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ISHM: SEPTEMBER 2 – 15, 2016 September 15, 2016 EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis

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ISHM: SEPTEMBER 2 – 15, 2016 September 15, 2016 EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis BEST COLLEGE ESSAY HELP TOP RATED ESSAY WRITING SERVICEPress Blog Podcast DO MY ASSIGNMENT FOR ME DO MY COURSEWORK FOR ME HONESTY BEST POLICY ESSAY BEST CUSSTubOsMcri bEeS tSo AouYr Newsletter AFFORDABLE LAST MINUTE HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENTS WTEHROM W PEA PAERRE WRITTWENHAT WEC DOOLLEGE EGSESTA IYN VEODLITVIENDG SERVDICOENATE CHAIKHANA Serving all the latest news from EPIC ISHM: SEPTEMBER 2 – 15, 2016 September 15, 2016 EPIC Iraq Security and Humanitarian Monitor, Monitoring the Crisis Key Takeaways: Despite a tenuous security and public health situation, 965 IDPs have returned to Qayyarah in Ninewa Province from the overcrowded Debaga Camp in Erbil Province, and several hundred families will begin returning to central Fallujah within the next few days. Despite some effort, the preparedness of these locales to welcome returnees is uncertain at best. Qayyarah was only recently cleared of ISIS militants after the so-called Islamic State held control of the town for the past two years. The presence of hidden IEDs is very likely and access to electricity and water is absent or very limited. The Provincial Council of Kirkuk is denying admittance of 2,400 IDPs from Salah ad-Din who are seeking to transit Kirkuk en route to their homes in Diyala, despite an agreement in July to comply with the constitutional right of citizens to free movement. Delays at provincial border crossings and overcrowded camps are motivating factors which contribute to IDP interest in returning to their places of origin despite continued dangers of IEDs, inadequate security, and a lack of services. U.S.-led international coalition airstrikes and ground advances by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga have intensified in recent weeks as preparations for the impending operation to clear Mosul of ISIS militants continues. Operations have successfully killed ISIS field commanders and dozens of militants, destroyed weapons depots and IED factories, cut ISIS off from the Qayarra oil refinery which had been a major source of the group’s revenue, and on September 14, U.S. Central Command in Iraq reported that airstrikes successfully destroyed a significant chemical weapons factory in Mosul. U.S. Army Lt. General Stephen Townsend commented on September 10 that the invasion of Mosul itself will begin “in early October.” Despite these gains, Iraqi Security Forces and PMUs operating near Hawija, in Kirkuk Province, reported that ISIS is becoming “more aggressive and arbitrary” as forces prepared to expel ISIS militants from that city. There were reports that up to 250 “young” IDPs have left IDP camps near Hawija in order to join PMUs in their efforts. As previously reported in ISHM, certain PMUs have been accused of actively recruiting children into their ranks, accusations which those units have denied. Although Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi toured security checkpoints throughout Baghdad, was briefed on security screening plans, and formed a committee to investigate security, violence in Baghdad and random terrorist acts have increased in recent weeks. On September 6, an estimated 29 people died and 39 were wounded in a vehicle based IED attack at the Abdul Majid hospital in the Karradah neighborhood of central Baghdad and on September 9, 13 people were killed and 31 wounded when two suicide bombers targeted that al-Nakheel Mall in east Baghdad. A week prior, the Interior Ministry arrested one of Baghdad’s top security officials on charges of corruption. (For a complete list of IED attacks and casualties, see the map at the end of this full report.) As Iraqi Security Forces and their allies concentrate on operations in Ninewa Province near Mosul and in western Anbar Province in efforts to secure the border with Syria, ISIS militants are reappearing in Ramadi and Hit. Ramadi was cleared of ISIS militants in December, 2015 and despite being “90% destroyed” in that assault, has since encouraged the return of the majority of its citizens. On September 8, U.S. airstrikes killed seven ISIS militants and a cache of weapons and ammunition in Hit. On September 9, six ISIS militants were killed when security forces attacked a “gathering” of militants in Ramadi and another three were killed the following day. Speaker of Parliament Salim al-Jabouri issued a list of candidates being considered for the vacant Defense Minister position. They are: Badr Mahmoud Hafl al-Jabouri: Member of the Jamahira political bloc from the Salah ad-Din Province Kamil Karim Abbas Dulaimi: Former member of the Sunni National Movement for Development and Reform bloc, and Ahmed Abdulla al-Jabouri: Former Minister of State for Provincial Affairs and member of the Shia National Alliance. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is expected to nominate one of the candidates after the Eid al-Adha holiday. Embattled Minister of Finance Hoshyar Zebari may face a vote of no confidence after Parliament reconvenes on September 20. On September 15, however, the KDP submitted a petition to Speaker of Parliament al-Jabouri requesting a re-vote on Parliament’s decision to not accept Minister Zebari’s August 25 testimony. The Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil reached a tentative agreement over the export and sale of Kirkuk oil in northern Iraq via the KRG-owned pipeline system through Turkey. The tentative deal will split oil revenues over Kirkuk oil 50/50 between Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) and the KRG. The deal comes despite objections from the PUK, which requested greater transparency and fairness in the sharing of revenues. Member of Parliament and former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki conceded the presidency of Parliament’s largest political bloc, the National Iraqi Alliance, to fellow MP Ammar al-Hakim after two years of highly publicized political tensions. al-Hakim vowed to mobilize the public to “reunify and reorganize” Iraq’s political organizations. Iraqi President Fuad Masum and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi publicly congratulated al-Hakim. Return of IDPs Encouraged Despite Security Concerns On September 5, Anbar Operations Command of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) announced the successful dismantling of about 100 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) left behind by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the Hallabsa and Nasaf districts approximately 20 kilometers west of Fallujah in Anbar Province. The progress is part of an ongoing effort to secure the area for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). On September 6, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 400 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been stranded at the Maktab Khalid checkpoint since September 1 while awaiting approval to enter Kirkuk. Many have fled from violence in Hawija, 65 kilometers southwest of Kirkuk City. Kirkuk had previously agreed to allow IDPs to enter the Province, but has since delayed the settlement of IDPs into camps which are now unsustainably crowded. The province has received 650,000 IDPs since June 2014. On September 6, the UNHCR reported that over 200 IDPs fled ongoing fighting between ISIS and ISF in the Albu Thiyab district in northern Ramadi, 3 kilometers northwest of the city center, and arrived in Khalidiyah Camp on September 3. On September 6, the UNHCR reported that the number of IDPs from Sharqat, Qayyarah and surrounding areas has increased to 88,500 since fighting in the area intensified in June. The number is a 5,500 jump up from the 83,000 reported on August 27. The number of IDPs from from Mosul and nearby surrounding areas has grown to 53,700 IDPs since March, a 3,900 increase from the 49,800 reported August 27. On September 6, the Anbar Provincial Council declared that nine districts of Fallujah have been cleared of IEDs. The speed of the operations indicates the urgency with which the government and security forces are acting in order to return IDPs to areas recently cleared of ISIS militants. On September 6, the Anbar Provincial Council announced the return of 250 families to areas around the city of Fallujah, which was cleared of ISIS militants on June 26, 2016, and stated that the return of hundreds more displaced families to the area would take place in “the days to come”. This news comes despite the fact that the areas had only been cleared of IEDs that day and services such as water and electricity had not been restored. The Anbar Provincial Council had previously anticipated the start of returns to areas surrounding Fallujah to begin after Eid al-Adha, or September 12, and had warned against the premature return of IDPs. On September 6, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 965 IDPs departed the Debaga Camp in Erbil Province on September 1 and returned to Qayyarah, 60 kilometres south of Mosul, despite an uncertain security situation in the city. Qayyarah has seen heavy fighting in recent weeks due to its strategic importance for ISF advancing to clear ISIS militants who have controlled the city for the past two years. Qayyarah was cleared on August 28, but according to a United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) report on September 13, the retreating ISIS militants opened up oil pipes running through the town, leaving the streets flowing with oil, much of which had been set on fire. Corpses litter the streets, and the safety of returnees is threatened by the presence of IEDs. On September 6, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) announced that it has installed medical detachments to provide relief to families displaced from Saqlawiyah and Garma, 12 and 27 kilometers northeast of Fallujah respectively. The IRCS’s team provides medical and relief assistance to more than 230 families in camps in the Anbar and Baghdad provinces. On September 6, the Education Committee of the Council of Diyala announced the secure return of more than 30,000 displaced students to school.
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