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INSTITUT KUDE RPARD IS E Information and liaison bulletin N° 370 JANUARY 2016 The publication of this Bulletin enjoys a subsidy from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DGCID) aqnd the Fonds d’action et de soutien pour l’intégration et la lutte contre les discriminations (The Fund for action and support of integration and the struggle against discrimination) This bulletin is issued in French and English Price per issue : France: 6 € — Abroad : 7,5 € Annual subscribtion (12 issues) France : 60 € — Elsewhere : 75 € Monthly review Directeur de la publication : Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire : 659 15 A.S. ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tel. : 01-48 24 64 64 - Fax : 01-48 24 64 66 www.fikp.org E-mail: bulletin@fikp.org Information and liaison bulletin Kurdish Institute of Paris Bulletin N° 370 January 2016 • TURKEY: 1128 ACADEMICS CALLING FOR KURD0-TURKISH PEACE ARE BEING CHARGED WITH TREASON • SYRIA: ALTHOUGH A KEY FACTOR IN THE SITUATION, THE KURDS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS BY TURKEY • TURKEY: Mr. ERDOGAN’S ALL OUT WAR TURKEY: 1128 ACADEMICS CALLING FOR KURD0-TURKISH PEACE ARE CHARGES WITH TREASON. he latest news from founder of a religious brotherhood, tion in 2014, including his own son Turkey show the extent which has a great network of —charges that shook his political T to which any expression NGOs, schools, businesses and authority. Convinced that Gulen of disagreement with press organs, is accused of “high had masterminded these accusa - President Erdogan’s treason”, for which the Prosecutor tions, Erdogan declared war on increasingly authoritarian policy is is asking for a sentence of life him. Some 1,800 people suspected immediately accused of treason. imprisonment. The 66 people joint - of being members of his “network” Indeed, it is not even necessary to ly charged with him are very much have been arrested since 2014and express one’s opposition — in the present — mainly former police - nearly 300 of them are awaiting present atmosphere of paranoiac men, including two police chiefs. trial in jail. The Turkish govern - tension everyone is a potential dan - They are accused of being mem - ment is trying (so far without suc - ger to Mr. Erdogan’s authority and bers of an armed organisation and cess) is securing the Imam’s extra - faces serious problems. face sentences of between seven dition from the United States. and three hundred years imprison - Thus, on the 6 th of the month, the ment… Another example: on the 11 th the in absentia trial of Fethullah Gülen Public Prosecutors began a crimi - began in Istanbul, although the While long allied to the Gülen net - nal enquiry for “terrorist propa - accused, who has lived in the USA work, Erdogan quarrelled with the ganda” against the Kanal D broad - for the last fifteen years. This influ - brotherhood after some AKP cast of the “Beyaz Show ”. Why? ential 74-year-old Imam, the Ministers were accused of corrup - Because during the, an actress from • 2 • Information and liaison bulletin n° 370 • January 2016 Diyarbekir had called to try and Turkey’s own laws and interna - Sultanahmet suicide attack in sound the alarm over the human tional treaties to which Turkey is a Istanbul. An hour after this attack, cost of the military campaign now party. These actions are in serious Mr. Erdogan showed, on television, being carried out in Turkish violation of international law. what the French weekly Express Kurdistan. In danger of losing his described on its site as “a strange job and faced with threats from the We demand the state to abandon reaction”, even going so far as to nationalists, the show’s presenter its deliberate massacre and depor - wonder whether the Turkish had to make public apologies. tation of Kurdish and other peo - President was “losing his head”. ples in the region. We also demand Speaking about the attack, However the main target, during the state to lift the curfew, punish President Erdogan immediately the month of January, of Mr. those who are responsible for blamed it on ISIS before dropping Erdogan’s public condemnation human rights violations, and com - any further mention of the Jihadst and prosecution has been the 1,128 pensate those citizens who have organisation and, in less than a academics from 89 universities, experienced material and psycho - minute, concentrating on furious both Turkish and foreign, who, on logical damage. For this purpose attacks on the Kurdish PKK rebels the 11 th , signed an appeal entitled: we demand that independent and — on the signatories of the “We will not be accomplices of this national and international appeal “ We will not be party to this crime ”. This appeal attacks the observers to be given access to the crime ”. Apparently driven rabid by authorities’ policy of indiscrimi - region and that they be allowed to this appeal, the Turkish President nate violence in the country’s monitor and report on the inci - described the signatories as “ pseu - Kurdish region. This appeal has dents. do-intellectuals ” and “ traitors to the been signed by, inter alia , the country ”, calling for over half an famous American linguist Noam We demand the government to pre - hour for the opening of a real Chomsky and the Slovenian pare the conditions for negotiations witch-hunt against them. philosopher Slavoj Zizek, and calls and create a road map that would for the ending of the Army’s cam - lead to a lasting peace, which Erdogan certainly does not lose his paign in the Southeast and the includes the demands of the head where his projects for power resumption of negotiations with Kurdish political movement. We are at stake, It is nore likely that he the PKK to find a peaceful solution demand inclusion of independent deliberately chose to “highlight” the to the Kurdish Question. observers from broad sections of appeal by academics, so as to dis - society in these negotiations. We tract Turkish public opinion from The following is the full text of this also declare our willingness to vol - the sensitive question of Turkey’s appeal. unteer as observers. We oppose relations with ISIS and to direct dis - suppression of any kind of the cussion round the question of sup - As academics and researchers of this opposition. port for his government — and so to country, we will not be a party to his project of a presidential regime. this crime! We, as academics and researchers His brutal attacks on his critics have working on and/or in Turkey, enabled his to renew his policy of declare that we will not be a party reaching out towards the ultra- “The Turkish state has effectively to this massacre by remaining nationalists for support for his pro - condemned its citizens in Sur, silent and demand an immediate ject. Silvan, Nusaybin, Cizre, Silopi, and end to the violence perpetrated by Thus the ultra-nationalist Sedat many other towns and neighbour - the state. We will continue advoca - Peker, (who, incidentally, is a mafia hoods in the Kurdish provinces to cy with political parties, the parlia - chief who has already been sen - hunger through its use of curfews ment, and international public tenced on criminal charges regard - that have been ongoing for weeks. opinion until our demands are ing organised crime), has character - It has attacked these settlements met”. istically mobilised part of this with heavy weapons and equip - Turkish neo-fascist movement in ment that would only be mobilized (The text is translated in several support of the Head of State. He has in wartime. As a result, the right to languages in the Kurdistan site, published on his web site a state - life, liberty, and security, and in http:// http://www.kedistan.net/2016/ ment announcing that the signato - particular the prohibition of torture 01/05/baris-paix-peace-asiti- ries of this appeal should pay for it and ill treatment protected by the kurdistan/ as well as on several with their blood, describing them as constitution and international con - French language blogs). “so called intellectuals ” in ters similar ventions have been violated. to those used by President Erdogan. This deliberate and planned mas - This appeal was published on the Peker added: “ You should rather thank sacre is in serious violation of th 11 , that is the day before the the police and the troops who you have n° 370 • January 2016 Information and liaison bulletin • 3• tried to discredit. If these terrorists were all, 21 academics were subjected to idarity) with those who commit to succeed in their mission of provoking such raids and placed in detention. crimes are themselves guilty of those the failure of the Turkish Moslem State crimes ” (…) “ The fact that they have you would really face moments of terror. This repercussion aroused many some title before their name, professor, The bell would then toll for all of you. reactions in Turkey as abroad, As lecturer or whatever it may be does not Let me repeat: we will make your blood from the 14 th , 558 intellectuals, make them enlightened — they are flow, we will bathe in your blood !”. mainly writers or stage directors, people in deep darkness ”. (…) “ I have Sedat Peker had already drawn published their own declaration: asked the legal institutions and attention to himself before the last “In our hearts we support the aca - University administrations immedi - November’s elections with a speech demics’ call for peace for peace. (…) ately to take the necessary measures in supporting Mr. Erdogan, in which We refuse to see freedom of expression the face of their violation of the he mingled Islamist and fascist ref - so limited.
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