platoon up in the. rear of Pickup’s position. out of its beach defenses to launch an The situation clearly called for the com- attack against the enemy. After a con- mitment of additional men in the East Sec- ference with Harris the company com- tor. Colonel Howard had made provision mander decided to leave the 1st Platoon for this soon after getting word of the in position. ,Japanese landing craft were landing attempt. He alerted Schaeffer’s still coming in , and the platoon’s with- command of two companies first, but held drawal would leave several hundred yards off committing Williams’ battalion until of beach open. The fact that enemy the situation clarified itself. There was troops were ashore had been communi- cated to Lieutenant Colonel Beecher’s CP no guarantee that the ,Japanese would ac- just inside Maliuta Tunnel’s east entrance, commodate the 4th Marines by landing all and small groups of men, a squad or so at their troops in the East Sector; in fact, a time, were coming LIp to build on the there was a general belief among the men line in front of Denver Battery. The manning the defenses which commanded enemy now fired his machine guns steadily, the ravines leading to Topside that the and intermittent but heavy shellfire struck East Sector landing was not the main all along the roads from Malinta to Den- effort and that the enemy would be coming ver. Casualties were severe throughout in against West and Middle Sector the area. beaches.3] Complicating the entire prob- By 0130 surviving elements of 1/4 on the lem of command in the confused situation eastern tip of the island were cut off com- during the early morning hours of 6 May pletely from the rest of the battalion. was the fact that, only runners could get 13eecher was forced to leave men in posi- word of battle progress to Beecher?s and tion on both shores west of Denver Battery Howard’s CP. And any runner, or for to prevent the enemy landing behind his that matter any man, who tried to make lines. .411 the men who could be spared the 1,000-yard journey from the Denver from the beaches were being sent L~pto the line. to the mouth of Malinta Tunnel stood defensive position astride the ridgeline a good chance of never completing his mis- jllst west of Denver, but the strength that sion. The area east of Malinta Hill was could be assembled there amounted to little it killing ground as Schaeffer’s men soon more than two platoons including a few found out when they made their bid to Philippine Scouts from the silenced anti- reach Denver Battery. boat guns in I/4’s sector. No exact fiagures reveal how many ,Japanese were ashore at “ l{fr~c.’iRrpt, Statement of LCdr E. M. Wade, W. The ~e)tcrat existence of this belief was “0Fmvwll, 1. questioned by one surviror. ,Jach’son. THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 195 THE (’OMMITME,+’T OF P was in the lead, following the left fork THE RE/SER VE 3’ of the road behind its guide, Captain Golhmd L. Clark, Jr., the 1st Battalion In Government Ravine the 4th Marines’ Adjutant. As the last platoon of the com- reserve companies Saw and heard the ma- pany cleared the tunnel it was diverted to chine guns along the East Sector beaches a vicious fire fight raging on the right of hammering at the Japanese landing craft. the Marine line by an officer who had come Major Sclmeffer’s command was already back seeking reinforcements. Several standing by to move out, and near 2400 enemy machine guns had been set up near Companies O and P filed down the trail the base of a stone water tower forvard and started for Malinta. There was little of Denver Battery and to the right front confusion, for the men had rehemsed their of the Marine positions. The platoon, in movements often. Crossing Bottomside common with most of the rest of the units by means of a tank trap which protected that tried to reduce this strong point, was them from enemy shellfire, they moved into chopped to pieces by interlocking bands of Malinta Tunnel where company and pla- machine-gun fire. toon commanders supervised the distribu- On Clark’s order, Hogaboom deployed tion of machine-gun ammunition and gre- his remaining two platoons in line of skir- nades cached there for just such an emer- mishers once they were well clear of the gency. Volunteers from the Navy and tunnel, The. advancing line made contact Marine headquarters installations joined with Lieutenant Harris and the remnants the companies to serve as ammunition of Company A’s 1st Platoon holding the carriers “although they were neither offi- left of the Denver defensive position and cially or morally obligated to do so.’? 33 tied in with them. Hogaboom found that Major Schaeffer reported to Colonel his right flank was open; Captain Cham- Howard and received his instructions; he bers’ Company O which was to have fol- was to take his men out into the East Sec- lowed him out of the tunnel and come up tor and counterattack the Japanese posi- on his right was not to be found. sion. At 0200 the companies began to Chambers’ men had left the tunnel all move out of the oppressive heat xnd foul right, but almost immediately after the air of the crowded main tunnel onto the company column cleared the entrance deeply cratered roads which led to Den- bright flares were seen going up over the ver.3~ Lieutenant Hogaboom’s Company ,Japanese position. Chambers and his 1st Platoon leader, (l,luarterrnaster Clerk 3’ unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from lTS.4FFE-VS’FIP Rcpt; Frank W. Ferguson, concluding that the l~th Army Rept: Howard I@t; Fer.qt(so~z; Fer- flares were a signal to the artillery on rcll; Hogaboom; ,Jt’nliin. q,. 13aldwin 1$’arrati~~; Bataan, passed the word along the line to Isle of Dela8ima; Full of thr Philippines. = Ferguson, 14. look for the nearest shelter. The guess on a By the time the Japanese landed, the only road into the East Sector was that which led shortly before the landing that enemy artillery through Malinta Tunnel. The road cut Gut of had blown a deep, ra~ine-like depression in the the side of the hill on the north had been com- southern circling road that rendered it impassable pletely demolished, and Col Howard, looking for to organized troop movement. Howard Inter- an alternate route of approach, had discovered %ieu~. 196 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL the flares was right, and Ferguson’s pla- Many close friends died that morning in toon was fortunate in taking its shelling in the darkness and choking dust as the Jap- an area where the Japanese had provided anese and the Americans and Filipinos deep bomb craters. The platoon came faced each other from positions less than through with only eight casualties. As forty yards apart. Some men cut off be- soon as the bombardment lifted, Fergnson hind the enemy lines still kept firing at moved toward Denver until he was forced occasional landing craft that were coming to deploy by heavy machine-gun and mor- in to reinforce sate. Hogaboom could see tar fire. He looked for the 3d Platoon to the tracers of a single .50 caliber and felt come up on his right according to plan, but that “the bullets smacking into the armor only its commander, Quartermaster Ser- of the barges sounded like rivet hammers geant John E. Haskin, and five men ap- rattling away.” % 13very movement of the peared, the rest had been lost in the shell- Japanese botats which stood in number off- ing. Captain Chambers sent up the reserve shore was counted as an attempt at land- platoon, which was in even worse shape, ing, although many of them were impro- having been caught in the open near the vised gunboats whose mission was protect- tunnel entrance. Quartermaster Clerk ing and supporting the landing craft. But Herman L. Snellings had only four sur- detachments of Sate’s force kept coming in \,ivors alive and unwounded. all night, and one enemy lieutenant, prob- Company O now contained but one pla- ably a member of one of the 61.~t’ssupport- toon and had not yet made its attack. ing units, gave a vivid description of the Major Schaeffer established control over helpless feeling of the men in the barges the scattered groups of men from the 1st as they were caught in Corregidor’s fire: Battalion and the reserve and launched three separate counterattacks on the dug-in American high powered machine guns poured a stream of bullets on us from all directions. Japanese. Sometimes the men would get Rifle fire added to the hail of death. Our men up the slopes leading to the battery gun who were huddled in the center of the boat were pits, but they were always driven back, all either killed or wounded. Those who clung fewer in number each time. On the right to the sides were hit by shells that pierced the steel plating. The boat had already sprung sev- flank, Sergeant Major John H. Sweeney eral leaks when we finally came within landing and Sergeant Haskin took advantage of distance of Corregidor. Desperately I gave the the water tower’s battered elevation to hurl signal and led the charge against the shore de- grenades down on the machine guns that f enses. I don’t remember how many men re- were holding up the advance; Haskin was sponded. 