Russian Grand Strategy
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Research Report C O R P O R A T I O N SAMUEL CHARAP, DARA MASSICOT, MIRANDA PRIEBE, ALYSSA DEMUS, CLINT REACH, MARK STALCZYNSKI, EUGENIU HAN, LYNN E. DAVIS Russian Grand Strategy Rhetoric and Reality For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR4238 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0432-9 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © 2021 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Alamy Stock Photo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Russian Grand Strategy Amid Resource Constraints, sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to document the extent and limits of Russia’s global ambitions; evaluate whether and how those ambitions are matched by resources and coherent defense policies; and assess the implications for the Army and U.S. national security, par- ticularly for engaging Russia on a broad scale, including deterrence in Europe and managing Moscow’s involvement in the Middle East, Asia, and post-Soviet Eurasia. This research was conducted within RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) sponsored by the United States Army. RAND operates under a “Federal-Wide Assurance” (FWA00003425) and complies with the Code of Federal Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects Under United States Law (45 CFR 46), also known as “the Common Rule,” as well as with the implementation guidance set forth in Department of Defense Instruction 3216.02. As applicable, this compliance includes reviews and approvals by RAND’s Institutional Review Board (the Human Subjects Protection Commit- tee) and by the U.S. Army. The views of sources utilized in this study are solely their own and do not represent the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. government. iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO A Framework for Analysis of Russia’s Grand Strategy ..................... 5 The Value of Understanding Another State’s Grand Strategy ................ 7 Challenges in Identifying a State’s Grand Strategy ............................ 9 Analytical Framework ...........................................................11 Methodology and Sources .......................................................13 CHAPTER THREE Russia’s Stated Grand Strategy ................................................17 Beliefs About the International System .........................................18 Interests .............................................................................21 Threats and Opportunities ..................................................... 24 Logic and Tools....................................................................29 Selecting Key Elements ...........................................................32 v vi Russian Grand Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality CHAPTER FOUR Strategy Element: Integrated Threats Require an Integrated Response .....................................................................33 Stated Strategy .....................................................................33 Evaluation Method ...............................................................35 Evaluation ......................................................................... 38 Conclusions ........................................................................45 CHAPTER FIVE Strategy Element: Russia as Regional Leader ..............................47 Stated Strategy .....................................................................47 Evaluation Method .............................................................. 48 Regional Integration Outcomes That Russia Accepts or Rejects ............53 Russia’s Military Approach to the Region ......................................71 Conclusions ........................................................................78 CHAPTER SIX Strategy Element: Focus on Non-Contact Warfare .......................81 Stated Strategy ....................................................................81 Evaluation Method ...............................................................83 Posture Revisions Initially Consistent with Stated Strategy Until 2014 ... 86 Evolution of Military Thinking Since 2014 .................................. 92 Posture, Procurement Decisions Increasingly Inconsistent with Stated Strategy Since 2014 ......................................................... 94 Conclusions ...................................................................... 103 CHAPTER SEVEN Strategy Element: Limited Expeditionary Ambitions .................. 105 Stated Strategy ................................................................... 105 Evaluation Method ............................................................. 106 Readiness ......................................................................... 111 Mobility ......................................................................... 116 Sustainability ................................................................... 125 Conclusions ...................................................................... 128 CHAPTER EIGHT Strategy Element: Selective Cooperation and Selective Pushback with the West ..................................................................... 131 Stated Strategy .................................................................. 131 Evaluation Method ............................................................. 135 Russia’s Cooperation with the West .......................................... 137 Russia’s Interference in the West .............................................. 144 Conclusions ...................................................................... 152 CHAPTER NINE Strategy Element: Rebalance Away from the West ..................... 153 Stated Strategy ................................................................... 153 Evaluation Method ............................................................. 154 Government-to-Government Engagement ................................... 157 Economic Engagement ......................................................... 159 Conclusions ...................................................................... 165 CHAPTER TEN Conclusions and Implications ............................................... 167 Summary of Findings .......................................................... 167 Overarching Implications ...................................................... 170 Considerations for U.S. Army Planners ...................................... 172 APPENDIXES A. National Security, Defense, and Federal Budget Trends ........... 175 B. Data on State-Directed Political and Economic Engagement ..... 191 References ...................................................................... 197 vii Figures 6.1. Approximate SAP-2020 Spending by Service, Percentage of Total ................................................................. 90 6.2. Size of Russian Military Exercises, 2009 to 2018 .............. 102 7.1. Russia’s Heavy Air and Sea Lift Capacities, 1992 Versus 2017 .................................................. 117 9.1. Russia’s MPK Meetings at Minister Level or Higher, 2012 to 2017 ........................................................ 158 9.2. Bilateral Visits by Select Russian Ministers: 2012 to 2017 .... 159 9.3. Russian OFDI, Non-Western as Share of Western, 2012 to 2017 ........................................................ 160 9.4. Russian Exports to Partner Countries, Non-Western as Share of Western, 2013 to 2017 .................................. 161 9.5. Imports to Russia from Partners, Non-Western as Share of Western, 2013 to 2017 ...........................................