Creating Provinces for a New South Africa, 1993

NEGOTIATING DIVISIONS IN A DIVIDED LAND: CREATING PROVINCES FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA, 1993

SYNOPSIS As South Africa worked to draft a post-apartheid constitution in the months leading up to its first fully democratic elections in 1994, the disparate groups negotiating the transition from apartheid needed to set the country’s internal boundaries. By 1993, the negotiators had agreed that the new constitution would divide the country into provinces, but the thorniest issues remained: the number of provinces and their borders. Lacking reliable population data and facing extreme time pressure, the decision makers confronted explosive political challenges. South Africa in the early 1990s was a patchwork of provinces and “homelands,” ethnically defined areas for black South Africans. Some groups wanted provincial borders drawn according to ethnicity, which would strengthen their political bases but also reinforce divisions that had bedeviled the country’s political past. Those groups threatened violence if they did not get their way. To reconcile the conflicting interests and defuse the situation, the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum established a separate, multiparty commission. Both the commission and its technical committee comprised individuals from different party backgrounds who had relevant skills and expertise. They agreed on a set of criteria for the creation of new provinces and solicited broad input from the public. In the short term, the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of States/Provinces/Regions balanced political concerns and technical concerns, satisfied most of the negotiating parties, and enabled the elections to move forward by securing political buy-in from a wide range of factions. In the long term, however, the success of the provincial boundaries as subnational administrations has been mixed.

Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson drafted this policy note based on interviews conducted by Makgetla in Pretoria and Johannesburg, South Africa, in February 2010. A separate policy note, “Refashioning Provincial Government in Democratic South Africa, 1994-1996,” focuses on the two-year mandate of the Commission on Provincial Government. Case originally published August 2010. Case revised and republished October 2012.

ISS is program of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs: successfulsocieties.princeton.edu. ISS invites readers to share feedback and information on how these cases are being used: [email protected]. © 2014, Trustees of Princeton University. This case study is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies

INTRODUCTION In September 1991, the National Peace By 1990, South Africa’s National Party Accord, signed by 27 political groups and (NP) government saw the writing on the wall: territory governments, established a a government based on the racial negotiating process in order to draft a new segregation policy of apartheid was constitution for South Africa. But unsustainable. Faced with mass rioting, subsequent party talks proceeded fitfully, international sanctions and a determined stalling amid civilian fighting and violent underground resistance, President F.W. de protests throughout the country. Ultimately, Klerk unbanned the African National the ANC accused the NP government of Congress (ANC)—the anti-apartheid involvement in civilian clashes and withdrew movement led by Nelson Mandela— and from the talks. entered into secret negotiations with In 1992, the NP government and the Mandela and other ANC representatives to ANC to agree to return to the negotiating formulate a plan for transition to a post- table to seek a political settlement after the apartheid government. deaths of more than 60 people in civilian The new government was to preside violence. The assassination of popular ANC over a unified South Africa of equal leader and general secretary of the citizenship for all regardless of ethnicity, Communist Party Chris Hani in April 1993 thereby ending the practice of using by a man tied to South Africa’s Afrikaner far segregated homeland territories, or right accelerated the pressure on negotiators Bantustans, to divide the black African to reach a settlement. “The outcome of the majority from the white and other minority Chris Hani assassination was that there was populations. Under apartheid, the then a consensus between the government government did not recognize residents of and the ANC [that we] would have to move Bantustans as full citizens of South Africa, as forward very quickly,” said Roelf Meyer, a part of a broader strategy of racial chief negotiator for the NP government. “If segregation and discrimination. Apartheid we didn’t do that, the masses would have had marginalized the black South African taken to the streets and demanded population—79% of the population in the immediate takeover.” 2001 census—and elevated the 9.6% white The ANC and the NP began bilateral South African population to govern the talks, and by 1993, other parties had country, with limited representation of returned to the table as well. Formally mixed-race individuals and individuals of known as the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum Asian descent. The apartheid government (MPNF), the negotiators, representing a used the homelands to further divide the broad swath of political constituencies, black South African population into adopted an interim constitution and set language groups (the largest of which, Zulu, April 1994 as the deadline for a new constituted only 23.8% of the population in constitution and election. They also agreed 2001) and at times worked at creating that the new constitution would divide the conflict between the groups. country into provinces.

