Deep Cuts Working Paper No. 3, January 2015

THE ‘P5’ PROCESS: PROSPECTS FOR ENHANCEMENT by Alexey Arbatov THE ‘P5’ PROCESS: PROSPECTS FOR ENHANCEMENT

Introduction

Ever since his return to the Kremlin in 2012, However up until now these efforts have Putin has encouraged to emphasize been fruitless. and modernize its nuclear weapons in order to enhance nuclear deterrence1. At the The ’ official view on this same time Russia’s leadership had repeatedly subject is muter and does not have the same mentioned the impact of nuclear arsenals sense of urgency, as that of Russia. Hence, in belonging to countries other than the United Summer of 2013 the U.S. President Barack States and Russia on the global strategic Obama proposed to Russia further strategic balance and the prospects for U.S.-Russian arms reductions (down to about 1,000 war- nuclear arms control. Thus, on the eve of heads) without reference to third nuclear we- the 2012 Russian presidential elections, apon states’ engagement in the process. Still, Putin expressed his views on the subject as Washington would probably also endorse an element of his presidential program on their joining nuclear disarmament at some the matters of defense and security: “…We future time, in particular regarding China. [allegedly Russia and the United States] will not disarm unilaterally. As for further steps Most importantly, the idea of bilateral and Both principal avenues in nuclear disarmament, those steps should multilateral nuclear disarmament is conside- of nuclear arms control: be comprehensive in nature, and all nuclear red the indispensable precondition to nuc- further U.S.-Russian powers should participate in the process. We lear non-proliferation. In the famous Article nuclear disarmament cannot disarm while other nuclear powers VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and enhancement of are increasing their arms.”2 Speaking at the it clearly states: “Each of the Parties to the nuclear non-prolifera- National Research Nuclear University, an eli- Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in tion – imply an ex- te Russian college, in January 2014, Russian good face on effective measures relating to pansion of the nuclear President Vladimir Putin made the following cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early disarmament format. statement: “My personal position is that at date and to nuclear disarmament…”4 Since some point, humanity must renounce nuc- the United States, Russian Federation, Great lear arms. But for now, we are far from this, Britain, France and China (‘P5’) are the only in the sense that other nations aside from nuclear weapons states-Parties to the NPT, Russia have nuclear arms as well—and many recognized as legitimate NWS by the Treaty, of them—and they are not going to renoun- this demand unquestionably relates to them. ce this means of armed combat. Such a step Hence, both principal avenues of nuclear by the Russian Federation would be very arms control: further U.S.-Russian nuclear strange in these conditions, and could lead disarmament and enhancement of nuclear to some fairly serious, grave consequences non-proliferation – imply an expansion of for our nation and our people.”3 the nuclear disarmament format. The third nuclear weapon states (TNWS), namely Bri- Apparently this idea has risen to the highest tain, France and China logically seem to be political level in Russia, and it is affecting the first candidates for joining nuclear arms ’s official position as a precondition limitation and reduction agreements. A few for further nuclear arms reductions following years ago this idea was officially formalized the U.S.-Russian New Strategic Arms Re- in the so called ‘P5’ forums. duction Treaty (New START), due to expire in 2021. Ever since the time of Strategic However this seemingly robust concept Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I) of 1972 and endeavor turned to be a trap. The “P5” Moscow has been trying to capture third meetings produced a forum for interesting nuclear weapon states’ forces (NWS) by arms discussions and constructive general docu- limitation provisions, foremost having in ments, but failed to achieve the principal view U.S. nuclear allies – Britain and France. stated goal: engagement of TNWS in the

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process of nuclear arms limitations and reductions. It looks like there is no prospect of reaching this goal in the future for reasons beside the negative political environment, brought by the Ukrainian crisis of 2013- 2014. Even in case of political resolution of the current crisis and improved international environment, the “P5” format does not seem promising for the task assigned to it. Quite different assumptions, ways and formats would be needed. These issues are addressed below.

