A I R U N I VE R S ITY review MAY-JUNE 1976 The Professional Journal of the United States Air Force from the editor's aerie

Lieutenant General John W. Pauly's "Thread of Doctrine" constitutes what we believe to be a solid platform for continuing dialogue on Air Force doctrine. As an offspring of the twentieth century and its technological revolution, the Air Force has faced a formidable challenge in developing doctrine and tactics to keep pace with the quantum leaps in hardware capability. We mean for Air University Review to contribute to this process by providing a forum where conflicting ideas may help refine and sharpen evolving doctrine. Our cover graphically reflects General Pauly's ". . . yesterday's lessons learned, applied to tomorrow's expectations." In an article both profound and whimsical, Hoyt W. Huggins speculates on the present and future role of computers in the conduct of human affairs. Anyone concerned with the impact of computers in the manage- ment process will find that Huggins offers some stimulating—even offbeat -insights. Among letters that cross the Editor's desk from time to time are those inquiring if the Review would be interested in book reviews or articles from sources outside the Air Force. The answer is an emphatic yes. Al- though the majority of our contributors have traditionally been active duty or retired Air Force personnel, we have always welcomed articles from anyone who has something significant to say. Aspiring authors need not feel that their opinions must conform to what they perceive to be the offi- cial policy of the Air Force. We welcome differing points of view so long as they are well supported. Potential book reviewers interested in receiving a book for review should drop us a card or letter indicating their area of competence. De- spite the fact that we have regular reliable reviewers, we always welcome new talent and fresh points of view. Since our authors often express pleasant surprise when they receive a check for their articles, perhaps it is worth mentioning again that we do offer modest sums for articles accepted for publication. The only exception applies to Air Force or other federal personnel whose articles were written during normal duty hours. At the end of February the Review lost one of its most capable and dedicated staff members and the Air Force an employee of long-standing tenure. M iss Genie Cory, Copy Editor for the Review since the Quarterly Review days back in 1957, started her federal employment in 1927, the year in which Charles Lindbergh flew the Spirit of St. Louis solo across the At- lantic. Her 48 years and four months' continuous federal service establishes a record in Air University not likely to be broken. Miss Cory's painstaking care to detail and her wealth of Air Force experience will be greatly missed, but we delight in her accepting a retirement so richly deserved. Ave atque vale.

AIR U N I VE R S ITY

May-June 19 76 Vol. XXVII No. 4 Preview

From the Editor’s Aer ie...... Facing Page The Thread of Doctrine...... 2 Lt. Gen. John W. Pauly, USAF Instructional Technol ogy in the Depar t ment of Defen se, Now and in the Future...... Dr. M. Richard Rose Computers Alive? ...... 24 Hoyt W. Huggins Communication: T he Key Element to Prisoner of War Survival...... 33 Lt. Col. Bobby D. W'agnon, USAF Air Force Review Assessin g the Assessmen t Cen t er : New Dimen sio n s in Lea der sh ip...... 47 Maj. Peter Henderson, USAF Do More with Less...... Maj. D. K. Crooch, USAF In My Opinion The USAF Instrument Flight Cen t er : Anachronism or Instrument Flight Pa c eset t er for the Future? ...... 62 Maj. Jimmie L. Coombes, USAF The People Mix ...... 72 Maj. James M. Alford, USAF Books and Ideas Truth in Jeopardy ...... 75 Col. Don Clelland, USAF Soviet Mil it a r y Theory in English: T he Language Barrier Hurdl ed ...... 78 Dr. Kenneth R. Whiting Something New under the Sun...... 86 Lt. Col. David R. Mets, USAF Books Rec eived...... 92 The Contributors...... 95

ATTENTION The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking and stimulate dialogue concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air Uni­ versity. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed. THE THREAD OF DOCTRINE

L ieu t en a n t Gener a l John W. Pauly doctrine—Fundamental principles by which the act of one man hitting another man the military forces or elements thereof guide was the genesis of man’s combat experi- their actions in support o f national objectives. ence from which military doctrine evolved, It is authoritative but requires judgnient in albeit in its most rudimentary form. To- application. day’s doctrine is the product of combat experience in the form of yesterday’s les- JCS Pub. 1, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military sons learned, applied to tomorrow’s ex- and Associated Terms pectations. Doctrine, therefore, is the discipline that is applied to bring about Aerospace doctrine is an authoritative state- a reasoned adjustment to the dynamics ment of principles for the employment o f of modern aerospace warfare and pro- United States Air Force resources. It is based on mote the rational employment of modem an accumulation o f knowledge gained through aerospace forces. Warfare has winners military experience, study and test. It is de- and losers. More often than not, winners signed for continuing applicability in war have successfully applied certain time- and peace. proven principles in the employment of AF\1 1 - 1 , United States Air their forces. Such principles and their Force Basic Doctrine application are the substance of the disci- pline of doctrine. We can reasonably con- clude, then, that in the future, as in the HE essence of doctrine lies in its past, our success or failure in war will purpose: to teach, to endow a body rest to a large degree on our doctrine of people with a common set of and how we apply it. T broad assumptions, ideas, values, and atti-This article will trace the evolution of tudes as a guide to future actions. Rather doctrine, more specifically basic doctrine, than a one-time revelation from on high as it applies to the United States Air Force, to be taken as dogma, doctrine is the and in doing so will answer the questions: product of a continuing effort to join (1) How did it come to be this way? and theory and practice—one of the most (2) Was it through logic and careful analy- difficult of all enterprises. Theory, without sis of experience? (3) What has been the the leavening of experience, lacks sub- influence of the Air Force-wide coordina- stance and foundation; experience without tion process? and (4) What ideas have theory lacks an adequate frame of reference prevailed? In reviewing the history of to accommodate future changes that will basic military doctrine for answers to surely come. Meaningful Air Force doc- these questions, we are led to the conclu- trine, suitable for all the complexities sion that the ultimate product is a care- and forms of modem aerospace warfare, fully and thoughtfully derived statement is the synthesis of theory and experience. of well-established and proven employment In this context, the human equation principles, which also reflects adjustments plays a fundamental role. For example, to changing national security policy and

3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

strategy. Tracking these principles in Air War Department Training Regulation No. Force basic doctrine, we will find that 440-15, “Employment of the Air Forces of there is a consistency or “thread” of doc- the Army” (1935) trine that has stood the test of combat, WDFM 1-5, “Employment of the Aviation the evolution of Air Force thinking, and of the Army” (1940) the dynamic aspects of doctrine develop- AWPD-1, “Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces” (1941) ment. FM 31-35, “Aviation in Support of Ground Let’s begin by tracing the evolution of Forces” (1942) basic doctrine from its roots in the minds WDFM 100-20, “Command and Employ- of our early Air Force leaders. As we ment of Air Power” (1943). proceed through time, the doctrinal thread that persists, and is slowly but steadily Most of these documents were narrowly refined, is the idea that air power is an circumscribed statements about the em- entity and as such can best be employed ployment of aviation. They considered under the principles of centralized con- air support of the ground forces to be trol and decentralized execution. While the main mission of Army aviation. The the early manifestation of this idea was exceptions were the Air Corps Tactical in the concepts of strategic bombardment, School publication, “Employment of Com- it has come to be applied to all aspects bined Air Force” (1926), AWPD-1 “Muni- of aerospace operations. tions Requirements of the Army Air Forces” Many officers of our earlier Air Service, (1941), and WDFM 100-20 “Command Air Corps, and Army Air Forces con- and Employment of Air Power” (1943). tributed to the development of such con- The first “envisioned the air arm being cepts, which have been elevated to the coordinated with land and sea forces, hav- level of Air Force doctrine. Earliest and ing as its aim the destruction of the ene- best-known of American air power advo- my’s morale and will to resist, preferably cates was General Billy Mitchell, whose by means of attack against the targets in flamboyant personality and flair for pub- the enemy’s interior.” licity gained wide recognition of his ideas AWPD-1, prepared in 1941 and incor- about air power, particularly those of an porated as part of a joint Army-Navy independent air arm and the primacy study of overall U.S. production require- of strategic bombardment. Generals ments for defeat of the Axis, has been “Hap” Arnold, Hugh J. Knerr, and Haywood called “a notable achievement which S. Hansell, Jr., among others, were disci- marked both the apex of pre-war doctrinal ples of Mitchell and helped put many of thought and a blueprint for the air war his ideas into practice. Eventually, theory which would follow.”1 and practice evolved into Air Force doc- FM 100-20, published on 21 July 1943, trine. grew directly out of the experience of The basic documents produced during the then recently concluded North Afri- this period that reflected the evolution of can Campaign. The lesson of North Af- these early ideas include: rica lay in the fragmentation of air power and the consequent inability to concen- War Department Training Regulation No. 440-15, “Fundamental Principles for Em- trate air power; this was the result of ployment of the Air Service” (1926) organizational arrangements that had the Air Corps Tactical School, “Employment effect of making air support organic to of Combined Air Force” (1926) Army divisions. THREAD OF DOCTRINE 5

FM 100-20, reflecting the lessons learned, with the issuance of FM 100-20, the Army declared that land power and air power formally accepted the principle of cen- were coequal, that gaining air superiority tralized control of air assets. By the end was the first requirement for success in of World War II the Army Air Forces land operations. More important, it re- had gained acceptance of most of its doc- jected the principle of organic control of trinal precepts, with the notable exception tactical air assets by stating that control of independence. That came shortly there- of available air power must be centralized after. to realize the maximum benefits. This In the years immediately after World represented a complete turnaround in War II, the Army Air Forces was too busy official Army doctrine and helped pave demobilizing and reorganizing to pay much the wav for an independent Air Force. attention to doctrine. Not until after the It was a landmark document, expressing passage of the National Security Act of the principle of centralized control of air 1947 did the newly born United States Air power in joint operations. Force direct attention to its doctrine. In The basic concepts, beliefs, principles, September 1947, the month in which the and attitudes that emerged in the years independent Air Force emerged, Head- between World War I and World War II quarters usaf, realizing the void in current provided the foundation for the broad air power doctrine, directed the new statement of air power doctrine found in educational center, Air University, to FM 100-20 and subsequent usaf doctrinal revise the 1943 version of FM 100-20 publications. Air as a separate operating and recommend a system of doctrinal medium, an independent .Air Force, em- publications. Five and one-half years later, phasis on the offensive, strategic bombard- on 1 April 1953, the first usaf basic doc- ment, centralized control of air power, trine manual, AFM 1-2, was published. and control of the air—all represented the The sources of inspiration for this initial essence of .Air Force doctrine. These essen- statement of Air Force basic doctrine were, tiallvy consistent and interrelated ideas of course, all of the documents and ideas were driven chiefly by the strong and per- previously mentioned, plus the experience sistent belief of most Air Corps officers of World War II and some postwar addi- in an independent Air Force and in stra- tives. The Air Force declaration of inde- tegic bombardment. The doctrine of the pendence, the National Security Act of 1920s and 1930s—that the bomber was the 1947, did not spell out missions and func- dominant air weapon—supported the con- tions, except in the most general terms. It cept of strategic bombardment, the most did charge the Air Force, by law, to de- independent of all air missions, and there- velop the basic tenets regarding the use of fore was the primary justification for an air power. The President’s Air Policy independent Air Force. The insistence on Commission, headed by Thomas K. Fin- centralized control of air power grew out letter, placed overriding emphasis on an of theories that were formulated during air strategy of retaliatory attack against World War I but remained only a hope an enemy’s industrial capacity. The Key until 1935, when the General Headquarters West and Newport Agreements, both in Air Force (ghqaf) was organized. The 1948, represented early official statements preparation of AWPD-1 in 1941 was next of roles, missions, and functions of the in a crescendo of events leading to the ac- three services. Those agreements set to ceptance of air power doctrine. In 1943, rest notions that all aviation, including 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Navy and Marine, would be included in a in the development of usaf doctrine dur- single Air Force. The functions of the ing this period. At the direction of Head- services were spelled out, providing boun- quarters usaf, it functioned as a doctrinal daries for the subsequent formulation of center, at first unofficially and then offi- doctrine. These agreements eventually cially, beginning in 1951. In addition to were incorporated into dod Directive the 1953 version of AFM 1-2, Air Univer- 5100.1 and jcs Publication 2, Unified Ac- sity developed and submitted for publica- tion Armed Forces (UNAAF), which clearly tion during 1953 and subsequent years a spell out the functional responsibilities for series of operational manuals designated the services. 1-3 through 1-11. These had to do with The purpose of AFM 1-2 was to “pro- theater air operations, air defense opera- vide and impart to all Air Force personnel tions, strategic air operations, and the like. a basis for understanding the use of air The first revision of AFM 1-2, published forces in peace and in war, and to serve in April 1954, differed very little from the as a background for succeeding manuals 1953 version. Although the 1953 edition covering the tactics and techniques for had been subjected to review throughout employing air forces.”2 the Air Force, only minor editorial changes The purpose of the U.S. military instru- were made in 1954. The edition of the ment was to deter aggression or to repel manual published in April 1955 was, how- it if it occurred. Air forces were purported ever, a major revision. Nevertheless, as to be most decisive in actions dealing im- in previous manuals, it continued to stress mediately and directly with the enemy’s the principle that air forces are an entity warmaking capacity, a reflection of the and their employment must be under the consistent thread of thought on strategic centralized control of an air commander at operations since the early years. The manu- a level high enough to exploit their char- al emphasized the uncommon versatility of acteristics fully. The new manual also air forces and related them positively to stressed the capabilities of air power the principles of war. It distinguished two throughout the entire spectrum of inter- broad and interdependent aspects of air national conflict, taking cognizance of the operations: heartland and peripheral ac- capabilities of air power in periods other tions. Control of the air was emphasized than general war. It defined air power as as necessary for both of these categories, including the entire aviation capacity of and unity of effort was also stressed. While the United States. Control of the air was offensive operations were considered to be the desired position; “control is achieved the best way to provide security for the when an air force can effect planned de- homeland against attack, an effective air grees of destruction while denying this defense was also considered mandatory. In opportunity to the enemy.”3 The manual general, AFM 1-2 was a clear reflection of advocated minimizing the striking capacity contemporary Air Force ideas and atti- of enemy air forces as a primary consid- tudes at that time; it retained the concept eration in war. It considered air defense that air power was an entity and that forces in-being as indispensable to na- offensive strategic operations and cen- tional security, and it set forth the view tralized control of air operations were that air forces have the capability to con- fundamental precepts in the employment of duct wartime operations against all com- air power. ponents of an enemy’s strength. This The Air University played a central role briefest of the basic doctrine manuals THREAD OF DOCTRINE 7 had only 4100 words, setting a worthy tion of usaf Basic Doctrine was trans- standard for those that have followed. ferred from Air University to the Air Staff Sputnik, missiles, and space were re- in Washington. A Doctrine Division was flected in the 1959 revision of AFM 1-2. established in the Directorate of Plans to This revision incorporated the concept of assume the responsibility. Later, the divi- aerospace as “an operationally indivisible sion became a part of the Directorate of medium consisting of the total expanse Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives under beyond the earth’s surface. ”4 Moreover, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and the manual declared that the operating Operations. The Doctrine Division retains systems of the .Air Force—air systems, bal- the responsibility, today, for the develop- listic missiles, and space vehicle systems— ment, formulation, and implementation of were the “fundamental aerospace forces of usaf Basic Doctrine. the nation.”5 It stressed the importance In August 1964 the changes in the stra- of maintaining a position of general su- tegic environment and concepts for em- premacy in aerospace in both peace and ployment of forces in that environment war. Such supremacy could affect the culminated in publication of AFM 1-1 fundamental elements of a nation’s strength. as the replacement for AFM 1-2. This The years between 1959 and 1964 wit- edition was also strongly influenced by nessed great changes in the strategic en- Project forecast, a major Air F o rce study vironment and the thinking about that in 1963-64 headed by General Bernard A. environment. The advent of the submarine- Schriever, which sought, among other launched ballistic missile and the acquisi- things, to identify the goals of national tion of a major strategic nuclear offensive policy that would influence systems devel- capability by the Navy, the development opment decisions and other decisions of missile and satellite technology and de- within the Air Force.6 The new AFM 1-1 ployment of missiles and satellites on a set forth general characteristics and re- large scale, the adoption of a flexible quirements of aerospace forces and de- response and the search for multiple re- scribed the various modes of employment sponse options by the Department of De- of these forces at different levels of war- fense, the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the fare. This manual also acknowledged that Cuban missile crisis of 1962—all impacted thermonuclear weapons and an assured significantly on the scope and context of delivery capability in the hands of poten- the Air Force basic doctrine manual. tial enemies had created a new strategic The emergence of “flexible response as environment and profoundly affected the our national security policy brought a new use of military power. The basic conclu- surge of initiatives, notably by the Army, sion held that to develop organic airlift, reconnaissance, . . . the nature of modern war has altered the and close air support capabilities, which use of force to the extent that total victory competed with Air Force missions. Thus, in some situations would be an unreasonable roles and missions and doctrine-related goal. Where enemies with capabilities to matters became national issues, with their destroy our urban centers are involved, we focus not only in the Department of De- should seek military objectives more realistic fense but in the Congress as well. During than total defeat of the enemy.7 this period also, when matters related to doctrine were becoming national issues, But despite the dynamics of the period, responsibility for preparation and publica- there remained the enduring doctrine that 8 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

air power is an entity best employed under of the elements required to achieve the centralized control at levels high enough basic objectives of the Air Force. It dif- to fully exploit its inherent characteris- fered, therefore, very little from previous tics and capabilities. And, while the 1964 statements of broad requirements to per- manual retained a strong emphasis on form usaf missions. It did, however, re- offensive strategic operations, it also iden- flect terminology derived from the Defense tified and discussed each of the tactical Reports of the new Secretary of Defense, air missions in conditions of nuclear, con- Melvin R. Laird. Finally, the manual ventional, and counterinsurgency opera- discarded the terms “general war” and tions. “limited war” in favor of four categories of It should be noted that the nuclear test- operations that were considered more de- ban agreement between the United States scriptive and adequate: conventional and the Soviet Union had been signed in operations, low-intensity nuclear opera- 1963. The preliminary discussions that came tions, high-intensity nuclear operations, eventually, in the years after 1964, led and special operations. to the strategic arms limitation agree- Again, work was started immediately on ment of 1972. The trend toward parity the next revision. After three years of in strategic nuclear offensive forces be- relatively continuous work and broad came increasingly apparent after 1964 staffing throughout the Air Force, a new and had impact on later versions of AFM manual was approved by the Chief of Staff 1- 1. in November 1974. Although a revision of the 1964 manual As with previous versions, it is possible did not appear for seven years, work on it to perceive a basic and continuing thread began almost immediately after publica- of broad principles that have their roots tion of the 1964 version. There was a full- in the historical evolution of airmen’s scale draft revision in 1965 and a series thinking over the past fifty years. The of additional drafts at least annually there- words have changed, and new excursions after. into areas reflective of 1973-74 national A new AFM 1-1 was approved by the policy pronouncements are immediately Chief of Staff and published in September evident. As a result of today’s challenges 1971. This manual took into account the of war, national environment, and inter- prevailing thought in the Defense Depart- national relationships, many generalized ment. It affirmed that the “national leader- concepts and policies have been included ship must be provided with a wide range in the manual. However, fundamental of alternatives in the use of military pow- principles learned from two World Wars, er”8 and stated the characteristics, tasks, reinforced in subsequent armed conflicts, and capabilities of aerospace forces for as well as from analyses, tests, and hy- performing a wide variety of functions. potheses, are enduring. The manual reaffirmed that the “primary In essence, the changes in the manual objective of U.S. national security is deter- reflect the dynamic evolvement of our rence of military actions which are counter national security policy and strategy, while to U.S. interests.”9 This had been the at the same time reinforcing the specifics basic concept underlying U.S. national of the enduring fundamental employment security policy since World War II. More- principles of aerospace power addressed over, the manual used the term “force in basic doctrine. sufficiency” and found that it included all The process by which AFM 1-1 is pro- THREAD OF DOCTRINE 9

duced seems to bear out the maxim that trate the total air effort. This has been the the means are as important as the ends. basis for Air Force positions on issues in- It is unlikely that anyone reads the manual volving command arrangements in the em- more carefully or analyzes it more thor- ployment of air power throughout our oughly than the authors and the critics of combat experience. The most recent ex- drafts of the manual. Among the critics are ample was the issue over single manager literally hundreds who are experts on some for air in South Vietnam that gained sharp aspect of doctrine. Thus, hundreds of focus during the battle for Khe Sanh. The usaf officers, including generals, engage question was whether Marine Corps tac- in an extensive dialogue that examines tical air would operate independent of, Air Force basic thinking in depth. This or under the operational control of, the debate illuminates the various facets of Deputy for Air Operations to comusmacv. Air Force doctrinal issues. Out of this After considerable debate, which at times dialogue and debate, issues are identified, reached all the way to the office of the doubts resolved, and the enduring con- Secretary of Defense, command arrange- cepts of air power employment emerge in ments that provided for a single manager their doctrinal vestments. for air were established. The need for such arrangements lay in the essence of centralized control: enabling a commander W e assert that Air Force basic to exploit fully the characteristics and doctrine is alive and well. History shows capabilities of air power and the flexibility that our doctrine has been responsive to to shift and mass firepower or forces in a changing times and philosophies while single integrated effort, wherever and maintaining a consistent thread of funda- whenever needed. The late Army Chief mental principles. We can conclude that of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, our doctrinal process is a discipline—a appreciated and understood this philosophy discipline for dealing with new concepts, as well as anyone. In testifying before the technology, and roles and missions rela- House Armed Services Committee, he said: tionships with other services or allies. It Close air support, as provided by the Air serves to sharpen the debate bv providing Force for somebody in the position I was, a framework of time-proven principles the overall commander (comusmacv), there against which we can illuminate and test is no way to replace that with helicopters contending ideas now and in the future. . . . it can generate . . . more hitting power However, in the final analysis, the most . . . because high performance aircraft can important function of doctrine is that it carry a much greater payload. And you can provides the fundamental guidance for focus that very quickly. I don’t mean from the employment of aerospace forces in the first brigade to the second brigade. I combat. am talking about . . . instead of putting it In the experience of three major wars— in [Military Region] MR-4, you go to MR-1; World War II, Korea, Southeast Asia— you switch that whole faucet and you do it we have seen a consistent thread of basic in about 45 minutes. The whole control system and base system that supports that, doctrine encompassed in the most funda- there is nothing in the Army like that. There mental of principles: that air power is an is nothing anywhere in the world like it.10 entity and is best employed under the centralized control of a single authority As was noted earlier, our basic doctrine who is at a level that can best orches- is subject to constant and critical review. 10 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Numerous drafts are analyzed throughout 1-1, we should be able to speak out con- the Air Force before AFM 1-1 is pro- fidently and discuss our primary missions mulgated. However, the number of people and how we go about accomplishing who work directly on it is small when com- them. As with any organization, the pro- pared to the total usaf population; time fessionalism of our Air Force depends in and circumstances preclude a formal review large measure on how well we know our by every Air Force member before the missions and the basic doctrine that guides document is published. It therefore becomes us in performing them. an individual effort for our men and women Air Force Manual 1-1, USAF Basic to learn about Air Force doctrine. It is Doctrine, can be the source of much of essential that each member take it upon this information, and it’s as close as the himself to be familiar with the manual nearest publications file. The motivation and understand these fundamentals of our for getting it out and reading it is your very existence. own individual professionalism. Armed with the knowledge gained Hq United States Air Force through reading and comprehending AFM

Notes 5. Ibid 6. General Schriever reviewed Project FORECAST in an article entitled 1- Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas. Concepts, Doctrine: A History o f Basic "Forecast" published in Air University Review, March-April 1965, pp. 2-12. Thinking, in the United States Air Force 1907-1964. Second Printing. Air 7. AFM 1-1. United States Air Force Basic Doctrine. 14 August 1964, University, 1974, p. 59. p. 7-1. 2. AFM 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Washington, D.C., 8. AFM 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 28 September 1971, 1 April 1953, p. i. P. i-i. 3. AFM 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine. 1 April 1955, p. 8. 9. Ibid., p. 1-2. 4 AFM 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 1 December 1959. 10. Creighton W. Abrams. Testimony before House Armed Services Sub- p. 11. committee. "Close Air Support,” Washington, D.C.. 17 April 1973.

Any critic can establish a wonderful batting average by just rejecting every new idea. J. D. W illiams HE Department of Defense faces a monumental task in the area of training and education. Between 15 and 20 percent of its 3 million military and civilian personnel are normally T involved in the training process, either as trainers or trainees. As the militarv budget has decreased, weapon systems have be- come more complex. To research, develop, acquire, maintain, and operate these systems require that more resources be devoted to producing qualified personnel. The answer is increased efficiency in the training and educational process. (For this discussion, the distinction between training and education will be unexpressed, and the teaching means used in both, bv adoption from various technologies, will be referred to as “instructional technology.”) The Department of Defense keeps training and education under constant review, and additional innovative and cost-effective measures should result from the FY 76 funding of $32.4 million for re- search and development of instructional technology.

