Occasional Paper No. 10

Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs

James Clay Moltz, ed.

Special Joint Series on Missile/Space Issues

CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES

University Mountbatten Centre for International Studies of Southampton

THE CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES

The mission of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) is to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and disseminating timely information and analysis. Dr. William C. Potter is the director of CNS, which has a staff of over 60 full-time personnel and approximately 65 student research assistants, with offices in Monterey, CA; Washington, DC; and Almaty, Kazakhstan. CNS is the largest nongovernmental organization in the United States devoted exclusively to research and training on nonproliferation issues. CNS gratefully acknowledges the support of the following funders and thanks them for their commitment to our mission: the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Center for Global Partnership, the Compton Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the HKH Foundation, the Japan-United States Friendship Commission, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Ploughshares Fund, the Prospect Hill Foundation, and the Scherman Foundation.

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The Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) is based in the Politics Department of the University of Southampton, UK. Its work is focused upon strengthening the international regimes designed to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and is directed by Professor John Simpson, OBE.

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ISBN 1-885350-04-X

©Monterey Institute of International Studies

CONTENTS

Notes on Contributors ii Introduction Future Choices in Space 1 by James Clay Moltz Defenses in Space: Background Issues Defenses in Space: Treaty Issues 3 by Jonathan Dean U.S. Commercial Space Programs: Future Priorities and Implications for National Security 8 by Charles V. Peña Military Approaches to Space Vulnerability: Seven Questions 11 by Robert McDougall and Phillip J. Baines Debris and Future Space Activities 18 by Joel R. Primack Weighing Alternative Approaches to Space Security Putting Military Uses of Space in Context 23 by Steven Lambakis Space Weapons: More Security or Less? 28 by Theresa Hitchens Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges 32 by Peter L. Hays Enhancing Global Security through Improved Space Management: A Russian Perspective 44 by Vitaly A. Lukiantsev Treaties as an Approach to Reducing Space Vulnerabilities 48 by Cheng Jingye A U.S. Perspective on Space 51 by Eric M. Javits How to Move Forward? Government-Led Discussions regarding Space Weapons and Avenues for Progress 54 by Vladimir Petrovsky Commercial-Led Options 58 by Alain Dupas NGO Approaches and Initiatives for Addressing Space Security 61 by Rebecca Johnson

i

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Phillip J. Baines worked as an aerospace of numerous articles on multilateral engineer from 1982-97. Since 1997, he has disarmament and security issues. served in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada as a policy Dr. Steven Lambakis is a senior defense adviser in space verification and arms control. analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy, in Fairfax, Virginia. He is the author Cheng Jingye is deputy director of the Arms of the recent book, On the Edge of Earth: The Control Department in the Chinese Ministry Future of American Space Power (2001). of Foreign Affairs. Vitaly A. Lukiantsev is senior counselor Ambassador (ret.) Jonathan Dean is an with the Department for Security and adviser on Global Security Issues at the Union Disarmament Affairs in the Russian Ministry of Concerned Scientists. He served of Foreign Affairs. previously in a number of senior State Department positions and holds a Ph.D. in Robert McDougall is Director of the Non- Political Science from George Washington Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament University. Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada. Dr. Alain Dupas is a physicist, space analyst, and adviser to the French government on Dr. James Clay Moltz is associate director space issues. He received his doctorate in and research professor with the Center for 1977 from the University of Paris, where he is Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the now a professor. Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Lt. Col. Peter L. Hays is executive editor of Charles V. Peña is a defense policy expert at Joint Force Quarterly and a 1979 honor graduate the Cato Institute. Peña is the author of of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has numerous articles on space/missile defense taught space studies in several universities and issues in such publications as the Washington holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Post, New York Times, Defense News, Financial Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Times, and Aviation Week & Space Technology.

Theresa Hitchens is vice president of the Ambassador (ret.) Vladimir Petrovsky was Center for Defense Information in director-general of the Conference on Washington, D.C. Editor of Defense News Disarmament in Geneva from 1993-2002. He from 1998 to 2000, she has had a long career joined the Soviet diplomatic service in 1957, in journalism, with a focus on military, rising to the rank of first deputy foreign defense industry, and NATO affairs. minister in 1991. He is the author of several books on foreign affairs and holds doctorates Ambassador Eric M. Javits is the U.S. in both law and history. permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. A graduate of Dr. Joel Primack is professor of physics at the Columbia School of Law, he served for the University of California, Santa Cruz. He many years as a senior partner in international holds a Ph.D. in physics from Stanford legal practice and as a consultant to the U.S. University and has a career of research in State Department. high-energy physics, cosmology, and astrophysics. He is one of the main Rebecca Johnson is the executive director of originators of the theory of cold dark matter, The Acronym Institute for Disarmament which has now become the standard theory of Diplomacy in London. Johnson is executive structure formation in the universe. editor of Disarmament Diplomacy and the author

ii

FUTURE CHOICES IN SPACE

by James Clay Moltz Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies

Perhaps the single most important security critical space assets to possible attack by states debate of the early 21st century is the future with medium- or longer-range missiles. Treaty status of activities in outer space. The loopholes from the 1960s have created gaps in international community of states is at a the arms control framework in space, and there crossroads in this regard, facing a choice of are concerns that hostile countries will move to several different directions for how best to exploit them. At the same time, there are proceed. Unfortunately, due to sharp possible new opportunities for strengthening differences of opinion between the United protections in space, if states are able to reach States and other countries over missile defenses consensus on the threats that exist and create and anti-satellite weapons, there are no serious reliable means of verifying that harmful international discussions going on at the activities can be prevented or limited in governmental level regarding these issues. meaningful ways. Similarly, there is currently no domestic forum The purpose of this project on “Future in the United States where representatives of Security in Space,” initiated jointly by the various perspectives and interests are discussing Monterey Institute’s Center for areas of consensus and possible compromise. Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the This is not a productive state of affairs for any University of Southampton’s Mountbatten participants with an interest in future space Centre, is to identify areas of common ground activities. in the field of future space activity. By creating a Space is unique in the history of human new discussion forum that includes activities in offering an example of early representatives from the defense community, weaponization, then rapid retreat. After more industry, the space science community, the U.S. than a dozen U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons Congress and other legislatures, and executive tests in space from 1958-62, however, the two branch officials from various space-faring sides re-thought the sagacity of this approach countries, this project seeks to move beyond and agreed to halt these activities, instead the existing stalemate at the Conference on extending new protections to space. These Disarmament and at other international measures prevented future nuclear testing and negotiating fora. It seeks to offer an unofficial thereby protected spacecraft from the harmful mechanism to give all parties interested in effects of electro-magnetic pulse radiation, consensus-building the opportunity to consider which had proved very hazardous to and discuss future priorities outside the reconnaissance and communications satellites constraints of formal government-to- during the years of space-based nuclear testing. government channels. Of course, the hope of Instead of unrestrained competition, the this effort is that eventually these discussions space age witnessed a mix of competition and will facilitate the development of fruitful new cooperation between the superpowers, allowing concepts for moving forward official great advances to be made in manned space governmental discussions on these issues. activity, space commerce, and passive military The initial stage of this project brought space systems that would not have been together a wide range of space actors to discuss possible without the Limited Test Ban Treaty the relevant issues at a workshop held near (1963), the Outer Space Treaty (1967), and Southampton, England, on May 28 to 29, 2002. other agreements. Over 50 governmental officials, space industry Today, space weapons are again being representatives, and NGO experts from over 15 considered by the United States and a few other countries (including Argentina, Austria, Canada, countries, due to a perceived vulnerability of China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan,

1 James Clay Moltz

Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Ukraine, the This publication includes those United Kingdom, and the United States) met presentations made at the off-the-record May for discussions on the future of space activity meeting that officials and experts were willing and means of breaking the current impasse at to share publicly. Our goal is to provide these the international level in space security talks. studies to a broader audience in a timely The meeting allowed a very positive exchange manner with the hope of stimulating further of ideas and facilitated the development of a discussion and thinking about new avenues for number of new diplomatic initiatives, international consensus-building regarding particularly via off-line discussions among the space. Pending funding, follow-on activities are government officials present. Many of the planned to try to continue this process and to delegations expressed renewed optimism about draw in other interested parties, particularly chances for progress following the meeting, from the commercial space sector. particularly thanks to the highlighting of CNS and the Mountbatten Centre express attention on areas of consensus that do exist their particular thanks to the Ploughshares today—including, among others, shared goals Fund for a grant in support of this project, as of non-interference with satellites and enhanced well as the Carnegie Corporation, the Ford mitigation of orbital debris as possible first Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the steps. The various sides discussed ideas for Prospect Hill Foundation, the Scherman new initiatives via unilateral pledges, bilateral Foundation, and the W. Alton Jones commitments of non-interference (expanding Foundation for general support grants that have upon existing U.S.-Russian pledges regarding supported this work. As the editor of this arms control monitoring satellites), as well as collection, I would also like to thank my multilateral resolutions or conventions on space summer research assistant, Derek Turner, who debris. provided valuable help in all phases of the production of this Occasional Paper.

2

DEFENSES IN SPACE: TREATY ISSUES

by Jonathan Dean Union of Concerned Scientists

THE PRESENT SITUATION – weapon in space within the next five to six ANARCHIC COEXISTENCE OF years will cross the fateful line into the MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL competitive weaponization of space. ASSETS It can be argued that, before these two missile defense weapons are orbited, the The present rather anarchic coexistence of weaponization of space will begin with the military and commercial assets on the space deployment of the first ground-based frontier may come to an end within the next interceptor missile in Alaska in 2004. It will be five to 10 years. This could happen if a new possible to use this system to destroy or stage—weaponization of space—begins and is incapacitate satellites moving in fixed orbit followed by the first space weaponizing power’s more easily than destroying an incoming promulgation of its own rules of the road for missile. These interceptors will in practice be space. Or, it could happen if the present near- anti-satellite weapons, or ASATs. Beyond this, anarchy is replaced by a new international rule in May 2002, the House Armed Services of law, whether via a formal treaty or political Committee placed an unsolicited sum of $7 agreements. million in the fiscal 2003 budget for the In any event, there cannot be much doubt Defense Department calling for continued that the weaponization of space will begin in development of a ground-based ASAT. the foreseeable future unless it is hindered by As weaponization appears to loom closer, organized, effective international opposition or there have appeared several suggestions for the current U.S. administration is replaced by an partial measures: “rules of the road” or administration willing to cancel projects for confidence-building measures that would weaponization of space in the face of restrict weaponization or mitigate its effects if it considerable opposition from domestic comes. Some examples include: keep-out zones proponents of weaponization. around satellites; non-interference and This issue is not a theoretical one. protection for manned space flight and manned Development of two specific space-based space vehicles; and pre-launch notification and weapons, a kinetic kill weapon and a space- verification. One recent article suggests a mixed based laser, is official policy of the U.S. regime of some weaponization and some administration as part of its missile defense reassurance measures.1 project. It is not a priority, but it has a specific Regardless of their motives, those development program and a budget of many advocating mixed regimes appear to assume millions projected over the next several years. that the weaponization of space is inevitable The first space tests are scheduled to take place and that we might as well make the best of it. in five to six years, with deployment five to six Must we take this outcome for granted? It years thereafter. This action is backed by an would be far more desirable to reach agreement official doctrine calling for U.S. supremacy in on a treaty prohibiting the weaponization of space and doing what is needed to achieve that space, while also assuring use of space for both supremacy. military and civilian observation and It is sometimes argued that space weapons communications, with their own rules of the won’t work and therefore that concern over this road governing this non-weaponized situation. I subject is misplaced. This is a misleading do not think this possibility can or should be argument. There are real doubts that some ruled out. Furthermore, it should be possible to forms of missile defense will be effective, but this does not prevent justifiable concerns over 1 James Clay Moltz, “Breaking the Deadlock on the effects of U.S. deployment of nationwide Space Arms Control,” Arms Control Today 32 (April missile defenses. The deployment of the first 2002).

3 Jonathan Dean enter into dialogue with the United States to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer negotiate widely beneficial confidence-building Space, and the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer measures while leaving open for later discussion Space.3 Since June 13, 2002, when U.S. the question of whether space-based weapons withdrawal from the ABM Treaty became shall be permitted or banned. effective, there is no longer a treaty prohibition against testing or deploying weapons in space EXISTING LEGAL STRUCTURE other than weapons of mass destruction. Lt. General Ronald Kadish of the Missile Defense In regards to the existing legal structure Agency has already ordered ground-breaking at relating to space weapons, the principal relevant Fort Greeley for the missile defense installation treaty is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), there. which prohibits the orbiting or stationing in A sixth treaty is relevant to space weapons. space of weapons of mass destruction, but not The concept of non-interference with national other weapons. I will return to the OST in a technical means of verification first appeared in moment. Five other treaties address outer the SALT I Treaty of 1972 and was taken over space. They include: the Limited Test Ban into the START I Treaty, which has been Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear tests prolonged to 2009. Similar protections are (and any other nuclear explosion) in the imbedded in the INF Treaty and the atmosphere or in outer space; the Astronauts Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Rescue Agreement of 1968; the Liability The intent of these measures is to preserve Convention of 1972; the Registration from attack or interference satellites involved in Convention of 1976; and the Moon Agreement verification. As I read it, it would be a violation of 1984.2 These last four treaties elaborate of the provisions on noninterference with aspects of the 1967 treaty. national means of verification in the START I In addition, there are five relevant General and INF treaties to use weapons against any Assembly resolutions: the Declaration of Legal early warning, imaging, or intelligence satellite Principles Governing the Activities of States in and, by extension, against any ocean the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space surveillance, signals, intelligence or (1963); the Declaration on International communications satellite of the U.S. or Russia. Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of This obligation was made multilateral in the Outer Space for the Use and Benefit and in the CFE Treaty. Interest of All States (1996); and also resolutions on Direct Television Broadcasting,

2 The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 3 The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Launched into Outer Space (the “Rescue Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Agreement”), opened for signature on April 22, Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 1962 1968, entered into force on December 3, 1968, 87 (XVIII) of December 13, 1963); The Principles ratifications; The Convention on International Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the Satellites for International Direct Television “Liability Convention”), opened for signature on Broadcasting (resolution 37/92 of December 10, March 29, 1972, entered into force on September 1, 1982); The Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of 1972, 81 ratifications; The Convention on the Earth from Outer Space (resolution 41/65 of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space December 3, 1986); The Principles Relevant to the (the “Registration Convention”) opened for Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space signature on January 14, 1975, entered into force on (resolution 47/68 of December 14, 1992); The September 15, 1976, 43 ratifications; The Agreement Declaration on International Cooperation in the Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit Other Celestial Bodies (the “Moon Agreement”), and in the Interest of All States, Taking into opened for signature on December 18, 1979, entered Particular Account the Needs of Developing into force on July 11, 1984, 9 ratifications (As of Countries (resolution 51/122 of December 13, February 1, 2001). 1996).

4 Defenses in Space: Treaty Issues

THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY weapon on the moon or other celestial bodies. There is no provision for verification. As is well The 1967 OST is based on “the common known, the 1967 Treaty does not prohibit the interest of all mankind in the . . . use of space orbiting in space of weapons other than nuclear for peaceful purposes.” The treaty forbids the weapons or other weapons of mass orbiting or stationing in space of weapons of destruction.4 mass destruction and prohibits the use of the However, the OST is not without useful moon or other celestial bodies for other than features relevant to the possible weaponization peaceful purposes. The treaty contains four of space. Article VII makes treaty parties that explicit references to the peaceful use of outer launch objects into outer space liable for space. damage to the property of another treaty This language points to the fact that, party—this is also spelled out in the Liability during the 30-year existence of the OST, a Convention of 1972. The Liability Convention powerful norm has emerged against the foresees the establishment of a Claims weaponization of space, for keeping armed Commission to determine the extent of liability conflict out of space, and for ensuring the for damage by the space objects of one country peaceful use of space. This conclusion is to the space objects or property of another documented by UN General Assembly state. Article IX of the OST provides for resolutions each year for the past 21 years consultations if any treaty party believes an calling for maintaining peaceful uses of space activity planned by another treaty party would and opposing its weaponization. Most of these cause “potentially harmful interference with resolutions have been unanimous and without activities in the peaceful exploration and use of opposition, although the United States and a outer space.” Beyond this, the General few other governments have abstained. In the Assembly could by majority vote request an most recent version of December 2001, the Advisory Opinion from the International Court General Assembly once again passed, by 156 of Justice if either the peaceful uses language of votes for to zero opposed, a resolution calling the 1967 treaty or these two articles on liability for negotiation in the Geneva Conference on and consultation come under dispute as the Disarmament of a treaty to prevent an arms space-based component of the missile defense race in outer space. This time, there were four system advances. abstentions to the resolution. The now In fact, requests for consultation or under customary trio of the United States, Micronesia, Article IX, or also a General Assembly request and Israel was joined by a fourth country, for an advisory opinion, can and should come Georgia. The resolution asks all treaty parties to now to make world opinion aware of this issue refrain from actions contrary to the peaceful before the damage has been done, and to use of outer space and calls for negotiation in motivate the United States government to study the Conference on Disarmament on multilateral the issue seriously, including the possibility of agreements to prevent an arms race in outer rules of the road. The request for consultation space. under Article IX can come from any party or These repeated, nearly unanimous group of parties to the 1967 treaty. In addition, resolutions, against which even the United George Bunn and John Rhinelander point out States does not vote, are not only evidence for in a letter to the editor in the June 2002 issue of the existence of a norm against the Arms Control Today, that parties to the treaty weaponization of space. They also indicate a very widespread desire to expand existing 4 Article IV of the 1967 Treaty states: “States Parties multilateral agreements to make explicit a to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around prohibition against all weapons in space. the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or Article IV of the OST prohibits placing in any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, orbit around the earth any objects carrying install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” destruction. It also prohibits the testing and, I This language would appear to preclude orbiting weapons around the moon, but Article III of the would argue, the deployment of any kind of 1979 Moon Treaty makes this prohibition explicit.

5 Jonathan Dean could convene and issue an interpretation that weaponization of space. Russia and China have the U.S. testing or orbiting of space weapons proposed comprehensive treaties prohibiting was contrary to the peaceful uses language of weapons in space. In 2001, China presented the treaty, in effect amending it to preclude any component concepts of a draft treaty on this weaponization. The General Assembly could topic in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) then pass a resolution endorsing this and in May 2002, China and Russia presented a interpretation. joint draft in the CD. The prospects for a Presumably, Russia, the United States, or comprehensive treaty depend in large part on any state party to the CFE Treaty could also the willingness of China, Russia, and other large take legal action based on treaty provisions countries to undertake a major international prohibiting interference with national technical effort supported by non-governmental means of verification. In addition, legal action organizations (NGOs) in the face of U.S. could be taken in U.S. courts by U.S. opposition. For this effort to succeed, China, commercial users of space satellites if these Russia, and other major states, including satellites were endangered by U.S. space European Union members, would have to weapons. In theory, other legal actions might conclude that preventing the weaponization of be taken by private corporations at the Hague space is a top priority national interest, Court of Arbitration if the defendant state is justifying the sacrifice of other important willing to permit this. In short, existing space national interests in a stand-off with the United law provides numerous opportunities to remind States. They do not appear to have reached this the United States that weaponization of space conclusion yet. However, they still may reach could be a complex and difficult process, to this conclusion at some future point, especially make it worthwhile for the U.S. government to if the United States continues to make major negotiate on confidence-building measures, or, increases in funding for its missile defense if necessary, to block early weaponizing program. But, otherwise, it is plausible that measures. these countries may seek some compromise It is relevant to this subject that there have with the United States that could result in a been press reports that the U.S. Defense mixed regime of some weaponization and some Science Board has expressed interest in regulation. reexamining the possibility of using nuclear Second, the same difficulty of prevailing warheads for missile defense purposes. upon the world’s most powerful state, the Explosion of nuclear weapons in the United States, to renounce categorically its atmosphere or in space is explicitly forbidden plans to place weapons in space has already led by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). to suggestions from think tanks and NGOs that Action by the Defense Department to carry out concede some weaponization and argue for a these plans would be a violation of the LTBT mixed regime of partial weaponization backed and would in addition lead to a multitude of by limits and controls. Think tanks and NGOs suits and injunctions under the Liability may be joined in this approach by commercial Convention. The same applies to tests of the users of space that have thus far held back from GALOSH missile defense system around taking a position in this controversy. Moscow, which continues to be armed with Finally, if the U.S. policy of placing nuclear warheads. weapons in space proceeds and results in de facto space supremacy for the United States, PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION OF THE Washington itself is likely to attempt to reach LEGAL REGIME agreement with other spacefaring governments on rules of the road, like keep-out zones, to Driven by U.S. moves to weaponize space, blunt some of their criticisms, and, in the final it appears likely that the legal regime covering analysis, to prevent situations where the United space weapons will expand in the next several States may be forced against its will to use its years for a variety of reasons. space weapons. One possibility, of course, is action to fill The combination of all these pressures in the gap in the 1967 OST and to prohibit any seems quite likely to bring additional

6 Defenses in Space: Treaty Issues

agreements, both formal and informal, related negotiate a treaty prohibiting weaponization. to weapons in space and anti-satellite systems. This may be the best outcome we can hope for The present quasi-anarchy of space law is likely at this time, but it will require continued to give way to a network of rules while energetic opposition to weapons in space. preparations for weaponization proceed. This There is a possible comparison between process and the discussion that will accompany the issue of weaponization of space and the it will also help to inform the U.S. electorate emergence of nuclear weapons. Efforts to ban and perhaps incline it to back a preventive or nuclear weapons completely gave way slowly to corrective policy when the present U.S. the efforts to tame these weapons. Efforts to administration is replaced after the next two to control and tame space weapons are coming six years by its successor. The expanding legal earlier in the cycle and space weaponization regime in space will in any case benefit from the may emerge more slowly with a longer interval provision of maximum information to the before the first use of these devices as weapons American and world public and from maximum than was the time between Trinity and public discussion. Hiroshima. Consequently, there may be more There is another, more hopeful, possibility; time to play out the recurrent contest between the protests and objections of foreign human capacity to invent new weapons and the governments and military and commercial users efforts of human society to control them. Let of satellites may cause the United States to hold us hope that this time is well used. back from proceeding with the weaponization of space even while it resists pressures to

7

U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE PROGRAMS: FUTURE PRIORITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

by Charles V. Peña Cato Institute

Control of space is at the crux of the multiplicity of alternative communications debate about the future of U.S. military space paths).”1 policy. It is important to point out that the In all likelihood, in the future, the military issue is not whether the United States should will be even more reliant on commercial space militarize space. The militarization of space has systems. As General Moorman has also stated: already occurred and will continue. Space On the one hand, commercialization assets are currently used to great effect to is not a total panacea.... On the other support terrestrial (ground, sea, and air) military hand, the commercial space industry operations. The more immediate issue is is expanding at such a rate and with whether the United States should weaponize such marvelous capabilities that it space, at least in the near- or mid-term, and seems reasonable if not inevitable more important, whether military uses and that a number of missions— requirements in space should be the driving heretofore the exclusive province of force behind how we think about space and the government—can be satisfied or space policy. augmented commercially. We can Advocates of a more aggressive U.S. also realize significant efficiencies by military policy for space argue that the United taking advantage of commercial States is more reliant on the use of space than is space.2 any other nation, that space systems are Therefore, as U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Peter vulnerable to attack, and that U.S. space Hays and Karl Mueller (both former professors systems are thus an attractive candidate for a at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies) “space Pearl Harbor.” Critics of such a policy argue: “It is no longer clear that the relationship shift are concerned that weaponizing space between space and national security is, or could trigger a dangerous arms race. They are should be, shaped primarily by international quick to point out that no country currently has military competition.”3 Indeed, space as it an operational anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon relates to national security may be shaped and that threatens U.S. satellites or weapons in influenced more by the future of commercial space and that a U.S. move to deploy weapons space activities. (either offensive or defensive) would only If there are significant military and national provide unneeded impetus for other countries security advantages to be gained via commercial to follow suit. space, then it is important to recognize that Regardless of how one views the need to there is the potential for great harm by placing weaponize space, one thing is abundantly clear: military requirements at the forefront of how the U.S. military greatly benefits from using we think about space. While the January 2001 commercial space systems. Former vice chief Space Commission report (and others) focus on of staff of the Air Force, General Thomas S.

Moorman, asserts that by making maximum use 1 of commercial satellites, “military satellite Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., “The Explosion of Commercial Space and the Implications for National communications will benefit in terms of access Security,” Aerospace Power Journal (Spring to additional capacity (tremendous increases in 1999),. 2 Ibid. 3 Peter Hays and Karl Mueller, “Going Boldly— Where?” Aerospace Power Journal (Spring 2001), .