1. Origins and Achievements of the ‘P5’ Process.

The initial idea of the endeavor was put forward by Des Browne, then UK Defense Chinese Type 908 replenishment ship at the port of Malta, March 2013. Copyright: Martin Brayley. Secretary, in February 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The first meeting took place in London in Septem- Many provisions were addressed to the ber 2009. The second was convened in Paris enhancement of the NPT and its regimes, in in June 2011, the third - in Washington in particular: universalization of the 1997 Ad- June 2012. The fourth ‘P5’ meeting was in ditional Protocol to NPT nuclear safeguards, Washington in April, 2013 and the fifth – in strengthening export controls, supporting Beijing in April of 2014. the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, preventing nuclear terrorism. For During this period the parties negotiated and this purpose, in particular, the group called for adopted a number of general documents, securing all nuclear materials within four years which gradually were becoming more and more – in line with the appeal of President Obama. Even in case of routine and similar to each other. Those docu- The ‘P5’ called for implementation of the UN political resolution of ments universally underlined the intention of Security Council Resolution 1540 and the the current crisis and the parties to create the conditions for further International Convention for the Suppression improved international progress under NPT Article VI, discussed stra- of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Also the parties environment, the “P5” tegic stability, measures for better mutual con- urged all states to apply the IAEA recommen- format does not seem fidence and transparency. They called for the dations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear promising for the task entry into force of the Comprehensive Nucle- Material and Nuclear Facilities. assigned to it. ar-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), emphasized the importance of negotiations on a Fissile Material Since the 2011 Paris meeting the ‘P5’ made ef- Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), encouraged all states forts to better prepare for the 2015 NPT Re- to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention view Conference. In particular the importance (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons of implementation of the Action Plan adopted Convention (BTWC). Much attention was by the 2010 NPT Review Conference was dedicated to calling on Iran to comply with the underlined. The group discussed the progress UN Security Council Resolutions and coope- made towards signature of the Protocol to the rate with the IAEA, as well as to urging North Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear We- Korea to agree to the complete and verifiable apon Free Zone (SEANWFZ), endorsed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear

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Weapon Free Zone and supported the plan of 2. Questioning the Basic convening a Conference on the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destructi- Assumptions on (WMD) free zone. The principal deficiency of the ‘P5’ nuclear Beside the mentioned documents the ‘P5’ initiative was applying the model of multilate- process produced some practical results. One ral arms control over various nuclear activities of these was the creation of the working group to the “hard core” arms control of partial and (led by China) on the Glossary of key nuclear phased limitation and reduction of nuclear terms, which made a big progress with the aim weapons – i.e. delivery vehicles and warheads. of completing the first phase of the Glossary by the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Ano- The first model has been relatively successful ther working group was created to deal with in achieving since 1963 several nuclear test- nuclear verification issues. ban treaties (culminating in the signing of the CTBT in 1996), the NPT in 1968, as well as While recognizing some usefulness of the a number of treaties on non-deployment of discussions and documents of the meetings, nuclear weapons in various spaces (i.e. Outer it should be pointed out that the ‘P5’ did no Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibited the tangible progress towards its main initial goal: deployment of WMD in space, and the Treaty engaging all five NWS in the nuclear disar- of 1971, prohibiting such deployment on the mament process through involving Britain, Seabed and Ocean Floor), as well as in various France and China in practical negotiations geographic regions (nuclear weapon or WMD and agreements. The routine common positi- free zones). Also this collective model was The trap of the ‘P5’ nuc- on of the latter three states has been that the implemented in total prohibition and phy- lear process was that U.S. and Russia should reduce their nuclear sical elimination of the whole two classes of its concept stemmed weapons arsenals to bring them closer to the WMD: by the Chemical Weapons Conven- directly from the NPT UK, French and Chinese force levels as a pre- tion of 1993 and the Biological and Toxin Article VI. Thus the NPT condition for negotiating common reductions Weapons Convention of 1972. model of collective ob- for all five NWS. ligations regarding ac- The second model was only implemented tivities was mistakenly The essence of the attitude of the “big in eight U.S.-Soviet/Russian agreements on applied to the task of two”(whether vocal in Moscow or implicit in SALT/INF/START/SORT during 1972- physical limitation and Washington) is that in order to move subs- 2010. This kind of treaties was very different numerical reduction tantially below the New START they need a from all others since it directly addressed the (elimination) of nuclear binding guarantee of other NWS joining the nuclear deterrence potential and arsenals of arms and forces of five process with specified timing and force levels the nations, considered the key pillar of their states. of this step. Moreover, for Russia getting close security and that of their allies. to the nuclear force levels of each of the three smaller states would imply at least a triple infe- The trap of the ‘P5’ nuclear process was that riority to the aggregate level of NATO nuclear its concept stemmed directly from the NPT forces, while for the U.S. that would mean a Article VI. Thus the NPT model of collective double inferiority to the summed nuclear arms obligations regarding activities was mistakenly numbers of Russia and China, which proclaim applied to the task of physical limitation and themselves “strategic partners”. Besides, for numerical reduction (elimination) of nuclear Russia this would exacerbate its conventional arms and forces of five states. However, the inferiority to NATO and China, while for the NPT Article V does not necessarily imply U.S. it would put in doubt its security guaran- five-party negotiations or “2+3” (the U.S., tees to European and Asian allies. Russia + the three others) forum for practi-

