Refugee Review Tribunal AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: RUS32923 Country: Russian Federation Date: 27 February 2008

Keywords: Russian Federation – Yabloko – Treatment of supporters – Tax investigations

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Questions

1. Please provide information on fate of Yabloko Party supporters from 2003 to present. 2. What are the procedures for investigating tax offences? Who are the investigators? Where are the people interviewed? 3. Where are the tax offices located in Moscow? 4. What are the summons and charge procedures for tax offences? 5. Is there a “black list” for people wanted for tax offences when departing Russia?

RESPONSE

1. Please provide information on fate of Yabloko Party supporters from 2003 to present.

Information on this question is provided under the following sub-headings:

Information on the Yabloko Party Funding of the Yabloko Party Treatment of Yabloko supporters since 2003

Information on the Yabloko Party

The Yabloko Party is a liberal democratic party in Russia. Although it is well established, Yabloko has been marginalised in Russian politics and has a relatively low level of support. It did not win any seats in the Duma elections held in December 2007.

According to the Political Handbook of the World 2007 Yabloko (“Apple”) is formally known as the Russian Democratic Party “Yabloko” (Rossiiskaya Demokraticheskaya Partiya “Yabloko”). The party descended from the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc, an electoral group formed in October 1993 by Grigori Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev and Vladimir Lukin. The Chair of the party is Grigori Yavlinsky and the Deputy Chair, Alexei Arbatov. The party has lost most of its influence since Vladimir Putin became president in 2000 (Banks, Arthur S. et al. (eds) 2007, Political Handbook of the World 2007, CQ Press, Washington, pp.1027-1028 – Attachment 1; Nichol, Jim 2007, Russia’s December 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, Congress Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 10 December, p.2,4 http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22770.pdf – Accessed 11 February 2008 – Attachment 2; ‘Russia’s party barred from polls’ 2007, BBC News, 28 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6308511.stm – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 3; McFaul, Michael and Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2008, ‘The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back’, Foreign Affairs, January/February http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87105/michael-mcfaul-kathryn-stoner- weiss/the-myth-of-the-authoritarian-model.html?mode=print – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 4).

In the most recent Duma (lower legislative chamber) elections held on 2 December 2007 Yabloko received 1.59% of the vote and failed to win a seat. Petrov, from the Moscow Carnegie Center, stated that the liberal parties will forfeit the 60 million roubles deposit paid to get on the ballot and also pay for the air time provided by the state. As a result, according to Petrov, Yabloko is effectively bankrupt. Nichol, a Russian specialist at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), noted that the Russian NGO, Golos, assessed the elections as not being “free and fair”. Observers from the Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Nordic Council had stated that the election was more efficiently run than in the past but “‘there was not a level political playing field’” (Nichol, Jim 2007, Russia’s December 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, Congress Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 10 December, p.2,4 http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22770.pdf – Accessed 11 February 2008 – Attachment 2; ‘Official End Result of the Duma Elections (December 8, 2007)’ 2007, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 32, 14 December, p.10 – Attachment 5; Petrov, Nikolai 2007, ‘The Consequences of the State Duma Elections for Russia’s Electoral System’, Russian Analytical Digest, No.32, 14 December, p.6 – Attachment 6).

Petrov also writes:

One of the main results of the elections was a significant reconfiguration of the political party spectrum in Russia, representing a new approach of the Kremlin. Earlier the Kremlin worked with the completely loyal leaders of the democratic parties SPS [Union of Right Forces] and Yabloko, who still managed to preserve some independence. After these parties did not win representation in the 2003 Duma, the Kremlin decided that it would be easier to get by without them. To gain support on this side of the spectrum, the Kremlin was satisfied with the newly created Civic Force and the resurrected Democratic Party of Russia. Putin’s decision to lead the United Russia party list meant that many of the old parties lost their key constituents.

Does the Russian political system even need parties? If they are needed, the results for SPS and Yabloko are not just an alarming warning, but evidence of the crash of the party system in the form that it existed since the beginning of the 1990s. This crash is the result of several causes. Among the objective causes are economic growth, and as a result, the increased well being of the citizens and their satisfaction with the authorities. During bad times, it was necessary to think of a new “party of power” before each election and the opposition parties always made advances. Now the situation has changed fundamentally.

Another important cause is the Kremlin’s decision to exert greater control over the parties. The authorities have decided that it is easier to work with parties of their own creation, merging and dividing them according to whim, than it is to work with loyal politicians, who seek to maintain some autonomy. Another problem is the absence of a realistic role for political parties in the political system. The voters have a dim view of the parties and their leaders and therefore support for them is declining. If the parties don’t break out of this closed circle, it will be necessary to constantly think of new party projects, attractive because of their newness and not tied down by past promises, or to find effective showmen like Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

Many professional politicians who were completely loyal to the Kremlin, and even capable of working with it, have now been excluded from the Duma and public life in general. If the regime does not want to work with some politicians, that is its business. However, if there is a constant dearth of qualified politicians in the system and it can’t find a place for dozens of qualified politicians, then this is a serious failure of the system itself. If the regime is about to adopt new reforms which will likely summon mass social protests onto the streets as a result, then forcing unwanted politicians out of the system is a serious mistake (Petrov, Nikolai 2007, ‘The Consequences of the State Duma Elections for Russia’s Electoral System’, Russian Analytical Digest, No.32, 14 December, pp.6-7 – Attachment 6).

McFaul and Stoner-Weiss state that all independent parties, including Yabloko, are much weaker today and work in a more constrained political environment than in the 1990s. They also state that several candidates of independent parties were disqualified from participating in local elections for political reasons. Yabloko was banned from participating in the local elections held in St. Petersburg in March 2007 because, according to the city’s electoral commission, too many of the signatures supporting the party’s candidates were invalid (McFaul, Michael and Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2008, ‘The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back’, Foreign Affairs, January/February http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87105/michael-mcfaul-kathryn-stoner- weiss/the-myth-of-the-authoritarian-model.html?mode=print – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 4; ‘Russia’s party barred from polls’ 2007, BBC News, 28 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6308511.stm – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 3).

White, a lecturer in Russian politics at the University of Birmingham, in a 2007 article writes:

Yabloko’s failure in the 2003 Duma election did not reflect a sudden rejection of the party’s social-liberal agenda by the Russian electorate. The party’s share of the vote had been in constant decline since the first post-Soviet parliamentary election in 1993. Nevertheless, despite its relatively low level of support over ten years, Yabloko is a well established political party. The party’s leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, who worked with both Gorbachev and Yeltsin and stood for the presidency in 1996 and 2000, enjoys a high profile both in Russia and the West. As an overtly democratic, liberal reformist party with a strong pro- Western orientation, the fact that Yabloko has become a marginal force in Russian politics should be of concern to those in Russia and the West who are interested both in the establishment of democratic norms and the relative strength of political forces promoting democratic and market reforms in Russia (White, David 2007, ‘Victims of a Managed Democracy? Explaining the Electoral Decline of the Yabloko Party’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring, p.210 pp.209-229 – Attachment 7).

A July 2007 article in The Economist noted that the Yabloko party tends to stay within bounds set by the Kremlin (‘Putin versus nobody serious’ 2007, The Economist, 26 July http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9558338&CFID=56209 59&CFTOKEN=e53cac8edd541197-F6D0AE46-B27C-BB00-0143E0D8AD098CF7 – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 8).

Funding of the Yabloko Party

Sources indicate that political parties are allowed to accept donations from organisations or individuals provided they are Russian. However, all parties depend on “covert” funding. The Yabloko Party has received donations from a number of organisations and individuals. A major financial backer of Yabloko was Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO of the Yukos oil company, who was put on trial and sentenced to eight years imprisonment on charges of tax evasion and fraud1. See below for further information on the Khodorkovsky matter under the heading ‘Treatment of supporters since 2003’.

A December 2007 news article reported that all political parties, including Yabloko, depended on “covert” funding. The article noted that no political party was able to select its own sponsors “without running them by the Kremlin first”. The article stated that the presidential administration was only interested in major donations. Businesses were allowed to “handle smaller sums, up to $10million, on their own”, provided the administration was informed in advance (‘How the Kremlin provided campaign funding for parties’ 2007, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: The New Times, 11 December – Attachment 11).

An August 2003 article states that under Russian law any party may receive 1billion roubles2 in contributions a year; however, political parties’ “official” budgets are significantly lower (‘Russia’s political parties spend more than they say they do – newspaper’ 2003, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, source: Vedomosti, 21 August – Attachment 12).

