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Russia: Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IMEMO CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN EDITIONS OF SIPRI YEARBOOKS (1997-2000) Institute of World Economy and International Relations RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO) RUSSIA: ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IMEMO CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN EDITIONS OF SIPRI YEARBOOKS (1997–2000) Compiled and edited by Vladimir BARANOVSKY and Alexandre KALIADINE Moscow 2001 INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO) IMEMO is a research institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. It was established in 1956. IMEMO conducts fundamental and applied research and comparative studies focusing upon contemporary economic, social and political processes in the world, Russia’s involvement in global developments, problems of arms control, disarmament and international security. Director Academician Nodari SIMONIA Former directors 1956-1965 Academician Anushavan ARZUMANIAN 1966-1982 Academician Nikolai INOZEMTSEV 1983-1985 Academician Alexandre YAKOVLEV 1985-1989 Academician Yevgeny PRIMAKOV 1989-2000 Academician Vladlen MARTYNOV 3 CONTENTS Preface………………………………………………………………………….. 5 Acronyms……………………………………………………………………….. 9 PART I. SEARCHING FOR SECURITY: CONCEPTUAL DIMENSIONS………………………………………….……………… 13 1. Russian and western security interests: problems and prospects Alexei ARBATOV……………………………………………………………….. 15 2. Russia’s national security and a multipolar world Alexei ARBATOV……………………………………………………………….. 31 3. Towards a new arms control agenda Vladimir BARANOVSKY……………………………………………………….. 45 4. Problems of international security in basic documents of the Russian Federation Vladimir BARANOVSKY……………………………………………………….. 52 PART II. REFORMING RUSSIA’S DEFENCE…………………… 65 5. Military reform in Russia Report of the Working Group of the Russian Academy of Sciences…………… 67 6. Problems of the 1998 defence budget Pyotr ROMASHKIN, Valery YARYNICH………………………………………. 90 Appendix 6A. The law on the 1998 federal budget. Chapter “National defence”………………………………………………………………………. 119 Appendix 6B. The Federal law on introducing changes and additions to the budget classification of the Russian Federation……………………………… 120 7. Defence appropriations in the federal budget for the year 2001 Pyotr ROMASHKIN……………………………………………………………. 125 8. The SSN Kursk catastrophe and the condition of the Russian Navy Boris MAKEEV………………………………………………………………… 131 PART III. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL, NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT 139 9. The ABM Treaty and the prospect of further deep reductions of strategic offensive weapons Alexandre SAVELYEV…………………………………………………………. 141 10. The ABM Treaty and Russia’s position. A Summary of the discussions at IMEMO Alexandre SAVELYEV…………………………………………………………. 152 4 11. Russian approach to further reductions of strategic offensive arms (on the ratification by Russia of the START II Treaty) Alexandre PIKAYEV…………………………………………………………….. 170 Appendix 11A. Law of the Russian Federation “On the Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”………….… 180 12. The ratification by Russia of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Pyotr ROMASHKIN and Natalya ROMASHKINA………………………….…. 185 Appendix 12A. Law of the Russian Federation “On the Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty”………………………………..…. 188 13. Challenges to international nuclear and missile non-proliferation regimes Alexandre PIKAYEV……………………………………………………………. 192 14. Preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons Alexandre KALIADINE………………………………………………………… 200 15. The CWC regime and Russia Alexandre KALIADINE……………………………………………………..….. 207 Appendix 15A. Law of the Russian Federation “On Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction”…………………… 235 16. The problem of the limitation of conventional weapons Sergey OZNOBISHCHEV………………………………………………………. 239 17. Weapons and technology export controls in Russia Elina KIRICHENKO…………………………………………………………… 246 Appendix 17A. On Reinforcing Export Control of Dual-Use Goods and Services Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Missile Delivery Vehicles. Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation…... 273 Appendix 17B. On Control over Exports of Nuclear Materials, Equipment and Technologies from the Russian Federation. Presidential decree………... 273 18. Preventing an arms race in outer space Gennadiy ZHUKOV…………………………………………………………….. 275 Annexe. Key official documents of the Russian Federation on national security, defence and arms control (1997–2000) ……………………………… 285 About the contributors………………………………………………..………... 322 Index……………………………………………………………………………. 323 PREFACE This volume presents the result of research on topical issues of Russian national security, defence and arms control policy conducted at IMEMO and published in 1997–2000 as Special supplements to the Russian editions of the SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Since 1993 these editions have been undertaken jointly by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO). Several volumes published so far in this series have convincingly shown that this publication has become an authoritative and regularly used source in Russian language for scholars, politicians, lawmakers, diplomats and security analysts who need reliable information on problems of conflict, armaments, arms control and international security. In addition to the articles translated from the English edition, Russian versions of the SIPRI Yearbooks contain various contributions written by Russian authors and focused upon those aspects of arms control and disarmament that were (and still are) of particular relevance to the RF. However, these analyses may be of interest to the non-Russian audience as well – which explains the logic of translating them into English. Indeed, understanding Russian views on arms control and international security is as important as spreading objective information on these issues in Russia itself. Our intention in publishing this volume is to present facts, data and analyses concerning Russia’s perception of, and its attitude towards, fundamental problems of international security. We strongly believe that promoting openness and transparency in arms control developments might contribute to the unbiased assessment by the international community of the Russian security situation and needs and stimulate responsible debate on the measures to enhance world stability. The book could be helpful to policy-makers, journalists, researchers and specialists from universities, academic institutions and non-governmental organisations – all those who deal with international security problems. 6 PREFACE The focus of study is on Russia’s arms control policy. The authors proceed from the assumption that steps towards protecting legitimate national security interests must take into account requirements of international strategic stability. In the view of the authors, the maximum expansion and enhancement of the role of such multilateral security structures as the UNO and the OSCE in settling conflicts is in Russia’s interest and the RF possesses many unused resources in this field too. Similarly, Russia has an interest in the expansion and reinforcement of the regimes of the limitation of armaments and military activities, disarmament and non- proliferation of WMD and their delivery means. The purpose of the present volume is to explain the factors that prompted Russia to adopt its current positions on the issues of arms control, disarmament and international security and to investigate how Russia, its defence and foreign policy and its security environment should evolve in order to make new steps in the direction of international disarmament feasible. The 18 chapters of the volume are grouped into three parts. Part I addresses conceptual dimension of the quest for security, related to the post-cold war strategic environment and the new position of Russia in the world. It also considers risks and challenges confronting Russia, analyses current military strategy, ponders the importance of arms control agreements. Part II deals with the military reform in Russia. It also addresses budgetary problems as major factors shaping Russian arms control policy. Part III focuses upon Russia’s approaches towards specific issues of arms control and disarmament. It analyses problems that constitute a real or potential threat to international stability and the measures aimed at improving and consolidating international security. To assist readers who may want more details from official documents the texts of some laws of the Russian Federation related to arms control and disarmament are also included in the book. IMEMO researchers wrote sixteen of the chapters; two chapters were prepared by prominent experts from outside IMEMO, whom I hereby would like to thank for their contributions. PREFACE 7 I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Vladimir Baranovsky and Dr. Alexandre Kaliadine who had the responsibility for compiling and editing the volume. My thanks also go to the members of the IMEMO staff – Boris Atlas, George Bechter, Tamara Farnasova, Olga Maltseva, Valentina Matveeva and Jeanna Shatilova, who were actively
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