HarvardUkrainianStudies ,no. – (–): –. Introduction MH S. FR AR GRS W RS HR H RS of the conference States, Peoples, Languages: A Comparative Political History of Ukrainian, –, organized by the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI) at Harvard in June with the support of the Ukrainian Studies Fund. The bulk of the conference papers are published in this volume, and we have included an additional essay on the language question in Ukraine in the s. The essential goal of the conference, developed with the crucial contribution of Dr. Lubomyr Hajda, was straightforward and ambitious: HURI should go beyond the commemoration of the 5th anniversary of the Valuev Circular, which repressed the use of Ukrainian in the Russian Empire, to venture into a comparative, political history of Ukrainian not lim- ited to the circular’s impact in the late nineteenth century. Rather the Valuev document was to be taken as a springboard for examining issues that find their continuation, in changing circumstances, all the way to the present: from the late tsarist period to the chaotic years of war, revolution, and short-lived inde- pendence, from Soviet rule (in both its “moderate” and Stalinist manifestations) to the emergence of an independent Ukraine, laden still with the contradictions of its imperial Russian and Soviet legacies. Moreover, this history had to be situated in a long-term perspective, capable of shedding light on the origins of the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian languages. The task clearly required an approach that could not be limited to the confines of one discipline. The Valuev Circular dealt with issues of language, and so had a direct connection to language study and philology, including the internal development of Ukrainian and its relationship, specifically, to Russian. But it also dealt with the function of language in society, and thus is the proper subject of sociolinguistics. It further dealt with the use of Ukrainian in writing and publishing—and hence intersects with literature. It did so within the framework of a particular political system—and thus is subject to analysis from the standpoint of political science. And all of these generic associations possessed a clear historical context. The conference was thus to be based upon R RS interdisciplinaryfoundations:linguists, historians of languages, sociolinguists, literaryspecialists, historians,and political scientistswereinvited to partic- ipate. It wasalso clearthatthe study of Ukrainian-specific language issueswould greatlyprofit if viewed in acomparative frameworkwithother analogous cases, and not only those in theimmediateEastEuropeanneighborhood. Highand low status with their resultantattitudes, bilingualism and diglossia, statepoliciesofpromotion and repression of one versusanother language, and similar areasoflinguistic interaction prevailedand prevail in varying degrees in manystates. Much could thus be learnedfromthe juxtaposition of some, even unusualand unexpected, cases:the conferenceovertlyaimedatapplying thecomparative method to theUkrainian case. From theinterdisciplinaryand comparative paradigms it followedthatthe conferencehad to be basedonscholarly collaboration on awide international scale. Papers on countriesnot usually associated with comparative Slavic or regional East European studies—Ireland, Catalonia, Canada, India, Kazakh- stan—weresolicited, specifically those whose experiences mayhaveexhibited features in common with,orininstructive contrast to,their Ukrainian counter- parts.Apart from theintellectualbenefitsofsuchcross-fertilization, theidea wastofirmly placethe Ukrainian experienceinawider international context, pointing to itsrelevancefor thestudy and theunderstanding of anumber of keyquestions. The conference, which, in thewords of one of theparticipants, “wasa genuinely interdisciplinary, intellectualexperience,”tookplace at theheight of aRussian-Ukrainian conflictinwhichlanguage played acrucialrole, as a political pretext and tool, as well as an occasion forindividual and collective reflections about itsmeaning in defining cultural and national identitiesand allegiances.This could not help but give aspecialand immediaterelevance to thecomparative discussion of acontrasted history. The relationshipswith Russian, and theMoscow-basedpolitical power promoting it,wereclearly at itscore. Yet, as events in theDonbas and thecountryatlarge wereconfirming once morebeforeour veryeyes, Ukrainian also providedamost interesting case of whathas been acommon storyofempiredisintegration/re-formation and statebuilding theworld over,anarrative in whichlanguageshavebeen “planned,”promoted,standardized, and repressed, or have learnedtocoexist in multilingualcommunities. The volume followsthisstory on two planes. On theone