Another August 2003 news article notes that political parties are permitted to accept donations from individuals or organisations provided they are Russian and do not exceed certain limits. The article states that:

Business tycoons are not on the donor lists, even though their money is present in the treasuries of political parties. They simply use some obscure companies as a smoke-screen. The largest contributions from these companies do not usually exceed 10-13 million rubles3.

Political parties are permitted to accept donations from individuals or organizations, provided they are Russian and do not exceed certain quotas…(‘The pro-Kremlin party and others’ 2003, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: Moskovsky Komsomolets, 19 August – Attachment 13).

1 Khodorkovsky was put on trial in 2003. In 2005 he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment on charges of tax evasion and fraud (‘Khodorkovsky ‘on hunger strike’’ 2008, BBC News, 30 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7218022.stm - Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 9; Human Rights Watch 2008, Choking on Bureaucracy: State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Activism, Vol. 20, No. 1(D), February, footnote 12/p.12 – Attachment 10). 2 Converted on the OANDA website (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic) to $AUD49,950,661 as at 21 August 2003. 3 RUB10million is converted on the OANDA website (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic) to $AUD501,337 as at 19 August 2003. From the sources consulted reported financial contributors to Yabloko are outlined below.

According to an April 2000 news article, information provided to Russia’s Central Electoral Commission indicated that Grigori Yavlinsky, Yabloko’s leader, was supported in the 2000 presidential election, “For some reason” by insurance companies. It identified the companies as “Strakhovaya Kompaniya [Insurance Company] ROLYeS Limited Company and the Strakhovaya Kompaniya ASKO”. They reportedly both gave over 3.3million roubles4 (‘Newspaper bewildered by sponsors of Russian presidential candidates’ 2000, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political, source: Izvestiya, 4 April – Attachment 14).

In March 2003 it was reported that Yabloko was having funding difficulties until Yavlinsky visited the Kremlin and found a new sponsor to the party. The article stated:

Yabloko was pressed for funds before its leader Grigori Yavlinsky started visiting the Kremlin regularly. The Kremlin found a new sponsor for the party. According to rumor, this is the YUKOS oil company. Judging by how active Yabloko and its functionaries are these days, their financial standing has greatly improved. Some Duma members whisper, however, that money is donated to Yabloko by its German friends from the Friedrich Nauman trust and the Ebert trust. If this is so, it is unlawful (Netreba, Tatiana and Pivovarova, Lyudmila 2003, ‘Whose money political parties use’, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: Argumenty i Fakty, 20 March – Attachment 15).

An August 2003 news article notes that membership fees for Yabloko are not seen as a significant funding source “or as any source at all, for that matter” (‘The pro-Kremlin party and others’ 2003, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: Moskovsky Komsomolets, 19 August – Attachment 13).

Another August 2003 article mentioned that Yabloko received “last year” 41.9million roubles5. It continued that Yabloko’s major sponsors were the ‘the Parsek closed-type joint- stock company and the limited liability companies Yupiter XXIX, Saturn XXV and Venera XXI”. It also stated that the “Saynform limited liability company” contributed RUB949,6006 (‘Russia’s political parties spend more than they say they do – newspaper’ 2003, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, source: Vedomosti, 21 August – Attachment 12).

A December 2007 article suggests that some of Yabloko’s funding sources for the 2007 Duma election from the presidential administration included “an oil corporation and Novolipetsk Metals” (‘How the Kremlin provided campaign funding for parties’ 2007, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: The New Times, 11 December – Attachment 11).

Treatment of Yabloko supporters since 2003

Sources indicate that supporters of the Yabloko party have been arrested, detained and, in one instance, a party candidate was murdered. Individuals and businesses who made donations to the party were reportedly the target of tax audits and other financial inspections. The most

4 Converted on the OANDA website (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic) to $AUD188,743 as at 4 April 2000. 5 Converted on the OANDA website (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic) to $AUD2,092,933 as at 21 August 2003. 6 Converted on the OANDA website (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic) to $AUD47,433 as at 21 August 2003. publicised case involved Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the CEO of the Yukos oil company, who was also seen to be a potential presidential opponent to Vladimir Putin.

In an October 2007 report the Economist Intelligence Unit stated that Vladimir Putin came to power promising to eliminate oligarchs “‘as a class’”. His actions against oligarchs have been selective. Initially he moved against media tycoons who had added leverage over politics then against Mikhail Khodorkovsky who had perceived political ambitions. The Economist Intelligence Unit states:

One of the most salient features of Mr Putin’s president has been his long-drawn-out fight against the “oligarchs”, a group of well-connected and immensely wealthy businessmen who made their fortune in the 1990s by taking advantage of the chaos that followed the end of central planning. The oligarchs’ biggest coup was the notorious “loans for shares” scheme: they financed Mr Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election campaign through loans securitised on state assets. The government did not pay them back, and the oligarchs’ banks organised auctions through which they sold themselves these assets at very low prices.

When Mr Putin came to power he promised to eliminate the oligarchs “as a class”, and indicated that he would move towards an economy where transparency and market forces ruled, rather than political connections. However, Mr Putin’s fight against the oligarchs has been highly selective. He first moved against those tycoons whose influence over the mass media had given them added leverage over politics—most notably Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky, both of whom now live in self-imposed exile. Then in 2003 the Kremlin launched a large-scale campaign against Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the Yukos oil company, who was perceived to be developing political ambitions. Mr Khodorkovsky was arrested in October 2003 and sentenced to eight years in prison in May 2005 (‘Russia risk: Macroeconomic risk’ 2007, Economist Intelligence Unit – Risk Briefing, 25 October – Attachment 16).

In 2003 it was reported that Mikhail Khodorkovsky had set his sight on succeeding Russian President Vladimir Putin. Stratfor indicated that Khodorkovsky had given long-term financial support to two political parties: Yabloko and the SPS. The Stratfor article also mentioned that Khodorkovsky had announced a commitment to support the pro-government United Russia Party. However, BBC News identified a third party to receive financial support from Khodorkovsky as the Communist Party. A 2004 Foreign Affairs article stated that Khodorkovsky reportedly had offered Yabloko and SPS $100 million to unite and campaign against Putin and his United Russia Party. The 2003 BBC News article also reported that Khodorkovsky paid for half Yabloko’s election expenses (‘Russia’s Richest Man Sets Sights on Presidency’ 2003, Stratfor Today, 23 April – Attachment 17; Fraser, Hugh 2003, ‘Business muscles in on Russia’s election’, BBC News, 26 November http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3237160.stm – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 18; Goldman, Marshall I. 2004, ‘Putin and the Oligarchs’, Foreign Affairs, November/December http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101faessay83604/marshall-i- goldman/putin-and-the-oligarchs.html?mode=print – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 19).

McFaul and Tatic in a 2005 Freedom House report write:

Third, the Putin regime cracked down on Russia’s tycoons (or oligarchs). Very early in his term, Putin made clear that these billionaires could no longer treat the state as simply another tool to be used for their personal enrichment. Instead, Putin implied that the oligarchs had to get out of politics altogether. Eventually, he arrested or chased into exile three major oligarchs – Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Russia’s richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the business conglomerate Yukos. All three had previously played significant roles in funding and supporting political parties and individuals not deemed loyal to the Kremlin. The downfall of these three sent a chilling message to other tycoons. In the 2003 parliamentary campaign, oligarchs continued to contribute significant resources to political campaigns, but only as sanctioned by the Kremlin. Compared to the previous electoral cycle, big business in 2003 was relatively united in backing United Russia and other pro-Kremlin candidates. In 2004, everyone backed Putin (McFaul, Michael and Tatic, Sanja 2005, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance, Freedom House, June, p.470 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm – Accessed 1 November 2005 – Attachment 20).

A 2007 Freedom House report Stoner-Weiss also mentions that state auditing and inspection bodies are selectively used for political purposes. Stoner-Weiss writes:

The OECD confirms that the Russian state is expanding its role in the economy, particularly in “strategic” sectors like oil and gas. This began in earnest in 2004 with the seizure of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s oil company Yukos and the Kremlin – orchestrated transfer of its assets to a state-owned firm. Khodorkovsky and his colleague Platon Lebedev were arrested in 2003 on charges of tax evasion. After an eleven-month trial in 2004 and 2005, both men were found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison. Meanwhile, virtually all of Yukos’s key assets were sold in dubious state-sponsored auctions to pay off huge tax assessments. Khodorkovsky is widely believed to have been targeted because of his resistance to Kremlin control and possible presidential ambitions.

