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Oleg Deripaska Has Struggled for Legitimacy in the United States, Where He Has Been Dogged by Civil Lawsuits Questioning the Methods He Used to Build That Empire
The Globe and Mail (Canada) May 11, 2007 Friday Preferred by the Kremlin, shunned by the States BYLINE: SINCLAIR STEWART, With a report from Greg Keenan in Toronto SECTION: NEWS BUSINESS; STRONACH'S NEW PARTNER: 'ONE OF PUTIN'S FAVOURITE OLIGARCHS'; Pg. A1 LENGTH: 957 words DATELINE: NEW YORK He is perhaps the most powerful of Russia's oligarchs, a precocious - some would say ruthless - billionaire, who built his fortune against the bloody backdrop of that country's "aluminum wars" in the 1990s. He has nurtured close ties to the Kremlin, married the daughter of former president Boris Yeltsin's son-in-law, amassed an estimated $8-billion in personal wealth and built a corporate empire that stretches from metals and automobiles to aircraft and construction. Yet for all his success at home, 39-year-old Oleg Deripaska has struggled for legitimacy in the United States, where he has been dogged by civil lawsuits questioning the methods he used to build that empire. Mr. Deripaska has repeatedly denied allegations levelled against him, and he has not been specifically accused by American authorities of any crime. However, these whispers about shady business dealings may raise concerns about his $1.5-billion investment in Canada's Magna International, not to mention Magna's attempts to win control of DaimlerChrysler, an iconic American company. The United States has recently shown protectionist proclivities, citing national security concerns to quash both a Chinese state-owned oil company's bid for Unocal Ltd. and a planned acquisition of U.S. port service contracts by Dubai Ports World. -
Company News SECURITIES MARKET NEWS LETTER Weekly
SSEECCUURRIIITTIIIEESS MMAARRKKEETT NNEEWWSSLLEETTTTEERR weekly Presented by: VTB Bank, Custody March 29, 2018 Issue No. 2018/11 Company News Russian antitrust allows Onexim Group to buy 100% in IFC Bank On March 23, 2018 it was reported that Russia’s Federal Antimonopoly Service allowed Mikhail Prokhorov’s Onexim Group to acquire a 100% voting stake in International Financial Club (IFC Bank). According to the central bank, Prokhorov owns 27.74% in IFC Bank through Cyprus-based Onexim Holdings Ltd. Winterlux of Viktor Vekselberg owns 19.71%, businessman Alexander Abramov holds 39.42% and Yekaterina Ignatova 13.14%. Central bank orders Asian-Pacific Bank to change owners, up capital On March 23, 2018 it was announced that the central bank asked Asian-Pacific Bank, Russia’s 60th largest bank by assets as of February 1, to change shareholders, the largest of which is former owner of retailer Azbuka Vkusa Andrei Vdovin, and to raise its shareholder equity before April. Previously, the central bank allowed Asian-Pacific Bank to delay provision of reserves against a loan provided to defunct subsidiary M2M Private Bank to the beginning of 2018, but the bank created reserves only against 80% of the loan. Asian- Pacific Bank asked for more time, and the regulator set the deadline for March 31. The reserves will also force the bank to raise capital in line with the central bank’s orders. After the failure of M2M Private Bank, the regulator ordered owners of Asian-Pacific Bank to cut their stakes in the bank to no more than 10%. Previously, Vdovin, Alexei Maslovsky, and Peter Hambro owned 22.5% in the bank each, but in December 2017 they cut their stakes to a combined stake of 8.24% controlled through company PPFIN Region, while British Virgin Islands registered company Shelmer Holding Ltd acquired 31.8% in the bank. -
Medvedev Succession
BR POLIC IEF MEETING MEDVEDEV: Y THE POLITICS OF THE PUTIN SUCCESSION Andrew Wilson SU On 2 March, Russians will in all probability elect Dmitry Dmitry Medvedev’s election on 2 March 2008 offers EU leaders a new chance to overcome their disunity and Medvedev as their new president. A 42 year-old, English- put their uncertain Russia policy on a better foundation. speaking, economically literate lawyer, often described as a Whatever his personal inclinations, Medvedev will be “liberal”, the ex-chairman of Gazprom cuts a different figure unable to behave like a democrat in his first years in office. MMARY from Putin and his political mentor’s KGB acolytes. Will his EU leaders should cautiously welcome the new president’s election bring a new start for EU-Russian relations? Or will election, but must wait and see whether Medvedev proves a willing interlocutor who can deliver. They should refrain it be more of the same - “Putinism without Putin”? Does from the foolish enthusiasm they displayed when the Medvedev represent a new opportunity, or false hope? sober and coherent Putin succeeded the ailing Yeltsin in 2000. Instead they should test Medvedev with specific This policy brief addresses four questions, each prompted demands over energy policy, Kosovo, and Iran. by one of the salient features of the system developed Medvedev, a lawyer by training, has often been depicted by Putin in Russia: Will Medvedev act like a democrat? as a “liberal”. Considering the alternatives and his own How will the proposed cohabitation with Putin work? record, he may well be one of the better options to succeed Will Medvedev eventually be his own man? And will Vladimir Putin, the outgoing autocratic president. -