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cal nuclear arms limitations. It just says that NWS should proceed with nuclear disarma- ment without specifying any particular format of the process.

Obviously each of those states assign speci- fic military and political tasks to its nuclear forces and programs and thus the simplistic model of “joining the club” (of nuclear disar- mament) could never work. Quite naturally the ‘P5’ forum activities shifted to the first paradigm of collective nuclear arms control (paying attention mostly to the NPT, CTBT, FMCT etc.), rather to the second mode of limitation and reduction of actual nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads. 2nd Infantry Regiment of the French Foreign Lgion during a ceremony at Pont du Gard, July 2, 2012. Coypright: Mmeeds. Each of the five NWS (and for that matter the other four as well: Israel, Pakistan, India, Hence, even bilateral nuclear arms control has North Korea) assign various tasks to their periodically experienced serious difficulties in nuclear forces. One and the basic task is deter- finding a mutually acceptable formula for an ring nuclear aggression through the threat of agreement—as evidenced by the present state devastating retaliation. For this purpose nuc- of U.S.-Russian dialogue, which is stalled due lear arms are measured against their ability to to differences over missile defense, conventio- survive and retaliate after nuclear or conven- nal precision-guided long-range systems and tional counterforce (disarming) enemy strikes sub-strategic nuclear arms. Such problems and penetrate ballistic missile defense systems would be much more complex in the context of the opponent. However, there are other of multilateral arms control arrangements or purposes and functions that nations assign to in applying nuclear arms control at regional nuclear arms: levels.

• deterrence of overwhelming conventional The experience of 46 years of practical The experience of aggression, nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks 46 years of practical (since 1968) demonstrates that negotiations • deterrence of attacks using other kinds of nuclear arms limitation and agreements are only possible between weapons of mass destruction, and reduction talks countries that, first, have relations of mutual (since 1968) demons- • deterrence of nuclear or other WMD aggres- nuclear deterrence and, second, have appro- trates that negotiations sion against their allies, ximate equality (parity) in weapons types and agreements are and numbers. The first condition implies that • deterrence of conventional aggression only possible between in the context of mutual nuclear deterrence against their allies, countries that, first, one state makes concessions on limitations have relations of mutual • deterrence of several potential nuclear ag- and reductions of its weapons in exchange nuclear deterrence and, gressors simultaneously. for acceptable concessions of the other state. second, have approxi- The second condition means that conces- mate equality (parity) In addition, some nuclear-armed states orient sions should be approximately equal and in weapons types and their weapons to helping them sustain security would legitimize resulting equality as the numbers. guarantees to and political influence over only acceptable principle (in the early stage allies, to support global or regional status or of U.S.-Soviet talks these two principles were to serve as bargaining chips in negotiations on formalized as “equality and equal securi- arms control and other issues. ty’). Otherwise in the absence of parity the