8 Charles V. Peña

the vulnerability of U.S. space assets and the will be the sole user for systems such as DSP potential for a “space Pearl Harbor,” there is a (Defense Support Program) satellites, which “flip side” that must also be considered. John monitor missile launches worldwide. Newhouse, senior fellow at the Center for But virtually all other applications of space Defense Information, states: are “dual use.” To be sure, military needs and The [Space Commission] report does requirements must be recognized. For not call for but implies a U.S. need to example, the military and intelligence agencies accelerate development of antisatellite may have unique requirements for surveillance weapons, some of them space-based. and reconnaissance that can be met only with But deploying such weapons will their own dedicated satellites—either for press other countries to develop and reasons of security of data or technical deploy countermeasures. And in any requirements (e.g., resolution, processing time). such tit for tat, the United States has A similar situation exists with regard to the most to lose, since it is far more communications. For example, MILSTAR dependent on satellites for (Military Strategic and Tactical Relay) is a commercial communications and dedicated military satellite communications data-gathering operations than any system that provides secure, jam-resistant, other country. Among the effects nuclear-hardened communications for all U.S. could be a sharp rise in the cost of forces. insuring commercial satellites and an But, wherever possible, the Department of outcry from industry.4 Defense (DOD) should make use of And, as John Logsdon, director of the commercial assets rather than spend needlessly Space Policy Institute at the George on unique military assets. For example, the Washington University points out: “There military should use existing communications appears to be no demand from the operators of satellites for its nonsecure communications commercial communication satellites for capability. Communications probably defense of their multibillion-dollar assets. If represents the single biggest use of space for there were to be active military operations in both the military and civilian/commercial space, it could be difficult not to interfere with sectors. According to General Moorman: the functioning of civilian space systems.”5 “Space-based communications is the giant in In other words, weaponizing space could space commerce. The giant clearly will be even be costly to an American industry that has great more dominant in the future, and the promise to grow and increase its contribution information revolution will be the driver.”6 to the U.S. (and world) economy. Ultimately, a Although the DOD operates several vibrant commercial space industry will support communications satellites (or payloads on other and enhance U.S. military capabilities far better military satellites to provide communications than letting military requirements dominate services)—for example, the Defense Satellite space policy. Therefore, the government Communications System, Air Force Satellite should avoid overregulating commercial space Communications System (AFSATCOM), activities and imposing costly military Leasat, UHF Follow-On (UFO), and requirements. MILSTAR—this segment is largely Certainly, there are some uses of space commercially driven. According to a RAND that are unique to the military – such as report: “The technology for new satellite integrated tactical warning and attack communications, especially high-speed mobile assessment (ITW&AA). This is an area where services, is evolving so rapidly that the DOD is military needs and requirements cannot be met planning to make greater use of commercial by commercial systems. That is, the military

4 John Newhouse, “The Missile Defense Debate,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2001), p. 105. 5 John M. Logsdon, “Just Say Wait to Space Power,” 6 Moorman, “The Explosion of Commercial Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 2001), p. 36. Space….”

9 U.S. Commercial Space Programs: Future Priorities and Implications for National Security systems rather than fielding/g its own The military should also consider using systems.”7 distributed and redundant commercial satellite Another area where the military can also systems as a means to reduce vulnerability to make greater use of commercial assets is in attack rather than deploying unique military satellite imaging, such as Earth Watch’s systems that are likely to be more expensive and EarlyBird 1, Space Imaging’s Ikonos (which take longer to deploy. For example, it may be offers one-meter resolution, the highest more cost-effective to develop and deploy resolution of any commercially available smaller satellites in a distributed system system), and Orbiting Image’s OrbView. configuration designed to operate at low-Earth According to RAND: “Commercial remote orbit and medium-Earth orbit than larger, sensing offers the U.S. military potential new heavier satellites operating in geosynchronous sources of remote-sensing data without (stationary) orbit. That approach is especially requiring it to pay for the development of the meritorious if there is a potential shortage of space system.”8 And General Moorman heavy-lift launch capability. believes “that these new commercial capabilities It is also important that military will both complement and reduce the numbers requirements should not be imposed on shared of military and intelligence systems required. nonmilitary satellites. For example, the military The resulting savings could be substantial.”9 should not require hardening against Indeed, during the U.S.-led military electromagnetic pulse on commercial satellites campaign in Afghanistan, the U.S. National that are also used by the military. To the extent Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) that such requirements are absolute needs, the purchased exclusive rights to pictures taken of military should deploy its own dedicated the war zone by Space Imaging’s Ikonos systems to meet those requirements. Neither satellite, which has 1-meter black and white commercial satellite operators nor the other resolution and 4-meter color resolution. This users of commercial satellites should shoulder “buy to deny” policy is an example that any cost burdens imposed by the military (and demonstrates the importance of and demand clearly, the military must be more realistic about for commercial space assets by the military. its requirements). Somewhat ironically, these high-tech, high- Even if commercial space is not a panacea resolution images were initially delivered via for the military, it should be the driving force of “pony express.” Ikonos imagery was recorded space and shape space policy. Indeed, on the satellite and downloaded to Space commercial space efforts often lead those of Imaging ground stations in the United States. the government and the DOD and usually have From there, it was delivered to NIMA’s lower costs, due to market influences and Commercial Satellite Imagery Library at Bolling competition. Therefore, defense and national Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. The Air security need to be one component of overall Force had to send someone to the library to U.S. space policy, but certainly not the primary manually transfer the data to compact discs, component. In the post–Cold War which were then delivered by aircraft to Saudi environment—with no immediate threat from Arabia. Eventually, the data was transmitted via another great power and none on the horizon the Pentagon’s satellite-based Global Broadcast (at least in the near- to mid-term)—the U.S. Service. So not only is there a commercial government must avoid establishing inflated opportunity in imaging itself, but also possibly and costly military requirements for space-based in how those images are transmitted—especially resources. U.S. space policy should strive to securely—to the customer. foster an environment that allows commercial space activity to grow and flourish rather than create a new area for costly military 7 Dana J. Johnson, Scott Pace, and C. Bryan competition. Gabbard, Space: Emerging Options for National Power, RAND MR-517 (1998), p. 29. 8 Ibid., p. 32. 9 Moorman, “The Explosion of Commercial Space….”

10

MILITARY APPROACHES TO SPACE VULNERABILITY: SEVEN QUESTIONS

by Robert McDougall and Phillip J. Baines Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canada

In analyzing the issue of space number of dual (military/civilian) missions and vulnerability, we will begin by attempting a commercial providers of military services. broad examination of the relevant problems from a variety of different technical angles.1 Question 2: What are the chief threats to We will also weigh both weapons and non- space-based assets? weapons responses to these vulnerabilities. In our conclusion, we provide thoughts on a A “space-based” system actually includes possible weaponization ban, which, after our three parts: a ground segment (including analysis, is our preferred solution. Our telemetry, tracking and control (TT&C) approach is organized by considering seven facilities, communications earth station and/or questions. data reception and archival facilities); the space segment itself (artificial satellites consisting of Question 1: What is the meaning of “space payloads and platforms), and the radio links vulnerabilities”? (uplinks/downlinks that carry commands, communication traffic, signals, telemetry and Vulnerabilities potentially exist both from data). Launch vehicles and their associated space and in space. Any careful analysis must infrastructure necessary to place artificial include possible space-to-space threats, space- satellites and their upper stages into orbits for to-terrestrial (land/sea/air) threats, and subsequent operational service are also terrestrial-to-space threats. There is prerequisites for space-based systems. considerable overlap in this regard: space Each element is vulnerable to a variety of targets can be attacked from space, from within distinct threats. The ground segments and the atmosphere or trans-atmospherically, and launch infrastructures are vulnerable to any technology that can strike terrestrial targets conventional attacks from opposing military from space can almost certainly be applied to forces. Radio links can be jammed, spoofed or attack targets in orbit as well. This essay covers otherwise hacked based on electronic primarily the vulnerabilities faced by space- transmissions from terrestrial, trans- based assets, including threats from all quarters, atmospheric or orbital sources. The space and the response to such vulnerabilities. This is segment is vulnerable to a range of attacks, not to suggest that other aspects are immaterial, including those from terrestrially-based trans- merely to note that we have chosen to limit our atmospheric vehicles (military space planes) or field of analysis for now. missile interceptors with nuclear, conventional Orbital assets potentially at risk from explosive, or kinetic energy warheads; from deliberate offensive action include both military terrestrial-based directed-energy weapons, such and civilian assets. Military aspects include as lasers; and from space-based weapons such navigation, communication, remote sensing and as mines, missile interceptors, directed energy related missions that contribute to national and weapons (including neutral particle beams or international security. Civilian missions include lasers), and devices designed to alter the commercial operations on which our trajectory of the target, to create highly economies increasingly depend, as well as damaging debris clouds or to generate electro- missions of great scientific value. Distinctions magnetic pulses (EMP). are often in fact blurred: note the increasing Two points are worth stressing. First, the threat to a space-based system is not only to its space segment. Secondly and consequently, 1 This paper reflects the views of the authors and space-based countermeasures cannot help in not necessarily the position of the Government of Canada.

11 Robert McDougall and Phillip J. Baines

some cases, and are not the only possible destruction of one or even several response in others. satellites does not take down the entire system); designated back-up or Question 3: How can these threats be redundant assets (both space segment countered? and TT&C) in secure locations for critical missions; rapid in-orbit or trans- One broad way to counter these threats atmospheric repair capabilities; involves active counter-force, in other words, a autonomous in-orbit navigation and direct attack on those enemy forces or weapons housekeeping against the event that threatening the assets to be protected. This communication with the TT&C ground includes a range of options. Some are segment is severed for an extended terrestrial, including physical attack on enemy period. forces, destruction of missile launch and • Hardening/Shielding: alternative power satellite command and control nodes, and sources (reducing the impact of information operations including the jamming damage to vulnerable solar arrays); of communications links. Others are trans- rapid-acting shutters deployable against atmospheric, for example, the destruction of debris or intense illumination; radiation orbiting weapons using land-, sea- or air-based hardening; counter-electromagnetic lasers, terrestrially based missile interceptors or pulse (EMP) measures such as military space planes armed with conventional grounding or Faraday cages; or other “exotic” anti-satellite weapons. component selection for immunity to Finally, some are space-based, including the system-generated EMP (SGEMP) mounting of “self defense” weapons on effects; enhanced encryption of the satellites with other primary payloads, uplink and downlink; electronic assignment of weapons- dedicated satellites to countermeasures to safeguard escort valuable orbital assets, or the creation of communications systems (e.g., agile a constellation of orbital weapon systems frequency hopping, signal power (featuring interceptors, directed-energy boosting and antenna nulling to defeat weapons, mine/debris fields, displacement enemy jamming); and operation from devices, etc.) designed for counter- or pre- higher and thus less accessible altitude emptive attacks on any and all enemy space- orbits. based weapons. • Awareness/Maneuverability: enhanced It is worth noting that, in the second and situational vigilance to predict and third cases just mentioned, counter-force detect attack, including improved options to protect satellites would often involve operational intelligence, threat analysis, developing and deploying the same sorts of space surveillance and on-board in situ weapons systems against which they are sensing, combined with built-in rapid intended to defend. Or, to look at the other maneuvering capability for critical or side of the same coin, many of the weapons high-value orbital assets (allowing them systems that could be deployed to protect to dodge some types of attacks), satellite assets could equally be used to destroy including robotic refuelling options for them. maneuvering thrusters. There are also, however, other possible • Denial/Deception: steps to make key approaches to defending space-based assets, orbital assets stealthy or harder to ones that do not depend on deploying counter- detect from Earth in the first place, force approaches. Some examples: inter alia through observational • Redundancy/Reconstitution: existence signature reduction, deception (reduced of replacement satellites stored in orbit or disguised interaction with the or terrestrially housed spares capable of ground segment) and enhanced security launch-on-demand; large networked measures surrounding deployment and constellations of assets with a purpose. distributed architecture (so that

12

Military Approaches to Space Vulnerability: Seven Questions

• Passive Defense: increased fixed and Few of these options are exclusive, and a mobile security features (e.g., personnel mixture may well be the optimum solution. It screening, physical barriers and guard seems worth underlining, however, that there forces) for the ground segment in are significant alternatives to space-based particular. weapons if the primary goal is to defend space- • Diplomacy and Threat Reduction: based assets—as opposed to broader scenarios reinforcement and extension of the envisaging space control or space-based attack international legal regime prohibiting on terrestrial targets. The argument has been space-based weapons, inter alia by made that the increasing value of satellite assets negotiating and gaining broad requires the space equivalent of a “deep sea adherence for international legal fleet” to protect the commerce of the sea lanes. instruments (e.g., on anti-satellite Unless and until the threat comes from outer weapons); cooperative measures to space, however, the need (if any) seems at most protect terrestrial military operations to be for the space equivalent of port-based among allies and associates (e.g., coast guard squadrons and perhaps shore multilateral shutter control artillery. mechanisms); strengthening of export controls and other nonproliferation Question 4: Who has the capability to create measures on pertinent technology; and such threats? increased international pressure on violators of existing norms and Space-based weapons are possible for any obligations. state with the economic and technological More radically, one could also consider capability to manufacture and launch ICBMs or whether too many eggs are being put in the rockets capable of putting satellites into orbit, same basket in terms of military reliance on and to control the actions of missiles and/or satellites. Is it wise, some policymakers and space objects from the ground. Theoretically, experts have asked, to develop a military system this could include the following states: the architecture and doctrine with a single point of United States, the Russian Federation, China, failure, necessitating complex and expensive the European Union (the European Space counter-force defense structures? One Agency and some individual member states), alternative would be to enhance flexibility and Japan, India, Ukraine, and Israel. reliability by adopting other approaches in An anti-satellite (ASAT) attack from the tandem with current space-based ones—such as ground might also be possible for states with a greater use of airborne assets or unmanned air developed medium- or intermediate-range vehicles (UAVs) where practical. Where space- ballistic missile (IRBM) capability, even without based approaches are necessary, consideration satellite experience. Such states could for could be given to downloading requirements to example theoretically include Iran, Pakistan and commercial systems (which may also be less North Korea. If the attacking states possessed expensive—compare the cost of MILSTAR and a nuclear device, an IRBM could place it on a INTELSAT communications systems for sub-orbital trajectory to reach the “Starfish example), reserving military satellites for critical Prime” apogee of 400 km; even in the upper missions only. Architecture and doctrine that reaches of the atmosphere, a nuclear explosion centralizes data collection, processing and would generate an EMP and SGEMP capable analysis could also be balanced with more of adversely affecting satellites in the widely dispersed and diverse nodes, serving to geostationary orbit and would significantly relieve computer, communications, command increase radiation in low-Earth orbit (LEO), and control, intelligence, surveillance and degrading satellite lifetimes. reconnaissance (C4ISR) network bottlenecks Space-based assets could also be hit with a over intercontinental distances. very high-power laser designed to degrade, damage or destroy satellites from land-, sea- or air-based platforms. Unhardened satellites in LEO could be incapacitated, although satellites

13 Robert McDougall and Phillip J. Baines

above medium-Earth orbit and in geostationary as deployment of weapons in earth orbit or Earth orbit are presumed safe against present higher. day technology. A small number of states have Advocates of weapons in space speak of sufficiently sophisticated R&D capabilities to the need for “space control” or “space create laser or other exotic weapons suitable for dominance,” including such aspects as assured ASAT roles. access to outer space via one’s own launch During the Cold War, the United States vehicles; assured use of one’s own military and the Soviet Union developed and tested assets in outer space for communications, both nuclear and non-nuclear ASAT-capable navigation, remote sensing, and other missions; systems. Within the past few years, the United denial of an enemy’s similar use of outer space; States has carried out well-publicized R&D the ability to defend non-military space assets; programs on advanced space-based and related and the use of space as a platform for attack on weapons systems with a range of primary and terrestrial targets, including missiles and ground secondary mission capabilities. A small number objectives. If achievable, these would be very of other states are reported in the open significant benefits for a given state from a literature to be doing so as well, although none military standpoint. Space-based weapons also seems to have given such programs the policy, have downsides, however, even from this same doctrinal, or financial priority recently accorded standpoint. by Washington. Since a space-based ASAT weapon will Compared to the space segment, the itself suffer from many of the same ground and radio-link segments are vulnerable vulnerabilities as its quarry, the development of to attack from a far larger range of potential such weapons will promote the development of opponents (indeed from anyone with the the counter-force means to defeat them, military and/or technological capability to resulting in an arms race focused on space and a attack terrestrial facilities or interfere with consequent erosion of initial advantage. electronic signals). In addition to governmental Deployment is likely to move opponents up the forces, this could include terrorists and other threat ladder in terms of creating vulnerabilities non-state actors, whereas the latter are unlikely in space, to an extent and at a pace they might to develop early capabilities to attack the space well not have considered necessary, absent first segment. deployment by another state. In the case where In summary, we note that the direct threat a potential first deployer already enjoyed a to space-based assets is limited to a significant technological edge in military use of comparatively small number of countries. This space, especially combined with a consequent factor, combined with the high cost and dependency on space-based military missions, it technological complexity of mounting such a is unclear why it would be to that state’s long- threat, argues against the urgent inevitability of term advantage to promote or provoke deployment of weapons in space and/or in an weaponization of that sphere. ASAT role. It means that action to prevent Strategic advantage based on technological such weaponization through international superiority has in any event often proven agreement or other approaches need only ephemeral in the past. Historically, the first use convince a limited number of states. It is also of new strategic technology has simultaneously worth noting, however, that a more widely- provided three things: incentive for others to based threat may exist to non-space segments acquire either the same capabilities or an and pose greater overall vulnerability. adequate asymmetrical response; a clear demonstration of what is technologically Question 5: Does space weaponization have possible, obviating generations of R&D; and a downsides? licit (defense-shared or commercial) or illicit (espionage-mediated) source of that technology. Let us therefore turn from the broad Examples over the past half-century or so have analytical context to a more specific included nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, consideration of space weaponization, defined long-range missiles of all types, and generations of spy satellites.

14

Military Approaches to Space Vulnerability: Seven Questions

Deployment of space weapons is also bolster weaponization options at the risk of likely to generate the sort of situation that promoting armed rivalry? fosters tension and risks poor decisionmaking. First deployment may face other states with Question 6: Has a proper cost/benefit unacceptable new vulnerabilities, resulting in analysis been carried out? unpredictable reactions. The Cuban Missile Crisis, it may be remembered, was itself the The authors have occasionally run into the result of weapons deployment creating new and firmly-held view that holding defense unexpected vulnerabilities. If, as suggested expenditure up to genuine cost-benefit analysis above, first deployment in fact spurs these falls somewhere between “unpatriotic” and other states to follow suit, this will in turn pose “must be illegal.” Taking into account such the first deployer with the need to decide how factors as the technical practicability, tactical to respond: should the secondary deployments effectiveness and strategic impact of space- simply be allowed to take place, degrading the based weapons as a defense against attacks on first deployer’s strategic advantage, or should orbital assets, it nevertheless seems worth the first deployer threaten and if necessary take carrying out a full calculation of this nature. active steps to prevent or reverse such Space (if nothing else) does not permit such an deployments? If the latter, what are likely to be analysis to be presented at this point, but a few the consequences in terms of conflict general comments may be pertinent. escalation, especially given the advanced First, it is clear that different cost-benefit military-technological levels of the states likely comparisons can in fact be drawn up from a to be involved? Or, given the need in some military, national security and international scenarios for an extensive constellation of security perspective even within the same state. space-based weapons to deny other states Furthermore, a given deployment’s cost-benefit access, will a nation challenged by a partial ratio for one state, alliance, or other group of deployment be moved to take action to prevent states may not be the same as the same the constellation becoming fully populated? deployment’s result for another state or group. Indirect and unintended consequences This inescapable range of domestic and must also be considered. One specific example international variance needs to be remembered that has generated considerable attention is the when debates are joined on the issue, given problem of orbital debris. Where use of common rhetorical assumptions to the weapons against targets in orbit results in the contrary. destruction or disarticulation, debris effects are At the international level, it must be likely, seriously degrading the survivability of all stressed that the present situation in space but the most heavily-protected assets in orbital operates to the benefit of many countries— paths. This result will likely pose a launching states, countries like Canada with a disproportionate threat to the overall security of strong space industry but without launch military satellites and civilian assets, including capacity and all nations benefiting from space- those with a security-related dual mission. It is related services—in term of both civilian also worth asking how the formation of a debris satellite operations and non-weapons military cloud would contribute to a first deployer’s missions. Putting such benefits at risk would assured access to outer space. have an imputed cost that might or might not As a final thought in this regard, it seems be offset by presumed increases in future important to consider not just whether to base security from active space-based defense, weapons in space, but also the question “why especially if such increases in security accrued now?” First may be arguably better than second asymmetrically to a small number of states. in the field, but later may also be better than This consideration includes the issue of soon. Will greater security be achieved by collateral damage to states not themselves defending the status quo of no weapons in space, directly involved in any space-based even at the cost of accepting some uncertainty deployment crisis or subsequent conflict. for the future, or alternatively by taking steps to Inadvertent war damage or longer-term debris effects may, for example, have a major impact

15 Robert McDougall and Phillip J. Baines

on states with civilian or military assets or space-based weapons? Bearing in mind that we access to space services at risk, regardless of are talking about convincing hard-headed whether they have any direct stake in the issues soldiers and not fuzzy-minded arms controllers? generating the conflict. And the international We would argue that the answer is yes, as long community will hardly welcome the prospect of as the ban was implemented by the major running a gauntlet of orbital weapons in order launching states and other states capable of to benefit from the future exploitation of the attacking into orbital space, and as long as it riches of outer space. At the very least, the was effectively verified. We would argue that deployment of space-based weapons by one or space non-weaponization should be seriously a few states over the objections of the rest considered by military as well as diplomatic could undermine the amity underpinning a authorities – not just for moral or geopolitical broad range of related international procedures reasons but as a genuine contribution to hard and arrangements, such as cooperation on radio national security, based especially on the frequency assignments and current state threat/capability comparisons, alternative practice of not interfering with remote sensing approaches, downside arguments, cost-benefit observations – representing another potential and opportunity cost factors flagged above. factor of indirect cost. One option within the range of At the national level, even accepting the possibilities in this regard is a convention to ban need for measures to defend space-based assets, space-based weapons—defined as damage- the differential cost-benefit of space-based causing mechanisms (not associated elements weapons as opposed to other possible passive such as sensors or command and control) and active defense measures (as outlined under actually based in space (not just transiting, like Question 3 above) needs to be drawn up missiles or space planes). Space-based weapons carefully. In this regard, it should be noted that as thus defined are not the only threat to space space is probably the most expensive assets (as noted earlier), but a ban on such environment in which to place a weapon weapons represents a useful place to start and a system. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of fairly straightforward expansion from the the actual threat is also important, taking into current prohibitions in the Outer Space Treaty account intention and likelihood as well as of 1967. current and potential capabilities. Space is an Considerable work has also been done on environment in which a threat to important the issue of verification of such a ban, including assets can make use of cheaper, less the Canadian PAXSAT study in the mid-1980s, sophisticated technology, so the risk of leading to the conclusion that the technical inducing such threats (along the lines discussed means for such verification existed – given the under the previous question) must be another necessary political will. The passage of time factor in the analysis. Finally, cost-benefit and since then has only reinforced this observation; opportunity costs for favoring space-based recent developments in space surveillance and weapons, as opposed to other defense situational awareness linked to non-weapons priorities, must also be a significant missions in space have already greatly enhanced consideration, absent the unlikely eventuality of the means available to distinguish a weapon no competition for budgetary allocations. from an otherwise benign space object. There appears to be considerable support Question 7: Can a space weapons ban for a space weaponization ban, in one form or create a safer environment for military another. Several countries, including Canada, space assets? have made such proposals in various international fora, differing somewhat in Staying with the military perspective, let’s concept and degree of detail. Other states have look at the issue from another angle. Limiting suggested even more restrictive approaches, the issue to protection of space-based military arguing for limitations on all military use of and other security-related assets, can a space- outer space, not just prohibitions on its based weapons ban serve as a full or partial weaponization. The last UN General Assembly alternative to a defense capacity reliant on voted 156 for, 0 against, and 4 abstaining in

16

Military Approaches to Space Vulnerability: Seven Questions favor of action within the Conference on example of establishing a discussion forum Disarmament (CD) to convene an ad hoc (such as a CD PAROS ad hoc committee), working group on the prevention of an arms mandating the UN to seek the views of race in outer space (PAROS), which most states members on the issue, creating an inter- consider likely to focus on the issue of space governmental experts group, promoting “no weaponization. The December 2000 NATO first deployment” pledges and establishing report on the alliance’s efforts in arms control transparency and other confidence-building and related fields meanwhile underlined the measures. importance of work by the international Reverting in closing to our true colors as community “to preserve and protect current arms controllers, we confess that it would be economic and security benefits from the use of pleasant to be able to negotiate some useful Outer Space while avoiding the creation of new mutual restraints before deployment took place and daunting military competitions in the in a fresh environment, rather than trying to future.” claw back deployment after the fact. Waiting If the international community agreed, a for a crisis to happen before starting work step-by-step approach could be adopted. If seems by contrast a poor option, especially negotiation of a comprehensive legally-binding given the current opportunities. space weapons ban was too much for some states as an initial step in the face of military concerns, then consideration could be given to a more cautious approach – consideration for