Initially, the ANC had resisted a into governable areas without reinforcing decentralized state structure, preferring the racial segregation that had been consolidation in a central government they practiced by the apartheid regime or were likely to control. On the other side, the rewarding fringe groups that used violence political parties whose support bases rested to advance their agendas while still keeping largely on a single ethnic or cultural them part of an inclusive process. identity—the NP, the largely white At the time, South Africa was divided Democratic Party (DP) and the Zulu-based into four provinces and 10 homeland areas. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)—had pushed Two of the provinces were former British for a decentralized system that would enable colonies—the Cape of Good Hope and them to retain power in smaller areas of the Natal—and the others had previously been country where they could win the vote. In an independent Boer republics—Orange Free essay published on his foundation’s website State and Transvaal—established by after the end of apartheid, de Klerk called Afrikaners, descendants of Dutch colonial the provincial system “one of the new settlers. The four provinces had been joined constitution’s great compromises: on the as a single country, the Union of South one hand, [the provinces] were not nearly as Africa, in 1910. The South African strong as the IFP, the NP and the DP government began the practice of apartheid wanted; on the other hand, they provided in 1948 and created the homelands in order much greater devolution of power to regions to segregate the black South African 1 than the ANC originally advocated.” population into ethnic enclaves that would function as legally distinct autonomous or THE CHALLENGE semiautonomous nation states, thereby In mid-1993, with elections looming, the denying South Africa citizenship and voting post-apartheid map of South Africa was still rights to their residents. The autonomous largely undecided. Where the apartheid homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, government had used internal boundaries Venda and Ciskei had been designed by the for an agenda of racial segregation, MPNF apartheid regime to function completely negotiators were faced with the task of independently from the South African dividing the country for provincial rule government and economy. The remaining without reinforcing old wounds or creating six—Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, new ones. Any discussion about new KwaZulu, Lebowa and Qwaqwa—were borders would open the door to groups that considered only partially autonomous. wanted ethnic enclaves with strong degrees In the 1993 talks, the main parties of independence from South Africa. Many of agreed to move away from ethnically defined those groups used violence to gain attention boundaries, though they were not yet able to from the larger negotiating parties, which come up with a single, mutually acceptable tended to have more-inclusive outlooks and map. more-widespread support. For negotiators, The ANC rejected the homelands as the key challenge lay in dividing the country fictions of the apartheid regime. Unable to

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies sustain themselves independently, ethnically diverse community, they stood homelands existed only to fulfill the little chance of winning election to political government’s segregationist vision. office. Long-serving homeland leaders Although South Africa was rich in minerals, Mangosuthu Buthelezi of primarily Zulu- the homelands shared little of that natural speaking KwaZulu and Lucas Mangope of wealth and also lacked land well suited to majority Tswana-speaking Bophuthatswana commercial agriculture. Many of the were particularly strong advocates of homelands were non-contiguous—scattered ethnically defined provinces centered on in pieces across several provinces— their homelands. Buthelezi commanded reflecting the government’s desire to unite considerable influence in KwaZulu through all speakers of a given language, with little the IFP, a Zulu cultural movement that had regard for the practicality of the borders. turned into a political party; and he agitated Few had the ability to administer for a province that would keep his political themselves, collect taxes or provide social influence intact. services. Negotiators for the ANC, the NP, and The NP did not oppose the idea of their respective allies could not ignore doing away with the homeland system. Buthelezi’s demands for a strong province Interested mainly in maximizing its power in due to ongoing violence between ANC and the new South Africa, the NP based its IFP supporters in South Africa’s urban position on its expected success at the slums. Thousands had died in the violence polls—primarily in the forms of the number between the two parties from the late 1980s of provincial governments and the number to 1993, primarily in the area that eventually of seats in the upper house of the country’s became the KwaZulu-Natal province and in parliament it hoped to win. the regions around Johannesburg, where Drafting a new constitution and migrant workers from KwaZulu often lived ensuring a peaceful transition from minority in cramped hostels. From 1990 to 1994 rule to majority rule in South Africa, alone, at least 14,000 people died in political however, required balancing a wide range of violence, according to a later report by moderate and extreme positions that were South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation beyond the positions of the two major Commission.2 Adding to the tensions were negotiating parties. Most important for the newspaper reports in July 1991 that security delimitation debate, the two center parties forces of the NP government had funded had to weigh voices from the fringes or and trained IFP supporters involved in the smaller constituencies that threatened to act violence in order to undermine the ANC, a as political spoilers in the process. scandal that became known as Inkathagate. Homeland political leaders did not want Similarly, Mangope wanted to retain the to give up their ethnically defined spheres of boundaries of his homeland to preserve his influence, and they argued for division along political base. The apartheid government ethnic or linguistic lines that would allow had appointed Mangope to lead the them to continue in power, because in an government of Bophuthatswana in the

1970s. Lacking widespread political support of unpredictable violence to achieve their within the homeland, Mangope relied on his objectives. police and army to maintain control. To advance their common interests, To bolster their bargaining positions, Mangope, Buthelezi and leaders of the the homeland leaders teamed up with conservative Afrikaners, who were less another group advocating segregation: extreme in their tactics than the AWB, conservative Afrikaners who demanded an formed in 1993 the Concerned South Afrikaner homeland, which they referred to Africans Group (COSAG), later called the as a volkstaat, to protect their culture and Freedom Alliance. Through the COSAG language. Conservative Afrikaner leaders alliance they sought to preserve or augment threatened to bring South Africa to its knees the power they held under apartheid. if post-apartheid plans failed to provide for Even though the ANC in particular was the establishment of a whites-only territory. vehemently opposed to the plans advocated Former general Constand Viljoen led the by these factions, they needed the Afrikaner Volksfront, or Afrikaner People’s conservative Afrikaners and the homeland Front, which included leaders of railway leaders to buy into the process in order to workers, farmers and mine workers who avoid further violence. threatened to use their collective power to damage the country’s economy if the ANC FRAMING A RESPONSE did not set aside a territory for white Recognizing the need for technical speakers of the Dutch-like South African expertise, as well as for the representation of language, Afrikaans. different viewpoints, MPNF negotiators set White extremist groups also used up the Commission on the threats of violence to gain more influence Demarcation/Delimitation of than their level of national support States/Provinces/Regions (CDDR) in May warranted—estimated in media reports to 1993. Creating the CDDR enabled represent a minority of South Africa’s negotiators to delegate the debate to a body roughly 3 million Afrikaners. Many of the representative of party viewpoints while Afrikaner right-wing leaders had come from freeing up major-party politicians to work on the army, and their movements adopted a the drafting of the constitution. military culture. During the MPNF In giving the CDDR its mandate in May constitutional negotiations, members of the 1993, the MPNF negotiators instructed the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB, or commission to (1) take into account specific Afrikaner Resistance Movement) rampaged criteria, (2) hear and evaluate proposals from through the conference center, committing interested parties around the country, and acts of vandalism to intimidate participants. (3) report its conclusions and While their actions did little to advance the recommendations to the broader negotiators cause of the white extremists, the incidents of the MPNF. The CDDR was divided into made clear that the extremists were capable two committees: the technical committee,