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inferior side would not agree to legalize its security. Russia for its part would never agree inferiority by an agreement, while the superi- to reduce its strategic forces to the levels of or side would hardly give away its superiority Britain and France, which enjoy the benefits of “free of charge”. American security commitments under NATO nuclear “umbrella”. Neither of the above conditions exists in the context of the ‘P5’ nuclear disarmament idea. Likewise, China undoubtedly has nuclear The United States, Britain and France do not deterrence relations with the United States, but have mutual nuclear deterrence relations. They allegedly is drastically inferior to the U.S. in are political and military allies; there is no sense numbers and quality of nuclear arsenal. Hence, for them to make concessions to each other by the second condition for practical nuclear arms limiting their nuclear weapons. On the cont- limitation is also lacking between these two rary, the nuclear forces of the U.S. and Britain powers. (and recently those of Britain and France as well) indirectly add to each other’s deterrence Finally, strategic relations between China and potential. Russia are quite mute. Formally they are not military allies. On the other hand, they do not It is hard to imagine As for Britain, France and China, they do not have mutual nuclear deterrence relationship arms control bargaining have mutual deterrence relationship and are – at least officially. Still some portion of their and trade-offs between largely out of range from each other’s nuclear respective nuclear forces is probably tacitly Moscow and Beijing. delivery systems. If their nuclear forces were assigned against each other, despite expanding assigned the purpose of political prestige only, economic cooperation and good political re- there might be some sense in agreeing on their lations, which due to the crisis between Russia approximately equal levels (although China and theWest have become closer than ever since would probably object even to this, pointing the 1950’s. Their forces are largely unequal (in out that the other two are under NATO securi- Russia’s favor) and quite asymmetric. Also they ty guarantees and need much fewer arms than are targeted on several other parties: Russian China). However, since they design nuclear – against the U.S. and its European and Pacific weapons with specific deterrence purposes vis- allies; Chinese – against the U.S., its Pacific al- à-vis other nations (and not against each other), lies and India. For all these reasons it is hard to there is little reason for them to negotiate tra- imagine arms control bargaining and trade-offs de-offs in limiting and reducing their weapons. between Moscow and Beijing.

No question, British and French nuclear forces Still some preliminary steps for involving the are designed to deter Russia and are targeted TNWS in the nuclear arms limitation process at its territory and vice-versa. Hence, the two are conceivable. The ‘P5’ format is not quite European states and Russia have mutual deter- adequate for this task, although it may be consi- rence relationship and might discuss reciprocal dered a useful departing point for the follow-on concessions through arms control. However, endeavor. Russian nuclear forces are much larger than British and French, and thus the second condi- tion of parity is absent, since the material basis 3. Engaging the United Kingdom for agreements is lacking. Britain and France would neither agree to legalize their nuclear and France inferiority, nor make concession to the old Moscow’s demand to add their arms to Ameri- For several reasons, it is worthwhile to start can strategic forces under the common ceiling with the United Kingdom and France when equal to Russian weapon levels. London and investigating how—and whether—an ex- Paris are claiming that their forces provide for panded framework for nuclear arms control autonomous national nuclear deterrence and would be possible.

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First, in parallel to the United States and many decades in intelligent discussions about France and the UK Russia and in contrast to other nuclear-armed the theoretical and practical issues of nuclear could adopt some of the states, these two nations have recently been deterrence and arms control, hence there are transparency measures reducing their nuclear forces unilaterally. no historic, cultural, or linguistic obstacles to and confidence-building Second, both countries are quite transparent expanding this narrative to address their own mechanisms negoti- as to their existing nuclear forces and moder- nuclear arsenals. ated by Moscow and nization programs. The Great Britain has 4 Washington under the nuclear missile submarines with 48 deployed At the same time, the balance of nuclear forces New START. sea-based ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carrying between Britain and France in relation to Russia 160 operationally available warheads (in sum (which allegedly has about 2,500 strategic about 225 are in stockpile)5. France has 4 nuc- warheads and altogether 8,500 warheads in lear missile submarines with 48 missiles and stockpile)6 implies that presently there is no 240 warheads, plus 30 land- and carrier-based parity between them and Russia. Moreover, medium-range airplanes with 30 air-to-surface there is no urgent strategic need (in contrast to missiles – about 270 warheads (290 in total Moscow’s political view) for involving the two stockpile) . Hence together the two Europe- nations in arms reductions. This is true not only an states possess around 430 operationally as long as Washington and Moscow implement available nuclear warheads (515 in aggregate the New START, but also if and when they con- stockpile). clude a hypothetical follow-up treaty to reduce their strategic offensive arms to approximately Third, their national security is better assured 1,000 operationally deployed warheads. This than that of all other nuclear states because conclusion is predicated on Paris and London they are located in Western Europe—one continuing a robust policy of sustaining stable of the most secure areas in the world—and deterrent capabilities at lower force levels. they are protected by North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union security It is unlikely that France and the UK will If Britain and Fran- guarantees. consent to directly engaging in nuclear disarma- ce consent to adopt ment in the near future. However, they could confidence-building and Fourth, official circles in the UK and France adopt some of the transparency measures and transparency measures, generally share classic U.S.-Russian principles confidence-building mechanisms negotiated as well as inspection of strategic stability and parity. Moreover by Moscow and Washington under the New activities, like those British politicians have repeatedly expressed START, thus indirectly legalizing their unila- provided for in New their overall support for the concept of a nuc- teral nuclear arms reduction plans and their START, it might send a lear-free world. This notion tangibly affected forces’ forecasted future numerical ceilings. This positive message and public debates over a British nuclear moder- may be the most realistic option for connecting set a precedent for nization program and UK-French coopera- Paris and London to U.S. and Russian efforts other countries, prima- tion on some nuclear-weapon development to make nuclear arms control a multilateral rily China. activities. endeavor.