17

DEBRIS AND FUTURE SPACE ACTIVITIES

by Joel R. Primack University of California at Santa Cruz

Space is the most fragile environment that are where the Bush administration wants to put exists because it has the least ability to repair parts of its proposed missile defense system, itself. Only the Earth’s atmosphere can remove including space-based lasers and thousands of satellites from orbit. When the sun flares up in “brilliant pebbles” (space-based interceptors). its 11-year cycle, it heats the upper atmosphere Such weapons were forbidden by the 1972 and makes it expand so that debris and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, but the spacecraft in low orbits are subjected to United States withdrew from this treaty in June increased drag. But the higher the original 2002. orbit, the less air there is to collide with. Maybe the reason missile defense has Near-Earth space is already at risk from gotten as far as it has is that so few people human activities, and it is in great need of understand the laws of physics. The nickname protection by scientists and humanity at large.1 “Star Wars” for missile defense all too Scientists should be especially concerned, both accurately reflects the popular fantasy because we are increasingly dependent on impression of how things work in space. In the scientific instruments in near-Earth space, and Star Wars movies and in hundreds of other also because we are in a position to foresee the popular science fiction films, we see things problems human activities are causing and to blow up in space and the fragments quickly propose measures to mitigate or avoid them. In dissipate, leaving space clear again. But in particular, we need to emphasize that a war in reality, space never clears after an explosion space could create a battlefield that will last near our planet. The fragments continue forever, encasing our entire planet in a shell of circling the Earth, their orbits crossing those of whizzing debris that will thereafter make space other objects. Paint chips, lost bolts, pieces of near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as exploded rockets—all have already become tiny well as military purposes. Debris in orbits satellites, traveling about 27,000 km per hour, higher than about 800 kilometers (km) above 10 times faster than a high-powered rifle bullet. the Earth’s surface will be up there for decades, There is no bucket we could ever put up there above 1,000 km for centuries, and above 1,500 to catch them. Anything they hit will be km effectively forever. Over 9,000 objects destroyed and only increase the debris. A larger than 10 centimeters (cm) in diameter are marble traveling at that speed would hit with currently tracked, and there are probably more the energy of a one-ton safe dropped from a than 100,000 pieces of orbiting debris larger three-story building. With enough orbiting than a marble.2 But crowded near-Earth orbits debris, pieces will begin to hit other pieces, fragmenting them into pieces, which will in turn 1 G. B. Field, M. J. Rees, and D. N. Spergel, “Is the hit more pieces, setting off a chain reaction of Space Environment at Risk?” Nature 336 (December destruction that will leave a lethal halo around 22, 1988), p. 725. J. R. Primack, “Protecting the Space Environment for Astronomy,” in Preservation of Near-Earth Space for Future Generations, John A. Debris (Office of Science and Technology Policy, Simpson, ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. 1995), ; Technical Report on Space Debris (New York: 2 A good introduction is N. L. Johnson, “Controlling United Nations, 1999); P. D. Anz-Meador, History of Debris in Space,” Scientific American 279 (August On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations, 12th Edition, 1998). Standard references on space debris include Johnson Space Center 29517 (July 2001), N. L. Johnson and D. S. McKnight, Artificial Space ; and NASA's Orbital Debris Quarterly, (Paris: European Space Agency, 1988); Orbital Debris: . Academy Press, 1995); Interagency Report on Orbital

18 Debris and Future Space Activities

the Earth. To operate a satellite within this and larger-scale structures in the universe, cloud of millions of tiny missiles would become according to popular but—before COBE— impossible: no more Hubble Space Telescopes unconfirmed theories such as Cold Dark or International Space Stations. Even the Matter.4 higher communications and GPS satellites The Hubble Space Telescope (HST), in a would be endangered. Every person who cares 600-km orbit, has observed many Cepheid about the human future in space should also variable stars in about 20 nearby galaxies, which realize that weaponizing space jeopardizes the has finally allowed accurate measurement of the possibility of space exploration. expansion rate of the universe and thus, indirectly, the time since the Big Bang.5 The Hubble Deep Fields—the longest time exposures with HST—have given us unprecedented images of the first galaxies, which are helping us to understand the history of our own cosmic home, the Milky Way galaxy.6 In the 17th century, Newton’s separation of physics into universal laws and special initial conditions provided a paradigm that still guides the field, even though the universal laws themselves have been revised several times. Darwinian evolution plays a similar central role in biology, connecting the structures of organisms and of ecological communities with the underlying molecular genetics. Geology just advanced tremendously a few decades ago with the confirmation of the plate tectonics Catalogued objects near earth.3 paradigm. Now it is cosmology’s turn, with the crucial help of observations from astronomical As a scientist whose research has benefited satellites. The data from COBE, HST, and enormously from space observations, these other new observatories should at last give prospects horrify me. Most of the important astrophysicists a solid foundation on which to astronomical satellites have been placed in the construct an overarching theory of the origin low-Earth orbit (LEO) region (from the lowest and evolution of the universe, an achievement practical orbits, about 300-km altitude, up to that is also bound to have deep implications for about 2,000 km). The Cosmic Background the development of human culture.7 Explorer (COBE) satellite, in a polar orbit at 900-km altitude, allowed the discovery in 1992 of the fluctuations in the first light of the 4 G. R. Blumenthal, S. M. Faber, J. R. Primack, and universe—the heat radiation that was emitted as M. J. Rees, “Formation of Galaxies and Large-Scale the hot primordial plasma first cooled and Structure with Cold Dark Matter,” Nature 311 became transparent about 300,000 years after (1984), pp. 517-525. the origin, long before the first stars formed. 5 W. L. Freedman, et al., “Final Results from the The temperature fluctuations COBE detected Hubble Space Telescope Key Project to Measure the are relics of ancient differences in the density of Hubble Constant,” Astrophysics Journal 553 (May 20, the primordial universe from place to place. 2001), p. 47. These initial conditions are what led over 6 R. S. Somerville, J. R. Primack, and S. M. Faber, billions of years to the formation of galaxies “The Nature of High-Redshift Galaxies,” Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomy Society 320 (February 2001), p. 504. 3 Source: NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Office 7 N. E. Abrams and J. R. Primack, “Cosmology and for Human Exploration Science website, . 2001), p. 1769.

19 Joel R. Primack

In addition, most Earth-observing is increasing. Random collisions between man- satellites are in LEO, both those that study made objects in LEO are still relatively rare, but changes in climate and vegetation and also the density of such objects may already be military surveillance satellites. These low orbits sufficiently great at 900-1,000 km and 1,500- permit the highest resolution imaging, and are 1,700 km that a chain reaction or cascade of also easiest to reach with existing launch collisions can be sustained.10 Further growth of vehicles. For example, NASA’s LANDSAT-7 the debris population will increase the threat at is in a 705-km orbit and the European Space even lower orbital altitudes. The resulting Agency’s ERS-2 is in a 780-km orbit. NASA’s debris environment will obviously be very new international Aqua satellite was launched in hostile to satellites in LEO. May 2002 into a 705-km orbit. These satellites Sally Ride recalled a run-in with space are all in sun-synchronous (near-polar) orbits. debris on her first shuttle flight. But such satellites are already at increasing About halfway through the flight risk from space debris. At any moment, only there was a small pit in the window of about 200 kilograms (kg) of meteoroid mass is the space shuttle and we didn’t know within 2,000 km of the Earth’s surface. Within what it was. An awful lot of analysis this same altitude range there is roughly was done while we were in orbit to 3,000,000 kg of orbiting debris introduced by make sure that the strength of the human activities. Most of this mass is about window would sustain reentry. It did. 3,000 spent rocket stages and inactive payloads. We were all fine. But the analysis Approximately 40,000 kg of debris is in some afterward showed that our window 4,000 additional objects several cm in size or had been hit by an orbiting fleck of larger, most of which resulted from more than paint, and the relative velocities were 120 satellite fragmentations. The main threat to enough that the paint actually made a satellites near Earth is from the 1,000 kg of 1 small but visible gouge in the cm or smaller debris particles, especially the window. Well, a fleck of paint is not approximately 300 kg of debris smaller than 1 the same as a small piece of metal mm. Such BB-size fragments of debris have traveling at that same speed. So, as the same destructive energy as a bowling ball soon as you start increasing the moving at 100 km/hr. An average small amount of junk in a low-Earth orbit, satellite in an 800-km orbit now has about a one you have an unintended byproduct percent chance per year of failure due to that starts putting some of your own collision with a BB-size piece of debris.8 The danger to a large satellite such as Hubble Space Telescope or the International Space Station is even greater.9 And the amount of small debris stated that achieving this capability would be technically challenging, according to Space Surveillance, 8 D. J. Kessler, R. C. Reynolds, and P. D. Anz- General Accounting Office Report GAO/NSAID- Meador, “Orbital Debris Environment for 98-42, pp. 16-17 Spacecraft in Low Earth Orbit,” NASA Technical 10 D. J. Kessler and B. G. Cour-Palais, “Collision Memorandum 100-471 (April 1988); J. M. Ryan, Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a “Tossed in Space: Orbital Debris Endangers Debris Belt,” Journal of Geophysical Research 83 (June 1, Instruments and Astronauts,” The Sciences 30 1978), p. 2637; D. J. Kessler, “Collision Probability (July/August 1990) at Low Altitudes Resulting from Elliptical Orbits,” 9 NASA has designed portions of the space station Advances in Space Research 10 (3) (1990), p. 393; D. J. with shielding to provide protection against objects Kessler, “Collisional Cascading: The Limits of smaller than 1 centimeter. It has concluded that Population Growth in Low Earth Orbit,” Advances in shielding against larger objects would be too costly. Space Research 11 (12) (1991) p. 63. Complete Debris from about 0.5 to 20 cm in diameter is of breakup is likely to occur in a collision when most concern because the debris may be too large to (impactor kinetic energy)/(colliding object mass) > shield against and too small to track and avoid. 40J/g, so a 0.1 kg piece of debris can fragment a 100 NASA will require DOD to detect, track, and kg satellite if it hits at 10 km/s velocity; see Orbital catalog objects as small as 1 cm. However, DOD Debris (ftn. 2), p. 91.

20 Debris and Future Space Activities

quite valuable satellites at possible electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or nuclear risk.11 radiation.14 Perhaps worst of all would be the Ride asked: “What if anti-satellite testing deliberate injection into LEO of large numbers proceeds and we start testing rockets that of particles as a cheap but effective anti-satellite clobber satellites and explode them in space? measure. Any country that felt threatened by What if enough of that goes on that there’s the America’s starting to place lasers or other equivalent to a test range up in low-Earth weapons into space would only have to launch orbit?”12 the equivalent of gravel to destroy the Offensive weapons in space pose the sophisticated weaponry. Many of these pieces worst threat to satellites in LEO. Fortunately, of metallic gravel and fragments of broken offensive weapons have not yet been weaponry would join all the other debris in introduced into space—except for a few tests orbit. It would hasten the fragmentation of the such as a Soviet space mine explosion, or the 3,000,000 kg of dead satellites and rocket intentional destruction in 1985 of the still- bodies now in LEO, and thus produce an operating Solwind satellite in a demonstration enormous cloud of debris that would threaten by the U.S. military. Each of these tests all satellites in LEO. generated hundreds of pieces of trackable Policies that can help avert a space debris. But kinetic kill vehicles such as the “tragedy of the commons”15 include the proposed thousands of “Brilliant Pebbles” are following: sure to generate great quantities of space debris • Do not introduce attack weapons just during their initial deployment, and far into space more if they are ever used. Since each of these • Avoid fragmentation of satellites attack satellites will circle the earth every 90 from explosions due to accidents minutes, basing weapons in space requires and anti-satellite weapons tests, hundreds of individual satellites in order that at the main cause of space debris. least one be near its time-urgent target, such as Prohibit explosions of any kind in a missile in boost phase.13 space. Any kind of space warfare will put all • Design boost and deployment satellites at risk. The explosion of nuclear systems for satellites that weapons in space (prohibited by the Outer minimize the production of space Space Treaty, but routinely considered by debris. Require all satellites in military planners) would indiscriminately LEO to carry a mechanism, such destroy unprotected satellites by as rockets or inflatable devices to increase drag, which will cause

11 them to reenter within a period of Sally Ride, Drell Lecture, Stanford Center for (say) 25 years after their useful International Security and Cooperation, April 10, 2002, as quoted in Stanford University press release lives are over. 12 Ibid. • Ban nuclear reactors in orbit, 13 Suppose, for example, that Space Based Lasers are since they are an environmental placed in orbit at about 500 km altitude. Lower threat and they are useful only for orbits are impractical since the satellites would re- military purposes.16 enter in only a few years, while higher orbits may be impractical since power falls off as the square of the 14 distance. The number of such satellites necessary in See, e.g., J. R. Wertz and W. J. Larson, eds., Space order that one be over (within a 45 degree angle of) Mission Analysis and Design (Dordrecht, Holland: any given point on the Earth’s surface is then just 4 Kluwer Academic Publishers, , 1991), esp. sec. 8.2. r2, where r is the ratio of the satellite’s altitude to the 15 G. Hardin, “Tragedy of the Commons,” Science Earth’s radius, 6,400 km. For this example, the 162 (1968), p. 1243. See also G. Hardin and J. number of satellites required is 650. If polar Baden, eds., Managing the Commons (New York: latitudes are not covered this number would shrink Freeman, 1979). slightly, but if two satellites are to be over a given 16 See, e.g., J. R. Primack, “Gamma-Ray target at any time the number of satellites required Observations of Orbiting Nuclear Reactors,” Science would be about 1,000. 244 (June 16, 1989); J. R. Primack, N. E. Abrams, et

21 Joel R. Primack

• Minimize light pollution from National political leaders usually take a orbit. short-range view, hardly ever stretching past the next change of government. Astronomers The space age is only 45 years old, yet we measure time in millions and billions of years. humans may already have placed so many We must help to educate the general public to artificial objects in the near-Earth environment think with at least an intermediate perspective that random collisions between them can of centuries and millennia about the produce a cascading number of debris environmental degradation that our increasingly fragments that will threaten and eventually powerful technology is causing on and near our prevent scientific and other uses of LEO. Such beautiful but fragile planet—the only one like it a debris belt would have other unfortunate that we know in the entire universe. consequences: for example, fragmentation of this debris by further collisions could eventually Author’s Note: The Powerpoint presentation of this produce enough dust to cause a lingering talk—as presented at the Conference on Future Security twilight as it is illuminated by sunlight, a new in Space, at New Place (near Southampton, England) and particularly unpleasant sort of light on May 28-29, 2002, organized by the Monterey pollution.17 It will without doubt be necessary Institute of International Studies Center for for all space agencies to take active steps to Nonproliferation Studies and by the University of prevent the buildup of debris, and it is an Southampton's Mountbatten Centre—is available as a encouraging first step that NASA and ESA pdf file on the Internet at: have succeeded in eliminating the Delta and . Ariane upper stage explosions that were a major source of orbital debris. But much more effort will be needed, and it may even be necessary to deploy special spacecraft to remove some of the larger pieces of space debris at the altitudes where the critical density for a cascade have already been reached. Designing such devices will be a useful exercise,18 not least because it will help to impress on public officials the cost of space debris. al., “Space Reactor Arms Control: Overview,” Science and Global Security 1 (1) (1989), pp. 59-82.; S. Aftergood, D. W. Hafemeister, J. R. Primack, O. F. Prilutsky, and S. N. Rodionov, “Nuclear Power in Space,” Scientific American 264 (June 1991), p. 42. 17 S. van den Bergh, “Summary Paper,” in Light Pollution, Radio Interference, and Space Debris, D. L. Crawford, ed. (San Francisco: Astronomical Society of the Pacific, 1991), p. 329; D. McNally and R. H. Rast, “The Effect of Spacecraft and Space Debris on Astronomical Observations,” Advances in Space Research 23 (1) (1999), p. 255; J.-C. Mandeville, J.-M. Perrin, and A. Vuillemin, “Space Borne Photometry Perturbations from Solar Light Scattered by Debris: a First Estimate,” Acta Astronautica 48 (February 2001), p. 229. 18 See, for example, D. Rex, “Space Debris Mitigation and Space Systems Design,” Acta Astronautica 41 (August 11, 1997), p. 311. Cf. R. Crowther, “Space Junk—Protecting Space for Future Generations,” Science 296 (May 17, 2002), p. 1241.

22

PUTTING MILITARY USES OF SPACE IN CONTEXT

by Steven Lambakis National Institute for Public Policy

In the debate over the military uses of establish organizations, and create programs to space, many often ask the wrong questions. All develop and deploy systems to bolster too often, questions about weaponizing space deterrence, strengthen defenses, and increase are divorced from life and death struggles here military efficiencies. on earth and the reality that we live in a So how we talk about this is important. dangerous world full of political-strategic How we pose questions about using space for uncertainties. It is not helpful to talk abstractly military purposes changes the possible answers. about the weaponization of space, or to talk Are people against placing weapons in space? I about it as the road to apocalypse. Times being suppose they would be, if that is all you ask. what they are, we should rather look more But moral, military, and strategic contexts closely at possible life-saving advantages. make a difference. To ask someone to consider The Rumsfeld Commission on Space whether they’re in favor of putting weapons in Organization and Management reported last space is different from asking that same person year that space is becoming increasingly whether he would support basing interceptors important, not only to the United States, but in orbit to intercept long-range ballistic missiles also to other countries, especially in the area of to protect his city. Indeed, when asked about national security. Space warfare is a “virtual whether they want a missile defense, polls have certainty,” it said, and this, to be sure, has consistently shown over the past two decades aroused interest and, in some quarters, panic. that the American people support such The commission recommended that defenses. It is also quite a different thing to ask Washington look hard at the advantages of a person whether he would support the expanding the military uses of space to enhance development of a weapon, a tool, to physically deterrence and improve defense. knock out a satellite that had uncovered the Yet for all its talk of reducing U.S. positions of our sons in uniform, who vulnerabilities in space and its advice to happened to be cornered in some dangerous policymakers to begin thinking about the valley in Afghanistan. Who would not favor possible wartime advantages of seizing the removing the threat? orbital high ground, the Rumsfeld Commission Second, there is historical context to expressly did not put forth plans and programs consider. Critics of expanding the military uses to continue what many call the weaponization of space are wont to make a clean-cut of space. And well it should not have. Who distinction between “militarizing” space, on the would embark on such an unfocused project? one hand, which they say already has happened, What does weaponizing space mean? What and “weaponizing” space on the other, which would such a plan look like? How would a they say has yet to occur. But this is a government accomplish it? And for what distinction without a meaningful difference, purpose? because the combat or force function, which These are fair questions that help make the naturally involves the use of arms, is a potential following point: that any meaningful discussion part of any military activity. Even some of this subject must have a context. And there peacekeepers carry arms. are two reasons for this. Viewed in this light, the term First, the concept of space weaponization “weaponization” may be used, in a general way, is far too abstract to take us too far along in our to characterize activities that countries have discussions. We do not talk in terms of undertaken for nearly 60 years. In other words, weaponizing the air, land, or sea. Governments the so-called weaponization of space is do not make decisions to “weaponize” space happening under our very noses. either. But they do make policies and strategies,

23 Steven Lambakis

Space weaponization started in September monopoly in this area. The Russian 1944, when the first German V-2 missile came GLONASS system performs a similar function, rocketing down from the edge of space and and the European Union may be giving the exploded on the residents and buildings of world a third alternative with the proposed London. The quest for a long- distance strike Galileo system. advantage continued with the development of As a final example of space weapon warheads to travel at even higher altitudes evolution, for the past two decades the United through space and across continents towards States has been developing and testing surface- their targets. Add countermeasures to the launched hit-to-kill interceptors to knock down ICBM reentry vehicle, balloon decoys and short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic maneuvering capability, and we have an even missiles. These tests, these defensive combat more capable offensive weapon engineered to engagements, take place well overhead, many of take advantage of the space environment to them, by necessity, in space. With today’s evade interceptors. technologies, it is advantageous to have a The military transformation of space took layered defense that includes elements to strike on other forms. By improving intelligence and a target in space, in the boost or midcourse of military operations, earth-circling platforms its flight. became attractive targets for military Washington already has conducted tests in countermeasures. During the Cold War, Soviet space from the ground. To counter a long- Electronic Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites and range ballistic missile that may be used against Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites tracked the U.S. homeland, the government has and could help target U.S. naval ships. The engineered and successfully tested a hit-to-kill U.S. anti-satellite (ASAT) response, which never sensor-propulsion package called the “exo- did materialize, was a natural reaction to this atmospheric kill” vehicle, part of the Ground- threat. based Midcourse Defense under what was Likewise, U.S. reconnaissance satellites, called National Missile Defense under the and commercial systems like Ikonos and SPOT, Clinton Administration. Though never talked which provide militarily useful images to about as such in the United States or abroad, anyone who can pay, also will face threats from this is a “space weapon” that spends most of its countries that now deploy and experiment with time on the ground. This interceptor was ASAT technologies. Some of these readily designed to be launched into space, to be available technologies include radio-frequency “based” there for a matter of minutes, and then jammers, blinding lasers, and missiles capable of to put itself onto a collision path with a hostile exploding shrapnel in the vicinity of spacecraft. warhead. Now this does not comport with our Different governments have developed and traditional understanding of what it means to tested over the years anti-satellite technologies “base” something in space, but it may be argued and considered deploying robust, dedicated that we are indeed engaged in a type of basing ASAT systems. operation so as to set up a collision—an In the 1980s, the use of space to enhance explosive clash of arms in space. weapons continued when the United States So, we are in space today because we must deployed Global Positioning System (GPS) be—some 60 years of increasingly intense satellites to aid military navigation and military activity in space, and the world has not positioning. Early on, there was only a very fallen apart. These are all examples of accurate military signal for use by U.S. forces. evolutionary events that have been shaped by The United States later added a less accurate pressing, even urgent, national security civilian signal, and this became so popular and requirements. And this is how it will continue successful that Washington arranged for all to be. parties to have the military signal. These signals There are some potential military guide and increase the accuracy of deadly advantages of operating in, from, or through weapons launched on Earth to their targets and space. For context, I will look primarily at the are available today to all countries for military missile defense mission area. In all cases, we use. The United States does not have a need to consider the best tools for doing the

24 Putting Military Uses of Space in Context

job, and then ask ourselves why it is we would not use a nuclear weapon, and I would rather want to limit ourselves to Earth-bound options. have some options available for taking out a Intercepting a ballistic missile is a highly dangerous site in a timely manner. significant technical challenge. The defender Several countries, to include the United must deal with very high speeds, very small States, have developed and considered a variety objects, and uncertain launch and target points. of weapon systems to strike distant targets, Where he places an interceptor and sensor can including conventionally armed intercontinental make an enormous difference, so that space ballistic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, or a may be able to provide unique positional new generation of strategic bomber. But why advantages for countering the ballistic missile limit arsenals to terrestrial options for delivering threat. force to a distant target, especially when you Space can offer global reach and host a may want to do it quickly? capability to strike targets in a timely manner. History supports the view that countries Given the great distances that missiles travel, a will not stop looking at new combat techniques, defender will have to operate in and from space new ways to exploit technology, to include new to defend different areas around the globe. ways to strike targets. As Russian Major Lasers, or speed of light weapons, in space may General Vyacheslav Bezborodov observed provide an even better tool for conquering about space back in 1995, “A clash of different distance, in a very short span of time, perhaps countries’ interests is inevitable here allowing the defender to counter hostile missiles considering the strategic importance of space, a few thousand miles away. Given adequate contradictions existing in the world, and the numbers of satellites, space also accommodates danger of outbreak of conflicts and wars.” around the clock coverage of the earth, helping There are sound political and strategic to provide early warning, track threat missiles, justifications for looking to space. First, a and discriminate target complexes. weapon that exploits Earth’s orbit may increase These are some of the potential military the number of foreign policy and military advantages of moving the ballistic missile options available to our leaders and defense mission to space. And, as with all other commanders. More options mean that a leader military procurement activities, there are always may not be forced to take a more destructive or questions to answer having to do with trade- weaker course of action, that he has choices on offs with other military mission areas (internal how his country should act in a dynamic, to and external to the ballistic missile defense complex, and often dangerous world. Effective mission area): costs, operational feasibility, legal military options, in other words, can work to obligations, and, of course, foreign policy. In improve deterrence and stability and help this case, space debris too must be considered. leaders deal more intelligently, even more There are other offensive or defensive diplomatically, with surprises. combat mission areas that could benefit from Second, enhanced military power in the more imaginative uses of space. These might hands of states that uphold the rule of include developing capabilities to counter international law can work to improve peace hostile satellites in space, or active defenses to and stability in the world. Treaties dealing with protect high-value spacecraft. Some have the space environment are written to establish proposed using space to strike targets on earth, stability and order on the space frontier. And to use the high speeds and unique reentry this is good. Washington has never considered angles that may be achieved, for example, to space to be a domain of anarchy. Indeed, it is destroy—using nothing but kinetic energy— in the U.S. interest to develop proper laws and underground storage sites for weapons of mass exercise force in a restrained and responsible destruction. manner to prevent space from devolving into a Think about it. If the choice were to take lawless, disorderly realm. out a hardened smallpox weapons storage site Some international treaties act as arms using a nuclear weapon or a precise non-nuclear control agreements to ban, reduce, or limit strike from space, which would be the better weapons. But we ought not lose sight of the option? From my point of view, I would rather fact that weapons, in the hands of the right

