HarvardUkrainianStudies ,no. – (–): –.
Introduction MH S. FR AR GRS
W RS HR H RS of the conference States, Peoples, Languages: A Comparative Political History of Ukrainian, –, organized by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI) at Harvard in June with the support of the Ukrainian Studies Fund. The bulk of the conference papers are published in this volume, and we have included an additional essay on the language question in Ukraine in the s. The essential goal of the conference, developed with the crucial contribution of Dr. Lubomyr Hajda, was straightforward and ambitious: HURI should go beyond the commemoration of the 5th anniversary of the Valuev Circular, which repressed the use of Ukrainian in the Russian Empire, to venture into a comparative, political history of Ukrainian not lim- ited to the circular’s impact in the late nineteenth century. Rather the Valuev document was to be taken as a springboard for examining issues that find their continuation, in changing circumstances, all the way to the present: from the late tsarist period to the chaotic years of war, revolution, and short-lived inde- pendence, from Soviet rule (in both its “moderate” and Stalinist manifestations) to the emergence of an independent Ukraine, laden still with the contradictions of its imperial Russian and Soviet legacies. Moreover, this history had to be situated in a long-term perspective, capable of shedding light on the origins of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian languages. The task clearly required an approach that could not be limited to the confines of one discipline. The Valuev Circular dealt with issues of language, and so had a direct connection to language study and philology, including the internal development of Ukrainian and its relationship, specifically, to Russian. But it also dealt with the function of language in society, and thus is the proper subject of sociolinguistics. It further dealt with the use of Ukrainian in writing and publishing—and hence intersects with literature. It did so within the framework of a particular political system—and thus is subject to analysis from the standpoint of political science. And all of these generic associations possessed a clear historical context. The conference was thus to be based upon R RS interdisciplinaryfoundations:linguists, historians of languages, sociolinguists, literaryspecialists, historians,and political scientistswereinvited to partic- ipate. It wasalso clearthatthe study of Ukrainian-specific language issueswould greatlyprofit if viewed in acomparative frameworkwithother analogous cases, and not only those in theimmediateEastEuropeanneighborhood. Highand low status with their resultantattitudes, bilingualism and diglossia, statepoliciesofpromotion and repression of one versusanother language, and similar areasoflinguistic interaction prevailedand prevail in varying degrees in manystates. Much could thus be learnedfromthe juxtaposition of some, even unusualand unexpected, cases:the conferenceovertlyaimedatapplying thecomparative method to theUkrainian case. From theinterdisciplinaryand comparative paradigms it followedthatthe conferencehad to be basedonscholarly collaboration on awide international scale. Papers on countriesnot usually associated with comparative Slavic or regional East European studies—Ireland, Catalonia, Canada, India, Kazakh- stan—weresolicited, specifically those whose experiences mayhaveexhibited features in common with,orininstructive contrast to,their Ukrainian counter- parts.Apart from theintellectualbenefitsofsuchcross-fertilization, theidea wastofirmly placethe Ukrainian experienceinawider international context, pointing to itsrelevancefor thestudy and theunderstanding of anumber of keyquestions. The conference, which, in thewords of one of theparticipants, “wasa genuinely interdisciplinary, intellectualexperience,”tookplace at theheight of aRussian-Ukrainian conflictinwhichlanguage played acrucialrole, as a political pretext and tool, as well as an occasion forindividual and collective reflections about itsmeaning in defining cultural and national identitiesand allegiances.This could not help but give aspecialand immediaterelevance to thecomparative discussion of acontrasted history. The relationshipswith Russian, and theMoscow-basedpolitical power promoting it,wereclearly at itscore. Yet, as events in theDonbas and thecountryatlarge wereconfirming once morebeforeour veryeyes, Ukrainian also providedamost interesting case of whathas been acommon storyofempiredisintegration/re-formation and statebuilding theworld over,anarrative in whichlanguageshavebeen “planned,”promoted,standardized, and repressed, or have learnedtocoexist in multilingualcommunities. The volume followsthisstory on two planes. On theone hand, it recon- structsUkrainian’s oftendramatic development, especially in itsrelationship with Russian. On theother,itcomparesthe fate of Ukrainian with that of languagesthatwentthroughoccasionally similar,but also divergentexperi- ences,suchasGaelic,Finnish,orthe Baltic language family.Complexsituations of multilingualcoexistenceand conflict, suchasthe Austro-Hungarian, the Yugoslav,and theIndian examples, providedadditional fertile ground forcom- RU parisons vis-à-visthe Russian/Sovietcase, thus contributing to theelaboration of interesting hypothesesofatheoretical, speculative nature. In this introduction we touchuponsome of themostsalientproblems raisedatthe conference, and discuss some of thehypothesesderivedfrom their analysistogive thereader an ideaofthe richness and diversity,and yet theinner coherence, of theissuesexamined. We do it in two sections,devoted respectively to thespecificsofthe Ukrainian case and to some of itsmost notable and enlightening similaritiesand differences with thedevelopmentof other languages. Thisoverview leadstoadiscussion of thecultural and political malleability of language, both in thepositive, “constructive” sense, and in the negative, “destructive” alternative. Ourconclusions stressthe unpredictability of outcomesand theelasticity of history.
THCRU OURK H HSR UR
The ValuevCircular()and theeven moresevereEms Decree (, amended) were amongthe manytools and methodsemployedbythe imperial Russian governmenttoreversethe upwards trajectoryofthe Ukrainian language towardsfull functionality as astandardlanguage. Unfortunately, such apattern of resistanceand overtinterference, justifiedbycultural mythology, whether Russian or Soviet,has persisted to thepresent day. To understand the battlefor Ukrainian, one must consider thesourcesand itshistory over time. Petr Valuevwas well awareofthe cultural rise of Ukrainian, noting in the circular that the “LittleRussian”language (the term used forUkrainian in the Russian Empire) wasappropriate forbelles-lettrescomposedbytalented, even original, writers forthe educated elites of SouthernRussia. But expanding the scopeofLittleRussian to nonfiction, and to educational and religiousmaterials forthe unenlightenedmasses,the common folk,was construedaspolitically dangerous, especially in light of theunrestgeneratedbythe emancipation of theserfs in and the Polish uprising.Ukrainian activists could use theincreasing prominenceofthe Ukrainian language as asymbolic flag representing an independentUkraine of thefuture. Valuev, whose view was not shared by all in thegovernment, would nip this possibility in thebud by instituting asecretban. Aside from effectively banning Ukrainian from public use, Valuevfeltit necessarytoundermine thelanguage along with potentialUkrainian inde- pendencebydemeaning Ukrainian in strictlyimperialterms:
They[themajority of LittleRussians expressing their opinions in the press] prove with greatconviction that therehas not been, is not,and cannot be anyspecialLittleRussian language, and that theirdialect R RS
as usedbythe common folk is theverysameRussian language, only corrupted by Poland’s influenceonit; andthatthe Common Russian language is as comprehensible to Little Russians as it is to GreatRussians, and even much morecomprehensible than theso-calledUkrainian language composedfor them by certainLittleRussians and especially by Poles.
