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FROM SUGAR BEETS to BANKING: Rusagro's Rise As a Russian

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FROM SUGAR BEETS to BANKING: Rusagro's Rise As a Russian FROM SUGAR BEETS TO BANKING: Rusagro’s Rise as a Russian Conglomerate June 14, 2010 1 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com FROM SUGAR BEETS TO BANKING: Rusagro’s Rise as a Russian Conglomerate Summary Rusagro is one of Russia’s largest agro-industrial holding companies, dealing mainly in sugar, oil and agricultural land. Starting as an intermediary for sugar producers and traders in the former Soviet states, Rusagro’s founder, Vadim Moshkovich, quickly used a sharp eye for opportunities and connections with established and rising businessmen throughout the region to grow Rusagro into a major force in Russia’s agricultural sector. Moshkovich himself has risen from low-level mercantile exchange worker to member of the elite Russian billionaire club and senator. He has been careful in cultivating powerful allies throughout the Kremlin and in powerhouses like Sberbank to promote his or his companies’ interests while holding the same tight-knit circle of loyalists around him for decades. At the end of the day, Moshkovich is interested in profit, and though Rusagro has been his mainstay for more than 15 years, he wants either to continue expanding it across Russia and the former Soviet states or start selling it off -- should the price be right. A Brief History As one of Russia’s largest agro-industrial holding companies, Rusagro has interests in more than 35 farms, seven sugar plants, eight regional trade branches, an oilseed refinery and dairy and pig-farming assets. A member of the Union of Sugar Producers of Russia, Rusagro is known mainly for its sugar and packaged margarine and mayonnaise, which is produced through 35 subsidiaries under well- known Russian brands such as Shchedroye Leto, Chaykovskiy, Khoroshiy and Brauni. Most of Rusagro’s oilseed and fats processing is done in Yekaterinburg, while its sugar facilities and crop and pig farms are located in the Belgorod, Tambov and Voronezh regions. Altogether, Rusagro controls roughly 360,000 hectares (1,400 square miles) of land. Rusagro was founded in 1995 to act as an intermediary between Ukrainian sugar producers and manufacturers and Russian confectionary companies. Upon the fall of the Soviet Union, both Russia and Ukraine were among the top 15 sugar producers worldwide, but their industries were falling into disrepair because of poor logistics, erratic raw-material supplies and lack of financing during the post- Soviet economic plummet. Before the fall, sugar production was part of the state’s agro-business sector, which was tightly controlled. After the fall, without the state’s organization and backing, nearly all agriculturally based businesses were obliterated. Despite this, demand for sugar was rapidly increasing as confectionary and related businesses continued to thrive and as Western businesses started to flood into the former Soviet countries. But sugar production needed a heavy dose of investment with little promise of a quick return. As a stop- gap measure to meet the demand for sugar, Russia began importing it from Kazakhstan, Belarus and, most of all, Ukraine -- not that any of the other former Soviet states’ sugar-producing industries were in good shape, either. Taking advantage of the turmoil following the fall of the Soviet Union was a worker in the Moscow Mercantile Exchange named Vadim Moshkovich. Moshkovich’s job at the exchange allowed him to form relationships with merchants around Russia and other former Soviet states and see the incredible opportunity in pieces of the economy that used to belong to the Soviet state but were now owned by no one. Moshkovich started by creating a company called Augur Estate in 1992 with his close friend Sergei Kirilenko, with the idea of picking up land and residences in the Belgorod region, sometimes without needing any money for the so-called “purchases.” 2 © 2010 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com This was common after the fall of the Soviet Union. Many (if not most) of today’s oligarchs came from middle or lower classes and felt no qualms about picking up pieces of land or assets that used to belong to the state -- without anyone quite knowing who owned what during the chaotic crisis. In developing land in the Belgorod region, which had been one of the largest sugar-producing regions in Soviet Russia, Moshkovich saw the incredible demand for sugar. He established the Sugar Trading Company -- later known as Rusagro -- in order to supervise the importing of sugar from the Ukrainian regions to supply Russian confectionary companies such as Krasni Oktyabr (Red October), Babayevsky, Rot Front (Red Front), Ulyanovsk and Cheboksary. At the time, Moshkovich was able to strike deals with two rising Ukrainian oligarchs of Jewish descent who were taking over their country’s sugar