Library Note

Debate on 27 February: Syria and the Middle East

This Library Note provides background reading in advance of the debate in the House of Lords on 27 February 2014 on recent developments in Syria and the Middle East. It provides in-depth information and material on Syria, and a brief summary of recent developments in selected countries in the Middle East (Yemen, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, the Gulf States, Egypt and Jordan). This Note adds to and updates information provided in the House of Lords Library Notes Recent Developments in the Middle East (13 July 2012, LLN 2012/029) and Recent Developments in Syria, the Middle East and North Africa (27 June 2013, LLN 2013/017).

Thomas Brown, Edward Scott, Mary Santo and James Tobin 13 February 2014 LLN 2014/006

House of Lords Library Notes are compiled for the benefit of Members of the House of Lords and their personal staff, to provide impartial, politically balanced briefing on subjects likely to be of interest to Members of the Lords. Authors are available to discuss the contents of the Notes with the Members and their staff but cannot advise members of the general public.

Any comments on Library Notes should be sent to the Head of Research Services, House of Lords Library, London SW1A 0PW or emailed to [email protected].

Table of Contents

1. Introduction ...... 1 2. Syria ...... 1 2.1 Current Nature of the Conflict ...... 1 2.2 Who are the Rebels? ...... 3 2.3 Use of Chemical Weapons ...... 6 2.4 Support for the Rebels ...... 8 2.5 Humanitarian Response ...... 10 2.6 Geneva Peace Talks ...... 13 2.7 Timeline of Recent Events (2008—Present) ...... 14 3. Yemen ...... 19 4. Iran ...... 20 5. Israel/Palestine ...... 21 6. Lebanon ...... 22 7. The Gulf States ...... 23 8. Egypt ...... 24 9. Jordan ...... 25 Appendix ...... 27

1. Introduction

This Library Note provides background information in advance of the debate in the House of Lords on 27 February 2014 on Syria and the Middle East. However, given the size of the region and the speed with which developments are unfolding in many countries, it is not possible to provide comprehensive, up-to-date briefing on all the issues that fall within the scope of this debate. As a result, this Note provides in-depth material on Syria and a brief summary of recent developments in selected other nations (Yemen, Iran, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, the Gulf States, Egypt and Jordan); adding to and updating information provided in the House of Lords Library Notes Recent Developments in the Middle East (13 July 2012, LLN 2012/029) and Recent Developments in Syria, the Middle East and North Africa (27 June 2013, LLN 2013/017).

2. Syria

The conflict in Syria, which began in March 2011 with national protests against the Ba’athist Government of President Bashar al-Assad, has now been raging for almost three years. Originating in the southern city of Deraa, protests calling for political reform and the release of political prisoners quickly spread to towns and cities across the country, including Baniyas, Homs, Hama and the suburbs of Damascus. The unrest soon evolved into a civil war between government forces and an array of rebel militias.

In July 2013, the United Nations (UN) estimated that more than 100,000 people have been killed during the conflict. The UN no longer releases estimates of the number of fatalities. However, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a group which monitors and documents human rights abuses in the country, believes that up to 31 January 2014 more than 136,000 people have lost their lives.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 2.4 million Syrian people have been driven into neighbouring countries as a result of the violence (out of a total Syrian population of over 22 million), with over 47,000 people still awaiting registration as refugees.1 The UN further estimated that more than 6.5 million people—46 percent of whom are children—are ‘internally displaced persons’.2 It also recorded that more than 9.3 million people are in urgent need of aid inside Syria.3

2.1 Current Nature of the Conflict

As of February 2014, heavy fighting continues across the country, with government forces and their allies battling a range of anti-government militias, some of whom are also reportedly fighting amongst themselves. Recent analysis by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provided an overview of the current situation:

Inside Syria, neither pro-[Assad] forces nor their opponents appear capable of consolidating their battlefield gains or achieving outright victory in the short term. Improved coordination among some anti-government forces and attrition in government

1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Regional Overview’, accessed 6 February 2014. 2 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), ‘Syria Crisis Overview’, accessed 6 February 2014. 3 ibid.

ranks makes a swift reassertion of state control across all of Syria improbable. Combat between the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, aka ISIS)4 and other [more moderate] anti-[Assad] forces across northern Syria has intensified since late December 2013, leading to the expulsion of ISIL forces from some areas.5

The authors of this analysis recorded that the war is exacerbating sectarian and political conflicts within Lebanon and Iraq, with the escalating violence threatening stability in these countries, as explored in more detail below.6 The CRS paper added that the flood of Syrian refugees to neighbouring countries, the growth of armed extremist groups in Syria, and the “assertive involvement” of countries such as Iran, Turkey and Sunni Arab governments (including those of Saudi Arabia and Qatar) are negatively affecting overall regional stability.7

Source: Congressional Research Service, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, 15 January 2014.

4 The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is also commonly referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham (ISIS). Al Sham is an Arabic term for the Levant. 5 CM Blanchard et al, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2014, p 2. 6 ibid, p i. 7 ibid, p 4.

2.2 Who are the Rebels?

The Syrian opposition is reportedly deeply fractious and divided. Noting the current situation, US analysts Blanchard et al observed:

There are hundreds of active militia forces, ranging in size from a few dozen to thousands and organised around a wide variety of local communities, ethnic and religious identities, and political-religious ideologies. The size and relative strength of groups have varied and will continue to vary by location and time.8

They added:

Opposition forces [in Syria] are formidable but lack unity of purpose, unity of command, and unified international support. Various opposition groups have, depending on the circumstances, cooperated and competed for influence and control. At present, significant elements of the opposition are engaged in outright conflict against one another. Some observers suggest that more than 75 percent of the armed opposition may seek to replace the Assad Government with a state ruled according to some form of Sunni Islamic law.9

Blanchard et al also wrote that the realignments and internal conflicts within the opposition since mid-2013 have made it difficult to monitor the day-to-day situation on the ground, therefore complicating the provision of support to moderate rebels by external parties.10

Since 20 November 2012, the United Kingdom has recognised the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces—commonly known as the Syrian National Coalition (SNC)—as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.11 The SNC, founded in the Qatari capital Doha in November 2012, comprises a number of opposition groups widely considered to be ‘moderate’. However, after the SNC membership narrowly re-elected Ahmad Jarba as President of the Coalition in early January 2014, dozens of individual members are reported to have resigned in response.12 Furthermore, the Syrian National Council—a coalition of opposition groups formed in October 2011—which was formerly the largest bloc within the SNC, quit the grouping on 20 January 2014 in protest over the Coalition’s decision to attend UN-sponsored peace talks in Geneva.

The Supreme Military Council (SMC) of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), led by Brigadier General Salim Idris, is affiliated with the SNC. However, some observers see the FSA as a loose network of brigades rather than a unified fighting force. General Idris is therefore thought to serve more as a spokesman and conduit for foreign funding and arms shipments, rather than asserting direct operational control of FSA brigades fighting on the front.13 By December 2013, some SNC officials were reported to have lost faith with Idris’s leadership, calling for him to be replaced and a more conventional army to be created.

8 ibid, p 14. 9 ibid, p 1. 10 ibid, p 4. 11 HC Hansard, 20 November 2012, col 445. 12 CM Blanchard et al, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2014, p 4. 13 BBC News, ‘Syria Crisis: Guide to Armed and Political Opposition’, 13 December 2013.

