DOCSLIB.ORG

Anti-Statist Discourses Within the Kurdish National Movement Ozum Yesiltas Florida International University, [email protected]

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Anti-Statist Discourses Within the Kurdish National Movement Ozum Yesiltas Florida International University, Oyesi001@Fiu.Edu Florida International University FIU Digital Commons FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations University Graduate School 3-24-2014 Rethinking the National Question: Anti-Statist Discourses within the Kurdish National Movement Ozum Yesiltas Florida International University, [email protected] DOI: 10.25148/etd.FI14040879 Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Yesiltas, Ozum, "Rethinking the National Question: Anti-Statist Discourses within the Kurdish National Movement" (2014). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1325. https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1325 This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY Miami, Florida RETHINKING THE NATIONAL QUESTION: ANTI-STATIST DISCOURSES WITHIN THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS by Ozum Yesiltas 2014 To: Dean Kenneth Furton College of Arts and Sciences This dissertation, written by Ozum Yesiltas, and entitled Rethinking the National Question: Anti-Statist Discourses within the Kurdish National Movement, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment. We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved. _______________________________________ Felix Martin _______________________________________ Charles G. MacDonald _______________________________________ Benjamin Smith _______________________________________ Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Co-Major Professor _______________________________________ Rebecca Mae Salokar, Co-Major Professor Date of Defense: March 24, 2014 The dissertation of Ozum Yesiltas is approved. _______________________________________ Dean Kenneth G. Furton College of Arts and Sciences _______________________________________ Dean Lakshmi N. Reddi University Graduate School Florida International University, 2014 ii © Copyright 2014 by Ozum Yesiltas All rights reserved. iii DEDICATION I dedicate this dissertation to my family and colleagues at Florida International University without whose generous emotional and intellectual support it would not have come to fruition. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to thank all members of my committee for patiently and smoothly guiding me throughout the research and writing phases of the present work. Special gratitude should go to Dr. Mohiaddin Mesbahi whose intellectual brilliance, generous mentorship, and inspiring lectures have been at the genesis of the present work and have guided it throughout. I would also like to thank Dr. Felix Martin, Dr. Charles G. MacDonald and Dr. Benjamin Smith for providing invaluable guidance and inspiring works and words. I am particularly grateful to my parents Muzaffer Yeşiltaş and Ayten Yeşiltaş and my brother Yalın Yeşiltaş for their inexhaustible patience and great understanding whenever I need. The Dissertation Evidence Acquisition Fellowship and the Dissertation Year Fellowship provided by the Graduate School of Florida International University during the fieldwork and writing phases of this dissertation are gratefully acknowledged. v ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION RETHINKING THE NATIONAL QUESTION: ANTI-STATIST DISCOURSES WITHIN THE KURDISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT by Ozum Yesiltas Florida International University, 2014 Miami, Florida Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Co-Major Professor Professor Rebecca Mae Salokar, Co-Major Professor Why and under what conditions have the Kurds become agents of change in the Middle East in terms of democratization? Why did the Kurds’ role as democratic agents become particularly visible in the 1990s? How does the Kurdish movement’s turn to democratic discourse affect the political systems of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria? What are the implications of the Kurds’ adoption of democratic discourse for the transnational aspect of the Kurdish movement? Since the early 1990s, Kurdish national movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have undergone important political and ideological transformations. As a result of the Kurds’ growing role in shaping the debates on human rights and democratization in these four countries, the Kurdish national movement has acquired a dual character: an ethno-cultural struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity, and a democratization movement that seeks to redefine the concepts of governance and citizenship in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The process transformation has affected relations between the Kurdish movements and their respective central governments in significant ways. vi On the basis of face-to-face interviews and archival research conducted in Turkey, Iraq and parts of Europe, the present work challenges the current narrative of Kurdish nationalism, which is predominantly drawn from a statist interpretation of Kurdish nationalist goals, and argues instead that the Kurdish question is no longer a problem of statelessness but a problem of democracy in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The main contributions of this work are three fold. First, the research unfolds the reasons behind the growing emphasis of the Kurdish movement on the concepts of democracy, human rights, and political participation, which started in the early 1990s. Second, the findings challenge the existing scholarship that explains Kurdish nationalism as a problem of statelessness and shifts the focus to the transformative potentials of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria through a comparative lens. Third, this work explores the complex transnational coordination and negotiations between the Kurdish movements across borders and explains the regional repercussions of this process. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 Kurdish Nationalist Goals Revisited ................................................................... 8 The Regional Context ...................................................................................... 18 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 29 II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KURDISH NATIONALISM ................ 37 Modernists vs. Ethnicists: A False Dichotomy? ............................................... 39 The Limits of an Emerging Theoretical Synthesis ........................................... 46 Structural Approaches to the Study of Kurdish Nationalism ............................ 52 III. KURDS IN IRAQ ................................................................................................ 65 The Road to Autonomy: The Legacy of the Armed Struggle ........................... 70 Autonomous Kurdistan: An Opportunity for Democracy ................................ 80 Political Development and Emergent Democracy in Iraqi Kurdistan .............. 85 Relations between the KRG and Baghdad in the Post-Saddam Era ................. 96 The Arab-Kurdish Divide: Challenges and Prospects ...................................... 98 The Debate on Federalism .............................................................................. 103 Democracy and Power-Sharing in Iraq: Towards an Alternative Model ....... 108 The Road Ahead ............................................................................................. 116 IV. KURDS IN TURKEY ....................................................................................... 118 The Ideological Foundations of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey ............... 121 Enter the PKK ................................................................................................. 130 The Rise of Political Violence ........................................................................ 136 Transformation of the Kurdish Movement in Turkey..................................... 143 The PKK's Turn to Democratic Discourse ..................................................... 153 The Justice and Development Party and the Kurdish Question ...................... 159 The Democratic Opening and the Oslo Process ............................................. 166 The Limits of the AKP's Kurdish Policy ........................................................ 170 The Road Ahead ............................................................................................. 174 V. KURDS IN SYRIA ............................................................................................. 177 Institutionalization of Kurdish Nationalism in Syria ...................................... 180 Hafez Al-Assad's Game .................................................................................. 184 Reawakening of Kurdish Nationalism in Syria .............................................. 189 Towards the Qamishli Revolt ......................................................................... 191 The Beginning of a New Era: The Qamishli Revolt ....................................... 197 Evolving Relations between The Kurdish and Arab Opposition .................... 201 Syria: The Arab Spring's Final Destination .................................................... 211 viii The Kurds and the Syrian Opposition in the Wake of the
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Organising and Contesting the 2017 Kurdish Referendum on Independence: Political Opportunities, Mobilisation Structures and Framing Processes in Iraqi- Kurdistan
    Organising and Contesting the 2017 Kurdish Referendum on Independence: Political Opportunities, Mobilisation Structures and Framing Processes in Iraqi- Kurdistan Tim Bogers 5506727 Utrecht University 2 August 2019 A Thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in Conflict Studies & Human Rights Supervisor: dr. Chris van der Borgh Date of submission: 2 August 2019 Program trajectory: Research and Thesis Writing (30 ECTS) Word count: 23.798 Cover page picture: Kurdish flags at the pro-Kurdistan referendum and pro-Kurdistan independence rally at Franso Hariri Stadium, Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Levi Clancy, 2017). 2 Acknowledgements First and foremost I would like to thank all my respondents who were kind enough to make time for me and share valuable insights and information concerning the referendum; without their cooperation this research could not have been conducted. I would particularly like to thank my thesis supervisor, dr. Chris van der Borgh, who has always supported me and provided me with useful feedback and suggestions on how to improve both my research and my thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank Saba Azeem, who was so kind as to provide me with valuable context at the beginning of my research and share her experiences in the Iraqi- Kurdistan region with me. In addition, she provided me with access to her networks in Iraqi- Kurdistan, which really helped me kick-starting my research. Lastly, I would like to thank everyone who has provided me with feedback on this thesis and who has supported me throughout the research and thesis writing processes.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: Opposition to the Government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)
    Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) Version 2.0 June 2021 Preface Purpose This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into two main sections: (1) analysis and assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note – i.e. the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw – by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies: • A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm • The general humanitarian situation is so severe as to breach Article 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC (the Qualification Directive) / Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules • The security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that it would breach Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive as transposed in paragraph 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules • A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies) • A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory • A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and • If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • Regional Implications of Iraqi Kurdistan's Quest for Independence
    Briefing December 2016 Regional implications of Iraqi Kurdistan's quest for independence SUMMARY Strengthened by its victories over ISIL/Da'esh, the government of the autonomous region of Kurdistan in Iraq has announced that it plans to organise a referendum on independence. The deadline is still unclear, as political divisions have led the region to an institutional stalemate. Negotiations with the federal Iraqi government will focus on the territorial scope of the referendum. The Kurdish leaders want to include the 'disputed areas', in particular Kirkuk, in the poll. However, Iraq is not keen to be cut off from this oil-rich region, which is already at the heart of a dispute on the sharing of oil revenues. The status of Mosul after it is recaptured from ISIL/Da'esh is also under discussion. Even if the referendum were to take place and the 'yes' side won, it is not certain that a Kurdish state would emerge. Such a state would be weakened by internal divisions and poor economic conditions. In addition, Syria, Turkey and Iran, neighbouring countries that have complex relations with Iraqi Kurdistan, are worried that an independent Kurdish state would encourage their own Kurdish populations to seek greater autonomy. Yet, the perspective of a Greater Kurdistan is remote, since the regional Kurdish landscape is dominated by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) and its affiliates, which do not share Iraqi Kurdish leaders' ideology or strategic alliances. As for the EU and the great world powers, although they consider Iraqi Kurdistan to be a reliable ally in the fight against ISIL/Da'esh (again recently in the battle for Mosul), they do not want to openly back the fragmentation of the Middle-East.
    [Show full text]
  • From the Heart of Kurdistan Region
    From the Heart of Kurdistan Region The only English paper in Iraq - No: 564 Mon. January 23, 2017 _ “Serious work and fewer words should be done on independence.” _ Barzani GLOBE PHOTO The Kurdish Globe No. 564, Monday, January 23, 2017 2 The Card KRG to Iran on Saudi consulate of the PKK and row: no one is entitled to request a consulate be closed in Erbil Narrowness in Politics! By | Gazi Hassan In recent years, the public civil and also some parties use PKK struggle and movement in Northee against KDP in the internal conflict, ern Kurdistan served PKK as an while KDP will not hesitate in using armed force a great deal, whilst the its cards against the games playing No one is entitled to ree Region destabilizes peace serious stance on these ire civil struggle has caused disputes in against it. quest that a consulate be and causes chaos. responsible statements and their view regarding the future of Iran has called on Saudi Arabia for closed in Erbil, the Kurde Mohammad Hossein also takes steps to prevent their public position in Kurdistan. cooperation in solving the problems istan Regional Governe Rajabi, the commander of them from recurring,” the The people who were about to ese and the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, ment (KRG) said Sunday the powerful Islamic Reve KRG's statement read. tablish the rights, role and identity Bahrain and other places. To what in a statement responding olutionary Guards (IRGC) “These unacceptable of Kurds in Turkey, were causing this Iran’s new stance is related? to remarks made by an Irae in the Kurdish province
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Fact Sheet
    Iraq Fact Sheet Government The Iraqi government was created by a new constitution in 2005, after the fall of Saddam Hussein. The government is led by a Kurdish President, currently Fuad Masum, a Shia Prime Minister, currently Haider Abadi, and a Sunni Arab Vice President, currently, Khodair Khozaei. The Prime Minister is the dominant leader. The population of Iraq is estimated to be 38 million, with two official languages, Arabic and Kurdish. Ethnic and Religious Groups Sunni Arabs: Iraqi Sunni Arabs number about 20% of the population, or around 5-7 million people. Under Saddam Hussein, who was a Sunni Arab, they had a privileged place in Iraq. During the de- Ba’athification process post-2005, Sunni Arabs were largely excluded by the Shia elites, particularly under former Prime Minister Nouri Maliki. Sunnis, including those from the “Awakening Councils,” were also mostly excluded from joining the Iraqi Army, as it was feared that they could retake control. Shia Arabs: Shia Arabs are roughly 60% of the total population. Under Saddam, the Shiites were largely oppressed, shut off from their Shia neighbor Iran, and generally excluded from power in the country. In post-Saddam Iraq, the constitution gave Shias the most powerful position, that of Prime Minister. Nouri Maliki, the former Prime Minister, favored Shias. Maliki also took advantage of U.S. aid; it is reported that Iraq’s security forces received nearly $100 billion from 2006 to 2014. Maliki became increasingly authoritarian during his eight years as premier, and eventually was pushed out. The current Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, is also a Shia Arab from the same party – Dawa – as Maliki, but has been generally less biased, less corrupt, more pro-American, and less pro-Iranian.