production. These Ukrainian oligarchs were Viktor Medvedchuk and Gregory Surkis. Moshkovich was not a close personal friend of the Ukrainians, who quickly became two of the country’s most prominent political figures. Instead, he played on their shared Jewish heritage to work him and his new Sugar Trading Company into the Ukrainian system. Engaging in myriad business ventures, including his real estate firm Augur Estate as well as the Sugar Trading Company, Moshkovich quickly gained enough capital to begin operating in the raw-sugar market (sugar beets) instead of just as a broker. In 1997, the Sugar Trading Company -- 3 © 2010 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com renamed Rusagro -- took over the Agrointer production and trading firm in Belgorod and began growing its own sugar beets. Also that year, Rusagro purchased the Rzhev sugar plant in Belgorod. These production units were in serious disrepair and had been underproducing since the fall of the Soviet Union. Other sugar manufacturers from the West were already attempting to move into Russia, and Moshkovich struck joint ventures with them so that he could learn the business. In 1998, Rusagro worked in cooperation with France’s Deleplanque & Cie to modernize production at the Valuikisakhar sugar plant in Belgorod. From there, Rusagro began picking up pieces of land to use for sugar beet cultivation and on which to build sugar refineries, expanding throughout the Belgorod region and into Rostov, Voronezh and Krasnodar. That same year, Rusagro expanded to the grain and sunflower markets, mainly in Yekaterinburg. Although the company did not have experience in these markets, it picked up two edible-oil manufacturing facilities and four vegetable-oil extraction plants. By 1999, Rusagro was among the top three sugar producers in Russia, holding a 19 percent share of the market. Rusagro began regular sugar deliveries to 50 Russian territories and about 20 confectioneries. It also began working with other foreign firms in addition to Deleplanque & Cie, such as the American food-production heavyweight Cargill. Rusagro invested heavily in its farms and facilities, claiming to sink $500,000 a year in its agricultural lands alone -- a sum equivalent to 50 percent of the entire federal aid to farms. In 2005, Rusagro was settled in place as one of Russia’s most prominent agricultural businesses, and its owner, Moshkovich, considered selling part if not all of the firm. Food and agricultural businesses that expressed an interest in purchasing the company were Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus. But 2005 was also the year that the Russian government started cracking down on the sale of its most important and strategic companies to anyone not Kremlin-friendly, especially foreign firms. Russia was starting an economic consolidation led by then-Russian President Vladimir Putin. Many foreign groups in banking, energy, manufacturing, metals, real estate and telecommunications were forced out of the country. Not willing to go against the Kremlin’s wishes, Moshkovich gave up on the idea of selling Rusagro to a foreign firm. Most of the largest firms in Russia were also reorganized to ensure that the Kremlin had loyalists running the Russian economy and Russian businesses. Moshkovich did not have to worry on this front, as his ties to the Kremlin were starting to deepen, which helped protect his interests and Rusagro (more on this below). Since 2005, Rusagro has continued to prosper even with the global financial crisis that began in 2008. At the same time, Moshkovich was considering once again selling part of Rusagro, since he is constantly looking to sell on the higher side of the markets. However, Moshkovich’s planned IPO, scheduled to be held in 2010, was suddenly canceled for financial -- and political -- reasons (more on this below). Structure and Ownership Rusagro is an umbrella company made up of the following three branches, each with a number of subsidiaries and parts: • Rusagro Group Limited Liability Company (LLC) consists of six food-processing plants, 38 agricultural companies in the Belgorod, Tambov and Voronezh regions, eight regional sales branches and a Moscow-based management company. • Rusagro Center LLC is the operating branch, producing sugar and developing the long-term plans for the sugar business. • Agricultural Company Rusagro LLC is an operating company involved in the agricultural business line, mainly seed oil. 4 © 2010 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com The ownership of Rusagro is constantly in flux and is one of the more secretive aspects of the business. One thing that is certain about Rusagro’s ownership is the involvement, in one way or another, of founder Vadim Moshkovich. 5 © 2010 STRATFOR 700 Lavaca Street, Suite 900 Austin, TX 78701 Tel: 1-512-744-4300 www.stratfor.com In the 1990s, Moshkovich owned 81 percent of Rusagro while his partner, Sergei Kirilenko, owned 19 percent.
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