POLICY BRIEFING May 2014 DYNAMIC STALEMATE: SURVEYING SYRIA’S MILITARY LANDSCAPE CHARLES LISTER BROOKINGS The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s) and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its scholars. Copyright © 2014 Saha 43, Building 63, West Bay, Doha, Qatar www.brookings.edu/about/centers/doha TABLE OF CONTENTS I. A Complex Affair ...........................................................................................................................1 The Opposition Camp ..............................................................................................................2 The Pro-Government Camp .....................................................................................................3 II. An Unstable Opposition ................................................................................................................5 III. Jihadi Dynamics ...........................................................................................................................8 IV. Pro-Government Forces Fight Back ...........................................................................................11 V. Conflict Assessment ..................................................................................................................... 14 VI. Policy Recommendations ...........................................................................................................17 VII. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................21 ACRONYMS ATGM Anti-tank guided missile CT Counterterrorism CW Chemical weapon FSA Free Syrian Army IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham MANPADS Man-portable air defense systems NDF National Defense Force OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OSINT Open source intelligence PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan SAA Syrian Arab Army SNC National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces SMC Supreme Joint Military Command Council SRF Syrian Revolutionaries Front UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel A COMPLEX AFFAIR The conflict in Syria has become an intensely National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary complex affair, incorporating overlapping and Opposition Forces (or Syrian National political, religious, sectarian, ethnic, and tribal Coalition; SNC) and the Supreme Joint Military narratives. The anti-government insurgency Command Council (SMC). currently involves approximately 100,000- 120,000 fighters—roughly 7,000-10,000 of Two-and-a-half years ago, it might have been whom are non-Syrian nationals—divided possible for Western governments to help bring about an accelerated and successful end among over 1,000 distinct armed units.1 A to the revolution through the formation of a majority of these factions are further organized representative opposition structure that both into an assortment of coalitions, fronts, and incorporated and helped to unify the armed temporary local alliances known as ‘military opposition. Over time, though, the involve- operations rooms.’ Meanwhile, government ment of ever-more actors, and interests, has forces—principally the Syrian Arab Army resulted in escalating brutality, spiraling casu- (SAA)—have both encouraged and adapted alty rates, immense population displacement, to the war’s sectarian overtones, primarily and the emergence of what may prove to be deploying Shia and Alawi units in front-line unparalleled opportunities for jihadi mili- operations alongside increasingly profes- tancy. This initial failure to act, combined with sionalized paramilitaries and Shia militias Assad’s proven adaptability and ruthless pur- composed largely of foreign fighters. All the suit of power, now requires Western states to while, both sides receive considerable levels of overcome previous miscalculations and cur- support from foreign states, organizations, and rent policy stagnation in order to help secure individuals. a resolution that best ensures regional stability and international security. The foregoing refers only to the dynamic of Sunni militias fighting against the Syrian As such, this Policy Briefing aims to provide government. The conflict, however, is by the reader with a present-day strategic assess- no means two-dimensional. Other elements ment of the conflict in Syria, which itself feeds include, but are not limited to, the role of into a set of specific policy recommendations. the Kurdish autonomist group, the Partiya This conflict assessment will take the form of Yekîtiya Demokrat, and its armed wings, the several distinct sections outlining the status of the Western-backed opposition, the influence Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) and Yekîneyên of jihadi militants within the wider opposition Parastina Jin; the eruption of fighting against dynamic, and the evolving capabilities of pro- the al-Qaeda-disavowed Islamic State of Iraq government forces. Before delving into this and al-Sham (ISIS); the interest-specific role of assessment, it is worth outlining and recog- Lebanon-based Hizballah in backing President nizing the wide range of international and local Bashar al-Assad; the damaging role of fre- actors involved and their various interests and quently incompatible or mutually conflicting objectives. Such actors can be loosely divided policies of opposition-supporting Gulf states; into two distinct comparative categories: firstly, and increasingly evident divisions within the state and sub-state bodies, and secondly, those political and military components of the two either supportive of or opposed to the Assad main Western-backed opposition structures, the government. 1 Based on the author’s ongoing calculations since initiating a study on the structure and scale of the anti-government insurgency in early 2013. Data has been compiled and analyzed from a variety of sources, including existing intelligence estimates, public data released by opposition bodies, interviews with insurgent groups, and other existing investigations. DYNAMIC STALEMATE: 1 SURVEYING SYRIA’S MILITARY LANdsCAPE THE OPPOSITION CAMP uniformly dismayed when the United States failed to carry out its threat of military action The Syrian opposition currently enjoys the following the chemical weapons attack out- support of a range of state actors. The United side Damascus in August 2013. Nonetheless, States (and its allies in Europe) plays a promi- there are also several important differences in nent diplomatic role in facilitating the coming approach. While Saudi Arabia currently appears together of opposition-supporting countries to be focusing on re-invigorating moderate under various umbrellas, including the so- armed groups—in broad alignment with U.S. called Friends of Syria group. While the United policy interests—Qatar, and to a lesser extent States was initially supportive of an outright Turkey, remain more supportive of actors in opposition victory in Syria through the over- the mainstream Islamist camp (which is dis- throw of the Assad regime, it recently appears tinct from al-Qaeda-type jihadis). Also, while to have adopted a more nuanced strategy based Saudi Arabia remains locked into a political on the realization that a political compromise battle with Iran, Qatar and Turkey have chosen is the only viable solution to the conflict. to retain constructive relations with the Iranian As such, the United States is now primarily government. This policy underlines Qatar and focused on preventing further regional spill- Turkey’s interests beyond Syria, yet may also over and destabilization, and on countering the represent a hedging of bets on the outcome of existing—and still growing—threat posed by the Syrian conflict. jihadis, including al-Qaeda. The United States is widely perceived to have adopted a policy With regard to the armed insurgency inside of supporting moderate rebel forces only to the Syria, a variety of actors play prominent roles. extent necessary to induce negotiations capable While the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has not of resulting in political compromise and a ces- represented a distinct military organization for sation of violence between government and some time, it remains an important umbrella opposition.2 term for those groups and coalitions gener- ally perceived to be acting in the interest of Meanwhile, the more determined providers of the exiled SNC opposition. There are also a practical military assistance to the number of politically indepen- Syrian armed opposition have The United States is dent, but largely moderate, rebel been regional states, most promi- alliances, including some that nently Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and now primarily focused maintain a moderately Islamist Turkey. While all have, over on preventing further undertone (such as Faylaq al- time, adopted differing strategies regional spillover Sham and Jaish al-Mujahideen), of opposition support—including which have become natural the provision of funds and weap- and destabilization, partners of FSA-branded groups onry, as well as the facilitation of and on countering through their shared interests. cross-border logistics—they all remain determined to precipitate the existing—and still Meanwhile,