DOCSLIB.ORG

Irak Qui Les Oppose Depuis Trois Mois Et Au Levant) Rant En Syrie a Aussi Incité Les Auto¬ Aux Djihadistes De L'etat Islami¬ Rités Koweïtiennes À Durcir Le Ton

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Irak Qui Les Oppose Depuis Trois Mois Et Au Levant) Rant En Syrie a Aussi Incité Les Auto¬ Aux Djihadistes De L'etat Islami¬ Rités Koweïtiennes À Durcir Le Ton INSTITUT KURDE DE PARIS Information and liaison bulletin N°349 april 2014 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGCID) aqnd the Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (The Fund for action and support of integration and the struggle against discrimination) This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 15 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 349 April 2014 IRAQ: GENERAL ELECTIONS IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY. IRAQI KURDISTAN: HOLDING PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN THE REGION. SYRIA: CONTROVERSY OVER A LINE OF TRENCHES ALONG THE KURDISH BORDER. STRASBOURG : A RESOLUTION BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ABOUT IRAN. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: THE LATEST REPORT OF THE CPJ REGARDING IRAQI KURDISTAN. CINEMA: THE RELEASE OF HINER SALEEM’S FIRM “MY SWEET PEPPERLAND” ATTRACTED A LOT OF ATTENTION. IRAQ: GENERAL ELECTIONS IN A DIVIDED COUNTRY he first Iraqi elections tors, defied the terrorism by turn- parties” to advocate a change in since the departure of ing up at the polling booths to elect the polling method. Thus “seven the US troops took place 328 members of Parliament for a 4 compensating seats” have been in a tense atmosphere year term of office. Parliament will allocated to parties whose results, T marked by acts of vio- then have to elect the President of at national level are not reflected in lence. They began on 28 April as Iraq, who will then appoint a each of the constituencies. Finally, the security forces voted two days Prime Minister responsible for there are eight seats reserved for before the rest of the citizens, forming the government. religious minorities — five for planned for the 30th. Already on Christians, and one each for the the 28th there were bomb attacks on The electoral system adopted is Mandeans, Yezidis and Shabaks. polling stations, causing at least 27 proportional representation with deaths. The Islamic State of Iraq open lists. The eighteen constituen- The Iraqi High Electoral and the Levant (ISIL) had already cies (governorates) must elect their Commission had authorised 276 announced that it would carry out representatives — 7 to 34 depend- political entities to field candidates. reprisals against Sunni Arab Iraqis ing on the size of the constituency’s These entities have formed coali- who turned out to vote. population. This is the first time tion lists the winning one of which this system has bee used in Iraq, has, according to the Constitution, As far as the Shiites were con- following a decision of the someone at the top of the list who cerned, bomb attacks on election Supreme Court. Previously the is due, should it win, become the meetings resulted in 37 dead and modified Saint-Laguë method was Prime Minister. This does not, many injured, some being in a criti- used which allocated a quotient to however, prevent the parties from cal condition. each seat, thus favouring the big- forming new coalitions after the ger parties. This is just the reason election results have been declared. Thus on the 30th, about 60%of the the Supreme Court put forward as Iraqis, out of the 18 million elec- “discriminating against the smaller The largest political parties in the • 2 • Information and liaison bulletin n° 349 • April 2014 field are the State of Law Party, led Nujayfi, the present Speaker of hoping to win a third term of office, by the present Prime Minister, Parliament, and the Iraqi National but he is in conflict with the Kurds Nuri al-Maliki, the Sadrist Front for Dialogue, a coalition of and the Sunni Arabs as well as a Movement (a Shiite militia), Masud five parties, four of which are main- substantial part of the Shiites. Were Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic ly Sunni Arab and one Christian he to take office, the country is in Party, that this time has not formed Party. Al-Hadba has a strong base danger of breaking up in the com- a coalition with either Jalal in the Nineveh-Mosul area where it ing years. Talabani’s Patriotic Union of has often clashed with Kurdish Kurdistan or with Gorran (an elected representatives on the Since the Parliamentary and opposition