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies which was responsible for formulation of the The commissioners then nominated initial proposal based primarily on members of the technical committee. Renosi geographic and economic considerations, Mokate, who headed the technical and the main body of the commission, committee, noted that its members were charged with balancing the technical chosen to reflect the political, gender and proposal with party viewpoints and other racial makeup of South Africa. For example, political considerations. The technical both Mangope’s daughter and Carel Boshoff committee was to make its proposal to the joined the technical committee, according to political commission, which would then commissioners. Boshoff would later form a make changes and vote on a final proposal whites-only community in the northern part before forwarding it to the main negotiating of the country. Though the size of the body for incorporation into the new technical committee fluctuated throughout constitution. the process, the committee retained a core The CDDR was made up of 15 team of roughly 10 economists, political commissioners, with wide representation scientists and sociologists. “The biggest among the negotiating parties. The ANC and problem was not so much finding the skills the NP retained significant influence over per se, but finding the people from a broad the process and nominated the political spectrum who had the skills, to get commission’s co-chairmen. The ANC chose the mix right,” Mokate said. economist Bax Nomvete, the secretary- Even though both the commissioners general of what became the Common Market and their technical committee members had for Eastern and Southern Africa. Philip clear political affiliations, all agreed to begin “Flip” Smit, vice chancellor of the University their work by devising a single interpretation of Pretoria, was the NP’s choice for of the criteria they had been given to Nomvete’s co-chair. The ANC and the NP determine the new provincial boundaries. appointed the majority of the They generally used this interpretation of commissioners; the DP and the Pan- their mandated criteria to frame their Africanist Congress also made discussions, a practice that encouraged the appointments. The ethnically and commissioners to make decisions based on linguistically organized groups were facts rather than on political considerations, represented among the commissioners as particularly at the technical level. well. COSAG nominated to the commission Commissioners recalled later that architect Koos Reyneke, who had drawn up despite their political differences, they were the volkstaat proposal. Another united by the desire to find a solution that commissioner, Ann Bernstein, then would enable the elections to move forward. executive director of the Urban Foundation “You had to get a balance, because if you and an expert on development, was chosen had somebody that was so hell-bent on their because she could speak to South African own political view, then you would never business interests. have been able to come up with a consensus

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies document,” Mokate said. “Because of the guiding principles they drafted, the time that we were in and [because] we were commissioners stressed the potential all trying to arrive at a workable solution for drawbacks of giving too much weight to the country…people also tempered their cultural/linguistic considerations over own ideological and political agendas.” administrative ones but acknowledged the To facilitate decision making, the need to avoid breaking up existing, cohesive commissioners operated on the basis of language communities. “sufficient consensus,” upon which the The “cultural and linguistic realities” broader MPNF negotiations were predicated. criterion posed a particular challenge for the Though vaguely defined throughout the commission. “We had to take into account negotiations, the principle enabled a slight that in demarcating the provinces, we must majority to carry a decision. not reinforce the legacy of apartheid—either The commissioners’ first task was to the ethnic divisions from the Bantustan era decide how to apply the criteria for or [through] provinces that would reinforce evaluation of boundary proposals. The the apartheid spatial economy,” Mokate said. MPNF mandated that the CDDR take into The commission, faced with navigation account historical boundaries, the of a minefield of political tensions, was also availability of infrastructure and service ill equipped technically to carry out its delivery, existing government structures, mandate. The government of South Africa demographics, economic viability, potential had never produced a census on the entire for development, and “cultural and language population, and other official statistics did realities,” and that it limit financial costs, not include the homelands, reflecting the inconvenience to citizens and dislocation of apartheid government’s desire to excise the service.3 homelands from South Africa. The Interpretation of those criteria, commission had to find demographic however, was in the hands of the information from other sources to make commissioners themselves. They organized good on its commitment to use objective the criteria into four categories—economic criteria to determine the country’s new aspects, geographic coherence, institutional provincial borders. and administrative capacity, and With the deadline of the April 1994 sociocultural issues—and agreed to evaluate elections looming ahead, time was critical. each proposed boundary on its merits within The commission first met in May 1993 and each of those four categories. had about three months to gather data, hold The commissioners referenced the public hearings and complete its work. experiences of other countries—specifically, the United States, Canada, Australia, India, GETTING DOWN TO WORK Nigeria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Once the commissioners agreed on the Italy—in balancing similar delimitation criteria, the members of the technical criteria. The commissioners concluded that committee were given only a few weeks to the criteria should be equally applied. In the draft a proposal to pass on to the political