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INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE now and in the future

Dr . M . R ic h ar d Rose

11 12 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

One indicated change is the relocation as to future heavy investment in the pri- of training from the large central train- vate sector. The present plateau, how- ing centers to field, ship, and submarine ever, can only be viewed as a launching locations for almost continuous upgrading pad for what must inevitably follow. Un- of a highly specialized nature for smaller precedented forces are at work in the numbers of individuals, so as to maintain form of aggregating arid synergistic tech- the required high state of readiness in the nological advances, accompanied by the complicated weaponry employed by to- continued knowledge explosion and at- day’s armed forces. tendant knowledge obsolescence cy cle- Secondary, but still important, is the all of this overlaid with the reality of in- general education provided to members creasing paucity of resources. It is well on active duty and former members under to examine briefly the present state of the GI Bill. The combination of educa- the individual technological ingredients as tional and training opportunities is the a prelude to a look beyond the present cornerstone of the all-volunteer force in horizon. attracting high-quality men and women. More than 85 percent of all service- instructional approaches learned skills have a direct and immediate civilian application. Department of Labor Instructional approaches within the De- studies indicate that one out of every six partment of Defense (dod) are undergoing civilian craftsmen acquired his or her skill significant changes in response to the new in the militarv. fiscal environment. An example is the In- In a broad sense, then, the $7 billion structional System Development concept annually expended by the Department of pioneered by the Air Force and subsequently Defense in education and training can be pursued by the other services. The system viewed as a national social investment. involves the development of behavioral The challenge is to find more efficient criteria that state what the student will ways for continuing and improving this be able to do as a result of instruction; investment in our nation’s most valuable develop criterion tests that indicate whether resource, manpower. the student achieves the objectives; plan, develop, and validate instruction; and, finally, conduct and evaluate the training. Technology in the Instructional By keying the training to specific job re- Process quirements, both overtraining and under- training are avoided. The second aspect In the recent past, instructional tech- of such an approach is to make courses nology has seemed to reach a temporary self-pacing, using such strategies as in- plateau. This is not to say that signifi- dividualized instruction modular sched- cant developments have not emerged. uling and a wide variety of audiovisual/ They have. The experience of high hopes computer-linked techniques. for educational tv and computers, ac- companied by significant investment in Advanced Instructional System the private sector and the subsequent failure of these media to effect the ex- The Air Training Command is moving rap- pected revolutionization of educational idly toward a totally integrated system processes, has induced an air of caution utilizing the most advanced instructional LNSTRIJCTIONA L TECH NOLOG Y 13

technologies under the “umbrella’ of the The forward potential of multiplexing Advanced Instructional System (ais). The at a single, central site or through geo- primary ingredients of such a system in- graphic regions opens even wider vistas cluded preliminary analyses of human for efficient sharing of training technolo- factors, facilities, reliability, and system gies and capacities, either intra- or inter- maintainability. Long-range plans envision service. the possible centralizing of the existing five major Technical Training Centers, learner-centered instructional research with the potential for creation of a net- work not unlike the Arpanet, wherein A widely held contemporary educational many major universities and industrial philosophy views the student as a relatively complexes are linked together for the pur- passive individual. Curricular materials pose of sharing information. are organized and delivered in such a way Central to the planning of an advanced as to make learning possible. This whole system is the essentiality of increased re- philosophy and approach is being re- sponsiveness to validated requirements. examined by the Advanced Research Proj- Components include the Time-Share, In- ects Agency (arpa). In an admittedly high- teractive, Computer-Controlled Informa- risk but high-gain area, the arpa study tion Television (ticcit) and the Lincoln postulates that alternative technological Terminal System as well as pl a t o IV, all approaches to learning are possible, cen- of which will be discussed. The planners tered in learning strategies. The thrust and programmers of the system contem- would be directed toward making people plate increased pooling of training items smarter, rather than contents smarter, at a central or regional site offering the using such devices as methods of improv- greatest potential for forward efficiencies. ing memory and reasoning ability. Having Automated and self-paced technologies done this, it is postulated that in subse- are envisioned, possibly even allowing the quent courses of instruction the trainees trainee freedom of action in selection of could utilize the newly learned skills in the best delivery system for the individ- improving their own learning. An analo- ual’s needs. Possible technologies could gous concept is found in present under- also include voice-sensitive terminals, takings in which computer science tech- three-dimensional manipulative visual dis- niques are utilized to make machines plays, touch-sensitive terminals, and key- smarter in the whole area of artificial in- board devices integrated into master com- telligence. puter systems of combined training and training management. instructional television The planners also contemplate the fu- ture potential for virtual memory units Within the Department of Defense, there using magnetic bubbles that could permit continues to be a recognized role for edu- a smaller mainframe than is currently cational television. This medium is used in possible but one possessing significantly each of the service academies, in the Naval more capacity. Use of virtual capacity, due Postgraduate School, the Air Force Insti- to the dynamic buffer zones, would sig- tute of Technology, the professional mili- nificantly improve communication relays, tary educational schools such as the com- either by telephone lines or microwave mand and staff colleges and war colleges, lengths. and in the service training commands. The 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Air Force finds educational television es- plication and transmission of educational pecially valuable at Air University in the material through satellite or other advanced Academic Instructor course. In training all means. Air Force instructors, including those who In general, however, each of the ser- will assume duties as professors of aero- vices is moving to consolidate and other- space science at colleges and universities wise reduce costs attendant to television throughout the country, this institution operations. A primary reason is a general offers a 20-hour elective course in educa- disenchantment with black-and-white tele- tional television. In addition, television is vision, coupled with the high cost of color used extensively in critiquing platform television. In the Air Force the number of presentations (self-confrontation). television production centers in use has At other military teaching institutions, been reduced from six to one. The other educational television is used to bring field services have similarly reorganized, with experiences into the classroom. In naval single centers servicing much wider geo- operations as well as flying operations, graphical areas. The price paid is lack of television introduces a valuable cost-effec- immediate responsiveness. tive dimension by permitting students to It was previously noted that 20 to 30 view an environment without the high cost percent of the approximately 900,000 of equipment operation. hours of “on-call” Department of Defense An exception to the declining use of in- instruction obsolesces annually. The rela- structional television throughout the De- tive costs of developing and updating such partment of Defense is found in the Acad- material are revealing: emv/ of Health Sciences of the United States Army located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Development and Updating of Instructional Material This organization has a vital outreach pro- (Cost per student minute—after gram in the medical and health sciences having developed learning objectives) field, including an extensive loan library Develop Update of videotape cassettes. Included are pro- Sound-on-slide $ 13 S 2 Computer-assisted instruction $ 38 $ 2 grams designed primarily for continuing Color television $248 $200 education of professional medical person- nel, in addition to lesson plans for training The relative developmental and update and instruction in paramedical fields. The costs suggest a central reason for the pres- library of video cassettes exceeds 1000 ent de-emphasis of educational television different programs. In addition, the Acad- as a primary instructional medium. emy operates a 12-channel closed-circuit Another reason for the present decrease playback system in support of the Academy in the use of educational television is its of Health Sciences’ academic curriculum, inherent lack of flexibility in some modes medical teaching programs of the medical and high cost in others. In the case of center, and patient rehabilitation and edu- videotape, there is no potential for feed- cational programs. A wide range of both back or question-and-answer session. Video studio and mobile production equipment disk technology, as presently being de- is utilized in conjunction with modern, veloped by Philips, rca, and Thompson up-to-date techniques and procedures. csf, addresses to a large degree the prob- Given some of the technological advances lems of flexibility and offers great promise. in communications, to be discussed later, The disk permits random access, as well there is obvious potential for expanded ap- as branching and switching to other modes, INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY 15

such as computers, for mediation. The $20 per student hour. Presently computer drawback lies in the cost of producing time in many cases can be obtained for the video disks. While it is estimated that less than $1 an hour. There is a real pos- video disk viewing equipment may soon sibility that, in the intermediate term, be available for $500 each, significant in- miniature computers or microprocessors vestment is essential for the equipment can be sold for less than $100 each. required for production. Production runs of approximately 2000 disks are required holography to bring costs within the reach of most users. In view of the unfortunate market- This recently emerged technology of com- place experiences of those who lost after bined reflected light waves and laser op- making significant investments in educa- tics permits the introduction of highly tional technology in the past, heavy in- realistic imagery in three dimensions un- vestment will not be soon forthcoming matched by any other photographic meth- without a proven market. od. This whole area of laser technology Militating against extensive use of video appears to be on the threshold of making disks in dod training establishments is truly major contributions to educational the low intensity of requirements in terms technology. of numbers of disks required and the wide The hologram produced by laser tech- variety of courses needing constant up- nology is totally descriptive of the medi- dating. Scalar economies would not be um. It comes from the Greek roots “holos” reached in the majority of dod require- and “gram,” meaning message, and those ments, which range from runs of two to who have viewed such holograms would two hundred items. There is, however, a agree that in fact the medium does truly great potential for such technology in convey the whole message. Defense overseas schools, educational pro- Far from being a simple three-dimen- grams, and other high-intensity instruc- sional image, the holographic projection tional applications. is visually indeterminable from the real object. The image preserves all of the cable television visual information about an object, in- cluding spatial depth. The unique con- An aspect of cable television as a com- tribution of laser light in the process, in munications mode of particular interest to addition to encoding and transmitting the policy-makers, planners, and educators is information, is that it stores all of the in- its low cost. In one investigation conducted formation in the hologram in a totally by the mit r e Corporation, the cost of unique way, permitting retrieval. Laser cable to bring mediated instruction into a light directed on the hologram unlocks series of homes in one community was less the stored visual information, permitting than $2000. the viewer to see the original object re- constructed in space in full dimensionality. miniature computers/microprocessors The applications to instructional tech- nology are legion. It has been said that Continuing breakthroughs in micro tech- we think in holograms. What, then, could nology present tremendous potential for be a better medium for conveying infor- computer miniaturization at very low mation than one consistent and in tune cost. Five years ago computer time cost with perceptual and cognitive patterns! 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The awe inspired by one’s first view of produced and overlaid with sound as the Michelangelo’s “Pieta” could be shared main medium. by all. Similarly, brain surgeons around In addition to being highly successful the world could simultaneously study a as a teaching/learning device, the system, master surgeon’s art in unprecedented known as Mark I, has the additional ad- proximity. At leisure, with full dimen- vantages of low production cost coupled sionality, individuals located in a submerged with low update cost—a significant item. submarine could be instructed in the in- A variety of sound tracks to the same video tricacies of a complex piece of equipment presentation makes the system multi- that defies description in piano. The com- lingual. The outstanding feature is the patibility of holography with video cas- transmission and storage capacity. A stan- sette and video disk technology opens dard one-hour, one-inch videotape will vistas that defy description. contain 30 times the capacity of existing The potential of holography for raising systems, or the equivalent of 30 one-hour training effectiveness while realizing large programs. From within any of the groups economies is suggested in a 1972 study of 30 segments, any number of programs that estimated the value of operational can be reproduced simultaneously on dif- equipment used for training to be in ex- ferent television sets. An individual user cess of $4.5 billion. With nuclear pro- would have access to all programs on the pulsion systems and jet aircraft, as well as tape, with the capability of selecting, a wide variety of other equipment costing stopping, and repeating at will. millions of dollars each, a large part of The rts programs can be transmitted these costs could be avoided. Up-to-date over standard television station cables, and extensive holographic libraries of the microwave, or satellites. The high-density pertinent high-cost equipment could be storage capability of the system i$ paral- maintained, for example, at training sites leled by extremely high transmission around the world on video disk for immedi- efficiency by compression of data at a 15- ate call-up and study as required. Trainees to-1 ratio. During a hypothetical eight- could become intimately familiar with hour period, when a television station or the equipment, lacking only the hands-on satellite might normally be off the air, phase, which could be easily attained on approximately 240 different half-hour les- the job. sons could be transmitted, received, and Holography will certainly have a pro- stored. This system, with its high efficiency found impact on instructional methodol- not only in rapid transmission and low- ogy, perhaps on our world and our lives. bulk storage but in low cost of updating, should find widespread application in the Department of Defense as one of the pri- rapid transmission and storage system (RTS) mary components of alternative instruc- tional delivery systems in the future. A unique system pioneered by Goldmark Communications Corporation is especially satellite communications pertinent in view of present fiscal con- straints as well as increasing update train- The roundness of the world introduces cer- ing needs. By use of a unique process that tain constraints on the typical line-of-sight is pedagogically as well as psychologically communications systems. Whereas the sound, pictures and graphic material are “High Antenna’ project conducted by Pur- INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY 17

due University, using an airplane as a broad- multiple-voice signals as well as color casting station, was able to broadcast tele- television were transmitted to small, in- vision programs to hundreds of Midwest expensive antenna-receivers from its geo- schools, a satellite independent of at- synchronous orbit above the equator. From mospheric interference and weather this position, television beams on the ATS-6 phenomena offers unparalleled opportunity transmitted signals to provide double foot- for maximum coverage. prints approximately 1000 miles north to Such a potential was demonstrated in south and 300 miles east to west on the May 1965 when a high school class in Rocky Mountain and Appalachian sites. West Bend, W'isconsin, and a class at the In addition to “receive-only” terminals, Lycee Henri IV of Paris, France, linked which cost approximately $4000 each, “in- up via Early Bird satellite for a joint one- tensive terminals” were utilized; these hour class. Since that time numerous ex- latter had the ability to receive both audio perimental and prototype programs have and video signals and to transmit audio been conducted. Under the present leader- signals, permitting interactive participa- ship of the National Institute of Educa- tion. Programs transmitted included the tion, the goal of a national educational “Time-Out” series on career education, network is fast approaching realization. directed toward junior high school stu- Applications Technological Satellite dents and including information on deci- ATS-6 experiments initiated in 1971, sion-making, self-assessment, and career jointly by the Department of Health, Edu- education. Additional series include “Ca- cation and Welfare and the National reers in the Classroom,” for in-service Aeronautics and Space Administration, training of teachers and staff members at pioneered the widespread applicability of the junior high school level, and “Foot- satellite communications as an instruc- prints,” designed for adults in rural, iso- tional and informational medium. The lated communities. Such topics as health premise underlying the experiment of care, land use and environment, problems direct and immediate application to the of the aging, and consumer education were Department of Defense was “that satel- included. lites could provide information to people The National Institute of Education who cannot easily, quickly, or economically experiments appeared to have prelimi- be reached by other means and that, given narily answered the question regarding its capability to reach large geographic the effectiveness of satellites as alterna- areas, a satellite could convey special in- tive delivery methods of education to formation needed by comparatively small, rural and highly isolated populations. This isolated groups.’ pioneering work has led the way to pres- A series of interrelated experiments in- ently emerging consortiums for the ex- volved separate activities occurring in panded use of satellite communications. Appalachia, the Rocky Mountain region, The international aspect of satellite and Alaska and were referred to by the communication, aside from the Alaskan National Institute of Education as the “Edu- experiment, was demonstrated by the same cation Satellite Communications Demon- ATS-6 satellite. In August of 1975 India stration.” The demonstration constituted began the Satellite Instructional Television the largest and most complex application Experiment. For one year the Indian Space of technology to education ever attempted. Research Organization (isr o ) will use the By use of available time on the ATS-6, nasa satellite to beam tv direct into 2400 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

isolated villages. Clearly demonstrated reduce training time by as much as 35 will be the ability of satellites to operate percent and failure rates frequently in on call to all parts of the globe, delivering excess of 20 percent. a wide variety of informational and in- Examples of on-line advanced technology structional programs utilizing various systems include pl a t o IV, currently being technologies. used throughout the country in technical It remains for the Department of De- training. It consists of a keyboard, a high- fense to realize the full potential of this speed individual image selector, a random- satellite technology, which is so immedi- access audio device, and a plasma display ately and directly applicable to a defense panel with variable numbers of terminals. organization dispersed in nearly 1(X) Computer support is supplied by the Uni- countries, on more than 600 ships and versity of Illinois and is possibly the most operating locations throughout the world. advanced computer-assisted instruction Toward this end, research is presently be- system using a large central main frame. ing contracted by the Advanced Research Presently the system will accommodate Projects Agency that will study the feasi- 700 students on-line at any one time. bility of using this technology in ship- The Navy uses pl a t o IV (Programmed board training. Logic for Automatic Teaching Opera- tions) in at least three advanced develop- computer-assisted instruction ments, including role-playing techniques. One program is directed toward under- A report prepared by the mitr e Corpora- standing and improving interpersonal be- tion, dated 1972, contains the blunt asser- havior in basic training between recruit tion that computer-assisted instruction and trainer. The second program involves (cai) has been a commercial failure. After a study concerning the value systems and tracing and properly identifying the root attitudes of company commanders. A causes of the commercial failure, the Na- parallel undertaking is in the form of de- tional Science Foundation funded mit r e veloping criteria for predicting successful to “catalyze the mass dissemination of performance in the role of recruit com- cai’ —this goal to be realized through the pany commander. achievement of a major market success A three-year effort using pl a t o IV has for computer-assisted instruction. Time- just been completed at Aberdeen Proving Share, Interactive, Computer-Controlled Ground, Maryland. The evaluation results Information Television (ticcit) is presently indicated that, in general, students who being used in two demonstration systems receive their instruction through cai per- at the community college level with great form significantly better than students who success. receive their instruction in other wavs. In Despite the commercial failure of com- addition, both student and instructor atti- puter-assisted instruction, which was largely tudes were positive. Time-savings ranging due to environmental factors and market- from 15 to 45 percent were consistently ing problems rather than the inability of realized, compared to traditional group- the system to do the job, computer-assisted paced instruction. However, the costs of instruction has found a broad constituency computer-assisted instruction in this par- in the Department of Defense. All four ticular form in the near term may be too services are finding extensive applications high to provide a viable instructional sys- for the system, which has been proven to tem for the Department of Defense. Ex- INSTR UCTIONAL TECHNOLOG y 19

paneled potential applications and the of instructors needed to teach this course continued escalation of personnel costs was reduced by 20 percent. Student per- continue to interact. In the intermediate formance rates were slightly better than term, scalar economies may be reached, under the old system. Both student and and cost/benefit analyses suggest the feasi- instructor attitudes were positive toward bility of implementation. computer-managed instruction. The Lincoln Terminal System, devel- As a result of these studies, the Navy oped bv the Lincoln Laboratories of Mas- has bought the computer hardware and sachusetts Institute of Technology, em- software to implement an expanded pro- ploys a terminal with a viewing screen gram. Currently 2000 students per week and audio speaker. With a keyboard for are employing the system. Within the student responses, terminals are connected next five years it is estimated that 15,000 to a central minicomputer, programmed students will utilize the system weekly. In to monitor student progress and facilitate order to provide the curriculum materials branching. The random-access audio fiche for this level of effort, the Department of feature replaces the computer memory. the Navy is allocating between 2 and 3 The system has proven highly cost effec- million dollars for the next three years to tive in reducing training times and asso- replace group-paced materials with self- ciated personnel costs, in some cases by paced instruments utilizing advanced in- as much as 37 percent. A follow-on ver- structional technology. sion is programmed for remote sites and field training detachments not requiring simulation the minicomputer hookup. The whole field of simulation, including computer-managed instruction synthetic flight training systems, has re- ceived unprecedented interest. Recent In computer-managed instruction, the advances in high-fidelity simulation and computer may not play a direct instruc- 360-degree visual systems promise greatly tional role as it does in computer-assisted to transform flight training as well as the instruction; rather, it manages the in- specialized training associated with all structional process, i.e., the testing, diag- high energy-consumption equipment. nosis, and prescription. Students may re- The reasons for such an increasing role ceive all their instructional materials in are obvious. It has been variously estimated some sort of off-line mode, usually pro- that, while the cost of a simulator could grammed instruction text, audiovisual ma- be ten times that of an aircraft, it is pos- terials, or any other instructional meth- sible that the annual training hours gen- od. The computer, in this mode, also erated by a simulator could exceed those manages instructors and deals with the re- of an aircraft by ten to one. Other studies source allocation problem. Potentials for project a potential reduction of up to 50 combination are apparent. percent of present flying time in under- The Navy has made significant use of graduate flight training through increased this computer management. In one study, use of flight simulation. It is further esti- documented savings—through the reduc- mated by some that up to 25 percent of tion of training time and attendant per- all flying might be replaced by simulation. sonnel costs—possibly exceeded $10 mil- There remain as many questions as lion in one year. In addition, the number answers in the field of mechanical and 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

flight simulation in such areas as the proper ments engendered by continued and accel- mix of actual versus simulator training, erating knowledge obsolescence, creates a certain interactive effects with other sen- prevailing requirement for educational and sory modalities, and a variety of similar training delivery systems. complex relationships. As the answers to In addition to proposed mission-related these vexing questions emerge, simulation training programs, the educational com- will play an increasingly key and central ponents of the wired garrison concept are role in the instructional equation. intended to extend from basic literacy in- struction through the postgraduate level. wired garrison concept The mit r e Corporation, upon completion of a “need assessment” coupled with an Recognizing the continued sophistication inventory of available systems and tech- of communications electronics systems on nologies, proposed an action program at Army posts and the piecemeal, sometimes Fort Bliss, Texas, to meet the validated incompatible, nature of the various sys- needs. Included are a wide variety of tems, the United States Army joined with computer-assisted, self-paced combinations, mit r e Corporation in examining the con- including two-way interactive video sys- cept of a wired garrison. The present com- tems. Also being examined is an array of plex of separately designed, procured, in- programs using computers for simulations stalled, operated, and maintained systems and gaming purposes in logistical as well tends toward increased cost and decreased as complex technical and administrative efficiency. In the light of recent techno- fields. Remote access is a primary consid- logical advances in the field of communica- eration in all applications. Using low-cost tions and computers, it was postulated that cable tv with currently available hard- interrelation of existing systems could re- ware, it would be possible to bring to the sult in an integrated multimode informa- post hundreds of individual courses offered tion transfer system with greatly increased through The Association for Graduate Ed- capacity as well as efficiency, perhaps at ucation and Research. A consortium of seven lower cost. private educational institutions, located in Implicit in the planning for this under- north Texas, pools their physical and aca- taking were the vast needs in the field of demic resources to enhance graduate edu- training and education within the Army. cation in the Dallas-Fort Worth region. A The Department of the Army has clearly wide variety of other courses is available, stated realistic educational and training either off-the-shelf or from other adjacent goals for each member, which are spelled institutions of higher learning. This imagi- out in a master plan. The Army Educa- native joint undertaking by the Depart- tional Services Plan is soundly based on the ment of the Army and mit r e represents a principles that each Army member should model and potential to be carefully ex- be permitted the opportunity to develop amined by others, both in the Department his maximum career potential, that the of Defense and elsewhere. The implications process of learning is continuous and life- and ramifications of such a system are legion. long, and that educational opportunities both attract highly qualified, highly moti- Beyond the Horizon vated people and retain them for a more productive average period of service. This, The Department of Defense is probably coupled with the technical training require- the largest instructional institution in the INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY 21

world, with a span of courses ranging from —the Training Technology Committee—is prekindergarten to the most sophisticated committed to the increased coordination postdoctoral studies and including a full and exchange of all facets of instructional range of specialized training. At any given technology. The committee’s charter time, more than one-half million individuals states: are participating in the dod training and educational process. Given these realities, To review existing and new training tech- it was to be expected that the Depart- nology with the objective of utilizing ad- ment of Defense would assume a lead role vancements by all Services, thereby effect- in the advancement of instructional tech- ing significant cost savings and avoiding nology toward increasing efficiency and unnecessary duplications. reducing costs. This has truly been the case. Recognizing the potential for redun- A present initiative of the organiza- dancy when each of the services has re- tion’s subpanel on technology is a study quirements to train individuals, frequently contract, funded by the Advanced Research in the same skills, the Army, Navy, Marine Projects Agency’s Training Resource Ap- Corps, and Air Force joined together in plication Information Data Exchange, under creating the Inter-Service Training Re- the acronym traidex. This feasibility study view Organization. This organization, envisions a system that would enable all headed by the training chiefs of each of members of the training community to in- the four services and working through a put to a central bank or repository the structure of committees with representa- various software and hardware elements tives from each service, has been in opera- of training technology and support material tion since September 1972. The purpose required in the development of training of the organization was not to create a courses. The system would be designed to new super training agency, with attendant interface with all existing systems, making bureaucratic inertia, but rather within research and development advances of one present resources to organize a small group group, agency, or service immediately of experts and users to examine existing available to all. training processes, practices, technologies, Simultaneously, a program is being un- and needs and thus to realize any econo- dertaken to create mutual interservice mies possible through cooperation, con- support areas, geographically bounded, solidation, exchanges, or changed training within which there will be a totally free patterns and practices. technology exchange between participants. From an early start in 1972, 27 enlisted Ten such mutual support areas have been occupational specialty subgroups, seemingly designated, and interchange is already tak- indicating the greatest potential for con- ing place. These initiatives are all designed solidation, were examined, and ten of toward forward effectiveness and avoid- these subgroups later consolidated. The ance of reinventing the wheel. organization has continued its efforts with In looking beyond the horizon (admit- great success. Aggregate recurring sav- tedly a dangerous pursuit), this Inter-Service ings now exceed $2,850,000 in cost re- Training Review Organization will increas- ductions, and annual cost avoidance is in ingly play a central role in fulfilling the excess of $1,200,000 as a result of actions needs created by continued escalation of to date. training costs, quantum technological ad- One committee within the organization vances, and the requirement for greater 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sharing of existing resources toward realiz- ployment decision process, in light of the ing even greater efficiencies. significant impact of instructional demands on the total cost of a weapon system dur- instructional systems—thrust o f the future ing its life cycle. Similarly, a significant number of research On re-examining the constituent parts of and development managers within the De- present-day instructional technology, one partment of Defense feel that computer- can readily see that the prior analogy to managed instruction in one form or an- instructional technology now being poised other will have a predominant role during on a launching pad is probably valid. With the next five years. Further utilization of the combinations of computer-assisted in- this technology will place in the hands of struction and computer-managed instruc- decision-makers the appropriate informa- tion in the context of advanced holography, tion on the optimal mix of technologies to video disk, and videotape and minicom- be used in any instructional process, recog- puter technologies, the instructional process nizing the individuality of the learning of the future will change dramatically. process and the continuing need to reduce Further, communications media advances, time in training and to get individuals on in terms of cable television and satellite the job faster and better trained. communications to carry such programs, It is apparent that all of the technologi- combined with the Goldmark Rapid Trans- cal components for advanced instructional mission and Storage System, suggest po- systems of unprecedented efficiency and tentials almost defying description. The economy are at hand. The pitfalls, however, general nature might well be that of flexi- lie in the attitudes and minds of men. Such ble, multipurpose, integrated instructional technology should be embraced and adopted systems. only within the context of learner-centered The possibility of an interservice-shared systems, not for technology’s sake alone. satellite communications system with Those senior officers charged with the presently redundant time devoted to in- educational and training responsibilities structional transmission immediately comes for members of the Army, Navy, Marine to mind. With such a system, military Corps, and Air Force have shown un- members located at the most far-flung and paralleled vision in what has taken place to isolated posts, including submarines and date. It remains only for the same indi- ships at sea, using stand-alone learning viduals, personally and through the aegis carels including video disk/tape and mini- of the Inter-Service Training Review Or- computers, could be constantly updated in ganization and its working committees, to their fields of specialty. In addition, high- continue to fit together the continually quality educational courses ranging the emerging complex existing pieces of the full spectrum, from remedial through gradu- jigsaw puzzles, toward the ideal. ate study, would be available for off- or Mr. David Samoff’s prediction made in on-duty education. 1966 has been more than fulfilled: In the future, instructional technology . . . some of the most profound changes will increasingly play a role early in weap- wrought by the computer will be in educa- on systems acquisition processes. Cost- tion, . . . the task ahead will be to assign to benefit analyses of training subsystems to the machine those things which it can best support such weapons will become an do and reserve for man those things he must implicit part of the acquisition and de- provide and control, . . . INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNOLOGY 23

Unparalleled opportunities lie ahead to time, these men and women must continue improve the quality of man’s life while to be afforded those opportunities for edu- increasing the efficiency of the instructional cational advancement enjoyed by their process. Away from the stultifying effect peers not serving in the armed forces. of group-paced learning, the individual, Components of instructional technology, in sharpened in abilities to learn, motivated hand or soon to be available, offer an un- by the instructional process itself, will be precedented opportunity for the creation of free to proceed at an individually selected a true “learning society” in the Department pace in a mode best fitted to his or her of Defense. learning pattern and abilities. Alfred University The men and women who serve in our armed forces are and must continue to be the best the nation has to offer. The de- Acknowledgment mands placed upon them by ever advanc- We are grateful to Dr. James D. Koemer, Program ing technology and decreased resources Director of the Sloan Foundation, for making this can be met only through such alternate in- article available to us. structional delivery systems. At the same T he Editor

Perhaps the most valuable result of all education is the ability to make yourself do the thing you have to do, when it ought to be done, whether you like it or not. This is the first lesson to be learned. T homas Hen r y Huxl ey O computers facilitate, or do they control? How would you answer if you thought the computers were COMPUTERS comingD to life? Ponder the madness of computer intelligence in control of our vast network of communications, logistics, dLiffE? and weapon systems. Science fiction non- sense? But surely history is replete with Hoyt W. Huggins science fiction “told-you-so’s.” Moreover, there have been hundreds of non-fiction works published over the past 20 years which seriously declare that computer consciousness is not only possible but likely. With the possible exceptions of ibm and at&t , the U.S. Air Force stands out like no other organization in its image of vast modern technology packed full of com- puters. Surely we should be the last to be unclear on this matter of machine intel- ligence-even for a discussion over a Fri- day beer at the club. In hopes the reader will finish with at least a more comfortable answer to the first question, let us apply a cool but de- cidedly unmechanical approach to the issue.

