FROM POLITICAL VIOLENCE TO CRIMINAL VIOLENCE - THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA

by

Sydney M. Mitchell

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Appendices Copyright Releases (if applicable) Table of Contents

Abstract vii

List Of Abbreviations And Symbols Used viii

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

1.1. Introduction 1

1.2. Methodology 3

1.3. Thesis Outline 3

1.4. Changing Identities 4

1.5. South Africa: From A 'Deeply Divided Society' To A Multicultural Society.... 11

1.6. Conclusion 13

Chapter 2: Identity Politics - Race And Ethnicity 15

2.1. Introduction 15

2.2. Rwanda And Political Violence 16

2.2.1. Collective Identities 18

2.2.2. The Debate: Individual Rights, Collective Rights And Group 'Survivance' 19

2.2.3. Liberal Theories Of Minority Rights 22

2.2.4. Limits To The Debate: The Complexities Of Identity Formation 24

2.3. Identities In South Africa 27

2.4. Conclusion 32

Chapter 3: The Construction Of An Identity From Without 35

3.1. Introduction 35

3.2. Critique Of Collective Crime 37

3.3. Specific Theories On Crime In South Africa 39

iv 3.3.1. Social Capital And Identity 40

3.3.2. Civil Society, Underclass Institutions/'Uncivil Society' 42

3.4. Building Exclusive Identity From Above 44

3.5. Conclusion 45

Chapter 4: The End Of Political Violence Base On Race/Ethnicity In

South Africa 1990 -1994 47

4.1. Introduction 47

4.2. Historical Context: Pre-1990 50

4.2.1. Spatial Segregation 50

4.2.2. The Apartheid System 52

4.2.3. Development Of The Bantustans/Homeland System 53

4.3. Afrikaners And Afrikaner Nationalism - 1948 56

4.3.1. Afrikaner Split: - 1969 & 1982 57

4.3.2. Afrikaner Social Integration 58

4.4. Inkatha Freedom Party (Ifp) And The Zulu Identity 62

4.4.1. Buthelezi's Alternative To The Violence 63

4.4.2. The Question Of Traditional Leadership In Kwazulu-Natal 64

4.4.3. Instrumental Use Of Ethnicity 66

4.4.4. Hostel Violence 67

4.5. Right Wing Groups And Other Movements 69

4.5.1. Kleurling Weerstands Beweging (Coloured Resistance Movement) 70

4.6. South African Constitution - 1996 71

4.7. Reflecting On The Voting Pattern - 1994-2004 72

4.8. So What Happened Between 1994 And 2004? 74

v 4.9. Conclusion 77

Chapter 5: Discussion 80

5.1. Introduction: The New Elite And Post-Apartheid South Africa Political Economy 80

5.2. A Nation-State Incapable Of Challenging Global Processes? 82

5.3. Globalization And The South African Political Economy 85

5.4. The Reconstruction And Development Program (Rdp) 86

5.5. South Africa And Its Macro-Economic Policy: Growth, Employment And Redistribution (Gear) 89

5.6. South Africa's New Political Elite 96

5.7. The South African Poor/Underclass 101

5.8. Identity Construction Amongst The Poor/From Below 102

5.9. Conclusion 104

Bibliography 107

Appendix A

Map Of South Africa Indicating Nine (9) Provinces 115

Appendix B

Map Of Western Cape Province Indicating Five (5) District Municipalities 116

Appendix C

Map Of City Of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality (Cpt) 117

VI Abstract

From Political Violence to Criminal Violence - The Case of South Africa

When apartheid ended, everybody expected political and ethnic conflict to erupt, all the more so that political violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which built its political mobilization at least partly on Zulu ethnic identity and the African National

Congress (ANC) was at the highest during this period (1990 - 1994) in KwaZulu Natal and that the transition to democracy was negotiated between parties which were demanding strong group protection (i.e. in terms of language, political veto, etc.). Some were even threatening war (i.e. the Afrikaner Volksfront, the PAC, and AZAPO) should their claims not be accommodated. However, after pervasive political violence during the late apartheid years which were deeply marked by racial and ethnic cleavages (most notably in KwaZulu-Natal), violence along ethnic and racial lines appears to have diminished, virtually to have disappeared in South Africa since its democratic self- governing transition in the early 1990s while criminal violence has reached very high levels, amongst the highest in the world in fact.

This thesis will explores the relative decrease in political and ethnic violence in a global context dominated by the rise of identity politics and identity based conflict. Secondly, it will look at the passage from political violence to criminal violence, which, while being both infra and supra ethnic, is very much organized and collective, e.g. gangsterism and vigilantism. Isn't such violence in fact political and expressing discontentment towards state policies by those excluded from such policies, i.e. the poor? Furthermore, aren't such non-civil organizations or institutions providing meaning and identity to their members, and therefore expressing an atypical form of identity politics?

vii List of Abbreviations and Symbols Used

ANC (African National Congress) APLA (Azanian People's Liberation Army) AVF (Afrikaner Volksfront) AWB (Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging)(Afrikaner Resistance Movement) CP (Conservative Party) COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) DA (Democratic Alliance) FF (Freedom Front) GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) HSRC (Human Sciences Research Council) IDASA (Institute for a Democratic South Africa) IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party) IMF (International Monetary Fund) KWB (Kleurling Weerstands Beweging)(Coloured Resistance Movement) MADAM (Movement Against Domination of African Minority) NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) NP (National Party) NNP (New National Party) NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) PAC (Pan African Congress) PAGAD (People Against Gangsterism and Drugs) PANSALB (Pan South African Language Board) RDP (Reconstruction and Development Program) SACP (South African Communist Party) TRC (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) UP (United Party) WTO (World Trade Organization)

Vlll Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Introduction

The last two or three decades, which embody the passage from modernity to postmodernity or 'late modernity' (Anthony Giddens), have been signified as an era of accelerated processes of social change. It is a period marked by the (re) construction of identities and the rise of 'identity polities'. Movements based on identity are very diverse in nature and range from ethnic nationalism, regionalism, separatism, calls for multicultural policies, the rise of religious fundamentalism, anti-immigrant movements, to the ghettoization and spatial fragmentation of big metropoles around the world. While being very diverse in form, identity politics occurs everywhere around the world.

In this way it could be argued that people on the margins of society construct for themselves new identities - resistant identities - formed in opposition to the dominant culture and the uncertainties of an unstable modernity (Castells, 1997). These identities are formed from below in organizations or institutions, which are considered uncivil by the state and civil society. Moreover, the growth of organize crime in South Africa provides services which the state no longer provide through gangs or vigilante groups, ranging from security to welfare needs. These are what some have referred to as

"phantom-States" or instances of governance from below (Comaroff quoting Derrida,

2004: 803).

Increasingly the state seems inadequate to provide the most basic, elementary needs to its citizens. Moreover, many analysts believe that the 'market' has replaced the 'state'. In other words, the idea of the nation-state has almost become superfluous since it no longer

l controls the movement of capital, which moves from one country to the next in search of exploitable markets and cheap labor (Pillay, 2002: 40).

As a result of the impact of globalization on nation-states, it is important to look at some of the effects and changes it has brought about, and more importantly how it has shaped identities on an international scale as well as locally, particularly in the context of South

Africa. Clearly, as many analysts have argued, the legacy of apartheid still lives on with regard to issues of race and ethnicity. What this thesis will examine, since identities in

South Africa are no longer exclusively base on race and ethnicity, are some of the new forms of identity construction mainly amongst those who feel excluded or marginalized from the benefits of democracy. My hypothesis is that people who are excluded from mainstream society build for themselves resistant identities. Whether these identities will eventually become project identities1 remains to be seen. One example would be to look at crime in South Africa.

Criminal violence in the new South Africa can be and has been explained by many things

(poverty, violent history, breakdown of social systems, legacy of apartheid, etc) but what this thesis will show - and what is a unique contribution to our understanding of violence in the new South Africa - is how the 'collective' aspect of crime (via gangs and vigilante groups) - in the post 1994 period has its roots in the configurations of collective

1 Castells distinguishes among legitimizing, resistance, and project identities. According to him, legitimizing identities are associated with dominant institutions or the state, whereas resistant and project identities represent two basic forms of antagonistic identity; resistant identities are those collective identities who are devalued and stigmatized and thus form the seedbed for identity movements and politics, and the latter are associated with movement beyond resistance to the construction not only of alternative identities but also a new system, for instance those social movements who attempt to transform the structure of society. He argues that project identities are "potentially able to reconstruct civil society of sorts, eventually, a new state." These identities start off as resistant identities and can eventually induce projects, for example feminist and environmentalist movements. (Castells, M. 1997. The Power of Identity).

2 sentiments of ethnic/racial identities bolstered by political forces during apartheid. By mobilizing groups together along ethnic/racial identity lines to further political goals,

allegiances and power bases were formed which, in the vacuum of post 1994 groups found new strength and security amongst the urban poor and disenfranchised in the

Western Cape. It can be argued that for most people within these underclass

neighborhoods a sense of security can be found within local gang organizations which provide their members with a sense of belonging and dignity in the same way as an ethnic identity would.

1.2. Methodology

Most of my research was conducted in the library and on the internet. Most of this work

is therefore based primarily on secondary sources. In particular, articles and books

written before and during the transition on identity issues will be compared to more

recent work on similar questions. I also looked at some of the main newspapers in South

Africa e.g. the Mail&Gaurdian, Cape Argus, Cape Times, the Sunday Independent and

the Business Day.

Other sources were taken from empirical research done by sociologist Simon Bekker and

Anne Leilde. Their research focuses mainly on the issue of identity construction within

the Western Cape.

1.3. Thesis Outline

Chapter one deals with some of the theoretical assumptions around identity/group

formation. Some examples from Africa - for instance Rwanda - and elsewhere in the

world will be instructive in this regard. In chapter two I will focus on some of the

3 theoretical assumptions around crime and how it relates to the issue of identity construction. Chapter three focuses on the disappearance of political violence and how different groups - mainly Afrikaner and Zulu nationalist groups - have been accommodated within the new constitution. However, chapter four deals with some of the new realities facing South Africa, including violent crime. This thesis is particularly trying to examine the links between previous political violence and that of 'collective' crime. The final chapter deals with the rise of criminal violence and organized crime in

South Africa, interpreting this phenomenon through the prism of identity formation and politics.

1.4. Changing Identities

It appears that 'post-modernity is the point at which modern untying of tied identities reaches its completion' (Bauman, 1996); that 'ethnicity has (now) become a global force'

(Appadurai, 1990); and that 'the urge to express one's identity, and to have it recognized tangibly by others, is increasingly contagious and has to be recognized as an elemental force even in the shrunken, apparently homogenizing, high-tech world of the end of the twentieth century' (Castells, 1997). In contemporary Africa there seems to be an insistence on the family, clan antecedents and birthplaces and a revival of ethnic imagination and a proliferation of internal borders - whether imaginary, symbolic, or cover for economic power struggles - and its corollary, exclusionary practices, "identity closure", and persecution (Mbembe, 2004).2 Recently in South Africa authors like

Herman Giliomee in his new book, The Afrikaners: Biography of a People - situates himself once again within the 'clan'. In a recent interview, Giliomee asserts that there is a

4 resurgence of 'ethnic' histories, ascribing this trend to a general retreat to the 'smaller units' of society. He describes it as a 'nuwe tendens' (new tendency). According to Kros, citing Giliomee, "people have become interested in 'gemeenskappe (communities) or kleiner eenhede (smaller units). He further talks about 'etniese gemeenskappe (ethnic communities). Perhaps in this sense it is not uncommon in the context of South Africa that people like Giliomee make reference to ethnicity, maybe as a result of Afrikaner insecurities or perhaps of political changes in South Africa.

Such a phenomenon came as a surprise for theorists of modernity who claimed that ethnic links would inevitably disappear as humanity followed its path to universal progress. In fact, post-modernity appears to have granted new legitimacy to traditional forms of identity and rendered obsolete former assimilationist policies, notably in the US (melting pot) and Canada (cultural dualism). Universal recognition of minority rights was made explicit in 1993 with the adoption by the United Nations of the Declaration of the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities."

Explanations of the persistence or revival of subnational cultural identities and the rise of identity politics vary according to authors and discipline. While some analysts argue that it is the consequence of the demise of the bipolar world and the appearance of new actors and narratives on the international scene, others - the world media in particular - tend to portray identity as primordial (i.e. given by birth) and often explain ethnic and nationalist assertions, especially in Eastern Europe, by a so-called 'genie out of the bottle' theory,

2 Quoted by Cythia Kros in a paper presented at Queens University, Canada - Ten Years of Democracy in Southern Africa; May 2-5, 2004 3 See UN, the Office of Human Rights Commission.

5 'attributing recent upsurges in identity politics to the weakening of regimes that had previously suppressed deep and long-simmering collective sentiments' (Comaroff, 1996).

Finally, some scholars impute this change to globalization and induced homogenization, which in turn is said to bring to the fore the Freudian notion of 'the narcissism of minor differences' (Ignatieff, 1993: 22). Simply put: the more people become alike, the more they want to be different and be recognized as such. Although identity and its politics are probably the most mundane characteristic of today's world, their emergence and persistence cannot be explained by a single causal pattern but are entrenched in specific circumstances that are endogenous to where they occur (Otayek, 2000). Indeed, identity is not given, immutable or essential but a social construct born out of a specific social context; it is situational and thus changing and evolving as circumstances change.

Identities are therefore dynamic realities, which are subject to renegotiations that come with new experiences and aspirations. In other words, they are not "birthmarks, but are acquired through conscious and unconscious processes informed by dynamic relationships with others" (Nyamnjoh, Codesria editorial, 2004:1). The world is full of examples of irreconcilable hatreds that have turned into long-lasting friendships.

There are always competing arrangements of what constitutes national identity in states.

Invariably civic and ethnic nationalisms have been used to mobilize people behind a vision of the 'nation'. Civic nationalism fosters loyalty to a political community, usually the nation-state, whereas ethnic nationalism emphasizes the common descent or affinities of people with respect to language and religion (for instance Afrikaner and Zulu nationalism). The former is tolerant and inclusive, whilst the latter is exclusive and often discriminates against outsiders. Civic nationalism propounds an allegiance to political

6 institutions (viz. the constitution and democracy) and principles (viz. common citizenship rights and obligations) rather than a community. The discourse of ethnic nationalism, on

the other hand, emphasizes a sense of shared history and common destiny. Clearly the

latter conforms to the traditional Afrikaner idea of a 'volk' or nation.

Historically, group rights in South Africa were used by the former, apartheid regime to

legitimize its policy of separate - and unequal - development, or apartheid. Cultural

differences, conceived as essential, were not so much respected as imposed or ascribed

and used as a basis for discrimination reaching all spheres of life. Such a fact largely

explains the ideological debate surrounding the notions of minority and ethnicity, which

were until recently largely accepted as primordial and unquestioned or rejected as pure

inventions of apartheid social engineers aimed at masking other social cleavages such as

class and economic interests, and thus undeserving of further investigation and

questioning. However, the period of transition to democracy gave way to multiple

predictions of approaching doom as exemplified in the title to a book by Brewer: "Can

South Africa survive? Five minutes to midnight" (Brewer, 1989). Ethnic conflict was

often conceived as a potential threat and although most argued that the terrible violence

that took place between 1990 and 1994 (15 000 people died between February 1990 and

April 1994) had a multiplicity of causal factors (e.g. state-manipulated 'Third Force';

local factors; political competition between party or more broadly legacy of the structures

of inequality inherited from apartheid, according to Guelke (2000)), certainly it seems

clear that race and ethnic mobilization also played a role.

Prior to the end of apartheid collective violence was expressed in the form of ethnic

identity, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal and on the East Rand, amongst hostel dwellers.

7 However, in post-apartheid South Africa the state has formed for itself a liberal

Constitution in which various groups have been accommodated including Zulus from

KwaZulu-Natal and Afrikaner nationalists. Consequently, there has been no need for political violence at this level. People do not mobilize themselves on the basis of ethnic or racial identity any longer - or at least these cleavages no longer recognize as a primary source of identity. However, this does not have to be so all the time; one can envisage the possibility of economic and/or political crises producing a repoliticization of ethnicity and race (Alexander, 2005: 25). Nonetheless, what is apparent in post-apartheid South

Africa is the rise in collective criminal violence, for instance in the form of gangsterism and vigilante groups. One could argue that this is not a new phenomenon in South Africa; in fact gangsterism and vigilantism have been part of South Africa since the early 1950s.

These expressions of collective forms of violence have no basis in ethnic or racial identification, but are increasingly expressions of exclusion by the state from the material and economic resources such as jobs, services and housing.

No where is the fact of gangsterism as prevalent as in the Western Cape, particularly on the Cape Flats4. Gangsterism has always been a problem in the Western Cape. However, recently it has been reported that the Western Cape gangs are attracting more and more youth into their fold. It is now estimated that there are nearly 144 gang groups on the

Cape Flats (Sarah Hobbs, Institute of Criminology UCT: 2004). According to recent research done by anthropologist Elaine Salo (2004) in Manenberg, "(•••) Eleven male

4 The 'Cape Flats' in popular discourse seems to imply mainly areas previously created for residence by people classified as 'coloured'. It is also essentialized as working class, poor and violent. The Cape Flats maybe largely 'working class', however, it is highly heterogeneous culturally, socially, politically and economically (Suren Pillay, 2002: 61). 5 This community is situated on the Cape Flats, north of the green belt of leafy suburbs that runs along the perimeter of Table Mountain. This township is one of a number of identical housing projects that were

8 gangs exist in Manenberg, each associated with its own particular turf. (...) [The] turf boundaries represent the physical, social and moral limitations of the local community"

(Salo, 2004: 13).

The recent spate of criminal violence in post-apartheid South Africa can also be attributed to the recent shift in the economy. For instance, over the period between 1994 and 2000 over a half million people have lost their jobs, largely because of the government's liberalization policies and the shift to a lean, neo-liberal state. Accordingly, there has been a huge expansion of associational life and informal economies, including religious and occult movements, saving associations, lotto and pyramid schemes, international drug cartels and crime syndicates, anti-crime vigilante groups, informal taxi organizations, etc (Comaroff quoted in Steven Robins, 2002: 669). According to Robins, gangsterism in places like Manenberg is symptomatic of broader political and economic processes. Can it be, then, that those who have continuously felt a sense of marginalization from the state are seeking other forms of association?

This is essential to understand because it adds depth to the often heralded argument that crime today is simply part and parcel of the political violence experienced by black youth during the struggle for liberation by South Africans prior to 1994. However, what this thesis will examine are the new collective identities that are being constructed within marginalized communities, particular in the Western Cape.

constructed for those classified coloured between the mid and late 1960s. These townships were mainly constructed to house the homeless from places like District Six, Claremont and Wynberg by the Group Areas Act. These were townships that were created through the processes of racial classification and forced relocation and were given the racial category coloured, with unique spatial and socio-economic meaning. Most of the coloured people in this area also speak Afrikaans.