The OECD notes that in Russia, “the expansion of state ownership in important sectors will probably contribute to more rent-seeking, less efficiency and slower growth.” State auditing and inspection bodies are used selectively and for political purposes. Recent examples include the investigation of former prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov, an opposition figure and possible contender for the presidency in 2008. Kasyanov was placed under federal investigation in 2005 for alleged fraud related to a property purchase he made in 2004 while still in office. As in the Khodorkovsky case, the target of the probe may well have broken the law, but he appears to have been singled out for political reasons while those in better standing with the Kremlin go unpunished.

Tax collection in Russia has greatly improved since the introduction of a flat personal income-tax rate early in Putin’s first presidential term, but tax laws are still complicated, and there is a pervasive culture of tax evasion. Corporations are pursued for tax arrears inconsistently and sometimes for political purposes (Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2007, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2007, Freedom House, pp.16-17 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7258-8.pdf – Accessed 13 February 2008 – Attachment 21).

According to White, Vladimir Gusinsky (mentioned above), at the time of the 1996 presidential elections was a major financial backer of Yabloko. Gusinsky was arrested in June 2000 on embezzlement charges and his media empire subsequently broken up. The New York Times reported that Gusinsky was released “a few days later” and in the following month fled to Spain. Gusinsky is currently reported to be in Israel. Yabloko came to miss Gusinsky’s financial contributions, but also favourable coverage on his television station, NTV. In February 2008 The Guardian listed Gusinsky as one of ten persons for whom Russia is seeking extradition (White, David 2007, ‘Victims of a Managed Democracy? Explaining the Electoral Decline of the Yabloko Party’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring, p.213,216 – Attachment 7; Arvedlund, Erin E. 2005, ‘Israel Freezes Some Assets of a Bank Under Inquiry’, The New York Times, 8 March http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/business/worldbusiness/08launder.html?_r=1&oref=slo gin&pagewanted=print&position= – Accessed 13 February 2008 – Attachment 22; Lewis, James, Evans, Rob and Leigh, David 2008, ‘Russia seeks extradition of shipping magnate in UK: Ten wanted by Moscow’ 2008, The Guardian, 1 February http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/01/uk.russia – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 23).

White writes that financial backing for Yabloko from Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Yukos Corporation seemed to fill the financial void left by the arrest and departure of Gusinsky. In April 2003 Khodorkovsky stated that he intended to finance the electoral campaigns of both Yabloko and the SPS. Initially, Khodorkovsky’s funding appeared unproblematic. In July 2003 Platon Lebedev, head of Yukos’ parent company Group Menatep, was arrested. In October 2003 Khodorkovsky was detained on both fraud and tax evasion charges dating back to the early 1990s. Actions against Yukos’ senior executives were popular with the electorate. Yabloko was in danger of being damaged through its association with Yukos: it was reliant on Yukos funding and, for the first time, Yabloko included three business people, all from Yukos but none a party member, on the party list. Yavlinsky, in an interview on NTV, was reportedly explicit in the reasons for including Yukos representatives on the party list – it was a Yukos condition for funding the party (White, David 2007, ‘Victims of a Managed Democracy? Explaining the Electoral Decline of the Yabloko Party’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring, p.216, footnote 48/p.226 – Attachment 7).

Stratfor has also noted that Switzerland blocked the accounts of Yukos and its subsidiaries in 2004 at the request of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office. In August 2007 the Swiss Federal Court unblocked the accounts of Khodorkovsky and his former partner, Platon Lebedev. The Swiss court had earlier refused to assist the Russian government by sending financial documents to Russia stating the case was politically motivated (‘Switzerland, Russia: Accounts Unblocked’ 2007, Stratfor, 27 August – Attachment 24).

Also, writing on the arrest of Khodorkovsky the US State Department reported:

In May 2005 Mikhail Khodorkovskiy and codefendant Platon Lebedev were convicted on six charges of fraud, tax evasion, and embezzlement and sentenced to nine years in prison after an 11 month trial. Khodorkovskiy’s conviction was upheld on appeal in September 2005, with the sentence reduced to eight years. Both Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev continued to appeal their convictions in Russian courts as well as the ECHR. As of April 19, 2006, the ECHR began preliminarily viewing Khodorkovskiy’s appeal. The arrest and conviction of Khodorkovskiy raised concerns about the rule of law, including the independence of courts, the right to due process, the sanctity of contracts and property rights, and the lack of a predictable tax regime. Many observers believed that Khodorkovskiy’s conviction was one of a number of politically motivated moves against wealthy “oligarchs” who represented centers of actual or potential political and media opposition to President Putin. Some observers believed that, despite the possibility that the charges against Khodorkovskiy may have had some merit, he was selectively targeted for prosecution because of his politically oriented activities and as a warning to other oligarchs against involvement in political affairs or providing financial support to independent civil society. In October 2005 authorities transferred Khodorkovskiy to a prison in Chita Oblast and Lebedev to a prison in Yamalo Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrug. In December 2005 Lebedev’s defense team filed an appeal stating that sending him to a prison not in the area where Lebedev lived or was sentenced violated Russian law. The Moscow City Court has rejected all appeals to review the case against Khodorkovskiy. Some human rights activists have objected to sentencing both men to prisons that were not in the area where they lived or were sentenced. On November 29, 2006, the Supreme Court refused to proceed with Khodorkovskiy’s appeal. According to Khodorkovskiy’s defense attorney Genrikh Padva, the defense was considering appealing this decision to the chairman of the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the prosecutor general’s office was forming a new case against Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev. Both were transferred to the detention center in Chita in December 2006 due to new investigation activities being conducted (US Department of State 2007, ‘e. Denial of Fair Public Trial’ in Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Russia, 6 March – Attachment 25).

In 2005 Khodorkovsky was jailed and is currently serving an eight-year sentence on charges of tax evasion and fraud (‘Khodorkovsky ‘on hunger strike’’ 2008, BBC News, 30 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7218022.stm – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 9).

It is of interest in a list of ten people wanted for whom Russia is seeking extradition, published in The Guardian, four are former Yukos executives: Alexander Temerko, former vice-president; Natalia Chernysheva, former Yukos manager; Dmitri Maruev, former Yukos manager; and Leonid Nevzlin, former Yukos chief (Lewis, James, Evans, Rob and Leigh, David 2008, ‘Russia seeks extradition of shipping magnate in UK: Ten wanted by Moscow’ 2008, The Guardian, 1 February http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/01/uk.russia – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 23).

In the context of the 2007 Duma election campaign, a November 2007 news article cites Yabloko “party activists” claiming business owners and companies who had previously donated to Yabloko had started refusing to make donations. It was claimed that party sponsors were not being directly forced to refuse, but companies which made donations to the campaign were being targeted by tax audits, financial inspections and other additional inspections (‘Communists and Yabloko forced to become more radical Signs of desperation from opposition parties’ 2007, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: Kommersant, 14 November – Attachment 26).

Some other reported incidents involving the Yabloko party are:

• In February 2008 it was reported that Yabloko was barred from participating in local elections in Altai Krai and Ingushetia (‘Yabloko branches excluded from local elections’ 2008, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 4, 5 February http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2008/02/1-RUS/rus-050208.asp – Accessed 13 February 2008 – Attachment 27).

• The local branch of the Yabloko party was reportedly evicted from its St. Petersburg premises in December 2007 (‘Petersburg activists protest Yabloko’s eviction’ 2008, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2 January http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2008/01/1-RUS/rus-020108.asp – Accessed 13 February 2008 – Attachment 28).

• A candidate on Yabloko’s party list for the 2007 election, Farid Babaev, was shot and killed in November 2007. Relatives and human rights activists cited his outspoken political views as a motive for his murder (Amnesty International 2007, Russian Federation: Systematic repression on eve of elections, 28 November, EUR 46/056/2007 http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/cabf6e55-a2f6-11dc-8d74- 6f45f39984e5/eur460562007en.pdf – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 29).

• In November 2007 Yabloko members, supporters and parliamentary candidates were detained in an anti-Putin protest in St. Petersburg (Belton, Catherine and Buckley, Neil 2007, ‘Moscow curbs protests ahead of elections, Financial Times, 26 November – Attachment 30; Titova, Irina 2007, ‘Police detain scores of opposition activists at St. Petersburg protest’, Associated Press Newswires, 25 November – Attachment 31).

• Ivan Bolshakov, a leading Yabloko youth activist and Duma candidate, was arrested in November 2007 in connection with a “tussle” with a police officer during a demonstration in May 2007 in Moscow (‘Yabloko candidate files complaint, faces arrest’ 2007, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 216, 21 November http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/11/1-RUS/rus-211107.asp – Accessed 13 February 2008 – Attachment 32).