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies commission for broader deliberation. As a World Bank officials on missions around starting point for their analysis, the members South Africa. World Bank officials had the of the technical committee decided to base resources to conduct aerial surveys and their provincial borders largely on a map extract information from institutions such as created by the government-funded the army. One of the members of the Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) technical committee, Trevor Fowler, said in the 1980s. The bank had drawn up the that the members’ experience in working map to plan its own investments, dividing with the World Bank gave the ANC “deep the country into nine economic regions that insight into all of the cities and what their cut across existing homeland and provincial governance structures were like.” boundaries. The commission adopted the map as a basic tool because it reflected Involving the public economic criteria without regard for politics, To give South Africans a voice in the existing government boundaries or other process, the commission asked the public to factors. propose ideas. Individuals could send their Making sure the proposed provinces suggestions directly to the commission or would be governable presented a challenge attend forums around the country. Members because the new constitution was still being of the technical committee and the drafted. The MPNF negotiators had not yet commissioners formed representative groups decided whether the constitution would to travel to each of the hearings. They imply a centralized or decentralized state advertised the meetings over radio and in structure, and the CDDR’s final proposal newspapers, inviting people to participate. had to be flexible enough to fit with either Research organizations often helped run the outcome while still creating a long-term gatherings, which were in the form of either solution. “We had to understand this is not town hall debates or closed-door talks. something that you are going to change after Commissioners recalled engaging two years,” Mokate said. members of the public in lively discussions In evaluating proposals, the technical during those events. “Our job was to be committee and, by extension, the larger there, to listen, to take notes but to also commission struggled to find accurate interrogate,” Mokate said. For example, the information about the country’s regions and commission grilled a leader of the Xhosa cities. Because of the lack of concrete census people when the leader proposed an data, the commissioners relied on unofficial ethnically Xhosa-centered province. The sources, such as the DBSA, for population commissioners asked whether that leader’s estimates. The ANC representatives also province would be economically viable, and used information from World Bank missions they questioned him about the implications to supplement their knowledge of South of creating provinces elsewhere on an ethnic Africa’s demographics and infrastructure. A basis. few years earlier, ANC members working on Although public consultation aimed to local government issues had accompanied make the process inclusive, the

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies commissioners and their researchers the care taken to process each submission. recognized that many people could not “Anything could have been used to derail participate. Discussions were often the process, so you had to be very careful dominated by people who were well how you did things, whether it was from the organized and who had the money and research side or from the logistics and education to engage in the issues. By administrative side.” contrast, people in poor, far-flung and weakly organized communities—often ones Ethnicity versus language: dividing communities in the homelands—were less involved. The One of the commission’s most Xhosa leader, for example, could not muster important tasks was to move South Africa much of an argument beyond a cultural beyond racial segregation while remaining claim, Mokate said, and he was not prepared sensitive to the danger of dividing cohesive to make arguments along economic lines. communities. Even though the commission “Even though it was designed to enable as had decided not to use ethnicity as an many people as possible to access the explicit criterion, its consideration of process, in the end it was the well-organized, language groups raised many of the same well-resourced people that were able to put issues. together those submissions, and come and The requirement that each province be make their case,” she said. “We were contiguous eliminated many proposals building a democracy, but the people who advocating the creation of provinces had been historically disenfranchised were centered on linguistic majorities. The disenfranchised, in a way, in that process as submission from the Bophuthatswana well.” leadership included several unconnected Once the public consultation phase was regions, so the commissioners quickly complete, the technical committee eliminated it. Initial proposals to set up a summarized and cataloged the arguments: volkstaat also did not meet tests of 304 written submissions and 80 oral administrative rationality. Paul Daphne, a presentations in total. The technical commissioner and ANC party leader, committee then compiled a report for the recalled, “The people proposing a volkstaat commissioners, highlighting the major outcome were battling to find a map which issues for their consideration. The report would show any part of the country with a noted particularly that many of the proposals majority of whites in it. It was a real struggle; spoke explicitly to the CDDR’s criteria and you had to draw a really strange-looking map that many used the DBSA’s development to find a part of the country which you could regions as starting points, though all call a region or province which had a advocated some changes. majority of whites.” “The administrative and logistical issues COSAG in particular continued to push were also critical because if they were not for majority single-language communities. done correctly, then people could have Reyneke, recalling the debate, said his plan challenged them,” Mokate said, explaining had been inspired by linguistically organized