9 By analyzing this form of conflict the study illustrates some of the ways in which recent changes in South African society have led to the growth of new forms of institution building outside of civil society, based on social networks that are considered by the state and civil society as not conducive to democracy and which are informed from below (i.e. gangsterism and vigilante groups, mainly formed in the underclass6). Conversely, middle- classes build identities that complement their lifestyles. However, as a result of the growing levels of crime, the middle class increasingly exit society through fortified community boundaries (e.g. gated communities) which shape new identities based on class.

With the shift away from group identity formation..- i.e. race and ethnicity - what are some of the new collective identities emerging within South Africa? The aim of this thesis is to highlight some of the most important new forms of identity construction in the new South Africa, since most people have now partially shed their previously ascribed identities.

Racial identity appears to be declining in South Africa. According to recent evidence by a

Human Science Research Council (HSRC) survey undertaken in 1998 and 2004, race relations are improving7. Furthermore, a study conducted by Bekker and Leilde (2003: 7) in the Western Cape, argues that race is rarely a primary source of meaning and only becomes primary in specific circumstances; otherwise it persists as one identity among many. In other words it no longer constitutes grounds for mobilization either among the poor or the rich. Nevertheless, Alexander argues race can still have significance for

61 use underclass to refer to people who are primarily working class and live in poor communities.

10 politicians. For instance, he cites the case of the 1999 general elections, where the white- led Democratic Alliance (DA) ran a campaign around the theme 'Fight Back', which identified with white fear about 'black crime'. However, since the former governing party

- New National Party (NNP) - has collapse into the ANC and where most political parties are committed to non-racialism and neo-liberalism, this has led to a reduction in the significance of racial identities.

1.5. South Africa: From a 'Deeply Divided Society' To a Multicultural Society

While there is no doubt that ethnicity and race were widely used by South African colonial power to legitimize its policies of domination over the majority of the population, it is also clear that they had some impact on South African society in a double process of internationalization from below and mobilization from political leaders. In this case indigenous groups (e.g. the Griqua8) seeking first nation status and other groups such as the Zulus - became mobilized on the basis of their ethnicity.

It is clear that much of the violence that took place between 1990 and 1994 was party- based (between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the African National Congress (ANC) and the still-difficult- to - grasp 'Third Force') but one can also assume that the Third

Force was probably racially motivated, as were violent acts from APLA (PAC military wing). Furthermore, while the Zulu ethnic identity is a relatively recent social construction, fostered by Apartheid Bantustan policies and the use of a common language, the IFP built its mobilization toward political gains (strong devolution toward

7 According to the latest SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004: Racial Relations in South Africa. Johannesburg: Markinor - November 19. Also available at www.markinor.co.za 8 This group was previously regarded as coloured, however, on the basis of their Khoi ancestry, are now making claim to 'first nation' status.

11 KwaZulu Natal in a federal state) at least partly on the Zulu identity. However, the situation in the Western Cape Province is different, particularly within the urban communities of Cape Town where violence seems to be more concentrated among the coloured communities and more gang related.

People within communities like Manenberg on the Cape Flats are becoming disillusioned with political parties and feeling abandoned by activists that run civic associations. Are people returning to gangs as a strategy of survival in an environment of grinding poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and threats of dislocation through eviction? Are gangs and vigilante groups responding to deepening marginalization and poverty? A process of what Castells calls 'perverse integration', where sections "of the socially excluded population, along with individuals who choose far more profitable, if risky ways to make a living, constitute an increasingly populated underworld..."(Castells, 2000:73) seems to be occurring. Many coloureds, particularly those living on the Cape Flats, feel a sense of alienation and marginalization in the Western Cape, which gives, rise to racial tensions.

Many, particularly amongst poorer working class coloured communities, perceive the government's affirmative action policies as promoting the interest of Africans. A recent survey done by Markinor suggests that 66% of Cape Town's coloured community feel that the government does not care about them. In the lowest category9 this figure stands at

86% (South African Reconciliation Barometer Survey, conducted by Markinor for the

Institute of Justice and Reconciliation). Another explanation for the tensions is job security: 35% of coloureds believe that they may see themselves without a job by next year, while another 21% think that there job prospects are uncertain. Accordingly, a sense

9 This is measured according to the minimum living level (MLL).

12 of alienation, fighting for scarce resources and high unemployment, does lead youth to become involved in more gang activity, which gives them a sense of belonging and identity in a society that otherwise appears hostile to and marginalizes them.

In contemporary South Africa violence is widely defined as criminal - in conflict with the values and norms laid down by the state10 and by civil society. Violent incidents take place in a bewildering number of different local settings. These incidents moreover very rarely appear to be related to one another. They flow from deep-seated sentiments of local exclusion: economic exclusion from the material rewards of the urban-industrial economy and socio-cultural exclusion from the dominant Anglophone urban culture.

1.6. Conclusion

In this chapter I highlighted the changes that have been occurring with regards to identity politics over the last two or three decades - a period that signified accelerated changes throughout the world. Many countries such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda witnessed violent out-breaks of ethnic clashes on a massive scale. For many analysts the upsurge of these violent conflicts could be ascribing to globalization or the homogenization of cultures.

South Africa had its own unique experience of ethnic and racial politics. The belief was that cultural differences were essential. However, as many sociologists and others have shown, racial and ethnic identity politics are not immutable or essential; rather they are social constructs which are born out of a specific context. Nevertheless apartheid or separate development became the official state policy, which was created in the belief of the primacy of cultural differences and was subsequently legitimized as such. For many

13 Afrikaner nationalist this belief rang true. Soon Zulu nationalists, under the leadership of

Mangosuthu Buthelezi, also claimed their unique status as a Zulu nation. The effect of such beliefs culminated in violent clashes in the province of KwaZulu-Natal and many other parts of South Africa during the 1990s.

However, post-1994 after South Africa has developed for itself a constitution whereby all parties were accommodated; violence still did not seem to have disappeared. The upsurge in criminal violence seems to have rocked the country. The province of the Western

Cape, where gangsterism has been a long time problem seems to have reached endemic proportions. Places like Manenberg on the Cape Flats, a mainly coloured township, were seen by authorities as places of criminal hotspots, needing quick attention. Many see the increase in criminal violence in these areas as a result of the ANC's new macro-economic policies. According to many analysts, gangsterism is a result of the broader political and economic changes.

Now that we have looked at identity politics and its effects across the world, particularly in countries such as Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and also its impact on South Africa, let us explore some of the theories of identity.

10 Many have argued that the state no longer has the monopoly on violence in many countries, but rather violence has been taken over by gangs, for instance in places like Brazil.

14 Chapter 2: Identity Politics - Race and Ethnicity

2.1. Introduction

The surest way to mobilize people into political violence in the world is to invoke a myth of origin (a so-called common ancestor), i.e. what is commonly known as ethnicity. Very often such myths are invented by charlatans and ethnic entrepreneurs (Alexander, 2003), but this does not make them less dangerous (see Rwanda, Yugoslavia). It is specifically dangerous when associated with a specific religion, like the Afrikaners did to legitimate their system for so many years (the Israel vision); it is even more dangerous when it opposes two religions - for instance Muslims vs. Christians (e.g. in cases like Nigeria,

Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia).

This chapter will focus on how identities are constructed, mainly along ethnic lines, to further political goals. Examples of ethnic violence will be drawn from a country such as

Rwanda. In a country like South Africa, particularly in the province of KwaZulu Natal one could argue that political violence was motivated by ethnic sentiments. The case of

Afrikaner nationalism is another example of identity construction based on an ethnic identity. In many ways this case shows how this identity became mobilized for the purposes of political control.

This chapter will also highlight some of the ethnic identity construction process in

Rwanda, and how groups became mobilized and violent for the purposes of political control. Here the work of Mahmood Mamdani is particularly instructive in showing how the violence in this country led to a major genocide. Other extreme examples where

15 ethnic politics were use by political leaders to further their own political agendas include

Yugoslavia and Nigeria, which I will not refer to.

This chapter illustrates how identities became politicize on the basis of their ethnicity promoted by ambitious leaders seeking political control. Often times these leaders are successful in driving their own ideology, mostly from feelings of marginalization and exclusion.

2.2. Rwanda and Political Violence

The case of Rwanda is particularly instructive since it explains how identities (Hutu and

Tutsi) became politicize, which were enforced by the state and as a result became polarize identities.

In his analysis on the Rwanda genocide, Mahmood Mamdani tries to make sense of how political violence has occurred in this country. He argues that in order for us to understand the violence in Rwanda, one needs to understand how two main groups (Hutu and Tutsi) became polarized as group identities. Firstly, he suggests that one has to look at the historic formation of the state, for it is the state that enforces a particular identity - in this case an ethnic identity - through its legal project. So ethnicity as a political identity is enforced by the legal and administrative systems of the state which had its origins in colonialism (Mamdani, 2003: 136). Accordingly, he argues it was the colonial state that distinguished between Hutu as indigenous and Tutsis as alien. Both were constructed as political identities and imposed by the state as an effect of power (2003: 149).

One could therefore argue that the violence in Rwanda was indeed 'political' violence in the sense that two groups, Hutu and Tutsi, were constructed as political identities through

16 the state, in the same way one could argue Zulu and Afrikaner nationalism were constructed as political identities. In both instances political identities are constructed from the raw materials taken from the cultural sphere i.e. common language, common religion, etc. according to Mamdani (2003: 149).

Political violence occurs then when a group, mobilized by small elites, is discriminated against in a country or believes that it is (for instance the Hausa in Nigeria or the Hutus in

Rwanda). The best way to avoid such a situation is to recognize minority rights (see

Kymlicka, Taylor) and to avoid any situation of ranked ethnicity, when class and ethnicity coincide (Horowitz). Nevertheless, the process is both complex and contested, as people strive to make sense of the changing order and their position in it.

The question is how should divergent ethnic groups be accommodated within the same state? This chapter will explore first the theoretical debates around identity politics and the eventual legitimization and accommodation of cultural diversity in South Africa. The contributions of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka are particularly instructive in this regard. It will then try to highlight certain limits inherent to the debate and which are relevant to the protection of diversity in the South African context. Finally I will explore the model of multiculturalism adopted in South Africa based on these limitations.

As mentioned above, it appears that 'post-modernity is the point at which modern untying of tied identities reaches its completion' (Bauman, 1996); and that 'ethnicity has (now) become a global force' (Appadurai, 1990). In contemporary Africa, Achille Mbembe makes a similar argument highlighting the 'unprecedented resurgence of local identities, an extraordinary insistence on family, clan antecedents and birthplaces and a revival of

17 ethnic imaginations...(the) proliferation of internal borders - whether imaginary, symbolic, or a cover for economic power struggles - and its corollary, exclusionary practices, "identity closure", and persecution...' (Kros, 2004). In other words, 'the urge to express one's identity, and to have it recognized tangibly by others, is increasingly contagious and has to be recognized as an elemental force even in the shrunken, apparently homogenizing, high-tech world of the end of the twentieth century' (Castells,

1997).

2.2.1. Collective Identities

Social identities also carry utilitarian value in a social context. As noted by Cornelissen and Horstmeier, the aspects of 'agency' and 'intentions' that lie behind the construction of identity are most of the time ignored (Cornelissen & Horstmeier, 2002: 62). By their very nature, collective identities are social constructs. According to Castells it is easy to agree on this; however the real is issue is "how, from what, by whom and for what are identities constructed" (Castells 1997: 7). One can argue that identities can be constructed

'from above', as in the case of governments in search of legitimacy or leaders mobilizing people into social action on the basis of a perceived shared identity, or 'from below', where the basic human need for solidarity with members of an in-group is accomplished through affiliation, assimilation and shared sentiments of security (Bornmann, 1999).

Two conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, it is clear that individuals may draw meaning from belonging to more than one in-group, and may construct and maintain multiple identities that emerge under different circumstances. However, 'such a plurality is a source of stress and contradiction in both self-presentation and social action' (Castells,

18 1997: 6) since these identities may be in internal tension with one another. Accordingly, under specific circumstances, a primary identity (one that is 'given priority over other

sources of meaning' (Castells, 1997: 6)) will emerge to prevail over others. One way to

identify the growing dominance of one identity over others is to detect and describe common identity narratives used by individuals and groups and thereby to deduce which

is being promoted. Furthermore, it is clear that each identity defines elements of

similarity (the 'We') and of difference (the 'They' or the 'Other') (D.C. Martin, 1995).

These elements are usually emotionally loaded and where an identity leads to experiences

of stigmatization and exclusion, the 'Other' may well be rejected. Conversely, where

identity leads to experiencing pride and growing self-esteem, the 'Other' may well be

viewed in inclusive terms. It is indeed "when one lacks positive elements to build his or

her identity...(that) the temptation is to resort to negative elements and one's identity is

then constructed around the rejection of the 'other'" (Todorov, 1996).

Taking up an identity requires drawing boundaries, which implies both inclusion and

exclusion or similarity and difference. An identity therefore relies on comparison and is

relational. Both similarity and difference are socially constructed and therefore

changeable even if they appear to be based on essential characteristics. Identity

accordingly is best viewed as a process rather than a property.

2.2.2. The Debate: Individual Rights, Collective Rights and Group 'Survivance'

Why should we recognize difference?

While classic liberals argue that individuals are shaped and their preferences constructed

outside their belonging to society, or before, both Taylor and Kymlicka argue that the

19 formation of the subject, according to the terms used by Touraine, is contingent to the fact that a person can refer, from his infant age, to a culture where he or she finds the necessary resources of dignity and self-esteem. Accordingly, they claim recognition of particular identities in the name of universal values, that of the formation of the individual subject.

According to Kymlicka,

'the shift from group-specific minority rights to universal human rights was

embraced by many liberals. (...). Many post-war liberals have thought that

religious tolerance based on the separation of church and state provides a model

for dealing with ethno cultural differences as well. On this view, ethnic identity,

like religion, is something, which people should be free to express in their private

life, but which is not the concern of the state. The state does not oppose the

freedom of people to express their particular cultural attachments, but neither does

it nurture such expression - rather, to adapt Nathan Glazer's phrase, it responds

with 'benign neglect'. The members of ethnic and national groups are protected

against discrimination and prejudice, and they are free to try to maintain whatever

part of their ethnic heritage or identity they wish, consistent with the rights of

others. However, their efforts are purely private (...). This separation of state and

ethnicity precludes any legal or governmental recognition of ethnic groups, or any

use of ethnic criteria in the distribution of rights, resources, and duties' (1995: 3-

4).

20 While criticizing this view, Kymlicka also strongly opposes the communitarian position for its tendency 'to inhibit people from questioning their inherited social roles (which) can condemn them to unsatisfying, even oppressive lives' (1995: 92). However, he contends that 'a comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or 'special status' for minority cultures' (1995: 6). His position remains liberal since the main objective of such latter protection, he argues, is individual freedom. Indeed, 'cultures are valuable, not in and of themselves, but because it is only through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful options. (...). [The] argument about the connection between individual choice and culture provides the first step towards a distinctively liberal defense of certain group- differentiated rights' (1995: 83-84).

According to Charles Taylor, 'the demand for recognition (...) is given urgency by the supposed links between recognition and identity, where this latter term designates something like a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being. The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the (mis) recognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or societies around them mirrors back to them a confining, demeaning, or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm; can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being' (1994:

25). As with Kymlicka, the individual rather than the group is at the core of Taylor's politics

of recognition, which arises from the notion of individual dignity and authenticity.

Firstly, 'with the move from honor to dignity has come a politics of universalism,

emphasizing the equal dignity of all citizens' (1994: 37); secondly, 'everyone should be

recognized for his or her unique identity' since 'we might speak of an individualized

identity, one that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself. This notion arises

along with an ideal of being true to myself and my own particular way of being, (...) the

ideal of 'authenticity'' (1994: 28-29).

However, while Kymlicka links the politics of recognition to a form of non­

discrimination, enabling each individual to fulfill his or her conception of the good life,

Taylor adds the concept of cultural survivance, i.e. a different cultural need. Indeed,

'while the politics of equal dignity is based on the idea that all humans are equally worthy

of respect, in the case of the politics of difference, we might also say that a universal

potential is at its basis, namely, the potential for forming and defining one's own identity,

as an individual, and also, as a culture' (1994: 41, my emphasis).

2.2.3. Liberal Theories of Minority Rights

According to Kymlicka, 'a liberal theory of minority rights (...) must explain how

minority rights coexist with human rights and how minority rights are limited by

principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice' (1995:6). To expose such a

'liberal theory of minority rights' he distinguishes two categories of collective rights:

internal restrictions - 'the claim of a group against its own members' - and external

protections - 'the claim of a group against the larger society' (1995: 35). 'The first kind

22 is intended to protect the group from the destabilizing impact of internal dissent (e.g. the J decision of individual members not to follow traditional practices or customs), whereas the second is intended to protect the group from the impact of external decisions (e.g. the economic or political decisions of the larger society)' (1995: 35). While the former might lead to the demise of the rights of the individual and individual oppression in the name of group solidarity - cultural tradition or religious orthodoxy- the latter might engender unfairness between groups. His position is that 'liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional authorities and practices' (1995: 37). Kymlicka gives a few examples of cases where internal restrictions clearly infringe on individual rights of minority group members. However, one must highlight the fact that the examples he quotes are extreme in nature and that in many cases, things might not be so clear-cut. For instance, in the case of many communities in South Africa, 'payment' to the family of the bride (Lobola) before a wedding is common. Such a practice, which was accepted in nineteenth century

Europe, might be considered as outrageous in certain Western countries but considered as a question of honor, or say, dignity by men and women of other communities. These value judgments on cultural practices are, at least partially, contingent on space and time and might be more difficult to make than what Kymlicka seems to suggest.

In concordance with his position on the right to cultural survival, Taylor seems sympathetic to policies that actively seek to create members of the community, for instance, in the case of Quebec, in their attempts to ensure that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers. Indeed, 'one has to distinguish the fundamental

23 liberties, those that should never be infringed and therefore ought to be unassailably entrenched, on the one hand, from privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be revoked or restricted for reasons of public policy - although one would need a strong reason to do this - on the other' (1994: 59, my emphasis). One clear limit he asserts to the politics of recognition is the following: 'there will be variations when it comes to applying the schedule of rights, but not where incitement to assassination is concerned' (1994: 62).

2.2.4. Limits to the Debate: The Complexities of Identity Formation.

One common criticism which has been made toward both Kymlicka's and Taylor's arguments is that they overemphasize culture as a source of identity, leading Appiah for instance to wonder whether 'we have not replaced one kind of tyranny with another'

(1994:163) - the tyranny of cultural affiliation. However, this argument has been formulated in two very distinctive ways: on the one hand, political analysts wonder what would be the consequences at a societal level of such a position? Would it not lead to the disuniting of the country, to paraphrase Schlesinger? On the other hand, sociologists ask themselves: is it empirically true that culture is peoples' primary identity?