Ingushetia: Building Identity, Overcoming Conflict
INGUSHETIA: BUILDING IDENTITY, OVERCOMING CONFLICT Anna Matveeva and Igor Savin Introduction The Republic of Ingushetia is the smallest in terms of territory of Russia’s republics, and numbers 412,997 inhabitants. 1 It was established on 4 June 1992 as a result of the separation from the dual-nationality Checheno-Ingushetia. A large part of the republic is taken by high mountains, the highest peak is 4451m, and the remaining part has a high population density. Birth rates are high and having six or seven children is common in rural areas. All Ingushetia’s leaders came from a security background. General Ruslan Aushev became the first president, but in 2001 was removed by Moscow and replaced with Murat Zyazikov, who was elected to the presidency in controversial circumstances in May 2002. In October 2008 Zyazikov was dismissed. General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov was nominated by President Medvedev and approved as president by the People’s Assembly of Ingushetia. Ethnic Ingush oligarch in Moscow Mikhail Gutseriyev, co- owner of Russneft, and his relatives are among the richest people in Russia. There is no major industry or budget revenue source in the republic, and it is subsidised by the federal centre. Local opinions perceive the republic’s facilities and infrastructure as backward, although field observation did not confirm this. Roads and public buildings have been constructed, communication systems work and housing is of good standard. Consumer goods are on sale and people appear able to buy them. However, there are fewer municipal buildings, such as social clubs and libraries, and overwhelming dissatisfaction with medical facilities. -
Russian Advocacy Coalitions
Russian Advocacy Coalitions A study in Power Resources This study examines the advocacy coalitions in Russia. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it looks at the power resource distribution amongst the coalitions, and how this distribution affects Russian foreign policy. The power resources examined are: Formal Legal Authority; Public Opinion; Information; Mobilizable Troops; and Financial Resources. In addition to this, the study used quantitative and qualitative methods to identify these resources. There are a couple of conclusions we may draw from this study. The method is useful in identifying power resources. It is not enough to use only the distribution of resources amongst coalitions in order to explain policy changes. It is found that the distribution of resources, coupled with coalition interaction, is enough to explain changes in Russian foreign policy. KEYWORDS: Advocacy Coalition Framework, Russia, Power Resources, Natural Gas WORDS: 24,368 Author: Robert Granlund Supervisor: Fredrik Bynander Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 PURPOSE .................................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................................ 2 1.3 OUTLINE.................................................................................................................................. -
Company News SECURITIES MARKET NEWS LETTER Weekly
SSEECCUURRIIITTIIIEESS MMAARRKKEETT NNEEWWSSLLEETTTTEERR weekly Presented by: VTB Bank, Custody June 28, 2018 Issue No. 2018/23 Company News Safmar says no plans to further cut stake in M.Video On June 22, 2018 Said Gutseriyev, chairman of M.Video’s board of directors and a member of Safmar’s board of directors, stated that Russian financial group Safmar did not plan to further reduce its stake in electronics retailer M.Video. Media-Saturn-Holding (MediaMarktSaturn), controlled by German retailer Ceconomy, said on June 20 it agreed to acquire a 15% stake in M.Video from Safmar of businessman Mikhail Gutseriyev and transfer its Russian business, Media Markt stores, to Safmar. The value of the deal is estimated at EUR 258 mln. As a result of the deal, Safmar’s stake in M.Video fell to 42.7%. Safmar does not plan a further expansion in the retail sector and is not considering any additional acquisitions. The group does not expect any problems with the Federal Antimonopoly Service over M.Video’s acquisition of the Media Markt chain, as believes that the purchase will not significantly raise its market share. He also said that M.Video could resume paying dividends after 2019. In late May, M.Video’s board of directors recommended paying no dividends for 2017. The planned increase of value-added tax (VAT) to 20% from 18% will not significantly impact prices for household appliances and electronics. MGTS holders elect new board of directors, now only MTS executives On June 22, 2018 shareholders of Moscow City Telephone Company (MGTS), a fixed line unit of mobile operator MTS, elected at an annual general meeting a new board of directors, which now comprises only MTS representatives. -
Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries
Order Code RL34261 Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries Updated March 27, 2008 Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries Summary Russian oil and natural gas industries are increasingly important players in the global energy market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Another trend has been the increasing concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government. This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an increasingly authoritarian political system, in which former intelligence officers play key roles. Russian firms have tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of the countries of central and eastern Europe. They need these assets to transport energy supplies to lucrative western European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where assets were sold to non-Russian firms, Russian firms cut off energy supplies to the facilities. Russia has also tried to build new pipelines to circumvent infrastructure that it does not control. Another objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by raising the price these countries pay for natural gas to world market prices. It is not completely clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is the primary explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions have been raised about the timing of such moves. -
Russian Federation – Yabloko – Treatment of Supporters – Tax Investigations
Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE Research Response Number: RUS32923 Country: Russian Federation Date: 27 February 2008 Keywords: Russian Federation – Yabloko – Treatment of supporters – Tax investigations This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein. Questions 1. Please provide information on fate of Yabloko Party supporters from 2003 to present. 2. What are the procedures for investigating tax offences? Who are the investigators? Where are the people interviewed? 3. Where are the tax offices located in Moscow? 4. What are the summons and charge procedures for tax offences? 5. Is there a “black list” for people wanted for tax offences when departing Russia? RESPONSE 1. Please provide information on fate of Yabloko Party supporters from 2003 to present. Information on this question is provided under the following sub-headings: Information on the Yabloko Party Funding of the Yabloko Party Treatment of Yabloko supporters since 2003 Information on the Yabloko Party The Yabloko Party is a liberal democratic party in Russia. Although it is well established, Yabloko has been marginalised in Russian politics and has a relatively low level of support. It did not win any seats in the Duma elections held in December 2007. -
FROM SUGAR BEETS to BANKING: Rusagro's Rise As a Russian
FROM SUGAR BEETS TO BANKING: Rusagro’s Rise as a Russian Conglomerate June 14, 2010 1 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com FROM SUGAR BEETS TO BANKING: Rusagro’s Rise as a Russian Conglomerate Summary Rusagro is one of Russia’s largest agro-industrial holding companies, dealing mainly in sugar, oil and agricultural land. Starting as an intermediary for sugar producers and traders in the former Soviet states, Rusagro’s founder, Vadim Moshkovich, quickly used a sharp eye for opportunities and connections with established and rising businessmen throughout the region to grow Rusagro into a major force in Russia’s agricultural sector. Moshkovich himself has risen from low-level mercantile exchange worker to member of the elite Russian billionaire club and senator. He has been careful in cultivating powerful allies throughout the Kremlin and in powerhouses like Sberbank to promote his or his companies’ interests while holding the same tight-knit circle of loyalists around him for decades. At the end of the day, Moshkovich is interested in profit, and though Rusagro has been his mainstay for more than 15 years, he wants either to continue expanding it across Russia and the former Soviet states or start selling it off -- should the price be right. A Brief History As one of Russia’s largest agro-industrial holding companies, Rusagro has interests in more than 35 farms, seven sugar plants, eight regional trade branches, an oilseed refinery and dairy and pig-farming assets. A member of the Union of Sugar Producers of Russia, Rusagro is known mainly for its sugar and packaged margarine and mayonnaise, which is produced through 35 subsidiaries under well- known Russian brands such as Shchedroye Leto, Chaykovskiy, Khoroshiy and Brauni. -
Russia Beyond Putinrussia Samuel A