Fifth, the nuclear forces of these two nations Should Russia and the United States pursue a are technically most similar to the elements responsible nuclear disarmament policy, in the of U.S. and Russian strategic triads: foremost longer run the integrated British and French submarine-launched ballistic missiles in nuclear force could be engaged in a legally Britain and France. They would be relatively binding arms limitation and reduction regime. easy to technically integrate into the tested Besides, if Britain and France consent to adopt U.S.-Russian methods of strategic arms cont- confidence-building and transparency measures, rol. as well as inspection activities, like those provi- ded for in New START, it might send a positive Last but not least, both British and French po- message and set a precedent for other countries, litical and expert elites have been involved for primarily China.

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Russian Tupolew Tu-160 long-range bomber. Copyright: Mrsusha2013.

4. Exploring China’s Model of 250 and 1,100 levels is in part due to higher numbers of medium-range and tactical aircraft Participation nuclear weapons, which the Russian estimate counts (altogether 570 gravity bombs and Compared to Britain and France, China air-launched cruise missiles on 400 airplanes), would be even more difficult to engage in as well as warheads on 200 land-based tactical nuclear arms limitation in military-technical, ballistic missiles and 50 long-range, land-ba- strategic and political senses. However, invol- sed cruise missiles9. ving China is more important and urgent. It is more difficult because among the five The missile and nuclear modernization pro- The missile and nuclear great powers - permanent members of the gram that China is conducting, at least to the modernization program UN Security Council and recognized NPT extent known to the outside world, is much that China is conducting nuclear-weapon states – China is the only one, more diversified and hard to match against is much more diversi- which is not providing any official data on its U.S.-Russian START counting rules, than fied and hard to match nuclear forces and development program. Due those of Britain and France. Allegedly, Chi- against U.S.-Russian to the lack of official Chinese data, foreign nese nuclear forces and program are primarily START counting rules, assessments differ widely. The majority of aimed at deterring the United States, India, than those of Britain Western sources estimate the overall number and (tacitly) Russia. and France. at around 250 warheads7. The highest Russi- an estimate gives the figure as high as 3,500 In keeping with the traditions and distinct warheads8. Some authoritative Russian assess- characteristics of its strategic culture, China ments put the amount at more than 1,100 may use a number of methods that would warheads. Apparently the difference between seem quite unusual to Russia and the West.

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U.S. Rockwell B-1 Lancer during takeoff. Copyright: Peterfz30.

