Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century Proceedings

Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century Proceedings London, UK 18–19 May 2009 September 2010 Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center Cataloging Data Deterrence in the twenty-first century: proceedings / [edited by Anthony C. Cain.] p. ; cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-58566-202-9 1. Deterrence (Strategy)—Congresses. 2. Security, International—Forecasting— Congresses. 3. National security—United States—Planning—Congresses. 4. Arms control—Planning—Congresses. 5. Weapons of mass destruction—Prevention— Congresses. I. Title. II. Cain, Anthony C. 355.02/17––dc22 Disclaimer The analysis, opinions, and conclusions either expressed or implied within are solely those of the au- thor and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force Research Institute, Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Nor do they necessarily represent the views of the Joint Services Command and Staff College, the United Kingdom Defence Academy, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, or any other British government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii PREFACE . vii 1 Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: Conference Summary . 1 Adam Lowther 2 Defining “Deterrence” . 15 Michael Codner 3 Understanding Deterrence . 27 Adam Lowther 4 Policy and Purpose . 41 Gen Norton A Schwartz, USAF Lt Col Timothy R. Kirk, USAF 5 Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . 63 Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF Greg Weaver 6 On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance . 77 Keith B. Payne 7 Conference Agenda . 121 8 Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence . 123 Tom Scheber 9 Case Study—The August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia . 141 Denis Corboy 10 Deterrence and Counterproliferation . 149 Malcolm Chalmers iii CONTENTS Chapter Page 11 Deterrence and Saddam Hussein . 155 Barry Schneider 12 Stymieing Leviathan . 215 Paul Schulte 13 The Madrid Train Bombing . 237 Peter Neumann 14 Framing Strategic Deterrence . 245 Lawrence Freedman 15 India versus Pakistan . 257 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury 16 Deterring Nonstate Actors. 269 John Stone 17 Deterrence and the Israel-Hezbollah War—Summer 2006 . 279 Shai Feldman 18 Post-Conference Briefing Note. 291 Michael Clarke John Gearson John A. Shaud 19 Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . 297 Anthony C. Cain 20 Deterrence and WMD Counterproliferation. 301 Adam Lowther 21 Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century Nonstate Actors versus State . 305 Dale L. Hayden 22 Quick Look: State versus State Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . 309 Larry G. Carter iv CONTENTS Chapter Page 23 Quick Look: Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century—State versus Nonstate Actors . 313 Jeffrey B. Hukill Attendee Roster . 317 v Preface Deterrence has long been a cornerstone of interaction among states. This was especially true when state interests clashed and when political leaders sought to avoid direct military conflict. In traditional deterrence relationships, calculations of military, economic, and diplomatic power determined the degrees of deterrence effectiveness. This seemed to change with the ad- vent of the Cold War. The potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons combined with the relatively small numbers of states that possessed them suggested a need for new concepts of deterrence tailored to govern the nuclear competition among the Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies. Deterrence thinking came to mean nuclear deterrence—and as the Cold War wound down, there was a general perception that the ab- sence of nuclear confrontation among the great powers required less emphasis on deterrence as a key feature of national strategy and a corresponding decrease in the instruments of deterrence that had prevailed during the Cold War. As the collapse of the superpower confrontation became more distant, however, states began to confront threats that were present during the Cold War but were perceived to be less impor- tant—what some have termed lesser included threats. These threats involved state failure, mass migration of populations, and drug, small arms, and human trafficking. Also included were environmental and humanitarian disasters, traditional state competition, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their components, and the emergence of nonstate actors empowered by new communication and information technolo- gies that give them global reach. Taken individually, few of these threats have the potential to overthrow established and func- tioning states—especially in the developed world. However, these threats present challenges that policy makers struggle to meet using traditional diplomacy. Economic sanctions and incentives have exerted little apparent effect toward solving some of these post–Cold War challenges. In the end, states—and particularly the United States and its partners and allies—relied on military intervention to cope with an increasingly complex set of challenges and crises. vii PREFACE To help understand and begin to develop alternative policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context, the US Air Force’s Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and King’s College, London, hosted a two-day conference at the RUSI offices in London on 18 and 19 May 2009. We sought to bring together some of the best thinkers on deterrence to examine how to reinvigorate this essential tool for today’s policy community. The conference exceeded our expectations, as readers will observe from the excellent products in these proceedings. From the pre-conference “thought pieces” by RUSI’s Michael Codner and AFRI’s Adam Lowther—the presentations by the keynote speakers and case study developers—to the post-conference “Quick Looks” by AFRI personnel, the outcome reflects the cre- ativity and the seriousness with which the attendees and the planning staffs approached the topic. We see this conference as a beginning conversation that has the potential to inform policy makers on how to develop richer options for coping with the increasingly complex and lethal security challenges of the world in which we live. We are grateful to the participants and to those who contributed to the success of the endeavor. viii Chapter Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century Conference Summary Adam Lowther The evolving challenges of an unstable international security environment—aggravated by the global financial crisis—set the context for renewed interest in strategic deterrence. After nearly a generation of near-constant operations, pitting the world’s most powerful military against rogue regimes and nonstate actors, scholars and strategists are struggling to adapt the theories and vocabulary of deterrence to a post–Cold War context that is very different from the context in which deterrence theory and policy was developed. The structure of the bipolar international system in which the United States and Soviet Union maintained an uneasy peace during the Cold War focused deterrence theory and policy on its nuclear aspects. Such theorists as Hermann Kahn, Bernard Brodie, and Thomas Schelling clearly emphasized that conven- tional conflict could escalate into nuclear war, thus requiring careful attention on the part of statesmen. The special circum- stances of the Cold War kept attention focused on preventing nuclear war rather than analyzing the continuities between nuclear and “lesser included” conflicts. The watershed events represented by the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 200 called into question the relevance of deterrence as a strategic approach. With their falling out of favor immediately after the Soviet Union’s collapse, democratization, globalization, and a focus on second and third world economic development displaced the focus on hard power. Nuclear operations seemed less relevant in a world characterized by diverse challenges such as failed states, humanitarian disaster, genocidal conflict, coun- ter/nonproliferation, terrorism, and asymmetric conflict. Thus, if deterrence is to be relevant, current questions should center on linking deterrence to desired effects. In other words, states that adopt deterrence as part of a comprehensive strategy should be able to determine, with a fair degree of certainty, that the policies and initiatives intended to deter some behavior FRAMING DETERRENCE IN THE 2ST CENTURY actually achieve their objective. This is where the notion of deterrence in the twenty-first century begins to break down. Theorists and practitioners agree that at its core, deterrence is about convincing an adversary, or ally, that the costs of an undesirable action are greater than the rewards, thus preventing a challenge to the status quo. This requires an understanding of the adversary’s motives, decision-making processes, and objectives. While the Cold War structure may have evolved to give strategists some degree of confidence that the principal adversary was deterred by American capability, force structure, and alliances, today’s diversity of challenges increases the com- plexity of formulating deterrence strategies. In fact, not all ad- versaries may be deterrable. This may be particularly true of nonstate actors. Some analysts postulate that globalization has fundamentally transformed the security environment, making unilateral state action impractical and ineffective. Those who adopt this per- spective argue that the threat-based nature of deterrence cre- ates

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