• In the context of an article on Russian blogs Orttung, a senior fellow at the Jefferson Institute, refers to the Yabloko party’s youth movement using blogs to mobilise street protests. After the rallies take place, pictures of the events are posted on the blog including “at times, photographs that show how the police beat some of the protesters” (Orttung, Robert 2007, ‘Russian Blogs: Tool for Opposition and State’, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 28, 2 October, pp.2-3– Attachment 33).

• In September 2007 two Yabloko activists set themselves on fire in protest of “Operation Successor”, the Russian practice of allowing the president to appoint a successor. They were taken to hospital and reportedly suffered minor carbon dioxide poisoning (‘Russia: Protestors Light Themselves On Fire’ 2007, Stratfor, 13 September – Attachment 34).

• In April 2007 anti-government protestors in Moscow and St. Petersburg were forcefully dispersed. The protest was organised by a coalition named “Other Russia” comprising both legal and banned parties and led by world chess champion Garry Kasparov. The demonstration was attended by 9,000 police who arrested some 170 demonstrators, including the head of Yabloko’s youth wing, for rallying without a permit (‘Geopolitical Diary: Russia’s Authoritarian Regime Shows Its Face’ 2007, Stratfor, 16 December – Attachment 35).

• In December 2006 Moscow city authorities prohibited some 300 members and supporters of Yabloko from marching in memory of killed journalists. The party was allowed to meet but refused a permit to march (US Department of State 2007, ‘b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association’ in Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Russia, 6 March – Attachment 25).

Of interest is a June 2005 news article which reported that a former Russian Legprombank official, Oleg Liskin, was granted asylum in Germany. The bank, which became bankrupt early 2004, was reportedly a major contributor to the Yabloko leader Yavlinksy’s 2000 presidential campaign. A Yabloko official reportedly claimed that Liskin played a minor role in the Yavlinsky campaign. The article also cited a German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees spokesperson that Liskin risked being imprisoned not only for his support of Yabloko but also for other incidents which were not detailed due to privacy laws (Abdullaev, Nabi 2005, ‘Berlin Grants Asylum to Yabloko Supporter’, The Moscow Times, 10 June – Attachment 36).

There are various other general reports, not specifically mentioning Yabloko party members or supporters, on the treatment on the treatment of Putin’s opponents. Some of these reports are outlined below.

McFaul and Tatic state that:

…At the same time, he [Putin] has increased the role of the federal security service (FSB, the successor to the KGB) in governing Russia and arbitrarily wielded the power of state institutions such as the courts, the tax inspectors, and the police for political ends…(McFaul, Michael and Tatic, Sanja 2005, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance, Freedom House, June, p.466 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm – Accessed 1 November 2005 – Attachment 20). And: …He [Putin] has not taken more extreme steps of canceling elections or arresting hundreds of political opponents. Even in his persecution of dissident forces, he has used the law, not brute force. It is an arbitrary use of the law for political purposes, but it is not open defiance of the law or democratic procedures altogether…(McFaul, Michael and Tatic, Sanja 2005, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance, Freedom House, June, p.467 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm – Accessed 1 November 2005 – Attachment 20).

McFaul and Stoner-Weiss write:

…Potential backers of independent parties have been threatened with sanctions. The imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, previously Russia’s wealthiest man and owner of the oil company Yukos, sent a powerful message to other businesspeople about the costs of being involved in opposition politics…(McFaul, Michael and Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2008, ‘The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back’, Foreign Affairs, January/February http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87105/michael-mcfaul-kathryn-stoner- weiss/the-myth-of-the-authoritarian-model.html?mode=print – Accessed 8 February 2008 – Attachment 4).

In the report dated 14 July 2003 Stratfor continued:

Although Putin does seek to limit the power of Russia’s oligarchs, the campaign against Khodorkovsky is not really an attack against them all. Instead, it is a warning: “Rule Russia’s economy and influence Russian politics if you will, but cooperate with me, do not aspire to the top political position.” (‘Putin and Khodorkovsky: The Battle for Russia’ 2003, Stratfor Today, 14 July – Attachment 37).

The US State Department in its human rights report for 2006 stated:

Unlike in previous years, there were no new reports or allegations that authorities detained and engaged in selective prosecution of political adversaries. In recent years observers considered the 2003 arrest on fraud charges of prominent and politically active businessman Mikhail Khodorkovskiy and the 2004 arrest on fraud charges of Yukos Oil Company lawyer Svetlana Bakhmina to constitute possible cases of selective arrest and prosecution with political motives, regardless of their guilt or innocence on the specific charges against them (see section 1.e.) (US Department of State 2007, ‘d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention’ in Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Russia, 6 March – Attachment 25).

Earlier US State Department human rights reports for the years 2003 and 2004 similarly referred to threats and arrest of major financial supporters of opposition parties.

The US State Department wrote in its 2004 report:

In the December 2003 parliamentary elections, the ability of opposition parties, particularly those receiving funding from some so called oligarchs, to mount strong campaigns was seriously hampered by the investigation and arrest of Yukos President Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, a step widely believed to have been prompted, at least in part, by the considerable financial support he provided to opposition groups. Other wealthy benefactors of opposition parties and candidates appeared to have responded to what they regarded as an implied threat by reducing their own involvement in political contributions…(US Department of State 2005, ‘Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government’ in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004 – Russia, 28 February – Attachment 38).

In the report for the year 2003 the State Department wrote on the charges, threats of arrest and actual arrests against supporters of opposition parties as follows:

…Criminal charges and threats of arrest or actual arrest against major financial supporters of opposition parties, and seizure of party materials from opposition parties, undermined the parties’ ability to compete…(US Department of State 2004, ‘[Introduction]’ in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003 – Russia, 25 February – Attachment 39).

In February 2008 Human Rights Watch stated in the context of a report on NGOs in Russia:

The NGO law is only one among many tools employed by the Kremlin that create a worsening climate for NGO activities and effectively paralyze the work of some organizations. Organizations that are working on particularly controversial subjects have been targeted for harassing tax inspections, inspections for building code or labor code compliance, and police raids, and some have faced politically motivated criminal charges. In what may be the start of a new trend, at least two NGOs were also inspected by police allegedly to verify whether the software installed on the organization’s computers is legal or pirated. Human Rights Watch is unaware of similar inspections of organizations working on issues not viewed as controversial. (Human Rights Watch 2008, Choking on Bureaucracy: State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Activism, Vol. 20, No. 1(D), February, p.4 – Attachment 10); And: The NGO law is only one of several means the government has used to harass and control certain types of NGOs. Other forms of pressure used by the authorities include specious criminal or other charges against organizations or their leaders, police inspections, and interference with an organization’s substantive work. Antiextremism legislation has also been arbitrarily used to target at least three NGO leaders; its broad and vague provisions raise concern that the law may be applied as a deterrent to those who wish to tackle violations of human rights that the Russian government would rather not be exposed (Human Rights Watch 2008, Choking on Bureaucracy: State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Activism, Vol. 20, No. 1(D), February, p.50 – Attachment 10).

Although specifically referring to “vocal media critics” of Putin, McFaul and Tatic also note that “sham lawsuits” have been used:

…His most vocal media critics have lost their jobs, have been harassed by the tax authorities or by sham lawsuits, or have been arrested…(McFaul, Michael and Tatic, Sanja 2005, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance, Freedom House, June, p.475 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm – Accessed 1 November 2005 – Attachment 20).

In respect of government critics living abroad in the 2007 Freedom House report Stoner- Weiss writes in connection with the murder of a former Russian spy in London:

…However, the poisoning approximately one month later [November 2006] of former Russian spy Aleksandr Litvinenko in London fueled theories that the Kremlin had begun to systematically murder critics at home and abroad. Litvinenko had been a critic of the Putin administration and had allegedly begun to investigate Politkovskaya’s murder when he was evidently poisoned with polonium 210, a radioactive substance used as, among other things, an initiator for nuclear weapons. Through painstaking investigation in London and Moscow, British authorities uncovered a trail of the substance leading from the restaurant where Litvinenko ate his last meal. Before dying in a London hospital in November 2006, Litvinenko himself accused Russian authorities of orchestrating his poisoning. Putin has denied this charge. The investigation into how polonium 210 was smuggled across Europe to London and then slipped into Litvinenko’s meal is still under way at the time of writing. Although it remains unclear whether the Russian state is culpable, Litvinenko’s unusual death has apparently buttressed a popular impression that the Kremlin is capable of, and amenable to, eliminating its critics one way or another…(Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2007, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2007, Freedom House, p.7 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7258-8.pdf – Accessed 13 February 2008 – Attachment 21).