Blanchard et al also recorded that in late 2013, “a number of powerful Islamist militia groups— some of which formerly recognised the leadership of Idris and the SMC—announced the formation of a new Islamic Front, which many expert observers now consider to be the most powerful element of the armed opposition in northern Syria”.14 Since early January 2014, the Islamic Front and other recently formed opposition coalitions active in northern Syria, such as the Syrian Revolutionaries Front and the Mujahedin Army, have been fighting Al Qaeda-affiliated ISIL in northern and eastern Syria.15 Fighters affiliated with Jabhat al Nusra, another Al Qaeda- affiliated militia, have in some places joined with these anti-ISIL groups against the more “extreme and brutal” ISIL.16 Blanchard et al contended that, as of January 2014, battles between ISIL and other elements of the opposition had “momentarily supplanted deeper questions about the future composition and direction of the Syrian opposition and the provision of external support to its armed elements”.17

Kurdish opposition groups control areas of north eastern Syria and it is thought by some analysts that they may seek autonomy or independence for this area in the future.18

The box below provides a brief overview of selected (moderate and extremist) opposition armed groups and militias:

14 CM Blanchard et al, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2014, p 5. 15 ibid. 16 ibid. The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, in its Annual Report 2012–13, stated that the intelligence agencies (the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)), and JTAC (Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre), assess that “Al-Qaeda elements and individual jihadists in Syria currently represent the most worrying emerging terrorist threat to the UK and the West. There is a risk of extremist elements in Syria taking advantage of the permissive environment to develop external attack plans, including against Western targets. Large numbers of radicalised individuals have been attracted to the country, including significant numbers from the UK and Europe. They are likely to acquire expertise and experience which could significantly increase the threat posed when they return home” . Intelligence and Security Committee to Parliament, Annual Report 2012–13, July 2013, HC 547 of session 2013–14, p 7. 17 CM Blanchard et al, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2014, p 5. 18 ibid, p 1.

Source: Congressional Research Service, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, 15 January 2014. Derived from US Government Open Source Centre reports, social media, and independent analyst reports. The positions, sizes, platforms and membership of groups are subject to change.

2.3 Use of Chemical Weapons

In June 2013, the US Government released a statement assessing that chemical weapons had been repeatedly used by the Assad regime, in contravention of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, which Syria ratified in 1968. At the time, Russian officials expressed scepticism of the claims. Reports then surfaced that the chemical nerve agent sarin had been used as part of an attack on the Ghouta suburb of Damascus on 21 August 2013. Photographs and video footage showed symptoms which appeared to confirm these reports, though there remains disagreement among the international community as to whether the atrocity was committed by the regime or by rebels.

The UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic was charged with investigating the attack, and published its report on 16 September. The Mission concluded that surface-to-surface rockets containing sarin were used against civilians in the Ghouta area. The Mission was not charged with assigning responsibility for the attack.

On 26 August, William Hague, Foreign Secretary, condemned the Ghouta attack and stated his regret that the UN Security Council was not united on the issue of how to deal with the conflict in Syria. On 28 August, the National Security Council (NSC) met to discuss the use of chemical weapons. Following the meeting, a Number 10 spokesperson said:

The NSC met this afternoon to consider the Government’s response to the appalling chemical weapons attack near Damascus last week. The NSC agreed unanimously on a recommendation that the Cabinet will consider tomorrow.

Ministers agreed that the Assad regime was responsible for this attack and that the world shouldn’t stand idly by; and that any response should be legal, proportionate and specifically to protect civilians by deterring further chemical weapons use. There was unanimous backing for the approach we are pursuing at the United Nations and the Chapter VII resolution [authorising the use of military force] put forward to fellow P5 members today.19

On 29 August, Parliament was recalled to debate the issue, and the Government published a copy of its legal position regarding the legality of military action. Following debate in the House of Commons, the Government was defeated on a motion to authorise the possible use of

19 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Syria Chemical Weapons Attack’, 10 September 2013. military action against the Assad regime by 285 votes to 272, ruling out the possibility of the UK joining possible US-led air strikes on Syrian Government targets.

Following the vote, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, said:

I strongly believe in the need for a tough response to the use of chemical weapons, but I also believe in respecting the will of this House of Commons. It is very clear tonight that, while the House has not passed a motion [authorising the possible use of force], the British Parliament, reflecting the views of the British people, does not want to see British military action. I get that, and the Government will act accordingly.20

On 31 August, Barack Obama, US President, stated that “military action against Syrian regime targets” should be taken in response to the 21 August attack and asked Congress to vote on the matter.21 However, in a speech on 10 September 2013, President Obama stated that he had asked congressional leaders to postpone a vote on the use of military force to enable his administration time to pursue a diplomatic initiative to neutralise Syria’s chemical weapons.22

A US and Russian-led agreement was subsequently reached on 14 September to enable the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an intergovernmental body tasked with ensuring adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to destroy Syria’s chemical arsenal. Also on this date, the Syrian Government acceded to the CWC, which requires its member states to eliminate their chemical weapons stocks, munitions, precursor chemicals, and related production and storage facilities.23 The OPCW adopted a destruction plan for Syria on 27 September. On the same date, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2118, requiring Syria to comply with “all aspects” of the OPCW decision.24

A joint mission of UN and OPCW personnel was created to monitor Syrian disarmament. OPCW–UN experts arrived in Damascus on 1 October to begin inspections. On 7 January 2014, the OPCW–UN team announced that the first “priority chemical materials” had been removed from locations within Syria, taken to the port of Latakia, and loaded onto a Danish vessel for disposal. The most dangerous chemicals removed from Syria are to be destroyed in international waters in a specially constructed tank aboard the US Navy Maritime Administration Motor Vessel Cape Ray.25

As of 6 February 2014, some observers have suggested that the Syrian regime has been seeking to delay the destruction of its chemical weapons, after it missed a 5 February deadline to hand over its complete stockpile. Faisal al-Mekdad, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that Syria was “doing its best” to comply, but that fighting was hampering the transport of chemical agents to Latakia. The US criticised this missed deadline, and alleged on 30 January that only 4 percent of Syria’s stockpile had so far been destroyed.26 Russia has said that Syria should complete the

20 HC Hansard, 29 August 2013, cols 1555–6. 21 The White House, ‘Statement by the President on Syria’, 31 August 2013. 22 CM Blanchard et al, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2014, p 7. 23 MBD Nikitin et al, Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 30 September 2013, p i. 24 CM Blanchard et al, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2014, p 7. 25 ibid, p 8. 26 BBC News, ‘Syria Chemical Weapons: Delay Claims Denied by Regime’, 6 February 2014. transfer of its chemical weapons stocks by 1 March 2014. The agreed final deadline for the complete destruction of Syria’s stockpile is 30 June 2014.27

At the time of writing, a third shipment of chemical weapons materials had left Syria, with some also having been destroyed within the country, according to the OPCW–UN mission.