According to Steven C. Rockefeller,

'our universal identity as human beings is our primary identity and is more

fundamental than any particular identity, whether it be a matter of citizenship,

gender, race or ethnic origin. (...) To elevate ethnic identity, which is secondary,

to a position equal in significance to, or above, a person's universal identity is

therefore to weaken the foundations of liberalism and to open the door to

24 intolerance. (...)• Regarding Taylor's Quebec brand of liberalism, I am uneasy

about the danger of erosion over time of fundamental human rights growing out

of a separatist mentality that elevates ethnic identity over universal human

identity. American democracy has developed as an endeavor to transcend the

separatism and ethnic rivalries that have had such a destructive effect on life in

the 'old world', the Yugoslavian civil war being only the most recent example'

(1994: 88-89).

Concrete measures to insure minority cultural survival are indeed problematic. As Walzer argues, 'what would the state have to do to guarantee or even begin to guarantee the survival of all the minorities that make up American society? It would surely have to move beyond official recognition of the equal value of the different ways of life. The various minority groups would need control over public monies, segregated or partially segregated schools, employment quotas that encouraged people to register with this or that group, and so on' (1994: 102). Such difficulty has a particular relevance to the South

African context, where a common national identity has never existed and where racial discrimination in the name of cultural survival has been the norm for centuries.

Moreover, the resources required to protect minorities are extremely scarce.

Sociologists question both the existence of culture and its impact on identity construction.

On the one hand, they accuse Taylor of perceiving cultural diversity as a given, in the same way as Levi-Strauss' anthropology tended to see the world as a juxtaposition of immutable and separated groups and identities, of societies fixated in their traditions.

Sociologists point to the hybridity of cultural belonging in contemporary societies.

Wieviorka quotes Gutman to argue that 'not all people are as multicultural as Rushdie

25 (...) but most people's identities, not just Western intellectuals and elites, are shaped by more than a single culture. Not only societies, but also people, are multicultural' (1998:

883). While Kymlicka agrees to a certain extent with this argument, he contends that

'moving between societal cultures' is rare (1995: 85) and 'even where the obstacles to integration are smallest, the desire of national minorities to retain their cultural membership remains very strong (...). In this sense, the choice to leave one's culture can be seen as analogous to the choice to take a vow of perpetual poverty and enter a religious order (...). I believe that, in developing a theory of justice, we should treat access to one's culture as something that people can be expected to want' (86).

Another argument made by sociologists revolves around the definition of identity itself, based on empirical evidence. When philosophers deal with the issue of cultural difference, they generally construct their analysis on the basis of identities that are already constituted, relatively stable and considered as such as the point of departure of their analysis, according to Wieviorka. Empirical evidence seems to broaden the concept of identity. Not only do people have plural identities, but also those identities fluctuate in time and space. Indeed, according to Castells, 'identity is people's source of meaning and experience' (1997: 6). In other words, identity reflects, gives meaning to, and aims to control one's experience. Accordingly, it is an act of consciousness (Comaroff, 1996). It is neither essential nor given nor immutable but a social construction open to change as circumstances, strategies and interactions fluctuate. Culture might constitute a strong element in identity formation, under certain circumstances, or might not. Class, for instance, may be more important or culture might be used to reflect class interest under

26 certain circumstances. Such an argument has been put forward by both Wieviorka and

Breton. According to Wieviorka,

'since the 1960s, throughout the world, we have witnessed the emergence of

demands and assertions of identity, from groups of extremely varied origin, since

they can be defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, race, history, national origin,

gender, physical disability and serious illness, etc. In some cases, these cultural

demands and expectations are directly and closely linked to social inequalities,

extreme exploitation in employment, unemployment or the relegation of actors to

an underclass, to exclusion and precariousness. In other cases, they are the

outcome of a profound desire for historical recognition. (...) In these cases, the

demand is less directly socially loaded' (1998: 890).

R. Breton goes further to acknowledge that in fact, demands for cultural recognition tend to become more important in a favorable socio-economic context. It is especially in times of economic prosperity that such symbolic need arises since according to R. Breton,

'indirectly, economic prosperity also contributed to an increase in the prominence of the symbolic dimension of ethnicity. In periods of prosperity, economic issues tend to be less at the center of public preoccupation. Other issues can then gain some importance. In contrast, periods of economic decline tend to give relative prominence to the material/instrumental aspects of ethnicity and ethnic relations' (1986: 41).

2.3. Identities in South Africa

In South Africa one cannot think of social identities without the consideration of race and ethnicity (Peter Alexander, 2005: 8). I would first like to delineate the significance of

27 these categories and show how they pertain to South Africa. Firstly, race is a form of

social identification, which identifies and distinguishes between different social

groupings on the basis of their biological characteristics. As a social category, race is

widely accepted as absolute. In this sense a person is either 'white' or 'black' or 'Asian'.

Thus, race is regarded as an important primordial identity (an identity that is fixed). In the

case of South Africa where racial categories were institutionalized, the example of

'coloured's' and the reclassification of individuals from one race to another during

apartheid, and then later the re-evaluation of the identity of 'coloured' in post-apartheid

South Africa are important to show that race is not in fact absolute, but that it is subject to

different interpretations (Cornelissen & Horstmeier, 2002: 63). A good example of the

changing nature of the 'coloured' identity is seen by some prison warders in the

Department of Correctional Services in the Western Cape who now want to move away

from the 'coloured' identity to a Khoisan identity. This comes, as a result of perceived

threats from a largely black African majority filling up positions within this department

(Cape Argus, May 3, 2005). Secondly ethnicity, which is closely related to race, also

represents its successor as viewed within academic circles. In one of the first academic

treatments of ethnicity, Weber (1978: 63) defines an ethnic group as:

"those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent

because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of

memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for the

propagation of group formation...Ethnic membership differs from the kinship

group precisely by being a presumed identity".

28 Following from this definition then, one can argue that ethnicity may be defined as the identification with a group on the basis of a 'belief in a common origin, descent, history and culture' (Cornelissen & Horstmeier quoting Vermeulen & Go vers 1997: 12). As mentioned above ethnicity is an important category in South Africa. The apartheid system encouraged and even created ethnic groups for political reasons. The new constitution of 1996, which includes viz. the rights of traditional leaders, customary law, and 'cultural groups' in post-apartheid South Africa, ensures that ethnicity remains meaningful for identification and political claims (2002: 63-64). However, identity has manifested itself in more than just ethnicity. Difference is also vested, increasingly, in gender, sexuality, generation, race, religion, life-style, and social class (Comaroff 2002:

22).

In contemporary South Africa most people still distinguish between 'whites', 'coloureds',

'blacks', and 'Indians'. These are similar categories to those that were used by the Group

Areas Act to enforce residential segregation (Omond 1985: 39 quoted in Peter

Alexander).

As will be shown most of the political violence that occurred following the logic of ethnic identity, appears most frequently in just such instances when individuals are persuaded of a need to confirm a collective sense of identity in the face of threatening economic, political, or other social forces. Moreover, it has been argued that 'ethnic politics' are by their very definition attributes of marginality and relative weakness, though under certain circumstances - as the success of Afrikaner nationalism bears witness - weakness can be transformed into powerful strengths. (Edwin N. Wilmsen with

Saul Dubow and John Sharp, 1994: 348).

29 South Africa presents a clear case of ethnic politics. As Mare argues, "the politicization of ethnicity directs these strong bonds towards a goal that has no essential link to ethnicity. Political manipulation moves ethnicity into the arena of competition for power against other groups. Politicized ethnicity (ethnic nationalism) moves social identity to political agency, provides the means for political mobilization and organization, and submits the ethnic group to another set of rules - those of competition for power" (italics in the original) (Mare 1999: 43). Undoubtedly, in the case of KwaZulu-Natal for example, Chief Buthelezi used the Zulu identity as a political strategy to gain political control in the region.

According to Zegeye, during the time of Verwoerd, race and ethnicity were essentially used to serve the interests of the white minority government. Moreover, he argues that prior to the Verwoerdian era; the concept of ethnicity was not yet relevant. (Abebe

Zegeye, 2001).

Accordingly, the term more often used to capture the diversity of South Africa is

"divided", an idea that derived from that of the plural society '. This classification implies more than cultural diversity. It suggests coinciding cleavages along lines of inequality - a situation of 'ranked ethnicity' according to Horowitz12 - and high potential for violence and for continuing conflict in society. In a similar fashion Pierre van den

Berghe argues "South Africa remains a plural society with a population divided by deep rifts of class, race and ethnicity. I see no clear evidence that those rifts have diminished

11 Horowitz, 1991, Rex 1971, van den Berghe 1990. 12 Horowitz, D. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. California: University of California Press

30 over the last three decades..."13 As Charles Villa-Vicencio has noted, "apartheid was...built on multicultural difference and the promotion of group identity, as pretext to dominate". More recently, he argues that during the late 1990s, "Boerestaat politics and

Zulu nationalism, in turn, in a different way, continue to affirm the right to be different.

To build a society in which different cultures and ethnic groups live side by side, rather than explore the possibilities of engaging one another, clearly has its own set of problems" (Charles Villa-Vicencio - Institute for Justice and Reconciliation). Neville

Alexander asserts, "Afrikaner volkstaaters and the adherents of the Zulu kingdom...these two are without a doubt the most distinctive politicized ethnic identities to have been handed down to the present generation" (Alexander 2003: 161). In contemporary South

Africa, the Afrikaner and the intellectual elite have become the most outspoken advocates for group rights, even though these advocacies are contested amongst Afrikaners. Some

Afrikaners, those, who advocate for group rights, argue that individuals own one dominant identity according to which they want to live. For others, like the Afrikaner activists, language and culture is very important and deserves protection if it is to persevere (Thomas Blaser: 2, unpublished paper).

Cultural differences, conceived as essential, were not so much respected as imposed or ascribed and used as a basis for discrimination reaching all spheres of life. Such a fact largely explains the ideological debates surrounding the notion of minority and ethnicity, which were until recently largely accepted as primordial and unquestioned or rejected as pure inventions of apartheid social engineers aimed at masking other social cleavages

P. Van Den Berghe 1990. 'South Africa after Thirty Years', Social Dynamics, 16 (2), p. 17

31 such as class and economic interests, and thus undeserving of further investigation and questioning.

An interesting comment in that regard was made by Tom Young (1989) in a review of several books written in the late 1980s on South Africa's future. He quotes Barrel, an eminent South African political journalist, as saying:

"The extremities of the national liberatory task at hand do not allow for the luxury of class and ethnic sectarianism within or between revolutionary organizations" (Howard

Barrell).

Young responds "so now we know. No doubt such luxuries have already evaporated in the face of Barrell's stern injunction. Who in his right mind, could possibly want to explain them?" (Young, 1989: 523).

Maybe a single example can illustrate this fact: while English is the language of commerce and politics in South Africa, it is spoken only by 43% of the population and it is the mother tongue of less than 10% of the population. This situation could have legitimized a form of deep multiculturalism, all the more so since no cultural group can claim majority or indigenous status - as opposed to immigrant groups. At first glance, individuals' constitution as subjects clearly occurs in very different cultural contexts across the society and cultural survival would seem to be an inherent right.

2.4. Conclusion

With the collapse of communism in the beginning of the 1990s, came the rise of ethnic nationalism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. This has led to unprecedented conflict in

32 places like Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In many cases this has sparked major interest

amongst political analysts and theorists around the world to interrogate the subject of ethnic identity politics. As I have mentioned in this chapter the question is how, from

what, by whom and for what.

With regard to collective identities, I have argued that they are socially constructed.

Governments who to construct identities 'from above' to legitimize their authority, or the

process can occur 'from below', where individuals may draw meaning from being part of

a group. However, identities always define those elements of similarity ('We') and

difference ('They') of inclusion and exclusion.

In his analysis, Kymlicka suggests that a theory of justice should in a multicultural state,

include both universal rights, which are assigned to individuals, as well as group

differentiated rights for minority cultures. As oppose to Taylor where the individual is at

the core of recognition, culture too should be recognized - in terms of its survivance.

Here he uses the example of Quebec.

With regards to minority rights - with reference to collective rights - Kymlicka

distinguishes between two categories of collective rights i.e. internal restrictions ('the

claim of a group against its own members') and external protection ('the claim of a group

against the larger society'). Without delineating his position, he basically suggests that

liberals should endorse certain external protections with regards to groups, but should

reject internal restrictions.

However credible these theories are, Taylor and Kymlicka perhaps overemphasize

culture as identity. In the context of South Africa the focus on culture as primordial or

33 essential has been problematic as I discuss in chapter four on the issue of politicized ethnicity. However, the social constructive theory is much more applicable with regards to identity since identities change as circumstances change - as we will see in the

following chapter concerning the changes in the political and economic system since post-1994.

Now that we have explored theories of identity, we will turn to an examination of

theories, which seeks to explain the social/political/economic context of crime.

34 Chapter 3: The Construction of an Identity From Without

3.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I looked at the developments of ethnicity and race in South

Africa. I suggested that ethnicity and race were imposed on the majority of South

Africans. However, in post-apartheid South Africa, some analysts have suggested a shift in identity construction, mainly affecting those living in poorer conditions, i.e. working- class/underclass, and explore some of the identity construction taking place within these underclass organizations. Here I rely on the empirical research done by sociologists,

Simon Bekker and Anne Leilde in the Western Cape. One of the arguments they put

forward concerns the continuation of the collective form of criminal violence, for

instance gangsterism and vigilantism. In their research they have found groups, in the

form of gangs, move beyond their own members and into the community.

Prior to South Africa's first democratic elections held in 1994, many analysts argued that

the violence was indeed politically driven. There is no doubt that the violence did take on

a political veneer; however, as Kynoch argues much of the violence that did occur during

the time of the transition was in fact more - or - less criminal and continued even after a

political compromise was reached.

However, studies done by Don Pinnock et.al, (Pinnock, 1980) in the 1980s, suggest that

gangsterism has had a long history in the Western Cape, particularly on the Cape Flats.

Their studies mainly show youth participate in gangs as a result of their marginalization.

However, there are scant writings that point to the contemporary struggles of youth

within these townships - seeking a sense of belonging, an identity which post-apartheid

35 South Africa no longer gives them. An interesting study done by anthropologist Elaine

Salo in Manenberg argues that there are shifts in young men and women's identity. In her study she shows how youth recreate their racial and gendered identity in relation to local histories, repertoires and ideals of masculinity and femininity as well as in relation to global forces (Salo, 2004). Therefore this study wants to point beyond the fact that criminals only partake in illicit activities which are restricted to gangs only. Gangs also reach people outside their own members - i.e. in their community. In other words they become providers, where the state seems to fail, or to have retreated.

Criminal violence in its collective form is also linked to identity and social capital. In this sense gangs would not be as strong in the Western Cape if they did not reach people outside their own members in their respective communities. They provide anything from shelter to food, money to community as a whole. For example, in one township on the

Cape Flats, Valhalla Park, Colin Stanfield, a well-known gang leader who died of cancer, was purported to be a well-respected member of the local community. At his death people within the community praised him for his generous giving; he provided food to them when they were hungry, and lends a sympathetic ear to their problems. As one of his "spiritual advisors" commented at his funeral: "He has kept a community together, despite allegations against him. We have lost a big man and the sorrow of the community will attest to this".14

For poorer communities in South Africa, in particular in places on the Cape Flats such as

Manenberg, Gugulethu, Langa, Nyanga, Khayelitsha and Mitchell's Plain, the relationship with the gangs is often ambiguous. Since the level of unemployment is so

36 high in most of these communities15, they rely on the illegal economy, which is sometimes their only source of income. For example in one coastal community in the

Western Cape where abalone poaching is a lucrative business which gangs are heavily involved with, increased community cooperation with these gangs is often beneficial to them since they are dependent on poaching for income (Tom Samara, 2003: 303).

3.2. Critique of Collective Crime

"Men and women look for groups to which they can belong, certainly and forever, in a world in which all else is moving and shifting, in which nothing else is certain"

(Hobsbawm 1996: 40).

"Nobody's life was planned more than a few weeks in advance. People had accepted uncertainty as endemic" (Jonny Steinberg, article published in Business Day, 04 April

2005).

In South Africa most of the underclass16 - which make up 40% of South African society according to Bekker and Leilde - build resistant identities, i.e. resistance to their exclusion from cultural and socio-economic advantages etc. They want to feel a sense of belonging. However, increasingly the divide between those who are marginalized and the elite is growing.

Recent work by Castells on identity construction in the network society has shown that the excluded build "resistance identities" which are "trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions

14 Morris, Cape Argus, October 5, 2004 15 According to Salo, in a place like Manenberg unemployment is estimated between 50% and 60%.

37 of civil society" (1997: 8). Gangs in American cities, he argues, "emerged as a major form of association, work, and identity for hundreds of thousands of youths. Indeed [...], they play a structuring role in many areas which explains the ambiguous feeling of local residents towards them, partly fearful, yet partly feeling able to relate to the gang society better than to mainstream institutions, which are usually present only in their repressive manifestations" (1997: 63-64). Similarly, Hagedorn agrees with Castells that gangs do provide employment and that they continue as a 'ghetto employer' for those in the unskilled labor market (Hagedorn, 2005: 157).

Accordingly, are the social forces discussed, for example gangs, not manifestations of the effects of the commodification of more and more aspects of life? A response to deepening marginalization and poverty? A process of what Castells calls 'perverse integration', where sections 'of the socially excluded population, along with individuals who choose far more profitable, if risky ways to make a living, constitute an increasingly populated underworld...' (Castells 2000: 73)? This is happening exactly at the time that the traditional organizations that defend the poor, trade unions and the state, find themselves unable or unwilling to provide safety nets for those without defense.

In the same way, Muslims finding a place in People Against Gangersterism and Drugs

(PAGAD)17 and Coloured youth finding a place in gangs, both relate to the issue of uncertainty, of a sense of community under threat. Echoing Jock Young's summation:

'Just as community collapses, identity is invented' (Young: 1999: 164).

16 This term refers to the poorer/working class within the South African society. 17 PAGAD emerged in 1996. It originated in Cape Town predominantly by people who were against drugs and gangsters. Later it became known as mainly Muslim group targeting drug dealers and gangsters. The group came into the international spotlight when they torched, shot and eventually killed a famous Capetonian drug dealer in August 1996.

38 3.3. Specific Theories on Crime in South Africa

Trends with regards to the increase in crime in South Africa cannot overlook the broader socio-political and economic conditions, which give rise to the increase in crime. A recent research study done by John and Jean Comaroff - two South African anthropologists based at the University of Chicago - sheds some light on crime rates in

South Africa. Their figures, taken from the Criminal Information Analysis Center (CIAC) of the South African Police Service in 2002,18 suggest that violent crime rates are very high. It is useful to quote them at length:

"Almost 22, 000 people were murdered in 2002, about 48 per 100, 000 of the

population. Even in the best of years since 1994, some 58 intentional homicides

occurred on an "average" day. Add 35,012 attempted murders and 11,087

culpable (i.e. non-intentional) homicides, and the tally of dead and wounded

bodies is considerable...By our calculations, homicide, attempted homicide and

culpable homicide have together, yielded 590,098 victims since the transition -

more or less 180 per day...Three other serious crimes of violence are also

noteworthy: in 2002, there were 119,185 recorded armed robberies, 264,399

grievous assaults, and 52,107 rapes...(along with) carjacking, at about 15,000

cases per annum" (Comaroff, 2004: 4-5).