On theone hand, one perceivesthatValuevwas formalizing aviewofthe Ukrainian language as separatist in itsessence,disloyal to theRussian state, and athreattothatstate’s unity, “composed” on purpose under foreignsuper- vision (a view to whichStalin subscribed in , and one that still perseveres in Moscow circles and among apartofthe monolingualRussophonesofthe Donbas today). On theother hand, one cannot help but noticethe stunning contradiction in Valuev’sown presentation of thestatusofthe LittleRussian language—now you seeit(in LittleRussian literature), now you don’t (in any- thing else). Valuevachievesthissleight-of-hand using thepolitically and sociologically loaded term dialect forLittleRussian/Ukrainian in opposition to theelevated term language forCommon Russian, thestandardRussian language, which itself had beguntodevelop only in theearly eighteenthcentury out of an amalgam of chancerylanguage, Moscow dialectal vernacular,and Church Slavonic.That malleable composition wasstretched and proddedthroughout thecentury with numerous foreignborrowingsand calques(oftenthrough Polish,Belarusian, and Ukrainian intermediaries)until it wasrefinedduring theage of Pushkininthe s–s. Ukrainian had startedalong itsown path towardsstandardization at theend of theeighteenthcentury. As farascomprehension is concerned, Valuev’sclaims forCommon Russian (thatis, Russian) areanachronistic.Inthe mid-nineteenth century, it wasthe urban Ukrainian elites who spokeand understood Russian, but not thevast majority of rural Ukrainians.Asfor Russophonesofthe past understanding Ukrainian well, historysuggestsotherwise.During thenegotiations between theCossacks and Muscovites that leduptothe Treaty of Pereiaslav,for example, interpreters (tolmachi)wereneeded forbothsides. Nikolai Gogol felt obligedtoinclude an extensive Ukrainian wordlistwithRussian equivalents in hisRussian-language Evenings on aFarmnearDikanka of –. (In our own times, Vladimir Putin needed an interpreterathis side to translate President Yushchenko’sUkrainian into Russian during thelatter’sstate visit to Moscow in January.) As regardsPetrValuev, it is highly doubtful that hisevaluation of Ukrainian-Russian comprehension resulted from meaningfulinteraction with Ukrainian speakers outside urban environments. In pointoffact, theUkrainian, Belarusian, and Russian languageshad all developed from theearly East Slavic dialectsthathad collectively distinguished RU themselvesfromWestand SouthSlavicdialectsofLateCommon Slavic by thelateseventh and eighthcenturies.Thevernacular varietiesofEastSlavic continuedtowitness changes, proceeding primarily from thehistorically cen- tral Carpathian region outwards to thenorthern, northeastern, and eastern peripheries. Aseriousexamination of these changesover time and territory revealsremarkable distinctions that show proto-Ukrainian dialectsdiverging not only from their genetically closerproto-Belarusianand proto-Russian counterparts,but also from proto-Polish as well. Forall theSlaviclanguages, theso-calledjer shift(thereidentification or loss of thecentralized, reduced vowels ъand ь) wasthe last,shared Common Slavic change, one that realignedthe phonology and hencethe morphology of each language area affected. Sweeping across East Slavic from center to periph- ery, thejer shiftset proto-Ukrainian dialectsoffinadirection fundamentally differentfromthatofits neighbors.Among itsimmediateSlavicneighbors, forexample, it is theonly language to have dispalatalizedall consonants (j excepted)before e without intervening boundaryfollowing thejer shift. More broadly,Ukrainian is theonly Slavic language that haspreserved apalatalized c’ (IPA ts’)fromthe Late Common Slavic c’ and that hasdeveloped an upper-mid frontvowelphoneme ÿ from i afterthe jershift. Ourperception of theearly changesinEastSlavicvernacular varietiesis necessarily indirectbecause they werespoken, not written. It wasonly with theofficialintroduction of Christianity in /byPrinceVolodimer that all the East Slavswereable to gain access to thealready rich writtentradition of Old Church Slavonic,aliturgicallanguage devisedbyByzantine missionaries Constantine (Cyril aftertonsure) and Methodiusinthe mid-ninth century on thebasis of their Macedonian Slavic dialect.Inall Slavic landswhereOld Church Slavonic wasintroduced,local features of speech—phonological, morphological, syntactic,lexical—gradually begantoappearinnewly copied texts. It is these occasional careless “errors” or “inconsistencies” in thetexts that offer indirectevidenceoflinguistic change in thevernacular speechofthe scribesthemselves. Oncethislocal variation showsconsiderable innovation as compared to theCyrillo-Methodian idiom, it is moreaccuratelylabeled Church Slavonic. It wasBulgarianChurch Slavonic that wasoriginally introduced to theEast Slavs. Already in theearliest textsfromthe eleventh century, however,East Slavic features areapparentand consistent, asituation that leadsphilologists to describe thelanguage as Rusian Church Slavonic,the writtenlanguage of Kyivan Rus´. Rusian Church Slavonic is thewrittenlanguage usedinall liturgi- caltextsbased on theOld and NewTestaments,hagiography,sermons,prayers, chronicles, translatedhistories,miscellanies, and thelike. From theeleventh century on, Novgorod in thenorthwest established asecular writtentradition on birchbark,using theChurch Slavonic Cyrillic alphabet, but permitting the R RS directexpression of theNovgorod vernacular,already notably differentfrom those in therestofRus´. The Mongol invasion in themid-thirteenth century brought deathand destruction to theRusianlands. Kyiv,the majorcultural and political center of Rus´, wassackedin.Anactive Church Slavonic tradition in Southern Rus´ wascontinued in thewestern regions of Galicia and Volhynia until the mid-fourteenth century, when Galicia wastaken by Poland and most of the remaining regions of Ukraine and Belaruswereincorporatedintothe Grand DuchyofLithuania. The writtentradition of Galicia wassubjecttointense influencefromPolish,whereasthe Lithuanians,devoid of awrittentradition of their own, usedachancerylanguage basedprimarily