O ne of the oldest computer jokes around tells of the latest ibm creation

24 COMPUTERS ALIVE? 25

being fed the entire works of Saint Thomas less the hapless victims acted quickly to Aquinas and then being asked, “Is there a destroy all machines. God?” After a few tense seconds, a print- Butler quite obviously did not understand out appears with the words, “There is the concept consciousness. Just as obvi- now. ” ously, he did not understand the concep- Despite its antiquity, this story serves tualization process required for extending well to kevnote the eerie feelings that grip the primitive survival instinct to the ab- some of us as we learn of the amazing straction threat. Let us deal first with the capabilities of today’s computers. More- latter. over, the apprehension goes back further than the joke. In the last century, English author " T h e m a c h i n e s w o u l d . . . Samuel Butler wrote “The Destruction of the Machines of Erewhon,” foreshadowing ruthlessly conquer and mer- serious consideration of machine life by cilessly control mankind . . . many later experts. For most of us, this land of speculation vaguely agitates our unless the hapless victims common sense, but few of us do more than acted quickly to destroy all shrug it off, and some of us believe it might machines." actually be possible. As with many other subjects, we have become victims of our dependence on the “explanations” of the To do this, let us imagine that, some- experts instead of masters of our own how, a machine has developed conscious- analyzing abilities. ness. Does this mean that it automatically This time, let’s respond to our common has a tendency to survive? If it does not sense, consult known scientific knowledge, have this “value,” it would certainly be examine the data, and get at the truth. We indifferent to its own continued existence. can begin by reviewing Butler’s forebodings. It therefore could not regard anything as a Butler feared that man would continue threat. The term “threat” can have no to evolve machines of increasing propensity meaning to an entity that does not value its for becoming living species. In fact, he own life. In fact, the behavior of such a wondered if they were already conscious, conscious machine would be indistinguish- patiently plotting their evolutionary per- able from a nonconscious machine. With- fection and eventual domination of the out a survival or life value, no other value world. If not, he was sure that one day man is possible. With no values, the machine would produce a mutant having conscious- would go on behaving according to the ness and independence. Moreover, he laws of physics, no more. So, we must implied that the machine’s consciousness conclude that, for the machine to be dan- would spring into being—like Pallas Athena, gerous, it must awaken with a survival fully panoplied—with a value system un- value. derpinned by self-survival. You see, Butler’s Where does it get this value? machines would just naturally view man An updated Butler, though free of his as both enemy and servant: a threat to Victorian assumptions, might still argue survival, yet essential to it. The machines that a survival value is inherent in con- would therefore ruthlessly conquer and sciousness. If so, he must necessarily pro- mercilessly control mankind, that is, un- duce his proof from our knowledge of 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

biology. He should not mind, therefore, if sideration of computer consciousness? I too turn to that field. He might even be In the first place, most writers on com- happy to let the argument stand or fall puter development make the mistake of on my analysis, which purports to show using the term “memory” as a primary, that, by correcting some false notions with a definition equally applicable to traceable to the field of biology, the idea both computer and man. The justification of machine consciousness becomes non- is seldom explicit, but the implicit “logic” sense. If I am successful in presenting that is that both man and computer exhibit some analysis, the question of whether machine of the same memory characteristics (input, consciousness would include a survival storage, retrieval); therefore, they both value becomes moot. possess a memory. Several writers have described the differences in human and computer memories as merely differences . . fo r the m a c h i n e to be in speed and size. John G. Kemeny, President of Dartmouth dangerous, it must awaken College, in his book Man and the Com- with a survival value/' puter, points out that man’s memory is slow but has an enormous capacity, while the computer’s is fast but has a relatively On the other hand, if my intrepid oppo- limited storage volume. Together, argues nent would bring the machine to life Dr. Kemeny, they can exponentially com- outside the laws of biology, that is, by an pensate for each other’s deficiencies and undiscovered process which contradicts move mountains. He argues for symbiosis, those laws, he must compound the fiction after explaining that he already regards the by giving it a survival value from the computer as a species. He implies that, if same thin air from which he gave it a computer has a memory, it must be con- consciousness. Keep in mind that we are scious, even if at a level not yet recog- dealing with reality, laws of nature, laws nized by man. He is right, of course. If a which have been discovered, not invented. computer truly has a memory, it is indeed Finally, if the insistent mystic argues conscious. But Dr. Kemeny gives no hint for miraculous machine consciousness that he understands the reason for the cor- without a survival value, he will have cir- rectness of that position. Where he is wrong cled back to the here and now. He, like is in thinking the computer has a memory. some modem scholars, would be indulging “Memory” for a computer is a compo- in the game of describing our current, nent of materials in a separate, uniquely nonconscious electronic automatons with locatable place with assigned functions. undeserved and illogical definitions. Man’s memory is a mental process subsumed Aided by twisted concepts of biology, under the concept consciousness, has no some experts blithely continue to resurrect specific location, and performs intricacies the notion that somehow the complexity far beyond the assigned retrieval functions of construction in a computer, together of the computer “memory.” Observe Dr. with its memory and learning abilities, will Kemeny pondering the human “retrieval produce synapsis and bring a living being system: into existence. What does science say . . . we are remarkably efficient at retrieving about consciousness? What are the errors items from our memory. We seem to be able the experts make that permit serious con- to do it through mysterious processes of as- COMPUTERS ALIVE? 27

sociation that no one has duplicated on the tion,” an inanimate object has conscious- computer. How does one associate a phrase ness. That theory has been thoroughly in a book with a conversation held ten years refuted by Robert Efron, M.D., Chief, ago? How does one associate a smell with Neurophysiology-Biophysics Research Unit, a childhood memory? How, in trying to solve Veterans Administration Hospital, Boston, a problem, do we pull out three unrelated Massachusetts, in his paper “Biology with- memories going back to different periods in out Consciousness—and Its Consequences,” our life to come up with a new approach presented at the Center for Philosophy of to the solution? And how do we sift through hopelessly large amounts of information pre- Science, University of Pittsburgh, on Febru- sented to us daily by our senses and retain ary 27, 1967.2 just the most relevant facts?1 Dr. Efron explains that learning and re- membering are two related mental pro- The phrase “retrieving items from mem- cesses performed by the conscious mind of ory” is perfectly appropriate for describ- a living entity. Just as walking is a physi- ing the action of a computer but is grossly cal process performed by a living entity misleading when applied to man or to any and cannot occur independent of an en- other living, conscious entity. Man does not tity, neither can learning or remembering activate a probe to scan a storage unit occur as primary and independent phe- located under the cortex in a corner of nomena. The reductionists, however, gave the hypothalamus. He does not use posi- new and unsupported meanings to the tive and negative charges in binary or octal terms “learning” and “memory,” discon- code to match location core address to call necting them from consciousness. By what address. (A process, incidentally, which is convoluted reasoning have the reduction- independent of address content!) He does ists foisted these impossibilities onto the not then send the content forward to a dis- field of biology? The answer will help us play or process register. This is the computer see how these ideas landed unchallenged procedure for retrieving an item from in the field of computers. “memory.” Computers retrieve, man re- members, two immensely different pro- cesses. " Computers retrieve, man re- What notions helped obliterate the dis- tinction? Part of the problem is the naive members, tw o im m e n s e ly d i f - awe with which some observers regard ferent processes." the astonishing speed of the computer, as if this alone endows the machine with in- telligence and therefore with life, or at Dr. Efron shows that the reductionists least the name “memory” for its retrieval use the epistemological method of defini- system. But the main culprit comes in a tion switching, which consists of package of false biological ideas, which seem to have influenced Dr. Kemeny and arbitrarily defining the contradictions away. others who write on computers. These ideas The reductionist attacks the definition and usage of every word which has historically spring from the “ theory of reduction,” referred to an action of a living entity: which rests on the premise that all the “memory,” “reflex,” “free will,” “cognition,” phenomena of life can be accounted for, etc. He then redefines that same word so that described by, and deduced from the laws of it will be applicable to an action of an in- physics and chemistry; thus, by “reduc- animate entity.3 28 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

In the process, the reductionist uses the tortion of the term. What did the reduc- “stolen concept’’ fallacy,4 whereby a con- tionists do to the historical concept of learn- cept is used while ignoring, contradicting, ing? They broke it off from consciousness or denying the validity of the concept on in order to make way for the degeneration which it logically and genetically depends. of memory to a function independent of For example, the concept orphan cannot life. Dr. Efron reports: exist without the antecedent concept par- The link between the concept of memory ent. Similarly, the internal contradiction and the concept of consciousness was ex- in the assertion “There are no absolutes” plicitly broken when “learning,” like all is often overlooked even though that very other concepts of mental functions, was assertion is an absolute and depends on the redefined in the twentieth century. Once the existence of the concept absolute to have concept of consciousness was eliminated meaning and is therefore, by ipsissima from the concept of “learning,” it neces- verba, false. Electron is subsumed under sarily vanished from the concept of memory.5 (not a component of) mass and charge; as an electron has mass and electrical charge, we cannot deny the concepts mass and "When a computer system charge and still expect “electron” to have meaning. Action presupposes entity (that compares newly sensed data which acts); we cannot have a disem- with previously accumulated bodied action any more than we can have remembering without a consciousness to data according to programmed perform that process. To declare that all evaluation instructions and definitions are only approximate is to be guilty of the same error. The concept ap- thereby modifies its actions, proximate is not a primary; it has meaning it has not 'learned'; it has al- only in contradistinction to exact. It is by such trickery that the reductionists use the tered its performance." concept memory while ignoring its ante- cedent concept consciousness. This is the same error committed by computer ex- The reductionists had narrowed down the perts when they refer to a computer’s re- meaning of learning to cover “only . . . trieval system as its “memory.” They fol- the alteration of behavior or of perfor- low the same pattern when speaking of mance as a result of a previous experi- the computer’s “learning” abilities. ence. ” This is most adequate for describ- Computer scholars have borrowed, per- ing the “learning” process of computers. haps unwittingly, the reductionist’s re- It also fits perfectly for describing the de- definition of “learning” when describing composition (alteration) of the human body the computer’s performance alteration after a fatal heart attack (previous experi- process. When a computer system com- ence). A corpse advancing in putrefac- pares newly sensed data with previously tion, a computer varying a design process accumulated data according to programmed to accommodate new data combinations, evaluation instructions and thereby modi- and a scientist discovering the means to fies its actions, it has not “learned”; it has thwart a disease are all engaged in “learn- altered its performance. But this is learn- ing.” This is no more absurd than some ing, according to the reductionists’ dis- of the applications of the new definition COMPUTERS ALIVE? 29

of learning found by Dr. Efron in the the acquisition of perceptual discrimina- field of biology and some I have found in tions, acquisition of motor skills or habits, the field of computers. problem-solving, adaptation, association, H. O. Simon, in his article “The Shape “insight” solution, secondhand concept ac- quisition, and . . . the discovery of new con- of Automation,” states, “We can now ceptual knowledge.9 write programs for electronic computers that enable these devices to think and leam.”6 His “proof’ is similar to that "The distinction between presented by other writers; he shows that a computer can be programmed to run a human learning and com- factory entirely automatically, detecting puter learning is so profound and compensating for deficiencies, recog- nizing variations, etc. In “The Psychology that it is preposterous that of Robots” Henry Block and Herbert Gins- the two processes share the burg say the computer is learning when it uses sensory devices to seek data, store same name." them, evaluate them, and react to them as programmed.7 (Unexpected results Only part of this list can be made to fit reinforce the notion that the machine the computer “learning” process, where- “learned”) G. Rattray Taylor, in an arti- as all are needed in combination to de- cle on androids, explains the game-learning scribe the achievements of the human process of a computer thus: The rules are consciousness. Furthermore, the abilities programmed in and the computer discov- of the computer are totally and inextrica- ers the best move “substantially in the bly tied to measurement— specific, care- same manner [as] you and I . . . by look- fully detailed quantification. All computer ing at a lot of results and noting which programming and evaluation are carried ones pay off.” (Note the embarrassing out in terms of mathematics, whereas the spectacle of a scholar stating the case and human mind can perform feats of rec- pretending to have thereby explained it!) ognition, evaluation, and general conceptu- He admits to altering the definition of alization without reference to specific mea- learning, or to sensing that he is using surement. Reflect on how, after practicing an altered definition, when he says, “Un- algebra, you are able to make exchanges less, therefore, we define the word ‘learn’ between both sides of the equation, skipping in a very narrow way, we are bound to whole steps and sometimes even “seeing” speak of these machines learning.”8 Tay- the solution without performing any of the lor may be so bound, but, as we are inter- steps. Consider the differentiation and in- ested in explication, not drama, we will tegration process of human value formations. use clearer thinking. Such words as “intuition,” “curiosity,” and “sentiment” have implications in hu- T he distinction between hu- man learning completely unanchored to man learning and computer learning is so either measurement or logic—those twin profound that it is preposterous that the essentials of the computer. two processes share the same name. Dr. Since it has come up, let’s pause a mo- Efron tells us that, before the reduction- ment and look at computer “logic.” Logic, ists changed it, the term “learning” re- for a computer, refers not to the com- ferred to prehensive art of noncontradictory iden-

32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

is, therefore, no more than another in the rectly question the input. No less is re- long line of magnificent technical but quired on the human level if we want to nonconscious achievements of the mind break the grip of the experts. This is par- of man. ticularly important when the experts fall I hope my point is now clear that we for contradictory definitional traps or when must stop and analyze when our common they forget the courtesy of labeling their sense warns of questionable theories and stories “fiction.” Samuel Butler, at least, semiclear pronouncements by the “ex- did not fail us in that respect. perts.” It is not an easy task, but we must Except that it gave his compelling story take the responsibility or we will find our- a good, old-fashioned midnight eeriness, selves very much like the computer in re- the machines of Erewhon need not have spect to “garbage in—garbage out.” When been destroyed, after all. we see computer garbage output, we cor- Grandview, Missouri

Notes eds. {New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., I960). 1. John C. Kemeny, Man and the Computer (New York: Scribner, 1972). 7. Henry Block and Herbert Ginsberg, “The Psychology of Robots,*’ pp. 17 and 18. Perspectives on the Computer Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 2. Robert Efron. "Biology without Consciousness—and Its Consequences," Prentice-Hall, 1970. pp 246-55; repr. from Psychology Today. April 1968, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, vol. 11, University of Chicago Press. pp. 50-55. 1968, pp. 9-35. 8. G. Rattray Taylor. “The Age of the Androids," Perspectives on the 3. Ibid., p. 18. Computer Revolution (Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey. Prentice-Hall, 1970), 4. See "The Stolen Concept" by Nathaniel Brandon in The Objectivist pp. 168-83; repr. from Encounter. London. November 1963, pp. 36-46. Newsletter. January 1963. 9. Efron, p. 25. 5. Efron, p. 26. 10. "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.” The Objectivist. vol. 5. 6. H. O. Simon, "The Shape of Automation." Perspectives on the Com- no. 7, July 1966. pp. 5 and 6. puter Revolution (Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 1970. pp. 11. "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology,” The Objectivist. vol. 5, 161-67. repr. from Management and Corporations. 1985. Anshen and Bach. no. 9, September 1966. p. 2.

Additional sources from Erewhon), Perspectives on the Computer Revolution. Englewood Cliffs. Amosov, N. M. Modeling o f Thinking, and the Mind. London: Macmillan New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 161-67. & Co.. Ltd.. 1967. Fogel, Lawrence J.. Alvin J. Owens, and Michael J. Walsh. Artificial In- Anderson. Alan Ross. ed. Minds and Machines. Englewood Cliffs. New telligence through Simulated Evolution. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1966. Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964. Jaki, Stanley L. Brain, Mind and Computers. New York: Herder & Herder, Butler. Samuel. "The Destruction of the Machines of Erewhon." (adapted 1969. COMMUNICATION the key element to prisoner of war survival

Lie u t e n a n t Col on el Bobby D. W agnon F all the significant events in in Korea were young draftees, serving in America in 1973, probably the the Army infantry. Many of those young happiest news was the return of soldiers who succumbed to so-called “brain- theO prisoners of war from the detention washing” were young men who had never camps of North and South Vietnam. Analy- had any real understanding of the nature sis of the psychological condition of those of democracy or any high degree of iden- po w ’s seems to suggest that they survived tification with the principles and morality their experiences as prisoners far better of a democratic system.3 Almost all than did Americans in other similar situa- po w ’s held in Southeast .Asia were older tions, particularly the Korean conflict. officers and pilots. The Southeast Asia News stories and magazine articles about group had a far better grasp of why they po w ’s stress that communication was the were in combat, had volunteered to be key element accounting for the better there (by becoming pilots), and were thus condition of the Vietnam po w returnees. better prepared to resist po w stress, although Like communication in the larger world, not entirely immune: communication in a po w society serves The shock of capture is one of the most three roles: (1) it makes possible social traumatic overwhelming, stupendous, psy- interaction; (2) facilitates group dynamics; chological reactions that can happen to an and (3) serves as a necessary tool for the individual. ... It is the complete and final socialization and indoctrination of new cutting off of all you’ve ever known, all group members.1 .Articles concerning the you’ve ever dealt with, all that’s ever been release and debriefing of American service- familiar. . . .4 men held as po w ’s in Southeast Asia have Communication with other po w ’s is the made clear the importance of communica- means to integrate into a society to develop tion in this setting. A conclusion already a new “familiar.” drawn is that a strong communication tie among Vietnam war po w ’s was a primary factor in preventing the psychological Communication as an Element breakdowns that were common among of POW Social Interaction American po w ’s held during the Korean Social interaction is the principal way conflict, where few such ties existed. The to establish and keep in touch with the point has been made by Lieutenant Com- new reality, po w ’s in Vietnam depended mander John S. McCain III, U.S. Navy, on each other for news, support, and sanity. who was shot down over Hanoi on 26 For those who were unable to make a October 1967 and released in the spring contact, the price was high. of 1973: Some men cracked under the hardship and As fax as this business of solitary confinement strain. “In extreme cases,” Kushner said, goes, the most important thing for survival “men would lie on their beds in fetal posi- is communication with someone, even if it’s tions, sucking their thumbs, calling for only a wave or a wink, a tap on the wall, or mama. One of the men sat on his bed with to have a guy put his thumb up. It makes a blanket over his head for two years. 3 all the difference.2 pow’s interned in South Vietnam came off There were many differences between the planes in 1973 at Clark .Air Base, the po w groups in Korea and those in Philippines, in much worse psychological Vietnam. The majority of American po w ’s condition than those imprisoned in the

34 COMMUNICATION 35

North. Military analysts found an explana- and get an answer back in ten minutes.” tion for this: “Most prisoners held in the We really got pretty fast at it.8 South by the Viet Cong suffered an even There were situations—for example, single- worse fate. Chained in separate cages, cell buildings or unusually alert guards— they were kept in total isolation. ”6 which made use of the tap code impossible. When paper and pen, or their practical methods o f communication equivalent, were available, notes were passed. For the men fortunate enough to be im- prisoned near other Americans, the only Notes were passed in the latrine, exercise roadblock to establishing communication and prayers were kept up, and a camp chronicler was even appointed to record the was the method, po w debriefings indicate history of the captivity.9 that a variety of methods was used. One of the most common was the “tap code.” In the following example, the exchange The rudiments of tap code are taught to of notes was the only contact the narrator Southeast Asia-bound men at the Jungle had with another American for the duration Survival School (jss) in the Philippines. It of his Korean po w experience. is a simple code based on the following One day, however, I glanced out of my door arrangement of the alphabet, omitting (I was not allowed outside the cell except the letter K. The first taps identified the for a specific reason) and noticed, in amaze- horizontal line. The second taps identified ment, another American dressed in prison the vertical column. Hence an “S” would garb, using the facility. Deciding this was be four taps followed by three taps. perhaps the only opportunity I would ever have to make a contact, I quickly wrote a code block note to give to the American . . . I then 123 4 5 mentioned to the guard that I was sick and rushed to the latrine. The guard was unable 1 A B C DE to see the other prisoner so he paid no at- tention to my actions. As soon as I got close 2 F GHI J enough, I threw the note to my fellow Ameri- 3 LMNOP can and ran back to my cell. A couple of days later, I saw my new 4 Q R STU friend again, sitting on the slit trench. As I watched he took a note from his pocket 5 V W XYZ and placed it in a crack in one of the boards near the trench. When he was finished, I The communication here was very good. asked my guard for permission to relieve We would tap between rooms; I learned a myself, and picked up the note.10 lot about acoustics. You can tap—if you get the right spot on the wall—and hear a When facilities prevented use of taps guy four or five rooms away.7 and notes, the po w ’s foimd other methods Variations on this code, including abbre- of contacting their comrades. viations, are possible. Special tap codes speed up the process, thereby lessening I had good communications, because there risk of detection. was a door facing the outside and a kind of louvered window above it. I used to With the prisoners' special tap code, . . . he stand up on my bucket and was able to take “could send a message through five rooms my toothbrush and flash the code to the 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

other prisoners, and they would flash back fellows was intense enough, however, to to me.11 drive po w ’s to risk anything in order to There were some disadvantages to the continue. use of informal, spontaneous codes. In- A l ot of it was my doing, because they significant actions and gestures could be realized far better than we did at first the seen as possibly meaningful. “One day, one value of communication with our fellow of those prisoners, looking straight at me, Americans. When they caught us communi- while his guard was a few steps away, cating, they’d take severe reprisals. I was whistled ‘Plaisirs d’Amour.’ Was he trying caught a lot of times. One reason was be- to convey anything?”12 A prisoner might cause I’m not too smart, and the other torment himself for months, trying to find reason was because I lived alone. If you live with somebody else you have somebody the “hidden” meaning in such an experi- helping you out, helping you survive. ence. When contact was so limited, the But I was never going to stop. Communi- thought of a wasted “conversation” could cation with your fellow prisoners was of the be maddening. utmost value—the difference between being able to resist and not being able to resist. penalties for communicating A lot depends on the individual. Some men are much more self-sufficient than others.15 Because the guards knew the value of communication as well as the Americans psychological effects o f communication did, they severely punished men for their attempts at contact. The following quote The emphasis on communication produced from Commander McCain is part of an a number of strange results. During the incident resulting from his being caught Korean po w experience, when contacts tapping the wall: were few and “brainwashing” common- When I said that, the guards, who were all place, American po w ’s grew fearful even in the room—about 10 of them—really laid of each other. The following refers to a into me, kicking and laughing and scratch- contact made in a Korean repatriation ing. After a few hours of that, ropes were camp, two days before actual release: put on me and I sat that night bound with Even though Frank Schwable was an ropes. For the next four days, I was beaten American in prisoner-of-war garb, I was every two to three hours by different guards. slow to trust him, being suspicious of every- My left arm was broken again and my ribs thing and everybody, and judging from his were cracked.13 restraint, he felt the same way about me.16 For those men who were not actually There are a number of examples of Ameri- caught communicating but who were cans escaping from Korean camps, running thought to be in possession of the code, into each other in the wilderness, refusing punishment was equally brutal. to speak to each other, and continuing in- Prisoners were hung upside down, from dependently. beams, until they were ready to talk, made Sometimes specific human contact was to stand for hours without being allowed to not necessary to remind a po w that he move, and forced to crawl through latrines had a society. Other contacts might be filled with human excrement. They were enough to “fix” him back into his group. beaten with clubs and rifle butts.14 The po w ’s in Vietnam were primarily The need to communicate with their reinforced by the direct support of the COMMUNICATION 37

POW society, but British correspondent and man was open. In the Vietnam prison Philip Deane resisted Korean brainwashing camps, the po w ’ s so totally distrusted their through the help of a completely different captors that they had a tendency simply and much larger society. to invert whatever their captors told them and believe that. Sometimes, however, some Then they made a mistake. They gave us genuine good news sneaked through and Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island in bolstered spirits: English, and I read it fourteen times in succession, casting off the world of Capi- The North Vietnamese gave us very little talism, Socialism, Communism, Stakha- except bad news about the U.S. We didn’t novism, and plunging desperately into that find out about the successful moon shot (in 1969) until it was mentioned in a speech by George McGovern saying that Nixon could put a man on the moon, but he couldn’t put an end to the Vietnam war.18

Communication as a Facilitator of Group Dynamics Perfecting methods of communication, resisting punishment for engaging in com- munication, and instilling in fellow pris- oners the trust necessary to reach out and try to communicate helped to create a po w society. The risks necessary to main- tain links welded the community, par- ticularly in North Vietnamese po w camps. From this social interaction developed groups so closely knit that they recognized their own sociological status and con- sciously sought to create a strong, suppor- tive society. The group dynamics of a North Vietnamese sources released numerous photographs po w society embody the two thrusts, of U.S. prisoners, here a Navy lieutenant, to substan- tiate their claims of humane treatment o f prisoners. leadership and cohesiveness. Awareness on the part of po w leaders that men need a strong group with which to align them- selves is one reason Vietnam pow’s appar- forgotten world of a child’s imagination, ently weathered their experiences so much with pirates and treasures and overworked better than their Korean War predecessors. cliches. I recaptured my childhood, then my Deciding the source of leadership in a youth, the books I had read, the men I had po w society is a simple matter. Military known, the power to think, I could read tradition dictates the senior ranking man Marx again, and question myself honestly without fear.1, as commander; the “Code of Conduct” requires him to accept command and re- Deane trusted Robert Louis Steveason. He quires all other military personnel to sub- felt no need to be on guard with the ordinate themselves accordingly. “If I am author; the communicating between book senior I will take command. If not I will