1 know I heard only a small chorus. In that mad dash for shore many were drowned killed trying to get more grenades up to as they dropped into the water mortally Sweeney, and Sweeney was picked off wounded. Many were killed outright . . . If after he had knocked out at least one of it had not been for the fact that it was the dark the guns. Ferguson, who knew and had hour before the dawn, pitch black, I doubt if any served with both these long-time regulars, of us would be alive today to tell the story.a’ wrote their simple epitaph: However heavy the Japanese casualties They were very close friends in life and it was were, they did not measurably weaken the most tltting that they should go out together.’s ‘“ Hogaboom, 16. “ ~w~wn, 18. ‘7 Quoted in Isle of Delusion., 34. THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 197 firepower of the Denver position. Each man down. At 0430, Colonel Howard attack by Schaefferjs men thinned the Ma- ordered Williams to take his battalion out rine line still more, Lost were officers and of the tunnel and attack the Japanese at N(2OS whose leadership was vital to the Denver Battery. operations of mixed units such as those The companies moved out in column. which held the Japanese at bay. Captain About 500 yards out from Malinta they Castle of Company D was killed trying to were caught in a heavy shelling that silence a machine gun, and many small sharply reduced their strength and tempo- unit leaders who still held their place in rarily scattered the men. The survivors line were badly wounded. The situation reassembled and moved toward the fight- was so desperate that Colonel Howard ing in line of skirmishers. Companies Q could no longer hold his last reserves out and R, commanded by two Army officers, of the action. He ordered the 4th Bat- Captains Paul C. Moore and Harold E. talion to move into the East Sector and Dalness, respectively, moved in on the left join the embattled defense line. to reinforce the scattered groups of rifle- men from Companies A and P who were THE 4TH BATT.4LIOiV trying to contain the Japanese in the I,3J A 12TIOiV 38 broken ground north of Denver Battery. The battery position itself was assigned to Major Williams’ 4th Battalion had been Company T (Lieutenant Bethel B. Otter, alerted early in the night’s action, and he USN), and two platoons of Company S,” had ordered the issue of extra ammunition originally designated the battalion reserve, and grenades. At about 0100 he got the were brought up on the extreme right word to move the battalion into Malinta where Lieutenant Edward N. Little, USN, Tunnel and stand by. The sailors pro- was to try to silence the enemy machine ceeded cautiously down the south shore guns near the water tower. The blue- road, waited for an enemy barrage which jackets filled in the gaps along the line— was hitting in the dock area to lift, and wide gaps, for there was little that could then dashed across to the tunnel entrance. be called a firm defensive line left—and In the sweltering corridor the men pressed joined the fire fight, back against the walls as hundreds of The lack of adequate communications casualties, walking wounded and litter prevented Colonel Howard from exer- cases, streamed in from the East Sector cising active tactical direction of the battle fighting. The hospital laterals were filled in the East Sector. The unit command- to overflowing, and the doctors, nurses, ers on the ground, first Captain Pickup, and corpsmen tended to the stricken men then Major Schaeffer, and finally Major wherever they could find room to lay a Williams made the minute-to-minute de- ‘* Unless otherwise noted the n]aterial in this cisions that close combat demanded. By section is derived from USAFFE-L7SFIP Rept; the time Williams’ battalion had reorgan- l~th A?my Rept; Howard Rept; Brook; Dalnew; ized and moved up into the Marine for- SSgt C. E. Downing, Personal Experiences 5-6- ward positions, Schaeffer’s command was May@ n. d. ; Perga.!+ on; Fcrrell; Hogaboom; Jenkins; Btzldwin Narrative; Isle of Delwsion; B’all of thc Ph ilippinrs. “ Saalman 1956. 198 PEARL HARBOR TO GU~DALCANAL practically nonexistent. Williams, by weapons that might have opened a breach mutual consent ( Schaeffer was senior), in the Denver position, the attack stalled took over command of the fighting since completely. Major Schaeffer sent. War- he was in a far better position to get the rant officer Ferguson, who had succeeded best effort out of his bluejackets when to command of Company O when Captain they attacked.~ Chambers was wounded, to Colonel How- At dawn Major Williams moved along ard’s CP to report the situation and re- the front, telling his officers to be ready quest reinforcements. Ferguson, like to jump off at 0615. ‘l’he company and Schaeffer and many of the survivors of 1/4 platoon command posts were right up on and the reserve, was a walking wounded the firing line and there were no reserves case himself. By the time Ferguson got left; every officer and man still able to back through the enemy shelling to Ma- stand took part in the attack. C)n the left linta at 0900, Williams had received what the Japanese were driven back 200–300 few reinforcements Howard could muster. yards before Williams sent a runner to Captain Herman H. Hauck and 60 men of check the advance of Moore and Dalness; the 59th Coast Artillery, assigned by Gen- the right of the line had been unable to eral Moore to the 4th Marines, had come make more than a few yards before the up and Williams sent them to the left withering fire of the Denver and water flank to block Japanese snipers and ma- tower defenses drove the men to the deck. chine-gun crews infiltrating along the The left companies shifted toward Denver beaches into the rear areas. to close the gap that had opened while At about 0930 men on the north flank of the men on the right tried to knock out the Marine line saw a couple of Japanese the ,Japanese machine guns and mortars. tanks coming off barges near Cavalry Lieutenant otter was killed while leading Point, a move that spelled the end on Cor- an attack, and his executive, Captain Cal- regidor. The tal~ks were in position to ad- vin E. Chunn, took over: Chunn was vance within a half houI, and, just as the wounded soon after as Company T charged men in front of Denver Battery spotted a ,Japanese unit which was setting up a them, enemy flares went Llp again and ar- field piece near the water tower.” Lieu- tillery salvoes crashed down just forward tenal)t Little was hit in the chest and of the Japanese position. Some men be- Williams sent a Philippine Scout officer, gan to fall back, and though Williams and First I,ieutenallt Otis E. Saalman, to take the surviving leaders tried to halt the over Company S. withdrawal, the shellfire prevented them The Marine mortars of 1/4, 3-inch from regaining control. At 1030 Williams Stokes without sights, were not accurate sent a message to the units on the left flank enough to support Williams’ attack. He to fall back to the ruins of a concrete trench had to order them to cease fire when stray which stood just forward of the entrance rounds fell among his own men, who had to Malint a Tunnel. The next thirty min- closed to within grenade range of the Jap- utes witnessed a scene of utter confusion anese, Robbed of the last supporting as the Japanese opened up on the retreat- ‘0Mi2e ltr, op. cit. ing men with rifles: mortars, machine guns, 4’ Chl(nn. and mountain howitzers. Flares signalled THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 199 the artillery on Bataan to increase its fire, cer he consulted, that the defenses outside and a rolling barrage swung back and Malinta could last more than the remain- forth between Malinta and Denver, demol- ing hours of the day, and he set the hour of ishing any semblance of order in the ranks surrender for noon in order %o avoid the of the men straining to reach the dubious horrors which would have accrued had I shelter of the trench. “Dirt, rocks, trees, let the fight goon until dark.” * bodies, and debris literally filled, the air,” 4’ The order to surrender was passed to the and pitifully few men made it back to troops on Topside and Middleside along Malinta. with instructions to destroy all weapons Williams, who was wounded, and larger than .45 caliber. The sickened men roughly 150 officers and men, many of them of the 4th Marines’ !2d and 3d Battalions, also casualties, gathered in the trench ruins who had been forced to stand by helplessly to make a stand. The Japanese were less as they heard and watched the battle to the than three hundred yards from their posi- east, carried the order even further, smash- tion and enemy tanks could be seen moving ing their rifles against the rocks. Veterans up to outflank their line on the right. The of fighting in World War I and a dozen Marine major, who had been a tower of “banana wars” stood unashamedly crying strength throughout the hopeless fight, as they were told they would have to sur- went into the tunnel at 1130 to ask Howard render, Inside Malinta, Colonel Howard for antitank guns and more men. But the ordered the regimental and national colors battle was over: General Wainwright had of the 4th Marines burned, to prevent their made the decision to surrender. falling into enemy hands. Two 1st Bat- talion officers, Captain Clark and Lieuten- SURRENDER 4’ ant Manning, a field music, and an inter- preter were selected to carry Wainwright’s Colonel Howard had personally re- flag of truce to the Japanese. .4s the white ported the landing of the Japanese tanks flag was carried out of the tunnel, Major to General Wainwright at 1000. The Williams ordered survivors of the East USFIP commander, who had kept current Sector fighting to move inside the hill and on the situation in the East Sector take shelter from the Japanese bon~bard- throughout the night’s fighting, made the ment which still was falling. fateful decision to surrender. He later Captain Clarks party passed the last related that “it was the terror that is vested American outpost; the music sounded off in a tank that was the deciding factor,” for and Manning waved a pole which bore a he “thought of the havoc that even one of piece of sheeting. The enemy infantry- these could wreak if it nosed into the tun- men, who had been given special instruc- nel, where lay our helpless wounded . . .’? 44 tions regarding the reception of flags of He did not believe, nor did any other otTi- truce, did not iire, and Clark was taken to the senior Japanese officer on the island “ ~alne8S,18. who cent acted Bataan and arranged for 43Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from USAFFE-USFIP Rep t; a parley on the peninsula with General lJth Arn6g Rept; Howard Rept; Baldwin Nurra- Homma. When Mrainwright, accompa- tive; Fall of the Philippines; Wai?tWright’8 Story. 44Wain.wrigh t’s StoW, 119. 4’Ibid., 186. 448777 0—58——14 200 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LGANAL denied by a few senior officers and aides, had 315 officers and men killed, 15 missing walked out of the tunnel and up the long in action presumed dead, and 357 men slope toward Kindley Field, he saw dead wounded; ~ the great majority of these and dying men on every hand, a grim casualties occurred during the battle for record of the ferocity of the fighting in the Corregidor. past 12 hours. The bloody battle for the island fortress No complete figures exist for the casual- did not end with Wainwright’s decision to ties suffered by either side on 5–6 May; surrender. The Japanese went right. ahead estimates of the Japanese losses range with their assault plan and preparatory from 900 to 4,000.