The official data comes from the Annual Report of the National Commissioner of Police for 2002/3 (ARNC) and those posted online by the CIAC. The latter, in turn, are given for the financial year (to 31 March 2003) and the calendar year (to 31 December 2002). Since they are more detailed, the figures from CIAC were used. A moratorium on crime statistics was imposed in 2000/1. The ones discussed are from the post-moratorium period.

39 What these figures suggest is that over half a million (i.e. 533, 870) serious violent

offences were committed in 2002 in a county of 44. 8 million people. And this excludes the 315, 623 residential burglaries and 256, 593 common assaults (2004, 5).19

Gangs today, according to Hagedorn, are organizations of the socially excluded (2005:

156). According to research done by Bekker and Leilde on the construction of identities

within underclass institutions20 in Western Cape violence, in particular criminal violence

needs to be studied in terms of local exclusion. They argue that while such collective

criminal institutions are both infra- and supra ethnic and racial, "people operating within

these institutions appear able to develop and sustain strategies of coping and of survival

in an otherwise hostile and exclusionary environment. They are also often able to gain

personal dignity in organizations established within these institutions and accordingly are

able to construct identities that counter the loss of self-esteem in the wider society"

(Bekker and Leilde, 2003). In that sense, criminal violence can be conceived as a peculiar

and particularly deadly form of identity politics.

3.3.1. Social Capital and Identity

Political violence instigated by coloured people would mean that as a group they feel

discriminated against. However when one looks at, for example, a middle-class coloured

person living in the suburbs and a coloured youth living in a poorer community, the

middle-class coloured person living in the suburbs will identify more with his/her middle-

19 There are no more recent statistics on crime. 20 In their research they make the distinction between the following: civil society organizations and underclass organizations; school organizations and youth & sport clubs vs. gangs; small, medium and micro-enterprises vs. spazas (informal shops) and shebeens, syndicates, drug trafficking, poaching; community police forums vs. vigilante groups, anti-gang organizations; and local authorities, NGOs, Community-based organizations, Civic organizations, Housing forums vs. Burial societies and stokvels (informal saving clubs) and Warlords and 'Strong men'.

40 class identity. One could argue that this middle-class identity is typically associated with a community of lifestyles which are common in most societies. These are constructed around shared values, a shared 'way of life' and common interests and concerns such as crime, property values and neighborhood tidiness. (Bekker & Leilde, 2005). Conversely, the unemployed coloured youth that is part of a gang and living in a poor community, might identify more with his gang group than with racial identity. In other words they would have nothing in common other than sharing a racial identity i.e. coloured.

Criminal violence, especially collective criminal violence such as gangsterism or vigilantism, should not be conceived of as the mere pursuit of easy cash. In the case of

South Africa, Bekker and Leilde (2003) have argued that "members of the underclass appear to draw minimal meaning from public participation on the local sphere (...). Their strategy is one of opting out of civil society". In other words, exclusion from socio­ economic benefits leads the poor to select alternative solutions and networks of support beyond civil society.

If one looks at the role of social capital, which according to Robert Putnam can be define as "features of social organizations, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions" (Putnam 1993: 167; see also

Putnam 2000) gangs are seen as 'negative social capital' and obstacles to establishing liberal democratic modes of governance and citizenship (Robins, 2000: unpublished paper). However, to see civil society as 'positive social capital'- trust among citizenry in an emergent democracy - and underclass organizations as being 'anti-social', reflecting

'negative social capital' - trust in small groups where activities which are seen as detrimental to the wider good of society - could be a very disingenuous categorization for

41 most members of the underclass appear to have little or no choice regarding their quest for a haven of survival and a badge of honor. In this sense then what this analysis implies is that the identities members of the underclass are able to construct remain local and the institutions in which they act remain particularistic. Moreover, as Bekker and Leilde continue to argue, "such constraints diminish the society's capacity to develop a democratic political culture and a vigorous civil society". If they have no resources to survive in their society, many find ways within the criminal world and find themselves in violent pursuit for these resources (Bekker and Leilde, 2002: 11).

3.3.2. Civil Society, Underclass Institutions/'Uncivil Society'

Civil society is not the only means of expressing discontentment with national, as well as global policies and institutions. According to Hirschman, there are three ways to express dissatisfaction or disagreement with an organization/institution: apathy, voice and exit.

The overemphasis on civil society might overlook other forms of expression resulting both from state and civil society deficiencies. They represent the darker side of social movements, but might also be the fastest growing institutions among the masses, i.e. the poor or the excluded; whose voice is faint and for whom exit seems the only option available. According to Bayart et.al, "confronted by the collapse of the state, any form of policy has been taken at least to some extent 'by Churches and religious solidarity's, a burgeoning informal economy, and military organizations and militias or other armed movements which are sometimes home grown, sometimes foreign'"(Bayart, 1999). In

South Africa, some analysts have observed a growing number of alternative institutions, situated beyond the state-civil society nexus and mostly non-liberal in nature, serving as alternative means for the poor to express their discontentment or as communal

42 organizations of support to substitute for the lack of welfare-state policies - e.g. gangs - or the inefficient police system - e.g. vigilante groups.

Micro-community organizations situated beyond the state-civil society nexus are not always positive or liberal in nature - in fact they can often be described as 'uncivil' according to Bayat. At the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime in 2001, Koffi

Anan describes organized crime as 'uncivil society'; yet there institutions may be the only source of support and solidarity available to the poor. They are undeniably emancipatory at a very small-scale level, but whether they are part of civil society is questionable. In fact, they may grow as a response to the deficiencies of 'civil society institutions'. Whether these 'everyday forms of resistance' (Bayat, 1997: 56) are able to organize themselves in a broader social movement is also questionable. However, Bayat suggests that they represent a 'movement in themselves', albeit in a metaphorical sense.

Nonetheless, they can become a social movement only 'if and when the actors become conscious of their doings by articulating their aims, methods and justifications' (1997:

57).

Speaking of the poor as the 'disenfranchised' of society, Bayat contends that gradually they can become a potential social force, through their 'quiet encroachment' on society.

This could be in search of work or just to better their lives. Nevertheless, these groups, even though poor, should not only be considered as individuals on the periphery of society, but also need to be considered as integral parts of society and hence can to a large extent become a major social force (Bayat, 1997: 59).

21 Andre Standing quoting Koffi Anan, Occasional paper 74, June 2003. 'The Social contradictions of organised crime on the Cape Flats'.

43 3.4. Building Exclusive Identity From Above

If identity from above is exclusive or perceived to be so by the targeted population, people are likely to build for themselves alternative identities around communal links, that will in turn provide them with substantive networks of emotional support and material solidarity. Built on feelings of rejection, such identities are likely to be negative and non-liberal. They are also bound to express themselves outside of civil society since

"inadequacies in the distribution of symbolic and material resources, and the alienation, resentment and social tensions they bring about, undermine the legitimacy of public institutions in general and of state institutions in particular" (Bekker and Leilde, 2003). It follows that a lack of loyalty and commitment to the institutions and "the degree to which the institutions are accepted as legitimate for the management of public affairs is diminished" (2003). A serious lack of loyalty and identification toward an institution threatens its capacity to act effectively or at worst leads to a rejection of the institution

(Breton, 1985). In sum, identification with identity from above creates a civil society, encourages loyalty to government and participation in public affairs - the voice option; inversely exclusion from and rejection of state identities creates an 'uncivil' society, where the exit option is preferred (Hirschman, 1970).

For some in the new South Africa being part of Muslim group or being Griqua can be of instrumental value. However, those without the socio-economic strength and who do not have faith in either political or civil institutions withdraw into known surroundings.

44 3.5. Conclusion

This chapter examines the shift in identity construction in South Africa. In particular, I look at how identities are being shaped by those living in poorer communities i.e. the working class. My focus is particularly on the Western Cape, and on those living on the

Cape Flats. I quote extensively from empirical research done by sociologists Simon

Bekker and Anne Leilde.

The chapter focuses particularly on criminal gangs and their organizations and their role within local communities. People participate in these organizations not just for monetary purposes, but also because it gives them a sense of belonging and dignity, in a society that they feel is exclusionary. In this sense people construct for themselves 'resistant identities' in a context that appears to be hostile to their plight.

These alternative institutions that are considered by some as 'uncivil' and as 'negative social capital', in contrast to civil society and positive social capital, are in many ways the only source of income and employment for those living on the margins of society.

This analysis also argues for a move beyond just civil institutions, and also to focus on some alternative institutions within poorer communities that are meeting the needs of those who feel a sense of exclusion from mainstream society. I have highlighted some of these institutions and compared them with civil society organizations.

Now that we have briefly looked at the body of theoretical work on criminal violence let us turn our attention to the specific problematic to be explained in this thesis: the issue of identity and the apparent shift from political violence (notably in the case of Afrikaner and Zulu nationalism), notably as it took place in KwaZulu-Natal and on the East Rand

45 townships, to look at criminal violence (in the form of gangsterism, and vigilantism) in the Western Cape amongst marginalized coloureds in the post-1994 period. Chapter 4: The End of Political Violence Base on Race/Ethnicity in South Africa 1990 - 1994

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapter explored the theoretical aspects of crime, particularly as it relates to social capital and identity formation. I suggested that people who are generally excluded from the socio-economic and political benefits of society build resistant identities as a result of their marginalization and turn towards other forms of survival that will give them a sense of dignity and belonging. In the next chapter I will elaborate on the implications for consolidating democracy of the South African government's adoption of a neo-liberal macro-economic policy. In this context many analysts have argued that racial segregation is fast being superseded by socio-economic segregation. However, similarly as people build for themselves resistant identities as a result of their exclusion, ethnic/racial identities are politicized to resist their marginalization.

Therefore this chapter firstly intends to examine to what extend ethnicity and race played a key role in the violence during the transition period and how these identities became mobilized for political purposes. Therefore it would be appropriate to begin with a brief history of how race and ethnicity came to be accepted and imposed as 'primordial' identities in South Africa through its spatial segregation and apartheid policies. In this way it will highlight why some groups, for instance Zulu nationalist and Afrikaner right- wing groups manipulated these identities to gain political control. These two groups were the only two groups with distinctive politicized ethnic identities that challenged the ANC government prior to the first democratic election (Alexander, 2003: 161). This comes as no surprise since they also strongly opposed the terms on which the 1990s negotiations

47 took place and instead argued for a federalist system, in the case of both KwaZulu-Natal

and Afrikaner right-wing groups under the leadership of General Constant Viljoen.

Secondly, I will look at the 1996 constitution and show how South Africa has managed

accommodate the different ethnic and racial identities, after many had predicted that the

country was bound to have a civil war, especially when the violence in KwaZulu-Natal

region was at its highest between the ANC and the IFP. The transition period was a

particularly volatile one in the history of South Africa, since many had predicted that

South Africa would become another Yugoslavia or Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, as

many analysts have argued, the violence cannot exclusively be attributed to ethnic/racial

factors alone since there were many other causes, which contributed to it during this time.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore some of these causes. Here, I will

examine the significance of the ethnic/racial aspect that contributed to the violence.

It will be shown that some of the violence did in fact relate to ethnicity and race as

leaders such as Buthelezi manipulated it in order to gain political control over the region

of KwaZulu-Natal, at the hostels in particular. In order to understand some of the reasons

for the conflict, particularly in places like KwaZulu-Natal and the East Rand where most

of the political violence during the early 1990s occurred, one needs to look at the role of

the leadership, for example Buthelezi, using Zulu identity as a key strategy in KwaZulu-

Natal to gain political control in the region. In addition, hostels dwellers on the East

Rand, for instance in places like Vosloorus, Katlehong and Tokoza (collectively known

as KATORUS) give similar explanations for the violence which do in fact relate to

ethnicity.

48 Nonetheless, South Africa did not experience a full-scale ethnic war as widely predicted.

So what happened? The transition to democracy had to be negotiated with parties which demanded strong group rights and protection (in terms of language, political veto, etc) - even a consociative power distribution with group veto rights as conceived by Arend

Lijphart - an American political scientist who was an adviser to the National Party (NP) in the 1980s. During these negotiations, some parties were threatening war should their claims not be accommodated. These parties included the Afrikaner Volksfront (AVF), under the leadership of the then former South African Defence Force (SADF) general

Constant Viljoen, and the Pan African Congress (PAC), and its military wing the Azanian

People's Liberation Army (APLA). Some other movements were also seeking recognition during this time. In the case of Zulu nationalist groups, based on the apartheid policy of separate development, they wanted to create for themselves a state in the new

South Africa. This also later encouraged other groups seeking self-determination - for instance Kleurling Weerstands Beweging (KWB) or the Coloured Resistance Movement and the December 1st Movement, among others. These latter groups have over the years disappeared. However, what seem to be on the rise are new identity constructions and social movements, for example a group in the Cape that call themselves Movement

Against Domination of African Minorities (MADAM), which has met with a group of prison officials who now claim a Khoisan identity. They are mainly a group of coloured prison officials that formed this organization as a result of perceive exclusion and restructuring of the prison system in South Africa.

Finally, notwithstanding the first democratic election in 1994 when voting was still based primarily on race, the two subsequent elections have shown a remarkable shift in voting

49 patterns - i.e. most people no longer seem to vote according to race or ethnic affiliations.

Instead class has become an essential criterion.

Let us first look at the historical developments in South Africa prior to the first democratic elections.

4.2. Historical Context: Pre-1990

One cannot understand social identities in South Africa without the consideration of race and ethnicity (Alexander P, 2005: 8). As intimated before identities are peoples' source of meaning and experience. However, in the case of South Africa, identities, whether racial or ethnic, were politicized and imposed.

4.2.1. Spatial Segregation

Formal urban segregation already started in the early nineteenth century, soon after the abolition of slavery in 1834. The practice of regional segregation varied greatly, even though there was a widespread consensus that the 'urban areas belonged to the white man'. In 1920, the Housing Act made central government funds available to local governments to build housing for the poor. These areas were to be racially segregated, and spatially separated from one another. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act was passed in

1923. It required local authorities to establish separate locations for the Black population, and to control the influx of blacks into the towns. The Slum Act of 1934 was introduced as 'non-racial legislation', but in practice it was used to exclude blacks from the inner cities. (Christopher 1994: 35 - 38). By 1948 townships were an integral part of the organization of urban space; however,

there were areas where racial boundaries were not that strict. After the National Party had

won the election in 1948, the apartheid regime gradually extended spatial segregation to

all areas of life. (Christopher, 1994: 65). Segregation operated on all levels in South

African society. On the personal level, the aim was to eliminate almost all-personal

/ contact between members of different population groups. Whites, for instance, were to be

separated from all Non-Whites. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the

Immorality Act Amendment (1950) were designed to keep the White race 'pure'. Public

spaces from the beaches to post offices were segregated in the Separate Amenities Act of

1953. (Christopher, 1994: 141-143).

At the National level, the country was divided into Homelands or Bantustans under the

Native Affairs Minister, H.F.Verwoerd, who had been appointed in 1950 (see below in

the developments of the Bantustans). Segregation in the urban areas was also tightened.

The Population Registration Act22 and the Group Areas Act of 1950 were two major

pieces of legislation designed to this end. The Group Areas Act was to bring about total

urban segregation once people had been racially classified. Towns and cities were to be

divided into group areas for the exclusive ownership and occupation of a designated

group. Anybody who was not a member of that group would have to leave and settle in

his or her 'own' area. This would result in total segregation - apartheid (Christopher

1994: 65, 103-105). Black and coloured areas redefined as white were demolished or

redistributed (Christopher 1994: 140). Places like District Six, in the Western Cape, a

22 The Population Registration Act meant the classification of the whole population into different groups. The three basic categories were Black, White, and Coloured, the latter being split into several categories

51 predominantly coloured area, later became an exclusively whites area. Most of the coloured people of this area were displaced into "coloured only townships" known as the

Cape Flats.

4.2.2. The Apartheid System

Most analysts agree that the basic premise of apartheid was 'a shared perception of the need to protect white supremacy and preserve the purity of the white race' (Christopher,

1994). Ideologically this premise was articulated and defended in the language of

"separate development". Separate development was in essence to get the country out of interracial mixing, by allocating the different races territorial distinctiveness, allowing the exercise of political rights and acquiring wealth and education separately from one another.

The concept of apartheid was first introduced by the National Party during the 1948 election campaign in order to distinguish its 'native' policy from the segregationist policy of the United Party (UP). The essential understanding of the development of the apartheid policy, which later became known as separate development under Verwoerd, was the construction of different ethnic groups. This policy was premised on the idea that ethnic groups should develop differently and each group has it own right to self-determination.

It entrenched and stimulated ethnic divisions by its attempt to 'retribalize African consciousness'. Eventually these groups were to become politically independent but with economic interdependence; in other words they needed a homeland (Nigel Worden quoting Giliomee, 1985: 111).

such as Cape Malay, Griqua, Indian, Chinese and Cape Coloured. - Christopher 1994: p. 103). In practice everyone had to carry an identity document, the hated Dompas, to prove his or her 'race'.

52 4.2.3. Development of the Bantustans/Homeland System

As mentioned earlier, the homeland system was introduced by Verwoerd in 1959 with the promotion of the Bantu Self-Government Act, which set up 8 (subsequently extended to ten) distinct 'Bantu Homelands' - each with a degree of self-government. These were developed out of already existing reserves set up during the implementation of the Native

Land Act of 191323. This provided the blue print of what later became known as Grand

Apartheid (O'Meara, 1996: 73).

Each of these homeland governments had their own chief ministers, cabinets, legislatures and fully-fledged civil services, which offered channels for black advancement that did not threaten whites. In general these governments concerned themselves with homeland affairs (Giliomee, 2003: 604). In this sense they extended great powers to these local chiefs, but also established the principle of ethnicity as the basis of the homelands (italics are mine) (Worden, 1994: 110). Essentially, the aim of the homeland policy was to divide the African population by entrenching ethnic-regional identities. In this sense the government could proclaim that South Africa was not a multi-racial society, but rather consisted of many 'nations', each of which had the right to control its destiny and preserve its identity (Zegeye, 2001: 6). It was therefore in their own 'homeland' that they could express their political rights, while forfeiting any civil rights and welfare privileges in 'white' South Africa (Terreblanche, 2002: 71). Accordingly, separate development was a bold attempt to break down a broad African nationalism and to replace it with tribal identities (Worden, 1994: 113).

This act forbade Africans to purchase land outside of the reserve (Worden N. 1994: 49).