party with which it is provincial councils Provincial elections were in full negotiating to form a government swing, the issue of Nuri Maliki’s in the Kurdistan Region). In addi- The results will only be made cuts in the budget allocation to the tion there is the Iraqi National known on 25 May, after the High Kurdish Region has not been Alliance led by former Prime Electoral Commission has ruled on resolved. In an interview given to Minister Iyad Allawi, a pro-Arab the many objections that have been the Arabic language daily, Al- secular party that includes Shiite filed with it. Hayat, Masud Barzani expressed and Sunni Arabs. the opinion that Iraq was falling In Kirkuk Province, the final apart and that this political reality Some new parties have formed results, as for the rest of Iraq, will had to be faced: “major instability” since the 2010 parliamentary elec- be published on 25 May. However, and “rampant terrorism in the tions, including the “League of it already appears that the PUK Western regions of the country”, that People for Truth” that brings come out top, with an overwhelm- has a Sunni Arab majority and together some Shiite paramilitary ing victory for the present gover- where the ISIL is establishing itself groups close to Iran and the White nor, Dr. Karim Najmaldin, who on a lasting basis, and where “the Block, a break away from the Iraqi won 200,000 votes, far ahead of the government has completely lost control National Movement formed when KDP (63,347) the Turcoman Front of some cities and where some terrorists eight of its members of Parliament (50,000). Then comes the Arab are operating in a public manner”. left it in March 2011 to form their Alliance (30,000), Gorran (23,713) own group following disagree- and the two Kurdish religious par- In his view, the heart of the conflict ments with Iyad Allawi. In the ties, Yekgirtu and Komal, with 7 between Erbil and Baghdad is their 2013 provincial elections they had and 4 thousand votes respectively. different interpretation of the Iraqi joint a list led by Nuri Maliki but Constitution: “Mr Maliki thinks that will be standing on their own for At first sight, and subject to the he is the only one to decide and that the parliamentary elections. final official results, neither Gorran everyone else has only to obey. He does nor the religious parties will win a not support the Constitution as we in Because of the increasing political seat on the Kirkuk Provincial the Kurdistan Region do (…) He and sectarian tensions in Iraq, every- Council. thinks that everything belongs to one expected the vote to be more Baghdad”. “community oriented” than inspired Since no party will be able to win a by the various lists’ political pro- majority of the seats, several As for the Sunni Arab provinces, in grammes (often pretty laconic). As months of haggling can be expected a state of quasi insurrection, well as the Sadrist Movement, the before a coalition government with President Barzani points out that “religious” Shiite votes could go to a parliamentary majority can be just after the fall of Saddam, he had the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council formed. tried to persuade the Sunni Arabs (ISIC), a religious Shiite party very to form their own region, as had the influential in Southern Iraq, which On the Sunni and secular Arab Kurds, since he already foresaw a has, however, lost ground to Nuri side, Al-Hadba, led by Atheel Al bloody conflict with the Shiites: “It Maliki’s State of Law party. The ISIC Nujayfi, is likely to win between 33 was possible at the time, but they proposes a form of autonomy for the and 37 seats, the Iraqi National refused and still believed that, in Iraq, Shiite South, but of a pretty theocrat- Alliance, founded by former Prime power traditionally and historically ic character. Minister Iyad Allawi, is likely to belonged to the Sunnis. They had not win between 17 and 25 seats and realised the extent of the change that In addition to the Iraqi National the Iraqi National Front for had occurred. Now they are demanding Alliance, Sunni Arab voters have a Dialogue might have another 10 it [to form their own Region] but choice between Al-Hadba, an Arab seats. now it seems harder and more complex nationalist movement led by Atheel to carry out. They are demanding and Al Nujayfi, brother of d’Usama Al The Prime Minister, especially, is Baghdad is refusing it”. n° 349 • April 2014 Information and liaison bulletin • 3• IRAQI KURDISTAN: HOLDING PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS IN THE REGION t the same time as the par- impact on public opinion than the appointed by the Region’s Ministry liamentary elections were Parliamentary elections, as several of the Interior. This governor, in taking place in Kurdistan international and Iraqi media noted turn, could choose and appoint high as in the rest of the coun- — especially as the provincial coun- officials without consulting the A try, the three Kurdish cils had not had any elections for the provincial councils.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iraq: Opposition to the Government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
    Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Version 2.0 June 2021 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: • A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm • The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules • The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules • A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) • A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory • A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and • If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • Internal and External Security Dynamics of Qatari Policy Toward the Syria Uprising
    Comillas Journal of International Relations | nº 05 | 065-077 [2016] [ISSN 2386-5776] 65 DOI: cir.i05.y2016.005 INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY DYNAMICS OF QATARI POLICY TOWARD THE SYRIA UPRISING Las dinámicas de seguridad internas y externas de la política de Catar frente al levantamiento sirio Kristian Coates Ulrichsen Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy Autor Affiliate Professor, Henry M Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington-Seattle E-mail: [email protected] Qatar played a leading role in supporting the opposition to Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of the Syrian uprising in 2011. While Kuwait emerged as a key (unofficial) conduit for financial Abstract transfers from the Gulf States to Syria and backing from Saudi Arabia initially took the form of illicit flows of militants and weapons to groups of opposition fighters, Qatar from the start adopted a political approach to organizing the Syrian opposition, in addition to providing tens of millions of dollars to rebel groups. Qatari support increasingly controversial as it was perceived to be tied to groups linked to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. During 2012, Qatar and Saudi Arabia backed competing groups, contributing to the fragmentation of the opposition, before responsibility for the “Syria file” passed decisively from Doha to Riyadh in spring 2013. This signified a major setback to Qatar’s ambition to become a regional power and highlighted how Qatar’s Syria policy was undermined by the lack of institutional capacity to underpin highly- personalised decision-making processes. Qatar; Syria; Saudi Arabia; Syrian civil war; Syrian opposition; rebel groups; terrorism financing; Key words foreign policy Catar; Siria; Arabia Saudí; guerra civil siria; oposición siria; grupos rebeldes; financiación del terrorismo; política exterior Recibido: 25/9/2015.
    [Show full text]
  • Kurdistan Rising? Considerations for Kurds, Their Neighbors, and the Region
    KURDISTAN RISING? CONSIDERATIONS FOR KURDS, THEIR NEIGHBORS, AND THE REGION Michael Rubin AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Kurdistan Rising? Considerations for Kurds, Their Neighbors, and the Region Michael Rubin June 2016 American Enterprise Institute © 2016 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any man- ner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI. American Enterprise Institute 1150 17th St. NW Washington, DC 20036 www.aei.org. Cover image: Grand Millennium Sualimani Hotel in Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan, by Diyar Muhammed, Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons. Contents Executive Summary 1 1. Who Are the Kurds? 5 2. Is This Kurdistan’s Moment? 19 3. What Do the Kurds Want? 27 4. What Form of Government Will Kurdistan Embrace? 56 5. Would Kurdistan Have a Viable Economy? 64 6. Would Kurdistan Be a State of Law? 91 7. What Services Would Kurdistan Provide Its Citizens? 101 8. Could Kurdistan Defend Itself Militarily and Diplomatically? 107 9. Does the United States Have a Coherent Kurdistan Policy? 119 Notes 125 Acknowledgments 137 About the Author 139 iii Executive Summary wo decades ago, most US officials would have been hard-pressed Tto place Kurdistan on a map, let alone consider Kurds as allies. Today, Kurds have largely won over Washington.