In particular, in parallel to gradually building and technical resources would be too limited up and improving the characteristics of its to enable them to challenge the two nuclear nuclear armed strategic, intermediate-range, superpowers even if they wanted to. North and tactical missiles, China is quite advanced Korea might have such intentions, which in the development of medium-range preci- worries its immediate neighbors, but it lacks sion-guided conventional ballistic missiles to the capabilities to become a significant factor be used against U.S. Navy and bases in the Far in the global strategic balance any time soon. East. Even more important, a portion of its missile and nuclear arsenal may be stockpiled Hence, in contrast to political preferences of in hardened underground tunnels. This would Moscow and relative strategic simplicity of be a unique development in the history of engaging Britain and France, Chinese nuclear nuclear arms of the last seventy years. forces and modernization are the most im- portant factor for the future of nuclear arms In fact, if the above Russian estimates are cor- control. Increased transparency might help rect, China is the third largest nuclear power to clarify the actual size and characteristics of in the world after the United States and Rus- China’s nuclear forces, as well as China’s po- sia, constituting a special class of its own and tential to build them up. If the country holds having more nuclear weapons than the rest 6 less than 250 or 300 nuclear weapons, as belie- nuclear arms states combined. Besides, China ved by a majority of the international strategic is the only country in the world that has the community, then there is no urgent need for economic and technical capability to launch legally binding limitations before proceeding a crash buildup of its nuclear forces to match with further U.S.-Russia arms reductions. A the United States’ and Russia’s in the next political commitment from Beijing not to ten to fifteen years. France and the United increase this number (like that of Britain and Kingdom are different: their nuclear forces France) would probably be sufficient. are being reduced, they are quite transparent and predictable, and they lack the capabilities But if China has 1,000 or more nuclear war- or intentions to rapidly increase their nuclear heads, plus the weapons stored in tunnels, its forces in the future. Israel, Pakistan, and India arsenal certainly should be limited. Other- do not aim their nuclear arms against the wise, it would be impossible for the other two United States or Russia, and their economic powers to reduce their nuclear weapons signi-

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ficantly below the New START ceilings, even were to become more transparent about its if they sort out their disagreements on BMD, nuclear forces and programs, it would greatly sub-strategic nuclear arms, and non-nuclear help Moscow and Washington to plan future strategic systems. strategic arms reduction treaties.

Another unique feature of China is that it is More generally, China’s approach to the the only of the nine nuclear-armed states to military balance and strategic stability differs officially and unconditionally pledge not to from that of Russia and the United States. It use nuclear weapons first. In a white paper is expressed as a series of very general, bene- entitled China’s National Defense in 2010, volent political pronouncements and does Beside the size of U.S. Beijing urged all nuclear-weapon states to not incorporate the concepts of approximate and Russian offensive “abandon any nuclear deterrence policy based strategic nuclear parity and mutually assured nuclear forces, Ame- on first use of nuclear weapons, make an une- destruction. In various formulations, China rican Ballistic Missile quivocal commitment that under no circum- often declares that “it will limit its nuclear Defense program in the stances will they use or threaten to use nuclear capabilities to the minimum level required for Pacific is understanda- 11 weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states national security.” bly a major concern for or nuclear-weapon-free zones. . . . Nuclear-we- China—even more than apon states should negotiate and conclude Regarding arms control Beijing’s official NATO missile defense a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons position is that the countries with the largest system in Europe 10 against each other.” arsenals “should further drastically reduce alarms Russia. their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversib- It is interesting to note that due to relative le, and legally-binding manner, so as to create vulnerability of China’s nuclear force and the necessary conditions for the complete its command-control-warning systems, this elimination of nuclear weapons. When con- pledge might have practical value (in contrast ditions are appropriate, other nuclear-weapon to propaganda), only if there is indeed a secret states should also join in multilateral negotia- reserve of nuclear missiles in hardened under- tions on nuclear disarmament.”12 ground tunnels. In this case Chinese nuclear forces would be actually capable of delivering Beside the size of U.S. and Russian offensive a retaliatory strike after receiving a disarming nuclear forces, American Ballistic Missile attack by the U.S. or Russia. But also in this Defense program in the Pacific is under- case China would have to possess much larger standably a major concern for China—even nuclear forces, than those observed on the more than NATO missile defense system in surface. Europe alarms Russia. China is responding by developing BMD penetration aids, anti-sa- Beijing has officially demanded that the Uni- tellite weapons (that could attack satellites ted States (and, logically, Russia) commit to critical to the U.S. BMD architecture), and an no-first-use of nuclear weapons before China anti-missile system of its own. agrees to increase transparency about its nuc- lear forces. While this demand seems reason- Additionally China is greatly concerned by able at first glance, it is in reality groundless. the development of U.S. non-nuclear pre- Official information from Beijing on the size cision-guided munitions, such as sea- and of its nuclear forces would be of no value to air-launched long-range cruise missiles, cou- the United States or Russia in planning for pled with space-based intelligence, navigation, a disarming strike: both Washington and and communication assets. Still greater alarm Moscow would rely on their own intelligence of China is caused by the development of information for that purpose. Information American new strategic conventional we- provided by Beijing would not have to include apons: orbital systems (notably the X-37B any precise data about the locations of its stra- “space plane,” which has flown three missi- tegic arms deployments. However, if China ons), and boost-glide systems, such as those