53 The Bantustan scheme rested on the convenient proposition that there was no African majority in South Africa. It held that 'Bantu' were not South Africans, but belonged instead to a multitude of 'national/ethnic groups', and should exercise their citizenship in their own 'homelands'. (Sampie Terreblanche, 2003: 321-22). Verwoerd saw this as a good opportunity to also declare the 'independence' of the Bantustans, which he hoped, might help the NP government to be accepted internationally through a South African version of 'decolonization'.

By the 1960s the National Party "unselfconsciously claimed for itself the mantle of an anti-colonial party, whose apartheid policy was in fact the realization of the principle of the right of people to self-determination" (O'Meara, 73). However, this did not impress the blacks or the international community.

Behind this elaborate plan was the control of black movement to and within the urban centers. Decentralized industries would be created on the borders of the Bantustans.

Moreover, a view that was particularly prevalent in the 1930s was that Africans were seen as having a separate culture and thus needed to develop separately. During the 1930s

Afrikaner nationalists had developed this idea, particularly under European influence, mainly that of German romantic nationalist thought. This conception did not view

Africans as a homogenous race or as an amalgam of primitive 'tribes', but as made up of distinct "primordial 'ethnic' groups each destined, like the Afrikaners themselves, for nationhood and eventual statehood" (Daryl Glaser, 2001:134).

In South Africa, the radicalized Apartheid State and the imposition of ethnic difference through artificial homelands for African 'tribes' created strong popular and intellectual

54 resistance to conceptions of ethnicity and nation (Thomas Blaser, unpublished paper,

Queens conference; 3), mainly amongst the ANC cadres and leftist intellectuals.

Comaroff argues that the ANC was always ambivalent towards anything associated with

"tribalism". The liberation movements tended during the struggle years and after, to dismiss culture as instruments of colonial overrule. This is reflected in Desmond Tutu's outburst against ethnicity: "we Blacks (most of us) execrate ethnicity with all our being."

(Desmond Tutu, 1981, quoted in Comaroff, 2003: 10). "Some senior ANC cadres were still openly dismissive of indigenous authority in the late 1990s...President Thabo

Mbeki's support of it, argues Barbara Oomen continues to seem more strategic than intrinsic... (2003: 10)" (quoted by Comaroff).

By the end of the 1950s, Dr Hendrik Verwoerd - who had become prime minister in

1958 - was astute enough to realize that the notion of the upliftment of poor Afrikaners - as the alleged victims of British imperialism and foreign capitalism - was no longer justification for the system of Afrikaner power and privilege. Consequently, he announced that the policy of apartheid would be replaced with the 'non-racist' policy of separate development. According to Verwoerdian ideology, "'national' sovereignty and political freedom would be granted separately to each of the nine African ethnic groups"

(O'Meara 1996: 300).

It was in this context that Inkatha - which was a cultural movement at the time - came to the forefront to mobilize its own constituency on the basis of an ethnic identity. Before examining the Inkatha movement, I would first like to focus on the Afrikaners and how they came into power.

55 4.3. Afrikaners and Afrikaner Nationalism -1948

In the early twentieth century, a mythologized nationalism that can be compared to other fabrications such as the Third Reich or Soviet Union was developed and effectively propagated. Many analyst and academics have pointed out that a considerable part of this national mythology and tradition was formed around the idea of the Afrikaners as God's chosen people, and the guardians of 'race' and 'civilization' (See Kinghorn 1997: 140-

141; Dubow 1995: 281-283).

Prior to the onset of apartheid, the Afrikaner nationalists, in a similar manner to the

Nazis, had already created multiple national symbols by inventing traditions (Hobsbawm

& Ranger 1992: 1-14). These invented traditions included the veneration of the first

Afrikaners to travel northeast (die Voortrekkers), and the revival of Afrikaans as the sacred language of the volk (McClintock 1995: 368-369). These traditions were then put on a pedestal where they confirmed and sealed the social order. They could be presented as great shows of national unity, celebrations or memorial sites.

In order to create unity, the nation-builders' regime used different means of negative ethnicity throughout the twentieth century. The English were the original archenemy, and at a later stage the perceived threats came from communists, blacks, Catholics and Jews.

Invented traditions and modern bureaucracy were harnessed to create oneness and the ideas of Afrikaner ethnicity (Afrikanerdom), ons eie and the so - called lager-mentality.

In essence one of the real reasons for group solidarity was to advance the groups own interests (in the case of Afrikaners) at the expense of the rest. This Afrikaner nationalist group believed that the state was there to promote their interests and to realize Afrikaner destiny (volkseie) (Dan O'Meara in Forty Lost Years: 43, Dubow, 365).

4.3.1. Afrikaner Split: -1969 & 1982

The loss of heart and disillusionment of the Afrikaner spiritual leaders manifested itself for the first time when the National Party split into verligte (enlightened) Verwoerdians and verkrampte (conservative) Hertzogites in 1969 (Grobbelaar et.al 1989:23)25. The latter's slogans, which were borrowed from the time of the building of the volkskapitalisme in the 1930s and 1940s, failed to appeal to upwardly middle-class

Afrikaners (O'Meara 1996: 310-311).

In 1982 the National Party was divided again, this time with more shattering consequences for Afrikaner unity. 17 parliamentarians broke away from the National

Party government to form the Conservative Party (CP), which was a counter-movement against the loss of heart and liberal influences. In addition, it also claimed that the

National Party regime had betrayed the Afrikaner culturally, politically and materially.

The Conservative Party leaned on the 'Verwoerdian' ideals of separate development

(Grobbelaar et.al 1989: 13). It based its political appeal on the language of ethnic solidarity, group identity and cultural cohesion, invoking Afrikaner 'tradition' as the wellspring of identity politics. Their slogans, 'we care about the 'volk' and 'volk knows no classes', were anachronistic at the time when a whole generation of young Afrikaners

24 A term used for the Afrikaners' infamous in-group mentality that leaves little or no space for foreign ideas or people. It also created a sense of togetherness. 25 Four National Party MPs broke away and formed the far-right Herstigte Nationale Party, which was to appeal particularly to working class Afrikaners. It did find some support among working-class whites and farmers, but in the 1970s it became labeled as an unpopular 'loser party' or 'lower class' party (Grobbelaar et.al 1989:23).

57 were turning their backs on the idea of Afrikanerdom. The 1980s saw Afrikaner political and spiritual unity shake at its foundations and fall (O'Meara 1996: 368-37). Later, this fragmentation amongst Afrikaners led to a plethora of right-wing fringe groups (Zegeye,

2001: 11). Some of these right-wing groups did not have such a significant impact in

South Africa, for instance the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB). However, there were others, like the Afrikaner Vryheidsfront (AFV) under the leadership of General

Constant Viljoen, who wanted to participate in the constitutional process and played a more significant role.

4.3.2. Afrikaner Social Integration

Not all Afrikaners gave allegiance to an ethnic form of mobilization. This was particularly true for mainly middle-class Afrikaners during the 1970s. In fact there had been some integration already occurring within the different ethno-racial groups on the basis of class similarities. In other words, ethno-racial cleavages may not have been as deep as people thought since people were already transcending social cleavages.

Between 1970 and 1990, most subjectivities of whites changed "in ways which undermined the possibility of mobilizing them for the much larger scale war which would have been necessary to defend apartheid into the 1990s" (Hyslop J, 2000: 2). Most subjectivities, which were largely organized around a modernist and racist project by the state, became largely replaced by an individualist and consumerist identity.

Since 1948 and up to the 1970s the Nationalist Party attempted to build a stable socially ordered society around a racist and ethnic modernity. This they achieved by setting up a bureaucratic mechanism, which would subject blacks to administrative, spatial and

58 coercive control. Furthermore, they promoted a vision of the nation-state which had an ethnic character, with an Afrikaner identity at the center. In order to make this work, a

"non-reflexive submission to authority" (Hyslop) was required. This they successfully achieved during the 1960s. Most Afrikaners benefited from the material improvements which government policies brought about.

In addition, whilst the Nationalist government never fully managed to gain control over civil society by the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts made to control white social behavior. This was done in various ways, for instance by intensifying surveillance and regulation on the white population. In this regard an increasing attempt was made to protect whites against what was seen as behaviors that represented a "disintegrative effect on modernity". Thus, censorship was intensified: for example, The Beatles were banned from state radio, huge measures were introduced against drug use, and there was a clampdown on homosexuality. In addition, the government refused to introduce television throughout the 1960s mainly because it viewed it as a source of "unwanted

'liberal' influences" on its viewers.

Nevertheless, by the 1970s as a result of the shifts within the social structures of white society, which allowed them to interact more on a global level, there had been a transformation of white subjects. This came as a result of the collapse of the Afrikaner populist alliance, created during apartheid, which led to a series of splits within the party.

In this instance it made whites less protected from the globalized world and more vulnerable to its influences. This was an era that "coincided with the global rise of the forms of subjectivity associated with late modernity" (Hyslop quoting Giddens, 1991;

1995). This new subjectivity to a large extent influenced white South Africans and as

59 they emerged created 'lifestyles' which did not fit well with those who fought for apartheid.

By this time a strong and confident white middle class had emerged. This grouping had very little in common with those who supported the apartheid regime (e.g. farmers, civil servants, artisans and 'traditionalist' intellectuals). By the beginning of the 1970s government responded by changing its policies in small ways to meet the more market oriented aspirations of this new elite and in many ways started showing less support for and racial protection of the poorer whites. Moreover, middle and upper class Afrikaners and English speakers became more and more exposed to the influences of the globalizing world. In this sense Afrikaner and English whites' 'lifestyles' "changed in ways which created new forms of self-identity; less solidaristic, more consumerist, and more hedonistic" (Hyslop J; 2000: 3).

So, how did these new developments, mainly amongst white South Africans, interact with the global processes of the time? These processes had an immense impact on white

South Africans during the 1970s and 1980s: whether they wanted to embrace or resist them, they had to create new narratives of the self. This had to be in line with what was already happening in the world at large. There was a sense amongst most whites, mainly middle-class, of needing to explain themselves to the rest of the world. Nothing explained this change better than the coming of television in 1976. The coming of television introduced a new perspective on reality, particularly the way white South Africans viewed others, and the way they were viewed by others, especially in the US.

60 One television program that was particularly popular during this time was the Bill Cosby show. This program was mainly influential among white South Africans, even though it did influence other races as well. It showed that racial desegregation was not a threat, but that class boundaries were. In this sense "Bill Cosby had helped to turn the white South

African middle class from race warriors into class warriors" (2000: 4).

Accordingly, white South Africans by this time had become globalized consumers and had increasingly defined themselves in that way. Moreover, by seeing themselves as

'middle class' they were participating in certain styles of consumption, which were essentially defined by television images of American suburbia. This was crucial to the decline of active support for apartheid (2000: 4).

Consequently, more and more whites increasingly saw themselves not in terms of a collective. Insofar as group identity was claimed it was a 'middle class' identity; "but this was precisely an identity which conceived of itself as being composed of highly autonomous units" (2000: 5).

As the new middle class of the time, white South Africans followed global trends as in other Western societies. The new middle class adopted new ways of consumption and elevated the role of consumption practices and as a result led to the construction of a new middle class identity. Through highly individualized consumption, group boundaries become more fluid, in a sense weakening the sense of loyalty to status or ethnic group.

As a result most white Afrikaners wanted to distance themselves from Afrikaner nationalism and all the symbols attached to this movement, and rather to be linked to their new found identity that would be in line with being a 'modern' person. At the same

61 time they sought international acceptance (2000: 5). In sum, as result of their marginalization by the English, Afrikaners sought to develop for themselves a sense of nation or volk based on primordial notions of a group. However, not all Afrikaners adhered to this ideology, mainly those middle-class Afrikaners - and the latter grew in numbers and influence over time.

As a result of the apartheid policies, however, Afrikaners had sought to extend the notion of self-determination to other groups, for instance the Zulus.

4.4. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the Zulu Identity

Inkatha, as a cultural movement with political undertones (...) was established in 1922.

However, they only established themselves as a party i.e. the IFP in 1975. While the Zulu ethnic identity is a relatively recent social construction, fostered by Apartheid Bantustan policy and the use of common language, the IFP built its mobilization toward political gains (strong devolution toward KwaZulu-Natal in a federal state) at least partly on the

Zulu identity. On numerous occasions, Buthelezi spoke of the ANC plots, for instance,

"to eliminate KwaZulu entirely from South Africa. There is a campaign to smash the

Zulu sense of identity in a desperate attempt to make you obedient to those who want to destroy KwaZulu [...]. We were born Zulu South Africans and we will die Zulu South

Africans, and we have an historic responsibility to make our Zulu contribution to the emergence of a new, just, free, and prosperous South Africa, for this we will die"

(Barber, 1994: 73). At a more recent "cultural function", Buthelezi challenged the

KwaZulu-Natal premier, Sbu Ndebele, "to assert, affirm, recognize and protect his

Zuluness" (Mail&Guardian, January 23, 2005). In the same article Buthelezi argues that

62 political representatives need to state that they are Zulu and that they represent the interests of the Zulu nation. Furthermore, Buthelezi says, "it is our responsibility to preserve our Zuluness...let the rest of South Africa know that we are Zulus, and we will not let our Zuluness be destroyed" (Mail&Guardian, 2005).

Clearly, behind these sentiments from Buthelezi lies much, including historical agreements made between him and the then nationalist government, notably an agreement of self-determination for Zulus under a federalist system.

4.4.1. Buthelezi's Alternative to the Violence

As Johnston contends in the case of KwaZulu-Natal, the transitional violence was potentially destabilizing because of the high political competition between the ANC and the IFP for the allegiance of the African majority. The focus of the competition was the

Inkatha Freedom Party, the only party that could rival the ANC in this province in the arena of African politics. KwaZulu-Natal is however the only province where the IFP have a major foothold and which also defines the IFP's identity (Gutterigde & Spence

(eds.); 1997: 79).

Historically it is the only province where continuous reference has been made to ethnicity, manipulated by its leaders to gain control of the area. One of the challenges that the IFP presented to the ANC, as Johnston notes, is "the potential for ethnic mobilization in African politics is much greater than in other parts of the country. By claiming that his party, and the KwaZulu 'homeland' statelet which it dominated, stood in direct line of succession from the nineteenth-century Zulu kingdom, the IFP leader Chief Mangosothu

Buthelezi has drawn on a rich source of the contemporary Zulu monarchy and other

63 aspects of Zulu traditional life that have survived the depredations and adaptations of colonialism, white minority rule and modernization" (Johnston, 1997: 79). It comes as no surprise that Chief Buthelezi used the ethnic strategy primarily to gain control-and to consolidate support bases in preparation for the first non-racial elections (Mary De Haas and Paulus, Zulu).

Buthelezi offered a clear alternative to the NP approach by proposing a multi-racial federation. In 1981 a commission (The Buthelezi commission) he appointed proposed the integration of the white-controlled province of Natal and the KwaZulu homeland, to be run by an assembly elected by proportional representation and a multi-racial executive making decisions along power-sharing lines (Giliomee 2004). The then prime minister,

P.W. Botha, responded in the classic apartheid mode: "Buthelezi was welcome to investigate matters that concerned 'his country', but had no right to deal with matters under the control of central government" (2004: 65).

In 1979 Buthelezi fell out with the ANC in exile over the issue of sanctions and the armed struggle. "The ANC-Inkatha relationship deteriorated into bitter enmity, with the

ANC branding Buthelezi as a counter-revolutionary force. It correctly saw him as much more dangerous than the other homeland leaders, who were, it said, mere puppets"

(Giliomee, 604).

4.4.2. The Question of Traditional Leadership in Kwazulu-Natal

The incorporation of traditional leadership within the new constitution is still a contentious issue. Demanding that the Constitution be amended to recognize their sovereignty, they (traditional leaders) refused to talk to anyone other than the state

64 president. "There have been times when they were sure that the government had been persuaded to do their bidding. And there have been other times where they have declared

- perhaps tactically, in order to rally their followers - that they had reached the end of the road," that "there was never an intention to accommodate [their authority in] the making of the new South Africa" (Comaroff, 2004). In a footnote, Comaroff states that these were the words of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, in a speech made to rally Zulu support in the "fight for autonomy of the[ir] kingdom."

(Comaroff, 2004: 12)

In one of the leading newspapers in South Africa (Mail&Guardian, January 23, 2005), a title read; Buthelezi: Government 'obliterates' traditional leaders. In this article Donwald

Pressly contends that Buthelezi had told traditional leaders that he has long been concerned that the South African government lacks the resolve to address "the issue of the obliteration of the powers and functions of amakhosi [traditional leaders]" through the imposition of municipalities.

He further argued that the Traditional Leadership and Government Bill did not recognize the role of traditional leaders and "completely ignores the very notion of a Zulu nation, a

Zulu monarchy, and a Zulu Kingdom. The Zulu nation must be very concerned about this

Bill because it intends to collapse our nation into the broader unity of South

Africa...From today's denial of our Zulu nationhood, tomorrow will follow the denial of our Zuluness. In a few years, it is likely that features of our Zuluness will be denied and they will try to foist upon us a uniform sense of Africanism" (Mail&Guardian, 2005).

65 4.4.3. Instrumental Use of Ethnicity

In their analysis of identity construction in relation to political power and social order, De

Haas and Zulu argue that the elite in KwaZulu-Natal made strategic use of colonial assumptions about natural ethnicities to impose an identity on millions of people in

KwaZulu-Natal.

In a review of Courtney Jung's book, Then I was Black, Zegeye suggests that Jung, focusing on Zulu identity since the time of Shaka, argues that 'Zulu' presented a specific ethnic category with which people at various times have identified. However, this category has not been that important to most people living in KwaZulu-Natal, the majority of whom are considered Zulus. Until the 1980s, for instance, Zulu identities coexisted easily with affiliates like the ANC. Inkatha, the political party of the Zulu homeland, maintained close links with the liberation struggle and the ANC, even while claiming to represent the 'Zulu nation'. Thereafter, even though Inkatha claimed, and still claims, to represent the Zulus under a common ethnic identity, it was only successful in large parts of the rural areas and with a shifting urban minority.

In their argument De Haas and Zulu explore the ways in which the elite in KwaZulu-

Natal used ethnicity as a political strategy to gain political dominance in this area.

Furthermore, they argue that this elite has managed to impose an ethnic identity on millions of people in KwaZulu-Natal. " 'Zulu identity' is a terrain of contestation and manipulation on which many actors - Inkatha, the Bantustan government, the apartheid state, white Natalians, the trade unions, and the liberation movements - have played diverse parts" (De Haas & Zulu; 351). While the Zulu identity was certainly not clear-cut

66 or exclusive of other forms of identity among the population, the IFP rhetoric clearly had an impact on the way people perceived themselves and the others, especially in a context of territorialized ethnicity.

4.4.4. Hostel Violence

In the context of the violence on the Rand, it is clear that this violence definitely had an impact on the way people perceived themselves and others, especially in the context of territorialized ethnicity.

