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Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IMEMO CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF THE SIPRI YEARBOOK 2004 Institute of World Economy and International Relations RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO) RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IMEMO SUPPLEMENT TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION OF THE SIPRI YEARBOOK 2004 Compiled and edited by ALEXANDRE KALIADINE AND ALEXEI ARBATOV Moscow 2005 УДК 327 ББК 64.4 (0) Rus 95 Rus 95 Russia: arms control, disarmament and international security/ IMEMO supplement to the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2004 / Compiled and edited by A. Kaliadine, A. Arbatov. IMEMO, 2005. – 128 p. ISBN 5-9535-0038-6 Your comments and requests for obtaining the book should be sent to: IMEMO 23, Profsoyuznaya str., Moscow GSP-7, 117997 Russian Federation Telephone: (+7 095) 128 05 13 Telefax: (+7 095) 128 65 75 E-mail: [email protected] Internet URL:: http://www.imemo.ru ISBN 5-9535-0038-6 © ИМЭМО РАН, 2005 CONTENTS PREFACE........................................................................................... 5 ACRONYMS ...................................................................................... 7 PART I. ANALYSES, FORECASTS, DISCUSSIONS 1. PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NEW THREATS, NEW SO LUTIONS. Alexei ARBATOV ................ 13 Nuclear deterrence and terrorism: the prospect of terrorists coming into possession of nuclear weapons....................................................... 14 Synergy of proliferation risks ................................................................................ 16 Where to go from here?.......................................................................................... 20 2. G8 GLOBAL PARTNER SHIP: THE INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO CO-OPERATION ON WMD NON -PROLIFERATIO N Alexander PIKAYEV .......................................................................30 3. THE CHALLENGES OF THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE. Alexandre KALIADINE ............................................. 38 Today’s challenges .................................................................................................. 38 New opportunities in the struggle against proliferators and their facilitators ................................................................................................ 42 Domestic debates about Russian participation in the PSI................................ 48 Conclusions.............................................................................................................. 51 4. RUSSIA ON THE PATH TOWARDS CW DESTRUCTION Alexander SAVELYEV and Ludmila PANKOVA.................................54 Results of phase 1 of the CW destruction........................................................... 55 Scope and characteristics of the forthcoming tasks........................................... 57 Chemical weapon destruction facilities............................................................... 58 Basic problems and specific features of phase 2 ............................................... 61 Russian chemical disarmament and global security.......................................... 63 5. COMPLIANCE WITH THE BIOLOGICAL AND TO XIN WEAPONS CONVENTION: FROM TH E RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE Natalya KALININA and Elina KIRICHENKO....................................66 Allegations of non-compliance............................................................................. 67 Russian participation in the conferences and meetings of the states parties to the BTWC......................................................................... 69 Russian approaches to biosecurity ....................................................................... 71 Export control in the biological sphere ............................................................... 73 Concluding remarks ................................................................................................ 75 4 CONTENTS 6. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CFE TREATY. Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV....................... 76 7. DISCUSSIONS AT IMEMO. Galina OZNOBISHCHEVA................. 84 Account of the presentation of the Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook 2003.................................................................................. 84 Seminar on “The Iraq crisis”................................................................................. 86 PART II. EXPERT INSIGHTS 8. THE IMPACT OF NEW GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES ON THE REFORM OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES (ANALYSIS OF A DEFENCE MINISTRY PUBLICATION) Vladimir DVORKIN.........................................................................97 On the way to a transparent military policy........................................................ 97 Drawing lessons from the international and domestic experience.................. 99 Problems of civilian control................................................................................103 The USA and other NATO countries: are they partners or adversaries of Russia? .....................................................................................104 9. RUSSIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURE: TRENDS AND PRIORITIES (DEFENCE OUTLAYS IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET FOR 2005). Pyotr ROMASHKIN ................................... 108 General characteristics of the Federal Budget for 2005 .................................108 Peculiarities of the defence budget (section 02 “National Defence” and section 03 “National Security and Law Enforcement”)..........................110 Expenditure under section “National Defence”...............................................111 ANNEX. KEY DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY, DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL (SEPTEMBER 2003–2004) Tamara FARNASOVA AND Vladimir EVSEEV................................... 117 1. Legislative acts ............................................................................. 117 2. Normative acts.............................................................................. 123 ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS ...................................................... 128 PREFACE The Institute of World Economy and International Relations presents in this volume the 5th edition of RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. This publication is an offshoot of the joint IMEMO – SIPRI project “The Russian edition of the SIPRI Yearbook: Armament, Disarmament and International Security”. From 1997 Russian versions of the SIPRI Yearbooks contain sup- plementary materials written by experts from IMEMO. Our intention in translating and publishing them in separate volumes has been to reach out to the English speaking readers – scholars and students, decision makers and experts, – who are used to reading the original, English version of the SIPRI Yearbook and wish to acquaint themselves with similar research originating from Russia. IMEMO Special supplements to the SIPRI Yearbooks focus on those aspects of global security and arms control that are of particular relevance to Russia. We aim to contribute to openness, transparency and democratic control over Russian policy in the area of defence and disarmament, but also to unbiased assessments of Russia’s security situation and needs. The 5th edition of RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY gathers together IMEMO contributions to the SIPRI Yearbook 2004. It contains analyses of developments in 2004 in inter- national security, Russian military spending, WMD non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Alexei Arbatov assesses nuclear proliferation threats and risks as seen from Russia, putting strong emphasis on the relationship between nuclear deterrence policies and swelling proliferation challenges. He outlines sub- stantial proposals in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including policy recommendations for revamping the global treaty-based WMD non-proliferation regime and controlling regional pr oliferators. Alexander Pikayev examines the progress of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, identifies shortfalls and lessons le arnt from its existing projects and formulates some recommendations for future activities. Alexandre Kaliadine analyses the evolution of the Proliferation Secu- rity Initiative (PSI), that is designed to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air and on land, and its role in the global effort at controlling prolifera- tion. Special consideration is given to domestic debates about Russian par- ticipation and contribution to the PSI. He argues that PSI participants will have to exert themselves in order to transform the current informal partner- ship into an integral part of the global strategy for strengthening multila t- eral non-proliferation and export control agreements. 6 PREFACE Alexander Savelyev and Ludmila Pankova examine Russia’s pro- gress on the path towards chemical demilitarisation and problems associ- ated with the CW destruction. Natalya Kalinina and Elina Kirichenko describe policies of the RF in the area of biological disarmament focusing on Russian approaches to bio- security and export controls. Sergey Oznobishchev assesses the prospects for the regime, created by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. He argues that ignor- ing Russia’s opinion on the NATO enlargement eastwards complicates the international political climate, adversely affects the politic al mood within Russia itself and impedes further institutionalisation of the RF interaction
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