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developed within the framework of the indirectly, Russia). In fact, it appears that the U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike following conditions will have to be met before program.13 China “opens up” step by step and eventually agrees to limit its strategic weapons: Such arms hypothetically would present a threat, which would deeply undermine China’s • The United States should commit to stopping official nuclear no-first-use doctrine becau- the further buildup of its sea- and land-based se, formally, this doctrine should not permit BMD assets in the Asia-Pacific and to ensu- nuclear retaliation in response to disarming ring transparency. conventional attacks against Beijing’s nuclear forces. If Beijing responded by making reserva- • The United States should agree to limitations tions about its nuclear no-first-use pledge (that and transparency measures with regard to its is, providing for the possibility of a nuclear strategic and intermediate-range non-nuclear response to a conventional strike against its offensive weapons, including Conventional nuclear forces), then China’s nuclear doctrine Prompt Global Strike systems. would not be so different from that of other nuclear-weapon states. Formal arms control involving China will create new challenges. China will not agree to a China apparently considers transparency to treaty that enshrines the United States’ nume- be an important bargaining chip. It is unlikely, rical superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. therefore, that it will be persuaded to be more The United States, however, is unlikely to transparent as a goodwill gesture, or as a mi- reduce its strategic nuclear forces to China’s nimum contribution to a multilateral nuclear levels. Still, provided that both sides have the disarmament process. In the best case, Beijing political will to reach an agreement, one way of can be expected to bargain hard over this issue starting the process may be to impose equal ag- to get the most from the other parties in return gregate ceilings on part of their strategic forces for each element of greater transparency. (for instance on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic Because of the Ukrainian crisis, U.S.-Russia missiles, and shorter-range ballistic missiles). relations are worse than at any time since the In fact U.S.-Soviet first strategic agreement end of the Cold War, and the prospects for – SALT-I of 1972 covered only part of their further strategic arms reductions beyond the strategic forces. New START are bleak. However, if the United States and Russia reach a political resolution to Thus, the United States might gain from trans- the current crisis, the issue of a follow-on treaty parency and limitations on China’s nuclear and will sooner or later return to the agenda and the conventional land-based missiles—a significant “China factor” is bound to reemerge. China’s concern to the United States in both a global nuclear forces may also factor into negotiations and a regional context. At the same time, the if the United States and China decide to start United States would retain huge superiority in substantive bilateral talks. the sea and air legs of the strategic triad, where it would be most difficult for China to catch up. In spite of all the difficulties, it appears pos- China, for its part, would also benefit from such sible to engage China gradually in the nuclear an agreement. It would be recognized as an equal arms limitation process—although this will strategic partner to the United States and as the not happen in response to rhetorical appeals world’s third nuclear superpower. The above by other nations. China’s participation will be agreement would not legally prohibit China strictly pragmatic: it will get involved once it from matching the United States in strategic has concluded that greater transparency and bombers and missile submarines, if it chooses to limitations on specific weapons will be offset take such steps. So China’s prestige would be pre- by concessions made by the United States (and, served, and its inferiority would not be legalized.

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Conclusions The ‘P5” format has not achieved and will not relations and disproportioned nuclear forces reach its principle goal of initiating a multila- of the ‘P5”. teral nuclear disarmament. Still, it may serve as a useful first step to better understand this It seems that under best political circumstan- problem and plan practical policies accor- ces in practical terms multilateral nuclear di- dingly. sarmament might be implemented via several, primarily bilateral fora: the UK and France It is highly unlikely that Britain, France on the one side and Russia on the other; the and China may be involved in nuclear arms United States and China (and for that matter control on any collective basis. They cannot China and India; India and Pakistan). As for simply jump on the U.S.-Russian “bandwa- Israel and North Korea, their nuclear we- gon” of strategic talks, which have been based apons should be addressed in the context of for many decades on a robust foundation of enhancing regional nuclear non-proliferation stability (i.e. mutual assured second-strike regimes, rather than by classic limitation and retaliation capability) and approximate, albeit reduction of nuclear arms. asymmetric parity, as well as on highly sophi- sticated verification and transparency regimes. Taking into consideration the complex interac- The third states just do not fit in this intricate tion of strategic and political relations among format. Moreover, even this format is present- nuclear-weapon states (and non-nuclear-we- ly falling apart due to political tensions and apon states), coordinating the talks between technological developments. Nor can they various parties might be the highest achie- start a new model of five-parties arms control vement of Moscow’s and Washington’s nuclear due to the above asymmetric strategic arms control diplomacy during next decades.