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies provinces in Belgium and by the cantons of Businesses in the region were nervous Switzerland, and he still believed that about joining economically prosperous areas language should be the primary criterion for such as the city of Port Elizabeth with the delimitation of provinces. As for the Transkei and “its sea of unemployment,” other mandated criteria, he said, “almost any Daphne added. Ultimately, the commission place can be economically viable if there are decided to unify the two former homelands peace, stability, [and a] low crime into a single province. rate,” thereby dismissing the position of In the debate over whether to create a many committee members that those criteria separate Northern Cape province, politics should be of greater concern. triumphed over economic arguments. Both When a more viable proposal did not the NP and segments of the conservative emerge from the public consultations, the Afrikaner contingent supported the creation technical committee forwarded to the of a Northern Cape province, but for commissioners its recommendation for eight different reasons. The NP was concerned provinces, based primarily on the DBSA about its chances against the ANC in the map and, therefore, on the potential for upcoming election, and the party was economic development and administrative convinced that the demographics of the capacity. proposed territory would give the NP a With that proposal as a guide, an better chance of winning provincial elections argument then raged among the than in any other proposed province. The commissioners over whether to split the commissioners recalled that conservative Eastern Cape into two provinces and Afrikaners, for their part, said they thought whether to create a Northern Cape province. that a Northern Cape province might vote in In the debate over splitting the Eastern favor of hosting an Afrikaner homeland. Cape, economic considerations won out over Opponents argued that such a province political pressures. The argument in favor of would not be economically viable and that splitting the Eastern Cape was based on its administration by a provincial government inclusion of two former homeland areas: would be difficult. In their report to the full Transkei and Ciskei. The Transkei leader, an CDDR, the technical committee members important supporter of the ANC, urged the did not envision a Northern Cape, instead party to create a separate province based on drawing a boundary between the Western his homeland, but Transkei and Ciskei were Cape and North-West province. ANC relatively undeveloped, and the members on the technical team noted that commissioners weighed whether it would be the Northern Cape had no history of local better to unite the former homelands in a administration and that the cost of single province together with economically governing the sparse population, coupled vibrant coastal cities in the non-homelands with the region’s modest local revenue, area, said Daphne, who lived in the Eastern would make a provincial government’s work Cape region. additionally difficult.

In the end, the fate of the Northern recommending in broad strokes a nine- Cape proposal came down to a show of province map. Thirteen of the hands, late at night, with the clock ticking: commissioners signed the report, while two, The commission had to turn in its report the Reyneke and Bernstein, submitted their own next morning to the MPNF negotiators minority reports, dissenting from the drafting the constitution. Reyneke initially CDDR’s proposal. The majority report refused to vote. He had been present at the acknowledged that certain highly contested hearings in the region, and the vast majority border towns and communities might of the participants wanted the commission warrant further investigation and noted the to include them in the Western Cape. need for provisions for future border Despite his inclusion as a representative of amendments in South Africa’s final the conservative Afrikaner community and constitution. The commissioners also of certain homeland leaders, he did not want discussed a volkstaat in the report, noting to vote against the wishes of the local that the groups that advocated one had been population. unable to unite behind a single proposal for In the first round, the vote was evenly its location, and therefore one had not been split, but NP-nominated chairman Smit then included. asked Reyneke to support the creation of a In his dissent, Reyneke argued that Northern Cape province. Reyneke said he while cultural and linguistic concerns had agreed, in part because of a bargain he had been considered in certain regions, the brokered with other conservative Afrikaners commission had not weighted the criteria to support his proposal for an Afrikaner enough. He argued that “conflict-reducing homeland near Pretoria. sociocultural borders” were of primary The pro–Northern Cape vote won the importance to avoid future violence, and he day, but Daphne said history might have praised the commission for demarcating been otherwise had one ANC-nominated such a border in the North-West province. commissioner not been absent. “Unfortunately, similar improvements in Other popular proposals for provincial other parts of South Africa were not boundaries did not hold up against the included because of overriding ‘cohesion agreed-upon criteria. Daphne said that reasons’ like economy, geographic progressive groups, for instance, favored coherence and so called homogeneity or many small regions with minimal powers. regional identity,” he wrote.4 Reyneke also The commissioners determined that those voiced objections to the exclusion of a proposals were not as viable economically or volkstaat in the proposal but thanked the administratively when compared with a commission for accommodating him on smaller number of provinces. other points. The commission submitted its report to Bernstein’s dissent was more critical: “I the MPNF on July 31, 1993—about three would strongly urge the negotiating parties months after beginning its work— not to impose an undemocratic map on the

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies country,” she wrote, arguing that the report but identified eight “sensitive areas” commission needed more time for public in the proposal that had not been fully consultation in order to produce viable resolved. Apparently agreeing, in part at regional boundaries.5 “To try and actually least, with Bernstein’s concerns, the produce a regional map for the country in negotiators extended the CDDR’s deadline, such a short time and think that this will sending the commissioners back to gather resolve the differences that exist between all additional citizen input on the “sensitive the many interests on this matter is to my areas,” including whether the Eastern Cape mind totally unrealistic and dangerous,” she should be split, whether a Northern Cape said.6 Bernstein argued that the criteria were province should be created or included in insufficient: they did not include a position the Western Cape, and where Pretoria on small versus large provinces and did not should fall. ask the CDDR to consider the electoral In August 1993, the commission implications of the regional boundaries. She reissued a call for proposals and also argued that the consultation period commentary and received 467 written revealed a need for greater study of the map submissions and 177 oral statements. The rather than settling border questions. CDDR began meeting again in September The map proposed in the report, she 1993, with only one month to reformulate its said, represented a political settlement, proposal. Smit refused to participate in the brokered in order to move negotiations second round, and the CDDR replaced him forward as quickly as possible, but it did not as co-chair with A.S. du Plessis, whose represent a viable blueprint for regional brother Barend had been minister of finance administration and development. “What I do under President P.W. Botha. Du Plessis had know is that apartheid is now dead and that participated in secret talks in the late a new government elected by the majority of 1980s—between Afrikaner political interests South Africans will need to address the and the ANC—that preceded the transition many important issues that have been negotiations and was already a CDDR ignored for so long,” she wrote. “This new commissioner. government will be fighting for its political In their revised submission in October, and economic survival and it will have to the CDDR commissioners noted that they reverse the past four decades’ failure with had not revisited the boundaries but, rather, respect to development generally and tried “to provide further information to the regional development in particular…[S]ome [MPNF] Negotiating Council on issues fundamental rethinking is necessary.”7 relating to possible boundaries.”8 In particular, the commissioners argued that OVERCOMING OBSTACLES their proposal should serve as a jumping-off The party representatives at the MPNF, point for a more inclusive process to settle in the midst of drafting South Africa’s final delimitations. The party negotiators then constitution and preparing for elections less accepted the CDDR’s second report, than a year away, accepted the CDDR’s concluding the commissioners’ work.