25 Steven Lambakis

governments, can serve the international weapons-free and a sanctuary. But while common good and be a positive catalyst for tactical and operational activities may be quite stability—even in space. This view of arms in different in space compared to other space is consistent with the freedom of space environments, from the strategist’s point of principle and the peaceful uses of space view there is no discernible line of separation in tradition that Washington has followed space at the levels of strategy and policy. throughout the space era. Indeed, we already have crossed that line. Only What do we mean when we say “peaceful a sincere and universal political decision can uses” of outer space. The writers of treaties create this imaginary boundary line between the and arms control agreements have not been Earth, where we fight wars, and space, where crystal clear on this subject. I would only say we do not fight wars. But because there is no here that peaceful purposes, as it has evolved universal political will, no consensus or over the years, means non-aggressive. Using agreement among nations on this point, this space for peaceful purposes does not translate line, in the end, is not enforceable. into non-military purposes. In other words, Different governments have very different military actions by some states can support ambitions and policy objectives. Arms control peaceful purposes and provide security essential is an instrument of policy. And so are weapons. for peace. States do not go to war because of weapons. And, as we know from our experience Weapons do not have a moral say, one way or with the land, sea, and air environments, the other. Governments go to war because of a peaceful, stable conditions are essential for clash of policies. commercial practices. Trade, commercial So without universal political will, without activities, and economic growth cannot flourish agreement on fundamental ends, arms control in an unstable environment. must be a weak tool—not entirely irrelevant, Let us put the question about space arms but weak. As we learned in the 1930s and ‘40s in perspective. The blame for warfare in any with the Washington and London naval environment must be placed on the aggressor, disarmament accords, it restrains the law- and not on the defender. Criticize, in other abiding, but not the criminal. If arms control words, the government or group that launched is to be successful, it must reflect political the nuclear warhead into space, not those who, realities. in seeking protection, attack that weapon in Many say that introducing weapons into space, rather than let it fall on their city. space will cause an arms race. I am not certain Warlike actions by aggressive states do what an arms race is—weapons programs and significant damage to stability and the the make-up of armed forces around the world conditions required to conduct business. But have always changed with the times. we must all agree—the right to self-defense is Countermeasures and offense/defense inviolable. Clearly, combat that reaches into competition have always been a part of the space could upset commerce and even destroy natural evolution in military capabilities. Yet it commercial satellites. But what is at stake may is asserted that a U.S. program to build ASATs be far larger than commerce—we could be will cause others to do the same, to compete, I talking about loss of freedom or the suppose, with the United States. prolongation of warfare. We must also ask States, of course, have many incentives to ourselves, in what other environment is start a weapons program, (not just reacting to commerce ever unaffected or commercial craft what Washington does). So we can’t ignore ever fully protected in wartime? unique national security requirements. I would So we need to talk less about trade-offs also observe that there is no evidence that between commercial space operations and unique capabilities residing in U.S. stealth national security space operations, and more in bombers and fighters, its aircraft carriers, terms of the dependent relationship that all advanced satellites, and superior land power commercial activity has with military power. forces have sparked in-kind arms racing, There are those who differ, and who although governments do seek ways to counter argue, for example, that space must remain U.S. superiority in less direct, unconventional

26 Putting Military Uses of Space in Context

ways. The rise of American aircraft carriers did obligations, and associated costs. This is the not spark hell-bent arms racing for carriers. normal process in the United States. We The appearance of U.S. stealth planes, and should allow ourselves the opportunity to specialized advanced satellites, did not turn the investigate these new military possibilities freely world upside down, with adversaries focused without arbitrarily restricting that investigation single-mindedly on matching the United States by casually adopting more familiar theoretical in these areas. assumptions about space warfare. Why do we presume that other states will Many observe that “America has the most not jump to space simply to counter the to lose in space.” But this is precisely why we operational advantages the United States should expect adversaries to strike there and currently enjoys there? History tells us that this why Washington should not foreclose its is what will happen. States will not need the options in space. If we’re serious about incentive of an American ASAT program to do addressing honest concerns, it’s very important so. we consider context (who, what, when, where, By way of summary, there is a strong case and why?), and recognize the complexity of the for considering possible uses of space to questions before us. enhance ballistic missile defense, and for In the end, all concerns about weapons in investigating more effective ways to accomplish space must be balanced against legitimate space control. And, in the end, of course, these defense imperatives in a world of proliferating questions must be considered in full view of weapon technologies and political-strategic national requirements for safety, international surprises.

27

SPACE WEAPONS: MORE SECURITY OR LESS?

by Theresa Hitchens Center for Defense Information

Under the administration of President There are some reasons to be concerned George W. Bush, the United States is that by expanding the battlefield to space, the reassessing its long-standing ambivalence United States could actually undermine, rather toward putting weapons in space. A review of than enhance, its own security as well as global U.S. space policy, the first since 1996, is being stability. Risks include the potential for starting launched by National Security Adviser a damaging and destabilizing space race; the Condoleezza Rice. With only a cursory read of potential for space weapons testing, let alone the Washington tea leaves, it is apparent that space warfare, to damage or destroy civilian this review more likely than not will result in a space research and commercial assets; and the reversal of direction: sending the U.S. military possibility that weaponizing space might harm into orbit in a way not seen since the dawn of the U.S. commercial space and the space age. telecommunications industry. On one hand, it is commendable that the administration is launching a space policy IS A SPACE RACE WINNABLE? review—especially in light of plans for missile defense that include near-term space-based The United States already enjoys an elements. For example, there is a goal overwhelming advantage in military uses of embedded in current budget plans that the space. Assets such as the Global Positioning Missile Defense Agency be able to make a System (GPS) satellite network have proven production decision about space-based kinetic invaluable in improving precision targeting, kill interceptors by 2006. On the other hand, thus giving the U.S. military a decisive there are indications that the review may not be battlefield edge. There could be an even more as far-reaching as it should be. According to formidable military advantage to possession of media reports, Rice’s key concerns are the weapons in space, particularly those aimed at growing worldwide access to commercial terrestrial or airborne targets: global power remote sensing and imagery and problems in projection and the enormous difficulty in U.S. space transportation (still too slow and defending against space weapons. expensive). “It is…possible to project power through However, the space policy question now and from space in response to events anywhere facing U.S. decisionmakers is a much more in the world. Having this capability would give fundamental one. Will moves to put weapons the United States a much stronger deterrent in space, for any reason, enhance U.S. and and, in a conflict, an extraordinary military global security or detract from it? It is not an advantage,” states the January 2001 report of easy question to answer. Indeed, the answer the Commission to Assess the United States may be different depending on what sorts of National Security Space Management and weapons are being considered: missile defenses, Organization—better known as the Space anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), or weapons Commission, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld aimed at targets in the air or on the ground. It before he was tapped by Bush as defense also may be different depending on whether secretary. one is looking at the next 10 years or the next Space weapons—especially those aimed at 25 years as a time horizon. terrestrial targets but also even those primarily It is thus imperative that any U.S. national designed for defense of U.S. satellites—would policy review consider the military, political and have inherent offensive and first-strike economic ramifications, both short- and long- capabilities. Thus, they would likely demand a term, of overturning the decades-long policy of military and political response from U.S. self-restraint on deployment of space-based competitors. weaponry.

28 Theresa Hitchens

China and Russia long have been worried The United States would not be able about possible U.S. breakout in space-based to maintain unchallenged hegemony weaponry. Both countries are key proponents in the weaponization of space, and of negotiations at the UN Conference on while a space-weapons race would Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space threaten international stability, it Treaty to ban all types of weapons. The effort would be even more dangerous to to start talks known as PAROS, for “prevention U.S. security and relative power of an arms race in outer space,” has been stalled projection capability, due to other due in large part to the objection of the United states’ significant ability and probably States. inclination to balance symmetrically It is almost inconceivable that either and asymmetrically against ascendant Russia or China would allow the United States U.S. power.2 to become the sole nation with space-based On the other hand, a space race cannot be weapons. “Once a nation embarks down the ruled out as a likely outcome—especially given road to gain a huge asymmetric advantage, the that many countries with much fewer economic natural tendency of others is to close that gap. and technical resources than the United States An arms race tends to develop an inertia of its are already going to space. A strategic-level own,” writes Dr. Bruce DeBlois, a former Air space race could have negative consequences Force officer now at the Council for Foreign for U.S. security in the long run that could Relations.1 outweigh any short-term advantage of being the Chinese moves to put weapons in space first with space-based weapons. In particular, it could trigger regional rival India to consider the would be costly in dollar terms to sustain orbital same; China and India both already are space- weapon systems and stay ahead of opponents faring powers. As always, any Indian move intent on matching U.S. space-weapon might spur Pakistan to strive for parity. Even capabilities. The price tag of space-weapon U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to systems and protective measures would not be meet U.S., Russian, or Chinese capabilities in trivial for anyone choosing to pursue them— some manner. with maintenance costs a key issue. On the one hand, one can argue about One problem is that space weapons, just whether a space race is likely or even all that like satellites, would have inherent serious a possibility, given that the costs of vulnerabilities (for example, fixed orbital paths), entry are very high and conventional space raising the specter of an ever-spiraling need for weapons are not likely to be nearly as better weapons and force protection. Just as it destructive as nuclear weapons. is difficult to protect satellites, it is difficult to Indeed, some experts argue that the more protect space weapons. For example, satellites likely path would be for U.S. competitors to or space weapons traveling in fixed paths in look for asymmetric challenges to U.S. space low-Earth orbit (LEO) are virtual sitting ducks dominance. After all, the easiest ways of for ground-based ASATs or even fighter disrupting space operations are to target ground aircraft equipped with rockets, not to mention facilities and communications links. space-based ASATs. Asymmetric challenges from those who could The other related negative side effect of not afford to be participants in a space race also the inherent vulnerability of orbiting weapons is would be costly in strategic, and possibly the pressure to use them first. The strategic economic, terms. dynamic of space-based weapons could perhaps Dr. Karl Mueller, a former Air Force be compared to that of nuclear intercontinental analyst now at RAND, writes:

2 Karl Mueller, “Space Weapons and U.S. Security: The Dangers of Fortifying the High Frontier,” paper prepared for the 1998 Annual Meeting of the 1 Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary: A American Political Science Association, Boston, Viable National Strategy,” Airpower Journal (Winter Mass. 1998).

29 Space Weapons: More Security or Less?

ballistic missiles— offense-dominant weapons large amounts of sand or gravel rocketing with inherent vulnerabilities (fixed sites). This through LEO.4 is a recipe for instability, as the United States Despite the U.S. Army’s program to and Soviet Union soon found in their nuclear develop a kinetic kill ASAT, army officials have competition. expressed concerns that using such weapons Spurring other nations to acquire space- could create debris clouds that could render based weapons, either ASATs or weapons useless the U.S. military’s own space assets in a aimed at terrestrial targets, would undercut the kind of “orbital own goal” (to use a soccer ability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the term) or “space fratricide” (to use a military ground on a global basis and thus negate what term). This concern has been echoed by top today is a unique advantage of being the world’s officials at U.S. Space Command. According to only military superpower.3 Along with military Saperstein, there are at least 24 U.S. military assets in space, U.S. commercial satellites would reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, and also become targets (especially because the U.S. meteorological satellites in LEO (below 1,000 military is heavily reliant on commercial miles or 1,667 kilometers) alone—the orbit in providers, particularly in communications). which satellites currently are the most In other words, the United States could be vulnerable to ground-based ASATs, precisely in the position of creating strategic and military because it is easiest to reach. This is also the problems for itself, rather than solving them. orbit where today’s commercial imagery satellites are parked, not only those in U.S. TESTING AND DEBRIS corporate hands but also the French and Russian systems—as well as the many satellites Another serious concern about moving used for scientific Earth observation, including weapons into orbit is the question of how the International Space Station.5 testing, let alone actual warfare, in space might In fact, the United States has been quite affect ongoing and future civil exploration concerned about limiting debris, including in its efforts and commercial satellites. The reason is missile defense testing program, and is one of orbital debris. the leading nations raising the issue on the There already is a good deal of debris in international stage. However, other countries orbit, primarily from satellites accidentally entering into a space weapons race might not exploding. Some 9,000 orbiting objects of a be so diligent. Increased space-based testing, certain size (including about 600 working especially of kinetic kill or explosive ASATs, satellites) are constantly tracked by U.S. Space could result in serious problems with space Command to avoid collisions. debris. Even tiny pieces of material orbiting in Finally, another potential problem for the space can cause destruction of a satellite or civilian space community would be the political numerous satellites, as such debris moves at fallout from U.S. moves to build and deploy very high speeds. According to a fact sheet put space weapons. A competition in military space together by Union of Concerned Scientists might have a dampening effect on international physicist Al Saperstein, “Impact with a small cooperation in space exploration, and that in pebble, traveling at average relative speed in turn could slow the advance of science. space, is equivalent to being hit with a 22 caliber long rifle bullet.” Indeed, Saperstein and other ECONOMIC RISKS scientists have suggested that one easily built space weapon, or missile defense Finally, there also is reason to be countermeasure, could be a bus that shoots concerned about the possibility that moves toward weaponizing space could damage the

3 Air Force Maj. William L. Spacy II, “Does the 4 Al Saperstein, “Space: What’s Up There? Why Is It United States Need Space-Based Weapons?” Important? What Threatens It?” Union of CADRE Paper, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Concerned Scientists, Fact Sheet (April 25, 2002). Force Base, Ala. (September 1999). 5 Ibid.

30 Theresa Hitchens competitiveness of the U.S. space industry, Galileo, in part due to fears that future access to which currently dominates the international GPS might be denied or downgraded by the marketplace and therefore bolsters U.S. U.S. military. economic and military power. The competitive and cost challenges the While commercial space was a booming U.S. satellite industry faces could be increased if business during most of 1990s, the market has the United States moved to make space a contracted over the past two years. Further, battlefield. Until now, the threat that there is excess capacity in the commercial space commercial satellites could become direct market place, with five major manufacturers wartime casualties has been negligible. But an (three U.S., two European). Notably, however, aggressive U.S. pursuit of ASATs would likely U.S. industry has not done as well as the overall encourage others to do the same, thus market over the past two years—and potentially heightening the threat to commercial industrialists partially blame government satellites. This could be costly for industry, regulatory requirements and export controls. especially because current commercial satellites The global marketplace is highly competitive, have little protection (electronic hardening, for and U.S. policy and regulations are a major example, has been considered too expensive). factor in determining U.S. industry There would be costs for increasing protection, competitiveness. not to mention the likely further skyrocketing U.S. industry officials also are of already sky-high insurance costs, and it is not uncomfortable about Pentagon plans to deny at all clear that the U.S. government would potential enemies access to (or even to shoot cover all those costs. down) U.S. commercial space assets, including In addition, there already are issues of those providing imagery and communications competition between Pentagon needs and services. Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Cosumano, Jr., industry needs. The most visible is in the area commander of the Army Space and Missile of access to spectrum and frequency Defense Command, admitted to reporters on allocations, but—if a number of new military July 15, 2001, at a conference sponsored by the satellites/weapons are to be launched—there U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense also could be issues regarding orbital slots. Command, in Huntsville, Ala., that “some of these assets belong to U.S. companies and they CONCLUSION don’t feel too good about the idea that we might shoot them out of the sky.”6 U.S. moves to weaponize space would The U.S. Defense Department already has come laden with a wide array of risks across the the legal right to exercise so-called shutter strategic, military, political, and economic control of U.S. civilian imagery satellites—that spectra. At the same time, space assets are is, the ability to shut down a satellite to prevent becoming more important to U.S. military enemies from accessing the data. Besides the operations and more vulnerable. Given these United States, France, Israel, and Russia are in issues, it would seem only prudent for the Bush the imagery satellite business. Obviously, U.S. administration to undertake a broad look at the industrialists could not be expected to cheer the costs vs. benefits of spaced-based weaponry, as idea that defense policy may be stimulating the well as alternatives for protecting space-based creation of stronger competitors for them. In assets, during the upcoming National Space addition, the European Union already is moving Policy review. to buy a European version of GPS, called

6 Author’s own notes from the conference.

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MILITARY SPACE COOPERATION: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES

by Peter L. Hays Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University

Military space cooperation, like many Space Hawks space issues, is a complex and contentious issue Adherents to this camp believe that space area. This essay presents a skeptical view about already is or holds the potential to become the the prospects for many or broad-ranging dominant source of military power. cooperative military space efforts by examining Accordingly, they believe that the United States the following subjects: space weaponization; should move quickly and directly to develop recent space arms control; control of high- and deploy space weapons in order to control resolution commercial satellite imagery, global and project power from this dominant theater utilities, and spectrum crowding; orbital debris; of combat operations. According to and space traffic control. Analyzing Republican Senator Bob Smith of New opportunities and challenges in military space Hampshire, for example, concerted cooperation may help to illuminate several of development of space weapons by the United the most likely paths forward for future space States “will buy generations of security that all activity and highlight the security implications the ships, tanks, and airplanes in the world will of these developments. not provide.... Without it, we will become vulnerable beyond our worst fears.”2 In SPACE WEAPONIZATION addition, space hawks often point to space- based ballistic missile defense (BMD) as a At a fundamental level, virtually all issues potentially decisive weapon capable of of space strategy and military space cooperation fundamentally reordering the strategic balance. are shaped by the spectrum of views on the Space hawks tend to oppose virtually all space- utility of weaponizing space. Major questions related arms control and are lukewarm at best include: whether space will be weaponized, how on military space cooperation because of the and when that might happen, which states and potential of these activities to slow or derail other actors might be most interested in leading rapid and direct space weaponization. or opposing weaponization, and how any of these space weaponization issues might best be managed. At the political level, there is, of Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air course, a broad spectrum of opinion on these Force’s Vision for Space,” Aerospace Power Journal 15 (Spring 2001), pp. 34-49. The growing importance issues but most of the major tenets in of commercial space activity adds a new dimension mainstream views on weaponizing space can to this analysis that few of the traditional approaches usefully be grouped into four major camps: seem well prepared to incorporate or even address. space hawks, inevitable weaponizers, For a groundbreaking analysis that advocates using militarization realists, and space doves.1 economic criteria to separate traditional military space functions from more regulatory functions that would be performed by a new U.S. Space Guard 1 The four camps are presented from a U.S. national (modeled after the Coast Guard), see Lt Col Cynthia security perspective. There are many strands of A. S. McKinley, “The Guardians of Space: thought within any of these camps. The four camps Organizing America’s Space Assets for the Twenty- are similar to the four space doctrines discussed in First Century,” Aerospace Power Journal 14, no. 1 Lt. Col. David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Space (Spring 2000), pp. 37–45. Power Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University 2 Sen. Bob Smith, “The Challenge of Space Power,” Press, June 1988) and have been derived from the Airpower Journal 13 (Spring 1999), p. 33. Prominent schools of thought about space weaponization space hawk groups include High Frontier, the discussed in Lt. Col. Peter Hays and Dr. Karl Heritage Foundation, and the Center for Security Mueller, “Going Boldly—Where? Aerospace Policy.

32 Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

Inevitable Weaponizers feasible and we should plan for the eventuality. This group believes that space, like all Fighting in space shows little promise, while other environments man has encountered, will fighting from space looks impractical for the eventually be weaponized. They differ from foreseeable future, with or without treaties.”4 space hawks in two important ways: they are Militarization realists support space-related not convinced that space weaponization would arms control and cooperation that precludes be beneficial for U.S. or global security, and other states from weaponizing or even they are unsure that space will prove to be the militarizing space. Most of them believe, decisive theater of combat operations. The however, that this support must be balanced January 2001 Space Commission Report is a against the increased attention that formalized good example of this camp: “We know from arms control efforts could draw to America’s history that every medium—air, land and sea— already formidable space-enabled force has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space enhancement capabilities and the political, will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, military, and arms control fallout this increased the United States must develop the means both scrutiny might cause. Informal cooperation to deter and to defend against hostile acts in might be one of the best ways to circumvent and from space.”3 Inevitable weaponizers take this potential difficulty. a nuanced view of space arms control and cooperation. They generally support Space Doves confidence- and security-building measures Finally, a wide range of organizations and (CSBMs) and other cooperative mechanisms viewpoints can be grouped together in the designed to slow military competition and space dove camp because they all oppose space channel it in predictable ways. But they are less weaponization for a variety of reasons, supportive of broad efforts to ban space including moral, arms control, conflict weapons because they see them as futile or even resolution, stability, and ideology arguments. dangerous due to their potential to lull the Most space doves also oppose any militarization United States into complacency or otherwise of space beyond the limited missions they see as cause it to be outmaneuvered by states that stabilizing—national technical means (NTM) of successfully circumvent space weaponization arms control verification, early warning, and accords. hotline communications—because they see any military missions beyond these as the “slippery Militarization Realists slope” to space weaponization. Most space Members of this camp oppose space doves emphasize how destabilizing most space weaponization because they believe U.S. militarization and all space weaponization security interests are best served by the status would be. “Unlike the strategy for nuclear quo in space. They believe that the United weapons, there exists no obvious strategy for States has little to gain but much to lose by employing space weapons that will enhance weaponizing space because it is both the leading global stability. If the precedent of evading user of space and, enabled by this space use, the destabilizing situations is to continue—and that dominant terrestrial military power. is compatible with a long history of U.S. foreign Militarization realists also believe that if the policy—one ought to avoid space-based United States takes the lead in weaponizing space, it would become easier for other states to follow due to lower political and technological barriers. For these reasons, militarization 4 Maj. William L. Spacy II, USAF, “Does the United realists believe that “fighting into space looks States Need Space-Based Weapons?” Cadre Paper 4 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, September 1999), p. 109. See also Maj. David W. Zeigler, “Safe 3 Report of the Commission to Assess United States Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary,” in National Security Space Management and Organization, Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, ed., Beyond the Paths of Heaven: (Washington, D.C., January 11, 2001), p. x. Most The Emergence of Space Power Thought (Maxwell AFB, U.S. space policy, military space doctrine, and Ala.: Air University Press, September 1999), pp. military officers probably fall into this camp. 185–245.

33 Peter L. Hays weapons.”5 They also highlight the deep roots enough incentives and assemble coalitions of President Eisenhower’s “space for peaceful capable of pushing forward any camp’s purposes” policy and argue that, especially in preferred vision for space competition or the post-Cold War era, there is no rationale for cooperation. Given this environment, it seems space weaponization that is strong enough to unlikely that the United States can or will overturn the basic strategic logic America provide strong or consistent leadership for developed at the opening of the space age. military space cooperation. It is more likely that Space doves support space arms control and the United States would move forward in cooperation more strongly than any other response to external space arms control camp. Since they do not believe the United initiatives or trigger events related to the States (or other states) would reap strategic weaponization of space.8 benefits from weaponizing space, they are not On the technical side of the equation, overly concerned about the numerous arms space arms control and formalized cooperation control challenges identified by the other designed to control the weaponization of space camps. Moreover, like Paul Stares, most space face all of the problems that plagued previous doves would not support using two-track attempts to develop these control mechanisms. approaches to space arms control.6 The most serious of these problems include: These ingrained but fundamentally disagreements over the proper scope and object divergent perspectives on space weaponization, of negotiations; basic definitional issues about space’s strategic utility, and the role for space what a space system is and how it might be arms control are likely to make it quite difficult categorized as offensive or defensive, stabilizing to craft cooperative approaches or even to or destabilizing; and questions concerning how establish a dialogue concerning the any agreement might be adequately verified. interrelationships between space and security. These problems relate to a number of very It is difficult to see a clear cooperative path thorny specific issues such as: whether the forward for the United States or global space negotiations should be bilateral or multilateral, community. The Realist lens in global politics formal or informal; what satellites and other and Graham Allison’s rational actor (Model I) systems should be covered; whether the object lens in domestic politics portend a rocky path should be control of space weapons or CSBMs forward.7 Likewise, it is also difficult to see for space; which types of CSBMs, such as rules clear lines of military space cooperation through of the road or keep out zones, for example, regimes or epistemic communities or by might be most useful and how these might be applying Allison’s Models II and III to the reconciled with existing space law such as the multiplicity of organizations and individuals Outer Space Treaty (OST); and verification that contribute to the pulling and hauling of problems, such as how to address residual anti- governmental decision making within a pluralist satellite (ASAT) capabilities or deal with the democracy such as the United States. Clearly, it significant military potential of even a small would be a formidable challenge to provide number of covert ASAT systems. New space system technologies, the

5 growth of the commercial space sector, and Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary: A new verification and transparency technologies Viable National Strategy,” Airpower Journal 12 (Winter 1998), pp. 41–57. This article is one of the interact with these existing problems in most comprehensive and persuasive expositions of complex ways. Some of the changes would the space dove camp. seem to favor arms control and cooperation, 6 Paul B. Stares, The Weaponization of Space, U.S. Policy such as better radars and optical systems for 1945-1984 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 7 Model I (rational actor), Model II (organizational process), and Model III (bureaucratic politics) are 8 See, in particular, the outstanding analysis of commonly used lenses for examining governmental trigger events for space weaponization in Barry D. decision making that were developed by Graham T. Watts, The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Allison in Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, and Budgetary Assessments, February 2001), pp. 97– 1971). 106.