2.4 Support for the Rebels

UK support for the moderate, secular opposition in Syria has so far been “non-lethal” in character. This is despite a lifting of an EU arms embargo on 27 May 2013 following pressure from the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, and others.28

A recent YouGov poll appeared to show that British public opinion is firmly against all but humanitarian intervention in the Syrian conflict. Surveying members of the public on 22 and 23 August 2013, after reports of the chemical weapons attack in Damascus, researchers found that:

77 percent of the British public support sending “food, medicine and other humanitarian supplies” to Syria. However, only 9 percent support sending British troops, while 74 percent oppose the action. Support is equally minor (10 percent) for sending full- scale military supplies or even small arms (16 percent) to the Anti-Assad troops.29

In the case of the UK, “non-lethal” support up until now has included technical advice and training, and, as listed in statements to the House of Commons in March and April of last year:

 equipment for search and rescue operations;  incinerators and refuse collection kit to prevent the spread of disease;  funds and equipment to repair electricity and water supplies to homes;  water purification kits;  communications equipment;  new types of non-lethal equipment for the protection of civilians;  protective equipment, including armoured four-wheel drive vehicles and body armour;  testing equipment for evidence of chemical weapons use;  heavy gauge trucks and forklifts;  solar power generators.

The Prime Minister, David Cameron, reiterated the Government’s commitment to this approach in a statement to the House of Commons following the G20 summit held in St Petersburg in September 2013:

[...] we will continue to assist the moderate Syrian opposition with political support, non-lethal equipment, technical advice and training. The Foreign Secretary convened a

27 ibid. 28 The legal issues surrounding the potential supply of arms to the rebels is explored in detail in House of Commons Library Standard Note, Syria: The Legality of Arming the Rebels After the Lifting of the EU Arms Embargo, 18 June 2013, SN06667, 29 YouGov, ‘Send Medicine to Syria, Not Guns or Soldiers’, 25 August 2013 (as cited in House of Commons Library Standard Note, Intervention in Syria, 27 August 2013, SN06714).

meeting with Syrian opposition leaders in London last week to continue this work, and he has discussed all these issues with the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, today. As I discussed with several G20 leaders, including President Putin, Britain will also lead efforts to get both sides to the table to shape a political transition, building on last year’s agreement in Geneva. That is because, as I have said, a political settlement is the only way to a stable, inclusive and democratic Syria.30

Furthermore, at the October 2013 Friends of Syria conference in London—the ‘London 11’ grouping, which includes Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the UK and the US—issued a communiqué in which they pledged to “continue to provide enhanced support to build the capacity of the opposition to deliver basic needs on the ground”.31

Speaking after this conference, William Hague said:

We agreed the Syrian opposition, including the moderate armed groups, and moderate opposition represented by the coalition continue to need our strong collective backing. There can be no peaceful and political settlement in Syria without the participation of the moderate opposition. So we pledged further support to them.

[...] The UK will continue to support the opposition in its efforts to help and protect the Syrian people from the murderous abuses of the regime through the more than £20 million in support to the opposition that we have provided this year. This is support that to helps to save lives and provide services to the Syrian population—including search and rescue equipment and training, power generators, communications, support and training to civil administrations.32

In December 2013, Islamic Front fighters took control of facilities and equipment belonging to the SMC, leading the UK and US Governments to suspend all “non-lethal” support for rebels in northern Syria.

US Support

Briefly on the issue of US support for the rebels, Blanchard et al observed that US officials have cited a number of reasons for their “reluctance” to undertake direct military intervention or provide large-scale assistance to shift the balance, including:

[...] fears of exacerbating the violence; inviting greater regional spillover or intervention; or opening a power vacuum that could benefit the extremists who are part of the opposition. Uncertain costs, military constraints, and domestic political opposition to such involvement also are likely factors.33

30 HC Hansard, 9 September 2013, col 686. 31 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘London 11 Final Communiqué’, 22 October 2013. 32 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘London 11 Meeting on Syria’, 22 October 2013. 33 CM Blanchard et al, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and US Response, Congressional Research Service, 15 January 2014, p 9. The authors noted that other competing foreign policy priorities also have influenced the US Government’s position, such as a desire to maintain Russian and Chinese support for international sanctions on Iran’s nuclear program, and concern that sectarian and strategic competition in Syria could ignite a regional conflict, threatening allies and global security interests.

2.5 Humanitarian Response

The humanitarian situation in Syria has continued to deteriorate as fighting has intensified throughout the country. US analysts Rhoda Margesson and Susan Chesser wrote that the international humanitarian response is necessarily complex and thus “struggles to keep pace with urgent developments that have risen well beyond anticipated needs”.34 As of September 2013, 97 percent of Syrian refugees have fled to countries in the immediate surrounding region, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and other parts of North Africa.35 In addition, some Syrian refugees have sought sanctuary in the EU by crossing Bulgaria’s border with Turkey.

According to the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), about 2.5 million Syrians are estimated to be living in hard to reach areas with limited access to humanitarian assistance, including in areas such as Damascus, Rural Damascus, Aleppo, Hassakeh, Deraa and Homs.36

Aid

The UN appeal for $6.5 billion at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, held in Kuwait in January 2014, was its largest appeal in the history of the UN. At this meeting, John Kerry, US Secretary of State, announced an additional $380 million in US humanitarian assistance to help those affected by the war in Syria, bringing the total US contribution to humanitarian efforts to $1.7 billion.37 Total funding from the European Union (which includes assistance from the European Commission and Member States) was €2.6 billion, as of 30 January 2014.38

Regarding the UK contribution to humanitarian aid efforts, Justine Greening, International Development Secretary, said in January 2014:

Where aid is getting through to hundreds of thousands of people, it can be the difference between life and death. The UK has led the way in responding to this crisis so far and we will continue to stand alongside the Syrian people in their time of need.39

As of 15 January 2014, the UK Government had committed £600 million to provide support including food, medical care and relief items for over a million people in Syria and the region; three times the response committed to any other humanitarian crisis. Of this total, £241 million has been allocated to partners providing humanitarian assistance inside Syria, and £263 million has been distributed in the region, including within countries such as Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. The allocation of the remaining £96 million is being finalised.40

34 R Margesson and SG Chesser, Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response, Congressional Research Service, 4 September 2013, p i. 35 ibid. 36 European Commission, Syria Crisis ECHO Factsheet, 30 January 2014. 37 US Aid, ‘Syria’, accessed 10 February 2014. 38 European Commission, Syria Crisis ECHO Factsheet, 30 January 2014. 39 Department for International Development, ‘UK Aid Syria Response’, 15 January 2014. 40 ibid.

According to a government factsheet on the issue produced last month, to date UK support inside Syria has:

 provided food for over 188,000 people per month across Syria through a partnership with the World Food Programme (WFP);  provided water purification supplies and repairs to water infrastructure benefiting over 901,000 people, and supported partner UNICEF in repairing water systems, trucking water and dispensing water purification tablets to provide clean drinking water to Syrian families;  funded the UN to strengthen security and humanitarian coordination mechanisms inside Syria;  supplied relief items (such as cooking sets, blankets, mattresses, etc) to over 305,000 people affected by the violence, and funded improvements to buildings accommodating displaced people;  funded 244,000 medical consultations to critically injured and sick people, and supported the World Health Organisation (WHO) in providing vulnerable Syrians with access to comprehensive health services, supporting trauma systems, delivering essential supplies and augmenting health systems to respond to outbreaks of diseases;  provided poultry and vegetable seeds to 6,000 households and supported training to support Syrians in improved farming methods.