on thevernacular speechinthe region around Vilna,the capital. Thislanguage is conventionally referred to as Ruthenian and containedprimarily Belarusian features.When Ruthenian wasusedinthe Ukrainian territory of Lithuania, Belarusian features werereplacedbyUkrainian onestovarying degrees. The Union of Lublin in resulted in thecreation of thePolish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Without statesupportRuthenian and Church Slavonic ceased to be viable alternativestoPolish and Latin. Ruthenian in Ukrainian territory lost all traces of Belarusian, adhering to localUkrainian features.Itwas this language, now called prostamova ‘plain talk’, that wassubjectedtoconsiderable Polish influenceand became theprimarywrittenvehicle forsecular genres.A revivalofChurchSlavonic in thesled to thepublication of dictionariesand grammars of Church Slavonic during thenext half century.Itwas in thelate sixteenthcentury that thefirst settlers from Russiabegantoenter thesparsely populated SlobodaUkraine in theeastern frontier,wheretheyencountered Cossacks and refugees from westernUkraine. As aresult of theCossackrevolution of ,the Treaty of Pereiaslav of ,and theTreatyofAndrusovo of ,whichceded most of Right-Bank Ukraine to Poland, Church Slavonic and prostamova werecarried over as the writtenlanguagesofthe CossackHetmanate in Muscovy, with theUkrainian vernacular actually usedextensively in administrative documents on both sidesofthe Dnieper. Additional Russian settlers arrivedinUkraine afterthe Cossackrevolution. Historiesand Cossackchronicleswerewrittenfromthe sthroughthe beginning of theeighteenthcentury.Foremost of these works wasthe East Slavic historycalled Sinopsis (), attributed to Innokentii Gizel´, archi- mandrite of theKyivCaves Monastery,who sought to enlist theprotection of theMuscovite tsar against Polish influence. In this printedwork, widely circulated in Russiathroughout theeighteenthcentury,the author elaborated hisconception of theunity of asingle Orthodox Russian (Slavo-Rus´) people, with thetsars of Muscovyportrayedassuccessors to thegrand princes of Kyiv. Teofan Prokopovychwas one of themanylearned Ukrainians who made their waytoMuscovyand then theRussian Empiretoserve at thetsar’s courtin RU theseventeenth and eighteenthcenturies.Prokopovych became theprimary ideologueofPeter I’simperialreforms and is credited with extending Gizel’s notion of aunifiedRus´(Slavo-Rus´) people to theentireSlavicpopulation of theRussian Empire. By themid-nineteenth centuryProkopovych’s notion of asingle Rus´ nation wastransformedbythe Russian Slavophiles into theconcept of thetriune (triedinyi)Russian people, whichapparentlyencompassed theRussians,the Ukrainians,and theBelarusians.Previouslythe adjective triedinyi had been reserved forthe phrase Triedinyi Bog ‘the triune God’—thatis, theHoly Trinity of theFather,the Son, and theHoly Spirit:three divine persons,distinct, yet of onesubstance, of one essence, and inseparable. ForRussians likeValuev, theperceivedseparability of theUkrainian people and itslanguage wasevi- dentlymorethan simply asignofpolitical and socialrupture; it had spiritual resonance. AfterMazepa’s defeatatPoltavain, theimperialRussian government tightenedits grip on theHetmanate,proscribing theuse of theUkrainian redaction of Church Slavonic in in favor of Russian, whichitselfhad a strong Church Slavonic component. Prosta mova waseventually replaced by Russian as theadministrative language by Catherine II in theearly s, leaving this vernacular-based language forindividual use.Itwas in thelate eighteenthcentury that larger numbers of Russians arrivedtosettleinthe southernregions of Ukraine, calledNew Russia. During thecourseofthe nine- teenthcentury even morecame to northern, central, and easternUkrainian territory,soonconstituting themajority of inhabitants of thetowns and cities experiencing industrialization. It wasthe encounterbetween Ukrainophones and Russophones, primarily in these urban settings, that ledtothe emergence of surzhyk, aUkrainian-based hybrid language with an admixture of Russian grammar and lexicon, alegacy that perseveres in Ukraine to this day. In thewest, thefirst partition of Poland () sawthe creation of thecrown- land of Galicia and Lodomeria in Austria.Thesecond and thirdpartitions of Poland (–)brought most of Right-Bank Ukraine under Russiancontrol. UnlikeRussia, HabsburgAustria permittedthe use of prostamova (Ruthenian) in schoolsand localgovernment, althoughPolish and German continuedto dominate in governmentand education. The Ruthenian elites werelargely Polonizedasopposedtothe vast majority of illiterate Ruthenian peasants. The turn of thenineteenth centurywas significantfor theUkrainian lan- guage on both sidesofthe Romanov-Habsburgborder,now redefinedbythe partitions of Poland. From thesuccess of Kotliarevs´kyi onward to thelater emergenceofromanticismand national revivalinthe Russian Empire, the modernUkrainian language gradually developed,but wasbased now on the southeastern dialects, primarily in Poltava, Kharkiv, and southofKyiv. It was this idiom, further refinedbyShevchenkoand Kulish,thatwas challengedby Valuev. R RS
The romantic movementinGalicia inspired thepublication by the so-calledRuthenian TriadofRusalkaDnistrovaia (TheDniester WaterNymph), an almanac containing Ukrainian folksongs, original poetry, translations, and cultural antiquities, acollection that traditionally marks thebeginning of modernUkrainian literature in Galicia. The use of aphonetically-based orthographyanticipated theso-calledalphabetwars (–)thatresulted in afailedattemptbythe Austriangovernmenttoimpose aLatin-based orthog- raphyonRuthenian. Vernacular-based GalicianRuthenian ultimatelywon out over Ruthenian Church Slavonic (so-called iazychie,containing some vernacular and borrowingsfromRussian and Polish)and Russian itself, aided by thepublication of aUkrainian-German dictionarybyIevhen Zhelekhivs´kyi (), and aRuthenian grammar textbookbyStepanSmal´-Stots´kyi and Theodor Gartner ()withthe zhelekhivka orthographyfromthe dictionary. Despitethe constitutional guaranteeofequal treatmentfor