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Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges improved space situation awareness and START I build on previous arms control verification, technologies for better space treaties. For example, START I repeats the system diagnostics, and the stabilizing potential NTM provisions first contained in the Anti- of microsatellite-based distributed and robust Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) but also relies space architectures. Many other trends, on extensive on-site verification (OSI) however, would seem to make space arms verification protocols to assure compliance.10 control and cooperation even more difficult. In addition, START I strengthens the OST For example, stealthy microsatellites might be prohibition on the placement of weapons of used as virtually undetectable active ASATs or mass destruction in outer space. Article V, passive space mines; the proliferation of space Paragraph 18 of the Treaty prohibits each party technology has radically increased the number from producing, testing, or deploying systems, of significant space actors, and these ranks now including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons include a number of important nonstate actors; or any other kinds of weapons of mass and growth in the commercial space sector destruction into earth orbit or a fraction of an raises issues such as how quasi-military systems earth orbit.11 This is an important provision should be protected or negated and the unclear designed to ban fractional orbital bombardment security implications of emerging markets for systems such as the one successfully tested by dual-use systems. Cumulatively, just as with the the Soviet Union from 1965 to 1971.12 political factors that animate the four space START I has many new implications for camps discussed above, it is hard to see many military space operations as well. There are technical factors that would clearly advance several restrictions on the use of space arms control and cooperation designed to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or control space weaponization. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as space-launch boosters. For example, the RECENT SPACE-RELATED ARMS treaty places restrictions on the number, type, CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS and location of ICBMs and SLBMs used to boost objects into the upper atmosphere or With the end of the Cold War, many space, and limits the number and location of formal arms control efforts have been de- space-launch facilities used to support such emphasized, and most space-related arms launches.13 Objects launched by ICBMs or control efforts are no exception. There have been, nonetheless, some very important but and analysis on START I and II below is drawn perhaps under appreciated space-related directly from Lt. Col. Thomas W. Billick, “Arms provisions in recent treaties and agreements. Control Implications for Military Operations in Moreover, the recent growth in commercial Space,” Research Report for USAF Institute for space activity undoubtedly creates an National Security Studies, USAF Academy, CO opportunity if not a need for expanded (May 2001), pp. 24–30. regulation and control in this area. 10 See “Article-by-Article Analysis of Treaty Text,” available on-line from the State Department website START I and II at: . 11 Ibid. Treaty I is a bilateral treaty between the United 12 Stares, Militarization of Space, pp. 99-100. States and Soviet Union designed to reduce the 13 START I, Paragraph 4 of Article IV provides number of deployed strategic offensive arms limits on ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering (warheads and delivery vehicles) maintained by objects into the upper atmosphere or space. The each.9 Several of the broad provisions in parties recognized that such use of ICBMs and SLBMs is valid and economical, but they also recognized that such use must be limited because 9 Treaty between the United States of America and such missiles could also be used for their original the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the purpose of weapons delivery. In order to limit the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive potential for breakout, paragraph 4 limits each Party Arms (START I), signed July 31, 1991, entered into to no more than five space launch facilities, which force December 5, 1994. Most of the discussion are defined as specified facilities from which objects

35 Peter L. Hays

SLBMs into the upper atmosphere or space are application initiatives. For example, if the also subject to the treaty’s telemetry planned space operations vehicle was designed requirements. In a major departure from past with a conventional strike capability, it might be practice, the treaty requires the party held accountable under START I limitations on conducting any peacetime launch of an ICBM heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or SLBM to make onboard technical armaments other than long-range nuclear air- measurements, broadcast all telemetric launched cruise missiles. No exhibition would information obtained from such measurements be required, but the vehicle’s distinguishing in a way that allows full access to the features would be listed in the START information, and then provide a recording and memorandum of understanding. In addition, analysis of that data to the other party. For the facility where the vehicle is based would objects delivered by ICBMs or SLBMs into the have to be declared as a heavy bomber base but upper atmosphere or space, the telemetry would not be subject to inspection unless it provisions only apply until the object(s) being contained a weapons storage area. A delivered either are in orbit or have achieved determination of treaty applicability, if any, escape velocity.14 Furthermore, advance launch would be subject to discussion between the notification must be made to the other treaty parties.16 party whenever an ICBM or SLBM is used as a Restrictions contained in the 1993 booster for delivering objects into the upper Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) atmosphere or space. Such notification is between the United States and Russia have now provided in accordance with the provisions of been bypassed, due to the U.S. withdrawal from START I and the Ballistic Missile Launch the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002 Notification Agreement.15 START I might also and the subsequent Russian declaration that it affect ongoing space control and force would no longer abide by START II. Finally, in addition to the notifications required by the START Treaties and the are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs. Paragraph 4 also provides that these facilities may not overlap ICBM bases; 16 START I article by article legal analysis makes limits each Party to a total of no more than 20 specific reference to the national aerospace plane in ICBM or SLBM launchers at those facilities, of describing the treaty definition of airplane and the which no more than ten may be silo and mobile treaty prohibition against flight-testing, equipping, launchers, unless otherwise agreed; and limits the and deploying nuclear armaments on an airplane that number of ICBMs or SLBMs at a given space launch was not initially constructed as a bomber but has a facility to no more than the number of launchers at range of 8,000 km (kilometers) or more or an that facility. Space launch facilities are not subject to integrated planform area over 310 square meters. inspection. The number of space launch facilities However, the parties did not reach agreement on the and the number of launchers at those facilities may applicability of the treaty to future non-nuclear be increased or decreased if the parties agree. Such systems. During the negotiations, the United States changes would not require an amendment to the stated its view that a future non-nuclear system Treaty. could not be considered a new kind of strategic 14 START I, Article X, and the Telemetry Protocol. offensive arm and, thus, would not be subject to the During the Cold War, the United States invested treaty. The Soviet Union did not accept this view. billions of dollars in intelligence-gathering The parties agreed, in the Second Agreed Statement, equipment designed primarily to obtain telemetry that, if “new kinds” of arms emerge in the future data on Soviet ballistic missiles. Gathering and and if the parties disagree about whether they are analyzing this information was among the most strategic offensive arms, then such arms would be difficult intelligence challenges of the Cold War. subject to discussion in the Joint Compliance and 15 Agreement between the United States of America Inspection Commission. Of course, if one party and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on deploys a new kind of arm that it asserts is not Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental subject to the treaty, and the other party challenges Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic this assertion, the deploying party would be Missiles (Ballistic Missile Launch Notification obligated to attempt to resolve the issue. There is, Agreement), signed and entered into force on May however, no obligation to delay deployment pending 31, 1988, in Moscow. such resolution.

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Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

Ballistic Missile Launch Notification enhance stability by limiting flexibility and Agreement, the United States and Russia have clandestine operations. The operation of these signed two new agreements expanding launch agreements should be studied carefully to assess notifications to include all space launch prospects for creating a truly shared early vehicles. On June 4, 2000, President William J. warning system as well as the applicability and Clinton and Russian President Putin signed a utility of providing this data among more states. memorandum of agreement to establish a joint The wide spectrum of opinion on the utility of data exchange center (JDEC) in Moscow to these latest agreements is another excellent share early warning information on missile and illustration of how fundamental disagreements space launches.17 Once the JDEC is completed on military space strategy can color all and commences operations, the two countries subsequent analysis.19 are supposed to exchange information obtained from their respective ground- and space-based CONTROL OF HIGH-RESOLUTION early warning systems on U.S. and Russian COMMERCIAL IMAGERY space launches (with rare exceptions) including time of launch, generic missile class, geographic The strategic, conceptual, and pragmatic area of the launch, and launch azimuth. difficulties associated with controlling high- Eventually this exchange of data will also resolution commercial space imagery is an include data sharing on detected space launches excellent illustration of other challenges to of other states. On December 16, 2000, U.S. military space cooperation. A number of Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright and complex interdependencies have and will Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov signed a continue to shape the global high-resolution memorandum of understanding establishing a commercial remote sensing market. The Pre- and Post-Launch Notification System United States should carefully and continuously (PLNS) for launches of ballistic missiles and, re-evaluate whether the benefits that with rare exceptions, space launch vehicles, Presidential Decision Directive 23 (PDD-23) is identifying launch window, time of launch, designed to create—such as greater generic missile class, geographic area of the transparency and market preeminence—do, in launch, and launch azimuth.18 The PLNS practice, actually outweigh the costs, including Information Center will be an Internet-based the possible use of this data for nefarious ends. system operated as part of the JDEC. Both Regulatory mechanisms, such as shutter control agreements provide for the voluntary that the United States has put in place, appear notification of satellites forced from orbit and to provide an equitable balance between certain space experiments that could adversely economic considerations and national security affect the operation of early warning radars, and concerns. These mechanisms should also be both agreements leave open the possibility of self-regulating to a large degree. If the United negotiations on future data sharing on missiles States overuses shutter control, it may drive that intercept objects not located on earth’s potential customers to foreign imagery surface. The JDEC and PLNS are among the providers; but such a control is required before most detailed and comprehensive space-related the United States should create incentives for CSBM ever negotiated. They are designed to its high-resolution commercial remote sensing

17 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on the Establishment of a Joint Center for the Exchange of 19 On the spectrum of opinion concerning the JDEC Data from Early Warning Systems and Notifications and PLNS see, for example, John Steinbruner, of Missile Launches (JDEC MOA), signed in “Sharing Missile Launch Data,” Pugwash, available Moscow and entered into force on June 4, 2000; on-line at http://www.pugwash.org/publication/nl/ available on-line at: . Security Alert,” Center for Security Policy, 18 Memorandum of Understanding on Notifications December 8, 2000, available on-line from the Center of Missile Launches (PLNS MOU), signed for Security Policy’s website at http://www. December 16, 2000. security-policy.org/papers/2000/00-A44.html.

37 Peter L. Hays

industry to dominate the global market. The shutter control” agreement opens many United States should also study the applicability interesting issues related to the utility of limiting of this regulatory model for other states that information dissemination for public operate high-resolution imagery satellites, as diplomacy, the media, and exploitation of well as the way the United States might create enemy information channels. It also raises the incentives for these states to adopt similar issue of whether this agreement using market internal controls over dissemination of satellite mechanisms has set a precedent that might well imagery. Thus far, the United States has make it more difficult to invoke formal shutter attempted to shape the world market via mostly control without buying up all the imagery in the economic benefits, rather than security future. considerations. It should rebalance that equation toward national security, perhaps by High-Resolution Commercial Imagery and formal arms control restrictions on high- Deception resolution commercial remote sensing, if the Digital imagery may create novel challenges benefits do not outweigh the costs. If it for transparency and cooperation efforts becomes prudent to move in this direction, because digitized data streams designed to there are a number of unilateral and multilateral produce imagery are ideally suited for regulation and control options that the United deception. This is because digitized data must States could pursue.20 always be mathematically processed to create In the latest developments in this area, images, and this processing is subject to during the early stages of Operation Enduring manipulation in a variety of ways—many of Freedom in Afghanistan, the National Imagery which are not available for manipulating film and Mapping Agency (NIMA) established de images. As Steven Livingston explains: facto shutter control by signing an “agreement of Mathematically altering the value of assured access” with the Space Imaging the pixels alters seamlessly the Corporation, reportedly for $1.9 million per representation. “Since it is purely a month. Under the terms of this renewed mathematically process, the source agreement, Space Imaging was not to sell or images can be altered fundamentally share its Afghanistan theater imagery with and undetectably before and/or anyone except the U.S. government (USG) until during their production.” Elements after January 5, 2002.21 This “checkbook can be added or subtracted, changed in color, brightness, or contrast. 20 On June 9, 1999, the Canadian Ministries of Changes are made not by altering the Foreign Affairs and Defense announced that they computer code that produces the had formed an interdepartmental team of experts image, and not in the image itself as who are charged with developing new “access in analog manipulation. In fact, it is control” legislation to control Canadian commercial more accurate perhaps to say that no remote sensing satellites. The principles guiding the image exists beyond the mathematical interdepartmental team are very similar to PDD-23, equations that create a particular array and the process of drafting and implementing the of pixels. The equations are the policy is expected to take up to two years. The image. Therefore as computer News Release and a Backgrounder are available on- line at: . 21 Kerry Gildea, “NIMA Extends Deal with Space Imaging for Exclusive Imagery Over Afghanistan,” Afghanistan,” Space Newsfeed, 28 (October 2001), Defense Daily, November 7, 2001, p. 2; “Eye Spy,” available at: . These decisions have Hess, “DOD Won’t Release Pix Until 5 Jan,” left Cypress-based ImageSat International as the Washington Times, November 7, 2001. In addition, only company able to provide one-meter commercial the French Ministry of Defense barred SPOT Image imagery of Afghanistan and the surrounding region. from selling or distributing images of Afghanistan Barbara Opall-Rome, “U.S. Data Purchase Opens and the surrounding regions to anyone except that Doors for ImageSat,” Space News, October 22, 2001, ministry. “Shutter Control for SPOT Over p. 6.

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Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

powerful, so too does the ability to requirement as a way to attempt to confirm the alter digital information.22 veracity of digitized imagery. The phrase “altered fundamentally and undetectably” is absolutely loaded with Global Utilities implications. For starters, it means that Because of all the growth in space systems virtually anything can be added, subtracted, or and the services they provide, some analysts changed in digital imagery (or to any digital believe they create novel avenues for information) and that even experts cannot cooperation and should now be considered in a necessarily detect these changes. The new way as the global utilities that enable the possibilities for deception through manipulating global information infrastructure. In some digital imagery are literally unlimited. Perhaps ways, the concept of global utilities is just even more alarmingly, all of this can happen in another recognition of how much the real time as the data stream is converted into commercial space sector has grown and how manipulated imagery. It is no wonder that the important it has become; but it is also clear that digital age creates a number of legal the global information infrastructure, as it conundrums and that the veracity of digitized currently exists, simply could not function information is increasingly being questioned in without space systems and the services they courtrooms.23 The requirement for imagery provide. providers to use only USG-approved Global utilities have been defined as: encryption devices that allow USG access “Civil, military, or commercial systems—some during periods of shutter control, especially or all of which are based in space—that provide when coupled with the potential to use digital communication, environmental, position, data for deception, certainly presents some image, location, timing, or other vital technical interesting possibilities for control and services or data to global users.”25 To date, all exploitation by leaving systems operating rather space-based global utilities provide information than shutting them off. At the very least, as No services, but they are analogous to earth-bound More Secrets summarizes, “Commercially utility services that provide a foundation for available high-resolution satellite imagery will modern life such as water and electricity. And trigger the development of more robust denial like these earth-bound utility services, space- and deception and antisatellite based global utilities may be subject to countermeasures.”24 Given this potential for regulation and control at the local, state, deception, governments and the news media national, and international levels. Two should adopt a “dual phenomenology” relatively minor recent failures illustrate just how embedded global utilities have become in the global information infrastructure. In 1996, a controller at the Air Force Global Positioning 22 Steven Livingston, “Transparency or Opacity? System (GPS) control center accidentally put Information Technology and Deception the wrong time into just one of the 24 satellites, Operations,” paper presented at the International and this erroneous signal was broadcast for just Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, six seconds before automatic systems turned February 21-24, 2001. Livingston’s quote is from the signal off. That momentary error caused Don E. Tomlinson, Computer Manipulation and Creation of Images and Sounds: Assessing the Impact more than 100 of the 800 cellular telephone (Washington, D.C.: The Annenberg Washington networks on the U.S. East Coast to shut down, Program, 1993). See also Ivan Amato, “Lying with Pixels,” Technology Review (July/August 2000). 23 Kimberly Amaral, “The Digital Imaging 25 Lt. Gen. Bruce Carlson, USAF, “Protecting Revolution: Legal Implications and Possible Global Utilities: Safeguarding the Next Millennium’s Solutions,” on-line, Internet, available from Space-Based Public Services,” Aerospace Power Journal http://www.umassd.edu/Public/People/KAmaral/ 14 (Summer 2000), p. 37. For a more detailed Thesis/digitalimaging.html. discussion, see Scott Pace et al., The Global Positioning 24 Yahya Dehqanzada and Ann Florini, eds., No More System: Assessing National Policies (Washington, D.C.: Secrets, conference proceedings from May 26, 1999, RAND Critical Technologies Institute, 1995), pp. Carnegie Endowment, p. viii. 184–89.

39 Peter L. Hays and some took hours or even days to recover.26 global information infrastructure. In May 1998, “40–45 million pager subscribers Unfortunately, no clear or easy answers stand lost service; some ATM and credit card out, and there is a wide range of views on the machines could not process transactions; news best path forward. Despite the many threats bureaus could not transmit information; and detailed above, to date there has been almost many areas lost television service—all because “no demand from the operators of commercial of the loss of one satellite.”27 Clearly, space communications satellites for defense of their systems have become an increasingly important multibillion dollar assets.”28 The current lack of part of the global information infrastructure, support from industry for protection of global but questions remain about how they should be utilities is particularly disappointing to United regulated and protected. States Space Command (USSPACECOM) How global utilities should be controlled because during the late 1990s, they had and regulated is a complex issue that depends attempted to advance the argument that such on a number of factors, such as the specific protection was needed and would be demanded systems in question, the services they provide, as space commercialization grew.29 Some and the primary users. Communication analysts believe that a multilateral approach to satellites are already subject to significant protection for global utilities would be best and control and regulation at the international level argue that this function should be performed by through the International Telecommunications an international organization such as the UN. Union (ITU) and, in the United States, through This approach would likely, however, be filled the Federal Communications Commission with all the political, economic, and technical (FCC). This high level of regulation for difficulties that have plagued almost all communication satellites is justified both international space efforts. The rocky path of because of the threat of harmful interference in the International Space Station certainly does the radio spectrum and due to the lucrative not inspire confidence in this approach to nature of these services. Other areas within the providing protection for global utilities. At the commercial space sector that have yet to opposite end of the spectrum are those who demonstrate much profitability, such as high- advocate that the U.S. military, and the Air resolution remote sensing, are also subject to Force in particular, should take on the global regulation and control, but it is generally at a utility protection mission regardless of lower level. The United States provides other international opposition or a lack of support global utility services, such as meteorological from industry. On top of the political data and GPS timing signals, free to all users opposition to this approach, creating a viable worldwide as a public good. Given the current defense for global utilities also faces daunting range of existing regulation and control for economic and especially technical challenges global utility services, it is not clear what such as those presented by a high-altitude cooperative, national security, or economic nuclear detonation. Based on the technologies objectives would be served by attempting to currently being examined, only a robust space- regulate these services in the same or even based system would stand much chance of similar ways. providing an effective defense against the most In addition, the United States and the rest threatening attacks on global utilities.30 of the global space community should consider how global utilities might best be protected and 28 John M. Logsdon, “Just Say Wait to Space fostered as an enabling technology within the Power,” Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 2001), n. p.; on-line, Internet, 24 April 2001, available at: . modern “digital compression” telecommunication 29 USSPACECOM perhaps made this “Flag Follows protocols such as time division multiple access or Trade” argument most strongly in Long Range Plan: code division multiple access require highly accurate Implementing USSPACECOM Vision for 2020 timing signals to operate. (Peterson AFB, Colo.: US Space Command, 27 Ibid., p. 37. The PanAmSat Corporation’s Galaxy Director of Plans, March 1998). 4 satellite failed on May 19, 1998. 30 Carlson, “Protecting Global Utilities,” p. 41.

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Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges

Moving the ITU to auctions for its Spectrum Crowding, Orbital Debris, and coordination/registration process would Space Traffic Control undoubtedly produce greater efficiency and The final military space cooperation areas generate income, but these benefits would need to be examined relate to the cumulative effects to be weighed against the equal access concerns of greater use of space. Current and projected of the developing world and the fact that there use of space is creating challenges particularly in currently seems to be little support for moving the areas of crowding of the radio spectrum for in this direction. space, orbital debris, and the possible need for Cooperative approaches to mitigating space traffic control. Recent growth in orbital debris may represent the single, most commercial space activity has exacerbated potentially useful window of opportunity for crowding of the radio spectrum for space space arms control and regulation for the applications, and there are currently significant United States and the global space-faring pressures on portions of the spectrum now community.32 The National Aeronautics and allocated to military uses. In particular, today Space Administration (NASA) defines “orbital there is significant pressure to move the U.S. debris” as “any man-made object in orbit about Department of Defense (DOD) out of the 1755 the Earth which no longer serves a useful to 1850 megahertz (MHz) radio frequency band purpose.”33 Human space activity has in order to auction it off for third-generation generated a lot of debris: there are over 9,000 communications applications. It is not clear, objects larger than 10 centimeters (cm) and an however, that cooperation, U.S. national estimated 100,000-plus objects between one security, or even economic interests would and 10 cm in size.34 The largest single source of benefit from moving DOD out of this band. this debris has been intentional and As the General Accounting Office (GAO) unintentional satellite explosions on orbit.35 report on this issue makes clear, more study is required.31 In particular, the issue must be carefully reconsidered in light of the global war 32 Planetary defense or the effort to track and on terrorism and the radically reduced eventually defend against potentially life threatening bandwidth requirements that will undoubtedly near-Earth objects that might impact earth is accompany the economic downturn toward another high-profile window for cooperation on a which the global economy may be moving. space-related issue, but it does not appear to be a traditional control or regulation effort and is not More generally, the increasing pressure on the discussed in this paper. For more information about radio spectrum due to more commercial use of planetary defense, see, for example, “Preparing for space has been somewhat balanced by the use Planetary Defense: Detection and Interception of of new technologies and different orbits that Asteroids on Collision Course with Earth,” lessen the effects of increased use. For SPACECAST 2020, appendix R, available at: example, modern satellites in geostationary ; Air Force 2025 Research Paper, “Planetary between them (versus three or more degrees in Defense: Catastrophic Health Insurance for Planet the past) for most systems providing fixed Earth,” available on-line from the website of the Air satellite services. Likewise, increasing use of University at Maxwell Air Force Base at: ; and Brig. Gen. S. Pete Worden, satellite networks has decreased the pressure on “NEOs, Planetary Defense and Government: A overcrowding the GSO in terms of spectrum View from the Pentagon,” available on-line at: and spacing. In sum, then, current trends for . changes in the current regulatory structure. 33 “Frequently Asked Questions about Orbital Debris,” NASA-Johnson Space Center, Space Science Branch, on-line, Internet, available at: 31 “Defense Spectrum Management: More Analysis . Needed to Support Spectrum Use Decisions for the 34 Ibid. 1755–1850 MHz Band” (Washington, D.C.: General 35 The European Space Agency (ESA) estimates that Accounting Office, August 2001). 44 percent of the catalogued orbit population (larger

41 Peter L. Hays

Orbital debris generally moves at very high overall space policy.38 There is, however, speeds relative to operational satellites and undoubtedly more the United States could do thereby poses a risk to these systems due to its on the orbital debris front. The United States enormous kinetic energy.36 Only three should explore several options such as collisions between operational systems and unilaterally pledging not to create space debris orbital debris are known to have occurred thus through testing or operations of any ASAT far, but concerns about this hazard are growing system, creating strict unilateral regulations that due to the increasing number of operational mandate debris mitigation for U.S. commercial space systems and the five percent growth rate space operators (perhaps as a part of a in low-Earth orbit (LEO) orbital debris each “spaceworthiness license” required before year.37 There is even concern about the commercial space systems can bid in spectrum potential for orbital debris “chain reactions” auctions, apply for export licenses, or compete due to collisions in big-LEO communication for government business), multilateral efforts to satellite constellations or due to the debris “clean up” debris using lasers and other clouds that could be created by use of kinetic techniques, and creating strict multilateral energy ASATs in LEO. regulations for debris mitigation. These and Since the 1980s, the United States has led other creative approaches should be explored the world in publicizing the risks due to orbital vigorously in order to ensure that man’s debris, and it has made programs to mitigate increasing use of space does not impose debris an increasingly important part of its unacceptable risks on this activity. Finally, due again to the increasing use of space, the United States and global space community must carefully consider the need for and implications of space traffic control than 10 cm) originated from the 129 on-orbit systems (STCS) that could be analogous to fragmentations recorded since 1961. See European current air traffic control systems. The idea for Space Agency, “Introduction to Space Debris,” such a system is obviously related to the orbital available at: ; and the Aerospace Corporation’s beyond just this problem to include a wide “What is Orbital Debris?” website available from range of factors such as: how space traffic . Un- might coordinate and be approved for specific til fairly recently, several space-faring states (Russia in particular) routinely blew up their satellites at the orbital positions, how space traffic would be end of their useful life. Inadvertent mixing of located and tracked, sanctions and liability for propellant and oxidizer and over pressurization of noncompliance and collisions under an STCS, residual fuel or batteries are the most common and how such a regime might be established causes of unintentional explosions. and funded. As with many space-related issues, 36 In LEO (less than 2,000 km altitude) the average the technology to at least begin implementing relative velocity at impact is 10 km per second. At such a system appears to be closer at hand than this speed: “An aluminum sphere 1.3 mm in is the political will to begin down this path. For diameter has damage potential similar to that of a example, the Ballistic Missile Defense .22-caliber long rifle bullet. An aluminum sphere 1 Organization’s Midcourse Space Experiment cm in diameter is comparable to a 400 lb safe traveling at 60 mph. A fragment 10 cm long is (MSX) satellite launched in April 1996 is the roughly comparable to 25 sticks of dynamite.” See “What are the Risks of Orbital Debris?” available at: 38 Historic Space Policy documents are available . from the Air War College’s Space Operations & 37 The Aerospace Corporation, “What is the Future Resources Gateway at: . The first emphasis on . The orbital debris in National Space Policy came in space shuttle must infrequently (every year or two) President Reagan’s February 11, 1988 National maneuver away from known orbital debris. Critical Space Policy and by the Clinton administration’s components on the International Space Station have September 19, 1996 National Space Policy, been designed to withstand the impact of debris up mitigation of orbital debris was a major intersector to 1 cm in diameter. guideline.

