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2016 Country Review

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2016 Country Review Syria 2016 Country Review http://www.countrywatch.com Table of Contents Chapter 1 1 Country Overview 1 Country Overview 2 Key Data 5 Syria 6 Middle East 7 Chapter 2 9 Political Overview 9 History 10 Political Conditions 11 Political Risk Index 233 Political Stability 248 Freedom Rankings 263 Human Rights 275 Government Functions 281 Government Structure 282 Principal Government Officials 288 Leader Biography 289 Leader Biography 289 Foreign Relations 291 National Security 316 Defense Forces 326 Chapter 3 328 Economic Overview 328 Economic Overview 329 Nominal GDP and Components 332 Population and GDP Per Capita 334 Real GDP and Inflation 335 Government Spending and Taxation 336 Money Supply, Interest Rates and Unemployment 337 Foreign Trade and the Exchange Rate 338 Data in US Dollars 339 Energy Consumption and Production Standard Units 340 Energy Consumption and Production QUADS 342 World Energy Price Summary 343 CO2 Emissions 344 Agriculture Consumption and Production 345 World Agriculture Pricing Summary 348 Metals Consumption and Production 349 World Metals Pricing Summary 351 Economic Performance Index 352 Chapter 4 364 Investment Overview 364 Foreign Investment Climate 365 Foreign Investment Index 367 Corruption Perceptions Index 380 Competitiveness Ranking 392 Taxation 401 Stock Market 401 Partner Links 401 Chapter 5 403 Social Overview 403 People 404 Human Development Index 407 Life Satisfaction Index 411 Happy Planet Index 422 Status of Women 431 Global Gender Gap Index 434 Culture and Arts 443 Etiquette 445 Travel Information 446 Diseases/Health Data 457 Chapter 6 463 Environmental Overview 463 Environmental Issues 464 Environmental Policy 465 Greenhouse Gas Ranking 466 Global Environmental Snapshot 477 Global Environmental Concepts 488 International Environmental Agreements and Associations 502 Appendices 527 Bibliography 528 Syria Chapter 1 Country Overview Syria Review 2016 Page 1 of 540 pages Syria Country Overview SYRIA A country in the Middle East, Syria was occupied successively by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Byzantines, before finally coming under the control of the Ottoman Turks. Following World War I, France acquired a mandate over Syria, and the French administered the area until granting it independence in 1946. Since independence, however, the country has lived through periods of political instability driven by the conflicting interests of various ethnic and religious groups. Syria united with Egypt in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic, but the two entities separated in 1961 and the Syrian Arab Republic was reestablished. In 1963 the Baath (Renaissance) party took control of the country, which rules to this day. Baath government has seen authoritarian rule at home and a strong anti-Israeli policy abroad, particularly under former President Hafez al-Assad. In 1967 Syria lost the Golan Heights to the Israelis, while civil war in neighboring Lebanon allowed it to extend its political and military influence in the region. Syrian troops stationed in Lebanon since 1976 withdrew in April 2005. Following the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, Syria underwent a degree of relaxation, and hundreds of political prisoners were released. But real political freedoms have not been granted, and the economy remains dominated by the state. In 2011, Syria -- along with many of other countries -- was plagued with anti-government unrest in the "Arab Spring" sweeping the region. A harsh crackdown by the Assad regime led to global condemnation and saw Syria subject to unprecedented sanctions by the Arab League. Like many of its neighbors in the Middle East, Syria’s economy depends heavily on oil production and export. Editor's Note: Syria Review 2016 Page 2 of 540 pages Syria Since early 2011, anti-government protests have spread and escalated across the Arab world; Syria emerged as an addition to the list of countries experiencing unrest in March 2011. At first, protesters stopped short of demanding the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad, instead demanding greater political freedom and efforts to end corruption. For his part, President Assad announced he would advance a reform agenda, which would include lifting the emergency laws that had been in place for decades, and increased rights to the country's disenfranchised Kurdish population. These moves were aimed at quelling the rising climate of unrest gripping the country. But over time, as protests continued, and as the Assad regime carried out a hardline crackdown on dissent, tensions escalated between the government and the protesters. In mid-2011, the United Nations Security Council and the Arab League respectively issued condemnations of the violence in Syria. As well, the United Nations Human Rights Council called for an independent inquiry into the violent crackdown on dissent. Meanwhile, global leaders were calling for President Assad to step down from power, given the brutality of the Syrian regime's crackdown