Whilst formal ethnic divisions have been dispensed with, ethnic and cultural identities have remained a coping mechanism in the hostile urban context. Hostels thus became an important target for boosting political support. "Inkatha's practice of politicizing ethnic affiliation and manipulating it in the contest for political power strikes a powerful chord within the migrant population. Many Zulu migrants are already drawn informally into

Inkatha structures through a system of patronage that operates in KwaZulu" (Simpson,

Mokwena and Segal 1990: 27). What further divided life within the hostels was the

"state-enforced principle of ethnic categorization within a hostel, which encouraged the development of robust ethnic identities" (1990: 27). However, while the Zulu identity was not as clear-cut or exclusive of other forms of identity among the population, the IFP rhetoric certainly had an impact on the way people perceived themselves and the others, especially in the context of territorialized ethnicity. Guelke for example quoted Patti

Waldmeir regarding conflict between the Zulus of Merafe hostel and the residents of

Mapetla, a Sotho area of Soweto as saying, "the tribal element of the problem was not simple, not just a question of Inkatha Zulus versus ANC Xhosas or Basotho. But it was

67 real, nonetheless. For despite the ANC's denials that ethnicity was a fact, local people always articulated their worries in tribal terms. When Mapetla got wind of an attack from the hostel, the cry went up, 'The Zulus are coming' - not Inkatha is coming. And at

Merafe hostel, residents complained that they were not welcome in Mapetla 'because we're Zulus' (Waldmeir, P. quoted by Guelke, 2000: 246 - 247).

In her paper, The Human Face of Violence: Hostel Dwellers Speak, Lauren Segal discusses the violence during the early part of the 1990s in Thokoza and Kathlehong on the East Rand. The violence in this area also became known as the "Transvaal War". She focuses particular attention on the responses of hostel dwellers themselves toward violence, who are the main protagonist in the violence, as opposed to other explanations of the violence, which always tend to portray hostel dwellers as 'warriors', 'blood-thirsty impis'.

What is of particular interest is the ethnic aspect of the violence in this area and how hostel dwellers came to use this ethnic identity to further their cause. The war on the East

Rand, particularly in the hostels, showed that Inkatha could easily draw on its ethnic/cultural and Zulu values, according to Segal. Workers were restricted to these hostels, which were organized along ethnic lines, to the extent that men from the same village or rural area occupied the same hostel. This naturally reproduced the rural and

'traditional' hierarchy in the urban setting (Thiven Reddy, 2000: 161).

Apart from the conflict in the areas just mentioned, based on ethnicity, in other parts of the country, particularly the Western Cape, groups were also seeking recognition during the transition.

68 4.5. Right Wing Groups and Other Movements

While it is apparent that the National Party (NP) moved progressively away from a strict consociational vision of South Africa to defend a federal dispensation of power,

Afrikaner nationalism was the mobilizing force behind the formation of the Afrikaner

Volksfront, "the umbrella right-wing alliance, [which] was formed with the goal of uniting and mobilizing the right-wing in the more emphatic pursuance of the goals of the

Afrikaner self-determination through engagement and negotiation", under the leadership of the former Chief of the Defence Force General Constant Viljoen (Grobbelaar, 1998).

Viljoen agreed to participate in the 1994 elections (as the leader of the Freedom Front26)

97 after the Bophuthatswana debacle of March 1993 and negotiated in exchange for participation in the elections an amendment to the Interim Constitution to include an article on the right of self-determination by any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, whether in a territorial entity within the Republic or in any other recognized way. A Volkstaat Council28 was established to investigate self-determination possibilities (Grobbelaar, 1998).

General Constant Viljoen left the Volksfront after the intervention of a wild bunch of much cruder racists from Eugene Terre' Blanche's Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) wrecked his plans. He was appalled by this fiasco and left for Cape Town to register a right-wing party of his own, the Freedom Front, to fight the elections and campaign for his cause by constitutional means. He won 7 seven seats in the election. 27 One of the ten independent tribal 'homelands' created under the apartheid government, under the leadership of Lucas Mangope. Mangope was refusing to allow the people of his apartheid creation to participate in the first democratic election of 1994, and as his civil servants rebelled and the administration began to fall apart he appealed to the Volksfront for help. 28 This council, - which consisted of 20 members, was recognized by the Interim Constitution, and was established_after the April 1994 elections. It was set up by the ANC government to look into the possibility of a Volkstaat or ethnic state (Giliomee, 2003: 660). The main reason for the creation of a Volkstaat was predominantly based on the socio-cultural criteria, such as Afrikaner identity and ethnicity, the preservation of a shared Afrikaner history, and a common language. The Council was later disband by the ANC, primarily on the basis that the new government could not entertain the idea that a group should have an ethnic state of its own. Moreover, most of the council members could not agree on where exactly they would want this ethnic state to be situated.

69 With a new government in power, many groups were seeking self-recognition. "Group identity as a driving force in South African politics can be seen in the efforts of some coloured people (KWB, the December 1st movement) to use the term 'coloured' as a symbol of collective identity against other groups, in particular white people and

Africans. The appeal to this sense of identity lies in their perception of marginalization, which, it could be argued, has continued into the democratic South Africa" (Zegeye:

341). Similarly one could argue that a recent movement like the Movement Against the

Domination of African Minority (MADAM) who want to change their identity from that of coloured to Khoisan, is in fact a result of feelings of growing marginalization within correctional services. Whether this group could challenge the state on a broader scale remains to be seen.

4.5.1. Kleurling Weerstands Beweging (Coloured Resistance Movement)

Claims by both Afrikaner and Zulu nationalists inspired other ethnic movements, such as the Kleurlings Weerstands Beweging (KWB) (Coloured Resistance Movement) asking for the protection of coloured ethnic rights so that at the eve of the 1994 elections, it was evident to most observers that ethnicity and race were to continue to play a role in the future of South Africa as changes with regards to identifications were likely to be slow.

While such identities were often seen as constructed (but not always, as primordial views on ethnicity are still suggested in South Africa), judged as negative and exclusive, and criticized as conflictual in nature, calls for their accommodation were widespread to avoid feelings of group discrimination. The only way to accommodate divergent groups

70 in South Africa was to construct a constitution whereby all groups could be accommodated.

4.6. South African Constitution -1996

The new South African constitution has been described by some as very modernist,

Eurocentric and liberal: individual rights take precedence over all other claims. It does however, protect "traditional beliefs" (John and Jean Comaroff, Law and Social inquiry,

2004: 29, 3).

The 1996 constitution was fashioned on the field of political battle, in cross fires produced by forces of transformation and forces of preservation (Bekker and Leilde,

2003). While the term multiculturalism is not used in South African policy-making circles (McAllister 1996), the constitution offers many protections to cultural communities (although subject to individual rights). Minority political representation in the national government was included in the interim constitution (and gave birth to the

Government of National Unity) but it was excluded from the final text. However, the constitution recognizes eleven official languages and the state is obliged to take practical and positive measures to elevate the status of indigenous languages (section 6(2), SAC).

The Pan South African Language Board (PANSALB) has been established to that effect and Article 29 (2) of the Bill of Rights asserts that "everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that education is reasonably practicable."

A state commission for the promotion and protection of the rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities to make recommendations concerning the establishment or

71 recognition of relevant cultural councils for South African communities (section 185,

South African Constitution), was established in 2003. Customary law is to be applied when it does not infringe on individual rights and Muslim personal law is in the process of being recognized. Religious pluralism rather than secularism is entrenched. Traditional authorities have been given a role in the political system. Finally, Act. 108, art. 23529 provides for the right to self-determination (but not of secession) of communities sharing a cultural and linguistic heritage.

4.7. Reflecting On the Voting Pattern - 1994-2004

To most observers cultural differences are a fact in South Africa and were expected to continue even after the first democratically elected government took office in 1994. This impression was reinforced by the first democratic elections of 1994 when voting patterns followed lines of group solidarity, indicating that South Africans were still trapped in race and ethnic categories. However, this seems to have changed over subsequent elections. During the 1999 elections some commentators described the election, as a

'racial census', whereby "the dominant explanation is one that suggests that voting patterns in South Africa resemble a racial census because racial and ethnic political identities predominate among the citizenry" (Habib and Naidu quoting Giliomee). They continued to argue that "South Africans are seen to vote, not on the basis of their interests and opinions, but rather through the prism of ethnic and racial loyalties." ("Election '99: was there a 'coloured' and 'Indian' vote?" - (Adam Habib & Sanusha Naidu, 1994: 190).

29 On Self-determination - (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act. 108 of 1996) 235. "The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this Constitution, does not preclude, within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion of the right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way, determined by national legislation."

72 Such observations were not applicable during the 2004 elections. Seemingly, the ideal of an Afrikaner ethnic state died with the dissolution of the Volkstaat council. The only concrete reminder of such a dream remains Orania, a small town in the Northern Cape whose population of about 600 people has not increased since its inception. The only party defending 'Afrikaner rights', the FF+ received 0.89% in the 2004 national elections against 2.2% in the 1994 elections. Similarly the PAC, which scored 1.2% in 1994, received 0.73% of the votes in 2004. One of the reasons for the poor performance of the

PAC in the elections can be attributed to the fact that the PAC had a more racially militant, confrontational stance, which is highlighted in the slogan 'One settler, one bullet' (Heribert Adam, 1995: 472). While by 1996, the IFP's militant Zulu nationalist rhetoric and mobilization had disappeared, according to Piper (2002), in favor of a policy of cooperation with the ANC, the IFP's election results show a decrease in vote share from 10.5% in 1994 to 6.97% nationally as well as a sharp decrease provincially. Finally, the Western Cape, once the bastion of the National Party (NP), mainly on the grounds of the so-called 'coloured vote', is now dominated by the ANC, putting an end to speculations of racial bloc voting - in this instance against a group rather than for one.

It had become clear that in 2004, the New National Party (NNP) no longer had a major stronghold in coloured communities and other communities, where it had previously lend very strong support. However, recently the party has shrunk from its gargantuan majorities of the 1970s and 1980s to 20, 4% in 1994, 18, 3% in the municipal elections of

1996, 13, 3% in a 1998 opinion poll, and to a miserable 7% in the 1999 general elections.

(Allister Sparks: 133). Moreover, during the 2004 general elections the party lost its lead in the Western Cape legislature and won less than 2% support nationally, with only seven

73 seats in the National Assembly (Mail&Guardian online, March 2005). Consequently, it totally disbanded as a party and now falls under the umbrella of the ANC.30

In another article published in the Mail & Guardian (The Mind of the Voter), it is argued that South Africans are not just casting ballots along racial and ethnic lines. According to

Dr. Thabisi Hoeane, a political science lecturer at Rhodes University, to see South

Africans as merely trapped in racial and ethnic politics is too simplistic. He argues that economic and class considerations are better explanations for voting behavior. On the contrary, there are others, such as Roger Southall, executive director of democracy and governance at the Human Sciences Research Council, who argue, "poor people stay away from the polls because their expectations of democracy have not been met". He further argues that it will be the have-nots who would be unlikely to vote. This trend is reflected in the latest 2006 municipal elections, where the Democratic Alliance (DA) showed a tremendous increase in voters support in the Western Cape (42%), relative to the ANC

(37%). This increase in voting for the DA came from across the racial lines, and reflects the growth of class - based voting.

4.8. So What Happened Between 1994 and 2004?

Now that voting no longer seems to be based on race or ethnic identity only, and perhaps even primarily, why did political violence disappear? Here I will examine the reasons for the disappearance of political violence, particularly as it pertains to the Zulu identity.

Mail&Guardian website: www.mg.co.za - March 1, 2005.

74 It now seems that racial and ethnic threats seem to belong to a distant past, only unless these identities become mobilize for political purposes, which are not the case at the moment in South Africa. Instead, violent crime which takes on extraordinary proportions captures the nation's attention (I will focus on this in the next chapter) (Bekker & Leilde,

2003). So what happened between 1994 and 2004? Several potential responses come to mind: "ethnicity/race never mattered; ethnicity/race mattered but does not matter anymore; ethnicity/race matters but is not acted upon" (Bekker & Leilde, 2006 forthcoming).

According to Piper for instance (2000), such changes can be explained by two factors in the case of the IFP/Zulu identity: firstly, "the inclusion of the IFP in the democratic government made old strategies redundant"; secondly, "while a widespread sense of

Zuluness exists, the meanings attached to it vary to the extent that the Zulu nation cannot exist. Thus the Zulu nationalism of the transition was an elite-driven political nationalism prosecuted without a popularly imagined Zulu nation" (Piper, 2003: 73). In other words, such ethnic identity is not expressed because it was never there in the first place.

Other authors have argued that ethnic and cultural extra-constitutional (and potentially violent) claims are not put forward because cultural, linguistic and religious minorities have largely been accommodated in the new South African constitutional order, hence limiting possible feelings of grievances. For instance, Bekker and Leilde (2003) assert that:

"It would appear that multiculturalism both as a policy and an outcome has had a

measure of success in the new South Africa. Minority groups demanding

75 recognition of their identity and accommodation of their cultural differences

continue to use civil society institutions to challenge the state in search of such

identities and of accommodation. In urban-industrial South Africa and much of

commercial agriculture, the new institutions of state and of corporatism have

provided policies for implementation of which has accommodated both the new

and the old elite, particularly in terms of cultural differences. Neither need to

mobilize rank-and-file on ethnic or racial terms."

Furthermore, as mentioned before identity is a social construct depending on a specific historical and social context. It is likely that ten years into the new democracy, social circumstances have been transformed so that advantages and disadvantages are no longer perceived in racial terms exclusively. There is no denying that South Africans continue to see themselves and those around them in racial terms, all the more so since residential desegregation is slow (Bekker and Leilde, 2000). Competition over scarce public resources continues to a certain extent to be articulated in racial terms, especially in the province of the Western Cape, which used to be a "Coloured Preferential Area" during apartheid. Perceptions of racial discriminatory practices are still common in the workplace, described as a 'neo-apartheid workplace regime' (Von Holdt) (2003).

"Further legislation such as the Coloured Labor Preference policy31 simultaneously created a hierarchy over Africans as well as ensured a ready cheap labor force for the clothing, textile, canning and farming industries of the Western Cape" (Elaine Salo,

2004: 7). In sum then, even though most ethnic identities have been accommodated within the constitution, South Africans still view themselves in racial terms. In the province of the

Western Cape, on the Cape Flats, mainly amongst the poorer communities, the perception is that they are worse-off then they were before, and their struggle for resources will be hard and their future uncertain.

4.9. Conclusion

Many analysts have tried to explain political violence after the release of Nelson

Mandela, which occurred in 1990. Most have agreed, however, that the violence that occurred particularly between 1990 and 1994 had multiple causes and that there cannot be one simple explanation for it. Accordingly, the focus of this chapter has been to highlight at least one aspect of the violence, i.e. the contribution of ethnic and racial identities.

In trying to make sense of the political violence in South Africa, in the period between

1990 and 1994, one has to look at the Nationalist Party policies - i.e. apartheid or separate development - and what the implications of these policies were for the rest of the South

African society.

Many analysts have studied the origins of apartheid or separate development, which has led to various interpretations. Some have suggested that its origins lie in British imperialism and colonization.

31 The Coloured Labor Preference Policy legislated that coloured labor be given work preference over Africans in the Western Cape. In this way Africans were denied residence in the Western Cape and the urbanization of Africans was contained (Goldin 1987) until 1985, when the pass laws were removed from the statute books.

77 How did these different groups, formulated by the apartheid government, become influential within their own territories to promote their own identities through the politicalization of ethnic groups, such as the Zulus, Afrikaners, etc?

This was particularly prevalent in the context of the formation of Afrikaner nationalism and the subsequent development of policies that infiltrated all aspects of South African society. This included the creation of the Bantustans or 'homeland' system, as well as the division along racial lines in South Africa, e.g. whites, coloureds, Indians and blacks.

However, while during the transition and post-apartheid period one would have expected violence to break out, this did not happen. For a variety of reasons the construction of a new constitution brought all the divergent groups together. Most groups were accommodated within the constitution. Moreover, while the first democratic election was dominated by racial voting, and this pattern continued through the 1999 election, one sees the 2004 elections clearly breaking away from ethnic or racial voting.

Part of the political violence that was so endemic during the 1990s was due to the history of apartheid policies, instituted and implemented under the Nationalist government at the time - in particular its separate development policies. This was the focus of the development of ethnic and racial groups. Most of the political violence that occurred during the 1990s cannot be laid solely at the feet of apartheid government, but however should be looked at as the product of apartheid policies of separate development, that led to the politicalization of divergent ethnic groups/national groups.

Other right wing groups used the transition to promote their interests, as Guelke argues,

to add the racial and ethnic dimension to the violence is not to deny its political character.

78 "Both the violence of APLA and that of the extreme right had both an explicit racial character while also having an instrumental political purpose. That is to say, APLA's violence had both a powerful anti-white motivation, while it was also an attempt to advance the cause of the PAC politically. Similarly, the violence of the extreme right was both anti-black and intended to derail the transition" (Guelke, 247).

Some analysts continue to be cautious regarding the fate of a peaceful democracy in

South Africa. For example, Grobbelaar argued in 1998 that "the white right-wing should be understood to embody and symbolize not only the historical guardianship of the

Afrikaner nationalist dream but also its contemporary striving for self-determination, and hence a threat to the present state" (1998). As recently as 2002, the Boeremag, a right- wing Afrikaner organization whose ideology includes the infamous "Israel Vision" that sought to trace Afrikaners to one of the lost tribes of Israel, planted several bombs.

Accusations of hate speeches were invoked from several sides e.g. from the Freedom

Front (FF) against the use of the slogan "kill the Boer, kill the farmer" by the Landless

People's Movement; and against the musician Mbongeni Ngema's controversial song

AmaNdiya on South African Indians. Yet in many ways, the post-apartheid era has seen remarkable success in accommodating divisions of politicized ethnicity and race.

Now that we have looked at the decline of political violence and how the main divergent groups have been politically accommodated through the implementation of a new constitution, let us turn our attention to the rise of criminal violence.

79 Chapter 5: Discussion

"Gangs formation in Cape Town 'has been a survival strategy for the poor. A

result of grinding poverty, social exclusion, unemployment and dislocation caused

by apartheid forced removals, gangs have been a powerful organizing principle

for the communities of the Cape Flats....disillusioned by political parties,

abandoned by activists that run civic associations, are people returning to gangs as

a strategy of survival in an environment of grinding poverty, social exclusion,

unemployment and threats of dislocation through evictions?" (Ashwin Desai,

2004: 25).