Political considerations groups, [politicians] actually put those In the preface to their second report, districts back into the North-West province.” the two chairmen argued that at that time, the responsibility “rests with the political Public resistance leaders” to negotiate further issues and to Several communities on the proposed convince their constituents to accept the provincial borders, including the areas subsequent outcome. “The Daphne discussed, were strongly opposed to delimitation/demarcation of regions is not a their placement in certain boundaries. The legal or academic exercise dealing only with disputes threatened to hold up the drafting quantifiable or even logical arguments,” the of the new constitution and the elections. two chairmen wrote in the preface to their Political parties played roles in ensuring that second report. “It deals with the wishes, their supporters accepted the proposed fears and emotions of human beings and boundaries. For instance, after working on therefore requires a forum capable of the commission’s technical committee, reaching consensus and agreement through Fowler joined the ANC’s public relations a process of compromise and ‘give’ and team in the region that became Gauteng ‘take.’ Certain criteria may have to be province. He received phone calls from sacrificed in order to arrive at this unhappy constituents as soon as the compromise. [The CDDR’s brief and negotiating parties published their decision mandate] were not to find compromise on the provinces. The majority of those between conflicting historical, political and dissatisfied by the proposal objected to their often emotional interests held by various areas being placed into a particular province groups, however compelling these may be.”9 and asked that their areas be moved to Party representatives, through the different provinces. MPNF, took the CDDR’s proposal and Fowler appealed to the callers on the brokered compromises as envisioned by the importance of holding elections before chairmen. Daphne recalled, for example, dealing with those matters. The constitution that certain areas that the CDDR had contained a provision that allowed recommended be placed in Gauteng based communities to dispute the new boundaries on “logical economic linkages” were later within 30 days. “These comrades agreed that moved to the North-West province to keep they would not voice their concerns now; more areas of former Bophuthatswana they would first go through the elections,” together. “I think the view of the said Fowler. “Well, the day after the commission was that Bophuthatswana itself elections, they called.” Despite the ANC’s was a false construct and that we shouldn’t promises, however, the government did not really be using an objective of trying to keep address many of the boundary disputes the Bophuthatswana together as one of the bases following month. “Unfortunately, within 30 for determining provinces which were going days it was not resolved; many of these to go 100 years into the future,” he said. “I issues which people raised were not think, to placate some of those interest resolved—not because of lack of concern but

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies as a result of the reality of dealing with that in the short run, the different pro- governance,” Fowler said. volkstaat factions would not agree on a Not all disputes were shelved, however. single outcome.10 Afrikaner leaders relented By the time the CDDR submitted its final and dropped the matter for the duration of proposal, many homeland leaders and pro- the elections. volkstaat conservative Afrikaners had left the MPNF talks, arguing that the parties were Threats of violence not accommodating their views. In a last- In Bophuthatswana, however, Lucas ditch effort to bring them back into the Mangope was not satisfied with the CDDR’s process, MPNF participants invited the final proposal. As the country geared up for alliance of homeland leaders and pro- elections, Mangope stonewalled, refusing to volkstaat Afrikaners to suggest adjustments join his homeland with the territory of to the final map. Reyneke recalled that South Africa or to permit elections to take Tertius Delport, an NP parliamentarian place, unhappy that the separation of his deeply involved in constitutional issues, non-contiguous homeland into different called back both him and other members of provinces meant the disappearance of his the alliance to make minor adjustments to powerbase. In February 1994, in opposition the final boundaries, with the intentions of to Mangope’s position, many government both broadening the support base for the departments went on strike, causing an provincial system and forestalling potential extensive collapse of social services. In violence. March, the army mutinied and Mangope Other interviewees did not voice invited heavily armed conservative Afrikaner knowledge of that specific instance of paramilitaries of the Afrikaner Volksfront political intrusion, but they did acknowledge into the homeland to secure the territory. that political horse trading played a role in After the paramilitaries did so, members of determining final boundaries. “We provided the extremist AWB also invaded, claiming the technical input,” Mokate said. “Then the Mangope’s blessing. The Volksfront troops politicians got together and did their own pulled out after the AWB refused to work carving up.” with them. In the ensuing conflict between Despite giving its advocates a greater the AWB and Bophuthatswana’s mutinying voice, the negotiating parties did deflect the security forces as many as 100 civilians and issue of an Afrikaner homeland until after combatants were killed, according to reports the elections by promising to create a at the time. Though there were few AWB volkstaat raad, or volkstaat board, that would casualties among the dead, the paramilitary consider the feasibility of such a territory. group then withdrew, the national army The board would make its recommendation moved in, and the government replaced to a constituent assembly that was Mangope with a caretaker leader. responsible for drafting the country’s final Mangope had overplayed his hand and, constitution. The ANC’s strategy was to discredited by the affair, was no longer a secure buy-in for the process, recognizing serious threat to either the national