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Military Space Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges only operational space-based surveillance which would likely be borne by the United instrument. It has found some “150 objects in States) would be outweighed by its benefits. the last three years that were completely lost” Most of the benefits would seem to be in the and demonstrated the potential value of space- commercial and civilian space sectors, while the based sensors to an STCS.39 Likewise, GPS potential drawbacks might be most severe for positioning signals could be used to locate the military and intelligence sectors. The many space systems very accurately, and a United States most likely would not, for transponder-like system aboard space systems example, want the ephemeris on its military and could provide this data automatically in intelligence-gathering satellites to be response to queries from the STCS.40 On the preapproved and available worldwide through political side of the equation, however, the an STCS. At the very least, since an STCS United States must consider very carefully how could be such a powerful tool for denial, its objectives in space might benefit or be deception, and even targeting, the United States harmed via the creation and operation of an and other members of the global space-faring STCS. It is not obvious that an air traffic community must think through very carefully control model is the appropriate regime for exactly what type of control regime would be space, or that the political and financial costs of most appropriate for space and how such a creating and operating such a system (many of regime would operate in practice.

39 Leonard David, “Eye in the Sky to Track Space Junk,” Space.com, November 7, 2000, available at: . 40 For a detailed discussion of STCS (especially the technical requirements for such a system), see “Space Traffic Control: The Culmination of Improved Space Traffic Operations,” SPACECAST 2020, append. D, available at: .

43

ENHANCING GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH IMPROVED SPACE MANAGEMENT: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

by Vitaly A. Lukiantsev Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation

The rapid development of new undertaken to observe common guidelines with technologies and their use for military purposes regard to the transfer of missiles and missile has highlighted the need to solve the problem technology, but is not designed to impede posed by technological progress toward the national space programs or international weaponization of outer space. If no action is cooperation, so long as such programs do not taken, such developments will create a new contribute to delivery systems for weapons of channel for the arms race, which will have far- mass destruction. reaching negative consequences. The most It was a significant achievement in itself dangerous outcome in the near future would be that outer space has become a nuclear-free zone development and deployment of a space-based in conformity with international agreements. echelon of ballistic missile defenses and anti- Even during the troubled years of the Cold War satellite (ASAT) weapons. it was possible to build if not a perfect, at least a Currently, several international significant international treaty structure that instruments regulate state activities in space. narrowed the sphere of military use of outer Several of them play a key role in maintaining space. Today, we should be ready to improve global security and safeguarding outer space upon this structure now that the Cold War is from weapons. The agreements in question over. It is worth noting that the number of include, in the first place, the 1963 Limited Test countries joining the outer space club is on the Ban Treaty, which halted such tests in space. increase. Under these circumstances, particular Next, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty committed attention must be paid to the threat of the state parties not to place in orbit around the conventional arms and their components in Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or space, as well as weapons based on new any other weapons of mass destruction, not to physical principles. install such weapons on celestial bodies, and Clearly, the non-militarization of space is a not to station such weapons in outer space in complex and not well-defined question. On the any other manner. Another important one hand, this is due to the lack of precise legal instrument is the 1979 Agreement on the formulas regarding certain notions, for example, Activities of States on the Moon and Other the exact meaning of the use of space for Celestial Bodies, which extended a ban of any military purposes, what is “aggressive” military weapons in regards to the celestial bodies. A use, and whether military intelligence from major contribution was made by the 1972 U.S.- space or ballistic missiles with a space flight Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, trajectory constitute elements of space which obliged the two countries, inter alia, not militarization, etc. On the other hand, the real to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or reasons for the absence of such formulas are to components that are space-based and not to be found in the lack of political will on the part interfere with the national technical means of of certain countries to address the issue at all. verification of the other party. An important set Certain space-based systems in existence of limitations is also outlined in the 1977 today are in fact of dual use. This concerns Convention on the Prohibition of Military or communication satellites, remote sensing Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental equipment, space navigation systems, and Techniques, which includes space. And, finally, national technical means to verify arms control there is the Missile Technology Control Regime treaties and agreements. Having said this, it established in 1987. It is a voluntary, non-treaty would not be entirely correct to speak of mechanism combining 33 countries that have banning completely any military uses of space,

44 Enhancing Global Security through Improved Space Management: A Russian Perspective but rather of keeping outer space as a weapon- adopts a resolution on “Prevention of an Arms free zone and of preventing an arms race in Race in Space” (PAROS). The People’s outer space. In concrete terms, essentially it is a Republic of China, whose initiative at the question of putting a ban on the placement of Conference on Disarmament (CD) on PAROS weapon systems in space and prohibiting is well known, has taken a firm position on this warfare in space and from space. matter. For some time now, a public campaign Obviously, the existing legal structure is has been under way in the United States in not adequate to save outer space from weapons support of a World Treaty Banning Space-based considering its present use for certain military Weapons. Congressman Dennis Kucinich purposes. But it is the prevailing view of the introduced into the House of Representatives world community that space should not last October a bill to this effect entitled the become another sphere of military Space Preservation Act of 2001. confrontation or theatre of operations. One can In Russia, a ban on deployment of hardly agree with a commonplace argument that weapons in space is considered to be an space—just like the land, the sea, and the important element for ensuring global stability world’s airspace—with its gradual conquest by and security. The international conference man should inevitably become a sphere of “Space Without Weapons is the Arena for military activity. With the advent of weapons in Peaceful Cooperation in 21-st Century” held in outer space, the entire planet will be Moscow from April 11-14, 2001, was endangered, as will space assets in orbit. specifically devoted to the subject. Delegates Views expressed by competent experts on from many countries stressed in particular that both sides of the Atlantic testify to this obvious current international space law had not put fact. Speaking before the students of the sufficient barriers to weaponization of outer Stanford University on April 18, 2002, Sally space. They pointed to the need for a Ride, the first American woman to become an comprehensive ban on deployment of weapons astronaut, stated that deployment of weapon of any kind in space and for supplementing the systems in space would be a disaster. present rules of conduct for states in space Particularly, she accentuated ASAT weapons. accordingly. Testing such systems, she said, would create Suggestions have also been made to debris that could damage important space strengthen the international legal regime of objects flying in low-Earth orbit. According to outer space by modifying the current space- the report by UNESCO made public in London related treaties. Such an approach may also be a on April 28, 2002, there are already about 2.7 solution. However, amending one or two of the tons of various missile fragments in orbit, existing instruments will eventually necessitate ranging from exploded missile stages to chips changes in the rest of them. Consequently, it of missile cases. They fly at a velocity of 7.5 would be more productive to concentrate work kilometers (km) per second, which is 10 times on a single instrument. more than that of a rifle bullet. NASA keeps a The task of building the appropriate legal catalogue of space contamination, which base could be realized, for example, within the currently numbers 9,000 objects with a diameter framework of a comprehensive UN exceeding 10 centimeters. The same report Convention on International Space Law. A states that deployment of ballistic missile proposal to this effect was submitted by Russia defenses will make it practically impossible for at the 39th session of the Legal Sub-Committee research satellites to penetrate orbits at the of the UN Outer Space Committee on March altitude between 320 and 2,400 km, and that 31, 2000. The initiative has received broad weaponization of outer space is inconsistent support from the international community. In with its use for research purposes. the course of the discussions that followed, six In recent years weaponization of outer other countries representing all geographical space has become a subject of particular groups joined the initiative as co-sponsors. attention, and the concerns to this effect The issue of non-militarization of outer expressed by various countries are on the rise. space is not a new one on the agenda of Each year, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) priorities in Russian policies. In 1958, the Soviet

45 Vitaly A. Lukiantsev

Union raised the concept of a ban on the use of year it votes for the UNGA resolution on space for military purposes and submitted the PAROS. Together with a number of other relevant resolution to the UNGA First countries, it supports the reestablishment of the Committee. At the time, the world community appropriate Ad Hoc Committee at the CD to was not yet ready for such a radical approach. negotiate a regime capable of preventing an And, as life has shown in the years that arms race in outer space that could take the followed, certain military-oriented activities in form of a legally binding instrument. space have played a stabilizing role (for There are countries claiming that the issue navigation, verification of arms control is not ready for negotiations. This argument agreements, search and rescue, etc.). holds no water. The situation in arms control is The key political and diplomatic initiatives a good lesson to learn that preventive measures of the former Soviet Union related to space taken in due time are a more sensible path to weapons include: a draft treaty on banning follow than to have subsequent talks on deployment of weapons of any kind in outer limitations, reductions, and costly elimination of space submitted at the UNGA in 1981; and a armaments. draft treaty on banning the use of force in outer Much groundwork has been done at the space and from space against Earth, which was CD to pave the way for PAROS negotiations. proposed at the UNGA in 1983 and For nearly nine years, intensive work has been supplemented in 1984 by a proposal to ban the conducted along the following lines: use of force from the Earth against space • examination and identification of objects. They have never been fruitfully problems related to PAROS; discussed due to the opposition of some states. • improvement of agreements currently There were also attempts to come to in force related to PAROS; and agreement on partial measures. In March 1988, • development of current proposals and our country submitted at the CD in Geneva a future initiatives on PAROS. proposal to set up an international control Discussions have focused on such issues system to prevent deployment of weapons of as: the status of outer space and its use any kind in outer space. The main purpose of exclusively for peaceful purposes; the necessity the proposed mechanism would have been to of preventing an arms race in outer space; verify that objects launched or stationed in identification of possible dangers for the space are not weapons and do not carry functioning of spacecraft; the interrelation weapons. The key element of such a between PAROS and limitation of armaments mechanism would have been an international and disarmament; the correlation of bilateral space inspectorate that—with the consent of all and multilateral efforts on PAROS; the state parties—would have access to any terminological aspects of outer space problems; objects planned for launching or basing in outer the necessity of improving the existing legal space. regime for outer space, including verification There have also been well-known measures; and confidence-building and unilateral steps. In 1983, the Soviet Union predictability measures in outer space activities. undertook a commitment not to launch to The PAROS negotiations have now outer space any ASAT weapons. In other become an urgent matter. We propose the words, it decreed a unilateral moratorium on discussion of new initiatives aimed at getting such launches, as long as other countries would these talks started. Specific proposals to this abstain from such actions. In 1985, when the effect were put forward by the Minister of United States tested its ASAT system against a Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor real target in space, the Soviet Union became S. Ivanov in his statement at the 56th session of free from its commitment. However, in the the UNGA on September 24, 2001. He stressed exercise of good will, it continued to abstain, especially that “Russia invites the world and Russia keeps on abstaining from launching community to start working out a ASAT weapons into space. comprehensive agreement on the non- It is well known that Russia is insistent on deployment of weapons in outer space and on keeping outer space a weapon-free zone; each

46 Enhancing Global Security through Improved Space Management: A Russian Perspective the non-use of force or threat of force against the form of a treaty. In substance, it should space objects.” In particular, the agreement mention that outer space is the common outlined by Mr. Ivanov contains the following heritage of all mankind and plays an ever- elements: increasing role in its future development. It • use of space only in conformity with should provide for basic obligations, including international law and in the interests of pledges: not to put into Earth orbit any objects maintaining peace and security; carrying any kinds of weapons, to install such • an obligation not to place in the orbit weapons on celestial bodies, or to station such around the Earth any objects carrying weapons in outer space in any other manner; any kinds of weapons, not to install not to resort to threat of force in relation to such weapons on celestial bodies or space objects; and not to assist or encourage station such weapons in outer space in any state, group of states, international any other manner; organizations to engage in activities prohibited • an obligation not to use or threaten to by the treaty. There must be also provisions use force against space objects; and related to national measures on the implementation of the treaty, as well as to the • a provision establishing a verification use of space for peaceful purposes and for mechanism for overseeing the military purposes not prohibited by the treaty. implementation of the agreement on In elaborating the basic elements of a new the basis of confidence-building space-related instrument, Russia and China measures and transparency in outer have taken into account the views of the space. overwhelming majority of countries. If As the first practical step in this direction, achieved, such an agreement would contribute Mr. Ivanov stated that a moratorium should be to peaceful use of space in conformity with declared on the deployment of weapons in international law and in the interests of outer space, pending a relevant international maintaining peace and security and developing agreement. Russia would be willing to make multilateral cooperation in space exploration. such a commitment immediately, provided that Preventing deployment of weapons in the other leading space powers join this outer space, along with further reductions of moratorium. nuclear arms, while adhering to the principle of The current proposal on a moratorium is equal security are indispensable steps for of a more extensive character than the 1983 strengthening global security. What is of initiative. It covers all space weapons, including importance now is to find a suitable format for space-based attack weapons against terrestrial discussions at the CD. That is why Russia and a targets, and space-based anti-satellite weapons. number of other countries are pursuing efforts Further promoting proposals on keeping to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on space free from any weapons, Russia and the PAROS and to provide it with a negotiating People’s Republic of China have jointly drafted mandate. Early elaboration of an agreement on at the CD possible elements of a future non-deployment of weapons in outer space international instrument on preventing should become a priority task for the world deployment of weapons in outer space, and the community. use of force or threat of force against space objects. Such an agreement may be reached in

47

TREATIES AS AN APPROACH TO REDUCING SPACE VULNERABILITIES

by Cheng Jingye Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China

My remarks will focus on three aspects of into another battleground, thus endangering our the current debate on space security: 1) the dependence upon space. This prospect is clearly need for a new international legal instrument on not in the interest of any countries, and the preventing space weaponization; 2) the possible space powers themselves are likely to become elements of such an instrument; 3) and the ways the biggest victims. and means to achieve it. As an old Chinese saying goes, it is never too late to mend the sheep pen, even after some A NEW LEGAL INSTRUMENT ON of the sheep have been lost. At a time when SPACE SECURITY AND NON- weapons have not yet been introduced into WEAPONIZATION space—but when we are increasingly faced with such possibility—it is imperative for the Since the first successful launching of a international community to take effective man-made earth satellite nearly half a century preventive measures to forestall any possible ago, great progress has been made in the mishaps. In light of the vulnerabilities of our exploration and use of space for the benefit of space assets and our dependence upon them, mankind. During this process, we have space weapons are likely to become another witnessed two important trends. One is the ever new type of weapon of mass destruction. If we increasing dependence of human society on fail to prevent the weaponization of space, we space, to a greater extent than at any point in may—in the future—have to address the issues history. It would be no exaggeration to say that of space weapons proliferation, space arms our daily life, economic activities, and scientific control and regulation, and disarmament, as is research, among other things, are almost now the case with nuclear weapons. inseparable from the use of space. It's difficult As we often say in China, “To cure the to imagine what would happen to human disease, you must have the right medicine.” The society if we were to lose access to space. proper prescription for preventing space Parallel to this trend is the growing weaponization lies in concluding as early as possibility of introducing weapons into space. possible a legal instrument banning all space Because of its unique military and strategic weapons. significance, space became an important arena It is true that there have been already for the arms race during the Cold War. We all several treaties on regulating outer space remember the “Star Wars” program. But the activities. These treaties have played a positive end of the Cold War has not helped to curb this role in promoting the exploration and peaceful trend. Research and development on space utilization of outer space. However, as they weapons continues unfettered, and concepts were concluded decades ago, some of them and theories of space warfare are now being have inherent flaws or loopholes. For example, worked out. As a result, the weaponization of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty only prohibits space seems closer than ever. deployment of weapons of mass destruction in These two, above-mentioned trends pose outer space, but not other weapons. an obvious contradiction in the eyes of the Furthermore, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile majority of people today. Like many other Treaty, which prohibited space-based anti- countries, China is of the view that introducing missile systems, recently ceased to be in effect. weapons into space will not contribute to the Beginning with the 1980s, having realized goals of ensuring space security or reducing the need for strengthening existing treaties, the space vulnerabilities. Rather it will lead to an international community has made unremitting arms race in space, which will then be turned efforts to this end. In 1981, the UN General

48 Treaties as an Approach to Reducing Space Vulnerabilities

Assembly passed a resolution on the components from outer space against targets on “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” land, sea, and air. (PAROS). Since then, the resolution has been For the past several months, in adopted for 20 consecutive years. From 1991 to consultation with the Russian delegation, the 1993, a UN Governmental Expert Panel on Chinese delegation has worked out a joint Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space working paper in this regard, which was Activities was established and engaged in introduced to the CD members on May 28, focused study of the relevant issues. The 2002, in Geneva. Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament The joint working paper focuses on how (CD) set PAROS as an established item on its to solve the problems of the deployment of agenda beginning in 1982. From 1985 to 1994 weapons and use of force in outer space. As we an Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS was see it, the envisaged instrument could be called established and carried out considerable work the “Treaty on the Prevention of Deployment on many aspects of outer space for 10 of Weapons in Outer Space and the Threat or consecutive years. Many countries, including Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.” It Australia, Canada, Egypt, Germany, France, would include such sections as: a Preamble, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and China, have put Basic Obligations, National Implementation forward numerous constructive proposals and Measures, Confidence-building Measures, ideas in the UN General Assembly and the CD. Settlement of Disputes, and Executive More than a few nongovernmental Organization, as well as some other relevant organizations (NGOs), experts, and scholars provisions. have also came up with useful ideas and draft Among these, the Basic Obligations will texts. All these efforts have laid a solid basis for naturally be the core of the future treaty. We the commencement of substantive negotiations believe that to achieve the objectives of non- on a legal instrument on PAROS. weaponization and PAROS, the new treaty should at least include the following aspects: POSSIBLE ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL • Not to place in orbit around the Earth INSTRUMENT ON SPACE any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons China is dedicated to urging the on celestial bodies, and not to station international community to conclude an such weapons in outer space in any international legal instrument on both non- other manner; weaponization of space and PAROS. Given the • Not to resort to the threat or use of importance of PAROS, China started to press force against any outer space objects; in the late 1990s for the re-establishment in the and CD of an Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating • Not to assist or encourage other states, mandate. On February 9, 2000, the Chinese groups of states, and international delegation submitted to the CD a working organizations to participate in activities paper (CD/1606), outlining China’s preliminary prohibited by this treaty. ideas on such an instrument. A year later, To be sure, the elements of the above- having further substantiated and developed mentioned joint working paper are still these ideas, China came up with a more detailed tentative. Further amendments and paper (CD/1645, June 6, 2001) entitled improvements are welcome. As noted above, “Possible Elements of a Future International many countries and some experts and scholars Legal Instrument on the Prevention of the have conducted in-depth research into this issue Weaponization of Outer Space.” This paper and put forward concrete proposals, even draft proposed concepts such as: the prohibition of treaties. We believe all of these can serve as testing, deployment, and use of weapons and good food for thought for further substantive weapon systems and their parts and negotiations and deserve attention and study by components in outer space; and the prohibition all counties. of testing, deployment, and use of weapons, weapon systems and their parts and

49 Cheng Jingye

SPECIFIC MEANS TO NEGOTIATE AN forum, however, the CD has carried out OUTER SPACE TREATY considerable work already on PAROS. Relevant UN resolutions also call for the CD to play a There are different views and proposals on primary role in this regard. Therefore, the CD is how to negotiate a new legal instrument on the best forum to negotiate a legal instrument outer space. Some propose to negotiate a on outer space. To this end, an Ad Hoc specific treaty on anti-satellite weapons, some Committee should be re-established at an early favor a treaty on confidence-building measures date to start substantive work on the in outer space, and still others call for an negotiation and conclusion of a legal additional protocol to the Outer Space Treaty. instrument on non-weaponization of space. Amendment of the Outer Space Treaty is also To sum up, China strongly believes that it mentioned. With regard to the negotiating is now high time for concluding a legal mechanism, some propose to negotiate in the instrument on non-weaponization of outer UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer space. The main purpose of the instrument is to Space, some suggest the “Ottawa Process” prohibit deployment of any weapon in space model (an NGO-led effort used in regards to and the use of force against space objects. And land mines), and still more states prefer to start the best forum to negotiate such an instrument substantive work, including the commencement is the Conference on Disarmament. We have of negotiations on a treaty in the CD, according entered the 21st century. The rapid progress of to relevant UN resolutions. science and technology will provide human In my opinion, it is not an important or beings with unprecedented opportunities to substantial issue as to where and in what form explore and utilize outer space. For the welfare to negotiate. So long as the relevant proposal is of the mankind and for the sake of peace consistent with the general objectives of non- among future generations, let us take actions weaponization of space and PAROS and is and keep the genie of space weaponization and conducive to universal participation by all arms racing sealed tight in a bottle through the parties, it deserves serious consideration. As the rule of law, rather than thinking it will stay there single multilateral disarmament negotiating simply by magic.