In addition, UK support in the region has:

 provided food for up to 130,900 people per month and to refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq;  supported UNICEF in providing safe drinking water and toilets to over 213,500 people in camps and communities hosting Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq;  provided “significant” medical care to Syrian refugees and vulnerable host communities in Jordan and Lebanon;  helped deliver shelter/essential items to more than 84,600 Syrian refugees and to communities hosting Syrians who have been displaced by the violence;  provided winter items, including clothing and blankets, for over 10,000 Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanian families, along with emergency cash assistance for 36,000 refugees in Jordan;  provided shelter, assistance and financial support to 4,000 people in Lebanon.

The UK Government has asserted that this humanitarian assistance is provided through neutral and impartial agencies, and is “wholly separate from UK support for the [Syrian] opposition”. In addition, all UK funding is to humanitarian agencies “with a proven ability to operate in Syria and neighbouring countries”.41

41 Department for International Development, ‘Syria Crisis: Latest Updates on UK Aid’, 15 January 2014.

Refugees

António Guterres, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has called for 30,000 Syrian refugees to be admitted to other countries by the end of 2014, with focus on the most vulnerable. According to the UN, categories of vulnerable people include:

 women and girls at risk;  survivors of violence and/or torture;  refugees with medical needs or disabilities;  LGBTI refugees at risk;  vulnerable older adults;  refugees in need of family reunification and;  those who face serious threats to their physical security, especially due to their political opinion or belonging to a minority group.42

Summarising the UK position as of late January 2014, UK analyst Ben Smith observed on the 24 January 2014 that:

In the year to September 2013, the UK had accepted 1,100 Syrians as refugees, the third highest number of refugees in the EU after Germany and Sweden. These are people who have managed to get to Britain. In October 2012, the Home Office also introduced a temporary concession allowing Syrians in the UK to apply for an extension of their visa or switch into a different visa category. The concession has been extended until end February 2014 and the Government is currently considering options to extend it further.43

On 29 January 2014, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, announced in the House of Commons that the UK would be “coming forward with a scheme to help the most needy people in those refugee camps and offer them a home in our country”.44 Later that day Theresa May, Home Secretary, made a statement in the House of Commons announcing the launch of a vulnerable person relocation scheme—a new programme to provide emergency sanctuary in the UK for displaced Syrians who are “particularly vulnerable”. This scheme would be run in parallel with the UNHCR’s Syria humanitarian admission programme, and would also be conducted:

[...] in addition to the two resettlement programmes the Home Office operates in partnership with the UNHCR: the gateway programme, which settles 750 refugees from a small number of targeted locations every year; and the mandate resettlement scheme, which is designed to resettle individual refugees who have been recognised as refugees by the UNHCR and have a close family member in the UK who is willing to accommodate them.45

Yvette Cooper, Shadow Home Secretary, welcomed this move, which followed criticism of the Government from MPs of all political parties for declining to participate in the UN-led Syrian refugee scheme.46

42 House of Commons Library, In Brief: Syrian Refugees and the UK, 24 January 2014, SN06805. 43 ibid. 44 HC Hansard, 29 January 2014, col 851. 45 HC Hansard, 29 January 2014, col 864. 46 BBC News, ‘UK to Act with ‘Urgency’ Over Syrian Refugees Says PM’, 29 January 2014.

Latest update on Humanitarian Assistance

At the time of writing, more than 1,000 civilians had been evacuated from the besieged city of Homs following a UN-brokered three-day truce, despite a UN convoy coming under attack during the operation. There is a possibility of this truce being extended, which would allow some of the almost 1,000 civilians still in the surrounded Old City to escape.

2.6 Geneva Peace Talks

In June 2012, following early diplomatic attempts to end the crisis in Syria, the ‘Action Group for Syria’—which included the Secretaries General of the United Nations and the Arab League, the Foreign Ministers of countries including China, France, Russia, the UK, the US and Turkey, and the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy—met in Geneva and agreed a blueprint for talks with the Syrian regime and opposition forces. Known as the Geneva Final Communiqué, the agreement outlined a broad path toward a transitional government with executive authority, formed by mutual consent in negotiations between the Syrian Government and Syrian opposition. This agreement did not specifically prohibit any member of the Assad regime, including President Assad himself, from serving in such a transitional government, despite Western calls for his resignation.47

In May 2013, John Kerry, US Secretary of State, and Sergei Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister, announced that—following on from the Geneva talks in 2012—the United States and Russia would cooperate to create an international conference to reach a political settlement in Syria (referred to as the ‘Geneva II process’). This initiative gained greater impetus after the chemical weapons attack of 21 August 2013. Indeed, UN Security Council Resolution 2118, which demanded the destruction or removal of Syria’s chemical stockpile by mid-2014, called for the “convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to implement the Geneva Communiqué”, and for “all Syrian parties to engage seriously and constructively” and be committed to the “achievement of stability and reconciliation”.48

Following the June 2013 G8 summit held at Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, highlighted the commitments agreed at this meeting and set out his hopes for the Geneva II diplomatic process:

Together with our G8 partners [...] we agreed to back a Geneva II process that delivers a transitional governing body with, crucially, full executive authority. So a core requirement for success that had been called into doubt in recent weeks has now been reasserted unanimously, with the full authority of the G8.

[...] We are committed to using diplomacy to end this war with a political solution. This is not easy, but the essential first step must be to get agreement between the main international powers with influence on Syria. That is what we have done at the G8 in Lough Erne. We must now work to turn these commitments into action.49

With the first peace conference meeting scheduled for late January 2014, the previous month saw an upsurge in violence, with both the regime and rebels apparently trying to gain ground

47 JM Sharp and CM Blanchard, Armed Conflict in Syria: US and International Response, Congressional Research Service, 14 June 2013, p 2 48 BBC News, ‘What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?, 22 January 2014. 49 HC Hansard, 19 June 2013, col 895. before the start of talks. Yet, as planned, on 22 January representatives from more than 40 countries and organisations assembled in Montreux for a meeting which opened with bitter exchanges between Walid Muallem, Syrian Foreign Minister, and the Syrian National Coalition delegation.

The issue of President Assad’s future appears to be a red line for both the regime and the opposition. On one side, in an interview three days before the conference, President Assad said there was a “significant chance” that he would seek a third presidential term. On the other, the Syrian National Coalition only mediated its demand for a guarantee that President Assad would step down before it would engage in talks following intense pressure from Western and Arab allies.50

Whether the Geneva II talks will engender a significant breakthrough is uncertain. Days before the talks were due to begin, Ali Haidar, Syria’s National Reconciliation Minister, said: “Don’t expect anything from Geneva II. Neither Geneva II, nor Geneva III nor Geneva X will solve the Syrian crisis. The solution has begun and will continue through the military triumph of the state.”51 Indeed, some commentators have stated that even if some kind of political agreement is reached through the Geneva II process, it will be virtually impossible to implement on the ground, given that most of the major fighting forces and opposition groups reject participation in the talks. These groups include the Syrian National Council (which split from the National Coalition over the issue), the National Co-ordination Committee (a faction within the Syrian National Coalition), the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front.52

However, an agreement was made between the two sides at the first round of negotiations on evacuating “innocent civilians” (defined as women, children, the elderly and the wounded) from the city of Homs, which has been under Syrian army siege since June 2012. The UN welcomed reports of this humanitarian pause in the fighting.53 This evacuation attempt is ongoing.