    [Show full text]
  • Fighting-For-Kurdistan.Pdf
    Fighting for Kurdistan? Assessing the nature and functions of the Peshmerga in Iraq CRU Report Feike Fliervoet Fighting for Kurdistan? Assessing the nature and functions of the Peshmerga in Iraq Feike Fliervoet CRU Report March 2018 March 2018 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Cover photo: Peshmerga, Kurdish Army © Flickr / Kurdishstruggle Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute ([email protected]). The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo, framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL. About the author Feike Fliervoet is a Visiting Research Fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit where she contributes to the Levant research programme, a three year long project that seeks to identify the origins and functions of hybrid security arrangements and their influence on state performance and development.
    [Show full text]
  • Library Note
    Library Note Debate on 27 February: Syria and the Middle East This Library Note provides background reading in advance of the debate in the House of Lords on 27 February 2014 on recent developments in Syria and the Middle East. It provides in-depth information and material on Syria, and a brief summary of recent developments in selected countries in the Middle East (Yemen, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, the Gulf States, Egypt and Jordan). This Note adds to and updates information provided in the House of Lords Library Notes Recent Developments in the Middle East (13 July 2012, LLN 2012/029) and Recent Developments in Syria, the Middle East and North Africa (27 June 2013, LLN 2013/017). Thomas Brown, Edward Scott, Mary Santo and James Tobin 13 February 2014 LLN 2014/006 House of Lords Library Notes are compiled for the benefit of Members of the House of Lords and their personal staff, to provide impartial, politically balanced briefing on subjects likely to be of interest to Members of the Lords. Authors are available to discuss the contents of the Notes with the Members and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public. Any comments on Library Notes should be sent to the Head of Research Services, House of Lords Library, London SW1A 0PW or emailed to [email protected]. Table of Contents 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 1 2. Syria ...............................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Has the Syrian War Entered a New Phase?
    Analysis Report 50/2013 25th September 2013 Mario Laborie Iglesias HAS THE SYRIAN WAR ENTERED A NEW Visit our Sign up for our Newsletter PHASE? website This document has been translated by a Translation and Interpreting Degree student doing work experience, IGNACIO CUEVAS MARTÍNEZ, under the auspices of the Collaboration Agreement between the Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid, and the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies. HAS THE SYRIAN WAR ENTERED A NEW PHASE? Abstract: The present document offers a brief revision of the different phases of the Syrian civil war; it analyzes the possible consequences that the August 21 chemical incident in Damascus may have with a view to the future of the war; and it considers the options for his ending. Keywords: Syria, civil war, chemical weapons, Assad, political opposition Analysis report 50/2013 1 HAS THE SYRIAN WAR ENTERED A NEW PHASE? Mario Laborie Iglesias ANALYSIS The fact that the Syrian regime has agreed to destroy its chemical weapons, as a way to prevent a punitive attack by the Western powers led by the U.S., has been greeted with relief by the foreign offices all over the world1. On September 21, according to the deadlines set by the Russia- U.S. agreement signed in Geneva, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) received the initial declaration of the chemical weapons that Syria has in possession2. On August 21, the most remarkable chemical weapons incident of the war took place3. That day a rocket attack, equipped with a chemical agent (sarin gas), killed 1,429 people in a Damascus suburb4, according to the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Games Without Frontiers: Renegotiating the Boundaries of Power in Iraqi Kurdistan
    GAMES WITHOUT FRONTIERS: RENEGOTIATING THE BOUNDARIES OF POWER IN IRAQI KURDISTAN THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE MIKE FLEET AND MEGAN CONNELLY JUNE 2021 WWW.MEI.EDU Photo above: Kurdistan parliament speaker Rewaz Faiq (top C), leads a parliament session in Erbil, the capital of Iraq’s northern autonomous Kurdish region, on May 25, 2021. Photo by SAFIN HAMED/AFP via Getty Images. Introduction Over the past year, intensifying political and economic conflicts between the Kurdistan Region’s two hegemonic parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of The parties’ efforts Kurdistan (PUK), have challenged the legal and institutional order to renegotiate their in which the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) operates. While financial entitlements power has always been concentrated in an exclusive coalition of and the scope of their partisan elites, the KDP and PUK had each tacitly acknowledged administrative control the other’s de facto autonomy over the territories they governed have so far produced independently from the civil war of the 1990s until the reunification no consensus. of the KRG. But a new generation of leadership within the parties, a fraught relationship with the federal government, and a prolonged economic crisis exacerbated by collapsing oil prices and the global pandemic have strained the KDP-PUK relationship to its breaking point. While the KDP has claimed a majoritarian mandate to govern on a reform platform that eliminates consociational entitlements, the PUK has issued an ultimatum: respect local autonomy and 2 A new generation of leadership, a fraught relationship with [Baghdad], and a prolonged economic crisis exacerbated by collapsing oil prices and the global pandemic have strained the KDP-PUK relationship to its breaking point.” restore an equitable division of power within the KRG or it will in consumer demand during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, withdraw from the governing coalition.