Continued on page 40

The Korean PO W Experience

The barrack-like structures (far left) near Chiktong, North Korea, were believed to house enemy-held U.N. prisoners, when pho- tographed in March 1952 by USAF jet reconnaissance planes The prisoners (some waving) are unidentified, and the build- ings bear no markings, despite Communist promises to mark all POW camps. . . . A Communist liaison officer (lower left) leaves the Panmunjom exchange site in April 1953 after agree- ing to exchange sick and wounded prisoners. . . . Freedom Village at Munsan-ni, Korea, (left) was the gateway to free- dom for U.N. troops being returned from imprisonment in Communist camps. . . . In Operation Comeback thousands o f Chinese and North Korean Communists were released from POW compounds in Korea after renouncing Communism for freedom. At Keelong, Formosa, (below) in January 1954 a crowd and band greeted ex-Chinese soldiers arriving via LST from Korea. 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

obey the lawful orders of those appointed leadership—formal military roles over me and will back them up in every way.”19 Among the po w ’s held in North In addition to providing the pattern for a Vietnamese camps were senior officers strong society, the 4th Allied po w Wing capable of handling this particular chal- also gave the po w ’s something to do, roles lenge. to play. The implications of this are nu- merous. First, the wing—by its very for- It was apparent that the POWs held in the malized existence—connoted control and North were in generally better health than discipline. The men were not on their the men imprisoned elsewhere. This was own; they were accountable to recognized ascribed to the improved diets and facilities provided by the North Vietnamese in the latter stages of captivity, and to the strong leadership asserted under the military disci- pline that prevailed in the camps. (It was this very lack of self-imposed military disci- pline by US servicemen that helped bring about disaster in the po w camps of Korea.)20 . y

Military custom requires that a po w camp be run as a military organization. The guidelines are basically limited to Sections III, IV, and V of the “Code of Conduct." The military model is an ex- cellent one for a po w society. The po w ’s are all familiar with it, and it offers a very complete (and rigid) pattern into which the men can fit. The po w ’s in North Vietnam elaborated somewhat on the guide- line. Prisoners’ over-all commander, Air Force Colonel John P. Flynn, formally organized the camp (old French prison in downtown Letters from home were always a fillip for morale, but Hanoi) as the 4th Allied po w Wing.21 whether this one is what it purports to be is anyone’s guess. Over the years, the po w Wing gradually es- tablished a military command structure with local commanders, executive officers and deputies in charge of operations, intelligence authority and a chain of command. Sec- and training. . . . The senior officers within ond, military organization gave weaker this group exercised far-reaching powers. men support and gave strong men support The wing command even promoted three in times of weakness. Commander McCain, sergeants to officers with the understanding speaking on this subject, agreed that that the commissions were subject to review “. . . it was also valuable to establish a and approval by the Pentagon, White House and Congress. . . . Working with their own chain of command in our camps, so our appointed chaplains, one group of POWs senior officers could give us advice and compiled an abridged Bible from memory guidance.”23 Third the structure and and the wing tapped its own historian to assigned tasks gave the po w ’s direction. chronicle the story of the camps.22 Responsibility, even if limited to passing A not-uncommon experience o f U.S. prisoners in North Vietnam was being paraded through the streets o f Hanoi. The USAF officer standing in the truck was subject for the crowd's taunting during this typical ride-hy.

a tap code message from one wall to the po w ’s to identify each other as group next, gave purpose to a day. The disci- members. They were different from their pline resulting from this kind of concrete, jailers racially (black and Caucasian po w ’s formalized assignment helped preserve the versus Oriental guards); they spoke a differ- POWs’ sanity. ent language, had a completely different culture and thought pattern. Group norms group cohesiveness were not difficult to establish. Once the leadership reminded the po w ’s who they Cohesiveness, as well as leadership, was were, i.e., officers and men in the U.S. necessary to create the po w society. In military service, the fundamental norms the Southeast Asian setting of the most relevant to them were the same as in recent po w experiences, it was easy for pre-pow times. The particular norms

41 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

relevant to camp experience were deter- ing after such trips with the help of flag- mined by the leadership and enforced by men and elaborate runways in the dust of peer group pressure. These particular the compound, sustaining “terrible” in- norms covered such matters as how much juries during crash landings, etc. The guards torture to bear before “talking,” what were angry, bewildered, threatening, and constituted “accepting favors” from the finally afraid (that they would be blamed enemy, and the amount of trouble a po w for inducing what they saw as mass psy- was expected to give his guards. chosis). As suddenly as they had begun the Group Inputs. Cohesiveness in the group game, the po w ’s stopped it, and enjoyed was effected by two sources. The group several months’ respite from harassment itself strengthened its cohesiveness, po w ’s by the now cautious guards. The triumph in North Vietnam were so well organized of sheer silliness over the nightmare of a that " . . . in some of the prisons a series of po w camp welded those po w ’s into one of courses in languages, mathematics, and the few strong po w societies of the Korean various other ‘mind-expanding’ subjects conflict. were taught by fellow POWs.”24 In some North Vietnamese camps, Ameri- Sometimes pranks served to bolster can po w ’s enjoyed group living. This was morale. The following incident took place a major factor in building cohesiveness. in a camp in North Korea, after the po w ’s had been tortured for months because The great advantage to living in a big room is that way only a couple or three guys out they refused to confess to American germ of the group have to deal with the “gooks.” warfare. When you’re living by yourself, then you’ve One day they had decided to put one over got to deal with them all the time. You always on their captors. Someone had found a dead have some fight with them. Maybe you’re rat and they cooked up a plot to see just allowed fifteen minutes to bathe and the how much the Communists would fall for. “gook” will say in five minutes you’ve got They printed an Air Force serial number to go back. So you have an argument with on two sides of a small swatch of white cot- him and he locks you in your room and you ton cloth. Next they fashioned a small harness don’t get to bathe for a week. But when for the dead rat, and they tied string from you’re in a big room with others, you can the harness to the cloth so that it resembled stay out of contact with them and it’s a lot a small parachute. At night they took the rat more pleasant.26 into the middle of the compound and placed it on the ground, exactly as though it had Guard/Captor Inputs. The other source dropped from the skies via the parachute. of cohesiveness in a po w camp can be The next morning the first Communist in- the enemy himself. Of course, there are terrogator who spotted the dead rat cried specific successful actions the captors can out in alarm, and soon a large group of take to disrupt the cohesive society. guards and interrogators assembled. . . . Later the interrogators returned to call a Many US senior officers and uncooperative general assembly of the POWs in order to prisoners of lower rank were held in solitary brief them on this horrible device that the confinement. Navy Captain James Mulligan United Nations had dropped on them in the was kept alone for 3l/k years; Colonel Risner night.25 for 4 x/i years and Air Force Colonel Fred Cherry for two years—with an unattended This same group of men “became” jet infected shoulder. Said Mulligan . . . , “You re fighters for an entire week, revving up isolated in a small cell, with no sound, no engines before flying to the latrine, land- fresh air. I was kept like an animal in a solid COMMUNICATION 43

cage, worse than an animal. I couldn't even care of those people. All 1 needed was the see out. 1 didn’t see the sun for four years."-' equipment, the medicine—and 1 was unable to get it.”30 Depriving the men of their leadership is an effective way to destroy the group. A number of po w ’s returned from Vietnam Some kinds of torture were effective in have been quoted as saying that hatred forcing row ’s to perform certain functions; was one of the principal forces which car- torturing a man’s best friend rather than ried them through the experience. The him was successful sometimes. outside threat and the constantly rein- forced concept of the captors as evil and [The Vietnamese] regularly trussed up cap- despicable had a very positive effect on tured pilots and exhibited them in trucks and jeeps to jeering, stone-throwing crowds; the po w society. The captors themselves, they packed some prisoners ten to a cell along with po w leadership and support and dumped others in windowless 9 x 9 foot from the lower-ranking po w ’s, were a force cubicles with only rats for companions. in developing cohesiveness in the po w

They withheld medical care from some societv.y prisoners in order to extract information from their cell mates, and beat others to Indoctrination for the POW force them or their buddies to appear before visiting antiwar activists.28 The third major area in which communi- Taking a man completely out of the po w cation is essential in a po w society is in society was another cohesion-destroying the indoctrination process. action of the captors. An elaborate grapevine eventually grew up Some POWs were forced to kneel on cold linking most of the camps. Prisoners tended concrete floors for days, while their knees this intricate communications system by swelled up like balloons. Others were feigning illnesses to get medical transfers beaten with rubber hoses—under the nose from one camp to another and even by in- so no telltale marks were left. A man would curring disciplinary transfers by baiting their sit on a small stool, without sleep, for twenty captors. Wing veterans exhaustively de- consecutive days. Breaking on the 21st day, briefed all new prisoners on their arrival in he gave the antiwar statements they were the camps, and their reports on changing demanding.29 military policies, political trends and new life styles back home were quickly sent out The guilt feelings of the po w who did through the grapevine.31 crack could be handled by the group; group norms were flexible enough in some Sometimes it took great effort to get cases to countenance “talking” after the through a new prisoner’s thick defenses, kind of torture just described. in order to begin the indoctrination process. On the other hand, social cohesion was Commander McCain recalls an instance: strengthened by the increased hatred of The story of Ernie Brace illustrates how the enemy which torture—and neglect- vital communication was to us. While I provoked in the po w . A com m ent from a was in the prison we called the plantation in po w doctor: October, 1968, there was a room behind me. I heard some noise in there, so I started ‘Ten good men died in my arms,” Kushner tapping on the wall. Our call-up sign was said bitterly—“three in one week alone. I the old “shave and a haircut,” and then the felt on the edge of insanity,” he declared. other guy would come back with two taps, ‘I had the knowledge, the training, to take “six bits.” 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

For two weeks I got no answer, but leaders of the particular group of prisoners finally, back came the two taps. I started at the Plantation. tapping out the alphabet, one tap for “a,” two for “b,” and so on. Then I said, “Put precapture conditioning and training your ear to the wall.” I finally got him up on the wall and by putting my cup against If a free man can ever effectively prepare it, I could talk through it and make him for po w conditions, the Americans on fly- hear me. I gave him the tap code and other ing status in Southeast Asia had been pre- information. He gave me his name—Ernie pared. The armed forces operate several Brace.32 survival schools; pilots, navigators, and Ernie Brace had been held in Laos by other airborne personnel regularly attended the Pathet Lao and then transferred to one them prior to departure for Southeast Asia. of the po w camps near Hanoi. In the Stateside schools are located at Fairchild process, he had built himself a very thick afb, Washington, and Eglin afb, Florida. shell. Eventually, he became one of the These schools are in addition to formal

.An International Committee o f the Red Cross inspection team visits prisoner-of-war facilities in South Vietnam. COMMUNICATION 45

confidence and skill-building courses like toward helping a downed flyer survive in the Army Ranger, paratrooper, and Special typical Southeast Asia terrain. The tap and Forces schools. The Air Force Academy hand codes mentioned so often by former makes practice for po w status part of po w ’s were also taught at jss. Here, too, its regular curriculum. men were reminded of the “Code of Con- duct” and its very pratical and real appli- Survival training has been a part of the cation to a situation in which the men at academy curriculum since the school was the school might find themselves within opened and . . . all activities are “strictly supervised” by academy staff. the year. The current mock po w exercise is carried Informal Reinforcement o f Capture out during a 39-hour block of training de- Possibility. Once on flying status in Thailand voted to training in application of the code or South Vietnam, men were constantly of conduct. The resistance training is con- reminded of the possibility of capture. This ducted in a “compound” surrounded by a happened as they put on their survival chain link fence topped with barbed wire, vests (with the many little pockets contain- and “protected” by a 20-foot guard tower.33 ing dozens of ingenious devices, carefully Survival Schools. Since 1968, the majority designed to carry a man through the first of Southeast Asia-bound flyers have attended few days until he could be rescued), sat both the Fairchild afb Survival School and through intelligence briefings, waited for the Jungle Survival School at Clark Air long overdue flights of close friends, and Base in the Philippines. The author at- took off themselves on mission after mis- tended both schools in 1969 and found that sion. Even close friends rarely speculated the courses in both schools simulated many about the possibility to each other, but of the anticipated po w problems. The they did little things like jogging without handful of po w ’s released prior to 1973 shoes to toughen their feet, “just in case.” lent their expertise in helping the school Combat flying boots are one of the first organizers to build mock-ups of real North things a po w is divested of, and a tender- and South Vietnamese po w camps, torture footed prisoner won’t get far in the jun- apparatus, and interrogation rooms. Stu- gle. This awareness and the jss training dents at the schools were treated as much made the indoctrination of men into the like po w ’s as reasonably possible. The po w societies in Vietnam far easier than knowledge that they were actually on an in previous wars and conflicts. air base prevented this simulated po w ex- perience from being psychologically identi- peer group pressure cal to the real thing, but it was almost identical physically. Men even spent time The peer group in the po w society also in “The Box” (a very small metal or helped indoctrinate the po w ’s . There were wooden container into which po w ’s were some failures, however, according to in- crammed—and left—until they broke from formation released through American news claustrophobia or pain). services. Eight enlisted men, banded to- In addition to having simulated po w ex- gether in an informal “Peace Committee,” periences, jss students learned much po- refused orders from their superiors and tentially useful information about sanita- voluntarily delivered antiwar broadcasts tion, survival equipment (and its manufac- for the enemy that far exceeded anything ture and repair), diet, first aid, jungle plants, the North Vietnamese were able to force and wildlife. This information was geared out of the other prisoners.34 Charges 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

were also levied against two officers for mis- T he impact of communication on the po w conduct, mutiny, and aiding the enemy. society, and thus on the prisoner of war The Pentagon later dropped all charges himself, is clear. With good communica- against both the officers and enlisted men tions, a strong, supportive society can be for lack of supporting evidence and for formed and maintained. Statements from the expressed belief that the ten men had former po w ’s make plain the importance suffered enough.35 However, prisoners of contact with other po w ’s ; such contact who had doubts about the war, or gave was vital for survival. Without communica- statements to protest groups, or were tion, a po w society cannot be formed, thus thought to have collaborated with the leaving the po w isolated and in a one-to- enemy were certainly judged by the other one relationship with his captors. When prisoners. Of the 566 known po w ’s from this situation exists, the po w is likely to Southeast Asia, only the ten mentioned suffer severe psychological damage and were formally accused of failing to adhere to give to his jailers the information they to the standards of the “Code of Con- want from him. Good communication is duct.” Peer group pressure and group truly the key element, then, to survival in support must, indeed, have been strong a po w situation. to keep that number so small. Air War College

Notes 17. Deane, p. 174. 1 C . T. Morgan. Introduction to Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill. 18. McCain, p. 115. 1966), pp. 577-92. 19. S. Sidney Ulmer, Military Justice and the Rig/it to Counsel (Lexington: 2. J. S. McCain III, "How the POWs Fought Back," U.S. News an d University Press of Kentucky. 1970), p. 5. World Report. May 14. 1973. p. 49. 20. William P. Schlitz, "The POWs Return," Air Force Magazine. April 3. Arthur W. Comhs and Donald Snygg, Individual Behavior (New York: 1973, p. 25. Harper and Row. 1959). p. 330. 21. "POWs: The Peace Committee," Newsweek. April 2, 1973, p. 27 4 Excerpts from a briefing on POWs. Newsweek. February 5, 1973, p. 21. (hereafter cited as "Peace Committee"). 5. "POWs: The Price of Survival.” Newsweek, April 16, 1973. p. 31 (here- 22. "Life in a POW Camp: the Well-Tended Grapevine." Newsweek, after cited as ' Price of Survival"). February 26. 1973, p. 21 (hereafter cited as "Life"). 6. ".And Now a Darker Story." Time, March 5. 1973, p. 14 (hereafter 23. McCain, p. 50. cited as "Darker Story"). 24. Schlitz. p. 26. 7. McCain, p. 113. 25. Mauhrin. p. 275. 8. “At Last the Story Can Be Told," Time, April 9. 1973, p. 20 (here- 26. McCain, p. 113. after cited as "At Last"). 27. "At Last," p. 19. 9. "Darker Story." 28. "Peace Committee." 10. W Mauhrin. Honest John (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1962), 29. Ibid. pp. 197-98. 30. "Price of Survival." 11. McCain, p. 113. 31. “ Life." 12. Philip Deane. I Was a Captive in Korea (New York: W. W. Norton 32. McCain, p. 49. and Company, 1953), p. 211. 33. "Survival School at Academy Hit,” Air Force Times, July 11, 1973, 13. McCain, p. 51. p. 19. 14. "Darker Story." 34. "Charges Filed against Eight POWs," Air Force Times. June 20, 1973, 15. McCain, p. 52. p. 33. 16. Mauhrin, p. 259. 35. "Pentagon Drops POW Charges," Air Force Times. July 18. 1973, p. 3. air force mm

ASSESSING THE ASSESSMENT CENTER new dimensions in leadership

Major Pet er Henderson HE mission of Air University is to pre- velopment of leadership is known as the T pare officers of all grades and special- Assessment Center method, by which ties for command of, and staff duties within, students go through a program of activities all types of Air Force organizations.1 Im- under the eye of expert faculty members. plied in that mission statement is the re- As a method of observation and evaluation quirement for strong Air Force leadership of behavior, the Assessment Center can at all levels of staff and command. Air contribute to a better understanding of Force professional military education (pme ) the nature of leadership; it can provide schools are devoting considerable talent specific dimensions of leadership that can and energy toward leadership education be observed in controlled conditions and as each labors to fulfill its own specific re- used for improving leadership education in quirements. The problem is that leaders precommissioning programs and in pro- and educators alike have been unable to fessional military schools. agree on a specific interpretation of leader- We are deluged with definitions and ship. What makes a leader, how does one theories of leadership. The primary diffi- recognize leadership when it occurs, and culty with many popular leadership theories how is leadership taught? is that they are based on either intuitive The usaf Chief of Staff, General David assumptions or attitudinal surveys. For C. Jones, has said that leadership is a example, the Blake-Mouton Managerial “nebulous quality” that turns failure into Grid6 is taught as a viable theory of leader- success.- Although we can easily see what ship and management behavior in most it is that occurs as a result of leadership, courses of leadership/management instruc- we still do not understand the nature of tion. This theory is popular because it is it. It would be difficult to find a topic more logically constructed and leads one to be- in need of clarification than leadership. In lieve that there is a “best” style of leader- an article in Air University Review, Gen- ship behavior. It is also a favorite in the eral Ira C. Eaker commented that leader- classroom environment because each stu- ship is still a “critical factor for the mili- dent can “learn" his dominant style of tary professional.”3 General Eaker went behavior by means of a simple paper-and- on to enumerate his favorite qualities of pencil test.' leadership, heading the list with “courage." On the other hand, some leadership All outstanding leaders seem to have their theorists totally reject the idea of class- favorite leadership attributes. For General room instruction in leadership. Dr. Fred E. Jones, it is the ability to solve problems.4 Fiedler, who has conducted a great deal Other leaders have named other attributes. of this country’s research on leadership, Squadron Officer School (sos), the Air states that no one has established any di- Force’s junior officer leadership school, rect correlation between the amount of actually publishes a list of attributes in training a leader has had and the per- one of its textbooks.5 Our concern with formance of the group he leads.8 However, leadership in the world of professional mili- Dr. Fiedler’s own theory, the Contingency tary education is not a problem of naming Model of Leadership Effectiveness, is attributes but one of limiting the descrip- grounded in behavioral assumptions based on tion of leadership to a measurable or ob- attitudinal surveys.9 These are examples servable quantity that we can isolate and of two of the more popular theories of evaluate. leadership being used in leadership courses A relatively new idea for promoting de- today. The point is that they are based on

48 AIR FORCE REVIEW 49

generalized statements which attempt to tional and observable leadership behavior explain behavior and are not particularly in a problem-solving environment. That is useful in helping students develop their the legacy of the Assessment Center method. own leadership skills. Our Air Force stu- Sometime after the start of Project X, dents, for all their study of leadership representatives from the U.S. Army In- theory, are still unclear as to their per- fantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, sonal concepts of leadership and what they borrowed the plan from sos and designed must do in any given situation to provide a leadership “confidence” course of their good leadership. own. That course continues to be a valu- It is my opinion that educators have able part of infantry basic training, and been looking in the wrong direction for similar courses are being established at assistance in leadership education within other Army schools.1,1 The Assessment given fields. The Assessment Center, as a Center method is a tried and proven way method of behavioral measurement and of evaluating leadership behavior in an individual feedback, can provide the pro- outdoor problem-solving course. fessional educator in any field with spe- In this outdoor form, however, it is not cific dimensions of leadership. This method fully suited to the needs of pme , the major can increase the instructor’s ability to command leadership academies, or the recognize individual acts of leadership in precommissioning programs for develop- group situations and properly counsel in- ing new ways of instructing in leadership dividual students on their leadership skills. behavior throughout the full spectrum of In the Assessment Center the emphasis is Air Force management activities. It is in on observed behavior rather than theoreti- the civilian sector that the Assessment cal abstraction. Before we analyze the Center method has made the largest con- method, let us examine its history. tribution. American Telephone and Telegraph, in looking for new management development How did the Assessment and training processes, took the lead 15 Center begin? years ago and attempted to identify the According to most sources, the Assessment variables related to success by applying Center was apparently first conceived by the Assessment Center ideas.14 Today, at&t the Germans in 1911 for purposes of offi- subsidiaries are operating some fifty As- cer selection.10 It was also used bv the sessment Centers nationwide. They are Office of Strategic Services during World processing approximately 10,000 personnel War II for selecting secret agents.11 The annually, identifying potential candidates British Royal .Army Selection Board con- among people eligible for first-line man- tinued to use a variation of this program agement positions.15 The Assessment Cen- after World War II in selecting young ter method is also being applied by ibm, applicants for Sandhurst, the Royal Mili- General Electric, and J. C. Penney, as well tary Academy. It is interesting to note that as many state and federal agencies, to help Squadron Officer School’s famed Project X in the selection of first-line supervisors and was originally designed as a copy of the top Civil Service candidates.16 British program.1- Since its beginning in For a while the only full-time Assess- 1951, the sos Project X has become the ment Center operated by the U.S. Air focal point for that school’s leadership Force was located at Wright-Patterson program because of the emphasis on situa- afb, Ohio. Designed specifically for the 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW assessment of candidates for civilian posi- The Assessment Center method uses a tions (GS 12-14) in the Aeronautical Sys- system of actual work-related problems tems Division, the center was operated on and situations in which the behavior of a trial basis January through June, 1974. It individuals can be observed and objec- was so successful in fulfilling its objectives tively assessed. The students participate in of identification and development of high- these situations under the watchful eye of potential managers that it is now refunded the assessors, who are specially trained on an annual basis.17 for this activity and who have themselves The U.S. Army operated a temporary undergone assessment. The behavior of Assessment Center at Fort Benning. The the student is recorded and later classified center’s mission was quite extensive: to in accordance with specifically tailored test the assessment concept as a precom- “dimensions” or skills. These dimensions missioning screening device and as a lead- are the actual leadership skills that have ership career development technique, and been identified as essential qualities for to determine whether the concept was valid the position being considered, or for the for Army-wide use.18 .An interesting fallout particular types of duties the student will from this research project was the develop- be assigned in future Air Force assign- ment of composite profiles of junior officers ments.21 and nco’s based on the accumulated be- The purpose of the Assessment Center, as havioral data. This composite provided the used by most civilian corporations, is to school with valuable information on the evaluate the specific skills, or dimensions, capabilities and anticipated needs of its of the candidates in order to determine future students.19 The program was dis- their fitness for promotion to a particularly continued in 1974 for lack of funds, but important position. It is designed as a the data are still being researched by the supplement to aid managers in making Army Research Institute.20 objective and rational decisions about the Most recently. Squadron Officer School promotions of their people.22 As will be re-examined the Assessment Center meth- fully explained later in this article, how- od. Based on the favorable results obtained ever, the Assessment Center's value to by the project at Wright-Patterson, sos Air Force leadership education lies in its initiated a pilot program in 1975. They use as a developmental system rather than have since added the Assessment Center as a placement system. method to their leadership curriculum as The typical .Assessment Center program another means of identifying and develop- consists of a one-week operation: 2 to 3 ing those leadership behaviors and skills days for the observation of exercises and most needed by junior officers in their re- 3 to 4 days for the assessment and resolu- spective staff and squadron duties. A full tion process. Specially trained observers examination of their work should be made are selected from management positions by any military educational institution seek- similar to the positions for which the can- ing to upgrade its leadership education didates are being considered. The candi- curriculum. dates are placed into six-man groups, which participate in a series of standardized What is the Assessment Center method? exercises such as management games, un- structured and structured group discussion The Assessment Center is a method of de- scenarios, in-basket tests, one-on-one in- fining, observing, and measuring behavior. terviews, briefings, speeches, and written AIR FORCE REVIEW 51 problem-solving exercises.23 Not all the leadership valued in the chaplain’s area exercises are conducted with the six-man of activity, for example, might not be the groups, but all are designed to bring out same as those valued in the personnel or some dimensions of management or leader- comptroller fields. The dimensions valued ship behavior. Most of the exercises require in precommissioning education will like- intense group interaction, since manage- wise be different from those valued in the ment and leadership require getting work Air War College environment, even if done through people.24 Most of the exer- only in degree and intensity. cises are realistic role-playing scenarios The following dimensions are a few of in which each participant has a task, and those used by the Aeronautical Systems he can do as much or as little with his Division in its Assessment Center at Wright- role as he wants. Patterson: energy, forcefulness, flexibility, There are typically three assessors ob- stress tolerance, risk taking, originality, serving each six-man scenario, although and problem solving.25 These specific- that ratio can vary according to the needs dimensions were not derived from arbitrary of the educational situation. Each assessor or academically intuitive sources; instead watches only two of the participants, re- they were obtained by exhaustive surveys cording their behavior as the problem of managers who occupied the positions situation moves toward resolution. The of leadership for which the Assessment assessors eventually observe all the candi- Center was assessing candidates. dates over the full period of time and later There are many more dimensions recom- meet to compare notes, discuss behaviors, mended by the commercial consultant and prepare their evaluations. During the firms that develop Assessment Center pro- “assessment phase," the assessors must grams for industry. Primarily, the dimen- catalog their observations in terms of the sions are job-performance related. The dimensions being measured. They can lists provided are only suggestions for de- later evaluate each participant’s leadership veloping a set of dimensions peculiar to ability based on the number and quality of the using activity. The dimensions used the leadership dimensions he displayed. by any institution should be obtained through as many ways as possible, includ- What are the dimensions? ing surveys of professional literature, job analyses, interviews, and questionnaires. The behavioral dimensions, or skills, are All these dimensions are related to lead- the backbone of the Assessment Center ership behavior because they specifically method. The dimensions provide the relate to task accomplishment through method with its inherent flexibility and people. One of the biggest problems in the adaptability. A dimension is a capability, area of leadership training has been an talent, or skill area that encompasses spe- inability to see the forest for the trees. cific behaviors. These behaviors are exam- Many leadership schools are trying to ples of abilities in the particular dimen- develop a cognitive understanding of sion, and they can easily be grouped and leadership, when the real need is to teach reliably classified in those particular di- and develop the skills or dimensions of mensions. The dimensions are not all- leadership. The Assessment Center, used inclusive; rather they are common areas in the developmental manner, facilitates of concern as agreed upon by experts in that instruction by creating situations in the particular area. The dimensions of which the specific skills, or dimensions, 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

can be observed, evaluated, and used for and length of the course. Preparation the leadership development of the student. should include having key faculty mem- bers attend an active Assessment Center to How good is the Assessment Center? observe the process from beginning to end. It would not be necessary to hire a civilian A review of all validity studies since 1956 consulting firm to establish the Assessment concerning Assessment Center methods Center, as most civilian corporations do. reveals that the assessments were valid There is sufficient expertise and material and were consistently correlated with sev- available within the resources of Air Uni- eral criteria. Predictive accuracy was high- versity to establish a developmental As- est for job potential, followed by progress, sessment Center method in any Air Force and then job performance. The Assessment school. Squadron Officer School has used Center was more efficient than traditional only minimum outside resources in establish- methods of evaluation, such as paper-and- ing their Assessment Center program. pencil tests.26 The popularity of the As- The reader may be thinking at this point sessment Center method results from its that Squadron Officer School, with its great flexibility in adaptation to different Project X, management games, group dis- jobs and job levels and inherent potential cussion seminars, and field activities, pro- for higher degrees of content validity (job vides a unique proving ground for the relatedness).2. It has endless implications Assessment Center method. But what for training, as a tool for planning training about the other professional schools? As needs, as a career-planning vehicle, and as a matter of fact, the Air Command and a learning experience per se.28 Staff College, Air War College, Chaplain The Assessment Center at the U.S. Army Orientation Course, Professional Military Infantry School was highly rated by school Comptroller Course, Professional Personnel officials. In a final report, one official stated Management Course, and the usaf Senior that the center presented “excellent hands- nco Academy are all engaged in various on performance-oriented leadership train- forms of leadership and management in- ing”; it was also reported that students struction that involve group projects, in- called the experience the “best leadership dividual exercises, and group discussions. training they had ever received.”29 Furthermore, the afrotc AS400 Leadership and Management courses provide excellent opportunities to use Assessment Center How does the Assessment Center method apply to Air Force schools? techniques. The cadet corps training en- vironment would lend itself well to this As mentioned earlier, the original purpose method. Almost all our leadership schools of the Assessment Center method was per- attempt to develop leadership and manage- sonnel placement or promotion evaluation. ment expertise in certain areas at various Whereas industry primarily uses the As- levels of authority. The Assessment Center sessment Center method for job placement method provides dimensions applicable to purposes, the Air Force should use it for each of these levels of expertise. It remains the leadership development and education for the faculties and staffs of the various of the professional officer. Air Force and other service professional Each school using the Assessment Center military education establishments to deter- method should tailor the method to its own mine the specific dimensions and criteria needs based on the curriculum objectives to be measured and developed. AIR FORCE REVIEW 53