all peoples and languagesinthe Austro-HungarianEmpire, thecompetition with Polish in Galicia alwaysput Ukrainian in aprecariousposition in legalterms. With uneven enforcementofthe ValuevCircularand theEms Decree in Russia, thehighest publication figures forUkrainian books actuallyvacillated between theRussian Empireand AustrianGalicia until ,when Galicia consistentlypublished themost. It wasduring this period that elites on both sidesofthe border begantoapply thetermUkrainian to thevarietiesformerly calledRuthenian and LittleRussian. Despitethe removal of thebans on Ukrainian publication afterthe rev- olution of , theRussian governmentcontinuedtoobstructUkrainian publication throughcensorship, intimidation, blacklisting,and destruction of print runs. Aprotractedstruggle between Galicianand Kyivan orthographic standardsand grammar aroseinthe sand continuedapace throughthe Revolution of ,the short-livedindependenceofthe Ukrainian National Republic of –,and thepartition of Ukraine among Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia,and Romania. The vacillation wasultimately resolvedlargely in favor of theeastern variety(except forthe representation of foreignbor- rowings, and afew morphologicalcategories) during theperiodofUkraini- anization in thelates–earlys. The Kharkivorthography of ,for example, wasthe productofcompromise among academic elites from Galicia and Soviet Ukraine. During this period Ukrainian profited from theappearance of newdictionaries, manuals,and broader use in education. In thewords of George Shevelov:
Ukrainianization reasserted theexistence of Ukrainian as astandard language…, extendedthe masteryofthatstandardlanguagethrough variousstrata of thepopulation, and contributed to itssurvivalduring thecoming years of constraint andpersecution. RU
Stalin’s reversal of Ukrainization in thescoincidentwithcollectiv- ization, theGreat Famine (Holodomor), and theannihilation of most of the Ukrainian intellectualeliteresulted in thelaunching of adeliberate campaign to Russifythe orthography, thegrammar,and thelexicon of Ukrainian in the USSR, to makeUkrainian as close to Russian as possible, and by so doing to undermine itshighly symbolic distinctiveness. As aresult theKharkivorthog- raphywas cast aside in ,withthe specialUkrainian letter ґ for g removed. During WorldWar II,western Ukrainian territories distributed among Poland, Czechoslovakia,Hungary, and RomaniawerealternatelyunderSoviet and German controlfromuntil ,when theRed Army drove the Germans out forthe last time and recaptured them. During theperiods of Soviet control, intensive Russification wasthe order of theday,entailing the liquidation of hundredsofthousandsofUkrainian “bourgeoisnationalists” and theincreasing domination of theRussian language in all formsofmedia, as well as in theclassroom. ThispolicyofRussian dominancecontinueduntil thebreakup of theSovietUnion in . Except forthe westernterritories incorporatedafter thewar,Ukrainian wasseldom heardinurban public spaces. In during theperiodofglasnost and perestroika,the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic passed alaw on languagesestablishing Ukrainian as thesole statelanguage (derzhavna mova), but allowing Russian as well as Ukrainian to function as languagesofinterethnic communication. Thislaw was stillinforce afterindependencein. It guaranteed that Ukrainian would become thesole language of administration, would be introduced as amandatorysecond lan- guage in Russian schools, would eventually become thelanguage of instruction in all institutions of higher education, and would be mandatoryfor all external signage in Ukraine. The lawforesaw extendedperiods of implementation. The constitution preserved thestatusofUkrainian as thesole statelanguage, but made allowances forlanguagesofnational minorities, including Russian, forspecific rights of useineducation, judicialproceedings, and mass media. In thedecadesfollowing independence, and especially afterthe Orange Revolution of ,the Ukrainian language made significantinroads in edu- cation, but less dramatic gains in printmedia,bookpublishing,radio and television broadcasting,and cinema production. In commercialpractice, the Russian language remaineddominant. Russophone opponents of thesuc- cessful spreadofUkrainian triedtouse theEuropeanCharterfor Regional or Minority Languages, originally createdfor theprotection of lesser used languagesinthe face of state-language dominance. Theycynically proposed having Russian, anearlyubiquitoussecond language in modernUkraine, to become thesecondstate language of Ukraine,thuseffectively undermining attempts to strengthen theposition of Ukrainian vis-à-visRussian. Afterthe Orange governmentpermittedthe officialratification of thechar- tertogoforward in , theBlue opposition, ledbyViktor Yanukovych, R RS launchedamovementacrossthe East and SouthtohaveRussian elevated to theeffective status of an officiallanguage of theaffected regional and local governments.This move wasultimatelyunsuccessful, but anticipated abroader struggle to come. OnceYanukovychcame to power,ahotly contestedlanguage law(“On thePrinciplesofthe StateLanguage Policy”)was passed on July by aparliamentthathad dissolvedintofisticuffs. The lawwas criticized by the VeniceCommission of theCouncil of Europe as not in keeping with the Ukrainianconstitution. The language lawallowed forthe establishmentof a“minority language,”including Russian, as an officialregional language. In rawterms,Russian would be able to replace Ukrainian in all functions in any administrative districtinwhichpercentofthe totalpopulation in that dis- trictwereRussian. As Dominique Arel hasassessedit,
Until , abrittle political consensuswas built around thesymbolic preeminenceofUkrainian (Ukrainian as thesole “state” language),state incentivestouse Ukrainian (strong in schools, butweakatworkand in themedia and bookpublishing), and an acceptanceofthe informal oral predominanceofRussian in citiesoutside of WesternUkraine,including in stateinstitutions.The lawshatteredthe political equilibrium by removing stateincentivestolearn anduse Ukrainian.
