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Section 4.2 Iraq Wmd Assessments, July To SECTION 4.2 IRAQ WMD ASSESSMENTS, JULY TO SEPTEMBER 2002 Contents Introduction and key findings ....................................................................................... 115 Late July and August 2002 ........................................................................................... 116 Mr Blair’s meeting, 23 July 2002 ............................................................................ 116 “Summer reading” .................................................................................................. 121 Reservations about the wisdom of publishing the dossier ..................................... 124 Revision of the WMD paper ................................................................................... 129 JIC Assessment, 21 August 2002: ‘Iraq: Saddam’s Diplomatic and Military Options’ .................................................................................................................. 132 Mr Blair’s position at the end of August 2002 ........................................................ 134 September 2002 .......................................................................................................... 136 Mr Blair’s decision to publish the dossier ............................................................... 136 The FCO position on the problem posed by Iraq ................................................... 145 Mr Campbell’s meeting, 5 September 2002 .......................................................... 149 Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush, Camp David, 7 September 2002 ............ 154 JIC Assessment, 9 September 2002 ..................................................................... 156 Confirmation of Mr Scarlett’s responsibility for producing the dossier ................... 170 Draft dossier, 10 September 2002 ......................................................................... 173 The view of the JIC .......................................................................................... 175 Other comments on 10 September draft dossier ............................................ 179 Instructions from No.10 ................................................................................... 182 The US perspective ......................................................................................... 188 SIS report, 11 September 2002 ............................................................................. 190 Draft dossier, 16 September 2002 ......................................................................... 197 Draft dossier, 19 September 2002 ......................................................................... 203 Preparation of Mr Blair’s Foreword ........................................................................ 208 The final version of the dossier .................................................................................... 215 Mr Blair’s Foreword ................................................................................................ 218 Key points in the dossier ........................................................................................ 219 Chemical and biological weapons ................................................................... 220 Nuclear weapons ............................................................................................. 223 113 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry Ballistic missiles .............................................................................................. 225 Funding for the WMD programme ................................................................... 226 Questions about the judgements in the dossier ........................................................... 226 Defence Intelligence Staff concerns ...................................................................... 229 Mr Blair’s Foreword ................................................................................................ 245 Threat to the UK national interest .................................................................... 246 Continued production of chemical and biological “weapons” .......................... 249 Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons ....................................................... 254 Longer-range missile systems ......................................................................... 258 Publication of the dossier, 24 September 2002 ........................................................... 260 Cabinet, 23 September 2002 ................................................................................. 260 Mr Blair’s statement to Parliament, 24 September 2002 ....................................... 263 Accuracy of the statement ............................................................................... 275 The Butler Review conclusions on the JIC authorship of the dossier .................... 279 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 280 114 4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002 Introduction and key findings 1. This Section addresses: • the assessment between late July and late September 2002 of Iraq’s capabilities and intentions to develop, produce and use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; • the production of the Government dossier Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, which was published on 24 September; and • Mr Blair’s statement to the House of Commons that day. 2. A significant number of the documents relevant to the events considered in this Section are already in the public domain, including: • documents published by the Hutton Inquiry, including the four drafts of the dossier produced in September 2002; and • documents released in response to FOI requests. 3. The Inquiry has examined most of the original, unredacted, versions of these documents and, in some cases, is adding further information to that already in the public domain. In a small number of cases, however, primarily emails given to the Hutton Inquiry, the Government has been unable to provide copies of the original documents. 4. The roles and responsibilities of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) are addressed in Section 2. 5. The development of UK strategy during the period addressed in this Section is addressed in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. 6. The military planning for a campaign in which chemical and biological weapons could be used, and in particular the arrangements to provide protection for UK forces, are addressed in Section 6.1 to 6.3. Key findings • The urgency and certainty with which the Government stated that Iraq was a threat which had to be dealt with fuelled the demand for publication of the dossier and led to Mr Blair’s decision to publish it in September, separate from any decision on the way ahead. • The dossier was designed to “make the case” and secure Parliamentary and public support for the Government’s position that action was urgently required to secure Iraq’s disarmament. • The JIC accepted ownership of the dossier and agreed its content. There is no evidence that intelligence was improperly included in the dossier or that No.10 improperly influenced the text. 115 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry • The assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and biological weapons or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued. The JIC should have made that clear to Mr Blair. • In his statement to Parliament on 24 September Mr Blair presented Iraq’s past, current and potential future capabilities as evidence of the severity of the potential threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction; and that at some point in the future that threat would become a reality. • The dossier’s description of Iraq’s capabilities and intent became part of the baseline against which the UK Government measured Iraq’s future statements and actions and the success of weapons inspections. • The widespread perception that the September 2002 dossier overstated the firmness of the evidence has produced a damaging legacy which may make it more difficult to secure support for Government policy, including military action, where the evidence depends on inferential judgements drawn from intelligence. • There are lessons which should be implemented in using information from JIC Assessments to underpin policy decisions. Late July and August 2002 Mr Blair’s meeting, 23 July 2002 7. Mr Blair’s meeting on Iraq on 23 July did not take firm decisions and he commissioned further advice and background material on the issues. 8. On 23 July, Mr Blair discussed Iraq with Mr Jack Straw (the Foreign Secretary), Mr Geoff Hoon (the Defence Secretary), Lord Goldsmith (Attorney General), Sir Richard Wilson (Cabinet Secretary), Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)), Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)), Sir Francis Richards (Head of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)), Mr John Scarlett (Chairman of the JIC), Mr Jonathan Powell (Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff), Baroness Morgan (Mr Blair’s Director of Political and Government Relations), Mr Alastair Campbell (Mr Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy) and Sir David Manning (Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec)).1 9. The meeting and the advice prepared for Mr Blair and other participants are addressed in detail
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