2. What are the procedures for investigating tax offences? Who are the investigators? Where are people interviewed?

Procedures

Tax administration in Russia is the responsibility of the Ministry of Taxation. Procedures for investigating tax offences are outlined in the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and include conducting on-site tax inspections, obtaining explanations, verifying data, examining premises and suspending account transactions.

A 2004 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report states that tax administration is the responsibility of the Ministry of Taxation. The Ministry is a federal executive body involved in tax collection at all levels of government. Tax policy is covered by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the Ministry of Taxation. March 2004 Indian Embassy information mentions that the tax ministry has been “transformed into a federal tax service”. Its duties to draft laws and undertake explanatory work on tax laws was transferred to the finance ministry (International Monetary Fund 2004, Russian Federation: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Fiscal Transparency Module, IMF Country Report No. 04/288, September, p.24 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04288.pdf – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 40; ‘President subjects government to drastic reform’ 2004, News from Russia, 12 March, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of India website http://www.india.mid.ru/nfr2004/nf12.html – Accessed 21 February 2008 – Attachment 41).

Article 10(1) in Chapter 1 of the Tax Code of The Russian Federation states that tax violation procedures are set out in Chapters 14 (“Tax Control”) and 15 (“General Provisions on Liability for Committing Tax Offenses”) of the Code (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 1 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section1/Chapter1.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 42; Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 43; Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 15 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section6/Chapter15.html – Accessed 20 February 2008 – Attachment 44).

Article 82(1) in Chapter 14 of the Tax Code of The Russian Federation states that “Tax control shall be exercised by tax officials within their scope of competence…”. Article 82(3) identifies the following authorities as carrying out tax checks: “the tax bodies, the customs agencies, the agencies of the governmental extra-budgetary funds and the internal affairs bodies” (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian- tax-code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 43).

In respect of the above investigating authorities, Articles 9(3), 9(4) and 11(2) in Chapter 1 of the Code define “tax bodies”, “customs agencies” and “extra-budgetary funds” (a definition of “internal affairs bodies” was not found) as:

Article 9. Parties to Relations Regulated by Legislation on Taxes and Fees … 3) the Ministry of Taxation of the Russian Federation and its subdivisions in the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the tax bodies); 4) the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation and its offices (hereinafter referred to as customs authorities) (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 1 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section1/Chapter1.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 42). … Article 11. Institutions, Concepts and Terms Used in This Code … – extra-budgetary funds mean governmental extra-budgetary funds formed outside the federal budget and the budgets of the subjects of the Russian Federation in conformity with the federal legislation (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 1 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section1/Chapter1.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 42).

Chapter 14 of the Code sets out tax controls which include:

• documentary and on-site tax checks (Article 87); • documentary tax audit (Article 88); • on-site tax audit (Article 89); • access to grounds (Article 91); • examining a taxpayer’s premises (Article 92); • requesting documents (Article 93); • seizing documents (Article 94) (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 43).

The rights of the tax bodies (Ministry of Taxation) set out in the Article 31 of Chapter 5 of the Code include:

1) to demand from a taxpayer or a tax agent documents in the forms established by state bodies and local self-government bodies to serve as grounds for the calculation and payment (deductions and transfers) of taxes, and also explanations and documents confirming the correctness of calculation and timeliness of payment (deduction and transfer) of taxes;

2) to carry out tax inspections in the order prescribed by this Code;

3) to seize documents, during tax inspections of a taxpayer or a tax agent, testifying to the commission of tax offences in cases when there are sufficient grounds to believe that these documents will be destroyed, concealed, changed or replaced;

4) to summon to tax bodies taxpayers, payers of fees or tax agents to give pertinent explanations by means of written notices in connection with the payment (deduction or transfer) of taxes by them or in connection with a tax inspection, and also in other cases associated with the execution by them of the legislation on taxes and fees;

5) to suspend transactions on the accounts of taxpayers, payers of fees and tax agents in banks and to distrain the property of taxpayers, payers of fees and tax agents in the order prescribed by this Code;

6) to examine (inspect) workrooms, depots, trading and other premises and areas used by taxpayers to derive income or connected with the maintenance of the objects of taxation, regardless of their location, to draw up an inventory of the property belonging to taxpayers. The procedure for drawing up an inventory of the taxpayer’s property during a tax inspection shall be endorsed by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Taxation of the Russian Federation;

7) to determine the sums of taxes to be paid by taxpayers to the budget or to the extra- budgetary funds and calculated on the basis of available information about a taxpayer, and also of the data on other similar taxpayers in case of the refusal of the taxpayer to admit tax officials to examine (inspection) workrooms, depots, trading and other premises and areas, used by the taxpayer to derive income or connected with the maintenance of taxation, in case of the refusal to submit to a tax body documents necessary for the calculation of taxes for more than two months, in case of the absence of the record-keeping of incomes and expenses, of the objects of taxation, and in case of keeping a record in contravention of the established order that has led to the impossibility of computing taxes;

8) to demand that taxpayers, tax agents and their representatives should remove the revealed breaches of the legislation on taxes and fees and to control the fulfilment of said requirements;

9) to recover tax and fee arrears, and also penalties in the order established by this Code;

10) to control the correlation of big expenses of natural persons with their incomes;

11) to demand from banks documents confirming the execution of payment orders of taxpayers, payers of fees and tax agents and the fulfilment of collection letters (orders) of tax bodies on the withdrawal of the amounts of taxes and penalties from the accounts of tax payers, payers of fees and tax agents;

12) to attract specialists, experts and interpreters for tax control;

13) to summon as witnesses persons who may know any circumstances of relevance to tax control;

14) to apply for the cancellation or suspension of the validity of licenses issued for engagement in certain activities to juridical and natural persons;

15) to set up tax posts in the order prescribed by this Code;

16) to bring the following actions in courts of general jurisdiction or in courts of arbitration:

– actions of recovery of tax sanctions from persons who breached the legislation on taxes and fees; – actions of the recognition as invalid of the state registration of a legal entity or of the state registration of a natural person in the capacity of an individual entrepreneur; – actions for the liquidation of an organisation of any organisational structure or legal status on the grounds established by the legislation of the Russian Federation; – actions for the early dissolution of a contract of tax credit and a contract of investment tax credit; – actions of the recovery of the indebtedness of taxes duties which correspond to penalties and fines by the budgets or the extra-budgetary funds, if this indebtedness is attributed for more than three months to organisations, which under the civil legislation of the Russian Federation are dependent (affiliate) companies (enterprises), from the corresponding basic (prevalent, participating) companies (partnerships, enterprises), when their bank accounts receive the proceeds from the sold goods (works, services) of (subsidiary) companies or enterprises, and also to the organisations which are under the civil legislation of the Russian Federation basic (prevalent, participating) companies (partnerships, enterprises), and from the dependent (subsidiary) companies or enterprises, when their bank account receive the proceeds from the sold goods (works, services) of the basic (prevalent, participating) companies (partnerships, enterprises); – in other cases provided for by this Code (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 5 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section3/Chapter5.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 45).

Although Articles 89 and 100 in Chapter 14 of the Code refers to a two-month limit on on- site tax audits Human Rights Watch states the experience of commercial entities suggests that the two-month limit is not always adhered to (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Articles 89,100(1)Chapter 14 http://www.russian-tax- code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 43; Human Rights Watch 2008, Choking on Bureaucracy: State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Activism, Vol. 20, No. 1(D), February, p.36 – Attachment 10).

It is of interest that Stoner-Weiss writes that business regulations in Russia are “complicated and amorphous” and a hurdle faced in opening a business includes unpredictable tax collection. Tax collection has greatly improved since a flat-tax rate was introduced early in Putin’s first presidential term. Tax laws, however, are still complicated and there is a “pervasive culture of tax evasion” (Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2007, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2007, Freedom House, pp.16-17 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7258-8.pdf – Accessed 13 February 2008 – Attachment 21).

Investigating bodies

Country information indicates a number of organisations carrying out tax investigations, including the Federal Tax Service, tax police, the Interior Ministry as well as municipal and local police. The tax police have also reportedly been involved with “secret police” and “security officials” in interviewing people on tax matters.

Article 82(1) in Chapter 14 of the Code provides for tax control to be generally exercised by tax officials as follows:

1. Tax control shall be exercised by tax officials within their scope of competence by conducting tax audits, obtaining explanations from taxpayers, tax agents and payers of fees, verifying accounting and reporting data, examining premises and territories used for generating income (profit), as well as in other forms provided for in this Code…(Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian-tax- code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 43).

Article 82(3) identifies the following authorities as carrying out tax checks: “The tax bodies, the customs agencies, the agencies of the governmental extra-budgetary funds and the internal affairs bodies” (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 43).

