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Tuesday August 26 2003, 2.00 Pm Tuesday August 26 2003, 2.00 pm: MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett, we have looked at the memo of 10th June 2003, CAB/18/49, which was Sir David Omand's response to your minute of 9th June. Effectively, in paragraph 2, he appears to conclude that he was attracted by the idea that someone working in consultation with other people would look at matters, effectively; is that right? A. Yes, that is right. Q. Then we get a report from them on 9th July. Can I take you to CAB/18/51? We can see this is a memo from someone at Head of Security Policy Division, to you, copied to Sir David Omand: "You asked me to do some initial work on the reported leaks to the media about the Iraq WMD dossier." Then: "... an analysis of the published accounts of the '45 minutes' leaks to Gilligan." Then if one continues over the page to paragraph 5, there is reference to: "... full analysis of the press reports and FISC transcripts at Annex A and references to Gilligan's source at annex B." Can I take you on to annex B, which is page 55, and ask you one question in relation to it. It is towards the bottom of the page, at paragraph 4. You can see this is someone who appears to have done an analysis of knowledge of matters; for example, we can see, if we go up to paragraph 3, the previous one is: "Gilligan's latest meeting with source. "Gilligan initiated the latest meeting ..." He tells us where he got that from, the FAC transcript, The Mail on Sunday article. Then if you go down to paragraph 4: "Source's knowledge of opposition to 45 minute claim. "The source has first or second-hand knowledge of the opposition to inclusion of the 45-minute claim. He stated the 45 minutes claim was included in the dossier against our wishes because it wasn't reliable." Then the transcript is noted, and comment: "If source's claims concerning the double sourcing of most of the JIC items is correct, it confirms a close knowledge of the intelligence used for the dossier." I am just wondering about the heading "Source's knowledge of opposition to 45 minute claim." It appears to be written on the basis that there was opposition to the 45 minute claim. Do you agree with that analysis of the document? A. Well, no, I do not. I think it is an honest mistake. The purpose of this document was not to analyse whether or not there was opposition to the 45 minute claim. The purpose of the document purely was to analyse the access of Mr Gilligan's source. Q. It is right, so far as Dr Kelly was concerned, that if he said to Mr Gilligan that the material was single sourced and it was added late, both matters were in fact accurate? A. Yes, they were correct. Q. We now know more about Dr Kelly's involvement in the latter stages of the dossier. A. Yes. Q. Can I then take you to 15th June? We have looked at the 10th June memo. On 15th June there is an article by The Observer about mobile trailers. After that, did you have any discussions with anyone about possible sources for that story? A. I had one brief discussion about that article with Martin Howard. It may have been on -- the beginning of the week after the article had appeared, because there was a reference to a British official giving an opinion about the mobile laboratories; and I asked Martin for his view. Martin Howard told me that there were only -- this description of the British official could only be or could only apply to up to four people, probably four people; and one of those was Dr Kelly. That was the first time that I had heard his name. Q. I think we have heard from Mr Howard about the inquiries that he made. Were you any party to these further enquiries? A. I was not an active party. Mr Howard told me he had wondered whether Dr Kelly might not be the source for the article; that Dr Kelly, as it happened, had rung him from abroad to volunteer, as far as Mr Howard was concerned, that he was not the source of the article. Mr Howard said to me he wondered actually whether that was true, and we took the conversation no further. Q. 25th June, Mr Campbell gives evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. I think it is right that you had spoken with him on 24th June, helping him prepare for his evidence; is that right? A. Yes, that is right. Q. FAC/2/287. If one goes down to question 1019, Mr Chidgey asks Mr Campbell: "You appreciate how important this issue is. The accusation has been made that this document was adjusted, altered, sexed up -- whatever -- for a particular political purpose so one has to be somewhat pedantic and get exactly to the bottom of how the process worked. You said, and it is on the record elsewhere, that this process took many months to evolve. I think it would be very helpful if, perhaps not today but shortly afterwards, you could let the Committee have information on the suggestions that were made by you and your team as this document evolved. For example, it must be the case surely that in this process, as the drafts were continuing or continuously upgraded or amended, copies of earlier drafts would have been kept electronically within your Department, within your team. It would be very helpful if it was possible for us to have copies of those earlier drafts so that we could satisfy ourselves that there were no attempts to change the essence of the document in order to pursue a particular political point. Is that possible?" Mr Campbell said this: "Can I say again on that the JIC would have to be content that they were willing to do that but that is certainly something I can take back and ask them if they are." Did Mr Campbell in fact ask you whether he could release copies of the dossier to the Foreign Affairs Committee? A. It was mentioned, briefly, by him to me; and I replied that I was quite sure that my colleagues on the JIC would not be happy for the drafts to be released to the FAC. Q. And why is that? A. Well, there were two reasons. The first was that discussion of the drafts and all the various questions which would have arisen from the drafts, which would have quickly got into matters of intelligence because the drafts were very closely linked to underlying intelligence and whether or not it could have been included in the changes that were made and so on, was properly a matter for the ISC. And it is with the Intelligence and Security Committee that the Government deals, as a Committee of Parliamentarians set up by statute on intelligence matters. That is the first point. The second point was even leaving that matter aside, to pass over drafts, work in progress, advice which is being formulated but is only being formulated and is not anything which has been sort of signed up to by the officials working on it, is, as it were, revealing that process of formulation of advice by officials, as I say, for Ministers. It falls directly into that domain. It is an area where certainly colleagues on the JIC I knew, but officials I think more widely, feel strongly should remain confidential for the good conduct of Government business. Q. We have heard from Mr Campbell, and indeed almost everyone else who has come from the Government to talk about this claim, that this was the most serious of claims that could ever be made against the Government, how important it was to set the record straight. Would this not have been a public way of setting the record straight? A. It would have been. I have never been in any doubt myself that presentation, if you like, of the full drafts would reveal that the whole process was one of integrity, and honest and rigorous and well founded. But that does not get away from the fact that putting forward the drafts in the way suggested here would not have had the support of my colleagues; and I would not have wanted to put it to them. I might add there that separately and later the drafts were handed to the Intelligence and Security Committee, in response to their requests, and they are -- have been with the Intelligence and Security Committee since then; but amongst my colleagues on the JIC, when that matter was being discussed, the worries and concerns that I have just expressed to you were forcefully expressed to me. Q. Can I now take you to your next involvement with Dr Kelly? You have had a discussion with Mr Howard in June, after The Observer article. Do you have any other dealings in relation to Dr Kelly in June at all? A. No. Q. When is the first time, in July, that you are made aware that Dr Kelly is under discussion again? A. It is on the evening of Friday 4th July. I can be precise; at a meeting with Sir David Omand at 17.30 or thereabouts. Q. Right. You have a meeting with Sir David Omand. What is discussed? A. Well, I was due to meet him anyway, which is how I know, because it was in my diary.
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