5.1. Introduction: The New Elite and Post-Apartheid South Africa Political Economy

The previous chapter detailed the historical developments of ethnicity and race in South

Africa. I suggested that by the construction of these identities, which were viewed by the nationalists as fixed some of the political violence during the transition period was related to ethnic and racial tensions, mainly amongst Zulu traditionalists and Afrikaner nationalists. However, by 1996 the new government developed a new constitution whereby all minority groups were accommodated, which to a large extent explains the decrease in political violence. Moreover, I argued that since the 1970s some social divisions already overlapped. However, violence has not disappeared. The period between 1994 and 2004 saw unprecedented levels of criminal violence. This despite the fact that criminal violence has always been part of South African society - some even refer to it as a culture of violence. In post-apartheid South Africa, the adoption of a neo-liberal economic agenda has had serious implications for the country, mainly those large sections of the population outside the benefits of economic progress, viz. the poor and the underclass. What about their identity construction?

South Africa only recently fully entered the global community, at least in political and diplomatic terms. Having been a pariah state in international relations for thirty years due to various UN and other resolutions passed against the Apartheid regime, it has now become a full participant in the global system. While economically South Africa was born out of trade relations between the North and the South - first as a stopover on the colonial trade route and then as a major minerals producer for colonial empires - the end of apartheid clearly accelerated its incorporation in global economic and financial processes. In fact, the South African economy has become increasingly dependent on the global economy in the last decade, harboring numerous international companies in search of cheaper labor (such as BMW or Volkswagen), bank headquarters, and increasingly attracting international tourism. However, the majority of its citizens are still waiting for the benefits supposedly associated with globalization. While it is common to argue that confronted with global processes, the nation-state has lost its prerogatives and is thus unable to counteract global forces; some analysts have argued that the South African political economy is the direct consequence of internal choices made by the new political and economic leadership. This chapter will investigate both external and internal dynamics that are shaping South Africa's political economy and draw some conclusions in terms of democratization in this country and what the implications for identity formation within the Western Cape are.

81 5.2. A Nation-State Incapable Of Challenging Global Processes?

According to J. and J. Comaroff (2000), "neoliberal capitalism, in its triumphal, all encompassing global phase, offers no-alternative to laissez-faire; nothing else - no other ideology, no other political economic system - seems plausible. The primary question left to public policy is how to succeed in the "new" world order. Under its hegemony the social is dissolved..." (2000: 15). According to Castells, "while global capitalism thrives, and nationalist ideologies explode all over the world, the nation-state, as historically created in the Modern Age, seems to be losing its power, although (...) not its influence"

(1997). Indeed, globalization threatens the whole structure of the state as it used to be known and its capacity to formulate and implement independent policies.

"Bypassed by global networks of wealth, power and information, the modern nation-state has lost much of its sovereignty (...) the instrumental capacity of the nation-state is decisively undermined by globalization of core economic activities, by globalization of media and electronic communication, and by globalization of crime. The nation-state is increasingly powerless in controlling monetary policy, deciding budget, organizing production and trade, collecting its corporate taxes, and fulfilling its commitments to provide social benefits. In sum, it has lost most of its economic power" (Castells, 1997).

Examples of state limitations range from the recent financial crises around the world marked by states' inability to prevent them, to a situation where 'most states are finding it impossible to meet the material demands placed on them or to carry out effective economic development policies: few can adequately house, feed, school and ensure the health of their populations' according to Comaroff (1996). According to Appadurai,

82 (1990) in countries such as Mexico and Brazil, "international lending influences national politics to a very large degree".

It appears that in the era of globalization, national governments are too small to handle global forces, yet too big to manage people's lives. Indeed, "modern developments in transportation, social communications, technology, and industrial organization have produced pressures at one and the same time for larger political organizations and for smaller ones" according to Watts - a process which further weakens states (Watts, 2001).

The state's attempt to reassert its power in the global arena by developing supranational institutions further undermines its sovereignty and its capacity to represent its territorially rooted constituencies, inducing what Habermas called a 'legitimation crisis'.

However, global processes are not detrimental to everybody. Castells distinguishes between the elites and the masses: "the network society...is characterized by the transformation of material foundations of life, space and time, through the constitution of a space of flows and of timeless time as expressions of dominant activities and controlling elites" (1997: 1). The network society and its new form of social organization is "diffusing throughout the world, creating wealth and inducing poverty, spurring greed, innovation and hope, while simultaneously imposing hardship and instilling despair"

(1997: 2). Thus, he argues, social polarization is on the rise everywhere. Bauman (1996) expresses the same argument with his metaphor of the "tourist" and the "vagabond".

While the tourist partakes and takes advantage of the global economy, the vagabond, "the flawed consumer", is left behind by the individualization of wealth and the disappearance of collective and societal responsibility induced by globalization.

83 The elite is the minority few made up principally of the multinational corporations, which increasingly can "dictate the terms of competition" (Nyamnjoh, 2000: 4) and constitute the core of the world economy (Castells, 1998: 4). The elite is also constituted by the consumers who can afford to be part of the "imagined lifestyles groups of consumers" created by globalization, consumption being the main vehicle for the spreading of global culture.

The masses on the other hand are the impoverished majority. Castells (1998: 7) describes the world population the following way: "the global system of production is populated simultaneously by extremely valuable and productive individuals and groups, and by people (or places) that are not, and not any longer, even if they are physically there". The latter constitute the "people, and territories, who have lost value for the dominant interests that prevail in informational capitalism, some of them because they offer little contribution as either producers or consumers, others because they are uneducated or functionally illiterate, others because they become sick, or mentally unfit...The fourth world of social exclusion of "disconnected locales" exists everywhere, albeit in different proportion" (1998: 7-8). They constitute the increasing majority affected by layoffs, lack of basic social services, crime and poverty, whose plight and resentments against corporate globalization have been voiced in the last few years in Seattle, Genoa or Porto

Alegre. The masses are the ones who suffer deeply from the end of societal solidarity and the demise of the interventionist state consequential to globalization. Because of the fact that states are bypassed by global flows and forced into neo-liberal economic strategies, welfare states come under attack, regulations break down and the social contract, wherever it existed, is fundamentally challenged (Castells, 1998: 7). However, not all

84 developing countries experience the negative effects of globalization. Countries such as

China and India for instance, have had much more positive experiences as a result of globalization, though still with highly polarized impacts. In China for example, even though it's ruled by a top leadership of a single party, its grip on the media, economy and population has slackened in the recent years; it has been participating in international trade, receiving international investments and technology. To this extent it has benefited greatly in economic terms (Brawley M. 2003: 133). India has also experienced significant growth as a result of globalization. Over and above its technological advancement, it has also made significant strides in, for instance, "business process outsourcing (BPO), which is everything from answering a phone, to writing software and running a human resource department" (Thomas Friedman interviewed by Nayan Chanda, editor of YaleGlobal

Online: 2006). So, in what ways has globalization impacted South Africa?

5.3. Globalization and the South African Political Economy

Globalization is a "deeply and starkly inegalitarian" process (Nyamnjoh, 2000: 4) which affects the most vulnerable and marginalizes further southern economies. According to

Castells, "technological dependency .. .becomes the fundamental obstacle to development in our world" and "certainly, the diffusion of information and communication technology is extremely uneven, (as) Africa...is being left in a technological apartheid" (1998: 2).

Similarly, Nederveen Pieterse (2000: 130) argues "there has been a marked downturn in participation in the world economy by developing countries since the beginning of the

1980s. In this context, what is at issue are differences at multiple levels: material differences and technological gap(s) ...; transnational economic regimes; power differentials relating to geopolitics, security and prestige". As a consequence, far from

85 being on the decrease, the gap between richer and poorer countries is widening' in 1960 per capita GDP in the richest 20 countries was 18 times that in the poorest 20 countries.

By 1995 this gap has widened to 37 times' (Alexander, 2001: 58).

While increasing the North/South divide, globalization simultaneously deepens inequalities inside countries as global processes most negatively affect the masses of the poor. In a similar vein, David Renton argues that globalization not only "intrudes widely

[but] that it intrudes deeply, intensifying work, cutting the welfare state, privatizing space and services, and expanding inequalities" (David Renton, 2003: 223). In this regard, globalization has had a tremendous impact on South Africa's economy in terms of employment, wages, environment, and criminality.

Increasingly, the divide in South African society can be described as socio-economic rather than racial or ethnic in nature as globalization and subsequent neo-liberal economic policies have had tremendous impacts on the country's economy.

5.4. The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP)

The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) established in 1994 emanated from

COSATU, and its most powerful affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), which envisaged the program to be a socio-economic benchmark against which the new democratic government would be judged. Many members of the democratic movement, including the ANC, contributed to the document. Later this document served as the

ANC's election manifesto in 1994.

86 The RDP was based on several principles' . In addition, it had five major policy programmes whose aim was to correct the most unbearable conditions created by apartheid among blacks. The fifth major programme, one of the most fundamental amongst others33, was to essentially reconstruct the economy. Another major principle stated in the RDP was that the new democratic government must play a leading and enabling role in guiding and leading the economy and market towards reconstruction and development. The document warned that policies concentrating solely on promoting economic growth would heighten existing inequalities, perpetuate mass poverty, and soon stifle economic growth. Thus the government's task was to integrate economic growth with economic reconstruction and social development (Sampie Terreblanche, 2003: 108).

One of the main qualities of the RDP document was that it clearly describes all the distortions and injustices that had become part of South African society during racial capitalism and white rule. After the 1994 election, the RDP became 'the centerpiece of its

(the ANC's) socio-economic policy' (quoted by Blumenfield 1997: 3 in Terreblanche).

In the 1994 election, the RDP had managed to mobilize over 60% of the electorate behind the ANC alliance. It was of symbolic importance, since it formed part of the nation- building and healing process in a country that was ravaged by deep inequality, division and conflict. However, the RDP encountered a number of problems with regards to its

32 Reconstruction and Development Programme: a policy framework, Johannesburg, 1994, Firstly, the RDP required an integrated and sustainable policy programme; secondly, the policy must be people driven; thirdly, the process of development is conditional on peace and security; fourthly, to integrate growth, reconstruction, redistribution and reconciliation into a unified programme so that it meets basic needs and help build infrastructure; fifthly, as a requirement, both state and society must be democratized; and finally, the process needs to be assessed on a continual basis. 33 Meeting the basic needs of most blacks living below the minimum living level (MLL) (i.e. at least 17 million), develop the neglected human resources of mainly Africans, democratize state and society, and finally implement the RDP.

87 implementation. While its main aims were the alleviation of poverty and reconstructing the economy, it did not have a detailed programme as to how it was going to do this.

Moreover, one of its main deficiencies was that it assigned a strategic role to the state, in what was thought to be a developmental state; however, soon after the ANC took power it became evident that the capacity for a developmental state did not yet exist. There were allegations of fraud and corruption, evidence of bureaucratic incompetence and unnecessary red tape in most of the projects (Terreblance, 2003: 109).

The main objective of the RDP was to restructure the economy, given the 'deep-seated structural crisis'. This idea of 'fundamental restructuring' of the economy was initiated with the conviction that South African capitalism was not a 'normal' or 'social- democratic' kind of capitalism, but that it was a remnant of colonial and racial capitalism that had been in place since the start of the 20th century and had been sustained through the processes of segregation, white domination, and apartheid. Furthermore, it realized that if it did not (re) structure the economy, those who were in the 'commanding heights' would remain there and fundamentally the economy would remain unrestructured (2003:

110).

Eight years after its publication the RDP was generally regarded as a miserable failure.

However, its demise came much earlier in the white paper on reconstruction and development, which was published in November 1994. This paper departed considerably from the original document, and included among other features the introduction of fiscal prudence - the notion of redistribution was dropped - as the government's major role in the economy was reduced to managing the transformation. It has been argued further that since the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) policy was adopted in 1996,

88 the RDP project was in effect abandoned. Moreover, some analysts have argued that the

RDP was only an electioneering strategy by the ANC. However, what finally did put the last nail in the RDP coffin, according to Terreblanche, was not only the lack of will within the ANC to fully implement the programme which consequently led to its downgrading but also the ANC's discovery that after 1994 that it did not have the necessary bureaucratic capacity to fundamentally restructure the economy and hence had to leave it to the market to do that. The RDP Office continued for some time but was eventually closed in March 1996 by then - President Mandela (2003: 112).

5.5. South Africa and Its Macro-Economic Policy: Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)

Democratic South Africa has certainly embraced globalization and the neo-liberal agenda. Within two years of transition, the government - under pressure from the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and threatened with capital flight - settled on the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR, 1996) policy.34

This is one of the clearest indicators of the acceptance of the imperatives of globalization in South Africa and has been criticized for its adherence to western-technicist economic models35 by ANC allies (notably COSATU36 and the SACP37) as well as economic experts. According to this policy, poverty and underemployment will be alleviated by job-creating economic growth and such growth will be made possible through an

(international) investor-friendly environment. The 'growth-through-redistribution'

34 Jacobs, S. article in The Nation. A neo-liberal macroeconomic plan that promotes an "open economy" with relaxed exchange controls, foreign investment and privatization as motors of growth. 35 What T. Mbeki calls South Africa's efforts «to stay within the confines of the rules ». See T. Mbeki, Address to the Commonwealth Club, World Affairs Council and US/SA Business Council Conference, 24 May 2000. 36 COSATU is the biggest labour union in South Africa.

89 strategy of the early transition has been replaced by a 'redistribution-through-growth' economic policy. Such a policy has already had tremendous negative effects on the poor majority, as political choices in South Africa, according to X. Mangcu, "are depoliticised and given the aura of technical truth. Public policies that get implemented are those backed by "growth coalitions" which span government, business, media and other interest groups - the best organized and financed sectors of society - which shape national consensus on priorities" (quoted by Comaroff, 2000: 15). A tightly controlled macroeconomic balance - deficit reduction, keeping inflation low, privatization, tax cuts and phasing out exchange controls - has taken precedence over redistribution (Cheru,

2001). Such a policy was certainly welcomed and supported by both the IMF and the

World Bank, and 'the government was further encouraged to repeal the labor law to make the economy competitive in world markets and to attract foreign investment into the country' (2001: 516). However, a state that seeks to strengthen its position in the global market can hardly be a welfare state. It has to position itself favorably on the "social cost competition" scale. As a result of the GEAR policy - privatization and the pursuit of an investor-friendly environment - 500,000 people lost their jobs between 1994-2000, a good number being among the low-qualified workers employed by multinational corporations. They are the victims of both "capital's vast indifference to their fate and the state's inability to counteract this lack of interest" (Sharp, 1998: 6). Simultaneously,

"South Africa is seeing only a little trickle of investment" (Castells, reported in the

Sunday Independent 1) and the growth rate continues its downward spiral. According to

Gibb, 'the performance of the South African economy during the past decade has been poor, with the growth rate declining to a level below the rate of population increase'

The South African Communist Party.

90 (1998: 294). More recently reports by the Mail & Guardian suggest that, "investment growth is anticipated to be between 9% and 10% a year over the next 3 years."38

Furthermore, according to estimate statistics from Stats South Africa shows that the economy grew by 5% in 2005.

They further argue that the "South African economy is expected to grow by 4.9% this year, dipping to 4.7% in 2007 before reaching 5.2% in 2008."39 Moreover, president

Thabo Mbeki's latest state of the nation address (2006),40 quoting from the Grant

Thornton International Business Owners Survey, 80% of South Africa's business owners are optimistic about the year ahead, making them the third most optimistic business group internationally. Moreover, the First National Bank and the Bureau for Economic

Research in South Africa, reported that consumer confidence index is at its highest in 25 years (T. Mbeki, State of the Nation Address: 3 February 2006). In sum, as Trevor

Manuel put it, "the economic outlook is exceedingly favorable - more promising since its been since the last 40 years."41

Nevertheless, even though there seems to be more confidence in the economy and in the government as whole, improvements, have been patchy. In fact, South Africa's embrace of multilateral trade has clearly increased inequalities and the number of people living below the poverty line. According to Gibb, world food prices are predicted to increase as a result of agricultural reforms necessitating an end to export subsidies. Such a trend is already obvious in South Africa, where, coupled with the rand's devaluation, basic food

38 Jacques Keet, 'Manuel upbeat about economic future'. Mail & Guardian, 15 February 2006. 39 Thebe Mabanga, 'Economy a go-go'. Mail & Guardian, 16 February 2006. 40 Thabo Mbeki's 2006 State of the Nation's address, can be view at www.gov.za 41 Trevor Manuel's Annual Budget Speech, February 2006.

91 supply has become out of reach for the rural poor, leading to increasing famine levels in certain areas of the country.

Furthermore, WTO-sponsored trade liberalization symbolized by the Uruguay Round has had negative effects on certain industries and regions, e.g. those lacking mineral wealth.

The economy of Cape Town for instance was largely based on labor-intensive industries such as the textile/clothing, and footwear industries and as a result of increased international competition from countries where labor is cheaper (e.g. China),42 a lot of people, mainly coloured women have lost their jobs, leading to a regional unemployment rate of 40% (reaching 80% in some areas of the Cape Flats such as Manenberg according to Steven Robins).4 In the absence of protective welfare nets, such a situation has had dramatic social consequences including increased criminality and gangsterism. Indeed according to Desai, most poor South African households, i.e. more than 13, 8 million people, do not qualify for any social security transfers. This means that the poor have had to rely largely on themselves for survival (2003: 18), creating a new social apartheid.

Corporate globalization around the world has pushed toward lowering un-skilled - replaceable - worker wages while increasing those of upper-management and professionals - the elite few described by Castells. According to Alexander, 'in South

A recent article in the Business Day reported that cheap Chinese imports to South Africa, underpinned by a weak currency, low labor costs and state subsidies, grew 80% in 2001-02, 196% in 2002-03 and 88% in 2003-04. Consequently, some factories had to close down - 24 since July 2002 - and thousands of jobs have been lost - 35 500 in 2005. This is according to figures provided by the Democratic Alliance (DA). Business Day, March 11, 2005. 43 A recent article - Rand's Winners & Losers, suggests the strengthening of the rand is having devastating consequences on exporters, particularly in the Western Cape's clothing and textile industry. According to the executive director of the Cape Clothing Association, 15 companies had closed in the past 12 months, which was partly due to the strong rand. In December 2003 alone, four companies shut their doors and a further two factories closed in January 2004. The decline of the clothing industry has been occurring gradually. In October 1995, this sector employed more than 50 000 employees, and by May 2004 it had

92 Africa pay and earning inequalities have expanded since the end of apartheid'

(Alexander: 2001). A study from the Labor Research service shows that 'pretax profits in their sample of listed companies rose 52% in 2002 as the rand's depreciation spurred export growth. The earnings of executive directors mirrored this growth, rising just over

22%. Fees paid to non-executive director's rose 19%. But workers' minimum wages rose just...O, 41%' ('Salary divide puts workers even further behind', Cape Times, 24/03/03).

In fact according to Cheru, "South Africa's Gini-coefficient of 0.58 makes it second only to Brazil, which at 0.63 has the highest level of inequality among similar middle-income countries" (2001: 505).44 In addition, at a micro- or local level, South Africa's dependency on international capital has had a direct influence on the structure of the

South African space. While rising unemployment among the urban poor foreclosed any move toward residential desegregation, global (as well as national) capital continues to flow to white middle-class parts of its major cities, where the crime rate is still manageable and infrastructures already developed, polarizing urban spaces even further into first world suburbs vs. third world shanty-town landscapes. In turn, such a situation has direct, pernicious consequences on the environment as the poor are forced to live on land highly unsuitable for occupation.