Under the heading of “Tax Police Bodies”, Article 36(1) in Chapter 6 provides for:

1. Internal affairs bodies at the request of tax bodies shall participate, jointly with tax bodies, in visiting tax inspections held by tax bodies (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 6 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section3/Chapter6.html – Accessed 21 February 2008 – Attachment 46).

An entry in a ‘Timeline’ in a Global Integrity country report indicates that in March 2003 the tax police’s authority was transferred to the Interior Ministry (Global Integrity 2008, ‘Timeline’ in 2006 Country Reports – Russia, Global Integrity website http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/RUSSIA/timeline.cfm – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 47).

The attached articles have reported the involvement of tax police in investigating tax offences (‘British Council closes Russia offices to protect staff’ 2008, The Age, 17 January http://news.theage.com.au/british-council-closes-russia-offices-to-protect-staff/20080117- 1mmw.html – Accessed 21 February 2008 – Attachment 48; ‘Kinnock to escape charges as British Council-Russia row continues’ 2008, RIA Novosti, 18 January – http://en.rian.ru/world/20080118/97296726.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 49; Committee to Protect Journalists 2008, ‘Police confiscate Russian newspaper’s computers’, News Alert 2008, 5 February http://www.cpj.org/news/2008/europe/russ05feb07na.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 50).

In relation to the raids on the British Council office in January 2008, news articles also reported that the tax police and “Russia’s FSB secret police” or “Russian security officials” were jointly involved (‘British Council closes Russia offices to protect staff’ 2008, The Age, 17 January http://news.theage.com.au/british-council-closes-russia-offices-to-protect- staff/20080117-1mmw.html – Accessed 21 February 2008 – Attachment 48; ‘Kinnock to escape charges as British Council-Russia row continues’ 2008, RIA Novosti, 18 January – http://en.rian.ru/world/20080118/97296726.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 46).

Sources also indicate that Russia’s Federal Tax Service (FTS) carries out tax inspections and investigations (‘Tax Service Takes Aim at Auditors’ 2007, Kommersant International, 9 March – Attachment 51; ‘Russian tax service freezes NGO accounts’ 2007, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, source: Interfax, 29 May – Attachment 52; Romanov, Pavel 2007, ‘Russia’s Federal Tax Service Pursuing TNK-BP’, Energy Tribune, 21 August http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=600 – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 53).

The Kommersant International news article states the FTS requested audit companies to supply wide-ranging information including:

…data on income growth trends of auditing firms, expenditures broken down by category, lists of consulting services provided by the company, lists of people and companies who request such services, evidence of any complaints that have been lodged against individual auditors, and information about foreign employees at the company…(‘Tax Service Takes Aim at Auditors’ 2007, Kommersant International, 9 March – Attachment 51).

A range of sources report that the Ministry of the Interior’s involvement in the investigation of tax offences. The sources variously describe the involvement of the Interior Ministry as “officials from the Russian Ministry of the Interior”, “law enforcement officials from the prosecutors’ office and interior ministry”, “tax officials within Russia’s Interior Ministry” and the “Interior Ministry’s investigative committee” (‘Yukos Auditors’ Moscow Offices Raided’ 2007, International Oil Daily, 12 March – Attachment 54; Buckley, Neil 2007, ‘PWC raided as Moscow turns screw over Yukos’, The Australian, 12 March http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21362519-36375,00.html – Accessed 20 February 2008 – Attachment 55; ‘Russian tax office targets Hermitage Fund – paper’ 2007, Reuters News, 14 June – Attachment 56; Shuster, Simon 2007, ‘Court Freezes Russneft Assets After Tax Probe’, St. Petersburg Times, 10 August – Attachment 57).

The Australian news article, dated March 2007, referred to “law enforcement officials from the prosecutor’s office” as well as from the Interior Ministry were involved in a raid on the Moscow office of Price Waterhouse Coopers (Buckley, Neil 2007, ‘PWC raided as Moscow turns screw over Yukos’, The Australian, 12 March http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21362519-36375,00.html – Accessed 20 February 2008 – Attachment 55).

In an published interview, dated December 2007, the chief of a division of the “Investigative Committee organizational administration” in the Internal Affairs Ministry stated that it had instituted proceedings against several Moscow entrepreneurs under two articles of the Criminal Code – “tax evasion and fraud on an especially large scale” (‘Russian senior investigator on probes at secret facilities’ 2007, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, source: Vremya Novostey,18 December – Attachment 58).

A 2008 Human Rights Watch report mentioned that NGOs were inspected by the Tax Service and the “economic crimes department of the local police inspectorate” (Human Rights Watch 2008, Choking on Bureaucracy: State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Activism, Vol. 20, No. 1(D), February, p.42 – Attachment 10).

A news article, dated June 2007, also referred to the “tax crime department” of the “Moscow GUVD (municipal police)” conducting an investigation into a Western funds company operating in Russia (‘Western Fund Involved in Criminal Proceedings’ 2007, Novecon, 14 June – Attachment 59).

An earlier report covering the year 2005 by the Committee to Protect Journalists also noted that the Federal Tax Service as well as “local police” opened a criminal investigation into a newspaper publisher on tax evasion charges (Committee to Protect Journalists 2006, Attack on the press in 2005 http://www.cpj.org/attacks05/europe05/russia_05.html – Accessed 17 February 2006 – Attachment 60).

Where are the people interviewed

No information was found was found in the sources consulted on any specific location where people are taken and interviewed by tax investigators. However, the procedures for investigating tax offences (see above) provide for on-site tax inspections and searching of premises.

In addition, news articles reporting the incidents involving the British Council in Moscow state that the tax police had questioned Russian nationals working at Council and some employees were visited at home late at night (‘British Council closes Russia offices to protect staff’ 2008, The Age, 17 January http://news.theage.com.au/british-council-closes-russia- offices-to-protect-staff/20080117-1mmw.html – Accessed 21 February 2008 – Attachment 48; ‘Kinnock to escape charges as British Council-Russia row continues’ 2008, RIA Novosti, 18 January – http://en.rian.ru/world/20080118/97296726.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 49).

3. Where are the tax offices located in Moscow?

The addresses of two tax offices were found in the sources consulted. Another source also mentioned a tax office in Moscow, however, with no street address.

Information in Russian on the Federal Tax Service’s website (http://www.r77.nalog.ru/), accessed with the assistance of a Russian-speaking Tribunal officer, shows the location of one tax office in Moscow. An English version of the website gives this address as “15, Bolshaya Tulskaya, Moscow, 113191” (‘Управление Федеральной налоговой службы России по г. Москве (Ministry of Taxation of Russian Federation Department for Moscow)’ 2006, Federal Tax Service website, 1 October http://www.r77.nalog.ru/document.php?id=131758&topic=ps77 – Accessed 20 February 2008 – Attachment 61; ‘Department for City of Moscow’ (undated), Federal Tax Service website http://www.nalog.ru/english.php?topic=eng_umns_moscow – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 62).

News reports referred to a tax office on Dolgorukovskaya street near Novoslobodskaya metro station (‘Investigators attribute Moscow tax office blast to ‘hooliganism’’ 2006, RIA Novosti, 20 October – Attachment 63; ‘Blast near tax inspection reported in Moscow’ 2006, RosBusinessConsulting, 20 October – Attachment 64).

One news article mentions the “Moscow Tax Inspection Office *5” without mentioning an address (‘Tax Service Takes Aim at Auditors’ 2007, Kommersant International, 9 March – Attachment 51).

4. What are the summons/charge procedures for tax offences?

Article 10(2) in Chapter 1 of the Code provides for proceedings for violations of tax and fee legislation containing elements of an administrative violation to be conducted by the procedure established by legislation on administrative violations; procedures for violations containing elements of a crime will be in accordance with criminal procedure legislation (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 1 http://www.russian-tax- code.com/PartI/Section1/Chapter1.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 42).

Article 101 in Chapter 14 sets out the proceedings in tax offence cases as follows:

Article 101. Proceedings in a Case of Tax Offences Committed by a Taxpayer, a Fee Payer or by a Tax Agent (Rendering a Decision on the Results of Examination of Audit Materials)

1. Check materials shall be examined by the manager (deputy manager) of a tax body. In the event of submission by the taxpayer of written explanations or objections to the report of a tax check, the materials of the check shall be examined in the presence of the officials of a taxpaying organisation or an individual entrepreneur or of their representative. The tax body shall notify the taxpayer about the time and place of the examination of the check materials well in advance. If despite the notification the taxpayer failed to appear, the check materials, including the objections, explanations and other documents and materials presented by the taxpayer shall be considered in his absence.