Lakhdar Brahimi, joint UN-Arab League mediator, began a new round of talks between the regime and opposition on 10 February 2014. At the time of writing, Lakhdar Brahimi had commented that the second round of talks had made little progress so far, with both the Syrian Government and opposition characterising efforts to reach agreement on a number of points “fruitless”.54

2.7 Timeline of Recent Events (2008—Present)

The timeline below is compiled from the BBC, with the most recent updates provided by the House of Lords Library.

2008 July: President Assad meets Nicolas Sarkozy, French President, in Paris. The visit signals the end of the diplomatic isolation by the West that followed the assassination of Rafik Hariri, former Lebanese Prime Minister, in 2005. While in Paris, President Assad also meets Michel Suleiman, the recently-elected Lebanese president. The two men agree to work towards the establishing of full diplomatic relations between their countries.

50 BBC News, ‘What is the Geneva II Conference on Syria?’, 22 January 2014. 51 ibid. 52 ibid. 53 BBC News, ‘Syria Conflict: ‘Deal Reached’ On Homs Civilian Evacuations’, 6 February 2014. 54 Reuters, ‘Syria Peace Talks Make Little Progress, Says Envoy’, 11 February 2014.

September: Damascus hosts four-way summit between Syria, France, Turkey and Qatar, in a bid to boost efforts towards Middle East peace. Explosion kills 17 on the outskirts of Damascus, the most deadly attack in Syria in several years. Government blames Islamist militants.

2009 March: Trading launches on Syria’s stock exchange in a gesture towards liberalising the state-controlled economy.

June: The UN nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, says traces of undeclared man-made uranium have been found at second site in Syria—a reactor in Damascus. The IAEA was investigating US claims that the site destroyed in the 2007 Israeli raid was a nuclear reactor.

2010 February: US posts first ambassador to Syria after a five-year break.

May: US renews sanctions against Syria, saying that it supports terrorist groups, seeks weapons of mass destruction and has provided Lebanon’s Hezbollah with Scud missiles in violation of UN resolutions.

2011 March: Protests in Damascus and the southern city of Deraa demand the release of political prisoners. Security forces shoot a number of people dead in Deraa, triggering days of violent unrest that steadily spread nationwide over the following months. The Government announces some conciliatory measures in an attempt to damp down unrest. President Assad releases dozens of political prisoners and dismisses the Government, and in April lifts the 48-year-old state of emergency. However, he accuses protesters of being Israeli agents.

May: Army tanks enter Deraa, Banyas, Homs and suburbs of Damascus in an effort to crush anti-regime protests. US and European Union tighten sanctions. President Assad announces amnesty for political prisoners.

June: The Government says that 120 members of the security forces have been killed by “armed gangs” in the north-western town of Jisr al-Shughour. Troops besiege the town and more than 10,000 people flee to Turkey. President Assad pledges to start a “national dialogue” on reform.

The IAEA nuclear watchdog decides to report Syria to the UN Security Council over its alleged covert nuclear reactor programme. The structure housing the alleged reactor was destroyed in an Israeli air raid in 2007.

July: President Assad sacks the governor of the northern province of Hama after mass demonstrations there, eventually sending in troops to restore order at the cost of scores of lives. Opposition activists meet in Istanbul to form a unified opposition.

October: Newly formed Syrian National Council says it has forged a common front of internal and exiled opposition activists. Russia and China veto UN resolution condemning Syria.

November: Arab League votes to suspend Syria, accusing it of failing to implement an Arab peace plan, and imposes sanctions. Army defectors target a military base near

Damascus in the Free Syrian Army’s most high-profile attack since protests began. Government supporters attack foreign embassies.

December: Syria agrees to an Arab League initiative allowing Arab observers into the country. Thousands of protesters gather in Homs to greet them, but the League suspends its mission in January because of worsening violence.

Twin suicide bombs outside security buildings in Damascus kill 44, the first in a series of large blasts in the capital that continue into the following summer. Opposition accuses Government of staging these and subsequent attacks.

2012 February: Russia and China block a UN Security Council draft resolution on Syria, and the Government steps up the bombardment of Homs and other cities, recapturing the Homs district of Baba Amr the following month. The UN says that more than 7,500 people have died since the security crackdown began.

March: UN Security Council endorses non-binding peace plan drafted by UN envoy Kofi Annan. China and Russia agree to support the plan after an earlier, tougher draft is modified. The UN statement falls short of a formal resolution, and violence continues into the summer.

May: UN Security Council strongly condemns the Government’s use of heavy weaponry and the militia killing of more than a hundred civilians in Houla, near Homs. France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain, Canada and Australia expel senior Syrian diplomats in protest.

June: President Assad tells his reshuffled Government that they face “real war”, indicating the authorities’ conviction that the conflict will be long-lasting and require the side-lining of all other priorities.

Turkey changes rules of engagement after Syria shoots down a Turkish plane that strayed into its territory, declaring that if Syrian troops approach Turkey’s borders they will be seen as a military threat.

July: Free Syria Army blows up three security chiefs in Damascus and seizes Aleppo in the north. A government offensive to recapture the city makes only limited headway.

August: The Government suffers further blows. A UN General Assembly resolution demands that President Assad resign, high-level defections gather pace—most notably Prime Minister Riad Hijab—and US President Obama warns that use of chemical weapons would tilt the US towards intervention.

UN appoints veteran Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi as new UN–Arab League envoy for Syria after resignation of Kofi Annan.

September: The Free Syrian Army claims responsibility for two explosions at the military headquarters in Damascus. The Government says four guards were killed in the “suicide attacks”.

October: Syria–Turkish tension rises when Syrian mortar fire on a Turkish border town kills five civilians. Turkey returns fire and intercepts a Syrian plane allegedly carrying arms from Russia. Both countries ban each other’s planes from their air space.

Fire in Aleppo destroys much of the historic market as fighting and bomb attacks continue in various cities.

UN-brokered ceasefire during the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Adha breaks down as Government continues attacks.

November: Several major opposition forces unite as National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces at meeting in Qatar, including the Syrian National Council. Arab League stops short of full recognition. Islamist militias in Aleppo, including the Al-Nusra and Al-Tawhid groups, refuse to join the Coalition, denouncing it as a “conspiracy”.

Israeli military fire on Syrian artillery units after several months of occasional shelling from Syrian positions across the Golan Heights, the first such return of fire since the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

December: The US joins Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states in formally recognising Syria’s opposition National Coalition as “the legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.

2013 January: Syria accuses Israeli jets of attacking a military research centre near Damascus, but denies reports that lorries carrying weapons bound for Lebanon were hit. Unverified reports say Israel had targeted an Iranian commander charged with moving weapons of mass destruction to Lebanon.

International donors pledge more than $1.5 billion (£950 million) to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria.

March: Syrian warplanes bomb the northern city of Raqqa after rebels seize control. US and Britain pledge non-military aid to rebels, and Britain and France propose lifting European Union arms embargo. Rebel National Coalition elects interim “prime minister”, US-educated technocrat Ghassan Hitto.