Dædalus Dædalus Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Spring 2017 Russia Beyond Putin George W. Breslauer & Timothy J. Colton, guest editors with Valerie Bunce · Henry E. Hale Fiona Hill · Brian D. Taylor Maria Popova · Elena Chebankova Marlene Laruelle · Stanislav Markus Samuel A. Greene · Keith A. Darden Russian Patronal Politics Beyond Putin Henry E. Hale Abstract: Russian politics from the tsars through Vladimir Putin has been shaped by patronalism, a so- cial equilibrium in which personal connections dominate, collective action happens primarily through in- dividualized punishments and rewards, and trends in the political system reflect changing patterns of co- ordination among nationwide networks of actual acquaintances that typically cut across political parties, firms, nongovernmental organizations, and even the state. The “chaotic” Yeltsin era reflects low network coordination, while the hallmark of the Putin era has been the increasingly tight coordination of these networks’ activities around the authority of a single patron. In at least the next decade, Russia is unlikely to escape the patronalist equilibrium, which has already withstood major challenges in 1917 and 1991. The most promising escape paths involve much longer-term transitions through diversified economic develop- ment and integration with the Western economy, though one cannot entirely rule out that a determined new ruler might accelerate the process. While its seventy years of Communist rule often steals the limelight, Russia’s weightiest political leg- acy is arguably something even older and more stub- born: patronalism. Russian political actors experience patronalism as a particular kind of social environment in which they operate. In this environment, direct per- sonal connections are not just useful, but absolutely vital to succeeding in politics and actually accomplish- ing anything once one secures office. -
Market News Company News SECURITIES MARKET NEWS
SSEECCUURRIIITTIIIEESS MMAARRKKEETT NNEEWWSSLLEETTTTEERR weekly Presented by: VTB Bank, Custody April 8, 2021 Issue No. 2021/13 Market News Finance Ministry places RUB 54.7 bln of OFZ bonds at auction On April 7, 2021 it was stated that Russia’s Finance Ministry had placed RUB 54.688 bln of OFZ 26235 government bonds with fixed coupon, maturing in March 2031, at an auction on April 7. The cut-off price amounted to 90.9814% of a face value and the weighted average price to 91.0614%. The cut-off yield stood at 7.31% annually and the weighted average yield at 7.30% annually. Demand totaled RUB 73.408 bln. Company News Region Group buys 100% in private pension fund Safmar On April 2, 2021 it was stated that investment company Leningrad Adagio of Region Group’s majority owner Sergei Sudarikov, had bought 100% in private pension fund Safmar. In March the pension fund’s owner Safmar Financial Investments said that Region planned to buy the fund for RUB 20–24 bln. The Federal Antimonopoly Service gave its permission on March 9. Safmar is Russia’s largest private pension fund with assets exceeding RUB 270 bln and the amount of clients under a mandatory pension insurance program standing at 3.8 mln people. Legenda sets RUB 4 bln bond coupon guidance at 9.95% On April 2, 2021 it was reported that Russian real estate developer Legenda had set the final guidance for the first coupon of RUB 4 bln 4-year bonds at 9.95% annually. Bids were accepted from March 22 until April 2 and the technical placement took place on April 6. -
Involvement of Russian Banks and Other Financiers In
INVOLVEMENT OF RUSSIAN BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIERS IN SENSITIVE SECTORS IN RUSSIA A RESEARCH PAPER PREPARED BY PROFUNDO FOR BANK TRACK NOVEMBER 2012 CONTENTS Summary ..........................................................................................................4 Introduction ..........................................................................................................8 Types of finance ..........................................................................................................9 Chapter 1 Financing trends in four Russian sectors..............................................12 1.1 Financing trends in the Russian coal mining sector............................................12 1.1.1 Sector overview .................................................................................................12 1.1.2 Largest companies..............................................................................................14 1.1.3 Groups of financial stakeholders ........................................................................15 1.1.4 Banks .................................................................................................................15 1.1.5 Shareholders......................................................................................................16 1.1.6 Investment banks...............................................................................................18 1.2 Financing trends in the Russian oil & gas sector ................................................19 1.2.1 Sector