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KRG) Area, May 10-22, 2011 Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) Federal Office for Migration February 1, 2012 Report on Joint Finnish-Swiss Fact-Finding Mission to Amman and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Area, May 10-22, 2011 Haftungs- und Nutzungshinweis zu Quellen und Informationen Der vorliegende Bericht wurde von der Länderanalyse des Bundesamtes für Migration (BFM) zusammen mit dem Country Information Service des Finnish Immigration Service erstellt gemäss den gemeinsamen EU-Leitlinien für die Bearbeitung von Informationen über Herkunftsländer. Er wurde auf der Grundlage sorgfältig ausgewählter und öffentlich zugänglicher Informationsquellen zusammengestellt. Alle zur Verfügung stehenden Informationen wurden mit grösster Sorgfalt recherchiert, evaluiert und bearbeitet. Alle verwendeten Quellen sind referenziert. Dessen ungeachtet erhebt dieses Dokument keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit. Es erlaubt auch keine abschliessende Bewertung darüber, ob ein individueller Antrag auf einen bestimmten Flüchtlingsstatus oder auf Asyl berechtigt ist. Wenn ein bestimmtes Ereignis, eine bestimmte Person oder Organisation in diesem Bericht keine Erwähnung findet, bedeutet dies nicht, dass ein solches Ereignis nicht stattgefunden hat oder dass die betreffende Person oder Organisation nicht existieren. Die Inhalte sind unabhängig verfasst und können nicht als offizielle Stellungnahme weder der Schweiz oder ihrer Behörden noch Finnlands oder seiner Behörden gewertet werden. Reservations on information, its use, and its sources This report, written by Country Analysis of the Federal Office for Migration in partnership with the Country Information Service of the Finnish Immigration Service is in line with EU Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information. The report draws on carefully selected sources that are referenced in the report. Information has been researched, analyzed, and edited according to best practices. However, the authors make no claim to be exhaustive. No conclusions should be drawn from this report regarding the merits of a request for refugee status or asylum. The fact that some occurrence, person, or organization is not mentioned in the report does not imply that such occurrence never happened or that a person or organization does not exist. This report is the result of independent research and editing. The views and statements expressed in this report do not necessarily represent any consensus, neither by the Swiss government or its agencies nor by the Finnish government or its agencies. Public Executive Summary / Main Findings The Swiss and Finnish Immigration services visited the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) area and its surroundings in 2007 in separate fact-finding missions (FFMs) and in May 2011 in a joint FFM. The presence of police, Peshmerga, and Asayish forces throughout the KRG area is significantly lower today than in 2007. There are fewer checkpoints, and security checks within the KRG area seemed to be less stringent than before. This does not apply to checkpoints between the KRG region and Central Iraq, however. The security situation was still tense in disputed areas in the Kirkuk, Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah al-Din governorates at the time of the joint FFM. There were pro-democracy demonstrations in Sulaymaniya and other northern governorates in the spring of 2011. The demonstrations, which were aimed at improving people’s rights and access to services while combating corruption and nepotism in the society, were suppressed by Kurdish security forces in April. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) have continued talks with opposition parties, mainly the Gorran, the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU), and the Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), in a tense political environment. Key issues between the KRG and the government of Iraq, such as the disputed areas, hydrocarbon legislation, constitutional reform, and Peshmerga funding, remained unresolved at the time of the joint FFM. The economy in the KRG region has been booming in recent years. The fact-finding mission witnessed many new residential areas, roads, and shopping malls, as well as a modern car fleet and a newly constructed Erbil International Airport, as signs of economic success. At the same time, productivity is low, most products are imported, much of the reconstruction is done by foreign companies, prices are high, and jobs are mainly available in the public sector. Agriculture has been neglected, along with social services and job creation. The human rights situation is better in the KRG region than in the rest of Iraq, but it worsened in 2011 with the repression of independent journalists, demonstrators, and opposition parties. The situation for women has improved slightly as a result of new legislation, but there are still a significant number of honour killings in the KRG area. KRG authorities have become more aware of human rights and with the aid of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international groups have improved their practices (for instance, in the correctional treatment of prisoners). At the time of the FFM, there seemed to be little discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities. The flight of Christians from Central Iraq to the KRG area has continued since the bomb attack on a church in Baghdad in October 2010. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees are better off in the KRG area than in the rest of Iraq and generally felt safe in the region at the time of the FFM. At the same time, some suffer from poverty, remain unregistered, and lack access to proper housing, education, health care, and employment. Overall, there is noticeable growth in the health sector in the KRG area compared with the situation in 2007. People generally have access to health care. The quality and quantity of health information, specialized health services, drugs, and health care facilities need significant improvement, however. The migration potential in the KRG remains high, particularly among young unemployed Kurds and groups such as Iranian refugees, whose families have lived in local camps for decades. 3/106 Public Table of Contents 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................9 2. Security Situation........................................................................................................9 2.1. Security situation in Iraq................................................................................................9 2.2. Security situation in the KRG area ..............................................................................10 2.3. Security situation in the disputed areas ......................................................................11 3. Political Situation......................................................................................................12 3.1. Pro-democracy demonstrations in Iraq .......................................................................12 3.2. Pro-democracy demonstrations in the KRG area .......................................................13 3.3. The aftermath of the spring 2011 demonstrations ......................................................16 3.4. Opposition in KRG area politics ..................................................................................17 4. Economic and Humanitarian Situations .................................................................19 4.1. Economy .....................................................................................................................19 4.1.1. Construction boom......................................................................................................20 4.1.2. Corruption and Nepotism ............................................................................................21 4.1.3. Job opportunities / unemployment / foreign workers...................................................22 4.2. Infrastructure...............................................................................................................22 4.2.1. Regional differences ...................................................................................................22 4.2.2. Accommodations.........................................................................................................23 4.2.3. Fuel / water / electricity ...............................................................................................24 4.2.4. Traffic / telecommunications / banks...........................................................................25 4.2.5. Education ....................................................................................................................25 5. Law Enforcement ......................................................................................................27 5.1. Security forces in the KRG..........................................................................................27 5.1.1. Peshmerga..................................................................................................................27 5.1.2. Police and the Zerevani ..............................................................................................27 5.1.3. Asayish........................................................................................................................29 5.1.4. Intelligence services (Parastin and Zanyari) ...............................................................29 4/106 Public 5.2. Prisons ........................................................................................................................29
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