April: US and Britain demand investigation into reports government forces used chemical weapons. Wael Nader Al-Halqi, Prime Minister, narrowly escapes death in bomb attack in centre of Damascus.

Moaz al-Khatib, opposition National Coalition chairman, resigns, complaining that foreign backers were trying to manipulate the group. He is succeeded by veteran socialist George Sabra, Leader of the older opposition Syrian National Council.

May: Israeli and Syrian Army exchange fire in the Golan Heights.

EU leaders agree not to renew the bloc’s arms embargo on Syria, in a step seen as potentially freeing EU countries to arm the rebels.

May–June: Government and allied Hezbollah forces recapture the strategically- important town of Qusair between Homs and the Lebanese border. Rebel commanders complain that arms supplies taper off over international concerns about Islamists in the opposition camp.

France says it has evidence that the Government used sarin nerve gas in attacks on rebels and civilians.

June: The US confirms its belief that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin.

The G8 group of nations meet in Northern Ireland: Syria is high on the agenda. The final communiqué reflects new humanitarian commitments and a unified call for weapons inspectors, but no new date for the start of peace talks.

The ‘Friends of Syria’ meet in Doha and agree to provide further support to opposition groups, to ‘balance the situation on the ground’.

July: In a leadership overhaul, Saudi-backed Ahmad Jarba replaces interim figure George Sabra as leader of the main opposition National Coalition, defeating a Qatari-backed rival. Ghassan Hitto, interim opposition Prime Minister, quits, citing his inability to form a government in rebel-held territory.

Rebels state that they have captured Khan al-Assal, the last major government-held town in the west of Aleppo Province.

September: UN weapons inspectors conclude that chemical weapons were used in an attack on the Ghouta area of Damascus in August that killed almost 300 people, but do not explicitly allocate responsibility for the attack.

October: President Assad allows international inspectors to begin destroying Syria’s chemical weapons following negotiations.

December: US and UK suspend “non-lethal” support for rebels in northern Syria after reports that Islamist rebels seize some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army.

2014 January: First “priority chemical materials” removed from Syria.

International donors pledge further humanitarian funding at as conference in Kuwait.

First round of Geneva II peace talks take place and agreement is reached on evacuation of civilians from Homs.

February: Second round of Geneva II peace talks begin.

3. Yemen

As measured by GDP, Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East.55 It faces a range of challenges including high-levels of poverty, food insecurity, rapid population growth, a weak economy and poor social service provision. It also remains mired in tribalism and regional division, and its traditionally weak central government structure and rugged terrain has not only made it historically difficult to govern, but allowed insurgent groups to prosper. In particular, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), led by Nasir Al-Wuhaishi and based in Yemen, is considered by Western intelligence agencies to be the most dangerous branch of Al-Qaeda currently in operation. AQAP has been responsible for attacks within Yemen, including on the Yemeni Defence Ministry in December 2013 when 52 people were killed. However, it has also reportedly exported its brand of jihad by using other militant groups around the world as its proxies.

Politically and socially, Yemen remains in the midst of a turbulent transition that began in 2011 with the wave of unrest that swept much of the region. Following the resignation of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012, as mandated in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)-backed peace plan of November 2011, a National Dialogue Conference was held between March 2013 and January 2014. The purpose of the conference was to bring together established political parties, newly emergent political movements, youth activists, women’s leaders and civil society organisations in shaping a plan for the country’s future. 565 delegates from those various groups took part, producing a final outcomes document on 21 January with approximately 1,400 recommendations.

Despite this progress, however, the process remains considerably behind schedule. As observed by Danya Greenfield, acting director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Centre for the Middle East, the 2011 agreement mandated for a two-year framework with a consensus candidate, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, as President; a power-sharing transitional government; a six-month national dialogue; a new constitution approved by referendum; and national elections. That deadline expires in February 2014, with key issues remaining unresolved. Most notable of those is the ‘Southern Question’ regarding what would happen to the south of the country in a new federal Yemen. Many southerners have rejected the very basis of the GCC agreement and national dialogue itself, and Greenfield observed: “Yemen has crossed an important threshold with the conclusion of the National Dialogue […] Yet the next phase— creation of credible state institutions and implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes with buy-in from Southerners—will be even more challenging and will demand equal commitment by Yemen’s people and its international partners to achieve a more stable, prosperous, and democratic future for the country.”56

Further resources:

 GOV.UK, ‘UK and Yemen’, accessed February 2014; and Human Rights and Democracy Report 2012, accessed January 2014  Department for International Development, Summary of DFID’s Work in Yemen 2012– 2015, June 2013  Human Rights Watch, “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda”: The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen, October 2013  Congressional Research Service, Yemen: Background and US Relations, 6 February 2014

55 According to the most recent figures published by the World Bank, Yemen’s GDP per capita is $1,494. 56 BBC News, ‘Analysis: Yemen Faces Fresh Challenges as National Dialogue Ends’, 28 January 2014.

4. Iran

Recent developments in Iran have focused on the country’s nuclear programme. On 24 November 2013, the ‘Permanent Five plus One’ (P5+1) group of nations announced that they had agreed a Joint Plan of Action with Iran with regard to the future of its nuclear ambitions.57 The Plan is not a binding agreement in the conventional sense. Instead, it is a resolution, binding for six-months (and renewable by mutual consent), that a mutually-agreed, comprehensive and long-term accord will be negotiated, which will allow “Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] in conformity with its obligations therein”.58

On the crucial issue of enrichment (necessary in order to produce the fissile material required for any nuclear weapons capability), the Joint Plan of Action states that any final agreement would “involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.”59 In a statement to the House of Commons on 25 November 2013, William Hague, Foreign Secretary, said:

Just to be clear, [the Plan] is not a recognition of the right to enrich, which we do not believe exists under the non-proliferation treaty. The agreement envisages that if we agree a comprehensive solution, that would enable Iran to enjoy its basic rights of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which a mutually defined enrichment programme limited to practical needs.60

Under the terms of the deal—which came into force on 20 January 2014—Iran has committed to halt any enrichment above a purity of 5 percent, to ‘neutralise’ its existing stockpile of near 20 percent enriched uranium and to not install any new centrifuges. It has also agreed to inspections of its nuclear facilities by officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (who visited the Arak facility in December 2013). In return, the P5+1 have agreed that no further sanctions will be imposed on the Iranian regime, certain existing sanctions will be suspended and £2.6bn from oil sales will be transferred to Iran.

Despite the progress made through the negotiations process, however, there has been recent speculation that domestic forces inside Iran, worried that the country could lose influence if it gives up its nuclear ambitions, may be seeking to derail the agreement. The Independent reports that, with new talks scheduled to begin on 18 February, these dissenting voices have been “increasingly critical of the Islamic republic’s negotiating team”.

Furthermore, an invitation by Ban Ki Moon, the UN Secretary General, for Iran to participate in the Geneva peace negotiations on Syria generated considerable controversy. Tehran is viewed as one of the Assad regime’s closest allies, and has been strongly critical of international backing for rebel forces. After Syria’s political opposition threatened to withdraw from the talks, Ban subsequently withdrew the invitation, drawing criticism from Iranian and Russian officials.