* - The strait betwe~n bombardments, paying no heed to the Bataan and Corregidor was heavily dotted white flags displayed on all the islands in with enemy bodies, and American pris- the bay. Eighty-eight. tons of bombs were oners on Corregidor estimated that ~hey dropped on 6 May, a good part of them helped collect a~d cremate the remains of after the surrender.” Wainwright, who hundreds of Japanese soldiers.” The de- had released his southern Philippine com- tailed losses of the 4th Marines will prob- manders to Mac.4rthurk control before he ably never be known because of the joint- attempted to meet the enemy commander, service nature of the regiment at the time tried to surrender only the fortified islands of battle and the scarcity of contemporary to the Japanese. He was rebuffed coldly records. The casualties of Marines alone by Homma’s emissary and told that the are known, however, and they may be con- Japanese knew that he was commander of sidered indicative of the fate of soldiers all the forces in the Philippines and that they would not accept his surrender unless and sailors who served with them. In the it meant the capitulation of every man in whole Philippine campaign the regiment his command, everywhere in the islands. MMost American survivors of the battle men- The American general, convinced that the tion that they heard from the Japanese later in Japanese would treat the men on the forti- prison camp that the enemy had suffered almost fied islands as hostages, perhaps even mas- 4,000 casualties in trying to take Corregidor. sacre them if the fighting continued in the However, Japanese officers commenting on Dr. south, finally acceded to the enemy demand Morton’s draft manuscript of The Fa.tl of the and broadcast a surrender message at mid- PhUippine8 wrote that the total casualties of the Japanese in the Corregidor operation between night on 6 May to all his commanding 14Apr-7May42 were 603. MilHistSec, SS, GHQ, officers. There was considerable dissension FEC, Comments of Former Japanese Officers Re- regarding this order, especially on islands garding “The Fall of the Philippines,” 19Apr42 where the Japanese had not made much (located at OCMH), Chap XXXI, 3. effort to subdue the Philippine Army 4’ Saalrnan1956. Saalman recalls having re- marked to Maj Williams shortly after daybreak troops, but eventually most of the organ- on 6 May, “I believe we could walk from Corregi- ized units of USFIP came out of the hills dor to Bataan over dead bodies.” In light of the to lay down their arms. Wainwright felt, number of bodies that were collected and cre- as did most of his advisors at the time, that mated, Saalman is convinced that the 903 figure supplied by the Japanese in commenting on the the Japanese were quite capable of slaugh- draft of The Fall of the Philippine reflects only tering the men surrendered on the fortified enemy dead rather than total casualties. 4’ See Appendix D for Marine casualties. “ Philippine AirOp8Rec, Plate 8. THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 201 islands if he did not insure a complete eastern beaches. Until the night of 5 May surrender of all his forces. there was no compelling reason to believe The struggle for control of Manila Bay that the East Sector would draw the first finally ended on 7 May when the Japanese assault. And even after the enemy landed occupied the last of the island forts, but at North Point the very present threat to for most of the captured men “the fight western Corregidor existed and could not for life had just begun.” 50 Thousands be ignored. To meet it, a number of .4rmy succumbed in the next three years to brutal units were alerted to back up the positions mistreatment, malnutrition, and disease in of 2/4 and 3/4.51 Japanese prison camps in the Philippines, The problem which Colonel Howard in the enemy home islands, and in Man- faced of when, where, and in what strength churia. Two hundred and thirty-nine to commit the reserves available to him oflicers and men of the 4th Marine Regi- was a classic one for commanders at all ment died in enemy hands, troop levels. If he committed all his re- serve at one time and in the area of CONCLUSION greatest existing threat, he distinctly in- creased the vulnerability of other sectors The battle for Corregidor was bitter to enemy attack. If he committed only and confused; relatively few men survive part of his reserve and retained the capa- who fought in the East Sector through the bility of reinforcing against further at- night and morning of 5–6 May 1942. tacks, he stood the chance of not using Hundreds of well-trained infantrymen in enough men to have a decisive effect in positions within a mile or so of Malinta any sector. The decision to commit the Hill were only spectators and auditors of reserve piecemeal reflected the regiment’s the fighting. The poorest-trained ele- estimate of the enemy’s capabilities and ments of the 4th Marines constituted the intentions in light of their actions.52 The vital mobile reserve. On the surface and Japanese, although opposed by a rela- in hasty consideration it would seem that tively small force, did not or could not the tactics of the beach defense left much vigorously pursue their advance after to be desired. Corregidor, however, was not a fortress reaching the Denver position. The con- with only one entrance. The beaches tinued presence of numerous small craft fronting the ravines defended by 2/4 and off Corregidor’s north shore indicated a 3/4 led directly to the island’s major de- possible, even probable, early attempt at fensive installations. The threat of am- a. second landing. lTmjer these circum- phibious assault existed all around the stances the East Sector assault might well island’s perimeter, but especially along the be a secondary effort which had stalled, northern and western shores. The Japa- with the enemy’s main attack still to come. nese. laid down preparatory fires all along Actually this was the Japanese plan, with the north side of the island, devoting as the difference that the second landing was much attention to James Ravine and Bot- to follow the first after a day’s interval tomside west of Malinta as they did the “ Col F. P. Pyzick ltr to CMC, 300ct56 50Jenkins, 19. - Howard Interview. 202 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL rather than as soon as the Marines premium on having the best infantrymen expected. at the point where their value would be In large part the 4th Marines’ reserve greatest—the beaches. strength wasalready comrnitte don5 May, The fall of Corregidor was inevitable; The ,Japanese preparatory fires, especially the garrison simply did not have enough those which were laid on areas in plain food to hold out until relief could arrive. sight of Bataan, made movement by any Although the enemy, primarily for pres- body of troops extremely difficult-witness tige and propaganda reasons, choose to as- the fate of Company O. The bombard- sault the island, they could easily have ment had the effect of tying the regiment starved its defenders into submission. to its defenses. The trained infantrymen When the Japanese did make their attack in its ranks were kept where they could do they paid a high price for their haste, the most to bolster the crucial beach posi- but extracted as great a one from the de- tions.53 If any sizable number of these fenders. In the immediate tactical sense, men had been withdrawn from the beaches however, the enemy artillery was the vic- to forma reserve, it is questionable whether tor in the siege and fall of Corregidor; no the remaining men could have withstood defending force could have withstood its any enemy assault. Once the Japanese be- devastatingly accurate bombardment. gan to bombard Corregidor in earnest Although it was a defeat, the battle of there was no such thing as a strong beach Corregidor is marked down in the annals defense position; the very fury of the bom- of the 4th Marines as a fight to be proud bardment, destroying as it did most of the of. Those who fought and died in its prepared defenses and demolishing the major supporting weapons, placed a high ranks, whatever their service of origin, were, if only for a brief moment, Cor- regidor Marines. PART V Decision at Midway CHAPTER 1 Setting the Stage: Early Naval Operations’ Early in January 1942 the U. S. Pacific Pago Pago naval station was shelled by Fleet ~~aslooking for a way to strike back a Japanese submarine on 11 January while at the Japanese; and advocates of the fast the 2d Marine Brigade (composed for the carrier force, believing their case ironically most part of the 8th Marines and the 2d had been proven by tie Japanese at Pea~l Defense Battalion) still was en route to the Harbor, ~~ere read; to test-their theories.’ islands from San Diego. But on 23 Jan- But first there were some fences to mend. uary after the Marines’ four transports The all-important communications chain and one fleet cargo vessel were delivered to Australia and New Zealand was rather safely to Samoa, Vice Admiral William tenuous, and the bulk of the Navy had to F. Halsey’s Enterprk force, together be used for escort duty until reinforce- with a new fast carrier force commanded ments could be put ashore to bolster some by Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher of the stations along the route. and formed around the Ym%town, were re- One of the most important links in this leased for the raiding actions that the fleet communication chain was Samoa. The was anxious to launch. worst was feared for this area when the While the 2d Marine Brigade unloaded at Samoa on 23 January, the Japanese ‘ Llnless otherwise noted the material in Part landed far to the west at Rabaul where V is derived from Rising Sun in the Pacific; S. E. the small Australian garrison was quickly Morison, Corul Seu, .llidwav and flabrnarine .4c- overrun. Although the importance of tion~, May 19~Z–.Lt{gust 1942: History of United Rabaul to the Japanese w-as not realized States Naval Oprration.s in World Wor II (Bos- ton : Little, Brown and Company, 1949), here- at once, it was soon clear that from the inafter cited as Coral Sea a~bd Midwag; L7. S. & Bismarcks the enemy could launch an at- Sea Power; M. Fuchida and M. Okurniya, .lfid- tack through the Coral Sea toward ALM- way: Thf Battle That Doomed Japan (Annapo- tralia and N’ew Zealand. This threat lis: (’. S. Xaval Institute. 