On February ,the dayafter thefugitive Yanukovych wasofficially removedfromthe presidencybyParliament,thatbodyapprovedabill to repeal the lawand return Ukraine to thestatusquo ante.Althoughthe bill was tabledbythe acting president, Oleksandr Turchynov,and remains unsigned by thecurrent president, PetroPoroshenko, thenet effectofthe repeal motion wastogenerate protests in Russophone regions in thesouthand theeastand to drawcriticismfromthe Council of Europe.Thegovernmentofthe Russian Federation usedthese reactions as apretext to occupy and laterannexCrimea and stokeanarmed insurrection in thesoutheastern regions to “protect” Rus- sian speakers. The battlefor theUkrainian language, traced across centuriesofUkraine’s interaction with itsmorepowerfulneighbors,has ultimatelybecome amet- aphor forthe struggle of independentUkraine itself, lockedinahybridwar with Russiawithnoend in sight.Slightly over acentury and ahalf separates theValuev Circularfromthe currentcrisisinUkraine—bothostensibly based on issuesoflanguage and national identity.Now seems an appropriate time to redirectour attentiontoconsider thepastand future of theUkrainian language and theUkrainian nation in acomparative framework. RU
THMLU
Interestinthe historyofUkrainian derivesfromits dramatic and contradictory movements,whichopenupdifferentcomparative perspectives. Hrushevs´kyi’s democratic, “populistic”solutionofthe nation/people/language nexus, which wasinline with contemporaryEuropeandevelopments,was recast afterthe revolution along Austro-Marxist,Bauerianlines, with theRadaadopting amulti-peoplesconception of thenew Ukrainian Republic,whichrecognized theautonomy and therightsofnational minorities. The national-commu- nist experimentinSovietUkraine, annihilated in the– tragedy of the Holodomor,was predicated on amoreradical reading of the “populist”dis- course, thinly covered by aMarxist veneer that did not preventHrushevs´kyi fromrecognizing itscore. It wasparalleledbythe rapid evolution toward an extreme nationalist option in WesternUkraine, gravitating towardsanexclu- sivistvision of a “Ukraine forUkrainians,” intendedasanethnic blocbonded by ancestry, culture, and language. Moscow brutally repressedbothvisions,trying with some success to emas- culate anynational discussion or project, leaving thenew,post- republic saddledwithaheavy legacy,complicated by thelackofamature—ifcon- flicting—intellectualdebateonwhat “Ukraine” and “Ukrainians” meant. This debate had to be reconstructed after, and is now fully underway,asproven by theattemptsatimagining adifferentand diverse, but inclusive “Ukrainian people” and thetensions they generate. It suffices to read theessaybyJussi Kurunmäkiand Ilkka Liikanen on the Finnish case,however,todiscover that thesame imperial and tsaristenviron- mentallowedfor quitedivergentpaths.Out of averysimilar “people-based” interpretation of thepeople, verydifferentdevelopments could follow. Religion toocould and did play unexpectedly contradictory roles, both supporting and undermining thedevelopmentofthe believers’ languages. In Catalonia, afterFranco’sharsh repression, Catalanreappearedbyway of church leaders speaking at areligiouscelebration; theCatholic Church proved crucialtothe spreadofSlovene and Croatian; and theUkrainian GreekCath- olic Church wasessential to thegrowthofUkrainian in Galicia,also through thesupportoffered—not without initial contradictions—tothe development of vernacular-based education. Yet, in Ireland that veryChurch played an oppositerole formanydecades, thus indirectlycontributing to thespread of English.This spreadwas paradoxically also aidedbythe support, in line with theProtestantstanceinfavor of vernaculars,thatanunpopularAnglican Church offered to education in Gaelic,making sucheducation look suspicious in theeyesofthe Catholic peasantry. The comparisonbetween theUkrainian and theIrish case provestobe particularly germane also on amoregeneral level. Despitebeing driven by R RS differentcauses, and leading to differentoutcomes, thestunting of Ukrainian and Gaelic infavor ofRussian and English presentsanumber ofcommon features operating,however,indifferentcontextsand ways,generally more directinUkraine, whereconsciousstate policiesplayedacrucialrole, and less so in Ireland. In both cases,moreover,inspiteofthe greaterresilienceof Ukrainian vis-à-visGaelic—possibly also theproductofthe aforementioned diversity—while language certainly did not ceasetobe a “flag,”itbecame so in amuchmorenuanced way. In fact the “norm” according to whichlanguage is thestandard-bearerofnational identity looksverydifferentifwelookatit from Dublin or Kyiv (but Astana toocould be mentioned), rather than from theusual Paris, Rome, Budapest, or Prague: manyofpost- Ukrainian or Kazakh Russian speakers,aswellaspost- IrishEnglish speakers,provedto be as solidly Ukrainian, Kazakh,orIrish as theinhabitants of countrieswhere language continuedtobethe main flagand carrier of national identification. Manyofthe comparisons discussedin, or suggested by theessays we pres- ent, allow thereader to morepointedly ask, and partially answer acrucial question: Whatmakes alanguage perspektivnyi or besperspektivnyi,touse the verymarkedRussian terms? By using thematerials presented in theessays here one could drawupalistofusable levers,differentiating theindirectfromthe direct, and thus trytoassessthe respective “virtues” of soft versushardpower. Economic incentives, socialmobility,and theverypossibility of abetter career provedcrucialindifferentcontexts: if in nineteenth-century Ireland “Irishwas ‘the synonym of poverty and misery,and that manyofthe evils from which[Irishmen] suffer aretraceable to itscontinueduse;that, if they could dispose with it altogether,theywould elevatethemselvessocially’… ,” Soviet Jews of thes–s, put thequestion in even starkerterms: “The matterisquitesimple.