How is Assessment Center sessment Center method is that the stu- information used? dent gains valuable experience from the participation itself, as he undergoes more The information generated bv Assessment and more assessment, since the exercises Center activities should be disseminated in are problem-oriented and can be tailored feedback sessions between faculty instruc- to the production needs of the school. The tors and their students. The faculty mem- faculty members will become more and ber, who should also be an assessor, should more proficient at recognizing skills and communicate to the student exactly what abilities and will increase their capabilities he did and did not do in terms of specific as evaluators as well as their credibility leadership dimensions during the exer- with the students. Their counseling tech- cises. Usually there is more information niques will also improve. As the student than the student can handle, because the recognizes areas in which he needs im- assessment technique is so thorough. These provement, he can concentrate on those feedback and counseling sessions are the skills in further exercises, while continuing most important aspect of the Assessment to satisfy the academic requirements of Center in the developmental method; they the school programs. must be done carefully by faculty members who are well qualified.30 The faculty mem- ber should pick out only the most impor- It must be repeated, in conclusion, that tant information that is most closely re- the Assessment Center method is strictly lated to the specific needs of the student. a method and will only be as good as the In the educational enviromnent, infor- time and expertise devoted toward making mation accumulated on each student as a it work for the particular school. As a result of the .Assessment Center method technique, it does not provide all the an- should be used for school purposes only. swers to the questions of leadership, but This is an important point. Evaluations it does provide an effective and objective obtained may also be used for determination way of measuring leadership behavior in of graduate standing, but the information a situational context. A great deal of time should not be included in any official docu- and effort must be invested in the method mentation that leaves the school and be- by each school in order to make it work. comes part of one’s official military records. The results, as compared to attitudinal sur- Since the objective of this use of the As- veys, paper-and-pencil exercises, and ob- sessment Center method is for develop- servations of opportunity made by faculty mental purposes, the information should members, should be informative and in- not be used for promotion selection infor- structive for both students and faculty mation. It may well be of considerable members. The results should be well worth value for assignment information, however, the preparation if the graduates are able and it is conceivable that at some point to say that they have a better understand- in the future the Air Force will see a need ing of their personal and professional lead- for the placement type of Assessment Cen- ership capabilities in their particular field ter. It should be emphasized, though, that and have a clear understanding of specific we must know a lot more about this tech- areas for self-improvement. The Assess- nique before it ever replaces the tried and ment Center, as a developmental leader- true “commander’s evaluation.” ship education method, can assist the Air One of the greatest benefits of the As- Force’s professional leadership educational 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

system in accomplishing its mission of pre- duties in all types of Air Force organiza- paring officers for command and staff tions and commands. AFROTC Detachment 5, Auburn University

Notes resentatives from the U.S. Army Infantry School. Fort Benning. Georgia, during the author’s visits to that school in 1973 and 1974. (Hereafter cited as USAIS.) 1. Air University, Quarterly Program Summary (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 14. Byham. p. 151. Headquarters Air University, 1st Quarter. FY 75). p. 1. 15. Ibid. 2. General David C. Jones, "Leadership—the Key to Success," TIG Brief, 16. William C. Byham and Carl Wettenel. "Assessment Centers for Super- 28 February 1975, p. 1. visors and Managers,” Public Personnel Management, September-October 1974, 3. Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Ret). "The Military Profes- p. 352. sional." Air I'niversity Review, January-February 1975, p. 7. 17. This information is based on the author’s visit to the Aeronautical 4. Jones, op. cit. Systems Division Assessment Center at Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio, includ- 5. SOS-2, Leadership in the Air Force, Squadron Officer School. Maxwell ing conversations with the Director of that center. William L. Bryant. (Here- AFB. Alabama, October 1974. pp. 2-1. 2-2. after cited as ASD Center.) 6. Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton. "Managerial Facades," Advanced 18. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. TRADOC Leadership Con- Management Jotimal July 1966. p. 31. fcrence Report, U.S. Army Infantry School. Fort Benning, Georgia, 20-24 7. Hall. Harvey, and Williams, Styles o f Management Inventory, copyright May 1974, p. 70. (Hereafter cited as TRADOC Report.) 1973 by Teleometrics International. P. O. Drawer 1850, Conroe. Texas. This 19. Ibid., pp. 75-76. is a testing and scoring instrument designed specifically to "predict" one's 20. USAIS. dominant and backup leadership/management styles in given situations. 21. Development Dimensions, Inc., Catalog of Assessment and Development The results are based on one’s honesty about one’s behavior in these situations. Exercises. Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania, 1975, p. 2. 8. Dr. Fred E. Fiedler. "The Trouble with Leadership Training Is That It 22. Ilnd. Doesn’t Train Leaders,” Psychology Today, February 1973, pp. 23-25. 23. Byham, pp. 162-63. 9. Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard. Management o f Organizational 24. Cohen, p. 21. Behavior (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pre mice-Hall, 1972), p. 89. 25. ASD Center. 10. Barry M. Cohen. 'The Assessment Center." Training in Business and 26. Barry M. Cohen. William C. Byham. and Joseph L. Moses, "The Validity Industry, February 1974, p. 22. of Assessment Centers,” unpublished literature survey. Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania, 11. William C. Byham. "Assessment Centers for Spotting Future Man- 1974, p. 1. agers,” Harvard Business Review. July-August 1970, p. 151. 27. Byham and Wettenel, p. 352. 12. Colonel Russell V. Ritchey. Years o f the Tiger, Squadron Officer 28. Cohen, p. 23. School. Air University. Maxwell AFB, Alabama, June 1974. pp. 67-68. 29. TRADOC Report, pp. 74-75. 13. This statement is based on conversations between the author and rep- 30. ASD Center. DO MORE WITH LESS

job enrichment may be the answer

Major D. K. C rooch O more with less!” “ Manpower job enrichment—review and update levels are going down!” “Budgets will be more constrained than ever!” Job enrichment has become one of the most D popular management buzz words. Like most “With all my resources decreasing, the mis- sion is increasing!” How can we do more buzz words, it has frequently been misused with less? How can we improve perfor- or used loosely. mance and mission accomplishment? In the The term “job enrichment” is firmly lodged in face of the “gloom and doom” forecasts, the vocabulary of managers, behavioral scien- what, indeed, is today’s Air Force manager tists and journalists. Managers are beginning to do? to accept the basic theory behind job enrich- As we continually examine managerial ment, but only at the cocktail-party level of strategies hoping to find the answer to cope understanding of human behavior. Behavioral with the challenges presented by increas- scientists, ever ready to jump on a bandwagon, ing requirements in an environment of often have an equally shallow understanding, scarce resources, there is a growing aware- but a better vocabulary. And journalists have a new movement to misinterpret. The result ness that perhaps the single most important has been that job enrichment now represents factor in people’s performance is the de- many approaches intended to increase human sign of the work. However, most efforts to satisfaction and performance at work, and the improve performance seem to center on differences between all the approaches are no improving the conditions surrounding the longer clear.1 work. We stress improved supervisory techniques and interpersonal relations, and Since the term “job enrichment” has been we try to improve working conditions. abused and distorted, then, we need to These are worthwhile efforts, but they usu- make our use clear. ally result only in short-term improvements Job enrichment is both a concept and a in attitudes and productivity, and the situa- process concerned with changing jobs to tion often returns quickly to normal. make them more meaningful to those who Long-term improvements will not be perform them and at the same time to make made until we realize that it is the job better use of the worker’s knowledge, skills, itself which needs to be changed. If peo- and ideas. The concept of job enrichment ple are unhappy with the temperature in was crystallized with the motivation-hygiene the room, adjust the temperature; but if theory of job attitudes advanced by Fred- they don't like their job, don’t expect more erick Herzberg, currently University Dis- comfortable temperatures to change their tinguished Professor at the College of Busi- attitudes and behavior. We have to learn ness, University of Utah. His two-factor to make jobs more interesting. theorv, first presented in 1959, departed A concept with great potential for the sharply from conventional theories of job usaf manager in this regard is “job en- satisfaction.2 richment.” The concept of job enrichment A brief review of Herzberg’s findings is provides the manager with a strategy that necessary to understand fully the concept of will motivate subordinates and at the same job enrichment. time enhance mission accomplishment. The Motivation-hygiene theory suggests that job purpose of this article is to examine the satisfaction and job dissatisfaction are pro- concept of job enrichment, look at its utility duced by different work factors. What makes for today’s usaf managers, and discuss the people satisfied at work are factors that re- enrichment process. late to the content of their jobs—specifically:

56 DO MORE WITH LESS 57

achievement. recognition for achievement, as much decision-making responsibility and interesting work, increased responsibility, control as possible in carrying out the work. growth, and advancement. (Called motivators). The conditional phrase “as possible” is a On the other hand, what makes people un- recognition of the fact that it will not al- happy at work is not what they do but how ways be possible to extend complete con- well (or poorly) they are treated. These treat- trol or decision-making to a job incumbent. ment factors (dissatisfiers) are related not to It is important that the person have the the content of work, but to the context of the job. The main factors in this group are power to act in unusual situations or cir- company policy and administration practices, cumstances. Build in as many decision and supervision, interpersonal relationships, work- problem-solving activities that affect the ing conditions, salary, status and security. service and quality levels of the work as Because these factors describe the job context possible. For example, the worker should and, in their negative aspects, serve to pro- have as much control as possible over such vide job dissatisfaction, we have called them things as setting work priorities, resolving hygiene factors, symbolizing the fact that complaints and mistakes, sending work they represent preventive and environmental back for more information, and direct com- conditions of work.3 munication with other areas. Therefore, according to Herzberg, superior (3) The third and final dimension of an performance can only be generated by con- enriched job is that it provides direct feed- centrating on the "motivators.” back through the work itself on how well This concept is then applied to the work the worker is doing. The worker should itself. When we look at any job, we find three not be dependent on a supervisor to know dimensions that define its parameters: the whether or not the job is being satisfactorily degree of completeness, the control factor, accomplished. Such feedback can be pro- and the feedback dimension. Bv further vided by direct user complaints, error rates, specifying these dimensions, we can define volume counts, and turnaround times. an "enriched job” as follows:4 A job having these three dimensions will (1) An enriched job is a complete piece of therefore include: responsibility for plan- work in the sense that the worker can iden- ning task accomplishment; the freedom to tify a series of tasks or activities that end exercise that plan in the completion of the in a definable product for a specific recipi- tasks; and the feedback necessary to enable ent. These two aspects of job completeness each worker to assess the effectiveness of need amplification. First is task combina- that plan in accomplishing the task so as to tion. The job needs to be complete in that take any necessary corrective action to in- it has an identifiable beginning and end, is sure successful task completion. logically separable from other “pieces” of work, and is not duplicated by anyone else in the work unit (i.e., before, after, or Relevant to the USAF? above). Second, the jobholder should be What is the utility of job enrichment in able to identify users or receivers of the the usaf? We can gain insight into this work. Work should be assigned on the basis question by looking at experience in the of client relationships (other departments, private sector. Industry has been wrestling external customers) or natural work units with the problem of job satisfaction and (specific set of accounts, geographical areas, worker motivation for a number of years. or alphabetical ordering). There is a growing consensus among man- (2) An enriched job affords the worker agers as well as behavioral scientists that 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the way jobs are structured—the work it- today’s jobs are perceived by a select group self—is critical. They have concluded that of usaf middle managers. A survey of the today’s workers desire challenge and indi- students in the Air War College and Air vidual growth on the job. Unfortunately, in Command and Staff College classes of 1974 the interest of efficiency, today’s complex found that 89 percent of 680 respondents organizations often rigidly structure jobs, felt that almost every job can be made career progression, and personal develop- more stimulating, interesting, and chal- ment. Work tends to be too simplified and lenging. Ninety-nine percent felt that in- overspecialized. Industry has found that dividual recognition is a key factor in em- these conditions result in decreased pro- ployee motivation. Seventy-five percent ductivity, alienation, hostility toward the felt people want to accept responsibility. organization, increasing absenteeism and And seventy-two percent felt that allowing turnover, and pervasive feelings of unhap- subordinates to set performance standards piness and discontent. The extent to which will not result in subpar standards.5 these conditions exist in the usaf is open Clearly, usaf managers perceive that to question. Air Force traditions and our there is room for job improvements. People mission in support of national objectives want to be challenged, to have interesting undoubtedly help to cushion or retard the work, and to be responsible for their ac- impact of such forces. It is clear, however, tions. They also recognize that their sub- that the Air Force is affected by the same ordinates want to be involved and will social and technological trends as the rest probably be more productive if they are. of society and that our people will respond positively to motivation through the work candidates for the enrichment process itself. Indeed, many an Air Force manager Traditionally, when job enrichment advo- may already have recognized signs of dis- cates have been asked where this concept content with the job on the part of his will help, they have answered, “Anywhere personnel—or even with his own job. What, you have problems.” It was basically a then, do some managers perceive as good symptomatic approach: look for jobs where jobs? An example from experience common worker attitudes are poor as evidenced by to many of us may help. Officers and nco’s low productivity, poor-quality work, low who served a tour in Southeast Asia think morale, disciplinary problems, requests for of the job there as the best they have ever transfers, and low re-enlistment rates. Of had. We talk of feeling a sense of achieve- course, if these or other symptoms are ment, recognition for a job well done, in- present, it is the manager’s responsibility teresting work, and tremendous responsibi- to get at the cause. While this sympto- lities. It is interesting that we felt this way matic approach to job enrichment has some- about jobs with a less than desirable en- times proven successful, it has also resulted vironment, poor working conditions, family in much misdirected activity. separation, finances stretched to the break- Obviously, there are situations with high ing point, and great personal danger for turnover or poor productivity in which job many. This common experience provides enrichment would not help. People leave jobs a practical example of a kind of job en- or perform poorly for many reasons: They richment that was not designed but re- feel they are underpaid, their supervisor is sulted from the exigencies of the situation. poor, the work conditions are unacceptable, For another perspective, let us look at how or they are bored and uninterested in their DO MORE WITH LESS 59

assignments. Since job enrichment is a process steps for the process for making work more interesting, it can help only when the last reason mentioned is There are specific steps a manager can the cause of the symptoms. But another, more take to facilitate the enrichment process fundamental condition must exist before job once it has been decided that an enrich- enrichment can make a contribution: there ment effort is the course of action to pursue: must be a structural opportunity to redesign the job. So the first question to be asked in 1. Select a job with which at least one assessing the usefulness of job enrichment in member of your group or work team is in- any organization is—where are the tasks done timately familiar. Define all the major tasks in such a way that leaves room for them to and responsibilities of the selected job as be enriched?6 it is presently designed. 2. Determine criteria against which you Structural data can provide information can measure improvement or slippage re- about the technical feasibility of job en- sulting from job changes. richment. In studying structural oppor- 3. Brainstorm a list of changes. Gener- tunities, the manager is attempting to de- alizations such as responsibility, achieve- termine the possibilities for assigning work ment, recognition, and personal growth on a user basis or task combination, or must be translated into specifics relating building better decision-making and control into the job, or providing better feedback. to the work being performed. The existence of one or more of these 4. Categorize all the ideas, identifying structural clues does not necessarily indi- potential “motivators” and potential “hy- cate that jobs should be enriched, only giene” factors, into the following areas: that the structural opportunity for enrich- a. A complete module of work ment exists. Some of the structural indicators b. New responsibility that may warrant further investigation c. New form of recognition include d. New feedback —duplication of functions (Is task com- e. Growth opportunities bination possible?) f. Roadblocks—rules or procedures that will need to be changed —extensive use of specialists or trouble- g. Working conditions (and other hy- shooters (Do they have the best part of giene factors). everyone else’s job?) 5. Evaluate the ideas and identify those —one-on-one reporting relationships that seem to be excellent and those that (Does the person on the bottom get the seem to be good. The rest are classed as leftovers?) “not so great” and may be ignored. —the existence of general labor pools 6. If it is possible to remove roadblocks (Is client identification possible?) or improve working conditions, by all —multiple authority limits (Can more means do so. If the list is strong on road- authority be given to those in lower jobs?) block items or working conditions and —divided responsibility (Can responsi- weak in the first five categories, a job en- bility be specifically placed?)7 richment effort may not be particularly These clues should be helpful in determin- profitable. ing whether job enrichment is possible. 7. If the list is strong on the first five cate- Whether it is desirable is usually not an gories, implement the excellent and good easy question to answer. items that are the best candidates for re- 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

shaping the job. Introduce changes gradually enrichment is, “I’m giving away all of to allow workers time to assimilate new my authority.” Once the manager becomes procedures, tasks, responsibilities, and rela- accustomed to the changes, he may be tionships. able to do things he had only limited time 8. Re-evaluate the criteria for measur- to do before, like planning. ing the results of change. The enriched job may not include all the original indicators, or unanticipated bene- J ob enrichment is not a panacea. It is not fits may result. an end in and of itself. Above all, it is not simply redesigning jobs. It must be viewed cautions8 as part of a larger systems approach that includes work organization—close attention Not all jobs need enrichment. “Some jobs to the way work groups are made up and do not lend themselves to redesign, or managed. It also includes redesign of su- would be too expensive to change.”9 Not pervisory structures, including hierarchies, all people want or need their jobs enriched. reporting relationships, and levels of super- “Employees may differ in their psychologi- vision. Finally, it includes team building, cal readiness for enriched work.”10 Before worker participation, supervisory training, enriching jobs in the organization, the man- creation of autonomous work teams, goal ager should obtain the support of his own setting, performance appraisal, and turn- supervisor. This enables the supervisor to over analysis. become aware of the problems and issues A change or intervention technique is involved. Few supervisors like surprises! generally introduced into an organization Managers can enrich jobs below them to because some aspect of the system is not the degree that they possess the leeway working well. I feel we should become to give their people more autonomy in committed to job enrichment as a very their jobs. But one cannot trade off “hy- potent means of breaking a dysfunctional gienes” for “motivators”—even if it is a cycle. Compared to other methods of in- good job, people still need a good job en- tervention, it works fast, and it has perhaps vironment (status, supervision, working the best chance of bringing about lasting conditions, etc.). performance improvements. It seems in- Unrealistic expectations should be evitable that job enrichment is linked to avoided. Many enrichment efforts have these other kinds of change. Sometimes been stopped before they had an ade- one technique comes first, sometimes an- quate chance to work out. Industry’s ex- other. They may deal with different aspects perience has been that there may initially of the total quality of working life, but be a slight drop in productivity. After all, they can all be valid starting places, and the people are learning a new job. they can all enrich the job. If job enrichment is confused with In the final analysis it’s really up to each merely adding additional tasks, it will manager to examine the organization and probal}ly not work. Dr. Herzberg cites determine the feasibility of the enrichment the example of the dishwasher who spe- process. Job enrichment can help us to cialized in washing cups and saucers. After “do more with less,” and that is our chal- his job was “enriched,” he washed silver- lenge for the foreseeable future. ware as well. Air University Institute for A typical supervisory reaction to job Professional Develofvnent DO MORE WITH LESS 61

Note* ness Review. January-February 1975. p. 74. 7. Ibid.. pp. 74-80. and Lyle Yorks, "Determining Job Enrichment Feasi- 1 Frederick Herzberg, 'The Wise Old Turk. Harvard Business Re- bility,” Personnel, November-December 1974, p. 22. nett.. September-October 1974. p. 70. 8. Lieutenant Colonel T Roger Manley. “An Air Force Supervisor's Guide 2. Frederick Herzberg, "One More Time: How Do You Motivate Em- to Job Enrichment “ unpublished monograph. Department of Systems Man- ployees5" Harvard Business Review. January-February 1968. pp. 53-62 agement. School of Engineering. .Air Force Institute of Technology. April 1975 3 Frederick Herzberg, Motivation-Hygiene Profile.** Orgmiaxhcnal Dy- 9. A. Cohen, S. Fink, H Gad on. R Willits, Effective Behavior in Organize namics. Fall 1974. p. 18 tions (Homewood. Illinois Richard D. Irwin. Inc.. 1976). p 117. 4 Lyle Yorks. “Job Enrichment Boosts Performance," Journal o f Systems 10 J. R Hackman. "Is Job Enrichment Just a Fad?” Harvard Business Management, Januarv 1975. p. 16. Review. September-October 1975. p. 130. 5. These data were gathered in an Air Command and Staff College Croup Research effort. “Air Force Leaders in the 1960 s" (June 1974?. which wiU Acknowledgment be published m a senes of articles and papers edited by Lieutenant Colonel Frankim D Margiotta. Chief. Division of Staff Communications and Re- The author is extremely grateful to Major Francis M. Rush. Bolling AFB. search, Air Command and Staff College. for his invaluable editorial advice and unselfish comments and contributions 6. David A. Whitsett. "Where Are Your Enriched Jobs'” Harvard Busi- to this article.