50

A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE

by Eric M. Javits U.S. Department of State

THE UNITED STATES, OUTER SPACE, his January 24, 2002 statement, the security and AND THE CONFERENCE ON well being of the United States and its allies DISARMAMENT (CD) depend on the ability to operate in space. And we are not alone in having military space The United States continues to recognize programs. Russia and China, for example, have the common interest of all countries in the such programs too. exploration and use of outer space for peaceful National security is the highest purposes, as declared in the 1967 Outer Space responsibility of a government, and each nation Treaty. When our astronauts walked on the must decide on the elements of its security moon for the first time, they left the message policy. Arms control and disarmament are not that they “came in peace for all mankind.” The ends in themselves but tools to enhance United States and other nations have sent security. Our discussion should be framed in unmanned probes to explore outer space and that context. the celestial bodies, to explore the surfaces and Free access to space and use of space by atmospheres of the other planets in our solar space-faring nations are central to the preserva- system in order to understand the environment tion of peace and the protection of civil, beyond our world. commercial, and security interests. The United The exploration and use of space has not States sees no justification for limitations on the looked solely outward. Satellites orbiting the right of sovereign nations to acquire all forms Earth monitor the weather, the climate, the of information from space. growth of crops, and the impact of drought and We fully understand that maintaining land use. Communications satellites make international peace and security is an possible rapid global sharing of information. overarching purpose that guides activities on Satellites have revolutionized terrestrial Earth as well as in outer space, but, in the final navigation and provided a new and powerful analysis, preserving national security is likewise tool for accurate surveying of the Earth's necessary and essential. For these reasons, the surface. The peaceful exploration and use of United States sees no need for new outer space outer space have also resulted in technological arms control agreements and opposes spin-offs that would take days to enumerate in negotiation of a treaty on outer space arms their entirety. control. The commitment of the United States to Some suggest that a new forum might be the exploration and use of outer space by all the appropriate place for outer space arms nations, for peaceful purposes and for the control efforts. We do not share this view. benefit of humanity, is clear. But the peaceful Changing venues would not change national exploration and use of space obviously does not positions. States would still have the same rule out activities in pursuit of national security concerns that they have in existing fora. goals. The security and well being of many THE EXISTING OUTER SPACE nations depend on the ability to operate in REGIME IS SUFFICIENT space, and Article 51 of the UN Charter makes it clear that all member states have the inherent A number of standing agreements already right of individual and collective self-defense. sufficiently regulate military activities in outer The global responsibilities of the United States, space. The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the new threats facing it in today’s world, prohibits parties from conducting nuclear require that that right be exercised both on the weapon test explosions or other nuclear Earth and above it. As Under Secretary John explosions in outer space. The activities of the Bolton told the Conference on Disarmament in Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer

51 Eric M. Javits

Space (COPUOS), which facilitated the respond to military threats, and monitor arms negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) control and nonproliferation agreements are itself, also reinforce the existing regime. key priorities for our national security space COPUOS does not deal with disarmament and activities—and they help strengthen arms control aspects of outer space, of course; international stability and security. The lawful but it is concerned with promoting international military use of space provides broad benefits to cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. the international community in the areas of Most important, however, is the OST, to communications, global positioning, navigation, which the United States remains firmly environmental monitoring, combating committed. The OST puts celestial bodies off terrorism, and cooperating in enforcement of limits to all nuclear weapons or other weapons UN Security Council sanctions. of mass destruction and prohibits states parties from placing in orbit or stationing such TIME TO MOVE ON weapons in outer space—a far-reaching non- proliferation measure in itself. It also provides The United States continues to hear calls that celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for for immediate negotiations in the CD to peaceful purposes and prohibits their use for forestall all manner of ills: 1) the possibility that military establishments or maneuvers, or for missile defense would upset strategic stability, testing any type of weapons. In addition, the leading to a new arms race here on Earth; 2) the OST clearly establishes that states parties retain potential for disruption of the arms control jurisdiction and control over objects they have process; and 3) the risk of an arms race in outer launched into outer space, and have space. The United States has always believed international responsibility for national objects these concerns are groundless. in outer space, including whatever damage the Clearly, missile defense has not upset launched item may cause. strategic stability or led to a new arms race. In sum, there already exists an extensive The treaty signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, and comprehensive system for limiting the uses shows that. Importantly, the Treaty of Moscow of outer space to those that are peaceful and also demonstrates that pursuit of missile providing a framework for the legitimate defense and the demise of the Anti-Ballistic military uses of outer space. We believe that Missile (ABM) Treaty are not an impediment to this existing multilateral arms control regime further reductions in nuclear weapons or to adequately protects states’ interests in outer increased U.S.-Russian cooperation. Clearly space and does not require augmentation. also, U.S. missile defense efforts, and the There simply is no problem in outer space for various systems under development, are not arms control to solve. The problems we all directed against Russia or China. Rather, they need to address are right here on Earth—the are designed to defend against limited ballistic need for effective implementation of, and full missile attack in a world where increasing compliance with, key regimes that tackle the numbers of states are striving to be able to very real threat of weapons of mass threaten such an attack. Finally, as we have destruction—above all the Nuclear tried to make clear, it is not a replacement for Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical Weapons deterrence through response or retaliation, but Convention, and Biological Weapons a supplement to it—adding a new dimension to Convention. deterrence. Indeed, if a non-state actor knew The United States is committed, through that a limited attack on the United States was its national space policy, to ensuring that not likely to succeed, they would be much less exploration and use of outer space remain open inclined to develop weapons of mass to all nations for peaceful purposes and for the destruction. A system capable of defending benefit of all humanity. For us as for others, against a large-scale attack with sophisticated “peaceful purposes” does of course allow for weapons would be both qualitatively and activities that support and serve national quantitatively different from that which the security goals. Improving our ability to support United States is pursuing. military operations worldwide, monitor and

52 A U.S. Perspective on Space

The United States remains committed to to weather this sort of disagreement. As the the arms control and disarmament process. Moscow Summit showed, it is a new and better The landmark strategic arms reductions day. agreement signed by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in Moscow on May 24 CONCLUSION has reaffirmed that commitment and finally laid to rest the Cold War world and the arms race it The United States continues to recognize spawned. There is no contradiction between the common interest of all mankind in the that process and pursuit of a limited missile furtherance of the exploration and use of outer defense system. And while the United States space for peaceful purposes, as declared in the and Russia have had different views on the 1967 OST. We see no need for further outer merits of the ABM Treaty, its disappearance is space treaties. We should move on to other simply not a problem. The reality is that U.S.- themes that address immediate and serious Russian relations are broad and strong enough threats to mankind.

53

GOVERNMENT-LED DISCUSSIONS REGARDING SPACE WEAPONS AND AVENUES FOR PROGRESS

by Vladimir Petrovsky Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ret.)

The issue of future security in space is The core of this regime is a code of being debated at a crucial moment in the behavior, or, metaphorically speaking, “traffic process of creating a new, broader rules” for outer space. Its political aim would architecture for security. The challenge of be to make outer space more secure, thereby terrorism to the world community, the danger contributing to strategic security on Earth. of the spread of weapons of mass destruction The new concept of strategic security as well as missiles, particularly in view of proclaimed at the Moscow Summit combines regional developments, necessitate major two leading principles—strategic stability and changes in global security arrangements. As security in all its aspects—which have served the May Russian-American summit in as guidelines in the period of transition from a Moscow demonstrated, the key proponents of confrontational to a cooperative approach a new strategic framework—more respectful both in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. of this new security environment—have The idea of strategic stability was born clearly expressed their political will for out of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in practical deeds. A Russian-American treaty the 1970s. The core of this idea is the stability has been concluded in the best diplomatic of nuclear weapons relations between the two traditions, which imply the achievement of a superpowers and the regulation and reduction balance of interests through compromise. The of these weapons. Other important elements treaty creates the momentum to pilot positive of strategic stability comprise the prevention change through the new security of crisis situations and military confidence- environment. It is high time to launch building measures, including the exchange of government-led discussions on arms information on certain forms of military regulation, in particular with regard to security activity as well as the creation of zones of in outer space. limited military activity. The concept has been In this essay, I do not intend to go into applied to both strategic offensive and the details of future security arrangements in defensive weapons, however, it fit within the outer space. This is a task for negotiators. I context of mutually assured destruction. would rather prefer to concentrate on the At the end of 1991, Washington and following issue: how and via which fora Moscow created a working group on strategic security in space can be dealt with in the most stability, which had its only meeting in effective and reliable way, taking into account November 1991 before the disintegration of the different political, military, and the Soviet Union. At that meeting, the idea of commercial interests of the major players. strategic stability was reconceptualized and applied not only to military, but also to all THE NEW CONCEPT OF other international activities. It was indeed a “STRATEGIC SECURITY” first step towards a convergence with the other concept, that of security in all its To begin with, there is a clear need to aspects, which was jointly proposed by create a new regime allowing for the Moscow and Washington and unanimously regulation of military activity in outer space, adopted by the United Nations at its 44th one that would be more than the Missile session in 1989 (Resolution 44/21). This Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but less resolution means that security should be than general and complete de-weaponization. treated not only in military terms, but in a Such a regime, at least, could contribute to broader context, such as the security of missile nonproliferation. individuals from violence, hunger, disease,

54 Government-Led Discussions regarding Space Weapons and Avenues for Progress environmental degradation, and violation of gathering, communications, navigation, etc. human rights. The concept of security in all These systems are not weapons in the strict its aspects incorporated the ideas of sense of the word, because they are not comprehensive, common and cooperative designed for inflicting destruction and do not security, which were advanced by that time create the danger of an attack from outer both in the United Nations and in space. nongovernmental structures. In other words, It is very important to note that existing the concept of strategic security is based on treaties with regard to all kinds of activity in internationally accepted ideas. outer space—which declare a common The new paradigm of strategic security obligation to maintain peace and security in deals with military issues within a broader this domain—also emphasize the responsibility context and opens the opportunity for much of states for their behavior. more thorough discussions of the guarantees New negotiations concerning security in of such security on Earth from outer space. outer space should be based on the existing There can be two kinds of such guarantees: norms of international law, putting particular • direct, which include political, emphasis on legal rather than on military diplomatic, and legal barriers to the deterrence for those trying to use outer space danger of military attacks against in their own interests, contrary to Earth from outer space; and international law. In other words, there • indirect, involving a cooperative should be a clear understanding that justice is approach to both military and best served before the bar and not by peaceful activities in outer space dropping bombs. which, in their turn, should Legal deterrence also implies coercive strengthen political and legal actions, making it quite clear, though, that measures aimed at strategic security. such actions should be undertaken in To move forward with the regulation of accordance with the UN Charter. These military activity in outer space it is necessary actions include sanctions and, as a last resort, to continue to be guided by the primacy of the use of military force. the legal approach. In these efforts, it is wrong to use the From the very beginning of the outer expression “rogue states,” because it does not space era, space has been considered in make a distinction between the international treaties as the common property decisionmakers in these countries and the of all mankind. This implies that outer space people at large. To promote productive is not subject to national appropriation by negotiations, it would be more appropriate to claim of sovereignty, by means of use or speak about “countries of concern,” and for occupation, or by any other means. All whenever coercive actions are to take place to countries have freedom of access to all its keep in mind the “humanitarian imperative.” parts on equal terms. In other words, the goal should be to Certain kinds of military activity are minimize the damaging effects of coercive prohibited in outer space. According to actions on vulnerable groups of the existing treaties, outer space today is de facto a population. This is not a game of words. Such nuclear-weapon-free zone and as such is part an approach, in practical terms, will help to of the existing regime of the nonproliferation facilitate positive changes in countries of of nuclear weapons. The deployment of other concern. weapons of mass destruction is also banned. There is no doubt that military activity in Nevertheless, international treaties do outer space has a place, but it does not mean not prohibit all military activity in outer space. that military activity in outer space should The majority of states involved in outer space follow the Cold War logic of military integrate the civil and military components of confrontation and be used for unilateral their activities. The military portion is advantages at the expense of others. designed for such purposes as early warning On the diplomatic side, efforts should be against possible missile attacks, intelligence directed at achieving a balance of political,

55 Vladimir Petrovsky military and commercial interests through a negotiations. The CD has tremendous cooperative approach. As the summit in experience in treaty making. (In my time as Moscow demonstrated, there is no alternative secretary-general of the CD (1993–2002), it to compromise. It should be kept in mind successfully dealt with two important arms that negotiations are not synonymous with regulation and disarmament treaties—the treaty making, which is the final stage of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the negotiating process. This stage is preceded by Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.) the difficult and sometimes long-lasting stages From the legal and diplomatic points of of preliminary consultations in search of the view, the CD is an important source of know- parameters of a future agreement. how. The Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS, Within the context of negotiations the which functioned at the CD from 1985 to issue of consensus is often raised. Of course, 1994, held discussions on definitions, consensus on substantive issues is a must. principles, existing treaties, confidence- However, it is necessary to avoid the building measures, and accumulated temptation of creating a cult of consensus. In experience, which could be useful for future my opinion, its application should be confined negotiations. only to substantive and not procedural issues. It is tremendously important that the Finally, from all viewpoints (i.e., the conference membership today expand to political, the legal, and the diplomatic), major embrace all the military significant states, as lessons should be drawn from the experience well as countries of concern. of the nuclear nonproliferation regime: any All member states and observers are effective military regulation process should be represented at the CD by top disarmament viewed as a vehicle not for codifying the status experts, which provides ample opportunity quo but rather for providing a framework for for holding highly professional multilateral, as changes based on strategic security and well as plurilateral and bilateral, talks. Taking effected through the force of law, but not the into account that disarmament negotiators law of force. have become a special brand within the diplomatic profession, the CD is turning into HOW TO MOVE FORWARD a focal point for this brand. In my opinion, even the bilateral negotiations of the key A regime allowing for the regulation of players should be held either at the CD itself military activity in outer space should become or in its outskirts. the subject of government-led discussions at However, the work of the conference is all existing levels—the bilateral, regional, paralyzed today. The CD is unable to start transcontinental, and global. substantive work on a set of issues regarded Many bilateral, regional, and as priorities by its member states. In my transcontinental bodies have been opinion, controversies surrounding the restructured and updated. Bilateral Russian- outstanding issues remind us, regrettably, of American machinery has been renewed and the mentality of the Cold War, when all put into motion. The role of the 33 nations of problems were tightly linked and an “all or the MTCR is also very important. nothing” rule often guided the negotiations. The major issue is how to reactivate In the new security situation, this multilateral bodies, which are critical in terms mentality has truly become out of date. A new of the outcome. They give voice to approach is needed, namely a comprehensive populations whose lives and future are at and balanced approach to all emerging issues. stake in strategic decisionmaking. They create I am also convinced that a new tactic should a sense of ownership of the negotiated be applied in dealing with these issues. It is instruments and are the best way to achieve important to avoid a situation where progress the irreversibility of the arms regulation and in one area is made contingent upon progress disarmament process. in another. The tactic of linkages, which is a The Conference on Disarmament (CD) relic of the Cold War mentality, should be is the most proper body for multilateral replaced by “constructive parallelism” with

56 Government-Led Discussions regarding Space Weapons and Avenues for Progress regard to all priorities on the disarmament and for mobilizing the entire international agenda. The potential advantage of this machinery in order to counter the new threat, approach is that progress in one area can which could affect the whole of humankind. stimulate progress in another. While emphasizing the importance of What is required at this stage is the political will, I do not want to create the display by the governments of member states impression that everything is perfect in the of the CD of the political will for existing international machinery. One can compromise, which would allow them to take expect of international bodies the exercise of into consideration the concerns of all and to responsible multilateralism. By this I open the road for progress on all agenda understand, on the one hand, the recognition items. Then, the CD will become fully of the role that key actors require for bilateral operative. As for outer space security, the and plurilateral policy formulation and, on the CD—as a first step for negotiating an other, a responsiveness by the same key international legal instrument—might discuss players to the broadly representative views of and review all pertinent issues of military the global community. activity in outer space, shortcomings of the From the perspective of the future, a existing legal instruments, and the key certain restructuring of the international elements of future arrangements. machinery is needed very much indeed. The Not only the CD, but also the major time has come to give thought to how to bodies of the United Nations could be used bring all disarmament and arms control more extensively by governments to deal with structures under one roof and to create an the new security situation. international arms regulation agency paralleled First of all, the Security Council. There is by a space agency that would deal with all much talk on the reform of the Security kinds of allowed activities in space. Of course, Council, but—for its involvement in dealing it will take time for these ideas to be realized, with arms regulation the provisions of Article but brainstorming should start without delay. 26—are quite sufficient. The Security Council Here, the academic community can make a created special subsidiary bodies in the 1940s tremendous impact. to deal with arms regulation and disarmament. Last, but not least, governments should Why not revive this practice? Moreover, begin viewing the NGO community as nothing prevents the Security Council from partners in discussions on arms regulation. considering issues at the highest political level We need this community to generate support (heads of states, foreign ministers) and within civil society in order to be able to meet holding meetings in Geneva, Vienna, Brussels, the world’s new security challenges. and other locations from which the necessary Moreover, NGOs hold views different from signals of a new attitude to security issues those of governments and can serve as an could be transmitted to other international effective partner for elaborating governmental and regional structures. policies. The General Assembly provides a rostrum to help mobilize the global FINAL THOUGHTS community in its support for a new view of the security situation. The Committee on In conclusion, it should be emphasized Peaceful Uses of Outer Space can be also that today, when new directions in strategic involved in dealing with security in all aspects security are being explored and new strategic of outer space. bargains are being canvassed, what is needed In case of necessity, a special conference for future security in outer space are action- on outer space could be convened, not unlike oriented discussions—productive exchanges the three UNISPACE conferences already that pool collective wisdom and in the long held. run will bring about tangible results. In other words, political will is very much in need both for reactivating the CD

57

COMMERCIAL-LED OPTIONS

by Alain Dupas University of Paris and International Consultant

One of the trends often emphasized in undoubtedly significant, but still smaller than space activities is the rise of the commercial governmental space budgets, which globally are sector, which can be defined as public and close to $40 billion. Could new fields of private companies commercializing space commercial activities emerge? Positioning products and services. But what are the products and services are successful but there is relationships, if any, between this sector and almost a total separation between the space military space programs? Could this sector have segment (the U.S. military’s Global Positioning any role and influence on the planned projects System, or GPS) and its civilian applications, in for the basing of weapons in space? which the space industry is not directly Before addressing these issues, it is involved. The situation should be different with necessary to make some remarks about the the contemplated European space-positioning perimeter of the commercial space sector and program Galileo, which will be much more its international aspects. It is also interesting to service-oriented than GPS. Another new consider the extent to which space commercial development in commercial space is tourism, activities are increasingly mixed with but with only two space tourists so far, this governmental activities, often in public-private activity has not become a full-blown industry partnership (PPP) frameworks yet.

THE SCOPE AND REAL IMPORTANCE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES EUROPEAN AND U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE SECTOR Commercial space activities are limited to a small number of fields, in contrast to Internationally, the relative importance of governmental space activities, which include the commercial sector is much larger in Europe scientific missions, manned spaceflight, remote than in the United States, which are the two sensing, reconnaissance and surveillance, dominant space powers. Two facts explain this ferreting, telecommunication, etc. The situation. dominant commercial space activity, by far, is First, governmental space budgets are space telecommunications; next is commercial much higher in the United States than in space transportation, which depends Europe. The ratio is about four to one in considerably on space telecommunications as civilian space and close to twenty to one in its largest market. The third commercial space military space. In fact, after the end of the Cold activity, remote sensing, is far behind the War and the fall of the Soviet Union, military others. space is nearly a U.S. monopoly, and this means Figures quoted for space naturally that European perspectives about telecommunication revenues are huge: close to militarization of space are very different from $100 billion in 2000. However, one must be what they are in the United States. very careful in considering these figures, which Second, Europe managed to build a strong cover all revenues from space commercial space industry in launchers telecommunications, not only those going to (Arianespace), satellite manufacturing (Astrium space companies. In fact, about 80 percent of and Alcatel Space Industries), the quoted revenues come from the selling of telecommunications services (Eutelsat, SES), services by operators who are not part of the and remote sensing (SPOT Image). This space industry. For them, satellites are just a industry is able to compete successfully with piece of infrastructure like any other. The real U.S. industry in open commercial markets. size of the commercial sector for the space From the beginning, Europe has focused industry is only about $20 billion. This is more on civilian and commercial space

58 Commercial-Led Options

activities. The European Space Agency (ESA), operated) facilities and programs. A well-known created in 1975, is mandated to conduct only example is the Department of Energy’s Sandia “civilian” space programs. However, this does National Laboratories, which is managed by a not prevent the use of rockets ESA develops to large aerospace industry contractor. The orbit satellites for military missions, as long as concept of PPPs is very broad and covers a these programs can be categorized as pursuing wide range of business arrangements, from “peaceful purposes” and are in agreement with simple sub-contracting to real partnerships— the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. European military where both commercial and governmental space programs are conducted outside of ESA parties share visions and investments. The in national or multinational frameworks and are model has been widely applied from the federal very limited in scope: for reconnaissance (the to the city level in sectors as varied as French Helios program) and for environment, health, education, and telecommunications (Syracuse in France, Skynet transportation. The concept has been also in United Kingdom, Italsat in Italy, and applied extensively in United Kingdom. Hispasat in Spain). Cooperation at the The increasing importance of PPPs in the European level, in the framework of the space sector blurs the frontier of commercial “second pillar” of the European Union space and mixes the interests of commercial (Common European Security and Defense companies and governments in civilian and Policy), is progressing, but any projects will be military activities. In fact, two of the three main strictly within the limits of international treaties commercial space fields might be more on space. European countries have always accurately characterized as the province of considered the framework of international PPPs: commercial space transportation and treaties, including bilateral treaties between the remote sensing. Soviet Union/Russia and the United States (the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, the Anti- Space Transportation Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Strategic Commercial space transportation in Arms Reduction Treaties) as the basis for Europe and the United States relies on international security. They have strongly launchers that have been developed using objected to the U.S. decision to withdraw from government funds. This is obviously the case the ABM Treaty. for the Ariane family of launchers in Europe and with the new U.S. Evolved Expandable THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF Launch Vehicles (Atlas–5 and Delta-4). Ariane, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN Atlas, and Delta launchers are operated by THE SPACE SECTOR commercial ventures (Arianespace, International Launch Services, and Boeing The Concept of PPPs Launch Services) but make use of launch European commercial space activities are facilities owned by governments and benefit thus simultaneously more limited in scope and from strong governmental support.1 Future much more central than in the United States. generations of space transportation systems will But there is also an increase in the importance be developed as governmental programs. There of activities that are neither purely commercial is, however, a difference between United States nor purely governmental (either civilian or and Europe: American commercial space military-oriented). The technologies involved transportation operators could survive with are “dual-use” and the frameworks of these only a governmental market, while activities can be characterized as “public-private Arianespace’s survival depends on the partnerships.” PPPs are not new: they were commercial market. introduced in the United States after World

War II in order to make the management of 1 facilities owned or conducted by the Private launch facilities can now be licensed in the government more effective. The concept was United States, but this possibility is rarely used and implemented at the federal level with the so- the U.S. government is still responsible internationally for the launches conducted at these called GOCOs (government owned contractor- facilities.

59 Alain Dupas

private and governmental parties. This quite The Case of Remote Sensing awkward situation leaves the U.S. government Commercial remote sensing can also be free to impose at will any limitation it considers characterized as the domain of PPPs. necessary for security reasons to the quality and Historically, the most successful remote sensing availability of the positioning signal. The venture, SPOT Image, has marketed images American position is understandable, but has from satellites owned and controlled by the played a major role in the European decision to French space agency Centre National d’Etudes move forward with its own Galileo system. This Spatiales (CNES). It is very close to a GOCO in network will be oriented toward civilian the United States. New American commercial applications, but security concerns will be remote sensing companies (Space Imaging, addressed in the development of the project. Orbimage), by contrast, own and operate their The Galileo program will be developed and satellites, but they cannot survive without operated within a PPP framework, involving orders from the U.S. government (mainly from ESA, the European Union, and commercial the National Imaging and Mapping Agency). companies. Compared to space transportation, however, remote sensing adds security issues to the PPP COMMERCIAL SPACE ISSUES AND framework. Space images can be used by rogue THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE states or possibly terrorists. Thus, their commercialization cannot be completely In the space sector, the mix of private and without restrictions. In the United States, the governmental interests and of civilian and government has the right to exercise “shutter military applications is, as shown above, very control” on U.S. commercial satellites in order complex. This situation imposes, however, a to prevent what can be considered to be “risky” considerable responsibility on the governments imaging. In the same spirit, the French of the major space powers: bold moves in the government can prevent SPOT Image from purely military space sector—such as the selling images of certain regions in cases of development of debris-creating anti-satellite military crises or other security concerns. weapons or other space-based offensive systems—could compromise the stability of the The Emergence of PPPs in the Space still fragile commercial space sector. Telecommunications Sector Commercial space activities are often Only space telecommunications operators considered by investors to be “exotic” and can be considered to be purely commercial “risky,” which makes them reluctant to provide entities. However, even in this sector the “dual the hundreds of millions of dollars (or more) use” character of space telecommunications needed for promising new projects. technologies is causing change. Military Irresponsible behavior in expanding the scope organizations in the United States and Europe of space militarization will only worsen the are now making extensive use of commercial assessment of space by the commercial market. space telecommunications capacities. In most This would be particularly dangerous for the cases, they behave as regular customers. But European space industry, which relies much the relationships can be much broader and more on commercial ventures than the include PPP frameworks. This is, for example, American space industry. It is in the interest of the case with the British military space space companies and operators to make their communication system. The future Skynet-5 governments aware of this risk. Such system will be procured and operated by a communication, one hopes, should be private venture called Paradigm, which will also facilitated by the close relationship between take over the operation of the existing Skynet-4 these companies and their governments in the network. framework of existing PPPs. What about positioning? The American GPS system is an extreme case of a PPP without any real relationship between the

60

NGO APPROACHES AND INITIATIVES FOR ADDRESSING SPACE SECURITY

by Rebecca Johnson The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Although a small number of non- 3. Does this pose a real threat – i.e. why governmental organizations, such as the Union should we worry? I mean this in terms of Concerned Scientists and the Global not only of military security, but in the Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in wider security definitions. Space have been concerned about the military 4. What are the drivers and obstacles and, uses of space for some time, for most NGOs of particular importance, the likely time awareness of the risks of space weaponization frames? have grown out of their concerns about missile 5. What can we do about it? Should we defense during the late 1990s. Though the take preventive and precautionary issues of missile proliferation, missile defense measures, and if so, of what type? and the weaponization of space may be As other authors have addressed the first connected, they give rise to different kinds of four issues, my purpose in this essay is to political questions and responses. It is perhaps address the fifth question. But it is important premature to speak of NGO initiatives on space to keep in mind that any consideration of what weaponization. There are, rather, a range of to do must take into account the other four tasks that need to be undertaken, preferably questions, and must also be prepared to through partnerships of NGO and government respond to any changes in the information or experts and practitioners, ideally together with conditions pertaining to the first four questions. constructive commercial and even military It is immediately obvious that much more work interests. Most importantly, there is the need to needs to be done to research the nature of the develop awareness, initiatives and approaches threats posed to space assets, and the costs, for addressing issues raised by current civilian risks, and benefits of different security and military activities in space and potential approaches. With this caveat, I will sketch out future developments that might jeopardize some of the considerations underlying various them or jeopardize the security and activities of possible NGO-led approaches. life on Earth. First, a note about language. Some In determining an approach, designing a diplomats and NGOs use the terms strategy or embarking on a campaign, some “militarization of space” and “weaponization of fundamental questions need to be asked. space” as if they were interchangeable. They are 1. What are the real, probable and not. Others use the term “peaceful uses of potential threats and risks, both in space” in ways that ignore the national technical relation to existing and future space means (NTM), surveillance, and pinpointing assets, and from the potential technology that allows conventional weaponry weaponization of space? to be finely aimed, controlled, and fired. Space 2. Who wants to attack or weaponize is already considerably militarized with space assets and why? In other words, significant observation, intelligence, and who is promoting, researching, and communications assets. While (as far as we developing capabilities to attack or know) there are no specifically designed and weaponize in space? Not just the deployed weapons in space yet, there are countries concerned, but agencies, satellites that could be maneuvered to act as personnel, and financial and political weapons and disable or destroy the space assets backers. What kind of weapons are of others. The question of what makes a under consideration—space based or weapon is not so much one of specific space capable? technological function or capability, but of intention, context, and use. This recognition

61 NGO Approaches and Initiatives for Addressing Space Security

has profound implications for the kind(s) of Raising public awareness arms control or disarmament approaches that At present, when it is clear that we need could be considered feasible. Furthermore, more information to determine the best way while some of the military uses of space have forward, research, academic, and policy-directed already gone beyond what I consider desirable, analysis will be a priority. There also has to be and there are some very gray areas surrounding greater outreach towards the mainstream media, technology such as targeting components, it is as well as specialist journals, to get them important to acknowledge the positive use of interested in the issue. As the informational space-based intelligence for verifying arms base begins to develop, grassroots and town control treaties, early warning of environmental hall meetings can widen interest, get the issue and military threats, and so on. These into local media, and begin to generate pressure distinctions and clarifications are important on elected representatives. The point to when considering ways to prevent the emphasize is that raising public awareness weaponization of space and develop a code of requires both solid, technically competent conduct for non-aggressive, non-offensive uses arguments and simple, direct, emotionally of space. Attempts to “demilitarize” space, as appealing messages. To get the public interested some NGOs demand, are non-starters. For the and concerned, it is important to enable people reasons given above, they are not feasible nor, I to picture the dangers. In local meetings around would contend, desirable. the United States, for example, some NGO representatives have been making very effective THREE AREAS OF NGO use of images and slogans from the U.S. Space CONTRIBUTION Command’s own promotional materials, such as Vision for 2020, which proclaimed (for NGOs, which can be local, national, or example): “US Space Command— dominating transnational, formally constituted or grouped the space dimension of military operations to in informal networks with common purpose, protect US interests and investment” and can contribute in three main areas of operation: “Integrating Space Forces into warfighting 1. Raising wider public consciousness of capabilities across the full spectrum of the concerns, problems and options, conflict.”1 The fact that these points were made mainly through public education, so forcefully by proponents of space information exchange and engagement weaponization makes them a far better with the media and elected and mobilizer than if the speakers were to allege governmental representatives, and with these motivations and intentions. commercial and military communities To engage public attention, a range of with assets, investments, experience, arguments needs to be utilized, as different and expertise in space and space- messages are likely to have different impacts on related matters; different kinds of audiences. European and 2. Providing technical, legal, and political many developing countries are already skeptical research, such as analysis of different about missile defense, and the evocation of approaches, definitions, parameters, missile defense plans extending into space- strategies, and instruments, with a view based weapons and wars is already perceived as to determining whether negotiations plausible and worrisome, if not a major political are necessary and, if so, preparing the priority. Because sections of the Bush ground for negotiations on the administration and the Pentagon are most appropriate instrument or instruments; optimistic about the prospects for 3. Identifying and promoting measures to weaponization of space, the U.S. homeland is address the issue, including perhaps the most important public constituency consultations, prenegotiations and to reach. Religious people might be moved by negotiations, essentially: what, how,

where, among whom and when? 1 United States Space Command, Vision for 2020, February 1997. Published as a visual presentation of images and slogans rather than in report form.