1955), hereinafter cited as Battle That Downed Japarz; Marinc8 at Mid- tended to increase rather than diminish UWV; “The Japanese Story of the Battle of Mid. the danger to Samoa. It was reasoned way,” OIVI Rctiicw, May 1947, hereinafter cited that a Japanese attack there would precede as OIVI Rruiew. a strike at Australia or h’ew Zealand to ‘ “There was still much difference of opinion [shout the effectiveness of the carrier striking block U. S. assistance to the Anzac areas. force] until 7 Dee 1941 when the Japanese attack Japanese occupation of Makin Island in took the controversy out of the laboratory class the Gilberts seemed to point toward .,. Japan knifed us with our own invention.” Samoa, and naval commanders held that Capt Miles R. Browning, USN, “The Fast Carrier Force,” MC Gazette, .June 1946, 19. the best insurance ag~inst subsequent 205 160° 1500 I I ~Sibylla —lo’ CAROLINE ISLANDS ONukuoro @-Mokin Aboi; g@ Moroki : Torowo oKopingomorongi 8“ %$!?ll%”o — 0[ O~on MARSHALLS GILBERTS NauruO > ~Nonu&(o AND EASTEfiN CAROLINES Topeteuoc@ @h Jukonau Q Onotoa %noe Targets of Halsey’s carrier OArurai %’( ~ / Raids of I February 1942 %)8 MAP9 I 1600 nNonomeo SETTIh’G THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL 01’ERATIOA”S 207 moves would be a raid a~~inst the Mar- fighter opposition, and that the reports sballs, from which much of this ,Japanese brought, back by pilots were enthusiastic, action w asmounted. Halsey’s Entetp?iw damage to the Japanese instaktions and force therefore set out to strike W’otje shipping was slight. Five Wildcats shot and Maleolap, seaplane bases in the Mar- down two Japanese planes over Maloelap, shalls. while Fletcher prepared to attack and nine S13D’S that returned from Roi Mili and ,Jaluit (also in the Marshalls) later sortiecl again and damaged some air- plus Makin with his l’orlcto~cn group. field installations. The surface bombw-d- (See Map 9) ment, too, was disappointing, and the A submarine reconnaissance found the bombardment flagship, Chester, took a Marshal]s lightly defended and spot- light bomb through her main cleck and lost ted the largest concentration of Japanese eight men killed and eleven wounded. plnnes and ships at Kwaj alein Atoll in To the south, Fletcher had bad luck over the center of the island group. Halsey ,Taluit when his fliers found their targets decided to add this choice target to his concealed by thunder showers. Two ,Jkp- list, and for the missions he divided Task anese ships off ,Jabor Town were hit, but Force 8 into three groups. The Enterpm”.se not sunk, and the damage ashore w-as with three destroyers would strike Wot j e, slight. A mine layer was hit at Makin, Maloelap, and Kwajalein; Rear Admiral and damage at Mili was also slight. Raymond .1. Spruance with the cruisers Similar actions were continued in other iVorthampton and ,Sa~tLake City plLMone areas of the Pacific to harass the .Japmese destroyer would bombard Wotje; and and to provide at least one outlet, for efforts Captain Thomas M. Sl~ock in USS to fight back at the enemy when the news (’hester, and with two destroyers, would from all other fronts was gloomy. Most shell Maloelap. The three southern atolls notable were strikes in early March agpinst in the Marshalls group and Makin in the VTake and Marcus Island, and the daring northern Gilberts would, be attencled to by raid by planes of Admiral Wilson Brown’s Fletcher in the Yonltown with his inde- task force over YTew Guinea’s 15,000-foot pendent command ( TF 17) made up of the Owen Stanley Mountains to hit the ,Jap- cruisers Lou{.y viJJeand ii’t.[.ouis and four anese newly moved into Lae and Salamaua. destroyers. lll~t in all cases actual damage to the The twin attacks struck on 1 February. enemy still failed, to measure LIp to ex- Halsey began h~uncbing at 0443 under a pectations, much less to the reports turner] full moon when his carrier was just 36 in by overenthusiastic aviators. Most audaciolls and unorthodox of the miles from Wotje. Kwajalein, the main attacks, of course, was that which launched objective was 155 n~iles away. N’ine tor- I,ieutenant Co]onel ,James H. I)oolittle and pedo bombers and 37 dive bombers led off his Army raiders from the Hornet’s deck the attack, the SBIYS striking Roi air base to tile 18 .Ipril Tokyo raid. Planned as on the nortl~ern end of the atoll and the tor- “sonlething really spectacular”-a proper pedo bombers bitt ing Kwaj alein Islancl retaliation for Pearl Harbor-the raid was across the lagoon. designed more for its dramatic impact At Kwaj alein the hlu~ting was better; upon morale than for any other purpose. but. in spite of the fact. that there was no In that it was highly successful. SETTING THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL OPER.4TIONS 209 After security-shrouded planning and both carriers returned to Pearl Harbor on training, Doolittle’s 16 B–25’s left San 25 April. Although the raid did more to Francisco on 2 April 1942 on board the boost American morale than it did to Hornet which was escorted by cruisers damage Japanese military installations, Vincennes and Nashville, four destroyers, more practical results came later. It al- and an oiler. After a 13 April rendezvous lowed a Japanese military group which with the Enterprise of Halsey’s TF 16, the favored a further expansion of their terri- raiding party continued along the north- torial gains to begin execution of these ern route toward the Japanese home ambitious plans, and this expansion effort islands.3 Enemy picket boats sighted the led directly to the Battle of Midway convoy when it was more than 100 miles which “. . . alone was well worth the ef- short of the intended launching range, fort put into this operation by . . . [those] and, with Doolittle~s concurrence, Halsey . . . who had volunteered to help even the launched the fliers at 0725 on 18 April score.’> 5 while the Howwt bucked in a heavy sea The first of Japan’s planned expansion 668 miles from the Imperial Palace in moves in the spring of 1942 aimed for central Tokyo.4 control of the Coral Sea through seizure Much of the rai~s anticipated shock of the Southern Solomon Islands and effect on Tokyo was lost by the coincidence Port Moresby on New Guinea as bases of Doolittle’s arrival over the city at about from which to knock out growing Allied noon just as a Japanese air raid drill was air power in northeastern Australia. completed. The Japanese, confused by Seizure of New Caledonia, planned as part the attack which followed their own of the third step in the second major series maneuvers, offered only light opposition of offensives, would complete encircle- to the B–25’s which skimmed the city at ment of the Coral Sea. This would leave treetop level to drop their bombs on mili- the LT. S. communications route to the tary targets. One plane which struck Anzac area dangling useless at the Samoan Kobe received no opposition, although two Islands; and later ,Japanese advances others over Nagoya and Osaka drew heavy would push the U. S. Pacific Fleet back to fire from antiaircraft batteries; but none Pearl Harbor and perhaps even to the was lost over Japan. west coast. Halsey managed to retire from the Characteristically, the Japanese plan launching area with little difficulty, and called for an almost impossible degree of ‘ Plans called for the bombers to land on timing and coordination. It depended for friendly Chinese fields some 1,093 miles from success largely on surprise and on the Tokyo, and completion of this trip for the planes IT. S. forces behaving just as the .Japanese loaded initially with four 500-pound bombs and hoped that they would. But this second 1,140 gallons of gasoline required that they be launched within 500 miles of Tokyo. element was largely corollary to the first, 4 .klthough the picket boats were prompt with and, when surprise failed, the Japanese a warning, Japanese interception attempts were were shocked to discover that the U. S. tardy. It was assumed that Navy planes, with a shorter range than B–25’s, were on the carrier, fleet did not follow the script. and that the force could not strike Japan until the ships steamed for another day. ‘ Rising SW tn. the Pacific, 398. 210 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL The Japanese anticipated resistance day with several powerful air strikes on from a U. S. carrier task force known to be the new garrison and on the Japanese ships lurking somewhere to the south or south- still in the area. The U. S. carrier planes east, but theyexpectedt ocornert his force struck virtually unopposed,7 but they in the eastern Coral Sea with a pincers caused little damage in proportion to the movement of carrier task forces of their energy and ammunition they expended, own. Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi would This startling deviation from the “Mo” skirt to the east of the Solomons with his script caused the Japanese to initiate the Striking Force of heavy carriers Shoha.kw remaining steps of the operation without and Zui?ca.ku and move in on the U. S. ships further delay. from that direction, while Rear Admiral The Battle of the Coral Sea proved the Aritomo Goto’s Coverv”ng Force built first major naval engagement in history around the light carrier A’hoho would close where opposing surface forces neither saw in from the northwest. Destruction of the nor fired at each others Although both northeast Australian airfields would fol- were eager to join battle, combat intelli- low this fatal pinch of the U. S. fleet, and gence was so poor and aerial reconnais- then the Port More.sby Inwzsion Group sance so hampered by shifting weather could ply the southeastern coast of New fronts that three days passed before the Guinea with impunity. main forces found each other. But other But Japanese overconfidence enabled things they did find led to a series of events U. S. intelligence to diagnose this opera- on the 7th that might be described as a tion in advance, and Fletcher’s Task Force comedy of errors, although there was noth- 17 had steamed into the Coral Sea where he ing particularly comical about them to all but completed refueling before the first those involved. Japanese elements sortied from Rabaul. Early that morning an over-enthusiastic On 4 May Fletcher’s Lemington, Yorktown, .Japanese search pilot brought Takagi?