When people are free to do as they please, they usually imitate each other. Eric Hoffer THE USAF INSTRUMENT FLIGHT CENTER anachronism or instrument flight pacesetter for the future? HE circumstances that led to the found- instrument flight instructors in sufficient T ing of the usaf Instrument Pilot In- numbers to meet the needs of the Air Force; structor School in March 1943 were chilling- providing standardization in the use of in- ly described twenty years later by one of strument procedures, techniques, and train- the officers responsible for founding the ing methods; and participating in the test school, Colonel J. B. Duckworth: and evaluation of flight instruments and I realize that most of you were not around instrument systems. This mission, though when this school was started at Bryan in early questioned, has seldom been seriously chal- 1943, and it may be difficult for you to realize lenged in those thirty years. In the beginning the urgency, and in fact, the tragedy of the it was a recognized fact that many pilots situation at that time . . . hundreds of Cadets were killing themselves and destroying air- . . . had completed flight training without ever craft because of inadequate training in in- having been given one hour of instruments. strument flying. Since that time, instrument What happened? They were immediately displays have progressed from crude needle- sent off to fly a B-26 across the Atlantic at night where, of course, it was black as the ball-airspeed presentations to the elaborate inside of a cow! . . . we were losing far more autopilot-coupled flight-director systems of pilots on instruments than from actual com- today, and instrument flying has progressed bat.1 from almost none to fully automatic all- That school formed the foundation upon weather landing systems. With such a rapid which the usaf Instrument Flight Center technological pace, the need for an iastru- was established in May 1972; it remains ment school, with its corollary standardiza- one of three divisions in the center. tion and research and development functions, Until World War II, the haphazard way seemed manifest. of acquiring and using aircraft instruments But in the seventies, spectres have begun had resulted in general flying training’s far to rear their heads: “cost effectiveness . . . outpacing instrument training. This, coupled mission essential . . . program cutbacks . . . with the fact that the air war in 1943 was force reductions. ” Planners have been forced conducted almost exclusively dining visual to look carefully at Air Force programs at flight conditions, resulted in a 27-week pilot all levels, and from this scrutiny one ques- training syllabus with only rudimentary in- tion has arisen: “Is the if c an anachronism?” strument instruction—primarily the “needle- Many pilots feel that it is. After all, they ball-airspeed” method at that!2 These short- say, Undergraduate Pilot Training is no comings, which seem so obvious in the cold longer a 27-week course in contact (visual) light of hindsight, led Colonel Duckworth flying; it is a 52-week course, with extensive and four other officers to devise an innova- academic requirements and 210 hours of jet tive full-panel system for attitude instrument flying time, approximately 20 percent of flying. They ran highly successful field tests which is instrument training. The graduate of the new system and developed a curricu- of Air Force pilot training today is a well- lum for the Instrument Pilot Instructor qualified instrument pilot. The major air School ( ipis), which was subsequently estab- commands have established, or are in the lished at Bryan Field, Texas, in March 1943. process of establishing, their own central Throughout the thirty-year history of the instructor schools that will perform all the ipis, its mission has remained essentially functions of the ipis. Because of these and unchanged; in fact, in expanded form it other arguments, there are many who feel has become the mission of the usaf Instru- that the if c /ipis is outdated and no longer ment Flight Center (if c ) today: training needed. Suggestions for its disposition range

63 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW from eliminating the if c altogether through and Research and Development Division of eliminating the ipis to conducting an all- the Instrument Flight Center. These divisions simulator (no flying) ipis. And why not? are tasked to To answer these questions, they must be examined in detail. . . . prepare and monitor Air Force directives and publications governing instrument flight, determine usaf operational requirements for eliminate the IFC flight information, develop, coordinate, vali- date, and test instalment flight requirements, Unlike nuclear or tactical weapons delivery, concepts, techniques, and procedures, . . . aerial refueling, or hurricane penetration, and participate in research and development instrument flying is not exclusive to one programs involving instrument flight. . . . major command or one mission. Only one The language of the regulation is dry, but aircraft type (or command) may ever be the charter is clear: these absolutely essen- called upon to land on the Arctic ice pack, tial functions are being performed by the but every pilot in every aircraft in the usaf if c , and the usaf cannot afford to be with- is continually required to engage in instru- out them. Who would administer the ment flight. Because of the rapid prolifer- fledgling research study of the Microwave ation of instrument flight operations world- Landing System (ml s) pilot factors? Who wide and the ever present need for safety, would complete the Helicopter Pilot Fac- these instrument flight operations must be tors study, the first of its kind in the world, standardized. Equally important, the “new that the Research and Development Divi- technology” of the sixties and seventies has sion is conducting? Who would complete resulted in a multitude of new and innova- such projects as the Landing Weather Mini- tive instrument systems that must be tested mums investigation, hailed by many as the and evaluated; engineers’ dreams for the most significant advancement in all-weather future are boundless. landing research ever achieved by the Air The civilian aviation community has Force? The list is extensive. built-in mechanisms to ensure that the capa- The mandate is clear. The programs and bility for instrument flight remains abreast requirements are essential. The Air Force of developments. First, the Flight Standards cannot afford to eliminate the Instnunent section of the Federal Aviation Administra- Flight Center. tion maintains general standardization of all procedures relevant to instalment flying and eliminate the IPIS ensures the application of these standards through its dissemination and monitoring . . . but maintain flight standards and re- (flight check) functions. The corporation search and development. profit motive, applied to both equipment The thnist of the argument in support of manufacturers and civil air carrier users, this suggestion is that the major air com- guarantees that equipment appropriate to mand central instructor schools will offer needs, actual or anticipated, is designed, identical instruction to that provided at developed, tested, certified, and utilized. ipis (whether or not ipis remains in oper- What of usaf? Where are the mechanisms ation), and therefore the $12,000 per gradu- to ensure that military pilots remain abreast ate cost of ipis is not cost effective.' The of innovations in equipment, systems, and point is well taken. Suppose the central procedures? At present these responsibilities instructor schools do, indeed, offer identical are vested in the Flight Standards Division instruction (from an effectiveness point of IN MY OPINION 65

view) and the standardization that is essen- dangers of such a situation and have at- tial in this nonparochial area can be main- tempted to avoid it.4 A regular infusion tained, perhaps ipis would not be cost ef- of ipis graduates into the faculties of fective. There are several problems inherent those schools would ensure a continuing in the basic supposition, however. fresh and informed approach to the teach- There is absolutely no requirement for a ing of instrument-related subjects. central school to expose an ipis graduate Is not the ipis itself a product of inbreed- who has been selected for instructor pilot ing? In a very limited way, perhaps, it is, upgrade in a particular aircraft to the same since all ipis instructors are ipis graduates. training that a non-ipis graduate will re- The permanent change of station (pc s) ceive. In the area of instrmnents and instru- inputs to ipis, however, are from all com- ment flying his training requirement would mands and represent a broad cross section certainly be minimal. If flying sorties in of experience levels. The students who at- aircraft such as the C-5 and B-52 could tend the school have equally dissimilar thereby be saved, the cost effectiveness of backgrounds, and these two factors prevent the ipis graduate begins to increase markedly. any stagnation in the ipis approach to in- Additionally, what more logical pilot is strument instruction. there to be charged with developing and The Instrument Flight Center operates operating the instrument portion of a cen- on a concept of synergism—the whole is tral instructor school? The ipis graduate is greater than the sum of its parts. This is ideally prepared and suited for this role. true to a very large extent because the One extremely important corollary to the ipis, through its instructors and its students, use of ipis graduates in this manner is represents a source of operational input to standardization—if the major air commands both the Flight Standards and Research operate their own schools according to their and Development Divisions. If there were mission requirements, as they should, there no ipis, these essential functions would be is a very real danger that, over a period of performed in a semivacuum, devoid of op- years, the .Air Force-wide standardization erational inputs on a face-to-face level, and that is essential in the area of instrument the effectiveness of both would suffer from flight would be diluted to an unacceptable a severe loss of credibility among Air Force degree. The continuing input of ipis gradu- pilots. According to General Momyer: “I ates into the faculties of these schools would have had much confidence in the teaching ensure that all commands were standardized and standardization of instrument flying with each other, the Federal Aviation Ad- techniques that have come out of ipis over ministration, and civil aviation in general. the years. . . . As a consequence of their .Another consideration that deserves men- first-hand experience, the ipis provides a tion is “ inbreeding.” .After a period of time, very needed service to the Air Force.”5 it is assumed that the faculties of the cen- Now back to that most important busi- tral schools would all be not only products ness of cost effectiveness. It is very tempting of their own schools but also long-time to make statements like “As a result of the products of their own commands (because efforts of ipis, X number of instrument- of 'longevity requirements for instructor related accidents have been prevented, sav- pilot upgrade). This kind of multiple in- ing Y millions of dollars.” As tempting as breeding could eventually result in an idea- it is to say, however, it simply cannot be stifled atmosphere. Civilian education insti- proven. But it is a fact that increased instru- tutions have long realized the inherent ment expertise in the Air Force can decrease 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the probabilities of instrument-related acci- cept because it appears to offer, at the dents, and the ipis is an available source of same time, a great cost saving in the elimi- such expertise. nation of the expense of flying while not The need for increased experience in the field degrading the effectiveness of the ipis in of instrument flying is substantiated by the providing the Air Force with fully qualified fact that our rated force experience level is instrument instructor pilots. But does it, rapidly declining and will even be lower in indeed, provide the “fully qualified” instruc- the post-1973 time period. . . . The cost of tor that the Air Force needs? this increase is relatively small if we can A great deal of research has been done, prevent the loss of one aircraft and crew.6 and is in fact being done, in the area of flight simulators. Much of this research in- an IPIS conducted with dicates that, with proper planning and cor- simulators (no aircraft) rectly designed simulators, present flying training syllabi can be radically redesigned This proposal has the greatest appeal to with greater emphasis on the use of simu- those who would alter the present if c con- lators and correspondingly lesser emphasis

L-5 to C-5—thirty years o f advancement in aircraft instruments and instrument displays IN MY OPINION 67

on actual aircraft flying.7 8 There has been When [a simulator] is employed for improving no controlled research, however, claiming performance, . . . the characteristic of impor- that flying training in the actual aircraft tance is the amount of transfer of learning to can be completely replaced by simulators. an operational task . . . the training effective- In fact, the transfer and validation of simu- ness of a device is determined in terms of the measurement of transfer from training on the lator training require far more research be- device to performance in an operational situ- fore we can know for certain exactly how ation.10 much of any given flying syllabus can be replaced by simulators.9 The training of an individual to be an in- Because of these research gaps, most structor pilot is similar in many ways to learning and engineering psychologists con- the basic training of someone to be a pilot sistently include in their discussions of —both involve the learning of a skill that simulators and training the understanding must eventually be performed in an air- that all such training should be validated craft. Granted that, like all present flying in an actual operational environment in an training programs in the Air Force, ipis aircraft. can make greater use of simulators in its Colonel Joseph B. Duckworth, founder o f the Instrument Pilot Instructor School, quoted a high-ranking member o f the Air Staff as saying: "Instrument flying is inherently dangerous and should not be taught to our pilots." This was in 1943 during deliberations on whether the school should be founded.

syllabus, available research indicates that indicate the nature of the service that is actual flying cannot and should not be desired. eliminated from the program. The if c /ipis has gone through several The if c and the ipis should not be elimi- changes in form during its thirty-year his- nated; the mission they perform is too vital tory. It was originally an instalment flying to the overall mission of the Air Force. But training school, and it is now an instmment to say this is not to say that the if c can instructor school. The Flight Standards and continue unchanged in a changing world. Research and Development Divisions, now The mission will remain the same—service— but the methods of achieving the mission and goals must keep pace with escalating The North American T-39 Sabreliner, back- needs. Iwne o f the Landing Weather Minimums inves- tigation. This project has been hailed by many as the most significant advancement in all-weather The Instrument Flight landing research ever achieved by the Air Force. Pacesetter of the Seventies If any single concept must attach itself to the Instrument Flight Center for the foreseeable future, it is the concept of re- sponsiveness. If the if c is to be a service to the worldwide operations of the Air Force, it absolutely mast be responsive to the needs of operations throughout the Air Force. But responsiveness is a two-way street—if an organization is to provide a service to a using agency, the user must

68 A T-39 approaching the Tactical Landing Approach Radar (TALAR) antenna. Investigation of pilot factors associated with advanced instrument technology is performed by ROD Division o f the IFC. 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW collateral units with ipis within the if c , and instrument procedures and techniques were once attachments to the ipis. The in the recent past. This expansion will cer- syllabus no longer contains physical training, tainly continue, and the needs of the Air which was at one time a 25-hour unit of Force today may change considerably by the course. Helicopter instrument training, next year. absolutely essential in the present-day Air A briefing team whose purpose is to Force, is now an integral part of the pro- make interested parties aware of the uses gram. And the list could go on and on. The to which the if c can be put is in the plan- point is that, while most of these changes ning stage. This team, to consist of instru- were made as adjustments to the changing ment flight experts from within the if c , will needs of the Air Force, in many cases the be on call to provide answers to instru- needs were interpreted by personnel within ment-related questions for Air Force oper- the center and not as direct responses to ational units and to provide a face-to-face stated needs from the using agencies. communications channel between these The required responsiveness is built into units and the if c . A staff assistance team, the center’s organization. If the instrument chartered to provide assistance in the design procedures and techniques currently used and operation of instrument training facili- need to be changed, the people who work ties, is in the conceptual phase. Neither .the here can change them. If the regulations briefing team nor the staff assistance team are too binding, unrealistic, or hard to un- will be forced upon anyone. They will re- derstand, the people who can rewrite them spond to requests from units who desire their work here. If the flight instruments in use assistance. are inadequate, the people who can test These are but a few of the efforts being and evaluate new equipment work here. made within the if c to keep the communi- If the instrument instructor pilot does not cations channels with the field open. They possess the skills he needs in the operational will be effective in ensuring the responsive- environment, the people who can change ness that is so necessary, but their total ef- the skills he is taught work here. The cen- fectiveness will be much greater if efforts tralization of all these functions ensures the are being made at the other end. As an needed responsiveness, but the users must example, area navigation capability is very tell the if c what their changing needs are likely to become a requirement for all in- The communications channels among Hq strument flight operations in the near future, usaf, usaf operational units, and the usaf and the if c Flight Standards Division will if c must be opened wide and strengthened. undoubtedly be called upon to assist in the The if c has initiated a broad spectrum of drafting of procedures and regulations for efforts designed to accomplish this from one its use. In addition, the Research and De- end. The recently initiated Instructional velopment Division will be involved in pilot System Development survey of ipis was be- factors testing of proposed equipment. gun in order to make the ipis syllabus coin- Finally, the ipis will establish a requirement cide and to keep pace with the needs of for teaching this new information in the the Air Force for instrument instructor school. All these steps can be taken with pilots. As a result of task analysis statements only minimal inputs from the field, but obtained from this study, the entire ipis think how much more effective and efficient syllabus is being realigned to the present they will be if the operational commands needs of the Air Force. But do not forget make their needs known in advance. This the fantastic proliferation of instruments is the way the if c should, and can, function IN MY OPINION 71

if Air Force operational units make their in the field of instruction, in general, and requirements known. instrument flying, in particular. He can Perhaps the most useful means of com- manage existing continuation training pro- munications between the if c and Air Force grams and design these programs where operational units is the ipis graduate. He they do not exist. He is ideally suited to can be optimally effective, however, only serve on the faculty of command instructor if his talents are properly utilized. Although schools. He would be an outstanding asset AFM 50-5 and AFR 53-12 both require to any standardization/evaluation section— that ipis graduates be utilized in an instru- and he is a point of contact: a communica- ment training capacity for one year from tion channel to the if c . He has been here the date of completion of the school, it has at if c and is more aware than anyone in been found that this resource is not always the operational unit of the capabilities of properly managed. A field survey in 1949 the center. revealed that ipis graduates were being only Any organization that deals with fast- 55 percent utilized, and Headquarters usaf breaking technological changes must remain directed all commanders to monitor utiliza- flexible and responsive if it is to accomplish tion more closely.11 Essentially the same its mission. It cannot afford a “head in the situation in 1959 resulted in another directive sand” attitude. But it cannot be viable if it from the Flying Training Division at Head- operates in a vacuum either. The responsive- quarters usaf to all commanders. A follow- ness and flexibility necessary to keep up up field survey in 1962 showed proper utili- with improvements and changes in the field zation,12 but the isd survey in 1973 showed of instrument flight are inherent in the mis- that utilization of graduates had, once again, sion and structure of the Instrument Flight become a problem area. In fact, the survey Center. It can be the service agency for the team found that in some cases commanders United States Air Force that it was designed were not aware that they had ipis gradu- to be, but the operational units in the Air ates assigned to their units.13 This repre- Force must be aware of the capabilities of sents mismanagement of a valuable resource, the if c , and they must tell the if c what a resource that could contribute greatly to their needs are. the operational effectiveness of any unit. USAF Instrument Flight Center The ipis graduate is an expert—an expert

Notes 7. H. Kingsley Poveninire and Stanley N. Roscoe, An Evaluation o f Ground 1 | B Duckworth {Colonel. USAF. Ret), .in address on the occasion of the Based Elicit Trainers in Routine Trimary Flight Training, Technical Report 20th Anniversary of the USAF IPIS. 29 March 1963. LF-69-1. October 1969. Aviation Research Lalx>ratory. University of Illinois 2. Major Changer in Undergraduate Pilot Training 1939-1965. published by 8. Beverly II Willigcs, Stanley N. Roscoe, Robert C. Williges. Synthetic History and Research Division. Headquarters Air Training Command. October Fligfit Training Revisited. Technical Report ARL-72-21/AFOSR-72-lO. August 1965 1972, Aviation Research Laboratory, University of Illinois 3. ATC Instructional System Development Survey of the IPIS. December 9. Robert M Gagne. "Training Devices and Simulators: Some Research 1973 (hereafter cited as ISD Survey). Issues." Engineering Psychology Cunent Perspective in Research. Appleton* I Bernard Berelson. Graduate Education In the United States McGraw-Hill Century-Crofts, 1971. pp. 441-58. 1960. p. 164 10. Ibid. 5 Lt Cen William M Momyer in a letter to Brig Ccn William C. Lindlev 11 History of the USAF Instrument Pilot Instructor School. USAFIFC, 28 Oct « Randolph AFB, Texas 6. Lt Cen Ceorge B Simler in a letter to Lt Cen Robert J. Dixon, recom- 12. Ilrid. mending budgetary increase for IPIS. 19 Aug 70. 13. ISD Survey. THE PEOPLE MIX

Major James M. Alford

N a recent article in Airman magazine, to excel, or else they tend to be main- I General David C. Jones is quoted as tenance seekers, who are more concerned saying, in part, about leadership styles: with a safe and secure job and are less “ . . . develop a style of your own in work- willing to take risks than is the motivation ing with others that is based upon motiva- seeker.3 tion, sensitivity and common sense.”1 The Many other theories of motivation and Air Force manager who would develop leadership activities are advanced in the such a leadership style needs to understand myriad of publications in this area. Some what motivates people, to be sensitive to are merely an extension of an earlier these factors, and to recognize the differ- concept. The degree of usefulness of such ences in the individuals with whom he theories to the supervisor varies with the works. supervisor’s background and ability to In studies of the behavioral sciences as correlate the data presented. However, applied to management and leadership, almost all fail to provide the manager/ the Air Force supervisor becomes familiar supervisor with what he really needs. with concepts such as the late Douglas That is, how does it all fit together? How McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y ap- does he know which theory to consciously proach to managing people: i.e., people apply? The answer lies in the old saying, are lazy and must be prodded and coerced “ Know your people.” to produce (Theory X), or people find work Alvin W. Gouldner provided a way to do to be as natural as play and will work this when he developed his models of em- diligently if provided an opportunity ployees by classifying them as either (Theory Y).2 Frederick Herzberg, in his “cosmopolitans,” that is, people oriented studies, found that people either tend to toward their professional skill, or “locals’ be motivation seekers, who wish to excel those oriented toward the organization.4 for the sake of achievement and growth Gouldner lists the characteristics of his and are willing to take some risks in order two categories of people:

72 IN MY OPINION 73

Cosmopolitans Locals the various professional specialties found 1. Identify them- 1. Identify them- in the nonrated areas, such as research sci- selves more selves strongly entists and engineers, personnel officers, strongly with pro- with the em- instructors in technical areas, and other fessional and ploying organi- staff positions. The staff positions demand functional spe- zation a type of specialized knowledge, skill, edu- cialty cation, or experience which relates spe- 2. More likely to 2. Career oriented be mobile with one firm cifically to the professional area of the indi- 3. More concerned 3. Committed and vidual job. about their dedicated to The Air Force encourages professional specialized skill the organiza- development by providing an abundance or functional tion as an of opportunities for the young officer to entity area participate in education and training related 4. More involved 4. Little concerned to specific professional areas through the with internal in and con- details or poli- cerned about Air Force Institute of Technology and other tics unless they internal details training activities. The officer is usually are inhibiting and politics surrounded by civilian professionals during 5. Seek recogni- 5. Rely on getting these programs. It is natural for him to tion beyond the recognition gravitate toward these professional people within the or- company boun- and their professional organizations. daries, i.e., ganization (from peers in A recent survey by Business Week maga- other organiza- zine revealed the following about 1965- tions, etc.) 1972 college graduates and their relation- 6. Less tolerant 6. More tolerant ships with employers:0 and more vocal of and less vocal about job about job cli- 1. Employers describe them as brilliant, mate problems climate prob- lems hard-working, and imaginative. 7. Tend to have 7. Develop closer 2. The graduates: few—and rela- and more ex- a. Value money for different purposes tively loose- tensive rela- than their predecessors (camping gear ties with peo- tionships with ple in the or- people in the rather than posh furniture) but value it ganization organization just as much. 8. Have less influ- 8. Tend to have b. Value security so little that some com- ence because of more influence panies no longer mention pension plans less involve- during recruitment. ment c. Prefer to work for “socially responsi- ble” companies. They will not leave other- It is important that Air Force managers wise desirable jobs but will channel ethical understand this concept. Talks with young impulses into after-hours projects. officers indicate that we have moved away d. Differ in their reactions to the busi- from an officer corps composed almost ness world. Liberal arts graduates are often totally of “locals” toward one with a con- happier than business school graduates. siderable percentage of “cosmopolitans.” Liberal arts graduates expect business to This appears more evident among the be dull and are happy to find that com- young nonrated officers than among the panies can be human and responsive. Busi- rated officers. This is primarily because of ness school graduates are prepared wholly 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

for rational business methods and recoil of trying to operate more effectively with from decisions made on subjective grounds less money and fewer people, our current and promotion through favoritism. personnel reduction programs tend to make 3. The young graduates are independent, the young officer unsure of the course he creative, willing to take risks and to stand should pursue. on principle. They become unhappy when We must be alert and understand the the organization stifles or does not ade- contributions that can be made by cosmo- quately recognize their ability and ac- politans. Do not rush to the conclusion that complishments. They are very mobile and the young professional scientist, engineer, do not hesitate to change jobs when they or staff officer will not become one of our are not provided with challenge and op- better officers because he talks in terms of portunity for advancement. his specialty rather than of the Air Force. The cosmopolitan tends to provide com- It is these qualities of young people that petition to the local, which can improve make them desirable officers and that also the local’s performance, and at the same can create headaches and misunderstand- time the local and his “company” orien- ing between more senior officers and them- tation can help the cosmopolitan better selves. As an officer matures, he tends to appreciate that the “company” goals and accept policy and directives without ques- his own can mesh. tioning them as do the younger officers. A healthy mix of cosmopolitans and lo- Also, officers who spend most of their career in operational positions, where mis- cals is needed to insure a strong, effec- sion requirements cause close adherence tive, and innovative Air Force. The challenge to checklists or routine procedures, find to the Air Force manager is to recognize themselves unaccustomed to the cosmo- the potential in such a mix and provide politan leanings of the young officers they the atmosphere in which both types can supervise when they receive career-broad- be productive. ening assignments. Further, in this period AFROTC Det 765, The Citadel

Notes ployees?" Harvard Business Review. January-February 1968. pp. 56-58. 1 Captain John B. Taylor, "The Uncommon Jones," Airman. March 1975, 4. Alvin W. Gouldner. "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis p. 21. of Latent Social Roles," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 2. December 2. Douglas McGregor. Tfic Human Side o f Enterprise (New York: McGraw- 1967-March 1968. Hill Book Company, 1960). 5. "A Home in Business for the Radical Generation," Business Week. 3. Frederick Herzberg. "One More Time: How Do You Motivate Em- October 5. 1974, pp. 78-81. variable an entity truth is and how useless sophistry is in defending its variations. As Mr. Knightley convincingly shows, the United States is not alone in its wartime censorship, with its denials and distortions of the truth. It is probably accurate to say that all nations share this culpability to some degree. Yet this knowledge offers Americans no real comfort. Judgments made concerning national ethics seem indissolubly tied to the ethical contract between the citizen and the state. Here in the United States that contract finds major support in the first ten amendments to the Constitu- tion. The first of these guarantees the free- dom of the press. And that guarantee stands apart, without any blanket wartime proviso which would nullify that freedom in the presence of “national security’’ or cause it to self-destruct at the sound of hostile fire. Nor is there anything likely to be “ found in related writings that obligates the press in wartime to roll over and await instructions at the first solemn whisper of “national security.” Not that passivity is a particular char- acteristic of war correspondents. Being composites, like the rest of us in other professions, they are active and lazy, liberal TRUTH IN JEOPARDY and conservative, reactionary and innova- tive, bold and cowardly. They also are in- Colonel Don Clelland spired by patriotism and hemmed in by the restrictions of centralized communica- tions and the constant threat of expulsion HE title of Phillip Knightley’s recent from the war zone. Yet, all that said, one Tbook, The First Casualty,t comes from reads The First Casualty and comes away Senator Hiram Johnson’s 1917 remark: with an ill-defined feeling that these unique “The first casualty when war comes is men did not fight fiercely enough against truth.’’ Frankly, benumbed as they are by the censorship of their efforts to bring the the Watergate-ciA-FBi revelations, many truth to the people. Americans may feel that war is being un- Sometimes surprisingly quick to sub- fairly singled out here. On almost a daily ordinate the role of the press to the role basis, our citizens are now discovering how of the government in wartime, the cor-

f Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975, $12.95), 465 pages.