57 Also described as the E3 plus 3, the P5+1 comprises the UK, France, Germany, the US, China and Russia. 58 European External Action Service, Joint Plan of Action, 24 November 2013. 59 ibid. 60 HC Hansard, 25 November 2013, col 39.

Further reading:

 GOV.UK, ‘UK for Iranians’, accessed 7 February 2014  Congressional Research Service, Iran Sanctions, 15 January 2014  House of Commons Library, The Deal with Iran, 13 December 2013, SN6780  New York Times, ‘Obama’s Losing Bet on Iran’, 15 January 2014  Oxford Research Group, Iranian Foreign Policy after a Nuclear Agreement, 22 January 2014

5. Israel/Palestine

Despite a renewal of direct talks between the Israeli Government and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) during the summer of 2013, there remains little indication of progress toward a conflict-ending negotiated settlement, observed Jim Zanotti of the Congressional Research Service. John Kerry, US Secretary of State, has attempted to engage both sides in the process, but Zanotti commented that “neither Israeli leaders, nor Fatah or Hamas leaders preoccupied with maintaining their domestic credibility and respective territorial fiefdoms in the West Bank and Gaza, appear disposed to make substantive compromises with one another”.61

The issue of settlements continues to exacerbate those divides. Prior to the resumption of direct negotiations, the Israeli Coalition Government approved the release of 104 Palestinian prisoners. However, Israel has often coupled the release of those prisoners with announcements of plans related to the construction of settlement housing in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (though in areas, according to John Kerry in August 2013, that though “illegitimate”, will “not affect the peace map”62). As recently as 7 February 2014, 250 Palestinian protesters were also forcibly removed from the Ein Hijleh site, close to Jericho and the Dead Sea, where they had set up camp for a week in order to publicise their claim to the land. Meanwhile, rocket strikes from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip continue, prompting retaliatory strikes from the Israeli air force, including one which reportedly killed two Palestinian members of Islamic Jihad in Gaza on 22 January 2014.

In light of these challenges, there has been expressions of both hope and scepticism that a Framework Agreement to be published shortly by Mr Kerry may lead to progress, including from the Secretary of State himself, who said after a recent visit to the region: “The path is becoming clearer. The puzzle is becoming more defined […] I cannot tell you when, particularly, the last pieces may decide to fall into place or may fall on the floor and leave the puzzle unfinished”. Details of the plan have yet to be made officially available, though the issues it addresses reportedly include security, borders, Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees.

The negotiations have also taken place against the backdrop of the death of Ariel Sharon, former Israeli Prime Minister, who passed away on the 11 January 2014. Left in a persistent vegetative state by a stroke in 2006, Mr Sharon, in the words of his obituary in the Guardian, “gave the impression of having been involved in every political development since [Israel’s] birth in 1948”.

With regard to broader regional issues, the Israeli Government has been a strident critic of the negotiation process over Iran’s nuclear capability, with the Israeli Prime Minister, calling the deal between the country and the P5 +1 a “historic mistake”. Israel has also been vocal about

61 Congressional Research Service, Israel: Background and US Relations, 1 November 2013, p 18. 62 Transcript of remarks by John Kerry, Secretary of State, 13 August 2013. the potential threats which it considers could emerge from the fighting in Syria, with reports that Israeli forces were responsible for air strikes near the Syrian city of Latakia in November 2013.

On the Palestinian side, humanitarian and economic problems persist in the Gaza Strip in particular, with recent warnings of a potential water crisis allegedly caused, at least in part, by the ‘logjam’ in the peace process. Commentators have also observed that power-sharing arrangements among Palestinian factions that would allow for presidential and legislative elections and reunified Palestinian Authority (PA) rule over Gaza and parts of the West Bank are often proposed but remain unimplemented.

Further reading:

 GOV.UK, ‘UK and Israel’; and ‘UK and The Occupied Palestinian Territories’, accessed 14 February 2014  Congressional Research Service, The Palestinians: Background and US Relations, 31 January 2014; Israel: Background and US Relations, 1 November 2013; and Arab League Boycott of Israel, 19 December 2013  Council on Foreign Relations, The Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations, January 2014  Robert H Serry, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation in the Middle East, 16 December 2013  Office of the United Nations Coordinator for Human Rights, The Occupied Palestinian Territories, accessed 12 February 2014

6. Lebanon

The Syrian crisis continues to have a fundamental impact on life in Lebanon, both in terms of the flow of refugees into the country who are seeking to flee the conflict, and on the political and social tensions which have long existed in the Lebanese state. According to the latest information available from the UN, the number of Syrian refugees absorbed by Lebanon is approaching one million people (adding to a pre-existing Palestine refugee population of around 280,000). This is close to a quarter of the entire Lebanese population, and has placed services and resources in the country under severe strain. The Financial Times reported in December 2013 that nearly 200,000 Syrians were living without proper shelter, and that prior to a renewed call for aid, funding could “barely meet half of the rapidly escalating need”.63 Writing in the Telegraph in January 2014, Najib Mikati, the former Lebanese Prime Minister, repeated a call for increased international aid in order to “prevent the collapse of a small country that alone cannot carry this colossal weight”. Yet the Lebanese administration has also been the subject of criticism for resisting calls to build formal refugee camps and banning box shelters in the apparent belief that they could encourage Syrians to stay.

Confessional tensions in Lebanon also continue to be exacerbated by the Syrian crisis. The country remains headed by a caretaker government following the resignation of Mr Mikati in March 2013, which was prompted by a dispute with the Shi’ite group Hezbollah, and elections in the country are still on hold until November 2014. In turn, Hezbollah’s ongoing political and military support for the Assad regime has provoked reprisal attacks in Lebanon from pro-rebel groups such as Jahbat al-Nusra, including five suicide bombings which have hit Dahiyeh, a

63 Financial Times, ‘UN Aid Call for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon; Shelter Crisis’, 17 December 2013, p 6.

Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, in recent months. Commentators have voiced concerns that the recent wave of deadly bombings and shootings on both sides, including that which killed former Sunni finance minister and fierce critic of Hezbollah, Mohamad Chatah, in December 2013, mean that Lebanon “could be slipping back towards full-blown sectarian conflict”. The Lebanese army, seen as a unifying force in the country, has recently benefitted from a pledge of support worth $3 billion from Saudi Arabia, ostensibly to help it stem the rising tide of violence.

Recent developments in the country have also taken place against the trial in the Hague of four members of Hezbollah accused of assassinating Rafik Hariri, the country’s former Prime Minister, in 2005. The trial is being conducted in absentia, as those accused have not been arrested, and Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, has refused to recognise the legitimacy of the court.

Further reading:

 GOV.UK, ‘UK and Lebanon’, accessed 12 February 2014  UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Syrian Regional Refugee Response— Lebanon, accessed 12 February 2014  CIA World Factbook, Lebanon, accessed 12 February 2014  Chatham House, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Seeking Accountability, 15 January 2014  Human Rights Watch, Country Report: Lebanon 2013, 2013

7. The Gulf States

Qatar

In 2010, Qatar was selected to host the 2022 International Federation of Association Football (FIFA) World Cup. Concerns over the exploitation and abuse of the migrants working on construction projects linked with the World Cup have been raised by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Guardian and the International Trade Union Confederation. In September 2013, the Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee stated their concern over reports of mistreatment of workers.