While the poor are excluded socially and economically from South African formal society, they are also excluded spatially from such society, enclosed as they are in third shrunk to just over 33 000. In the last four years, the industry lost more than 5 000 jobs. (Website article published in the Cape Argus, June 9, 2004). 44 The Gini-coefficient measures the distribution of a country's national income. "In a perfectly equal society 10% of the population will receive 10% of the income; 20% of the population will receive 20% of income, etc. For such a society the Gini-coefficient will be zero". The Gini-coefficient varies between 0 and 1 - the closer to 1, the more unequal a society; the closer to 0, the more equal a society.) {Website article: allAfrica.com - South Africa: Inequality a Threat to Social Stability, July 23, 2004).

93 world shantytowns, eluded by both national and global capital. The northern elite, embodied by the tourist, has yet another negative effect on the masses of South Africa.

The tourist fashions the world according to his/her own wishes. Bauman argues that

"whatever the intrinsic meanings of the sites he visits, whatever their "natural" location in the "order of things," meanings and locations may be pushed aside; they are allowed into the tourist's world solely at the tourist's discretion" (1996: 53).

South Africa is becoming a favorite destination for the northern tourist, and tourism is increasingly seen as a priority sector for economic growth, as is shown by "the government's (...) announcement that it is setting up an international marketing council to co-ordinate efforts to promote South Africa" (Sunday Independent 2). But South

Africa is not what the tourist seeks; instead, it is what the tourist searches for that transforms South Africa into a commodity for touristic consumption (Nyamnjoh, 2000:

28). This is quite obvious in the rise of sex tourism and subsequent exploitation of young children as a consequence of what Barber calls the 'globalization of vices'. Recent reports estimate that the overall disappearance of children in South Africa, that includes the sex trade industry, could be as high as 1 700 a year (Mail&Guardian, October 14 to

20, 2005). In a less explicit fashion, according to Steven Robins, the new rainbow tourism reproduces both the essentialized Africans of the tribal discourse of apartheid and the vision the North holds of Africa. "Ethnic villages such as Shakaland and Kagga

Kamma, where international tourists flock to photograph semi-clad Zulu and "Bushmen", are the more obvious manifestations of this new South African multi-cultural tourism"

(2000: 6). Robins gives several examples of these tourist-oriented strategies that end up

94 reifying the "exotic" and obscuring the "mundane social realities of the urban landscapes" (2000: 3) or "deflecting attention away from the banality of radicalized poverty and class differentiation" (2000: 6). One of these strategies, according to Robins, is embodied in the interest Cape Town's Urban Conservation Unit shows in the cultural landscape and especially the identification of "sacred places" such as Xhosa circumcision initiation rites. This is how the majority poor of South Africa are indeed sacrificed on the altar of global tourism: it has become more important to clear a land reserved for initiation ceremonies from its squatters than to provide shelter for the very same people.

In the same way as Nyamnjoh (2000: 27) describes the way "African peasants have been forced to pose as custodians of a tradition of which few, least of all the elite, are proud" despite the fact that "villagers aren't interested in preserving tradition any more than their urban counterparts are", the same goes for South Africa: people have to be "exotic" despite themselves. And while the masses are accorded, constitutionally, cultural essentialist rights in the name of multiculturalism (or tourists' preferences), they are denied the most basic human rights (of housing for instance).

At a micro-level, another negative effect of tourism in South Africa is that millions of

Rands are pumped into beefing up security at the Waterfront (a tourist-attractive shopping mall in Cape Town) in order to safeguard tourist dollars and sell Cape Town as the premier tourist destination in Africa, while in contrast, despite a few small ventures into townships tourism, there continues to be considerably less tourist value to the harsh realities of poverty and gang violence in the Cape Flats and therefore far less financial assistance in transforming these areas to secure havens. While global forces that are at play in South Africa negatively affect the poor majority, some analysts argue that, rather than being the result of global forces only, such a situation comes as a direct consequence of policy choices made by the national political and economic elite, to their own benefit.

5.6. South Africa's New Political Elite

In South Africa, these elites are made up both of the former colonizing white population as well as a growing Black bourgeoisie, creating a growing gap not only between rich and poor but also in terms of life-styles and habits between a minority and the majority of people, as alluded to earlier on.

A certain number of analysts have argued that South Africa's adoption of neoliberal policies stems from the nature of its transition from apartheid to democracy, which 'has been established through a negotiated settlement rather than a revolutionary process', resulting in the new government maintaining, rather than challenging, the status quo

(Stanley: 526) in its attempt to accommodate divergent interests. South Africa's present socio-economic difficulties are imputed to the willingness of the ANC government to maintain the status quo for short-term political and economic stability, and its avoidance both of dismantling white advantages and promoting the interests of the majority poor.

According to Desai, 'the transition to democracy led by the African National Congress

(ANC) was trumped by the transition to neoliberalism. The new ruling elite and the beneficiaries of the old apartheid regime had already made common cause after the ANC came to power in 1994. Now they were cementing their alliance with corporate raiders in the advanced capitalist world' (2003: 16). A similar argument has been highlighted by

96 Cheru. He asserts that the 'premature abandonment of the RDP by the ANC in favor of

GEAR may appear a sudden break from the past. In reality, however, the ideological downshifting actually dates back to the pre-election period (1990-1994), when the ANC leadership made a strategic surrender on the economic front. Although political power was handed to blacks, economic policy followed the same neoliberal restructuring that began in the mid-1980s under the National Party of FW De Klerk' (2001: 508). He argues further that conglomerate (white) business, the aspirant black bourgeoisie, and black professionals have benefited in the short term from the imposition of neo-liberal economic policies.

According to Cheru, a lot more could have been done in the initial years of the transition since there existed a 'window of opportunity' to generate new revenues from the white middle class and the domestic private sector. Regrettably, the ANC government was reluctant to levy new taxes on the well-off segments of society and the private sector to finance massive social infrastructure projects for fear of alienating these powerful forces.

This would have been possible in the first three years following the transition to democratic rule, since most white South Africans were prepared to pay a one time

'reparation/reconciliation tax' for their complicity in past crime had the ANC government asked for it.45 With the passage of time, however, and with the recomposition of powerful social forces (which now include the new black elites), the government has bent over backwards to grant tax and other incentives to the very capitalist forces who benefited from the apartheid system.

However, there are still ongoing cases presently in the United States of South African companies' involvement in the apartheid government where lawyers are seeking reparations for victim's families.

97 Such a lack of political will to overcome socio-economic inequalities has also been pointed out by Stanley regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's (TRC) shortcomings. Reparations to individual victims of apartheid and the previously disadvantaged as a group have been sidelined by the government, she says. While individual reparations are still not paid out fully, both the old and the new elite are impeding societal transformation and social justice, failing to acknowledge the long-term consequences of structural racial and gender discrimination.

Nearly a decade after South Africa's transition to democracy it is quite common among the country's political analysts, both from the right and the left, to argue that neither the

RDP nor its successor, GEAR, have succeeded in uplifting the poor majority. Global forces have certainly played a role in terms of the policy choices made by South Africa's leadership - notably through the pressure exercised by international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank in shaping these policies. Furthermore, the 'lackluster performance has been partly due to events beyond the government's control - such as the tight monetary policies of the independent reserve bank, and the contagion effects of the

'Asian crisis" according to two SA analysts (Nattrass and Seekings, 2001). Economic and financial globalization has had a clear impact on the country, which is, as Cheru rightly points out, a semi-peripheral state. Furthermore, the government has limited resources to implement redistributive policies, as most foreign countries' external aid is directed to the NGO sector. However, internal policy choices in favor of the elite few such as the ANC's clear political preference to build a black farming and business middle class rather than focusing on the upliftment of the poor have clearly had an impact.

98 Furthermore, while the socio-economic divide between the elite and the poor is ever increasing, the cultural and political gap is also widening.

For the minority, as H. Adam points out, "American habits and ostentatious consumption have become the desired yardstick by which South African progress is measured" (Adam,

1996). Harvey, in an article of the Mail and Guardian (2000), describes the Black middle class the following way:

"the black middle class who played a progressive role in the apartheid days (...),

ensconced in formerly white suburbs (...), today employed in the corporate and

state sectors, or operating businesses, their numbers having swelled substantially,

have become flashy, arrogant, snooty and greedy and no longer play a progressive

role in our society. Their Americanized and anglicized accents are part of a

mediocre upper-middle class whose sole or most important interest is self-

aggrandizement, even in the face of the deepening poverty of the majority of

black people (...). They have little or no patience with the "masses" in the

townships. I have heard stories of how some no longer visit their remaining

families in townships who instead have to travel by public transport to visit them

in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg and elsewhere (...). The bigger and

smarter the cars they drive and the more expensive the clothing they wear, the

more affected and smug their attitude (...). They are still a tiny fraction of the

black population, but in socio-economic terms there is a massive gulf that

separates them from the masses of poor black people".

99 American stars such as Bill Cosby have become the new role models of this elite as they are presented through the glossy pictures of the South African version of the American magazine Ebony. If the influence of the global culture on the new South African elite is not surprising given the fact that many of the top ANC echelon have been in exile abroad and received their training at European or American Universities, it has certainly had a negative impact on the masses of the poor, mostly Blacks.

The Black elite certainly shares increasingly similar features (those being "their common exploitation, their undeserved perks at public expenses and their conspicuous consumption in the midst of extreme poverty", according to H. Adam, 1998) with its white counterparts in a "color-free class dimension" (Harvey, 2000). Accordingly, the socio-economic and cultural gap between them and the poor majority is increasing. While the elite embrace the global consumer, the poor are increasingly further away from it.

This global culture is mainly spread through "global" English. But only 40% of the South

African population can speak English (Bekker, 1997) and among these 40% very few master the type of "American" English heard increasingly on national TV. Moreover, the global culture is a culture of consumption and of shopping malls, and thus can hardly influence the rural population, which still makes up 43% of the overall South African population. A national survey of March 199946 showed that the media in general has a limited role in information dissemination among this population. Where connection to electricity is the major concern, access to the internet is obviously non-existent. With both TV and newspapers (the 40% illiteracy rate of South Africa is concentrated in rural areas) playing a small role in rural areas, it should be clear that the mass mediation of

46 Conducted for the Human Sciences Research Council.

100 global cultural habits is largely restricted to urban areas. However, it hardly touches the urban dwellers living at the margins of the cities - that is mostly the black and colored population (due to the apartheid policy of residential groups areas) - sometimes situated tens of kilometers from the shopping malls concentrated in the former white areas and only accessible from highways (thus by car), and for whom the only shopping places available remain the "spaza"47 shops or the flea markets. And even if they manage to have access to these "temples of consumption", they can hardly afford to buy anything. In that sense, shopping malls and the aspiration to consumption they engender among the poor can only reinforce the feeling of alienation experienced by the masses of the poor.

5.7. The South African Poor/Underclass

According to Steven Robins, in order to understand the rise in criminal violence in post- apartheid South Africa, one needs to take into account the context of the recent shift within the economy.

What are the consequences of the growing cultural estrangement and socio-economic marginalization of the masses? They are increasingly alienated culturally from the elite.

Furthermore, this situation leads to feelings of frustration, alienation and "disillusionment at the grassroots" as well as the delegitimization of the elite - who have become

"strangers in their own country" among the majority. This certainly "diminishes hope

(for) a veritable culture of participatory democracy" (Nyamnjoh, 2000: 7). The masses constitute the third and majority nation of South Africa (since the concept of two nations propounded by Thabo Mbeki, one white and one black, divided by the poverty line does not seem adequate anymore), and the ultimate victims of globalization.

101 5.8. Identity Construction Amongst the Poor/From Below

A study done by Andre Standing on the Cape Flats explores the relations between organized crime and the resident communities. He argues that while churches provide emotional help to those communities, "the criminal elite have responded materially by providing the rudiments of an alternative welfare system" (Standing, 2003: 14), an observation which accords with Strange and Paoli's analysis according to which

"organized crime is operating as a form of 'organized counter-government' during an era in which the state is 'retreating' from certain areas of society" (quoted in Standing, 2003:

15). Not only do they provide a welfare system, but the criminal elite is also seen as settling disputes; this, as Standing argues, "may take the form of brokering peace during conflicts among residents, gangs or local businesses. Alternatively, residents may turn to the crime boss with grievances and appeals to sort out perceived injustices" (2003: 11).

Even though vigilante groups like PAGAD and Mapogo a Mathamaga48 seem to have disappeared from the scene, mob justice and vigilante activities still seem to be a frequent occurrence acted out by different groups.

Similarly, vigilantism can be conceived as a substitute to police inefficiency and widespread mistrust directed toward the police force by township residents. Thus one can argue that vigilante groups are filling the vacuum particularly within poor communities, where the state is unable to maintain order. It is at that level that collective criminal

47 Informal Township shops. 48 Mapogo a Mathamaga, which roughly translates as "If you are a leopard, I'll be a tiger" (Oomen, 2004: 153), was started by a businessman, John Magolego, in the Limpopo Province. The organization falls somewhere between a private security company and a violent vigilante group. This organization also emerged in 1996 and became notorious for its hard-handed methods in the later part of the 1990s. The most notorious weapon was the 'sjambok'. They were also known as the 'sjambok of the North'.

102 violence in South Africa can be conceived as political violence, or violence derived from state incapacity to include the poor in the formal political, social, economic and cultural sphere. Moreover, as Standing contends, it is in this context that the criminal elite provides what he terms 'governance from below' (ibid. 2003) - functions which are traditionally associated with the state. In other words, they are providing (as well as threatening) a modicum of security.

Accordingly, 'gangs'49 have largely replaced council authority and filled the vacuum left by the lack of jobs, social services and recreation facilities. Similarly, the role of organized crime: of the Mafia and of business-oriented "gangs" in post-totalitarian polities that, for a fee, perform services that governments no longer provide. In Cape

Town, The Cape Argus newspaper ran a series of articles, which featured headlines under the title Gang Land (Pty) Ltd. (4-11 August 2003). As noted (Pty) Ltd. designates a limited company in South Africa; thus the series aimed to shift the public's attention away from gangsterism as a criminal problem to the more complex nature of underworld business. In this sense the criminal economy thrives in the vacuum left by the state.

Such criminal "phantom-States", notes Derrida, are a fact of our times (Jacques Derrida

quoted by Comaroff). They organize everything from cash for school uniforms, a free

taxi ride to hospitals, and rent money to soccer tournaments. Thus, "being part of a gang brings a sense of belonging, power and material goods, like a pair of Nikes and gold jewelry" (Mail&Guardian, August 2-7, 2002). Jonny Steinberg makes a similar point in

Crime Wave, when he argues that those aspiring for material goods are not solely the

49 According to an article in the Cape Times, March 25, 2004. 'Building up communities, not gangs' Standing argues that "according to police estimates there are 120 gangs with a combined membership of

103 poor and marginalized, but also "the well-heeled and well educated. For an ever more visible sector of the population - most of all, young black men - gangster lifestyles have a seductive appeal" (Jonny Steinberg, 2001: 4).

Crime imitates corporate business and often flourishes where the state withdraws. "Hence the implosion of ever more virtual, border busting markets in illegal substances, and mercenary violence (e.g. in the recent case of Guinea-Bissau) - all of this are facilitated by the liberalization of trade" (Jean and John Comaroff, 2004: 802).

They flow from a deep-seated sentiment of local exclusion: economic exclusion from the material rewards of the urban-industrial economy and socio-cultural exclusion from the dominant Anglophone urban culture. Accordingly, violence - for perpetrator and victim alike - is rarely experienced as either racial or ethnic since the institutions competing with one another in order to offer personal dignity and material rewards are infra racial and infra-ethnic, typically localized in underclass neighborhoods and marginalized from state-civil society relations.

5.9. Conclusion

South Africa is part of the African continent but differs in many ways from the other countries of the continent, often confronted by the "Big Man" syndrome, corruption and ethnic politics. Nonetheless South Africa seems to increasingly share certain features with the rest of the continent and particularly the increasing alienation and marginalization of its masses, culturally, politically and economically, that make a national project articulated in terms of African Renaissance or Ubuntu (a philosophy of over 100 000 on the Cape Flats". Furthermore, it is said that this number is growing as more and more

104 togetherness) at best elusive and at worst a cynical facet of party politics. Such a situation endangers the new democracy. The South African state is recent and still in a process of institutionalization. Because of the recent character of South African institutions and the distrust that apartheid has created among the majority of the population toward state institutions, there is no "diffuse" support (i.e. long-term attachment to authority, according to D. Easton) toward the democratic state among the majority of the population. A 1997 survey by the Institute for a Democratic South Africa (IDASA) found that, whilst there was a general acceptance of democracy in principle, this endorsement of the new regime was closely tied to an expectation of policy performance. Accordingly,

South Africans "tend to see the narrowing of the gap between rich and poor as equal or even more important than the procedural aspects of regular elections, party competition, free speech and minority rights" (Du Toit, 2001: 147). Clearly, the more the poor feel estranged from and neglected by their leaders, representative institutions and policy choices, the less legitimate these leaders, institutions and policies will become. Indeed,

'neoliberalism (...) is an ideology that saps democracy by attacking public power'

(Barber, 2000: 283) and while economic alternatives are difficult to design, they will never be achieved without strong political will.

Perhaps one could argue that those who feel a sense of marginalization, i.e. the poor, would find other alternative ways to assert their identity and to find a sense of belonging.

It is therefore a fact that when one look at gangs and their institutions that they provide where the state seem inadequate to help.

youth join gangs as a result of high unemployment in the City - Myolisi Gophe, Cape Argus, July 23, 2004.

105 "Institutionalize gangs are unlikely either to gradually die out or be eliminated by

force. It might be profitable for social scientists to see them as partners at the table

who need to be included in the polity (...)• In Touraine's sense, institutionalize

gangs, too, are subjects. Dealing with gangs as social actors requires a policy of

both intolerance of violence and tolerance of informal, nonviolent economic

activity. It requires more negotiation and less suppression. How we deal with the

reality of gangs and others amongst the socially excluded is one of the markers

that will shape the nature, and the future, of civilization" (Hagedorn 2005: 164).

In the case of South Africa, in particular the Western Cape where gang violence and gangsterism are still prevalent, especially amongst the youth, giving them a sense of belonging and inclusion could be a step in the right direction.

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114 Appendix A

Map of South Africa Indicating Nine (9) Provinces

Municipal Demarcation Board (www.demarcation.org.za)

115 Appendix B

Map of Western Cape Province Indicating Five (5) District Municipalities

Municipal Demarcation Board (www.demarcation.org.za)

116 Appendix C

Map of City Of Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality (CPT)

Municipal Demarcation Board (www.demarcation.org.za)

117