75 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

respondents might all recall with profit the Catch-22 nature of wars fought to Jefferson’s remarks about the press: . . “make the world safe for democracy” and were it left to me to decide whether that at the same time deny the democracy we should have a government without the chance to talk about fighting, safety, newspapers, or newspapers without a gov- or democracy. ernment, I should not hesitate a moment Himself a correspondent, Mr. Knight- to prefer the latter.’’ ley writes with skill and insight about the Knightley cites Lloyd George, Prime wonders and the warts of the fourth estate. Minister of Great Britain, in what seems He writes with sensitivity about many of to be a flagrant abdication of responsibility, the moral questions reporters must deal as saying in 1917 about World War I: “If with; about those reporters who regard war people really knew, [this] war would be as fun; and about those who eventually stopped tomorrow. But of course, they stagger away disillusioned by the inhu- don’t know and can’t know. The cor- manity of man. He has Drew Middleton respondents don’t write and the censor- of the New York Times noting that a cor- ship would not pass the truth.” What ex- respondent’s basic responsibility is “. . . to actly it is that the people “. . . don’t know get the facts and write them with his in- and can’t know” is not spelled out. Retro- terpretation of what they mean to the spectively, however, one can speculate war. . . . " And he presents an alternative that it might have been the political mind- approach by citing Herb Matthews: “I lessness after Sarajevo that found one na- would always opt for open, honest bias. A tion after another following almost blindly newspaperman should work with his heart and stumbling into the abyss of World War as well as his mind.” I; or it might have been an exposure of Somehow, though, these stark statements the arid military imaginations on both of philosophy do not seem adequate. What sides of the conflict—imaginations stra- does it matter if Middleton is correct, or tegically and tactically so inflexible that Matthews, if the essence of what they are they would literally cripple an entire Euro- writing does not get to the reader because pean generation. of censorship? Perhaps the memory of As we know, the propagandists of the Watergate and the Washington Post's West were exceptionally successful in Woodward and Bernstein is still too vivid World War I—the people were not al- to accept reportorial diligence that does lowed to know— and the war continued not focus with equal intensity on the twin for more than a year following the above- goals of getting the story and getting it quoted remarks of Lloyd George. Today’s to the public. And perhaps the refusal of world may be better off through the re- the publishers of the New York Times to sultant delay of the eventual armistice; knuckle under to an irritated JFK and perhaps faithful adherence to “national withdraw David Halberstam from Vietnam security’’ did serve mankind well. The is still too recent a reminder that neither answer to this should probably be left to patriotic reporters nor patriotic publishers historians, political scientists, and govern- need give in automatically to governmental mental leaders. The layman, though, can pressures. speculate that the pressures of a war-weary, None of this is meant to suggest that enlightened electorate might have produced 11 le First C asu alty doesn't treat the issue better results than what did occur. The of governmental censorship. It does, and layman can also legitimately puzzle over well. However, the book also discusses BOOKS AND IDEAS 77

reporters from many countries involved in that . . the German breakthrough that many wars. Accordingly, it is likely to led up to Dunkirk . . . was actually achieved cause exclusively national issues to flare with armies inferior in numbers to those up—issues that were placed on the back opposing them. . . . ” burner during hostilities but which need The First Casualty also has a nice touch to be discussed in a time of postwar calm. in debunking legends. Hemingway would Certainly, this is a “big” book. It sweeps be furious were he able to read Knight- across the landscape of Western war from ley’s assessment of his reportorial perfor- Crimea to Vietnam at a pace swift enough mance in Civil War Spain: to sustain interest but not so rapidly that . . . his performance as a war correspondent events are fragmented beyond recognition. was abysmally bad. On a technical level, his It has a cast of thousands, and its main descriptions of battle and bombardments are characters—the Burchetts, the Murrows, monotonous; his emphasis on his own close the Pyles, the Halberstams, et al.—have location to the action smacks of boastfulness; been household names. It is easy reading his accounts of blood, wounds, and severed and caters to appetites as diverse as ad- legs are typical of his desire to shock. . . . venture, history, and war. In his devotion There are numerous bonuses like this to “the whole truth," the author will shock throughout the book. They spice it up and the average reader in at least one passage: make it swifter reading. But they hardly “The Americans mutilated bodies. One constitute the most memorable element wants the hearts cut out of the dead Viet- of The First Casualty. That consists, instead, cong to feed his dog . . . skulls were a in the reminder the book provides that the favorite, and [one well-known colonel] fight for individual freedom need not be carried one about at his farewell party.” an international fight, or even one against The student of history will find The First an avowed enemy, and that the best ally Casualty a valuable adjunct to his text, the citizen can have is a free press possess- since it adds to the dimension of view- ing the will to fight for that freedom. As point. The evacuation of Dunkirk, for ex- to whether we Americans should get the ample, has assumed almost mythical status unfiltered truth or that which drips down in some circles. Here the author has Gen- slowly and erratically through the bureau- eral Sir Harold E. Franklyn, a division cracy, Patrick Henry’s confident remark has commander at Dunkirk, saying " . . . that a wonderfully fundamental sound: “For the evacuation has been over-glamourized my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may and that reports of merciless bombing and cost, I am willing to know the whole truth, the hell of Dunkirk were quite ridiculous.” to know the worst, and to provide for it.” In the same spirit Liddell Hart points out Hamilton AFB, California SOVIET MILITARY THEORY IN ENGLISH the language barrier hurdled

Dr . Kennet h R. W hiting

A review of Harriet Fast Scott's new edition of Sokolovsky's Soviet Military Strategy and of William F. Scott's Soviet Sources of M ili- tary Doctrine and Strategy.

NTIL 1963 the study of Soviet mili- ginal symbols to indicate the various edi- U tary doctrine and strategy was an tions. Furthermore, in her notes she points arcane area limited to those who read out and reproduces the passages excised Russian. The literature in English dealing in later editions. She also puts the book with the topic was about Soviet military in perspective in a twenty-page introduc- thinking, i.e., how the American or British tion and precedes each chapter with a brief writer interpreted the Soviet thinker he was analysis. All in all, the ghost of the late dealing with at the time. Then in 1962 Marshal Sokolovsky would be very ungal- came the Sokolovsky classic on military lant indeed to complain about the elaborate strategy and translations of that work in treatment that Mrs. Scott has accorded 1963, thus opening up Soviet military think- his book. ing to those who did not read Russian.1 Military Strategy was written by fifteen Since then English translations of Soviet military theorists, mostly generals and books and articles on military topics have colonels, who worked under the overall proliferated, and the inability to read Rus- direction of the late Marshal Sokolovsky, sian is no longer a valid excuse for igno- Chief of the General Staff between 1955 rance about Soviet military thought. and 1960. The work represents the first full- A revised edition of Sokolovsky’s Mili- dress exposition of Soviet military strategy tary Strategy was published in 1963 and since the publication of Svechin’s Strategiya another revision in 1968. It is still the clas- in 1926. sic work on the subject and is recommended reading for Soviet officers right down to the present time. And now we have a new Eng- I he authors, in the first chap- lish version edited and analyzed by Mrs. ter of their book, go into great detail in Harriet Fast Scott.f Mrs. Scott combines describing just what “strategy” is and how all three editions in one volume, with mar- it dovetails into “operational art” one

f V. D. Sokolovsky, Marshal of the Soviet Union, editor, Soviet Military Strategy, edited, with an analysis and commentary, by Har- riet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975, $17.50), 494 pages.

78 BOOKS AND IDEAS 79

echelon below and into “military doctrine” The rest of the chapter is devoted to a one echelon higher. As they point out, the somewhat shrill exposition of the eternal Soviet use of the word “strategy” is equiva- verity of the Marxist-Leninist ideological lent to the term “grand strategy” in Western underpinnings for a correct military strat- parlance. They also admit, in contrast to egy. They maintain that, in spite of rumors earlier Soviet theorists, that the laws of to the contrary, the essential nature of war strategy are objective and apply impar- as a continuation of politics in a more tially to both hostile sides.” (p. 9) They go violent form does not change with develop- on to point out that the development of ments in technology and armament. King- weapons technology has considerably in- ston-McCloughery’s dictum that nuclear fluenced the nature of war and military warfare will result in mutual annihilation strategy. and thus put an end to all politics is cited The appearance of the nuclear rocket weap- as an example of bourgeois propaganda, on radically changed previous concepts of although the authors fail to explain how the nature of war. Modem nuclear rocket war politics continue once mutual annihilation in its destructive and death-dealing potential has ensued. Actually, they assert, state cannot be compared with previous wars. Mass policy determines not only the strategic application of nuclear rocket weapons makes aims but also the general nature of strategy. it possible within a very short time to force For example, imperialism is an outmoded a country from the war, or a number of social system, and thus its strategy is ad- countries, even those with relatively large venturist and ignores the laws of armed territories, well-developed economies, and conflict, the role of the popular masses, populations on the order of tens of millions. etc. Imperialism cannot have a viable There is an immeasurable increase in the spatial scope of modem war. The almost un- strategy, and thus the present theories of limited range of the means of delivery of “limited war,” “massive retaliation,” and nuclear weapons gives modern war such an “global war” advanced in such profusion infinite scope that the boundaries between the by bourgeois military theorists. front lines and the rear areas are erased, eliminating the previous concept of the theater of military operation, (p. 11) I n Chapter 2, entitled “Mili- The revolution in strategy has made it tary Strategy of Imperialist Countries and necessary to revise a whole series of pre- Their Preparation of New Wars,” the viously accepted principles, such as the Sokolovsky team describes and analyzes concentration of forces and weapons in de- imperialist strategy, especially the Ameri- cisive areas, less reliance on “potential can variety; at least they describe their capabilities” because of the great impor- version of imperialist strategy. tance of the initial period of the war, and The first section deals with “Contempo- the idea of gaining victory through a series rary Military Strategy of the U.S.A. and of partial victories. Furthermore, such a nato.” Following the defeat of Germany basic element of strategy as the “theater and Japan, Britain, France, and other Euro- of military operations” has changed com- pean countries that had been occupied by pletely: strategic bombers and long-range Germany were in bad economic straits. missiles have wiped out the old concept. But the U.S. had reaped unbelievable Theaters are now whole continents, vast profits from the war and used its position regions of the atmosphere, and the endless to strengthen its economic, political, and reaches of space. military positions. 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The political aims of the American imperi- weapons.” (p. 57) This theory was formu- alists were and are to enslave economically lated by General Maxwell Taylor in his and politically the European and other capi- book The Uncertain Trumpet and subse- talist countries and, having turned them into quently adopted by the Kennedy adminis- obedient instruments, to unite them into tration. In 1962 Defense Secretary Robert various military and political blocs and McNamara came up with the “counter- groups aimed against the countries of the socialist camp. All this follows the main goal: force” strategy, which posits the main task the achievement of world domination, (p. 52) as the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, not attacks on the civilian popula- In the early postwar years the military tion. The illusory nature of the “counter- and foreign policy of the United States was force” strategy is only too obvious: “If to surround the socialist camp with mili- nuclear war is unleashed by the militarists, tary and political blocs in a simple anti- then no strategy, however it may be called, Communist coalition. Then came the “ex- will save imperialism from destruction.” pansionist" policy, exemplified in the Tru- (p. 59) “The strategy of ‘counterforce’ man Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the primarily stems from the necessity for Eisenhower Doctrine. Shortly thereafter preventive war and the achievement of came nato (1949), sea t o (1954), and cento surprise.” (p. 61) Then there was the con- (1955), plus pacts with “vassal” states such cept of “guaranteed destruction," dating as Japan, South Korea, and the Kuomintang from 1965, which calls for the American clique. The appearance of nuclear weapons capability to destroy a potential enemy facilitated the formation of a single im- even after a well-planned attack by him. perialist military policy dictated by the McNamara accompanied this strategy with .Americans, an integral part of which was his “damage limiting" concept whereby the concept of dealing “from a position of strikes against the enemy’s nuclear means strength" toward the Soviet Union. of attack, plus passive defense measures to Between 1954 and late 1960 the U.S. protect the civilian population, limit the held to the strategy of “massive retalia- destruction in a general nuclear war. tion," but the imperialists were “in reality Our soldier-scholars then devote some preparing for a sin-prise nuclear attack six pages to a discussion of “limited war." against the Soviet Union and the other (This discussion is an addition to the third countries of the socialist camp.” (p. 54) edition.) Although they explore the con- But Soviet achievements in nuclear weap- cept in some depth and quote copiously ons, missiles, and exploration of space re- from American authorities, their attitude vealed the concept of “massive retaliation" is somewhat ambiguous; in their opening to be unrealistic. The tremendous increase paragraph they say: in the number of nuclear weapons and missiles and the incredible danger involved The concept of a limited war is an adven- turistic calculation of the U.S. imperialist in their use led to an American-NATo re- circles for conducting war on foreign ter- evaluation and the concept of “mutual ritories; it is a concept for assuring the deterrence." The inflexibility of “massive safety of the U.S. bv excluding their terri- retaliation" also resulted in the idea of tory from the possible zone of limited war- “flexible response," a concept which makes fare; and finally, it is one of the methods of “ it possible, if necessary, to conduct either preparing an unlimited nuclear war against a general nuclear war or a limited war the Soviet Union and the socialist coun- with or without the use of tactical nuclear tries. (p. 64) BOOKS AND IDEAS 81

But as they go more deeply into the sub- tinuation of politics by more violent means ject, their attitude is less dogmatic. They and assert that all the attempts of the im- acknowledge that little is known about perialists and heretical Marxists to change how the use of tactical nuclear weapons that truth will avail nothing. Modern his- mav affect the course of a limited war and torical development is nothing other than go on to quote Kissinger’s dictum (Foreign a conflict between imperialism and so- Affairs, July 1962) that “limited nuclear cialism [i.e., Communism—KR W], with war will automatically escalate into a socialism now the stronger of the two. It general war because the losing side will is this strength of socialism that makes the continually commit new resources in order policy of “peaceful coexistence between to restore the situation.” (p. 68) states with different social systems” pos- The authors (writing before the Bonn- sible. At the present time, however, there Moscow agreements of 1970, of course) is a real danger that a world war may be really take out after the West German unleashed by an imperialist attack on the “revanchists”: Soviet Union and other countries of the It is a reflection of the revanchist policy of socialist camp: the West German imperialists, those maniacs But an evaluation of the military-strategic of particular variety, who, in spite of the situation of both camps as a whole is that complete defeat in two world wars, continue the position of the socialist camp is con- pedantically, openly, and secretly, to plan, siderably more advantageous and will ensure and methodically and persistently to create, victory in the case of imperialist aggression. an extensive system of political, economic, “Such powerful, invincible forces now oppose military, and psychological measures in the aggressors that if they imleash war, then preparation for a new war. (p. 70) they will get nothing except their own de- struction”—such was the conclusion made in The rest of the chapter is devoted to a the Report of the Central Committee to the description of the American and nato XXIII Congress cpsu. (p. 187) forces and their economic preparations for war. On the whole, the factual data According to the authors, a new world for the second half of the 1960s are ac- war would be one between great coalitions, curate enough, but the interpretation is socialist and capitalist, and would be fought permeated with “imperialist subterfuges to the bitter end. It would involve tre- and the idee fixe of a surprise attack on mendous numbers of people and embrace the Soviet Union and the rest of the so- enormous geographical areas. It would be cialist bloc. a nuclear-missile war, and the qualitative Chapter 3 is a lengthy description of changes in the weapon systems involved the evolution of Soviet military strategy would affect strategy—for instance, give between 1917 and 1945, which may be of immense importance to the initial period interest to the historian but neither breaks of the war. The authors, at this point, view any new ground nor reveals any startlingly with pride the size o f the Soviet warheads new data. and see them as a real advantage if a nu- clear war were unleashed. After all these apocalyptic forebodings hapter 4, entitled “Nature about the inevitability of any new major of Modem War,’’ gets to the heart of the war being a nuclear-missile conflict, the matter. The authors again emphasize the authors fall back on the old refrain of So- Clausewitzian dictum of war as a con- viet military theory: 82 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

... no matter how important the role of to destroy his means of nuclear attack and such means of strategy as Strategic Rocket to eliminate his naval bases. These problems Troops and rocket-carrying submarines may can be solved only by complete defeat of be in a future war, victory over the aggres- the enemy’s armed forces and by seizure of sor can be achieved only by the combined his territories. efforts of all means of waging war: Ground It is not possible to accomplish all these Troops, National pv o Troops, Air Forces, tasks with nuclear weapons alone. Other and the Navy as a whole with the active types of weapons will also be needed, as participation of the people, (p. 198) well as different kinds of fighting equip- ment. In particular, in a future war one may They then describe the various services expect the employment of chemical and and their roles in any future general war bacteriological weapons the development and come to the conclusion that “final of which is being given great attention in victory will be attained only as a result of the Western countries, especially the United the mutual efforts of all services of the States, (p. 243) Armed Forces.” (p. 210) The advent of nuclear rocket weapons and In summary, a third world war will be the development of aviation and other means a nuclear-missile war in which “entire of armed conflict have, as we have already countries will be wiped off the face of the indicated, again brought to life the notorious earth,” “the war will acquire an unprece- theory of the possibility of waging war by dented spatial scope,” and “the initial peri- small but technically well-equipped armies. od of the war will be of decisive impor- The advocates of such theories fail to con- sider that the new weapons and the new tance for the outcome of the entire war.” military equipment, far from reducing the (p. 210) requirements of the armed forces for person- nel, increases them both in respect to combat personnel and in respect to support person- C hapter 5, entitled “Prob- nel. The necessity of massive armies is also lems of Organization of Armed Forces,” occasioned by the fact that large simulta- is devoted to describing the tasks allotted neous losses from nuclear blows require con- to the various branches of the armed forces. siderable reserves for the reinforcement of Although it is taken as axiomatic that the the troops and the restoration of their com- nuclear missile is the basic weapon and bat capacity. Furthermore, the increase in that it determines how the armed forces the geographic extent of the war and the are organized and how a future war will creation by nuclear blows of enormous zones be waged, nevertheless the conventional of destruction and radioactive contamina- tion require a large number of troops for weapons and services are extolled, as can the defense and protection of national bor- be seen from the following excerpts: ders, rear targets and communications, and It is well known that nuclear weapons for the liquidation of the consequences of have terrible devastating might and destruc- the atomic blows delivered by the enemy. tive power, that they are able, with one Therefore, there can be no doubt about the blow, to erase from the face of the earth fact that a future war will be waged bv entire countries with small territories. Enor- massive multimillion-man armed forces, mous damage can also be done in large (pp. 244-45) countries, especially when massive nuclear strikes are made against the most densely In their view, large ground forces are populated industrial regions. However, in still necessary, but will have to move with order to completely defeat an enemy it is great speed, largely in armored personnel necessary to eliminate his ability to resist. carriers. Airborne troops will he used BOOKS AND IDEAS 83

mainly to capture, hold, or destroy mis- conflict being resolved in the theaters of sile, air, or naval bases deep in the enemy’s military operations, strategic nuclear strikes territory, pv o (antiaircraft defense) will will be directed against the economy, na- have the job of fending off nuclear air tional administrative system, military bases, strikes on the ground forces, which, the and armed forces simultaneously through- authors admit, will be no small problem, out the depth of an enemy’s territory. The given the sophistication of modern offen- ground forces, in coordination with the sive weapon systems. Although the bomber Air Force, will use the results of the nu- has yielded first place to the missile, never- clear strikes to complete the annihilation theless both will be used simultaneously of remaining enemy units through unre- in a future war. Actually, some specific lenting attacks at great speed and in great missions, such as hitting mobile targets, depth. Simultaneously, the fleets will be can best be accomplished by bombers. The carrying out nuclear strikes against “ob- air force as a whole (fighters, fighter- jectives on the continents” and searching bombers, strategic bombers, and trans- out and destroying enemy naval units on ports) is still a very necessary part of the all the oceans and seas of the globe. modem armed forces. In a section entitled “Nuclear rocket attacks by strategic weapons” (pp. 288- 92) the authors outline the probable Soviet C hapter 6 is concerned with strategy in any future general war. The the “methods of conducting warfare,” primary targets of the Soviet ic bm ’s will which the authors define as “the aggregate be the enemy’s strategic aviation, ic bm of the procedures for waging military and ir bm sites, tactical bomber aviation, operations.” (p. 260) The term includes the naval bases, and nuclear weapon stock- methods of using the armed forces as a piles. Incidentally, they shrug off the whole and the utilization of the individual nuclear submarine threat in a short and services. pithy paragraph that merely states that In a 15-page minihistory of the develop- the Polaris submarines are vulnerable to ment of the methods of conducting war- antisubmarine submarines! Pointing out fare since Napoleon, which provides the that a “most important task is the destruc- authors an opportunity to point up the tion of the military-economic potential insignificance of the American-British of the enemy,” (p. 290) they list the United contribution in World War II,° they point States and West Germany as the main out the quantum leap in the development economic pillars of imperialist might. The of methods for conducting wars occurring conflict will be characterized “by great in the post-World War II period. This violence, the mass destruction of troops, qualitative jump has resulted in a radical colossal destruction, and the formation of alteration in the structure, technical equip- broad zones ... of radioactive contamina- ment, and training of the armed forces, tion.” (p. 292) “a complete revolution in the military art The team also describes the probable and in the methods of conducting armed offensive operations in the land theaters, conflict, (p. 2/4) Instead of the armed defensive operations, the role of pv o Strany in keeping the enemy off the back of the • The authors use the ne*t device of quotations from various American writen to the effect that stratetyc bombing in World War II was a mis- troops and out of the homeland, and the erable failure, and they elaborate on the Soviet thesis that the Ameri- cans and British delayed the opening of the second front until the Russians role of the navy. In short, although the had all fc*i! defeated the Germans. Strategic Rocket Troops are to be the 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW fair-haired lads, there is a role for every be in readiness at all times, which should service in the next war. be ready for immediate mobilization, and the problems associated with general C hapter 7 is devoted to the mobilization. In addition there are rela- problem of how to prepare the Soviet Union tively long sections on the value of stra- to repel imperialist aggression, i.e., how tegic intelligence, on the preparation of to stand up to a future world war. This the national economy for war, and on how problem of preparation is broken down into to deal with the population in the matter three elements: the armed forces, the na- of civil defense. tional economy, and the people themselves. The availability of missiles and nuclear weapons of megaton yields permits cut- C hapter 8, entitled “Leader- backs in conventional forces without a re- ship of the Armed Forces,” is a very dis- duction in overall firepower. But the exis- appointing part of the book in that it is tence of those very weapons means that largely concerned with the history of command systems in the major capitalist the technical and material basis for waging a long war can be destroyed at the very nations and in the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. gets the lion’s share of space, and for the outset of hostilities. Lastly, one cannot dis- regard the fact that enormous losses in historian it is an excellent survey, from population in a very short period of time an ultrapatriotic point of view, of the evo- will have psychological effects, especially lution of the command system in the Red since it will be something new in human Army from early 1918 through the Second experience. World War. The authors agree that it would be nice to have peacetime forces adequate to A ll in all, the Sokolovsky book achieve the objectives of the initial period is still the most comprehensive treatment of the war without additional mobiliza- of Soviet military strategy to date. But tion, but no nation has that kind of dough. for the Western reader it is somewhat The existing peacetime forces, however, disappointing in that it tends to fudge on must be able to deal a nuclear blow in some important problems of modern war- good time, to repel a surprise attack, and fare and often compels the reader to make to fight theater actions while additional do with a thoroughly confused answer forces are being mobilized. from this team of soldier-scholars. On the The authors point out that the whole whole, the most important part of the country must be prepared as a theater of book, at least in this reviewer’s opinion, is operations. Since the nation’s entire ter- Chapter 2, especially those sections that ritory will be dotted with missile sites, first appeared in the third edition. airfields, and pv o positions—all potential targets for enemy missile and air attacks— the country as a whole will constitute a M rs. Scott’s edition of the theater of operations. Sokolovsky opus was hardly off the press The rest of the chapter goes into a good when her husband. Colonel William F. deal of detail about which services must Scott, USAF (Retired),t came out with a

f William F. Scott, Soviet Sources o f Military Doctrine and Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975, $4.95), 72 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 book on Soviet sources of military doctrine Moscow, 1972. (Translated and and strategy. This handy monograph published under the auspices of provides the student of Soviet military the usaf; Washington, D.C., cpo, theory an annotated bibliography of im- 1973, $1.70) portant Soviet books dealing with military No. 2—Marxism-Leninism on War and doctrine and strategy published between Army, Moscow, Progress Pub- 1960 and 1974. lishers, 1972. (cpo, 1974, $2.45) Colonel Scott begins with a discussion No. 3—N. A. Lomov (editor), Scientific- of who writes Soviet military theory and Technical Progress and the Revo- describes how the major military acade- lution in Military Affairs, Mos- mies and institutes fit into the picture. He cow, 1973. (cpo, 1974, $2.25) then moves on to an analysis of the news- No. 4—V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Princi- papers and periodicals devoted to military ples o f Operational Art and Tac- affairs and a brief description of military tics, Moscow, 1972. (cpo, 1974, book publishing business. He also includes $2.30) some comments on the nonmilitary jour- No. 5—A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Koz- nals that may impinge upon the military lov, The Philosophical Heritage field. The rest of his monograph is devoted of V. I. Lenin and the Problems to the bibliography itself. This section is o f Contemporary War, Moscow, arranged in chronological order bv year 1972. (cpo, 1974, $2.35) of publication. As with wines, some years No. 6—V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kon- were better than others. For example, for torov, Concept, Algorithm, Deci- 1963 Colonel Scott found only three books sion, Moscow, 1972. (gpo, 1975, worthy of inclusion, while for both 1970 $2.80) and 1971 there are eighteen entries. Unfortunately, of the 168 books listed T hanks to the assiduous labors of the and described, only nineteen have been Scott family and the usaf’s “Soviet Mili- translated into English. These are listed tary Thought” series, those interested in at the end of the book, with information Soviet military theory, especially doctrine for ordering them. In the last two years and strategy, need no longer feel debarred six of these books dealing with Soviet mili- from the field because they read no Rus- tary doctrine and strategy have been pro- sian. These six books and the two here duced in English under the auspices of reviewed total 2280 pages, enough, one the usaf, the series entitled “Soviet Mili- would think, to satisfy anyone except the tary Thought”: specialist, at least for the nonce. No. 1—A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive, Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Note Cour£, and T. W Wolfe and published by Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs. 1 V D Sokolovsky (editor). Voennaya StraUgiya (Military Strategy), New Jersey. 196-3. Moscow Voenadat, 1962' There were two translations of the liook into English in 1963 one by the Foreign Technology Division, Air Force Sys- Editor’s note tems Command, Wright*Patterson AFB, which was also published by Praeger with an introduction by Raymond Garthoff. The lietter version of The Ixiok.s numliered I and 2 were reviewed by Dr. Whiting in the the first edition is the RAND translation done by H S. Dinerstein. L. January-February 1975 issue of Air University Review. SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN

A review of Armed Forces and Society, a new professional journal.