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies government or the upcoming elections. He Further, the country’s final constitution was not the only one. In the preceding did not grant control over the police to the months, AWB members had waged a terror provincial minister in charge of safety and campaign, setting off bombs in public places security. Instead, a nationally appointed and threatening to take the country by force commissioner filled that role. ANC should their demands for white rule not be negotiators said they introduced such a met. Their failure to secure the capital of provision precisely to prevent Buthelezi Bophuthatswana and the casualties they from incorporating members of his militia incurred assuaged concerns that the AWB into the local police. had the ability to instigate countrywide violence, should majority elections move ASSESSING RESULTS forward. The CDDR aimed to create a non- segregated map of the country—one that South Africa goes to the polls would allow elections to proceed without On April 27, 1994, South Africa voted as widespread violence and would begin to one country for the first time. The ANC, undo the physical segregation of the which won a majority of the vote, formed a homeland system. The CDDR also aimed to coalition government with the NP and IFP. create economically sustainable and logically The ANC won the majority of votes in seven governable provinces that would be able to of the nine provinces. The NP won the provide their own social services and Western Cape but failed to win the Northern physical infrastructures. Cape province despite having pushed for its Though the CDDR clearly succeeded in creation for that reason. its short-term goals, its long-term record is As predicted, Buthelezi easily won a more mixed. “We did well, given that you majority in the newly created KwaZulu-Natal were trying to fashion a process that would province. Realizing that Buthelezi and others arrive at a solution in a highly contested like him would attempt to consolidate environment—and trying to do it within a regional power, the negotiating parties had very short space of time,” said Mokate, taken measures to prevent him from using coordinator of the technical committee. In this power base to advance his narrow broad strokes, the provincial system ambitions. For example, although the proposed by the CDDR was widely accepted. provincial governments had a onetime Negotiated adjustments by political actors in chance to write their own, provincial the months leading up to the election helped constitutions after the first elections, their broaden the support base for the system, texts could not violate the terms of the though the forum gave greater weight to national constitution. The KwaZulu-Natal factions that could legitimately threaten legislature passed a provincial constitution economic or physical damage. The concerns after 1994, but South Africa’s Constitutional of communities not posing a threat often fell Court later found it unconstitutional. by the wayside.

The peaceful reception of the their views and their maps may have been, commission’s recommendations was aided had an opportunity” to participate, Daphne by Mangope’s fall and the later fracturing of said. the pro-volkstaat Afrikaner movement. The “I don’t think anybody in that room got council to investigate the possibility of a exactly what they wanted…but I think that white homeland lost momentum amid the people, as a collective, pulled together to infighting between Afrikaner groups. (One the extent that they could—even the people faction wanted a homeland in the Northern that disagreed with each other,” Mokate said. Cape, while another advocated a region “We’re still what we were, but, nonetheless, centered on the country’s capital.) The we are South Africans and we didn’t kill ANC’s recognition of the volkstaat board was each other. We’re still here and can talk to politically difficult. Initially, the ANC’s each other.” national leaders lambasted its own The CDDR was successful in bringing negotiators for compromising with the most of the parties to the table, and the Afrikaner leadership. However, the MPNF negotiators were subsequently able to negotiators argued successfully that the make deals that appeased the pro-volkstaat strategy had been designed to exhaust the Afrikaners and mitigated Buthelezi’s ability other side. to consolidate power. For the most part, History shows that the ANC negotiators nearly two decades later, South Africa’s were partially correct. Some conservative provincial boundaries remain largely Afrikaners eventually set up a racially unchanged from the original demarcations. exclusive territory, called Orania, in the That said, local disputes continued Northern Cape. Other communities sprang through the publication of this case study, up as well, reflecting some citizens’ often over provincial boundaries that cut underlying support for the idea of a white through municipalities or that separated homeland, but they remain a small border towns from nearby economic centers. movement in national politics. Communities objected to discrepancies in The most important benefit of the the quality of services across the CDDR, participants said upon reflection, municipality where the provincial boundary was that the commission was able to secure divided it or placed it in a different province buy-in from the main factions. Though it from the one it had been in. was important that the proposal reflect a According to Mokate, the communities broad range of views, it was even more vital objecting after the elections had usually not that the different factions remain part of the had a say in the original process. “It became process and feel that their views were being very clear to me that it was the well- taken into account either through resourced and organized that were really representation on the commission itself or getting their voices heard,” Mokate said. “I through public solicitation of proposals. The think that’s why we have the problems with process was “part of nursing the transitions, the border towns that we have now, because because every group, no matter how crazy those people are now feeling much more