    [Show full text]
  • Change in Iraqi Politics: from Ethnic-Sectarian Lines to Centralization Question
    Change in Iraqi Politics: From Ethnic-Sectarian Lines to Centralization Question Serhat ERKMEN* Abstract After the invasion of Iraq, politics in Iraq was rebuilt in accordance with ethnic and religious lines and the political alliances have been reshaped over these lines. However, the withdrawal of US troops and internal dif- ferences of Iraqi parties triggered new political balances which cannot be limited into only ethnic and sectarian bases. Today, because of the political and strategic effects of Arab Spring and internal power strug- gles among the main Iraqi political groupings Iraq has entered in a new phase in politics which centralization issue will be the focus. Keywords: Iraqi politics, centralization, Arab Spring and Iraq, With- drawal of US troops Özet *SC**4 0B- 4 * ' 0 0 - C*=*=@ * *4 * ***0*40' * C *C =S4***S*- C 0 **0 ****B' C'* **0 *=4* =@ * * Assos. Prof. Ahi Evran University, Department of International Relations, and Middle East Advisor of ORSAM Serhat Erkmen, Change in Iraqi Politics: From Ethnic-Sectarian Lines to Centralization Question, Ortadoğu Etütleri, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012, pp.143-164. Serhat Erkmen According to the author, there are two main reasons that explain the change in the political balances and policy making in Iraq. The first reason is that the United States have started to lose gradually their role both in military and political aspects in Iraq after 2010. Decrease in military power of the US in Iraq in a way that cannot be compared with previous years (even though all the combat troops have retreated, it will not be considered as a complete withdrawal since there are still American troops in Iraq under the name of military advisors) has cre- ated great impacts both in the fields of security and the fields of policy and this phenomenon has enlarged the maneuver room of the Iraqi political parties.