On 21 November 2013, the European Parliament passed an emergency resolution calling on FIFA to “send a clear and strong message to Qatar to prevent the preparations for the 2022 Football World Cup being overshadowed by allegations of forced labour”. FIFA have said that it would be working to ensure the International Labour Organisation’s core labour standards were “introduced quickly, consistently and on a sustained basis” in Qatar, and that the Qatari organisers would have to report proof of improved working conditions to FIFA.

Bahrain

Following the civil disturbances in Bahrain, which reached a peak in 2011, the Crown Prince of Bahrain met in January 2014 with opposition leaders in an attempt to reopen a national dialogue, a development welcomed by the British Government. In November 2013, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee criticised the Government of Bahrain for failing to implement the recommendations of an inquiry which had been critical of the role of the security forces during the civil unrest.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)

The economy of the UAE returned to a strong level growth following the 2009 financial crisis, with a recovery in property prices. However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned that more jobs would need to be created in the private sector in the Gulf States, including UAE, to deal with high levels of youth unemployment and disproportionate levels of public sector employment among nationals. The UAE is the UK’s largest civil export market in the Middle East and North Africa.64 The Prime Minister, David Cameron, visited UAE in November 2013 to promote British trade, although a deal with BAE Systems to sell Typhoon fighter jets to UAE collapsed in December 2013.

In July 2013, the UAE Federal Supreme Court sentenced 68 people on charges of aiming to overthrow the Government. In January 2014, 20 Egyptians and 10 Emiratis were sentenced on charges of endangering national security as part of a Muslim Brotherhood cell operating in the UAE.

Relations with Iran

Although tensions remain between the Gulf States and Iran, including over the ownership of islands in the Strait of Hormuz, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the ruler of Dubai, stated his support for the lifting of sanctions against Iran. The December 2013 meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Kuwait produced a statement of cautious support for the “new orientation” of Iran’s leadership.

Further reading:

 House of Commons Library, Qatar 2013, 18 October 2013, SN06745  House of Commons Library, United Arab Emirates Uncovered, 26 April 2013, SN06619  International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, November 2013

8. Egypt

July 2013 saw the replacement of the elected President, Mohammed Morsi, with a transitional government led by interim President, Adli Mansour. This was the second time a sitting Egyptian President was removed from office in two and a half years, following the forced resignation of President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. The transitional Government announced in January 2014 that presidential elections would be held in April of that year, followed by parliamentary elections before the end of July.

Following the 2013 change of leadership, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE gave US$12 billion in aid to Egypt.65 In October 2013, the United States Government announced that it would suspend some military aid, pending “credible progress” toward the establishment of an elected civilian government.

64 UK Trade and Investment, ‘United Arab Emirates’, accessed 10 February 2014. 65 Congressional Research Service, Egypt: Background and US Relations, 10 January 2014, p 4.

The BBC reported that, following Mr Morsi’s removal from office, at least 1,000 people were killed during protests. In September 2013, activities by the Muslim Brotherhood were banned by the courts, while the activities of the former ruling party, the Freedom and Justice Party, faced a separate legal challenge. In January 2014, Mohammed Morsi faced trial for allegations of organising prison breaks during the 2011 uprising; the killing of protesters in 2012; conspiring with foreign militant groups to destabilise Egypt; and for insulting a judge.

In January 2014, Egypt held a referendum on a new draft constitution, the countries’ third since the fall of President Mubarak. 98.1 percent of those who voted in the 2014 referendum supported the new constitution, with a 38.6 percent turnout. This compares with a turnout of 32.9 percent for the December 2012 referendum and a 41.9 percent turnout for the March 2011 referendum on the constitutional changes.

There have been a number of terrorist attacks since the summer of 2013. On 24 January 2014, six people were killed in series of explosions in Cairo for which Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a terrorist group based in Sinai, claimed responsibility. The Washington Post reported that, according to Egypt’s Health Ministry, eleven people were killed during the first two days of voting in the January 2014 referendum. The Egyptian Government also continued to fight against insurgents in the Sinai Peninsula. In August 2013, militants executed 25 police conscripts following a bus hijacking.

In further domestic developments, legislation concerning the regulation of protests which has been adopted by the transitional Egyptian Government have been criticised by Amnesty International as repressive. Hazem el-Beblawi, the Egyptian Prime Minister, defended the new laws, arguing that they were designed to protect the rights of protesters. In December 2013, Mark Simmonds, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated his concern following the sentencing of three democracy and human rights activists.

Further reading:

 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Jordan Response Plan Overview, December 2013  Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014: Jordan, 21 January 2014  The World Bank, Jordan—Emergency Services and Social Resilience Project, 28 September 2013

Appendix

Countries profiled in the Library Note are highlighted in grey.

Country Profile Information Economic Indicators Population Area GNI GDP Inflation Unemployment (Million) (Sq Km) Per (Annual (Consumer (Labour Force capita Growth Prices Annual Percentage) (PPP,$) Percentage) Percentage) (2012) (2012) (2012) (2012)

Algeria 38.1 2,381,741 8,360 3.3 8.9 10 (2011)

Bahrain 1.3 760 18,910 3.4 2.8 1.11 (2010) (2010)

Egypt, Arab 85.3 1,001,450 6,450 2.2 7.1 12.7 Republic

Iran, Islamic 79.9 1,648,195 10,250 1.8 27.3 10.5 Republic (2009) (2009) (2008)

Iraq 31.9 438,317 4,230 8.4 5.8 15.3 (2011) (2008)

Israel 7.7 20,770 28,070 3.4 1.7 6.9 (2011) (2011)

Jordan 6.5 89,342 5,980 2.7 4.8 12.2

Kuwait 2.7 17,818 47,770 6.3 2.9 3.6 (2010) (2011) (2011)

Lebanon 4.1 10,400 14,160 1.4 4 6.2 (2010) (2009)

Libya 6.0 1, 759,540 17,430 2.1 6.1 n/a (2009) (2009)

Mauritania 3.4 1,030,700 2,480 7.6 4.9 31.2 (2008)

Morocco 32.6 446,550 5,060 4.2 1.3 9.0

Oman 3.2 309,500 25,320 0.3 2.9 n/a (2010) (2011)

Palestinian 4.4 5,970 n/a 6.5 n/a 23.7 Territories (2010) (West Bank (2010 UN (2010 Territories) data) UN data) 365 (Gaza)

Qatar 2.0 11,586 80,470 6.2 1.9 0.5 (2011)

Saudi 26.9 2,149,690 30,160 5.1 2.9 5.6 Arabia (2011)

Syrian Arab 22.5 185,180 5,120 3.2 36.7 8.4 Republic (2010) (2010)

Tunisia 10.8 163,610 9,210 3.6 5.5 18.3 (2011)

United 5.5 83,600 41,550 4.4 0.9 4.2 Arab (2011) (2011) (2009) Emirates

Yemen, 25.3 527,968 2,310 0.1 17.3 17.8 Republic (2010)

Sources: World Bank, ‘Data—Indicators’; BBC, ‘Country Profiles’; Central Intelligence Agency, ‘The World Factbook’