The United Kingdom's 2001-2003 Preparation for the Invasion of Iraq
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1 Between Dream and Deed: The United Kingdom’s 2001-2003 Preparation for the Invasion of Iraq by KAROLIEN EMMA MICHELLE KEARY Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS at DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY 2017 2 Between Dream and Deed: The United Kingdom’s 2001-2003 Preparation for the Invasion of Iraq by KAROLIEN EMMA MICHELLE KEARY Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS at DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY 2017 3 To my grandmothers, who should have had a chance to study geography and languages. 4 Declarations This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree. This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended. I give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for interlibrary loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. The word count of the thesis is 90,397 words. The views expressed in this work are the author’s own and do not reflect the official position of the Federal Public Service of Foreign Affairs or the Belgian government. 5 Acknowledgements When four years ago I pleaded with the department to get Hidemi as a new supervisor, I knew working with him would be an intellectual delight and suspected it would change the way I understood the world. It was, and it did. Since then, so much has happened. This project has at times been pushed to the background, and delayed, by a whirlwind of personal and professional events. I am profoundly grateful that Hidemi not merely stuck by me as a supervisee, but encouraged me in life as much as in this academic endeavour. Like a daughter, I hope to make him proud. Huw is the supervisor any young person needs in today’s academia: young, flexible, ambitious, easily enthused, and willing to help. He was a tremendous person to have on board for the subject matter of this dissertation, of course. I also am most grateful for his recommendation for the Joint Services Command and Staff College and his understanding of the ropes of modern-day academia. ‘What would Huw do?’ is a test that will continue to serve me well. If someday I return to academia, it will be because of the joy of intellectual exchanges like the one I had with Christian Enemark during my IPRS. Thank you. I would also like to thank my examiners for agreeing to read the thesis and their thoughtful comments. The thesis is much stronger as a result. I wish my grandmother had lived to see the results of the many days I spent in her house going through thousands and thousands of pages of source material. The Aberystwyth Debating Union has been like family, as have some friends in the department. You have given me a university education in the true sense of the word. I want to thank my parents and family for supporting me throughout the program and when the PhD was put on the backburner for other plans. Michael would probably want me to point out that he believed in my PhD before it was cool. Thank you for reading, and rereading, and looking after baba during the weekends. No thanks to Sebastiaantje and the new Little One, because even though you are super adorable and I love you to bits, Pippi, Mila, and you both just made it so much harder. 6 Abstract This dissertation describes how it came about that the British government, civil service and military were prepared badly for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Its new analysis of this often-discussed period centres on the plans prepared in 2002 by the various government departments involved; those plans were not suitable for the policy that the British government eventually pursued in the beginning of 2003. This mismatch occurred because although Britain’s post-9/11 Iraq policy was understood across Whitehall and Downing Street, its limits were not. Specifically, there was no clarity on the circumstances under which a policy should be abandoned, and if so, for what alternative. The assumptions made about those elements varied across actors. This resulted in internally contradictory British plans, unsuitable for the invasion as it happened. A relatively simple mechanism that can limit, though not eliminate, these problems in future policy-making is the so-called ‘preferred alternative to the pursued policy’, derived from the ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’ (BATNA). BATNAs are a well-known concept in negotiation practice and doctrine; I argue that similarly, ‘preferred alternatives’ can and should be used in a policy-making context for keeping policy and policy plans aligned and coherent across members of government and their civil service departments. The original contribution to knowledge is both a new interpretation of the reasons for Britain’s difficulties in Iraq, and a new argument about how to improve policy-making through a new application of an already successful tool, the ‘preferred alternative to the pursued policy’. 7 Table of Contents Declarations ...................................................................................................................................................... 4 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................................ 5 Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................... 6 Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................. 7 Introduction: Between Dream and Deed ............................................................................................. 11 1. Between dream and deed ................................................................................................................................. 11 2. The curious failure to be prepared ............................................................................................................... 12 3. Unjustified assumptions determine incoherent plans .......................................................................... 16 4. Scope and argumentative burden ................................................................................................................. 22 5. Dissertation structure ........................................................................................................................................ 28 6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 31 Chapter I: Understandings of the Iraq War ......................................................................................... 32 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 32 2. The British invasion of Iraq: explanations in the FPA literature ...................................................... 34 3. British case for war ............................................................................................................................................. 41 4. Why did the US go to war?................................................................................................................................ 46 5. American planning for the post-invasion phase ..................................................................................... 51 6. The British failure to be prepared: the contribution of this dissertation ..................................... 59 7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................................... 62 Chapter II: The Importance of Knowing What You Want ............................................................... 67 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 67 2. Best alternatives in negotiations: the original concept ........................................................................ 68 3. Prefered alternatives in foreign policy decision-making .................................................................... 71 4. Transferability of the concept ......................................................................................................................... 73 5. Preferred alternatives and poliheuristic theory ..................................................................................... 76 6. Preferred alternatives in foreign policy: other benefits ...................................................................... 82 7. Practical use of the preferred alternative in foreign policy-making ............................................... 86 8 8. British Iraq policy from 2001 to 2003 ......................................................................................................... 88 9.