2. Based on results of audit materials examination, the head of the tax authority (or his deputy) shall render a decision to:

1) to hold the taxpayer fiscally responsible for committing a tax offence; 2) to not hold the taxpayer responsible for committing a tax offence; 3) to conduct additional tax control measures.

3. A resolution on holding the taxpayer responsible for committing a tax offence shall state the circumstances of the tax offence committed by the taxpayer as established by the tax audit, documents and other facts that confirm the said circumstances, arguments brought forth by the taxpayer in his defense and results of verifying these arguments, the decision to hold the taxpayer fiscally responsible for concrete tax offences indicating the articles of the law stipulating these offences, and the measures of liability applicable thereto.

4. Based on the decision to hold the taxpayer responsible for committing the tax offence, the tax authority sends out a demand for payment, requesting the taxpayer to pay tax arrears, and penalty interest.

5. A copy of the decision of the tax body and the demand for payment shall be served to the taxpayer or his/her representative, against a receipt or are delivered in another way which testifies to the date of the receipt by the taxpayer. If it is impossible to hand the decision of a tax body to a taxpayer or his representatives by the above-said methods, this decision shall be sent by registered mail and shall be deemed to be received upon the expiration of six days after its dispatch.

6. Non-observance, by tax officials, of the requirements established in this Chapter, shall constitute grounds for a higher tax authority or court to annull the decision of the tax authority.

7. With respect to tax offences revealed by the tax authority for which individual taxpayers or officials of corporate taxpayers are punishable under administrative law, the authorized official of the tax authority that conducted the audit draws up a protocol of an administrative offence. Examination of such tax cases and application of administrative sanctions with respect to taxpayer officials (if a legal entity) or individual taxpayers (if entrepreneurs) at fault shall be conducted by the tax authorities in accordance with the administrative legislation of the Russian Federation and subjects of the Russian Federation.

8. The provisions of this Article shall also apply to fee payers and tax agents (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian-tax- code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment cc).

The Code also sets outs out the procedure for the collection of tax sanctions in Article 104 of Chapter 14:

Article 104. Statement of Claim for Collecting a Tax Sanction

1. Having rendered a ruling on holding the taxpayer (or other obligor) responsible for a tax offence, the respective tax authority files a lawsuit with a court for the collection of the tax sanction established under the present Code from the person being held responsible for committing the tax offence.

Prior to filing a lawsuit with a court, the tax authority shall advise the taxpayer (or other obligor) to pay the amount of the tax sanction voluntarily.

If the taxpayer (or other obligor) refuses to pay the amount of the tax sanction voluntarily or does not make the payment within the time limit stated in the demand for payment, the tax authority shall file a statement of claim in at court for the collection of the tax sanction established under the present Code for committing the tax offence.

2. Lawsuits/petitions for collecting tax sanctions from organisations or individual entrepreneurs are filed with an arbitration court, and lawsuits/petitions for collecting tax sanctions from individuals other than individual entrepreneurs – with a court of general jurisdiction.

Attached to the statement of claim shall be the protocol of the tax offence and other materials of the case produced in the course of the tax audit.

3. If necessary, along with filing a statement of claim for collecting the tax sanction from the person being held responsible for committing the tax offence, the tax authority can file a motion in court to secure the claim in the order envisaged by the civil procedural legislation of the Russian Federation and by the arbitration procedure legislation of the Russian Federation.

4. The rules of this Article shall also apply in case of calling a taxpayer to account for breaking the legislation on taxes and fees in connection with the shifting of goods across the customs border of the Russian Federation (Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian-tax-code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 43).

5. Is there a “black list” for people wanted for tax offences when departing Russia?

No information was found in the sources consulted on a “black list” for people wanted for tax offences departing Russia. There are reports of arrests warrants issued for such people after having left Russia.

In June 2007 the FTS accused Mikhail Gutseriyev, owner of the RussNeft oil company, of tax fraud. He left Russia before an arrest warrant was issued on 30 August 2007. According to one news article Russian prosecutors said that Gutseriyev left Russia on 30 July 2007 and flew to Turkey from the international airport in Minsk, Belarus. Gutseriyev’s extradition is currently being sought by Russia (Ehrenfeld, Rachel 2007, ‘Russia’s New ‘State Oligarchy’’, International Analyst Network website, 20 December http://www.analyst- network.com/article.php?art_id=1432 – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 65; ‘Lawyer doesn’t confirm Gutseriyev’s staying in Turkey’ 2007, ITAR-TASS World Service, 5 September – Attachment 66; Lewis, James, Evans, Rob and Leigh, David 2008, ‘Russia seeks extradition of shipping magnate in UK: Ten wanted by Moscow’ 2008, The Guardian, 1 February http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/01/uk.russia – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 23).

Leonid Nevzelin, a former owner of Yukos, also left Russia before an arrest warrant was issued. He is wanted for arranging murders and committing fraud and tax evasion. According to a news article an arrest warrant was issued for Nevzelin at the beginning of 2004 after failing to appear for an interrogation in late July 2003. He arrived in Israel on 30 July 2003. Nevzelin’s extradition is currently being sought by Russia (Izenberg, Dan 2006, ‘State to decide Yukos oligarch’s fate after election’, The Jerusalem Post, 1 March – Attachment 67; Lewis, James, Evans, Rob and Leigh, David 2008, ‘Russia seeks extradition of shipping magnate in UK: Ten wanted by Moscow’ 2008, The Guardian, 1 February http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/01/uk.russia – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 23).

Of some interest is a list of ten Russians wanted for extradition: it includes three persons, in addition to Gutseriyev and Nevzelin, wanted on embezzlement and/or fraud charges (Lewis, James, Evans, Rob and Leigh, David 2008, ‘Russia seeks extradition of shipping magnate in UK: Ten wanted by Moscow’ 2008, The Guardian, 1 February http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/01/uk.russia – Accessed 19 February 2008 – Attachment 23).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/ Open Directory Project search engine http://www.dmoz.org/ Open Directory Project http://www.dmoz.org/ Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/ BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Brookings http://www.brookings.edu/ CIAONET http://www.ciaonet.org/ The Economist http://www.economist.com/ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty http://www.rferl.org/ STRATFOR http://www.stratfor.com/ Transitions Online http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/home.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=256

Databases: FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIAC Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. Banks, Arthur S. et al. (eds) 2007, Political Handbook of the World 2007, CQ Press, Washington, pp.1027-1028. (MRT-RRT Library)

2. Nichol, Jim 2007, Russia’s December 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, Congress Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 10 December http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22770.pdf – Accessed 11 February 2008.

3. ‘Russia’s party barred from polls’ 2007, BBC News, 28 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6308511.stm – Accessed 8 February 2008.

4. McFaul, Michael and Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2008, ‘The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin’s Crackdown Holds Russia Back’, Foreign Affairs, January/February http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87105/michael- mcfaul-kathryn-stoner-weiss/the-myth-of-the-authoritarian-model.html?mode=print – Accessed 8 February 2008.

5. ‘Official End Result of the Duma Elections (December 8, 2007)’ 2007, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 32, 14 December, p.10.

6. Petrov, Nikolai 2007, ‘The Consequences of the State Duma Elections for Russia’s Electoral System’, Russian Analytical Digest, No.32, 14 December, pp.5-8.

7. White, David 2007, ‘Victims of a Managed Democracy? Explaining the Electoral Decline of the Yabloko Party’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring, pp.209-229.

8. ‘Putin versus nobody serious’ 2007, The Economist, 26 July http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9558338&CFID =5620959&CFTOKEN=e53cac8edd541197-F6D0AE46-B27C-BB00- 0143E0D8AD098CF7 – Accessed 8 February 2008.

9. ‘Khodorkovsky ‘on hunger strike’’ 2008, BBC News, 30 January http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7218022.stm – Accessed 8 February 2008. 10. Human Rights Watch 2008, Choking on Bureaucracy: State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Activism, Vol. 20, No. 1(D), February, pp.1-13,35-37,41-43,50.

11. ‘How the Kremlin provided campaign funding for parties’ 2007, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: The New Times, 11 December. (FACTIVA)

12. ‘Russia’s political parties spend more than they say they do – newspaper’ 2003, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, source: Vedomosti, 21 August. (FACTIVA)

13. ‘The pro-Kremlin party and others’ 2003, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: Moskovsky Komsomolets, 19 August. (FACTIVA)

14. ‘Newspaper bewildered by sponsors of Russian presidential candidates’ 2000, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political, source: Izvestiya, 4 April. (FACTIVA)

15. Netreba, Tatiana and Pivovarova, Lyudmila 2003, ‘Whose money political parties use’, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: Argumenty i Fakty, 20 March. (FACTIVA)

16. ‘Russia risk: Macroeconomic risk’ 2007, Economist Intelligence Unit – Risk Briefing, 25 October. (FACTIVA)

17. ‘Russia’s Richest Man Sets Sights on Presidency’ 2003, Stratfor Today, 23 April.