hand, it recon- structsUkrainian’s oftendramatic development, especially in itsrelationship with Russian. On theother,itcomparesthe fate of Ukrainian with that of languagesthatwentthroughoccasionally similar,but also divergentexperi- ences,suchasGaelic,Finnish,orthe Baltic language family.Complexsituations of multilingualcoexistenceand conflict, suchasthe Austro-Hungarian, the Yugoslav,and theIndian examples, providedadditional fertile ground forcom- RU parisons vis-à-visthe Russian/Sovietcase, thus contributing to theelaboration of interesting hypothesesofatheoretical, speculative nature. In this introduction we touchuponsome of themostsalientproblems raisedatthe conference, and discuss some of thehypothesesderivedfrom their analysistogive thereader an ideaofthe richness and diversity,and yet theinner coherence, of theissuesexamined. We do it in two sections,devoted respectively to thespecificsofthe Ukrainian case and to some of itsmost notable and enlightening similaritiesand differences with thedevelopmentof other languages. Thisoverview leadstoadiscussion of thecultural and political malleability of language, both in thepositive, “constructive” sense, and in the negative, “destructive” alternative. Ourconclusions stressthe unpredictability of outcomesand theelasticity of history. THCRU OURK H HSR UR The ValuevCircular()and theeven moresevereEms Decree (, amended) were amongthe manytools and methodsemployedbythe imperial Russian governmenttoreversethe upwards trajectoryofthe Ukrainian language towardsfull functionality as astandardlanguage. Unfortunately, such apattern of resistanceand overtinterference, justifiedbycultural mythology, whether Russian or Soviet,has persisted to thepresent day. To understand the battlefor Ukrainian, one must consider thesourcesand itshistory over time. Petr Valuevwas well awareofthe cultural rise of Ukrainian, noting in the circular that the “LittleRussian”language (the term used forUkrainian in the Russian Empire) wasappropriate forbelles-lettrescomposedbytalented, even original, writers forthe educated elites of SouthernRussia. But expanding the scopeofLittleRussian to nonfiction, and to educational and religiousmaterials forthe unenlightenedmasses,the common folk,was construedaspolitically dangerous, especially in light of theunrestgeneratedbythe emancipation of theserfs in and the Polish uprising.Ukrainian activists could use theincreasing prominenceofthe Ukrainian language as asymbolic flag representing an independentUkraine of thefuture. Valuev, whose view was not shared by all in thegovernment, would nip this possibility in thebud by instituting asecretban. Aside from effectively banning Ukrainian from public use, Valuevfeltit necessarytoundermine thelanguage along with potentialUkrainian inde- pendencebydemeaning Ukrainian in strictlyimperialterms: They[themajority of LittleRussians expressing their opinions in the press] prove with greatconviction that therehas not been, is not,and cannot be anyspecialLittleRussian language, and that theirdialect R RS as usedbythe common folk is theverysameRussian language, only corrupted by Poland’s influenceonit; andthatthe Common Russian language is as comprehensible to Little Russians as it is to GreatRussians, and even much morecomprehensible than theso-calledUkrainian language composedfor them by certainLittleRussians and especially by Poles. On theone hand, one perceivesthatValuevwas formalizing aviewofthe Ukrainian language as separatist in itsessence,disloyal to theRussian state, and athreattothatstate’s unity, “composed” on purpose under foreignsuper- vision (a view to whichStalin subscribed in , and one that still perseveres in Moscow circles and among apartofthe monolingualRussophonesofthe Donbas today). On theother hand, one cannot help but noticethe stunning contradiction in Valuev’sown presentation of thestatusofthe LittleRussian language—now you seeit(in LittleRussian literature), now you don’t (in any- thing else). Valuevachievesthissleight-of-hand using thepolitically and sociologically loaded term dialect forLittleRussian/Ukrainian in opposition to theelevated term language forCommon Russian, thestandardRussian language, which itself had beguntodevelop only in theearly eighteenthcentury out of an amalgam of chancerylanguage, Moscow dialectal vernacular,and Church Slavonic.That malleable composition wasstretched and proddedthroughout thecentury with numerous foreignborrowingsand calques(oftenthrough Polish,Belarusian, and Ukrainian intermediaries)until it wasrefinedduring theage of Pushkininthe s–s. Ukrainian had startedalong itsown path towardsstandardization at theend of theeighteenthcentury. As farascomprehension is concerned, Valuev’sclaims forCommon Russian (thatis, Russian) areanachronistic.Inthe mid-nineteenth century, it wasthe urban