L ieu t en a n t Colonel David R. Met s

ROM the outset of our careers, most One of the aspects of this ideal was F of us will remember the “whole man” that the officer should develop his intel- concept as an ideal established for us— lect in a wide variety of disciplines. Thus, and an impossible ideal at that! To meet every lieutenant was to have established a that standard, it seemed, one would have professional reading program that would to spend so much time in the gymnasium keep him current in world politics, the lat- and the library as to guarantee that he est strategic thinking, the technology of would never make major. Indeed, it is an his own and sister services, management of ideal toward which we all strive but which resources, and many other areas. As often few have really approached. happens, the good intentions of most of

86 BOOKS AND IDEAS 87

us were enough to pave the road to hell, many of the pieces are highly informative and the press of events often restricted us and intensely interesting. The Aerospace to little more than a cursory look at a Historian is published by the Air Force His- weekly news magazine. Still, the ideal torical Foundation, a private organization certainlv is worthwhile, and even though though most of its members are connected none of us can hope to assimilate all the with the Air Force. Edited by Dr. Robin professional material available we should Higham, it has been devoted to the preser- trv to choose the best and learn as much vation of the air heritage for a couple of from it as we can. This article will take a decades now. Of course, there are also brief look at what is available in military numerous specialized periodicals published periodicals and review at greater length by the major air commands and several one of the recent additions to the field: technical publications as well. For those Armed Forces and Society. needing immediate currency in the tech- To extol the virtues of the Air University nical aspects of the profession, Aviation Review here would be much like preaching Week and Space Technology is probably the merits of church attendance to the one of the most reliable sources available congregation. Although the Review may —though it, like all other commercial works, be regarded as a company publication by is colored by the interests of its adver- many, its present editorial policy is directed tisers and by the technical backgrounds of toward offering more controversial articles, its editorial staff. Finally, Strategic Review, and the journal enjoys an increasing degree which was examined at length in our of academic freedom. For all of that, the November-December 1973 issue, is im- Review is a government publication, its portant as a source covering the thinking scope is fairly broad, but it does not often of a distinguished group of senior officers deal with the affairs of other services and and various foreign and domestic scholars. seldom draws work from authors of other An older British work, Survival, covers nations. While occasionally its articles are much the same strategic and political written by top scholars like professors Rob- ground from another viewpoint. ert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Theodore Ropp, etc., It is not at all difficult for the Air Force it is nevertheless difficult to compete with officer to remain abreast of the latest de- the academic journals for the work of many velopments in our sister services. The ap- of the leading intellectuals who do not proximate Army equivalent to the Air have a special interest in the military. University Review comes in two separate Other periodicals specifically oriented publications: Parameters, of the Army War toward Air Force affairs include Airman, College, and Military Review, the profes- Air Force Magazine, and Aerospace His- sional journal of the Army from its Com- torian. Airman, like the Review, is a gov- mand and General Staff College. Both are ernment publication, but its function is highly reputable works aimed at slightly more to inform than to stimulate profes- different audiences. The busy Air Force sional thought. Air Force is a private pub- officer interested in a quick survey of the lication and accepts advertising. Since its Army scene would doubtless find Military goal is to promote preparedness through Review the more useful. It is a monthly aerospace power, and since the interests journal in English, Spanish, and Portuguese of its advertisers inevitably have an effect, and carries articles on a wide variety of the range of articles found in it is de- topics. If one’s interest is a more leisurely fined by those parameters. Nevertheless, study of strategic and political thinking, 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

then Parameters should not be overlooked. nected with the military in some way. In The ground forces’ rough equivalent to fact, there has long been a need for a pub- Aerospace Historian is Military Affairs. It lication devoted to military topics but has been published by the American Mili- which is more or less independent of the tary Iastitute since 1933. Robin Higharn is military or the defense industries for its also the editor of this work, and it is more support. There is now something new of a military history journal than one de- under the sun in that the military studies voted purely to the past of the Army. have finally reached that status of academic The Naval War College, our senior pro- respectability that enables self-support of fessional military education (pm e ) school, a scholarly journal on the subject. sponsors a journal called Naval War College Review. It is similar to, though smaller than, Air University Review. One of the /\rmed Forces and Society oldest and most prestigious of all the mili- published its first issue during the fall of tary periodicals is the United States Naval 1974. It is sponsored by the Inter-University Institute Proceedings, which has just com- Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, pleted its 101st volume. It is a private which was formed more than a decade ago publication partially supported by an im- in this country and has since spread over- pressive array of advertisers. Like Air seas. There was no civilian school in the Force, it is dedicated to the promotion of land then which specialized in military national security through preparedness— studies, nor was there any one discipline but naval preparedness. Like Air Force, fully qualified to examine all aspects of consequently, its material is tinted bv the the subject. Thus, the Seminar is com- purpose of the work and the interests of posed of distinguished scholars from many its advertisers. The Proceedings is worthy different countries, disciplines, and in- of the attention of the Air Force officer stitutions. Among them are Raymond Aron, who wishes to keep up with the technical Morris Janowitz, Jacques van Doom, Adam and strategic thinking of his Navy coun- Yarmolinsky, Richard Rosser, and Amos terparts. The Marine Corps Gazette is simi- Jordan—to name only a few. The stated lar in support and purpose to Proceedings purpose of the journal is to provide a and Air Force. forum for papers on war, arms control, The one thing that all these publica- armed forces, revolution, and peacekeep- tions have in common is that they are ing. It was hoped that this would encour- supported by rather specialized interests. age research and discussion of these topics Either they are government publications, on an international plane and from a great their advertisers are drawn from the de- variety of scholarly viewpoints. fense industries, or their subscribership At this writing, five issues of Armed is largely limited to persons who are con- Forces and Society t have appeared—it

f Armed Forces and Society, An Interdisciplinary Journal on Military Institutions, Civil-Military Relations, Arms Control and Peacekeeping, and Conflict Management, published quarterly by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Ad- dress: Armed Forces and Society, Social Science Building, Univer- sity of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois 60637. Subscriptions: Professionals and teachers, $12 per year. BOOKS AND IDEAS 89

is a quarterly publication. Generally, each that predicted by the Gates Commission. issue has a broad variety of articles, but Since it is assumed that the armed forces the Spring 1975 issue was devoted to “ Po- must be as close as possible to a cross litical Participation under Military Re- section of the society as a whole—anything gimes.” The effects of the creation of the else may cause group loyalty to take all-volunteer forces and professionalism precedence over national loyalty—Jano- in the military are topics frequently ad- witz and Moskos propose a number of dressed. Civil-military relations constitute steps that might correct the imbalance. another area of interest. Sociologists were One, designed to increase the individual’s prominent among the founders, and a good identification with his unit, would permit many of the articles arise from that disci- enlistment or re-enlistment for a particu- pline. But Armed Forces and Society is lar unit and cut down on the number of certainly not a sociology journal; it con- transfers. They suggest that this might tains work by many historians, political make service more attractive for the scientists, and economists. It would be whites. Since the blacks seem to be en- easy for the professional officer to assume listing and especially re-enlisting for eco- that such a periodical would have a built- nomic motives, it is further proposed that in antimilitary bias, but such is not the the educational incentives be emphasized case. Though some of the articles certainly for two reasons: first, to make the ground are hostile to the armed forces and espe- forces more attractive to whites and, sec- cially to defense spending, some of the ond, to make a transition to an econom- others are actually promilitarv, and the ically rewarding civilian life more feasi- greater number of them maintain a bal- ble for the blacks. anced viewpoint. Authors vary from the In a more recent issue of Armed Forces likes of Seymour Melman of Columbia and Society (Fall 1975), Jerald Bachman (Summer 1975), who comes close to blam- and John Blair of the University of Michi- ing defense spending for all the world’s gan develop the educational idea a bit troubles, to William Taylor of West Point’s further. Basing their research and recom- Department of Social Sciences (Winter mendations on a sample taken from the 1975). enlisted Navy, they suggest that the ser- The topic of the volunteer armv re- vices deliberately promote a high turn- ceives much attention from the scholars; over of first-term enlistees—that re-enlist- granting that the recruiting goals are be- ments be purposely discouraged! They ing met, they are nevertheless worried recognize that this would be an expensive about the social complexion of the ground proposition, but they hold that it would combat arms and fear the possibility that be highly desirable as a method of pre- the armed forces may become alienated venting the ideological alienation of the from the society they serve. In one of the all-volunteer military. They would empha- best articles so far published, Morris Jano- size education as an incentive and thus witz and Charles Moskos address the prob- hope to attract very high-quality enlistees, lem and propose some solutions (Fall who, they hope, would compensate for 1974). The early experience with vol ar the high costs of the education and rapid (All-Volunteer Army) has shown that turnover by delivering superior perfor- there is a strong tendency for the black mances for the short term they are in the portion of the Army and Marine Corps service. Perhaps. Incidentally, a bit of the ground combat arms to increase beyond bias suggested earlier does creep into this 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

article when the authors imply that the The education of the officer corps is a best of the enlisted men tend to be the topic naturally of interest to an organiza- most antimilitary and the least likely to tion of scholars. Thomas Brewer of East- re-enlist. Of course, such a judgment is ern Michigan University wrote “The Im- highly subjective and would be wholly pact of Advanced Education on American dependent upon one’s definition of “best.” Military Officers” (Fall 1975) which ad- It is certainly conceivable that the most dresses the subject. His conclusion is that able will be the quickest to see great eco- education does not make a profound nomic rewards waiting on the outside; it difference in the outlook of the officers is also conceivable that the least bold will concerned but only makes them a bit go running home to mother at the earliest more articulate in their views and per- opportunity. Their sample was too small haps a little less rigid in their approach for the judgment arrived at. to foreign policy. The conclusion is prob- Civil-military relations and military pro- ably sound enough, and not very surpris- fessionalism are other, related, topics ing. The idea that a substantial number which receive a good deal of attention. of successful men would radically change Much of the work on professionalism is their views as a result of nine months of done from a historical perspective. M. D. schooling is improbable in any event. The Feld of Harvard contributed two articles problem with the article is that the sam- on the subject: one (Summer 1975) on the ple is far too small and the scope of the origins of the professional army in the study is quite narrow. He deals with fewer Netherlands under Maurice in the six- than 100 individuals, most of whom are teenth century; and the other (Winter naval officers and, one would suspect, a 1975) on the evolution of the mass army substantial proportion of whom are Naval from its inception at the time of Academy graduates. Further, he does not the French Revolution to its apparent address large portions of the curriculum demise in the last few decades. William nor discuss the purposes of the Naval War Skelton adds a superior article, “ Profes- College. Finally, Brewer makes some sionalization in the U.S. Army Officer rather sweeping generalizations about the Corps during the Age of Jackson” (Sum- impact (or lack of impact) of civilian gradu- mer 1975), which is accompanied by one ate education on the thinking of military from Great Britain: Gwyn Harries-Jen- officers. For the data on this topic, he kins’s “The Development of Professionalism draws only upon those students attending in the Victorian Army” (Summer 1975). a graduate program immediately asso- The trends of thought among these schol- ciated with the Naval War College—one ars seem to be that the alienation of the which could hardly be typical of the gradu- officer corps from the rest of society is ate education received by service officers a possible danger, but not inevitable; that at a very great number of civilian universi- the days of the mass army are gone— ties having no direct connection with the with the implication that technology will armed forces. have to do what bodies once did (or tried to do); that the military profession will Sam Sarkesian and William Taylor, in decline in attractiveness but demand “The Case for Civilian Graduate Educa- officers of an ever higher quality—and tion” (Winter 1975), assign a much greater therein lies the problem for our policy- effect to civilian graduate courses than did makers. Brewer. According to them: HOOKS AND IDEAS 91

. . . Graduate education has a decided posi- without damage to the muscle of the tive impact on professional competence, armed forces; prestige, and leadership qualities, while re- inforcing civilian control and democratic The B-l program values; it must become an integral part of The awacs program the professional career—not tangential. The three additional Army divisions Many reserve formations Any additional spending on counterforce. The authors complain that civilian gradu- ate education is a peripheral thing for the It should come as no surprise to Air officer, that it has an inferior status to Force and Army readers that Dr. Korb graduation from the (usually shorter) war is on the faculty of the Naval War College! colleges. They propose that it be given equal status to the war colleges insofar as /A rrned Forces and Society it is a qualification for service at higher does not provide a panacea for the prob- levels and that greater numbers of offi- lem we face in planning a manageable cers be sent to civilian schools instead of professional reading program. Of course, the professional military schools. To fi- there is little or nothing in it on the de- nance all this, they would eliminate the tails of technology. Few of the articles w'ar colleges at Newport, Carlisle Bar- are aimed at the problems of any particu- racks, and Maxwell afb along with the lar service. The book reviews, while inter- Industrial College of the Armed Forces esting and useful, certainly do not cover and the National War College. They would the range of books of interest to the pro- substitute a national defense college. Tak- fessional officer. There is some material ing the place of all the others, this insti- on military theory and doctrine but not tution would be staffed by officers from enough for the Air Force leader—and that all the services. Rather a radical proposal, which has appeared so far is in a form that to be sure, but it might have more merit does not help one’s strategic thinking very than only that previously cited as aris- much. Yet I do believe that the Inter-Uni- ing from civilian graduate instruction. versity Seminar has provided us with a There are other fine articles in Armed worthwhile addition to our reading lists. Forces and Society bv important scholars First, Armed Forces and Society will give like Louis Morton, George Quester, and us more critical insights to our military in- Morton Kaplan—to cite only a few—but stitutions than are available in any of the there is not space here to review all of professional journals—and it will do so them. One last note about a piece written from a variety of disciplines. Second, it by Lawrence J. Korb, “The Bicentennial will give some understanding of the think- Defense Budget, A Critical Appraisal” ing of scholars from other lands—mostly (Fall 1975); His logical and interesting mes- European. Third, it might offer a pres- sage is that cuts in defease spending are tigious outlet for the work of the officer- inevitable, and if we of the armed forces scholar. Finally, it makes available in do not propose our own cuts based on stra- convenient form a high level of social- tegic realities, then the Congress or the science scholarship devoted especially to public will force cuts on a more or less the problems of our military profession and random basis that will hurt us a good deal its relationship to the society which it more. Korb is more than ready with a list serves. of ‘‘marginal” programs that could be cut Maxwell AFB, Alabama Books Received

The abundance of new books published each The present listing includes books received dur- month makes it difficult for most of us to re- ing 1975 and early in 1976; subsequent lists main abreast of the current pertinent literature, will be published from time to time. Some of and at some more-remote bases the task be- the books listed here will be reviewed in later comes formidable. It is hoped that this new issues of the Review. feature, “Books Received,” will ease the chore.

I. Air po w er Horonjeff, Robert. Planning and Design of Air- Edwards, Roger. German Airborne Troops. New ports. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975. $24.95. York: Doubleday, 1975. $7.95. Ishoven, Armand van. Messerschmitt, Aircraft Freeman, Roger A. Mustang at War. New York: Designer. New York: Doubleday, 1975. $14.95. Doubleday, 1975. $10.00! Jack, Donald. It’s Me Again. New York: Double- Fuller, John F. Weather and War. Scott AFB, day, 1975. $7.95. A humorous account of Illinois: Office of MAC History, 1975. flying in World War I. Gregory, Barry. British Airborne Troops. New Taylor, John W. R. Civil Aircraft o f the World. York: Doubleday, 1975. $7.95. New York: Scribner’s, 1975. $6.95. Higham, Robin, and Abigail Siddal. Flying Com- ______Jane’s Pocket Book o f Military bat Aircraft o f the USAAF-USAF. Ames, Iowa: Transport and Training Aircraft. New York: Iowa State University Press, 1975. $7.95. Macmillan, 1975. $6.95 cloth, $3.95 paper. Hurley, Alfred H. Billy Mitchell. Bloomington, Walsh, John Evangelist. One Day at Kitty Hawk. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975. $10.00 New York: Crowell, 1975. $10.00. cloth, $2.95 paper. Jackson, Robert. Air War over Korea. New York: III. M il it ar y affairs Scribner’s, 1975. $9.95. Barker, A. J. Prisoners o f War. New York: Uni- Kullar, Amarjeet. Effective Airpower for Devel- verse Books, 1975. $8.95. oping Countries. Delhi: The Macmillan Com- Barnett, Correlli. The Swordbearers. Blooming- pany of India, 1975. Rs40.00. ton, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975. $15.95 cloth, $4.95 paper. On generalship II. Aviation: tales, techniques, and in World War I. TECHNOLOGY Bekker, Cajus. Hitler’s Naval War. New York: Buck, Robert N. Flying Know-How. New York: Doubleday, 1975. $12.95. Dell Publishing, 1975. $7.95. Blumenson, Martin, and James Stokesbury. Mas- Buckwalter, Len. The Pilot’s Night Flying Hand- ters o f the Art of Command. Boston: Hough- book. New York: Doubleday, 1976. $8.95. ton Mifflin, 1975. $12.95. Broad study of mili- Cain, Charles W. Aircraft in Profile, vol. 14. New tary leadership from the NCO to the generals York: Doubleday, 1975. $11.95. level. Hunt, Leslie. Veteran and Vintage Aircraft. New Brownlow, Donald Grey. Panzer Baron: The York: Scribner’s, 1975. $12.50. Military Exploits o f General Hasso von

92 HOOKS AND IDEAS 93

Manteuffel. North Quincy, Massachusetts: Free Press, 1975. $13.95. On the origins of Christopher Publishing House, 1975. $9.75. the U.S. Army during the days of Alexander Carter, Anthony, and John Walter. The Bayonet. Hamilton. New York: Scribner’s, 1975. $8.95. A tech- Kurzman, Dan. The Race for Rome. New York: nical history of the weapon, 1850-1970. Doubleday, 1975. $10.00. On the capture of Cortright, David. Soldiers in Revolt. New York: Rome during 1944. Doubleday, 1975. $7.95. On attitudes among Millar, George. The Bruneval Raid. New York: the troops of the U.S. Army during the Viet- Doubleday, 1975. $7.95. On the British raid nam war. against a German radar station during World Davis, William C. Duel between the First Iron- War II. clads. New York: Doubleday, 1975. $8.95. Milsom, John, and Peter Chamberlain. German Dramesi, John A. Code of Honor. New York: Armoured Cars o f World War II. New York: Norton, 1975. $7.95. On the author’s escape Scribner’s, 1975. $10.00. from a Vietnamese prison. Risher, James F., Jr., Colonel. Interview with Druzhinin, V. V., and D. S. Kontorov. Concept, Honor. Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1975. $6.95. Algorithm, Decision. Washington: Govern- On the Burr-Hamilton duel. ment Printing Office, 1975. $2.80. Part of a Russ, Martin. Line of Departure: Tarawa. New USAF series that examines the thought of the York: Doubleday, 1975. $6.95. Soviet military on automation of the decision- Smith, Charles R. Marines in the Revolution. making process within the Russian armed Washington: Government Printing Office, forces. 1975. $20.30. Foss, Christopher F. Armoured Fighting Vehi- Turner, John Fravn, and Robert Jackson. Des- cles o f the World. New York: Scribner’s, tination Berchtesgaden. New York: Scrib- 1975. $7.95. ner’s, 1975. $7.95. A history of the 7th Army Goldhamer, Herbert. The Soviet Soldier. New during the closing days of World War II. York: Crane, Russak, 1975. $17.95. Westmoreland, William C., General. A Soldier Henderson, George. Human Relations in the Reports. New York: Doubleday, 1976. $12.95. Military. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975. $14.00. Hodgson, Pat. Early War Photographs. Green- wich, Connecticut: New York Graphic So- IV. International relations ciety, 1975. $12.00. Adie, W. A. C. Oil, Power i* Politics: The In- Howard, Michael. The Theory and Practice o f dian Ocean Vortex. New York: Crane, Russak, War. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Univer- 1975. $4.95 cloth, $2.95 paper. sity Press, 1975. $12.50 cloth, $3.95 paper. Goure, Leon, and Morris Rothenberg. Soviet A collection of the author’s essays, chrono- Penetration of Latin America. Coral Gables, logically arranged. Florida: University of Miami, 1975. $9.95 Hughes, B. P., Major General. Firepower: Weap- cloth, $6.95 paper. ons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630- Kaplan, Morton A. Isolation or Interdependence? 1850. New York: Scribner’s, 1975. $12.50. Today’s Choices for Tomorrow’s World. New Hunt, Robert, and Tom Hartman. Swastika at York: Free Press, 1975. $10.00. War. New York: Doubledav, 1975. $9.95. A Moravec, Frantisek. Master o f Spies. New York: photographic study of World War II in Doubleday, 1975. $7.95. Czech agent tells of Europe. his experiences in espionage during World Kennedy, Gavin. The Military in the Third World. War II. New York: Scribner’s, 1975. $17.50. O’Neill, Bard, D. J. Alberts, and Stephen J. Kirk, Donald. Tell It to the Dead: Memories o f Rossetti. Political Violence and Insurgency. a War. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975. $6.95. Arvada, Colorado: Phoenix, 1975. $12.95. On the attitudes growing out of the Vietnam Sallagar, Frederick M. The Road to Total War. experience. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1975. Kohn, Richard H. Eagle and Sword. New York: $11.95. 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Sherwin, Martin J. A World Destroyed: The American Elsevier Publishing Company, 1974. Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance. New $24.50. York: Knopf, 1975. $10.00. Jacobs, David Michael. The UFO Controversy Steibel, Gerald. Detente: Promises and Pitfalls. in America. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana New York: Crane, Russak, 1975. $4.95 cloth, University Press, 1975. $12.50. $2.95 paper. Reed, John L. The Newest Whore o f Babylon: Stockholm International Peace Research In- The Emergence of Technocracy. Boston: stitute. Arms Trade with the Third World. Braden, 1975. $10.00. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1975. $15.00. Reimann, Viktor. Goebbels. New York: Double- Wolfe, Robert. Captured German and Related day, 1976. $12.50. Records: A National Archives Conference. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, et al. From Under the Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1975. Rubble. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975. $8.95. $ 10.00. A collection of dissenting essays by Solzhe- nitsyn and some of his former colleagues. V. G en er a l Wilkinson, David. Revolutionary Civil War. DeSola, Ralph. Abbreviations Dictionary (New Palo Alto, California: Page-Ficklin, 1975. An International Fourth Edition). New York: examination of the theory of the subject with eight supporting case studies.

Where all think alike, no one thinks very much.

W alter Lippm a n n the contributors

Lie u t en a n t Gener a l John VV. P auly (USMA; MS., George Washington University) is Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans ami Operations. Hq Hoyt W. Huggins, M ajor, USAF (Ret). USAF. He earned his pilot wings while at M B.A.. University of Missouri), is Ware- tending W'est Point. Following B-25 and B-17 house Manager for House of Lloyd Inc.. Major Pet er L. Hen der so n M B A.. In ter- transition, he served with the 60th Troop Missouri. After almost ten years enlisted ser Arnencan University. Puerto Rico) is Assistant Carrier Group. Germany. During the Korean vice, he was commissioned from OCS in 1962. Professor of Aerospace Studies. Aubum Uni- War he served as safety officer and squadron Most of his service was in computerized versity. Alabama. He has served with the operations officer with the 6th Bombardment supplies management, and he received the security police in several locations, including Squadron. Following tours at Hq Tactical annual USAF Outstanding Supply Officer a tour with the 12tli Tactical Fighter Wing at Air Command and Hq Fourth Allied Tactical Award five times. He served stateside with Phu Cat AB. Republic of Vietnam, 1970-71 Air Force in Germany, he was assigned to ADC. in Pakistan with USAFSS, in USAFE He has been a missile crew commander, mis- sile wing plans officer in the SAC Minute- the Directorate of Plans at Hq USAF. Other with the IG Supply and Disposal Inspector, major assignments include DCS Operations, and as Chief of Supply at RAF Bent waters man system, and recently served as the leader- 315th Air Division. Japan; Commander. 315th and RAF Lakenheath, England until his ship curriculum manager on the staff of Special Operations Wing. Republic of Viet- retirement in 1974. Squadron Officer School. Major Henderson is nam; Commander. First Strategic Aerospace a graduate of Squadron Officer Scliool and Division. SAC. Vandenberg AFB; and Assistant Air Command and Staff College. to the Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Pauly is a graduate of the National War College.

Lie u t e n a n t Colonel Bobby D W ag non Dr . M. Ric h a r d Rose iPh.D.. University of (B.B.A., North Texas State University) is a Pittsburgh) is President of Alfred University, member of the Air War College Class of Major Dobven K C rooch M B A. . Un i - Alfred New York. He began a career of 1976. He has served as a radar intercept versity of Denver) is Chief. Management military service and educational adminis- officer in the F-89J and F-101B; as a navi- Organization and Environment Division. Pro- tration in 1955 and served four years as an gator in the EC-121; and as a weapons con- fessional Personnel Management Course. officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. He then troller in the United States. Labrador, and Maxwell AFB. He is a career personnel officer filled various administrative positions at the Europe. He has also served as Commander. with assignments in Southeast Asia and Hq University of Pittsburgh. He was Deputy As- 601 Tactical Control Wing. USAFE. Colonel PACAF. He is a representative of Air Uni- sistant Secretary of Defense, responsible for Wagnon is a graduate of Squadron Officer versity to a Hq USAF job enrichment task all overseas military educational programs. School, the Armed Forces Staff College, and team. Major Crooch is a graduate of Squadron 1972-74. Dr. Rose has most recently been the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Officer School and Air Command and Staff appointed Secretary of the Navy Advisory His next assignment will l»e with the 52d Air College and a distinguished graduate of the Board for Education and Training. Warning Control Wing, TAC. Air Force Institute of Technology.

95 C-E Plans and Programs. Ent AFB. Colorado. Prior to his present assignment he was an Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies at The Citadel, Charleston. South Carolina. He has served tours as Joint Electronic Systems Staff Officer. SIXATAF(NATO). Turkey; as a special Electronic Systems Engineer; as a detachment commander on Wake Island; and as a radar maintenance officer. He is a gradu- ate of the Communications-Electronics Staff Officer Course. Dr . Kennet h R. W hiting (Ph.D., Harvard University) is Director of the Documentary Research Directorate, Air University. A fre- quent contributor to Air Unicerstft/ Review, he is the author of The Soviet Union Today: A Concise Handbook (1962) and of numerous monographs on Russian and Asian subjects. Major Jimmie L. Coombes (M.S., St. Mary’s Dr. Whiting formerly taught Russian history University is Chief of Academic Training. at Tufts University and is fluent in the Rus- USAF Instrument Pilot Instructor School. A sian language. former Air Defease Command navigator, his pilot assignments have included T-37s in Undergraduate Pilot Training. O-ls and 0-2* in Southeast .Asia, and T-38s at the I PIS. A distinguished graduate of Class 70A at Squadron Officer School, he has published an article ui the USAF Instructor's Journal.

Lieu t en a n t Colonel David R. Met s (USNA; Ph.D., University of Denver) is Acquisitions Editor of Air University Review. His last Colonel Don Clelland (M.A., University of assignment was as commander of an AC-130 Colorado) is on a special assignment to the gunship squadron in Thailand. He entered the Twenty-second Air Force. Travis AFB. Cali- Air Force in 1953 after seven years in the fornia. He flew RF-lOls in Vietnam and F-B6s Navy and has served as MATS instructor- in postwar Korea. He has served at the Air navigator, ATC instructor-pilot. SAC aircraft Force Academy; in the Office of the Secre- commander, assistant professor of history at tary of the Air Force; as the Executive As- Ixith the Air Force Academy and West Point, sistant to the U.S. Representative. NATO and as C-130 aircraft commander in Vietnam. Major James M. Alford (USNA; M S.. Uni- Military Committee, as the Deputy. Military Colonel Mets’s articles have also appeared in versity of Oklahoma) is assigned to the Pro- Assistance Directorate. Hq USEUCOM; and Aerospace Historian. Military Revieiv. and grams Requirement Division. Directorate of as the Chief of Plans, Hq Air Force Reserve. United States Naval Institute Prot'cedings.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected "The B-1: Strategic Deterrence into the Twenty-first Century" by Major General Abner B. Martin, USAF, as the outstanding article in the March-April 1976 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF Colonel Glenn E. Wa sso n , USAF Editor Lieu t en a n t Colonel Ric h a r d E. Nansen, USAF Associate Editor Lieu t en a n t Colonel David R. Met s, USAF Acquisitions Editor Jack H. Mooney Managing Editor John A. W est c ot t , J r . Art Director and Production Manager Enrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition Lia Mio o si May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition Wil l ia m J. De Paola Art Editor and Illustrator Rudol ph W. Morgan Financial and Administrative Manager

ADVISERS Colonel Eldon W. Downs Hij Air Force Institute o f Technology Colonel Russel l A. T urner 11 H