UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT of ORAL EVIDENCE to Be Published As HC 413-Iv HOUSE of COMMONS ORAL EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE the DEFENCE
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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 413-iv HOUSE OF COMMONS ORAL EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE SECURING THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN TUESDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2012 LT-GENERAL RICHARD BARRONS, VINCENT DEVINE and MARK SEDWILL Evidence heard in Public Questions 230 - 309 USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT 1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee, and copies have been made available by the Vote Office for the use of Members and others. 2. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither witnesses nor Members have had the opportunity to correct the record. The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings. 3. Members who receive this for the purpose of correcting questions addressed by them to witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Committee Assistant. 4. Prospective witnesses may receive this in preparation for any written or oral evidence they may in due course give to the Committee. 1 Oral Evidence Taken before the Defence Committee on Tuesday 20 November 2012 Members present: Mr James Arbuthnot (Chair) Mr Julian Brazier Thomas Docherty Mr Dai Havard Mrs Madeleine Moon Penny Mordaunt Sandra Osborne Sir Bob Russell Ms Gisela Stuart Examination of Witnesses Witnesses: Lt-General Richard Barrons, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Military Strategy and Operations), Vincent Devine, Director Operational Policy, Ministry of Defence, and Mark Sedwill, Political Director and Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence. Chair: Gentlemen, welcome. I think this is the fourth evidence session of our inquiry into Afghanistan, which is a longer inquiry than we normally do, but this is a matter of huge importance to the country, and I think to the world. We have lots of questions to ask you. Some we will have to ask in writing because of the sheer number of things we want to get to the bottom of. You are most welcome, and I wonder if you would like to begin by introducing yourselves. Lt-General Barrons: I am Lieutenant-General Richard Barrons. I am the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff for Military Strategy and Operations, and therefore the Director of Operations for the Ministry of Defence. Vincent Devine: I am Vincent Devine, Director of Operational Policy at the Ministry of Defence. Mark Sedwill: Mark Sedwill, Political Director at the Foreign Office, also the Prime Minister’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, former Ambassador, and formerly the NATO representative there. Q230 Chair: Okay, thank you. Mr Sedwill, we last saw you some time ago in Afghanistan. I wonder if you could explain how the political situation has developed since then, and how you would describe it now, particularly in relation to national governance and how it is doing. Mark Sedwill: I think there has been significant progress. Of course, there have been setbacks as well. I left Afghanistan in the spring of 2011, and I think the Committee visited a 2 few months before I left. Essentially, we have seen since then significant progress in the Government’s financial capacity, so they have improved their customs collection, their revenue collection and their tax collection, which has gone up quite significantly. They have started to tackle some of the abuses, such as Kabul Bank, and prosecutions have just begun this week. They have started to put in place the pillars for the next presidential election in 2014. The date has been announced, and laws are going through the Afghan Parliament for the Independent Electoral Commission and to manage the elections. Of course, very significant challenges remain, largely related to the security situation. Corruption is still, and will be for some time, a major challenge. There are significant issues with the nexus of drugs and criminal patronage, and networks in governance as a whole are still weak; in some areas, it is of course contested, particularly in the south and the east, and in others it is still weak. But provincial governance as a whole has improved, and we are seeing in the progress of the transition plan, which is the piece of work that I focused on in my last few months, a real sign that the Afghans are beginning to fill the gap that is being opened up for them as we gradually draw down and leave. Q231 Chair: You mentioned the presidential elections. I do not expect you to tell us who is likely to take over from President Karzai, but could you give us the general characteristics of the person who might take over from him? What would you expect? Mark Sedwill: In the 2009 election, both leading candidates ran on balanced tickets. The president and two vice-presidential candidates will stand. In President Karzai you had a Pashtun from the south, and then in the two vice-presidents a Tajik and a Hazara. I would expect to see the principal tickets being of that same kind of ethnic balance. Others may run, but I would expect that to be the case. I think most Afghans would expect still to see a Pashtun as President. About 40% of the population are Pashtun, and clearly that is the area that is contested by the Taliban. It is very important, therefore, that the Pashtun community in Afghanistan feels a connection to the President, but it will be a balanced ticket. The exact nature of the individual is very difficult to tell. There are a number of names out there, but no one is yet emerging as the strongest or the natural candidate. I suppose that, 18 months out, one would not expect that yet. Q232 Chair: As we draw down, and as 2014 comes ever closer, is it possible to say now whether Afghanistan will have a fully functioning Government after 2014—the sort of Government that would have an inherent stability built into it? Mark Sedwill: I think the answer is probably yes, but of course there are very significant challenges, particularly in the south and east of the country. In Kabul, in the north and the west, there is already a functioning Government and it is led by Afghans. Even in Helmand, as you know, our PRT has worked hard behind and in support of the Governor, rather than seeking to crowd out Afghan governance. That, to be honest, has been the pattern in one or two other parts of the country. I think there is a good prospect of Afghan governance that essentially is country-wide, but of course it depends particularly on the political situation and whether there has been some kind of political accommodation—some kind of reconciliation with the Taliban—that enables Afghan governance to function effectively throughout the whole country, particularly the south and east. I would expect it would be effective by the standards of a country at Afghanistan’s stage of development. Let’s remember this is one of the poorest countries in the world and will be for some time to come. We would expect it to be effective in the main urban centres, the main population centres, even in those contested areas. But clearly rural areas, if the Taliban are still strong in those areas, it would inevitably remain much weaker. 3 Q233 Chair: Lord Ashdown says we should leave now. What do you say to that? Mark Sedwill: There is a great deal in what Lord Ashdown has said, not only in his recent articles but over many years, that I would agree with, but I do not think that is right. I think if we raced for the exit, then all of the fears that we have about Afghanistan’s future would become that much likelier. It is not in their interests, or indeed in our national security interest, for us to race for the exit. If you just look—I know it does not seem long—at the period over the next two years and what we might be able to achieve, and should be able to achieve if we are resolute about it—perhaps I can just use the example of the last 18 months, which General Barrons will know a little more about. When I left Afghanistan in May 2011, less than 20% of operations were led by the Afghan national security forces. It is now over 80% and of the remaining 20%, half are co-led by them. That is a dramatic change in 18 months and demonstrates that the transition process—when we say it is making progress, that is real. Violence in the three areas that transition has already been taken through in covers about 75% of the population. Violence in those areas is down 15%. The security, of course, as we all know, is absolutely critical to creating the space for decent governance, enabling the population to hold the Government to account. If that continues and if we remain resolute over the next two years and see the project through to the end of the combat mission in 2014—and then, of course, there will be a continuing commitment thereafter—then I think we can achieve our core goals, which are to ensure that Afghanistan is no longer a source of threat to the region or to the wider international community, including the terrorist threat to the UK. Chair: Thank you. Q234 Mr Brazier: Mr Sedwill, what needs to happen to the economy to promote a successful Afghanistan post-2014? I will give General Barrons advance notice that I am then going to ask him what we are doing about defending those key objectives.