18. Fraser, Hugh 2003, ‘Business muscles in on Russia’s election’, BBC News, 26 November http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3237160.stm – Accessed 8 February 2008.

19. Goldman, Marshall I. 2004, ‘Putin and the Oligarchs’, Foreign Affairs, November/December http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20041101faessay83604/marshall- i-goldman/putin-and-the-oligarchs.html?mode=print – Accessed 8 February 2008.

20. McFaul, Michael and Tatic, Sanja 2005, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance, Freedom House, June, pp.465-491 http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/crossroads/cac.htm – Accessed 1 November 2005.

21. Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn 2007, ‘Russia’ in Countries at the Crossroads 2007, Freedom House, pp.1-21 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ccr/country-7258-8.pdf – Accessed 13 February 2008.

22. Arvedlund, Erin E. 2005, ‘Israel Freezes Some Assets of a Bank Under Inquiry’, The New York Times, 8 March http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/business/worldbusiness/08launder.html?_r=1&o ref=slogin&pagewanted=print&position= – Accessed 13 February 2008.

23. Lewis, James, Evans, Rob and Leigh, David 2008, ‘Russia seeks extradition of shipping magnate in UK: Ten wanted by Moscow’ 2008, The Guardian, 1 February http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/feb/01/uk.russia – Accessed 19 February 2008.

24. ‘Switzerland, Russia: Accounts Unblocked’ 2007, Stratfor, 27 August. 25. US Department of State 2007, ‘d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention’, ‘e. Denial of Fair Public Trial’, ‘b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association’ in Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2006 – Russia, 6 March.

26. ‘Communists and Yabloko forced to become more radical Signs of desperation from opposition parties’ 2007, WPS: What the Papers Say, source: Kommersant, 14 November. (FACTIVA)

27. ‘Yabloko branches excluded from local elections’ 2008, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 4, 5 February http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2008/02/1-RUS/rus-050208.asp – Accessed 13 February 2008.

28. ‘Petersburg activists protest Yabloko’s eviction’ 2008, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2 January http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2008/01/1-RUS/rus-020108.asp – Accessed 13 February 2008.

29. Amnesty International 2007, Russian Federation: Systematic repression on eve of elections, 28 November, EUR 46/056/2007 http://www.amnesty.org/en/alfresco_asset/cabf6e55-a2f6-11dc-8d74- 6f45f39984e5/eur460562007en.pdf – Accessed 8 February 2008.

30. Belton, Catherine and Buckley, Neil 2007, ‘Moscow curbs protests ahead of elections, Financial Times, 26 November. (FACTIVA)

31. Titova, Irina 2007, ‘Police detain scores of opposition activists at St. Petersburg protest’, Associated Press Newswires, 25 November. (FACTIVA)

32. ‘Yabloko candidate files complaint, faces arrest’ 2007, RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 11, No. 216, 21 November http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2007/11/1-RUS/rus-211107.asp – Accessed 13 February 2008.

33. Orttung, Robert 2007, ‘Russian Blogs: Tool for Opposition and State’, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 28, 2 October, pp.2-7.

34. ‘Russia: Protestors Light Themselves On Fire’ 2007, Stratfor, 13 September.

35. ‘Geopolitical Diary: Russia’s Authoritarian Regime Shows Its Face’ 2007, Stratfor, 16 December.

36. Abdullaev, Nabi 2005, ‘Berlin Grants Asylum to Yabloko Supporter’, The Moscow Times, 10 June. (FACTIVA)

37. ‘Putin and Khodorkovsky: The Battle for Russia’ 2003, Stratfor Today, 14 July.

38. US Department of State 2005, ‘Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government’ in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004 – Russia, 28 February.

39. US Department of State 2004, ‘[Introduction]’, ‘Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government’, and ‘Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights’ in Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2003 – Russia, 25 February.

40. International Monetary Fund 2004, Russian Federation: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Fiscal Transparency Module, IMF Country Report No. 04/288, September, p.24 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2004/cr04288.pdf – Accessed 19 February 2008.

41. ‘President subjects government to drastic reform’ 2004, News from Russia, 12 March, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of India website http://www.india.mid.ru/nfr2004/nf12.html – Accessed 21 February 2008.

42. Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 1 http://www.russian-tax- code.com/PartI/Section1/Chapter1.html – Accessed 19 February 2008.

43. Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 14 http://www.russian- tax-code.com/PartI/Section5/Chapter14.html – Accessed 19 February 2008.

44. Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 15 http://www.russian- tax-code.com/PartI/Section6/Chapter15.html – Accessed 20 February 2008.

45. Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 5 http://www.russian-tax- code.com/PartI/Section3/Chapter5.html – Accessed 19 February 2008.

46. Tax Code of The Russian Federation 31 July 1998, Chapter 6 http://www.russian-tax- code.com/PartI/Section3/Chapter6.html – Accessed 21 February 2008.

47. Global Integrity 2008, ‘Timeline’ in 2006 Country Reports – Russia, Global Integrity website http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/RUSSIA/timeline.cfm – Accessed 19 February 2008.

48. ‘British Council closes Russia offices to protect staff’ 2008, The Age, 17 January http://news.theage.com.au/british-council-closes-russia-offices-to-protect- staff/20080117-1mmw.html – Accessed 21 February 2008.

49. ‘Kinnock to escape charges as British Council-Russia row continues’ 2008, RIA Novosti, 18 January – http://en.rian.ru/world/20080118/97296726.html – Accessed 19 February 2008.

50. Committee to Protect Journalists 2008, ‘Police confiscate Russian newspaper’s computers’, News Alert 2008, 5 February http://www.cpj.org/news/2008/europe/russ05feb07na.html – Accessed 19 February 2008.

51. ‘Tax Service Takes Aim at Auditors’ 2007, Kommersant International, 9 March. (FACTIVA)

52. ‘Russian tax service freezes NGO accounts’ 2007, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, source: Interfax, 29 May. (FACTIVA) 53. Romanov, Pavel 2007, ‘Russia’s Federal Tax Service Pursuing TNK-BP’, Energy Tribune, 21 August http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=600 – Accessed 19 February 2008.

54. ‘Yukos Auditors’ Moscow Offices Raided’ 2007, International Oil Daily, 12 March. (FACTIVA)

55. Buckley, Neil 2007, ‘PWC raided as Moscow turns screw over Yukos’, The Australian, 12 March http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,21362519- 36375,00.html – Accessed 20 February 2008.

56. ‘Russian tax office targets Hermitage Fund – paper’ 2007, Reuters News, 14 June. (FACTIVA)

57. Shuster, Simon 2007, ‘Court Freezes Russneft Assets After Tax Probe’, St. Petersburg Times, 10 August. (FACTIVA)

58. ‘Russian senior investigator on probes at secret facilities’ 2007, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, source: Vremya Novostey,18 December. (FACTIVA)

59. ‘Western Fund Involved in Criminal Proceedings’ 2007, Novecon, 14 June. (FACTIVA)

60. Committee to Protect Journalists 2006, Attack on the press in 2005 http://www.cpj.org/attacks05/europe05/russia_05.html – Accessed 17 February 2006. (CISNET Russia CX146876)

61. ‘Управление Федеральной налоговой службы России по г. Москве (Ministry of Taxation of Russian Federation Department for Moscow)’ 2006, Federal Tax Service website, 1 October http://www.r77.nalog.ru/document.php?id=131758&topic=ps77 – Accessed 20 February 2008.

62. ‘Department for City of Moscow’ (undated), Federal Tax Service website http://www.nalog.ru/english.php?topic=eng_umns_moscow – Accessed 19 February 2008.

63. ‘Investigators attribute Moscow tax office blast to ‘hooliganism’’ 2006, RIA Novosti, 20 October. (FACTIVA)

64. ‘Blast near tax inspection reported in Moscow’ 2006, RosBusinessConsulting, 20 October. (FACTIVA)

65. Ehrenfeld, Rachel 2007, ‘Russia’s New ‘State Oligarchy’’, International Analyst Network website, 20 December http://www.analyst- network.com/article.php?art_id=1432 – Accessed 19 February 2008.

66. ‘Lawyer doesn’t confirm Gutseriyev’s staying in Turkey’ 2007, ITAR-TASS World Service, 5 September. (FACTIVA)

67. Izenberg, Dan 2006, ‘State to decide Yukos oligarch’s fate after election’, The Jerusalem Post, 1 March. (FACTIVA)