… Formanyyears Ihavecarried hundredsofpoodson my back dayinand dayout.Now Iwanttolearn some Russian and become a kontorshchik (clerk).” As nineteenth-century Ireland, but also thepost- Soviet Union, or post-Yugoslavia clearlyindicate, leaving suchfactors and feelingsfreeto operate—thatis, allowing “freedom”—could prove veryeffective, and more beneficialtothestrengthening of dominantlanguagesthan adirectlyrepressive environment. Afterthe Bandung conference, Yugoslav and Indian leaders discussedthe parallelism between thelinguistic situations in thetwo coun- tries,withthe former recommending to thelatter “the need never to give the impression of promoting Hindi at theexpenseofother languages, also because ‘even if we do not directlypromoteSerb, Serb gains ground anyway.’” Emigration perspectivesand expectations also played amajor role: it was thinking about Americathatled anti-English Irishpeasants to decide that it was bettertoswitch to English,ortomaketheir children switch.And thesame could be said of theJewsofthe Pale who, afterthe civilwar,saw in theemigra- RU tion to previouslyforbidden Russian cities, and thereforeinRussification, their best chanceofimproving their lot,aswas to happen afew decadeslater in the USSR, whereJewsdesiring to emigrate to theWesteagerly learnedEnglish. Freedom, however,could also workinthe oppositedirection; that is,under- mining theposition of adominantlanguage in favor of previouslydisfavored ones. It wasbystudying theevolution of thesituation in hisown city that KarlKautsky,aJew from Prague and theofficialheir of Marxand Engels, begantounderstand that,contrarytohis teachers’ predictions,moderniza- tion in arelatively free environmentfavored the “resurrection”oflanguages and nationalities,asinthe Czechcase, that Marxand Engels had believed doomedto“thedustbin of history.”Intheir studiesofthe national question in Austria-Hungary, Ludwig Gumplowicz and Otto Bauer weresoontoconfirm this hypothesis,thuslaying thefoundations of Marxism’s newattitude toward the national question that wastofind itsmostmatureexpression in Lenin’s theories and Stalin’s work. Soviet korenizatsiia (indigenization policies) wasthe most notable incar- nation of this newattitude. It had itsprecedents in theHabsburgEmpire’s post- legislation, according to which “Allen Volksstämmen istdie Unver- letzlichkeit ihrer Nationalität und Sprache gewährleistet.” Austria-Hungary thus became thefirst “cradle of nations,”and among some Siberian andCentral Asiangroups, andlater on and not without contradictions inFinland, the Russian Empiretoo came to play asimilar role. As Danylenkoshows, this role wasstrengthenedbydevelopments afterthatwerethe immediate background of Soviet korenizatsiia.Sincetheir verybeginningsthese policies vacillated between two differentand conflicting interpretations.Onthe one hand, tsaristsupportfor native languages could be,and was seen “as ‘the single best conduit’to‘unitethe native tribes within thestreamofall-Russian civilization,’” and Soviet korenizatsiia could be,and was introduced as, “a convenientbureaucratic substitutefor ‘nationalization,’aperfect euphemism to mean less,not morenationalization.”Onthe other,asUkrainian national- communistssoonmade clear, korenizatsiia could also be interpretedasatool forrealnation-building,thuscreating—in spiteofgood intentions—a source of seriousconflictwiththe imperial or federal center,aswas to happen again in Indiaafter . We have thus come to thepanoply of the direct levers available to alter the situation of alanguage and itsrelationshipstoother languages. These levers include, of course, theconsciousalteration of normand status,which—asthese essays repeatedly indicate—did operate,and must thereforebeanalyzed, both in apositive (“constructive”) and negative (“deconstructive”) way. The “build- ing”ofSerbo-Croat(but also of Neo-Italian with Manzoni in thenineteenth century), theprogram elaboratedbythe Prague School of thes, and that implementedbyUkrainian national-communistsinthe s, or by Tamil or R RS
Kannadaleaders in thes, must not makeusforgetthatdirectlevers were also usedtoundermine languagesand their positions,toweakentheir norms and statuses. The post-counter-Ukrainization, whichincludedchangesinalphabet, lexicon, and normtobring Ukrainian closertoRussian and wasaccompa- niedbythe intentionaldestruction of theUkrainian national political and intellectualelites,isaglaring example of theextremestowhichthe use of suchdirectlevers canbetaken. The Nazisplannedand startedtoimplement something similar towardsSlaviclanguagesand elites,and English discrimi- natory policiesinseventeenth-and eighteenth-century Ireland pushed,albeit moreindirectly, towardsthe same outcome. In Ireland, where “theFamine (GortaMór)may well have beenthe tipping point” in theprocess whichled to thedramatic weakening of Gaelic; in – Kazakhstan; and in – Ukraine, hunger also came to play acentral role in the “deconstruction”ofthe language situation. If famine produced suchanoutcome in an unintendedway in both Ireland and Kazakhstan, we now know that in Ukraine hunger was consciouslyusedto solve simultaneouslyboththe peasantand thenational questions. In this per- spective Stalin canbeseenasthe foremost,and most “complete”manipulator of languagesinmodernhistory:fromthe battles to defend and extol Georgian in hisyouthand hismassive contribution to the “constructive” korenizatsiia of thestothe draconian subjugation and alteration of Ukrainian after, coupledwiththe conscioususe of famine and repression to uprootits rural and intellectualfoundations,uptohis reflections upon thesuperior staying power of nations vis-à-visclasses found in his writingsonlinguistics.