+ en- screening ships, and support vessels were tire striking air power down on the U. S. joined by the combined Australian-Ameri- fleet tanker Neosho and her lone convoying can surface force under Rear Admiral J. C. destroyer, the USS Nimx, by reporting Crate of the Royal Navy. them as a carrier and heavy cruiser re- On the previous day the Japanese had started their operation (which they called spectively. This overwhelming attack ~~fifo~~)like any other routine land grab. sank the A!hnx and so damaged the A7~osho A suitable invasion force, adequately sup- ported, moved into the Southern Solomons, ‘ Experience to date had indicated to the Jap- anese that one of their landings constituted a seized Tulagi -without opposition b and fait accompti which no enemy would dare dis- promptly began setting up a seaplane base. pute, and the na~al force supporting the landing There Fletcher’s planes startled them next had departed in order to get on with the war. Takagi’s powerful Carrier Striking Force at this “ Tulagi, with which U. S. forces were to get time lay north of Rougainville to keep beyond better acquainted, was the capital of the British the range of Allied air search. Solomon Islands Protectorate. Officials and 8 “SO many mistakes were made on both sides such garrison as existed had been amply fore- in this new mode of fighting that it might be warned and evacuated several days earlier. See called the Battle of Xal-al Errors. ” Coral Sea Part VI of this volume. anc7 Midmau, 63. SETTING THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL OPERATIONS 211 that she had to be destroyed four days Early the following morning, U. S. later. search planes finally located the Japanese Not to be outdone, the Americans reacted carriers at about the time the Japanese re- similarly a short time later to a scout discovered the U, S. flattops. At last the plane’s report of two Japanese carriers and stage was set for the big show. four cruisers north of the Louisiades. Ac- Loss of the flhoho had cut the Japanese tually these craft were a subordinate enemy down to size. The opponents who slugged task group consisting of two old light it out on 8 May 1942 were evenly matched, cruisers and three converted gunboats. physically and morally, to a degree rarely But more by good luck than good manage- found in warfare, afloat or ashore?’ How- ment, the attacking planes investigating ever, at the time the battle developed, the the report sighted the Japanese covering Japanese enjoyed the great tactical advan- Force, then protecting the left flank of the tage of having their position shrouded by I>ort M ores by in.vasion Group, and con- the same heavy weather front that had centrated on the Nfioho to the virtual ex- covered the U. S. carriers the previous clusion of her consorts. Against 93 air- afternoon, while Fletcher% force lay in craft of all types, the lone light, carrier had clear tropical sunlight where it could be no more chance than Task Force Neosho- seen for many miles from aloft. A’im.s had against the Japanese, and, her The attacking aircraft of both parties demise prompted the morale-boosting struck their enemy at nearly the same time phrase, “Scratch one flattop !” g (approximately 1100), passing each other As a result of these alarms and excur- en route,’2 The two Japanese carriers and sions, both commanding admirals had their respective escorts lay about ten miles missed each other once again. By mid- apart. As the Yorktown’s planes orbited afternoon, however, Takagi had a pretty over the target preparatory to the attack, good iclen of the LT. S. carriers’ location the Zuikaku and her screening force dis- and, shortly before nightfall, dispatched a appeared into a rain squall and were seen bomber-torpedo strike against Fletcher. Thanks to a heavy weather front, these one escaped. In this action the Japanese lost 9 planes in combat and 11 attempting night land- planes failed to find their target, and ings without benefit of homing devices, against American combat air patrol intercepted U. S. loss of 2 fighters. them on their attempted return. In the “ A lucid summary of the several factors in- confusion of dogfights, several Japanese volved occurs in Coral Sea and Midway, 48. pilots lost direction in the gathering dark- Fletcher’s potential marked advantage in surface ness and made the error of attempting to screening strength had been dissipated when, early on 7 May, he had dispatched Crate’s force of 1and on the Yor?ctoum?o cruisers and destroyers on a dash westward to intercept the enemy transport convoy expected to 9“Scratrh one flattop ! Dixon to Carrier, round the southeastern tip of New Guinea the Scratch one flattop !“ Voice radio report LCdr next morning en route to attack Port Moresby. R. E. Dixon to USS I,e.rinqtoti, quoted in Coral For analysis of this perhaps ill-judged move and k’ea and Midway, 42. Action against the tlltoho its results, see Ibid., 37–39. was U. S. Navy Air’s first attack on an enemy “ “The story current shortly after the battle, carrier. that the Japanese and American planes sighted ‘0 Six planes in two groups of three each. Al- but paid no attention to each other when passing though they were recognized and fired on, all but on opposite courses, is not true.” Ibid., 52n. 212 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL no more during the brief action that fol- that the .Japanese pilots may be excused lowed, thereby escaping damage. So all their claim that they had sunk her. U. S. planes that reached the scene concen- These events made up the Battle of the trated on the Shokaku, but with disap- Coral Sea. It was all over by 1140. pointing results. Preoccupation of both forces with the The Yorktown7.s torpedo bombers went flattops left opposing escort vessels un- in first, low and covered by fighters. But scathed, although the Japanese claimed to faulty technique and the wretched quality have left burning ‘Lone battleship or of U, S. torpedoes at this stage of the war cruiser.” ‘~ The Americans had sustained combined to make this attack wholly in- far the heavier damage and casualties, but effective: hits (if any ) proved to be duds, had inflicted the greater tactical blow in the pilots launched at excessive ranges, knocking the .S’hokaku. out of further of- and the torpedoes traveled so slowly that fensive action while both U. S. carriers vessels unable to dodge had only to out- still were operational. Even the crippled run them. The dive bombers, following Lemh,gton had put out fires, shored up closely, scored only two direct hits. But torpedo damage, and was capable of sus- one of these so damaged the. Shokaku’s taining 25-knot speed and conducting flight deck that she could no longer nearly normal flight operations an hour launch planes, although she still was after the battle ended. capable of recovering them. Many of the The ,Japanese had lost the greater num- Lexington planes, taking off ten minutes ber of planes: 43 from all causes against after those from Yorktown, got lost in the 33 for the Americans. Their command, overcast and never found their targets. accepting at face value the ecstatic reports Those that did attack made the same mis- of their pilots that they had sunk both 17. S. takes the Yorktown fliers committed. The carriers, started the beat-up S’hokahw for torpedoes proved w%olly ineffective, and home, and in the afternoon commenced the damaging bomb hit on the ,S”hokwku withdrawal from the area on orders from was something less than lethal despite the Rabaul. Admiral Takagi concurred with pilot’s enthusiastic report that she was higher authority that it-would be unwise “settling fast.:”s to risk the vulnerable transport convoy in The ,Japanese did considerably better, the narrowing waters of the western Coral thanks to vastly superior torpedoes and Sea in face of the Allies’ Australian air- launching techniques. Two of these fields under cover of the whittled-down powerful “fish” ripped great holes in the air complement of the single operational Lexington’s port side, and she sustained carrier. So the Port Moresby [n.vasion two direct bomb hits plus numerous near misses that sprang plates. The more Group was ordered back to Rabaul. But the final, tragic act of the drama re- maneuverable York to /r71 dodged all of the torpedoes aimed at her and escaped all mained. The gallant old Gzin.gton, her hilt one of the bombs. l]ut this was an wounds pat ched up anc1 aplmrently fit to 800-pounder, and it exploded with sLlch a return to Pearl H;~rbor for permanent re- spectacular display of flame and smoke pairs, w-as suddenly racked by a terrible “ Ibid.,51. “ Ibid., 56. SETTIXG THE STAGE: EARLY XAVAI, OPERATIONS 213 exl)losion. This res(dted only indirectly own escort put her under the waves from enemy :~ction: relezsed gasoline forever. flmles were ignited by sparks from a gen- I.oss of the Leiw%gton gave tactical vic- erator sonleone hacl carelessly left running. tory to the Japanese. 13ut by thwarting This set off lvhat anlounted to a chain re- the invasion of Port Moresby, principal act ion. The best elforts of her crew avatled objective of the entire operation, the nothing, and at 1707 her skipper gave the L“nited States won strategic victory. At or(ler to abandon ship. This movement the time the enemy regarded this merely was carried out in the best order, Ivithout a postponement of their invasion phms; the loss of a man. At about 2000, nearly but events would prove that. no ,Japanese nine hours after the ,Japanese had with- seaborne invasion ever would near Port drawn from the battle, torpedoes of her Moresby again. CHAPTER ~ Japanese Plans: Toward Midway and the North Pacific Apparently ignoring this setback in the ships+r at least none in position for this Coral Sea, Japan next turned toward the upcoming battle.3 And Yamamoto also Central and North Pacific to launch the had a substantial edge over the U, S. in second complicated operation on her sched- cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. But ule. Admiral Yamamoto’s two-pronged the Japanese admiral squandered this lop- thrust at Midway and the Aleutians would sided advantage by dispersing his armada automatically wipe clean the Coral Sea in widely scattered groups and opened reverses and extend the outer perimeter himself for defeat in detail by the inferior of defense a safer distance from the home LT.S. Pacific Fleet.’ islands. And in the bargain, Yamamoto This Japanese fleet, divided for the hoped, these attacks would lure forth the complicated plan into five major forces, remainder of the L’. S. fleet so that he with some of these split into smaller could finish off the job he started on 7 groups, steamed eastward independently December? to carry out the various phases of the sec- The admiral accepted his aviators’ re- ond step in this strategy for 1942. Planes ports that they had destroyed both U. S. from two light carriers in the Second Mo- carriers in the Coral Sea, and he there- Me Force would strike Dutch Harbor, fore reasoned that the tT. S. could bring no more than two flattops against him any- Maska on 3 June to confuse the U. S. com- where in the Pacific. Actually the Pearl ‘ Although some of the battleships knocked Harbor yard had put. the Yorktoum back out at Pearl Harbor had been put back in serv- into operation in less than 48 hours so that ice, and three others had been brought around the U. S. had three carriers, including the from the Atlantic, these ships were operating Enterprise and the Hornet. But against from the west coast as a final defense for the u. s. these Yamamoto had seven, and four sea- ‘ In view of subsequent developments, Morison plane carriers as well. His force also con- describes Yamamoto’s disposition as “cockeyed.” tained 11 battleships, including three of Coral Sea and Midwag, 77–79. See also Battle the latest type.’ The U. S. had no battle- That Doomr’d Japan, 73–78. These Japanese authors, although sometimes carefully kind to ‘ Battle T?Lot Doomed Japan, Chaps 4 and 5, Yamamoto (who was killed later in a Solomon pu.wirn. The Aleutians phase was intended only Islands air action ), are most often highly critical as a diversion and to protect the northern flank of the Japanese Navy and of war plans in general. of the Midway thrust, the plan being to with- Although the work is valuable and serious (n. b. draw the landing troope in September. Ibid., 79. the final two paragraphs of the book, at pages ~Adm Yamamoto flew his flag in the Ymnuto, 247–248), the authors sometimes sound like men the largest, fastest, and most heavily armed ( 18” on the morning after, ruefnlly surveying the night guns) ship in the world. before. 214 J.4PANESE PLANS : TOWARD MII)WAY AND THE NORTH PACIFIC 215 mand and to cover diversionary Japanese. mism and overconfidence to cast the U. S. landings in the western Aleutians by the Pacific Fleet in the role of a timid char- Occupation Forces for .&dak-Attu and acter actor cued for a vulnerable “walk-on” Kiska. Next the (’omier Striking Fome, part. They begged the question of tactics commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi before their plan moved to the operational Nagumo, would soften Midway with the stage. The U. S. Fleet, according to Japa- planes from the big fleet carriers Akagi, nese plans, would be steaming for the Kaga, Hiryu, and floryu,5 and would then Second Mobile Force in the Aleutians, or move on to strike the first blow at,the U. S. would be vacillating in Hawaiian waters, Pacific Fleet if it challenged in a sortie until the strong (7arrier Stm”king Force hit from Pearl Harbor. Midway and revealed the target of the Admiral Yamamoto’s Main Body, in- main effort.G In either event nothing but cluding three battleships and a light the small Marine garrison force would cruiser of his force plus the .47eutian. stand in the way of the occupation of Mid- Screening Force of four battleships and way, and the Japanese would have an air two light cruisers, then would go in for base of their own there before the U. S. the kill against the U. S. Fleet. This en- Fleet could reach them. gagement would be followed, after dark- But, as at the Coral Sea encounter, the ness on 5 ,June, by Vice Admiral Noblltake U.S. Fleet already had sortied to await the Kondo moving in to shell the U. S. base ,Japanese. For more than a month Nimitz for two days. Then Kondo’s conroyed had been aware that something like this Transport Oroup would approach to land was in the wind, and he bet nearly every- the Midway Occwpction Force of 5,000 thing he had that the strike would hit Mid- ground troops. While crossing the Pacific, way. The weakened Pacific Fleet stood Yamamoto remained some hundreds of some 300 miles northeast of Midway, there miles to the rear with his Main, Body, to refuel, before the Japanese picket sub- awaiting word from the .4dvcmce Expe- marines took position. As a result, these ditionary Force of large fleet submarines boats sighted no U. S. ships and radioed already manning stations on the ap- no reports, and Admiral N’agnmo discov- proaches to Pearl Harbor to warn about ered the presence of the U. S. carriers in a sorties of the American ships. most unpleasant manner. This ambitious plan might have worked, even though it was over-intricate. But e Fuchida and Okumiya state that Japanese again the ,Japanese had allowed their opti- plans “calculated that the enemy naval forces would be lured out by the strike on Midway Island 5Absent members of the original Pearl Harbor and not be fore.” Battle That L)oemed Japan, 128. striking force were the Shokxzlcu and the Zu ikaku, But in this calculation their overconfidence must the former undergoing Coral Sea damage rel}airs, have beeu tempered somewhat, else why the di- and the latter reforming its air groups battered version into the Aleutians? Morison discusses in that same action. Presence of these big car- this faulty Japanese strategy, probably more real- riers at Midway might well hare been decisi~e. istically. Coraz Sea and Midwav, 74-79. 44s777 0—58—15 CHAPTER 8 Midway Girds for Battle’ Even before these Japanese plans were including about 100 officers and men of made, and long before Admiral Yamamoto Batteries A and C of the 4th Defense Bat- sortied eastward, all U. S. military plan- talion, left Pearl Harbor on 19 December ners recognized the vulnerable position of with the old Navy 7-inch b and, the 3-inch the Midway Atoll.’ Especially was this guns which had been shipped to Pearl Har- position clear in the light of early Jap- bor for Midway prior to the outset of war. anese successes elsewhere in the Pacific, (See Map 10, Map Section) and none w-as more keenly aware of the This force, on board the USS Wright, grim situation than the atoll’s small gar- arrived on Christmas Eve, and Lieutenant rison force. The 12 PBY>S of VP-21 were Colonel Harold D. Shannon, who com- soon withdrawn, and little help w-as ex- manded Marine defense forces on the atoll, pected from the crippled fleet. But on 17 turned over to Battery A (Captain Custis December, while the 6th Marine Defense Burton, Jr. ) the mission of installing and Battalion worked to improve existing de- manning the 7-inch and 3-inch batteries fense installations, 17 SB2U-3’S (Vindi- to be emplaced on Eastern Island. Battery cators) of Marine Scout-Bomber Squad- C (First Lieutenant Lewis A. Jones) was ron 231 ( VMSB-231 ) flew in unexpectedly assigned the job of setting up its 3-inch from Hawaii. Led by Major Clarence J. battery on Sand Island.’ Chappell, Jr., and assisted in over-water Next day Midway received another navigation by a PBY, the obsolescent craft Christmas present: 14 Brewster F2A–3’s, made the 1,137-mile hop in nine hours and the air echelon of Marine Fighter Squad- twenty minutes.’ Other reinforcements, ron 221 ( VMF-221 ), flew in from the USS Sarotoga which was retiring from the ‘ Editor’s Note: Material contained in Chap- abortive attempt to relieve Wake Island. ters 3 and 4 is derived mainly from Chapters III and IV of the historical monograph Marines at This squadron immediately began a daily MidwaV by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, schedule of air search and patrolling. C)n Jr., published by Headquarters, L’. S. Marine 26 December the 1?SS Tangier brought in Corps, in 1948. This has been extensively re- written and checked against sources subsequently 4These 7-inchweapons had been removed from brought to light. pre-World War I battleshipsandstored in reserve 2 See Part II for a description of the geography at naval yards. K, J. Bauer, “Ships of the Navy, and history of Midway. 1775–1945,” (}1S available from the author). 3This was then the longest massed flight of 5Interview with LtCol ~. Burton, Jr., 26Sep47, single engine landplanes on record, and it had hereinafter cited as llur;on. The two Eastern been carried out with no surface rescue craft available. CO MAG-21 serial 1173 to MGC, Island batteries were located side by side on the 19Dec41. The flight took off from Hickam since south shore of the island, near the western tip, Ewa’s runways were too short for the heavily- and the SandIsland battery was set up along the laden planes to use with complete safety. north shore of Sand Island. 216 MIDWAY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 217 Battery B of the 4th Defense Battalion criminate hits, and Captain Buckner’s (First Lieutenant Frank G. Urnstead) ; Battery D had expended 24 rounds. additional machine gunners and 12 anti- The next action against the atoll came aircraft machine guns from the Special two weeks later, on 8 February, when an- Weapons Group of that same battalion; other submarine appeared less than 1,000 an aviation contingent of three oflicers and yards south of Sand Island and opened 110 enlisted Marines constituting the fire on the radio towers. Captain Loren ground echelon of VMF-221; aviation S. Fraser’s Battery A opened fire on this supplies; additional radar; and much- boat, and it submerged after Marines had needed base-defense artillery material. returned two rounds. The enemy had hit Umstead;s 5-inch battery, along with the a concrete ammunition magazine, but for- island’s other 7-inch battery, were set up tunately the small arms ammunition was south of the radio station on Sand Island. not detonated. Two days later another By New Year’s Day of 1942 Midway was submarine-or the same one—surfaced garrisoned by a strongly-reinforced de- almost directly below two Marine fighter fense battalion, and one fighter and one planes flying the sunset antisubmarine scout-bomber squadron. patrol. The submarine got off two rounds A major air base took shape on Eastern before First Lieutenant John F. Carey Island under the direction of Lieutenant and Second Lieutenant Philip R. White, Colonel Wrilliam J. Wallace who on 9 the fliers, could launch a diving attack. ,January became commanding oflicer of the Both rounds from the submarine splashed Marine Aviation Detachment. Individual in the lagoon, and then the boat was aircraft. bunkers and underground person- driven under water by the air attack just nel shelters were built, emergency fueling as the batteries of the 6th Defense. Bat- expedients devised, radars calibrated, and talion were going into action. This was inexperienced operators trained to use the last time