62 Rebecca Johnson calls to “Keep the Heavens for Peace,” for sense and evokes an active response from the example, while others might get more nervous general public. by the idea of debris raining down on Earth— remember the spate of movies about asteroids Technical, legal, diplomatic engagement colliding with the Earth, and how worried As a first step, it would be good to gather people became when the Mir space station’s in one volume the most up-to-date research on orbit decayed and it plunged to Earth? Still existing and future activities, assets, and others might perceive it as a political or ethical interests in space, military as well as choice for the United States, essentially “Star commercial. Additionally, we need a study Trek” or “Star Wars”—space for exploration looking at the number and type of objects that and communication or for dominance and would have to be placed in space if missile warfighting. defense were to extend to the weaponization of Fear that communication or satellite space, and combine that with an analysis of the intelligence will be jeopardized is likely also to impact of increasing space debris. On the basis be a powerful argument, though this message of forecasts, it would be helpful for NGOs to cuts both ways. Businesses will back the option commission environmental impact assessments that offers the best chance of minimizing of weapons use or accidents involving the disruption. The military-vulnerability argument presence or use of weapons in space. Such is dual use. Steven Lambakis evokes a trapped information is intrinsically valuable, and can American soldier in Afghanistan who needs to often also be used to raise public awareness call upon a space weapon to knock out a hostile through the media or meetings. satellite that has pinpointed his position. Posed Conferences that bring together a range of in that way, Americans could not be expected experts and practitioners can be very useful. As to refuse to take the steps necessary to defend prospects and understanding of the issue the military assets that protect their sons. But become clearer, it will be necessary to involve the same image of the trapped soldier can be national politicians and diplomats from a wider used to convey a diametrically opposed message range of countries in further meetings. These about weapons in space—imagine him trapped could either be informal, or become constituted and isolated without GPS and satellite as a “Group of Space Experts.” There is a communication as a result of blackouts precedent for this: for some two decades before resulting from detonations in space. the Conference on Disarmament (CD) actually Different messages will work for different managed to agree to a Comprehensive Test Ban people. Although it is widely recognized that Treaty (CTBT) negotiating mandate, a fear can be a very effective political motivator, governmental Group of Seismic Experts was it is important not to use false or exaggerated convened to work on the seismic aspects of information and claims in order to whip up fear verification of a nuclear test ban. I would not and anxiety. Similarly, it is well known that necessarily argue for the same model, as the terrible accidents or, preferably, near misses, GSE suffered from an overly limiting mandate, can rouse a relatively quiescent public—the but it is worth considering how a group of “Chernobyl effect”—but too much “Chicken governmental and nongovernmental experts Little and the falling sky,” as appeared with the might be convened to study the problem and Cassini flyby, can leave NGOs looking foolish. options more formally, perhaps in the margins Fear- and threat-based messages have to be of the CD or a Prevention of an Arms Race in based on realistic scenarios and handled Outer Space (PAROS) Committee—if one ever without sensationalism. Misinformation might gets convened—in Geneva, or potentially produce short-term effect, but it will undermine through the United Nations and the Committee the credibility of one’s message over the long on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space term. So, I go back to the need for further (COPUOS). Such an initiative could yield research, and for consideration to be given for useful information, prepare the ground for how to get the most important information negotiations and also raise awareness of the across in a form and with language that makes issues.

63 NGO Approaches and Initiatives for Addressing Space Security

Measures to address the issue participation base for consultations or I think it is a mistake to regard the “great negotiations. treaty” vs. a “step-by-step” approach as For a particular multilateral disarmament dichotomous or as mutually exclusive measure, the “effective power” of the state alternatives; it would be better to see them as proponents combined with the “effective part of a spectrum of possible approaches. engagement” of civil society must outweigh the There is as yet no “grand treaty” in the pipeline: effective power of state opponents. To create there are different kinds of treaties that could the conditions for successful multilateral arms be considered, from the very radical demand control or disarmament, therefore, attention has made by some NGOs that want a to be paid to diminishing the effective power comprehensive treaty banning weapons and available to opponents, increasing the effective nuclear power used in or passing through space, power of proponents, and increasing the or the treaty elements sketched out by China, to effective engagement of civil society. a normative treaty prohibiting the use of Recognizing that power is principally a product weapons in space or against space objects. of domestic and international political factors Similarly, a step-by-step approach could range and the state’s military and economic force, the from establishment of a voluntary, regulative effective power of opponents and proponents regime, a sort of agreed code of conduct or will depend on the number of governments rules of the road governing civilian and military who oppose or support a particular measure space activities, to a partial treaty banning and their national cohesion and available certain kinds of space-related weapons or international power to push through their activities, either along the lines one analyst has perceived interests on this issue. The drive proposed in a recent Arms Control Today article2 toward space weapons comes almost exclusively or something like an ASAT ban, as was from what is still a relatively small section in the regularly proposed by various governments Pentagon, admittedly close to U.S. Defense during the 1980s. As a first step, states could Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, on the premise that hold talks to consider setting up arrangements space war is inevitable and that pre-emptive for transparency, pre-launch notification, U.S. military dominance of space is the only protection of space assets and joint approaches way to defend against future threats to U.S. for dealing with the problems of space military and commercial assets. It is not crowding and debris. therefore surprising that the primary opponent We often hear the pessimistic argument of CD negotiations on preventing an arms race that the U.S. government will never agree to in space is the United States. Britain, Germany, prohibit space weaponization and that it is and Israel are prepared to give some low key pointless to go ahead with negotiations without support to the US position, although Britain the United States. While agreeing that we and Germany traditionally join the majority in should beware of creating a club of the voting in favor of the PAROS resolutions year- virtuous, I want to argue that there is a wide by-year at the UN General Assembly. operating space between excluding or bypassing The United States may be only one state, the United States and giving Washington a carte but it is the sole remaining superpower, with blanche to do whatever it chooses to do in space, enormous financial, military, and political combined with a veto to block international power. It was also established as a pluralist efforts to set up a “space sanctuary” regime of society, with a constitutional separation collective security, restraint or prohibition with between the legislative, executive, and judicial regard to space. Finding the best approach is a powers, and press freedom, albeit matter both of aims and objectives—the type of circumscribed by advertising biases and who instrument or treaty, for example—and the controls the purse. The effective power that forum, i.e., the structure, context, and the U.S. government can deploy in opposing some form of space sanctuary agreement or

2 treaty banning weapons in space can be James Clay Moltz, “Breaking the Deadlock on diminished through mobilizing commercial, Space Arms Control,” Arms Control Today (April 2002). public and, very importantly, congressional

64 Rebecca Johnson support for such a measure. To prepare the making an argument against initiatives such as ground for multilateral negotiations on space, the Kucinich bill, which can be a very helpful therefore, the strategy must be consciously rallying point for activists, so much as sounding aimed at fostering opposition to the US Space a note of caution about how it is used. Command’s concept that the weaponization of space is inevitable and that the only real MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON question is who gets there first. Similarly, the A TREATY TO PROHIBIT WEAPONS effective power of proponents for addressing AND WAR IN SPACE (SPACE this issue may be diminished through divisions, SANCTUARY TREATY) arising from disagreements about the objective or approach or from larger political In my April 2001 presentation at a large considerations. Proponents may on paper international space conference in Moscow,3 I include almost all the countries represented in concluded that programs to weaponize space the United Nations, but some have very little would destabilize strategic relations, harm power, while others are caught between their international security and jeopardize civilian and perceived national security interests (to ban existing military assets in space. Thus, I argued weapons in space) and strong ties of alliance for early international action to prohibit the with the United States (NATO, etc.). research and development of military programs In exploring the space between US that would result in the deployment of weapons exclusion and U.S. veto, let us now briefly in space. Consequently, I proposed consider the implications of some of the negotiations on a treaty to prohibit weapons measures on that spectrum. and war in space, with the following three components: SPACE PRESERVATION • banning the deployment and use of all kinds of weapons in space, thereby The most uncompromising of the NGOs extending and strengthening the 1967 working on space issues, the Global Network Outer Space Treaty’s prohibitions on Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, weapons of mass destruction in space helped initiate and strongly supports a Space so that laser and other directed energy Preservation Bill tabled in the House of weapons (DEW) and kinetic energy Representative by Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) weapons (KEW) are also banned, as as H.R. 3616 (January 2002). In essence, the bill well as any other potential offensive calls on the United States to ban all research, innovations that military researchers or development, testing, and deployment of space- planners might dream up; based weapons. If passed, it would also require • banning the testing, deployment and the United States to enter negotiations toward use of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, an international treaty to ban weapons in space. whether earth-based or space-based; The Global Network is now soliciting American and groups and individuals and international groups • establishing a code of conduct for the to pledge their support to Kucinich’s bill. Such peace-supporting, non-offensive and initiatives, although unlikely to be successful per non-aggressive uses of space. se, can be very useful in raising the issue and focusing public and political attention. There is, A treaty such as this would probably need however, one potential danger that has to be to be normative, rather than relying on taken into account by proponents of national legislation and particularly by advocates of early international treaty negotiations: that premature 3 See Rebecca Johnson, “Multilateral Approaches to legislative initiatives may also serve to focus and Preventing the Weaponization of Space,” strengthen the opposition to such measures, Disarmament Diplomacy 56 (April 2001). The article thereby “inoculating” the issue against later, was based on the presentation to the International more pragmatically targeted initiatives to Space Conference on “Space Without Weapons— Arena of Peaceful Cooperation in the 21st Century,” prevent the weaponization of space. I am not in Moscow, April 11-14, 2001.

65 NGO Approaches and Initiatives for Addressing Space Security

technical definitions and elaborate verification, institutions, such as the CD, with its genealogy although there are measures relating to straight from the Cold War. transparency, launch notification and even Thirdly, it should be remembered that mutual observation agreements that could before the land mines campaigners bypassed enhance confidence. Nevertheless, while some the CD with the Ottawa process, they had forms of weaponry could be defined sought to have the issue addressed in Geneva technically, it would be more important to through the Convention on Certain Weapons prohibit certain kinds of activities, pre- (CCW) and at the CD. As public and political eminently the use of any space-based object to momentum grew, and it became clear that the attack, disable, or destroy others. The ASAT time was ripe for negotiations despite persistent ban would also have to be viewed in the obstacles in the CD, the Ottawa process context of further initiatives to control missile emerged as the logical process to achieve a ban. development and proliferation. It is true that many key countries stayed outside, In the context of the April 2001 paper, I although it can be argued that the normative noted that in view of the political realities, attributes of the ban and continuing attention which meant that PAROS issues were unlikely by international civil society will act as a weighty to get properly addressed, never mind restraint on producers and users. However, it negotiated in the CD, a space-focused Ottawa- must also be acknowledged that though the type process should be considered. Among CTBT was negotiated multilaterally in the CD, those who disagree with me about this, too India tried to block its adoption, and several of many fail to acknowledge that I noted that the the most active negotiators, including India, Ottawa process was not easily reproducible and Pakistan, China, and the United States, have that there were significant differences in nevertheless failed to support the completed conditions and circumstances between potential treaty. So, an all-inclusive multilateral process in space weaponization and the 1993-97 Ottawa the UN’s established fora does not guarantee process to ban land mines. In this regard, I ownership and full participation in the final want to make three important clarifications. product either. By the time a negotiating The term “Ottawa process” is short-hand for mandate is decided, the battle is more than half denoting a negotiating process that has two won. Therefore the question of negotiating salient features: an initiative led and forum is one for the end game, and characterized by partnership between acknowledging a possible future consideration governmental and nongovernmental experts, of negotiations outside the CD should not be practitioners, and negotiators; and multilateral made into a strategic stumbling block at this negotiations outside the established forum of early stage. I regard it as premature to push the CD. No other similarities are implied. As forward with drafting a model treaty along the my presentation today clearly shows, I lines I suggested—a great deal more work must recognize the pointlessness of negotiating space be done to lay the groundwork and build the issues without the United States. My contention necessary partnership with a small cross-section is that it may be worthwhile to bypass the veto- of states willing to take the lead in pursuing promoting consensus-based structure of the negotiations to achieve a far-reaching and CD, when one or a small number of key preventive space sanctuary agreement. governments block a negotiating mandate, providing that sufficient groundwork has been AMENDING OR ADDING TO THE 1967 laid to ensure that powerful constituencies OUTER SPACE TREATY within opposing states will support and participate in negotiations. Secondly, the Some states, including Russia, have decision to go outside the CD is not a decision proposed negotiating a protocol to strengthen to be taken early or lightly. But, at the same the Outer Space Treaty (OST). This would first time, we need to distinguish between the require the convening of a meeting of States institution of multilateralism, which has an Parties under the treaty. Since the United States important role to play in norm building and is a party, the initiative would risk the Bush regime-creation, and particular multilateral administration signaling its displeasure at being

66 Rebecca Johnson summoned to the negotiating table, not only by deployment of weapons and interceptors in blocking adoption of any protocol (à la the LEO might be welcomed by U.S. military and 1991 Partial Test Ban Treaty [PTBT] political constituencies (because they do not Amendment Conference), but, more seriously, have plans and intentions to go beyond that), by declaring the Outer Space Treaty an but it would not address the basic concerns of outdated encumbrance (as it has with the Anti- most other space sanctuary advocates. It would Ballistic Missile Treaty). Since the OST remains be a pity to divert the growing interest in this useful in its prohibition of weapons of mass arms control issue prematurely into a cul-de-sac destruction in outer space, any initiative to equivalent to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty amend or add to it should be very carefully and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of thought through, in case (by the law of 1974 and 1976, widely regarded as window unintended consequences) it has the damaging dressing (since both the USSR and USA had no effect of weakening U.S. commitment to the further interest in test explosions above 150 existing treaty provisions. kilotons). The step-by-step approach is not meant to PARTIAL TREATIES OR MEASURES be a substitute for addressing a problem fully, but rather a strategy for identifying and Inevitably, when proponents and undertaking partial but systematic and opponents seem to be so far apart, there will be progressive measures. If the objective is only attempts to find a middle ground that can the first step, as often meant in such address aspects of the problem in ways that are approaches, then this is not part of a step-by- more acceptable to the other side. Attempting step approach, but rather a partial measure to find a compromise between the Bush designed to deal only with an immediate Administration’s commitment to missile manifestation of the problem. Despite my defense and the “purist” position of opponents, doubts about an approach that leaves the one U.S. analyst has proposed prohibiting the United States free to do most of the stationing of weapons of any kind in low-Earth destabilizing space developments currently orbit (or LEO, 60-500 miles above Earth), planned or forecasted, I very much welcome forbidding attacks on permanent objects in the thinking that goes into such proposals. It is space and prohibiting shooting from space, but perhaps important at this stage not to rule permitting attacks on missiles traveling through anything out, but to try to engage those on all LEO. In that way, much of the administration’s sides of the argument in a conversation about missile defense plans might be allowed, while the best ways to address space security. clear barriers would prevent escalation to higher levels of space weaponization.4 While this is an VOLUNTARY REGULATORY OR interesting initiative to gain attention from CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES moderates in the Bush administration, it runs the risk of all partial measures—either buying The OST refers to the importance of off public concern, or failing to stimulate international cooperation and use of outer sufficient public support to ensure that space and makes a suggestion for parties to negotiations actually go ahead. The 1963 PTBT, observe the flight of space objects launched by for example, put nuclear testing out of sight, other states. Restraint regimes are generally underground, thereby defusing much of the more successful when they have both incentives public concern, although nuclear testing (shared technology or participation rights, for continued to fuel the nuclear arms race. As example) for those who renounce their own noted earlier, opposition to space programs, as well as transparency and weaponization is linked internationally with confidence-building measures. In this regard, opposition to missile defense. A “technical fix” there are a range of measures, relating not only or partial measure that permits testing and to space-vehicle/missile launches, but also to shared concerns about space collisions and debris, which could be profitably discussed in 4 Moltz, “Breaking the Deadlock on Space Arms Control.” the run-up to negotiations. Agreed measures

67 NGO Approaches and Initiatives for Addressing Space Security

could be established voluntarily to begin with, explored and critically examined. It may be and then incorporated into a negotiated possible to move forward relatively quickly on instrument when the time came. some transparency or regulatory measures, and build a wider NGO-government-commercial THE CD OR NOT THE CD, THAT IS constituency in the United States, and also in THE QUESTION the other three major regions of space interests—the European Union, India and Having explained earlier why I think that Japan—to take more far-reaching legal and we should be prepared to go outside the CD institutional measures. Personally, I think it will when and if it becomes necessary (and only if be necessary at some point to negotiate a new the three basic requirements of groundwork, and preventive space sanctuary instrument— mobilization, and leadership are properly in either a single treaty that incorporates all three place), I want to argue against the current dimensions I proposed in the Moscow paper Chinese (and, to a lesser extent, Russian) (space weapons ban, ASAT ban, and code of position of insisting on a negotiating mandate conduct for non-aggressive uses of space), or a for the PAROS committee equivalent to the series of interlinked agreements and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) instruments, some of which would be negotiating mandate as a condition of agreeing essentially norm-building expressions of to the CD’s program of work. Unless the expectation and prohibition, while others may United States is now going to step back from its be subject to internationally agreed verification earlier agreement to an ad hoc PAROS measures. Insisting at this stage on one true committee without a negotiating mandate, CD approach would be likely to divide proponents members should embrace the chance to get and therefore diminish their effective power started on PAROS discussions, inviting NGO early on. It is more important to get generalized experts and so on. They could start with an agreement to begin the process of discussion analysis of threats and risks, and go on to and exploration of the threats and options. consider confidence-building measures and so Although Secretary Rumsfeld moved on, all of which needs to be discussed before rather swiftly to consolidate U.S. Space anyone sits down to negotiate an actual treaty. Command personnel and structures more There is also COPUOS: but that body, by centrally in the Pentagon, space weaponization agreement, does not address military-related is still likely to be some years off. The Bush questions; the UN First Committee—where administration has a long way to go to prove debate would certainly proceed in the margins, the technology for the terrestrial-based focused around the text of the annual elements of its vague and “multi-layered” resolution, but is limited by the pressure of missile defense schemes, and some programs considering some 40-50 resolutions; or even the are now overshadowed by the budgetary black UN Security Council, if members wish to raise hole of the post-September 11 “war against space security as a priority issue. Of all these, terrorism”; so it seems unlikely that Congress however, the CD would be the most will vote further large sums for R&D on space appropriate forum for getting to grips with the weapons in the near future. We therefore have a complex legal, technical, and political issues, if special opportunity to take time, conduct good only the FMCT/PAROS linkage were not research, and consider the options before we hindering agreement on a program of work. nail our colors to a particular masthead. We have time to build effective constituencies, but CONCLUDING REMARKS we do not have unlimited time. It would be short-sighted to wait until the first weapons At this stage, when the prime task is to were deployed (or the first accident occurred) raise consciousness, a scattershot approach can and then try to establish a retrospective sow lots of fertile seeds. Thus, although some nonproliferation or disarmament regime in of the proposals being put forward are barely space. Much better to seize the early initiative to formed, and others might have serious take preventive and precautionary measures weaknesses, all approaches can (and should) be before too much serious investment of money

68 Rebecca Johnson and prestige goes into convincing the public and politicians that weapons in space will keep them safe.

69 Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation A Reference Handbook Sarah J. Diehl and James Clay Moltz A timely overview of the world’s nuclear weapons and the attempts to manage and control them. Features: • Includes a detailed chronology of nuclear weapons development and control efforts • Surveys current policy issues ranging from nuclear testing to weapons dismantlement to nuclear terrorism • Includes important facts and data, from texts of treaties to estimates of the nuclear capabilities of various countries • Provides annotated lists of print and nonprint resources, from important books to films and websites Sarah J. Diehl is senior editor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies. She is a lawyer and the former managing editor of The Nonproliferation Review. James Clay Moltz is associate director and research professor at CNS. He is the former editor of The Nonproliferation Review and has published over 30 book chapters and articles. $45.00 October 2002 ¥ 340pp. ¥ ISBN 1-57607-361-0 ABC-CLIO ORDER FORM Order by Phone: 800-368-6868, Fax: 805-685-9685, Web: www.abc-clio.com or Return This Form To: ABC-CLIO, P.O. Box 1911, Santa Barbara, CA 93116-1911

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OCCASIONAL PAPERS AVAILABLE FROM CNS

No. 1 Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future, by Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, June 1999.

No. 2 A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., November 1999.

No. 3 Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk, Michael Barletta and Amy Sands, eds., November 1999.

No. 4 Proliferation Challenges and Nonproliferation Opportunities for New Administrations, Michael Barletta, ed., September 2000.

No. 5 International Perspectives on Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Defenses (Special Joint Series on Missile Issues with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, U.K.), March 2001.

No. 6 WMD Threats 2001: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration, Michael Barletta, ed., May 2001.

No. 7 Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects, (Special Joint Series on Missile Issues with the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, U.K.), May 2001.

No. 8 After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation, Michael Barletta, ed., May 2002.

No. 9 The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program, Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, eds., July 2002.

No. 10 Future Security in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, James Clay Moltz, ed., July 2002.

CNS Occasional Papers are available online at: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers.htm

For print or multiple copies, please contact: Scott Parrish, Editor Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies 460 Pierce Street Monterey, California 93940 USA E-mail: [email protected] Tel: 831.647.6654 Fax: 831.647.3519

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