Russian Topol-M at the Victory Day Parade in Moscow, May 9, 2014. Copyright: Igor Dolgov.

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1 Vladimir Putin: RossiyaBudetNarashchivat’ Vozmozhnosti VKO 7 Nuclear Forces // Stockholm International Peace Research [Russia Will Develop Its Air-Space Defense Capabilities] // Institute. — Jan., 2014 (www.sipri.org/research/armaments/nucle- Natsional’nayaOborona [National Defense]. — Jul., 2013. — ar-forces). No. 7. — P. 22. 8 Khramchikhin A.“PekinMoskve — partner, no ne drug” [“Beijing 2 Transcript from meeting with experts in the city of Sarov to is Moscow’s partner, but not a friend”] //Nezavisimoevoennoeobozre- discuss global threats to national security, strengthening Russia’s nie [Independent military review]. — Nov. 7, 2014. — No. 40(892). defenses and enhancing the combat readiness of its armed forces // — P. 1 (http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2014-11-07/1_china.html). Archive of the official site of the 2008-2012 Prime Minister of the 9 Arbatov A, Esin V.“PerspektivypodklyucheniyaKitaya k ograni- Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. — Feb. 24, 2012 (http://archive. cheniyuyadernykhvooruzheniy” [“The Prospects of Engaging China premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18248/). in Nuclear Arms Limitation”] // . —Aug. 3 Excerpts from transcript of meeting with National Research 25, 2014 (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Article_Arbatov_Chi- Nuclear University (MEPhI) students // President of Russia. — na_Rus2014.pdf). Jan. 22, 2014 (http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6562). 10 National Defense Policy: Arms Control and Disarmament // 4 Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War // Ed. by Alexei Arbatov Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of and Vladimir Dvorkin. — Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, China. —March 31, 2011 (www.china.org.cn/government/whitepa- 2008. — P. 447. per/2011-03/31/content_22263420.htm). 5 SIPRI Yearbook: 2013. Armaments, Disarmament and Internati- 11 Ibid. onal Security / Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. — 12 Ibid. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. — P. 301- 304. 13 Saalman S. China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review // 6 SIPRI Yearbook: 2013. Armaments, Disarmament and Internati- Carnegie Paper. — Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. — onal Security / Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. — Feb., 2011 (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/china_posture_re- Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. — P. 294. view.pdf).

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About the Author

Alexey Arbatov is a scholar in residence with the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Non- proliferation Program. Formerly, he was a member of the , vice chair- man of the Russian United Democratic Party (), and deputy chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. Arbatov is a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He leads the academy’s Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, where he was once a depart- ment head and a research fellow. He is a member of numerous boards and coun- cils, including the research council of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the governing board of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, and the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy. Contact: [email protected]

About Deep Cuts

The Deep Cuts project is a research and analyses and specific recommendations, consultancy project, jointly conducted by the Commission strives to translate the the Institute for Peace Research and Secu- already existing political commitments to rity Policy at the University of Hamburg, further nuclear reductions into concrete the Arms Control Association, and the and feasible action. Deep Cuts Working Institute of World Economy and Interna- Papers do not necessarily reflect the opini- tional Relations of the Russian Academy on of individual Commissioners or Deep of Sciences. The Deep Cuts Commission Cuts project partners. is seeking to devise concepts on how to overcome current challenges to deep nuc- For further information please go to: lear reductions. Through means of realistic www.deepcuts.org

Page 14 Impress: Project Management Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik Ulrich Kühn an der Universität Hamburg (IFSH) Götz Neuneck Beim Schlump 83 Email: [email protected] 20144 Hamburg, Germany

Phone: +49 (0)40-86 60 77-42 Fax: +49 (0)40-866 36 15