for a number of months that them properly. Colonel Wallace was as- Midway was troubled by enemy sub- sisted by Major Walter L. 6 LtCol W. J. Wallace ltr to (3o1 C, .4. Imrkin, installation capable of handling as many 18Jan42. squadrons and aircraft types as could 218 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL physically be accommodated and protected Carol Sea and back again to Pearl Harbor there. where they were placed under a new com- On 10 March, during the work and re- mander, Rear Admiral Raymond A. organization, the Marine fliers got their Spruance; Fletcher’s Yorktown had just first test against enemy aircraft. Radar limped in from the Coral Sea needing an picked up a Japanese four-engined estimated 90 days of repair work; and all “Mayis” (Kawanishi 97) approximately the Fleet’s battleships were on the west 45 miles west of Midway, and 12 fighters coast where they could not be used (partly under Captain Robert M. Haynes vectored because Nimitz felt he did not have out to intercept. They made contact with enough air strength to protect them, any- the enemy flying boat at 10,000 feet and way ). But h’imitz was convinced that his shot it down. intelligence estimate was correct, and that Although the enemy plane did as well as the stand had to be made, it could to fight off this attack, this contact For the engagement Nimitz gave was more important as intelligence for Fletcher, in over-all tactical charge: direct Nimitz’ staff in Pearl Harbor than as a test command of Task Force 17 which included for the Marine. fliers. Two aircraft of this the Yorktown, (rushed into shape in two type had tumbled four bombs into the hills days rather than 90), two cruisers, and six behind Honolulu on the night of 34 destroyers. Spruance commanded Task March, and Nimitz already believed that Force 16 which included the Enterprise this portended an offensive toward Hawaii. and Hornet, six cruisers, and nine destroy- Now this new sighting near Midway gave ers. Four oilers and 19 submarines also added weight to his estimate, and this in- were assigned to the area, and, in addition, formation went into the CinCPac intelli- a h’orth Pacific Force was formed of five gence “hopper” which shortly thereafter cruisers and ten destroyers to screen the reached the considered opinion that the Aleutians. The Japanese had him out- Japanese attack would strike Midway. numbered on all counts, and Nimitz knew By this time the Japanese code had been that the enemy would be gunning for the broken, also.’ Thus were the fragments three U. S. carriers. But his carriers like- pieced together into Nimitz’s May 1942 wise were his only hope, and the admiral decision which caused him to -wager nearly ordered his subordinates to apply the rule every ship he had in an early sortie from of calculated risk when they went in with Pearl Harbor to the position 300 miles their air groups to stop the Japanese. northeast of Midway from which the WThile Nimitz readied this reception Japanese could be intercepted. committee? the ,Japanese completed their It was a bold, even though w-ell- Midway plans and polished the rough op- calculated, wager. The many ships on erational edges with carrier training and South pacific convoy duty had to be left on their important jobs; Halsey’s Enter- SFletcher was senior to Spruance, and thus be- pri,~e and Hornet bad rushed from the came Officer in Tactical Command. But as it turned out, Spruance exercised practically an in- Doolittle launching area part way to the dependent command during the critical days of *6 June, and this probably was fortunate be- ‘ Battle That Doomed ,lapan, 131 ; U. S. & Sea cause Fletcher had no aviation staff while Spru- Power, 686. ance had inherited Halsey ’s. MIDWAY GIRDS FOR B.4TTLE 219 rehearsals. By the last week of May, all the steps being taken to reinforce their ,Japanese fleet elements were underway, atoll against the anticipated attack. and on decks Imperial sailors sunbathed Japanese D-Day, the admiral predicted, and sang songs—vocal eruptions of what would be about 28 May. On the day they has been described as the “Victory received this letter, Simard and Shannon Disease.”’ conferred on their final plans for defense, Meanwhile on Midway, the focal point and that evening Colonel Shannon as- for these vast efforts, Marines got their sembled his key subordinates and warned first inkling of all this attention when them of the impending enemy attack. Nimitz flew in on 2 May to see their senior .Additional defensive measures and priori- oflicer, Lieutenant Colonel Shannon, and ties of final efforts were outlined, and all the atoll commander, Commander Cyril recreational activities suspended. May 25 T. Simard. The admiral inspected the in- was set as the deadline for completion of stallations, and then directed Shannon to the measures ordered. submit a detailed list of all supplies and On the 25th, however, came two wel- equipment he would need to defend the comed changes for the picture. First, atoll against a strong attack. Nimitz Nimitz passed the word that the Japanese promised that all available items requested attack was not expected until early June, would be forwarded immediately, and andj second, the first reinforcements ar- within less than a week men and material rived. On this date the USS St. Louis were being embarked in Hawaii to bolster came in with the 37mm antiaircraft bat- the island strength. tery of the 3d Defense Battalion plus the Three more 3-inch antiaircraft batteries two companies of raiders. Four of the totaling 12 guns, a 37mm antiaircraft bat- 37’s were emplaced on each island while tery of eight guns, and a 20mm antiaircraft Raider Company C (Captain Donald H. battery of 18 guns were temporarily de- Hastie ) went to Sand Island, and Com- tached from the 3d Defense Battalion at pany D (First Lieutenant John Apergis) Pearl Harbor; and two rifle companies of to Eastern Island. the 2d Marine Raider Battalion, together Next day the aircraft tender Kittyhawk with a platoon of five light tanks, also were arrived with the 3d Defense Battalion’s sent along to Midway. For M.AG–22, still ;~-inch antiaircraft group commanded by flying Brewster fighters and Irought Vin- Major Chandler W. Johnson, the light dicator dive bombers, there would be 16 tank platoon for the mobile reserve, and SBD-2 dive bombers and seven relatively the SBD–2’S and the F4F–3’s. In the new Grumman F4F–3 fighters. following week additional Army and Shortly after his return from Midway Navy planes arrived, and by 31 May there to Pearl Harbor, A’imitz arranged “spot” were 107 aircraft. on the island.l” promotions to captain and colonel respec- tively for Simard and Shannon, and de- MBy this date the daily aviation gasoline con- scribed to them in a joint personal letter sumptionof planes based on Eastern Island was &5,000gallons, and the following numbers of SBattle That Doomed Japan, 245. “. . . the planes were based there: U. S. Army—four spread of the virus was so great,” the authors say, B–26’s and 17 B–17’s; U. S. ~avy—16 PBY–5A’s “that its effect may be found on every level of the and six TB~’s; U. S. Marine Corps-19 SBD–2’S, planning and execution of the Midway operation.” 17 SB21~–3’s,21 F2A–3’s, and seven F4F–3’s. 220 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL For the ground forces and key civilian ered likely beach exits; and bottles of workers who had remained behind to help molotov cocktail stood ready at every posi- defend the island, the week was equally tion. A decoy mockup airplane (a ,JFU— busy. Reinforcing weapons were in- Japanese fouler-upper) was spotted prom- stalled, tanks tested in the sand, all defen- inently on the seaplane apron, and all un- sive concentrations registered in, and the derground fuel storage areas on Sand emplacing of an extensive system of ob- Island were prepared for emergency de- stacles, mines and demolitions completed. struction by demolition.’l Sand Island now was surrounded with two double-apron barbed wire barriers, and all “ The demolition system worked, too. On 22 installations on both islands were ringed May a sailor threw the wrong switch and blew by protective wire. Antiboat mines of up a good portion of the aviation gasoline. The supply was so critical after this that the pilots sealed sewer pipe, and obstacles of rein- who arrived on the Kittvhawk did not get a forcing steel lay offshore; the beaches were prebattle chance to check out in their SBD–2’S. sown with homemade mines of ammuni- Pipe lines also were wrecked in the blast, and tion boxes filled with dynamite and 20- MAG-22 thereafter had to refuel all planes by penny nails; cigar box antitank mines cov- hand from 55-gallon drums. CHAPTER 4 Midway Versus the Japanese 4-5 June 1942 A Midway PBY spotted the approach- were going up to patrol from Midway, he ing Japanese first, at about 0900 on June had reached a position approximately 250 3:- and tracked them long enough to re- miles northwest of the atoll. There at port eleven ships making 19 knots east- 0430 the Japanese admiral launched 36 ward. These vessels were probably the “Kate” torpedo planes and 36 “Val” dive transport and seaplane groups of the Occu- bombers, plus 36 escorting Zeros, for the pation Force, and they were attacked at first strike against the atoll. 1624 by nine B–17’s which Captain Simard At 0545 one of the Midway PBY’s sent out following the PBY’s contact re- sighted these planes about 150 miles out port. The pilots reported having hit “two from the island, and a short time later battleships or heavy cruisers’s and two another PBY reported visual contact with transports in the group then 570 miles two enemy carriers and the balance of the away from Midway, but the fliers were Japanese Curvie~ Str+king Fo~ce some 200 mistaken in both ship identification and miles from Midway. Enterprise inter- in calling their shots, for they actually cepted this report, but. Fletcher wanted to hit nothing. A Catalina scored on one of recover his search planes and sift further these oilers later that night in a moon- intelligence before launching his strike, light torpedo run. and so he ordered Spruance to take the van This was enough to convince Fletcher southwesterly and lead off the attack that the battle would soon be on, and he ag-ainst the enemy carriers. changed course from his station 300 miles Yleauwhile the Midway Marines were east-northeast of Midway to gain a new ready for the first shock of attack. Ground position about 200 miles north. From force defenders at general quarters manned there he could launch his planes the fol- every weapon and warning device, and lowing morning against the Japanese car- MilG-22, which already had fighters up to rier force which was expected to come in cover the sortie of the PBY’s stood by for from the northwest. U. S. intelligence orders. lit 0555, shortly after the second still was good. .Nagumo continued to steam P1;Y report had fixed the position of the in from the northwest while his transports ,Japanese Striking Force, the 6th Defense were under attack, and near daybreak on 13attalion radar logged a report of “many 4 June, when the Yorktown launched an planes,” and the NTavalAir Station raised early-morning search and while 11 PBY’s similar blips almost simultaneously. Air raid sirens began to wail, Condition One ‘ ~lidway (Zone plus 12) time and West Longi- was set, and the NL4G-22 pilots manned tude date. their planes. 