on protesters. As of 2012, the bloody crackdown by the Assad regime on anti- government protesters was ongoing. In fact, the crackdown appeared to become more relentless in places such as Homs and Aleppo. Despite widespread condemnation from the West, a United Nations Security Resolution on the situation in Syria was subject to veto by Russia and China. A subsequent vote in the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly condemned Syria for its brutal crackdown. A prevailing truce, brokered by the joint United Nations/Arab League envoy, Kofi Annan, was established in the interests of preventing further bloodshed; however, it was revealed to be an exercise in theory rather than practice and eventually the United Nations monitoring mission ended in failure. Syria has meanwhile been subject to sanctions by various countries and was sliding into pariah status in the international community. Assassinations, alleged massacres, geopolitical tensions with Turkey and Israel, and most recently, suspicions about the use of chemical weapons, have since mired the Syrian landscape. Indeed, it was increasingly clear that Syria had slipped into a state of civil war and was facing a devastating humanitarian crisis. That crisis reached new heights in August 2013 with claims that Syrian forces launched a chemical attack on the outskirts of Damascus. Was this the clear sign that United States President Barack Obama's "red line" had definitively been crossed? And would the international community become more involved in the Syrian crisis? Would the ensuing chemical weapons deal with Syria between the United States and Russia quiet the war drums? Would Syria actually abide by its international obligations set forth in that agreement? The answers to those questions were yet to be determined. In the meanwhile, the highly anticipated peace summit in Geneva ended without yielding any productive results and the civil war in Syria raged on and on. By mid-2014, while Syria had shown progress in its disposal of chemical toxins, in keeping with an international agreement intended to avoid intervention by the West, the country was dealing with an Syria Review 2016 Page 3 of 540 pages Syria ascendant "Islamic State." Previously known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS as well as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant or ISIL, this group self-declared a caliphate extending from Syria to Iraq. Whereas the West and regional powers in the Middle East had earlier called for an end to the Assad regime, suddenly the geopolitical stakes were quite different as extremist terrorists were now posing the most dangerous threat to regional stability. As of 2015, Syria was mired in horrendous crisis as the civil war between the Assad regime and its opponents raged on, but also as wide swaths of Syrian territory had fallen to the terror group, Islamic State. Syria Review 2016 Page 4 of 540 pages Syria Key Data Key Data Region: Middle East Population: 22878524 Mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (June to August) and mild, rainy winters Climate: (December to February) along coast; cold weather with snow or sleet periodically hitting Damascus. Arabic (official) Kurdish Armenian Languages: Aramaic Circassian French Currency: 1 Syrian pound (£S$) = 100 piastres National Day is 17 April (1946), Unity Day is 22 February, Revolution Day is Holiday: 8 March Area Total: 185180 Area Land: 184050 Coast Line: 193 Syria Review 2016 Page 5 of 540 pages Syria Syria Country Map Syria Review 2016 Page 6 of 540 pages Syria Middle East Regional Map Syria Review 2016 Page 7 of 540 pages Syria Syria Review 2016 Page 8 of 540 pages Syria Chapter 2 Political Overview Syria Review 2016 Page 9 of 540 pages Syria History Archaeologists have demonstrated that Syria was the center of one of the most ancient civilizations on earth. Around the city of Ebla in northern Syria (discovered and excavated in 1975), a great Semitic empire spread from the Red Sea north to Turkey and east to Mesopotamia from 2500 to 2400 B.C.E. During that period, the city of Ebla had a population estimated at 260,000. Scholars believe the language of Ebla to be the oldest Semitic language. Syria was occupied successively by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Arameans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Nabataeans, Byzantines and, in part, Crusaders before finally coming under the control of the Ottoman Turks. Syria is significant in the history of Christianity; Paul was converted on the road to Damascus and established the first organized Christian Church at Antioch in ancient Syria, from which he left on many of his missionary journeys. Damascus, settled about 2500 B.C.E., is the oldest continuously inhabited capital and one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. It came under Muslim rule in 636 C.E. Immediately thereafter, the city's power and prestige reached its peak, and it became the capital of the Omayyad Empire, which extended from Spain to India from 661 to 750 C.E., when the Abbasid caliphate was established in Baghdad, Iraq.
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