    [Show full text]
  • International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq
    International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq HCR/PC/ May 2019 HCR/PC/IRQ/2019/05 _Rev.2. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO PEOPLE FLEEING THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ Table of Contents I. Executive Summary .......................................................................................... 6 1) Refugee Protection under the 1951 Convention Criteria and Main Categories of Claim .... 6 2) Broader UNHCR Mandate Criteria, Regional Instruments and Complementary Forms of Protection ............................................................................................................................. 7 3) Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative (IFA/IRA) .............................................................. 7 4) Exclusion Considerations .................................................................................................... 8 5) Position on Forced Returns ................................................................................................. 9 II. Main Developments in Iraq since 2017 ............................................................. 9 A. Political Developments ........................................................................................................... 9 1) May 2018 Parliamentary Elections ...................................................................................... 9 2) September 2018 Kurdistan Parliamentary Elections ......................................................... 10 3) October 2017 Independence
    [Show full text]
  • Confessionalism and Electoral Prospects in Iraq
    Confessionalism and Electoral Prospects in Iraq Yasir Kouti Dlawer Ala’Aldeen About MERI The Middle East Research Institute engages in policy issues contributing to the process of state building and democratisation in the Middle East. Through independent analysis and policy debates, our research aims to promote and develop good governance, human rights, rule of law and social and economic prosperity in the region. It was established in 2014 as an independent, not-for-profit organisation based in Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Middle East Research Institute 1186 Dream City Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq T: +964 (0)662649690 E: [email protected] www.meri-k.org NGO registration number. K843 © Middle East Research Institute, 2017 The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of MERI, the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publisher. Confessionalism and Electoral Prospects in Iraq MERI Policy Paper Yasir Kouti Research Fellow, MERI Dlawer Ala’Aldeen President of MERI April 2018 1 Contents Summary ........................................................................................................................................................4 Confessionalism and Party Alliances ........................................................................................................5
    [Show full text]
  • Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria
    Timeline of International Response to the Situation in Syria Beginning with dates of a few key events that initiated the unrest in March 2011, this timeline provides a chronological list of important news and actions from local, national, and international actors in response to the situation in Syria. Skip to: [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [Most Recent] Acronyms: EU – European Union PACE – Parliamentary Assembly of the Council CoI – UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria of Europe FSA – Free Syrian Army SARC – Syrian Arab Red Crescent GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council SASG – Special Adviser to the Secretary- HRC – UN Human Rights Council General HRW – Human Rights Watch SES – UN Special Envoy for Syria ICC – International Criminal Court SOC – National Coalition of Syrian Revolution ICRC – International Committee of the Red and Opposition Forces Cross SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights IDPs – Internally Displaced People SNC – Syrian National Council IHL – International Humanitarian Law UN – United Nations ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant UNESCO – UN Educational, Scientific and ISSG – International Syria Support Group Cultural Organization JSE – UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy to UNGA – UN General Assembly Syria UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for LAS – League of Arab States Refugees NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization UNICEF – UN Children’s Fund OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of UNRWA – UN Relief Works Agency for Humanitarian Affairs Palestinian Refugees OIC – Organization of Islamic Cooperation UNSC – UN Security Council OHCHR – UN Office of the High UNSG – UN Secretary-General Commissioner for Human Rights UNSMIS – UN Supervision Mission in Syria OPCW – Organization for the Prohibition of US – United States Chemical Weapons 2011 2011: Mar 16 – Syrian security forces arrest roughly 30 of 150 people gathered in Damascus’ Marjeh Square for the “Day of Dignity” protest, demanding the release of imprisoned relatives held as political prisoners.
    [Show full text]
  • PH Lecture Draft
    University of South Wales Public Lecture, 20 March 2014 SYRIA: THE WORST WESTERN FOREIGN POLICY CATASTROPHE OF RECENT TIMES? (draft) Peter Hain MP for Neath and former UK Middle East and Cabinet Minister The Syrian horror has been unfolding since March 2011, and it is estimated that there have been more fatalities per head of population than any recent conflict in the region, with a death count averaging a colossal 117 per day. Government forces have unleashed waves of terror, while their Jihadist opponents, affiliates of Al Qaeda, have imposed their own medieval barbarity. The death toll is widely believed to be well over 100,000 (the last figure the UN released in July 2013 before conditions made further accurate estimates impossible). The Oxford Research group has reported 764 cases of summary execution of children. In the Damascus suburbs that were hit by chemical attacks, people died – and still are dying – from hunger. The number of Syrians in need of food aid is estimated to be as high as 10.5 million which is almost half the population. The murder and torture of thirteen year old Hamza Al-Khatib by government forces early on in the conflict showed Syrians and the world that no-one was safe, whatever their age, gender or religion. The names of cities like Homs – partly evacuated by the UN after being under siege for over 600 days – have joined some of the world’s worst atrocities: evacuees described the situation inside as ‘genocidal’. In February 2012 the entire Baba Amr district of Homs was destroyed, and very little is known of the fate of those who lived there.
    [Show full text]