CUSS
Most of theessays herestressthe unpredictability of outcomes; that is,the elasticity of history. The relationship of theJewishpeople to their languages afteranextraordinarily dynamic processofdecentering,inwhichthe relative importanceoflanguage and thespiritual/social/habitualpatterns and artifacts of theidentity wereslowly reversed,isagood,ifextreme, case in point. As Zvi Gitelman acutelyobserves, “Acentury or moreago, German wasthe language spoken at world Zionist congresses,and Yiddish wasthe lingua francaofEast European Jews in their native lands, theAmericas and parts of WesternEurope. Later, Hebrew became thelanguage of theJewishstate.Ithas not become the language of theJewishpeople. As in thepast, language is not critical to Jewish identity.” In her essayonSerbian and Croatian, AnitaPeti-Stantić providesaninter- esting hypothesis forthe cause of suchelasticity,focusing on thepossible RU convergenceand conflicts generatedbythe relationshipsbetween “thegiven (meaning thedialectal) base [ofalanguage] and theconsciouslydeveloped superstructure.” The role of history—that is,circumstances—and human agencyisthusstressed, as is in Crowley’sanalysisoftheprogressive mar- ginalization of Irish, in whichthe emergenceofanunforeseeable circum- stance, thepossibility to emigrate to an English-speaking,but no moreEnglish country, played acrucialrole. In Kazakhstan sucharole was played by the Moscow-induced,but not consciouslywilled, terrible tragedy of –, whichuprootedthe traditional Kazakh society,marking adeepbreak also in thehistory of theKazakhlanguage. The portim anceofthe recent,complex demographic dynamicsofWestern societies, energizedatfirst by apeasant-fed boomthatsubmergedthe cities, and then hit by itsrather rapid draining, whichleftthe door open to immigration from outside, is insteadstressedby theQuebec experience. Over thecourseofthe twentieth century, Quebec’s Frenchpeasants wereable to linguistically “re-conquer” Montreal as well, only to seetheir victorythreatenedbynew wavesofimmigration, an experience that generatedcomplex legislative answers,suchasthe CanadianCharter of Rightsand Freedom. Quebec’s,and specifically Montreal’s,history is but an example of the multiple possibilitiesopenedbyalinguistic reversal of status;thatis, by what happens when thepreviouslydominantlanguage—English in thecaseof Montreal—becomesthe language that comestobeperceivedasthatofthe colonial oppressor.Thetieswiththe experience of thenation-building version of Soviet korenizatsiia in thesand s, whichoften antagonizedRus- sians,aswellaswithdecolonization in general, arepatent, as is theplurality of outcomesgenerated by intrinsically similar conditionsthatprovide the groundsfor general interpretationsand categories, andyet also stressthe need to consider each individual case in itsspecificity.Thefailures and successes of thepoliciesimplementedbythe leaders of thepreviouslylinguistically (and not only) oppressedcommunitiesare acaseinpoint: Ireland after and in thesstandsincontrast to Quebec’s relative success,and thepost-Soviet spaceopens aviewover agreat diversity of approaches and solutions coming out of thesame past,asthe experiences of theBaltic republics, Belarus, or Kazakhstan show.Oncemore, thequestion of whichpoliciesare themost effective emerges. In general, one is temptedtoshareCrowley’sopinion that “power cantakemanyforms and maybeatits most effective when operating indirectly,”yet thereare unquestionably cases in whichnot to operate directly mayseemtoleadtoirreversible losses. Nonetheless, as theexperiences of Ireland, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine con- firm, language is not theonly,and at timesnot even themostimportant, “flag” of national identity and independence. And one mayeasily conceive of policiesinspired by apolitical, inclusive conceptofnational belonging in R RS whichlinguistic freedom and diversity maycoincide with strong—and even ethnically but not linguistically based—identity feelings, as recent events in easternand southernUkraine seem to indicate. The essays herealso stressthe importanceof, and theopportunitiesoffered by,evading theconstrictedbilingualconfrontational stance. The Soviet,Yugo- slav,and Indian (in itsHindi-based narration) experiences areall cases in which theactualorwould-bedominantlanguage pressedfor amultiple, bilingual model—Russian, Serbo-Croatian or Hindi vis-à-visthisorthat “minor”lan- guage—relegating thelattertoaninferior position, and feeding arrogance on theone hand, and resentmentorimpotenceonthe other. The Indian “trilingualplus” solution (Hindi and English,plusnational and possibly local languages), whichcame out of thestrugglesofthe late sand earlys, offers an opportunity to open amuchfreer space. Obviously, it is not a “natural” solution, but one in need of human agencytoaffirmitself. Yet, thecoming of age of English as thenew international vehicular language makes suchasolu- tion available in aplurality of contextstoday,creating thepossibility of breaking out of theoppressive bilingualscheme, easing thetensions between theold contenders,and promoting thepartial dislodging of thepreviouslydominant language. Howthese alternativesmight fare in thebattlefor Ukrainian remains to be seen.
NS
. Videoofthe conferences canbeaccessed at http://www.huri.harvard.edu/events/ conferences-symposia/-states-peoples-languages.html. .MichaelS.Flier, “Ukrainian —Russian: PolesApart?” in this volume. .JohannesRemy, “Against AllOdds: Ukrainianinthe Russian Empire in theSecond Half of theNineteenthCentury,” in this volume. .Theoriginal Russian text of thecircularand theEms Decree is reproduced in AlexeiMiller, The UkrainianQuestion:TheRussian Empire andNationalism in the Nineteenth Century (Budapest: Central European University Press, ), appendices –, –.TheEnglish translation by OlgaPaoto is providedhere with slight alterations. .Dominique Arel, “Language, Status,and StateLoyalty in Ukraine,”inthisvolume. .Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar,Jr., “Ukraine andthe Dialecticsof Nation-building,” Slavic Review ,no. (), –. .Flier, “Ukrainian —Russian.” .Itistelling that theRussophiles in Galicia,who believedinthe notion of one Rus´ people,referredtoitinTrinitarianterms as edinaiainedelimaia ‘unitary and indivisible’; seePaulR.Magocsi, “The Language Question in Nineteenth-Century RU