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies empowered, much more organized, and are commitment to a unified South Africa saying ‘But how did this happen? I don’t like allowed participants to work beyond their this. Now I’ve got a government in power, I narrow interests in the effort to create must tell them I don’t want this.’ And so you provinces and provincial boundaries for the could say, ‘But you were consulted,’ but new South Africa. “Most of the political really, were you consulted?” parties and the commissioners entered that While theoretically, the CDDR took into discussion from a genuine desire to put the account economic and administrative best map forward,” said commission considerations, at the time of its work the member Paul Daphne, who added that he constitutional structure of South Africa had and other commissioners argued delicate yet to be decided. In their revised issues on technical and factual grounds and submission on the Eastern Cape, for did not resort to political power plays. example, the commissioners noted that The commission’s low public profile MPNF constitutional negotiators had not yet enabled it to avoid entanglement in many of decided “the extent to which SPRs the hot-button issues that were dominating [states/provinces/regions] will be expected to public attention at the time. Daphne said rely on their own tax bases in the future, minimal media coverage enabled the [which] has a bearing on the importance that commission to stay out of the limelight. should be attached to the size of the The commission also played a valuable economic resource and tax base in the role as a sounding board for diverse causes demarcation of SPRs.”11 that characterized South Africa’s political In practice, most of the nine provinces scene at the time. Even if the commission relied heavily on central government did not accept the views expressed in financial and administrative support to submissions, proponents could tell their govern their territories, at great expense to supporters that their message had been the national government. At the national delivered. Political buy-in was essential for level, much of the country’s wealth and keeping parties at the negotiating table and economic growth from 1994 to 2012 was allowing a broad range of constituencies to concentrated in two provinces—Gauteng have a voice in the process, even if they did and the Western Cape—while the Eastern not get the solution they wanted. Cape was plagued by unemployment and The CDDR benefited from the quality poverty. The sparsely populated Northern of its chairs, who played important roles in Cape struggled with administrative capacity maintaining group cohesion and focusing and infrastructure. commission members on their objectives. “Each one of them was respected in the REFLECTIONS constituencies from which they came,” said As political nominees, the Renosi Mokate, coordinator of the technical commissioners and their technical team committee. Philip “Flip” Smit could exercise could not cast aside their political affiliations authority over the National Party and the and loyalties. Still, their common Afrikaner nationalists, while Bax Nomvete

© 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies held sway over the African National conjunction [with] or parallel to the Congress, the black nationalist Pan- negotiating process,” Meyer said. “In that Africanist Congress and the homeland regard, we failed ourselves by only doing leaders. “Once they had worked together for this within the last period of time before the a while, they could together pull the lot transition. I think we were so consumed, all together,” she said, adding that establishing of us, in our negotiations on finding a that rapport took time. constitutional settlement that we didn’t “Nobody got exactly what it is that they think about the bigger consequences of what wanted, but the people, as a collective, we were doing about creating a new state, pulled together to the extent that they creating a new administration at the national could,” Mokate said. “Even the people who as well as at the provincial level. You need a disagreed with each other fundamentally, proper process of planning to make it they still talked to each other.…They happen, which goes much deeper than the recognized each other as South Africans political settlement and the political who participated in a process that negotiations.” contributed to building this country.” Participants acknowledged the flaws in Administration of the provinces, the process but argued that their process however, later proved difficult. One of the was what the country needed at the time to primary NP negotiators, Roelf Meyer, who make elections and a peaceful transition was appointed minster of provincial affairs possible. and constitutional development after the Fowler argued that changes through the 1994 elections, said the negotiations were system indicated political buy-in to the not focused enough on creating the process. “So you at one level could say, ‘No, provincial administrations themselves, it was the wrong decision, because you had leaving the hard work of setting up nine new to change the boundary; people fought for it subnational governments for the new ANC- to be changed,’ but you could also argue that led government in the years to come. “I it’s not so easy to determine that it was the think what we should have done probably wrong decision because it resulted in a was start up with a process of real planning peaceful transition,” he said. [for provincial administration] in

Endnotes

1 F.W. de Klerk, “No Changes to the Provinces Without Provincial Referendums,” as quoted in Greg Ruthers (ed.), The Fate of the Eastern Cape: History, Politics and Social Policy, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2011, pp. 22-23. 2 Truth and Reconciliation Committee of South Africa, Final Report, vol. 6, sec. 4, appendix, 21 March 2003, p. 579. Accessed 1 September 2012. .

18 © 2014, Trustees of Princeton University Terms of use and citation format appear at the end of this document and at successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/about/terms-conditions. Tumi Makgetla and Rachel Jackson Innovations for Successful Societies

3 “Report of the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of the SPRs,” South Africa, Negotiation Council of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPRs, 31 July 1993, pp. 4-5. 4 Ibid., 82. 5 Ibid., 96. 6 Ibid., 88. 7 Ibid., 93. 8 “Report on Further Work of the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of the SPRs,” South Africa, Negotiation Council of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of SPRs, 15 October 1993, p. 1. 9 Ibid., 5. 10 Richard Spitz and Matthew Chaskalson. The Politics of Transition: A Hidden History of South Africa’s Negotiated Settlement. Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2000, p. 244. 11 “Report on Further Work of the Commission on the Demarcation/Delimitation of the SPRs,” p. 44.

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