    [Show full text]
  • Kurdistan Rising? Considerations for Kurds, Their Neighbors, and the Region
    KURDISTAN RISING? CONSIDERATIONS FOR KURDS, THEIR NEIGHBORS, AND THE REGION Michael Rubin AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Kurdistan Rising? Considerations for Kurds, Their Neighbors, and the Region Michael Rubin June 2016 American Enterprise Institute © 2016 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any man- ner whatsoever without permission in writing from the American Enterprise Institute except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. The views expressed in the publications of the American Enterprise Institute are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, advisory panels, officers, or trustees of AEI. American Enterprise Institute 1150 17th St. NW Washington, DC 20036 www.aei.org. Cover image: Grand Millennium Sualimani Hotel in Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan, by Diyar Muhammed, Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons. Contents Executive Summary 1 1. Who Are the Kurds? 5 2. Is This Kurdistan’s Moment? 19 3. What Do the Kurds Want? 27 4. What Form of Government Will Kurdistan Embrace? 56 5. Would Kurdistan Have a Viable Economy? 64 6. Would Kurdistan Be a State of Law? 91 7. What Services Would Kurdistan Provide Its Citizens? 101 8. Could Kurdistan Defend Itself Militarily and Diplomatically? 107 9. Does the United States Have a Coherent Kurdistan Policy? 119 Notes 125 Acknowledgments 137 About the Author 139 iii Executive Summary wo decades ago, most US officials would have been hard-pressed Tto place Kurdistan on a map, let alone consider Kurds as allies. Today, Kurds have largely won over Washington.
    [Show full text]
  • Police State, Mr El-Choufi Said That He Hoped Appointed RCC Secretary
    police state, Mr el-Choufi said that he hoped appointed RCC Secretary-General in succession to Mr Muhdi the formation of a new opposition front in Abdul Hussein Mashhadi, who had been dismissed on July 12 nd the democratic aspirations of the Syrian [see below]. ew cabinet *Dr Ahmed Abdul Sattar - al-Juwari . .1 k&s and Religious Affairs On *Mr Khaled ~bibmm . Minister of State for Kurdish Affairs , Mr Abdul Fattah Mohammad -I Amin. Local Pid&iinisiration* ' *Mr MzRasheed . * No change. t Changed or additional responsibilities. New portfolio. Mr Ramadhan, a member of the RCC, had hitherto been Minister , formerly known changes (i)Dr Ali was, as reported by the official Iraqi News Agency INA on Aug. 12, succeeded as Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research by Mr Jassim Muhammad al-Khalaf and (ii) under a presidential decree of Nov. 13 Dr al- Juwari was succeeded as Minister of Wads and Religious Affairs by Mr Nouri Faisal Shaher. I KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES February 22, 1980 February 2 death sentenc victed of ' quarters", ar against the pa to the Kurdis both within ar they had com~ [see 255 13 A]. ( Iraqi and o latter part of were being 1 result, many first secretary, Trial and Execution of Accused others moved ICP announcl its membershi] Front [see 26 barely particir missal in April Cabinet, see al During this had arrested I some detainees torture, and although the C nevertheless cc Furth a Deputy prim; that after the exc communist cells new prisoners [v fate" (political 5. death for non-B for the office of the RCC Deputy Chairman [see 28240 A].