Galicia,” in Aspectsofthe Slavic Language Question,vol. : East Slavic,ed. Riccardo Picchio and Harvey Goldblatt (NewHaven:Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies, ), . .Onsurzhyk,see MichaelS.Flier, “Surzhyk: The RulesofEngagement,”inCultures andNationsofCentral andEastern Europe: Essays in Honor of RomanSzporluk, ed.Zvi Gitelman et al.(Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUkrainian Research Insti- tute, [= HarvardUkrainianStudies []), –;idem, “Suržyk or suržyks,” in BelarusianTrasjanka andUkrainianSuržyk: Structural andSocial Aspects of TheirDescription andCategorization, ed.GerdHentschel andSiarhiej Zaprudski(Oldenburg: BIS-Verlag der Carl vonOssietzkyUniversität Oldenburg. [= StudiaSlavica Oldenburgensia ], –;and LaadaBilaniuk, Contested Tongues: Language Politicsand CulturalCorrection in Ukraine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ), –. .MichaelA.Moser, “The Fate of the‘Ruthenian or LittleRussian’(Ukrainian) Lan- guage in AustrianGalicia,–,” in this volume. .ThetermRuthenian Triadreferstothe editors of thealmanac,MarkiianShash- kevych,Iakov Holovats´kyi,and Ivan Vahylevych. .Jan Fellerer, “UkrainianinAustria-Hungary(–)and Interwar Eastern Europe (–),”inthisvolume. .Remy, “Against All Odds.” .Andrii Danylenko, “The ‘Doubling of Hallelujah’for the‘Bastard Tongue’: The Ukrainian Language Question in Russian Ukraine, –,” in this volume. .See Bohdan Krawchenko, SocialChangeand NationalConsciousness in Twentieth Century Ukraine (London: Macmillan Press, ), –;GeorgeY.Shevelov, The Ukrainian Language in the FirstHalfofthe Twentieth Century (–): ItsState andStatus (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, ),–; TerryMartin, The rmAffi ative Action Empire:Nationsand Nationalism in the Soviet Union, – (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ), –;Henna- dii Yefimenko, “BolshevikLanguage PolicyasaReflection of theIdeas andPractice of Communist Construction, –,” in this volume. .Shevelov, Ukrainian Language, . .Yurii Shapoval, “The Ukrainian Language under Totalitarianism and TotalWar,” in this volume. .Simone A. Bellezza, “WingstoLiftthe TruthUpHigh: The Role of Language for theShistdesiatnyky,” in this volume. .Dominique Arel, “Language PoliticsinIndependentUkraine:Towards Oneor TwoState Languages?” NationalitiesPapers ,no. (): . .See thefollowing articlesinLanguage Policyand Language Situation in Ukraine: Analysisand Recommendations,ed. Juliane Besters-Dilger (Frankfurt-am-Main: PeterLang, ): Oksana Kalynovs´ka, “Language Situation in Education,” –; Juliane Besters-Dilger, “Language Policyinthe Mass Media,” –; R RS
NadyaTrach, “Language Policy and Language Situationinthe Sphere of Legal Proceedingsand Office Administration in Ukraine,” –;and Volodymyr Kulyk, “Language Policiesand Language AttitudesinPost-OrangeUkraine,”–. . Kulyk, “Language Policies,” –. .Arel, “Language, Status,and State Loyalty in Ukraine.”For an exhaustive account of events leadinguptothe law’spassage,see Michael Moser, Language Policy and the DiscourseonLanguages in Ukraineunder President Yanukovych (February –October ),Sovietand Post-SovietPolitics andSociety (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, ). .Jussi Kurunmäkiand Ilkka Liikanen, “The Formationofthe Finnish Polity within theRussian Empire: Language, Representation, and theConstruction of Popular Political Platforms, –,” in this volume. .MontserratGuibernau, “Catalonia:PortraitofaDictatorship,”paper presented at theHURIconference. .Tomasz Kamusella, “The Rise andDynamics of theNormative Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and StateinCentral Europe,” in this volume. .Patrick Sériot, “Language PolicyasaPolitical Linguistics: The Implicit Modelof Linguistics in theDiscussion on theNorms of Ukrainian and Belarusian in the s,”inthisvolume. .TonyCrowley, “Language, Politicsand theState(s): Reflections from Ireland”; and ZviGitleman, “The DivergentFatesofYiddish andHebrew,”inthisvolume. .Andrea Graziosi, “Indiaand theSovietModel:TheLinguistic StateReorganization and theProblem of Hindi,”inthisvolume. .R.Gallissot, “Nazioneenazionalitànei dibattiti delmovimento operaio,”inStoria del Marxismo,vol. , Il marxismo nell’età della SecondaInternazionale,(Torino: Einaudi, ), –;L.Gumplowicz, Das Rechtder Nationalitätenund Sprachen in ÖsterreichUngarn (Innsbruck:Wagner, ); O. Bauer, The Question of Nationalities andSocialDemocracy, trans.JosephO’Donnell (Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress, ); A. Graziosi, “Communism and Nationalism,” to be published in vol. ofthe Cambridge HistoryofCommunism. .Moser, “Fate of the‘RuthenianorLittleRussian’(Ukrainian)Language”; and Kurunmäkiand Liikanen, “Formation of theFinnish Polity”; Ronald G. Suny, The Revenge of the Past:Nationalism,Revolution,and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, ). . MichaelG.Smith, “An Empire of Substitutions:TheLanguage Factor in theRussian Revolution”;Danylenko, “‘Doubling of Hallelujah’for the‘BastardTongue’”; Martin, Affirmative Action Empire;Ramachandra Guha, Indiaafter Gandhi:TheHistory of the World’s LargestDemocracy (London: Picador, ). .Shapoval, “Ukrainian Language under Totalitarianism and TotalWar”; Yefimenko, “BolshevikLanguage Policy”;Crowley, “Language,Politicsand theState(s)”; Andrea Graziosi, “The Uses of Hunger:Stalin’s Solution of thePeasant andthe National Question in Soviet Ukraine, –,” in Famines in EuropeanEco RU
nomic History,ed. D. Curran,L.Luciuk, A. Newby(London:Routledge, ), –;William Fierman and LubomyrHajda, “National Delimitation in Soviet Central Asia andthe Fashioning of ModernUzbek,” paperpresented at theHURI conference. .Gitelman, “DivergentFates of Yiddish andHebrew.” .AnitaPeti-Stantić, “Whenthe West Meetsthe East:SlaviaRomana at theCross- roads”;RobertD.Greenberg, “When is Language aLanguage? The Case of Former Yugoslavia,” in this volume. .FrançoisCharbonneau, “The ArtofDefiningLinguistic MinoritiesinQuebec and Canada,”inthisvolume; John Schoeberlein, “Kazakh National Language against theDominanceofRussian,”paper presented at the HURI conference. .Martin Ehala, “AfterStatusReversal: The UseofTitular Languagesand Russian in theBaltic Countries”; Bohdan Azhniuk, “Ukrainian Language Legislation in the National Crisis”; LaadaBilaniuk, “Purismand Pluralism: Language UseTrendsin Popular CultureinUkraine sinceIndependence”; and VolodymyrKulyk, “Language AttitudesinIndependent Ukraine: Differentiation and Evolution,”inthisvolume. .See,for instance, Walker Connor, The NationalQuestion in MarxistLeninist Theoryand Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ), –.