130th squadrons were in the 221 MIDWAY VERSUS THE JAPANESE, 4-5 JUNE 1942 223 air in less than 10 minutes, VMF–221 their strike. Since each of these Japanese heading to intercept the enemy planes and formations had left the carriers with 36 VMS13-241 off to rendezvous station 20 planes, it is possible that the Marine fliers miles east where the dive bomber pilots scored some kills.z would receive further instructions. The Kaga aircraft group in the first The VMF fliers under Major Floyd B. wave, assigned to attack the patrol plane Parks sighted the Zero-escorted Val dive facilities on Sand Island, dropped nine bombers at 0616 about 30 miles out from 242-kilogram bombs on and about the. sea- Midway, and Captain John F. Carey, plane hangars, setting them aflame and leading one of Parks’ divisions in an starting a large fire in the fuel oil tanks F4F-3, launched the attack from 17,000 500 yards to the north. The Akagi planes feet. The Marine fliers were hopelessly plastered the north shore of Eastern outnumbered, and they found that the Island to destroy the Marine mess hall, Zero fighters could “fly rings around galley, and post exchange. These the re- them.” They had time for only one. pass turning enemy fliers described as hangars> at the bombers, and then had to turn their Other targets of the Japanese dive attention to the swarm of Zeros, from one bombers included the already-flaming fuel to five of which got on the tail of each storage at the north end of Sand Island, Marine fighter. Only three of the original the Sand Island dispensary, and the East- 12 Marine pilots survived this brawl, and ern Island powerhouse which suffered although the damage they inflicted on the direct hits from two 805-kilogram bombs. enemy has never been assessed, it is be- These hits virtually destroyed the entire lieved that they splashed a number of the plant. And at the very end of the strike, bombers and some of the Zeros. Other the 6th Defense Battalion’s F,astern Island Zeros were led into the Midway antiair- command post received a direct hit which craft fire. killed the Marine sector commander, Meanwhile another group of 13 Midway Major William J$’. Benson, and wounded fighters under Captain Kirk Armistead several other men. After these bombers came in for an attack against the enemy completed their runs, the Zeros came in air formation. Again the damage inflicted for strafing attacks. This one and only upon the enemy was undetermined, but air strike on Midway was over shortly fewer Marine pilots were lost. For better after 0700. or for worse, however, the fighter defense ‘ Maj W. S. McCormick, an experienced anti- of Midway had been expended, and the aircraft officer, counted the 22 ; and Capt M. A. problem now passed to the antiaircraft Tyler, a VMSB-241 pilot with a grounded plane, guns on the atoll. counted the 18. CO, VMF-221 Rept to CO, MAG- The first Japanese formation attacked 22, 6Jun42, 1. However, Battle That Doomed at about 0630 from 14,000 feet. Antiair- Japan, 155, reports that “not a single hit” was craft fire knocked down two of these hori- sustained by the Japanese bombers until they struck in two waves of 36 planes each. This zontal bombers before they could unload, seems highly improbable in view of eyewitness but 22 came on through to drop their accounts and damage sustained. bombs. And just as these initial explo- ‘ ONI Review, 4.5-48. Information on ground sions rocked the two islands, 18 planes of defense from CO, 6th DefBn Rept to CO, N.&S, the enem y’s second wave came over for Midway on action of &5 Jun42, 13Jun42, 1–8. 224 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL Marine defense batteries fired through- arm them for the new attack of the atoll. out these attacks, and one source credited While his men were involved in this work this antiaircraft fire with 10 kills,’ Re- on the flight deck and in hangar spaces, ports from Marine flyers would appear to Nagum.o got the bela~ed word from a Tone require an increase of this estimate, how- search plane that U. S. ships, including at ever, since returning Midway pilots de- ieast one carrier, were in the area. This scribed enemy planes falling out of caused another change of mind, and the formation and others floundering into the admiral ordered the planes’ ordnance water.5 But ,Japanese authorities claim changed again, from bombs back to tor- that only six of their planes—three level pedoes with which to attack the surface bombers, two dive bombers, and a fighter— ships. But this decision was just tardy failed to make it back to the carriers.’ enough to allow Spruance to catch him This controversy probably will never be re- with his planes down, and with torpedoes solved, for regardless of how many of these and bombs strewn in great confusion about ,Japanese planes made it back to their car- the hangar deck.7 rier decks, Fletcher and Spruance—with a Meanwhile, as Nagumo vacillated, ..Ad- certain unintentional assistance from miral Nimitz’s orders for Captain Simard Nagumo-initiated action which resulted to “go all out for the carriers,” while in the destruction of all these planes, Marine antiaircraft batteries worried anyway. about Midway, were under execution. N“agumo’s mistake was a natural one for VMSB-241, like the fighter squadron, had a commander who believed himself to be divided into two striking units, the first unopposed on a “field” of battle of his own composed of 16 SBD–2’S led by Major choice. Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, the Lofton Henderson, and the second of 11 flight officer who had commanded the first SB2U–3’S commanded by Major Benjamin attack wave against Midway, radioed dur- MT.Korris. Henderson’s group climbed to ing his return flight that “There is need for 9,OOO feet to locate the enemy carriers, a second attack wave.’; Meanwhile, with which were then undergoing the attack Nagumo still ignorant of the U. S. fleet’s from the TBF’s and the B–26’s. Fliers of presence in the vicinity, six American this group sighted the ,Japanese. ships at TBF’s and four B–26’s from Midway came. 0744, but as the SBD’S spiralled down they in to attack his ships. This convinced the were set upon by swarms of Nakajima 97’s ,Japanese admiral that Tomonaga was and Zeros flying air cover, which were right, and he sent below to hangar spaces soon reinforced by more fighters from the the 93 planes he had kept spotted for carriers below. Henderson and several strikes against possible surface opposition. others were shot down (only eight of these These planes were to be re-armed with planes got. back to Midway) and the strike bombs for the second strike. Then scored no hits although some were Nagumo called in the returning planes to claimed. s ‘ OXI Reciex, 72. ‘ ONI Review, 17–19, 44-45. ‘ CinCPac Rept to CominCh on the Battle of ‘ Statement of Capt E. G. Glidden, 7Jun42, 1. Midway, 8. Japanese sources disclose, however, that no hits 6Bottle That Doomed Japan, 156. were scored in this attack. The ~uadalcanal MIDWAY VERSUS THE JAPANESE, 4-5 JUNE 1942 225 Next came an attack by 15 B-17’s led by gone in against the attacking Japanese Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, planes, only 10 returned, and of this num- USA, but again claims of hits were opti- ber only two were in shape to leave the mistic. And as these Flying Fortresses ground again. Thirteen F2.4–3’s and two pulled away, Major Norris came in with F4F’s were missing, along with the eight his 11 Vindicators which had taken off craft lost from the Henderson group and with Henderson. Beset by the Zeros, the three shot away from the Norris force. Norris turned to the nearest target at hand, Slick black smoke from oil fires billowed and the Marines crowded their ancient up from the islands, and ruptured fuel planes into a standard glide rnn almost lines left more than two-thirds of the avia- on top of the .Japanwe battleship tion fuel temporarily unavailable. Craso- Hcu-ww—previously claimed as an Army line had to be sent to the field from Sand B–17’s victim off Luzon. Some of the Island, and hand-pumped from drums. fliers also went after the Kirishirna, which The Marine ground defense force had sus- was nearby, but neither attack managed tained 24 casualties, and four ordnance- any hits. Three Marines were shot down, men of VMF-221 had been lost to a direct and the group was credited with splasiling bomb hit. two enemy fighters, plus two probables? .4t 1700 a burning enemy carrier was re- By 1100 all surviving Marine aircraft ported 200 miles northwest of Midway, had made their way back to the atoll and Major Norris prepared VMSB-241>S where all hands grimly assessed the battle’s six operational SBD–2’S and five SB21J–3’S damage and prepared for subsequent ac- for a night attack. The planes took off tion. Of the VMF-221 fighters which had at 1900, but could not find the carrier. Major Norris failed to return from this airfield: captured two months later, was named mission, although the other pilots managed in }Iaj Henderson’s honor. Rear gunners of this to home by the light of oil fires and strike group are credited with four enemy kills the antiaircraft searchlights which were plus two additional probables. 9 ONI Review, 19; USSBS Intcrrogatiorw, Nav turned up as beacons.’” Meanwhile, the NO 2, Capt Susumu Kawaguchi, IJN,I,6. See Battle of Midway had been decided at sea also Coral Sea and Midway, 111, for Adm Mor- in a fi~ht of carrier aircraft. ison’s dismissal of damage claims by land-based fliers. ‘“ V~lSB–241Rept of Gombat,7Jun42,3.