    [Show full text]
  • Fighting-For-Kurdistan.Pdf
    Fighting for Kurdistan? Assessing the nature and functions of the Peshmerga in Iraq CRU Report Feike Fliervoet Fighting for Kurdistan? Assessing the nature and functions of the Peshmerga in Iraq Feike Fliervoet CRU Report March 2018 March 2018 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Cover photo: Peshmerga, Kurdish Army © Flickr / Kurdishstruggle Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute ([email protected]). The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo, framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL. About the author Feike Fliervoet is a Visiting Research Fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit where she contributes to the Levant research programme, a three year long project that seeks to identify the origins and functions of hybrid security arrangements and their influence on state performance and development.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq and the Kurds: the Brewing Battle Over Kirkuk
    IRAQ AND THE KURDS: THE BREWING BATTLE OVER KIRKUK Middle East Report N°56 – 18 July 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. COMPETING CLAIMS AND POSITIONS................................................................ 2 A. THE KURDISH NARRATIVE....................................................................................................3 B. THE TURKOMAN NARRATIVE................................................................................................4 C. THE ARAB NARRATIVE .........................................................................................................5 D. THE CHRISTIAN NARRATIVE .................................................................................................6 III. IRAQ’S POLITICAL TRANSITION AND KIRKUK ............................................... 7 A. USES OF THE KURDS’ NEW POWER .......................................................................................7 B. THE PACE OF “NORMALISATION”........................................................................................11 IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS................................................................ 16 A. THE KURDS.........................................................................................................................16 B. THE TURKOMANS ...............................................................................................................19
    [Show full text]
  • Gareth R V Stansfield
    Gareth R V Stansfield BA (Hons) MA PhD FRSA FAcSS Al-Qasimi Chair of Arab Gulf Studies and Professor of Middle East Politics University of Exeter Senior Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London Global Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva Tel: (0044) (0) 1392 264105 Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] Biography Gareth Stansfield is Professor of Middle East Politics and the Al-Qasimi Chair of Arab Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, where he was between 2011-2015 the Director of the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies (IAIS), standing down for research leave between 2015 and 2018. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (FRSA), Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society (FRGS), and elected Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (FAcSS). He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Global Fellow (2015-17) of the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC, and Fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is a Visiting Professor of Northwest University, Xi'an, China, and Soran University, Kurdistan-Iraq. Between 2002 and 2012, he was Associate Fellow of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. From 2012-14, he was the inaugural Honorary Research Fellow attached to the Middle East and North Africa Research Group of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office A regular commentator and adviser on Middle East politics over the last decade, focusing in particular on the politics and political economy of Iraq, the Kurdish regions of the Middle East, dynamics of Gulf/Arabian peninsular security, and questions of post- conflict stabilization and nation/state building, Stansfield is one of a handful of academics to have lived and worked in pre-regime change Iraq for an extensive period of time, between 1996 and 2001, where he was funded by the UK government to advise the Kurdish leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis
    IRAQ AND THE KURDS: RESOLVING THE KIRKUK CRISIS Middle East Report N°64 – 19 April 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION: GROWING TENSIONS............................................................... 1 II. A TRAINWRECK IN THE MAKING.......................................................................... 2 A. NORMALISATION ...................................................................................................................2 B. THE ARTICLE 140 COMMITTEE ..............................................................................................4 C. THE ILL-CONSIDERED PUSH FOR A REFERENDUM IN 2007.......................................................7 D. FALL-OUT FROM FAILURE......................................................................................................9 III. THE NEED FOR A PROCESS.................................................................................... 11 IV. THE PATH TO A SETTLEMENT ............................................................................. 15 A. THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY ......................................................................................15 B. OUTLINES OF A GLOBAL SOLUTION......................................................................................17 V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 19 APPENDICES A. MAP OF IRAQ ......................................................................................................................21
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq: Politics and Governance
    Iraq: Politics and Governance Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Carla E. Humud Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs March 9, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RS21968 Iraq: Politics and Governance Summary Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions—muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq—are fueling a major challenge to Iraq’s stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite- dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da'esh). Iraq’s Kurds are separately embroiled in political, territorial, and economic disputes with Baghdad, but those differences have been at least temporarily subordinated to the common struggle against the Islamic State. U.S. officials assert that the Iraqi government must work to gain the loyalty of more of Iraq’s Sunnis—and to resolve differences with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—if an eventual defeat of the Islamic State is to result in long-term stability. Prospects for greater inter- communal unity appeared to increase in 2014 with the replacement of former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki with the current Prime Minister, Haydar al-Abbadi. Although both men are from the Shiite Islamist Da’wa Party, Abbadi has taken some steps to try to compromise with Sunnis and with the KRG. However, a significant point of contention with the KRG remains the KRG’s marketing of crude oil exports separately from Baghdad.
    [Show full text]