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THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AND

by Larry M. Wortzel

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EMERGING UNITED STATES–CHINA COMPETITION

A PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE pace warfare will be an integrated part of advocated establishing a jointly manned “aerospace Splanning by the Chinese People’s Liberation command” for India to use the missile, , and Army (PLA) in any future conflict. One of the major communications capabilities of the Indian armed proponents of integrated space power for the PLA, forces effectively.6 Major General Cai Fengzhen, believes that “control U.S. security planners must monitor China’s of portions of is a natural extension of efforts carefully, however, because the United States other forms of territorial control,” such as sea or air is singled out in much of the literature as the most control.1 More seriously, because of American supe- likely adversary for the PLA. The PLA has also made riority in space, China’s military theorists treat the surprisingly rapid advances in this area. United States as the most likely opponent in that The most senior and widely published author in domain of . The head of the U.S. Army Space the Chinese military on space warfare and aerospace and Command, Lieutenant General doctrine, Cai Fengzhen, borrows most of his termi- Kevin Campbell, thinks it is possible that “within nology and concepts from U.S. . three years we can be challenged at a near-peer level” Indeed, Cai credits U.S. Lieutenant General Daniel O. by China.2 This means that China will be capable of Graham and his book High Frontier with developing “taking out a number of communications capabil- the original concept.7 Cai traces the concept of ities over a of war.”3 expanding one’s borders directly into space to Gra- ham and his “high frontier” theory.8 Cai opines that space control is a natural extension of other forms of The Genesis of China’s Space territorial control, such as sea control or the control of Warfare Doctrine a nation’s airspace. This is a concept that Cai explored in an earlier work on aerospace operations and the e should not be surprised that the Chinese PLA .9 Wmilitary is developing doctrine for warfare in Other Chinese security literature reflects the inter- space. evolves in response to pretation that the intent of American missile defense changes in technology. It is a normal activity for in space is to extend national airspace control. An strategists and war planners in any military to con- article on in space by Huang Zhicheng of sider how advances in weapons and technology the Beijing Systems Engineering College says that affect warfare and to explore how to adapt to these “the United States is trying to build a ‘strategic exter- changes. The moves by the PLA are serious and nal border’ in space” with its defense bear watching, but American security policymakers plans.10 Huang quotes President John F. Kennedy as should avoid an alarmist reaction to what is hap- saying “whoever controls space [the universe] can pening in China’s military. control the earth” (shei neng kongzhi yuzhou, shei jiu The PLA’s development of space warfare doctrine neng kongzhi diqiu), reflecting China’s deep uneasiness is not some self-made phenomenon. Rather, the PLA about U.S. intentions.11 This is a popular quote in has carefully absorbed and is reacting to what the the PLA. It is probably taught in its military schools. U.S. military has published on space warfare and In a China article, Major General Liu counter-space operations.4 The PLA has also studied Jixian of the PLA Academy of Military Science para- Soviet-era and contemporary Russian thinking on phrases Kennedy this way: “Whoever controls the space operations, using these studies to guide its universe controls our world; whoever controls space own evolving doctrine.5 controls initiative in war.”12 China’s neighbors are also developing the sort of Ultimately, these Chinese authors fail to space warfare capabilities that the United States and acknowledge American intent in developing space the considered decades ago. Former doctrine. Nowhere in Cai’s work, or in other Chi- Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal S. P. Tyagi recently nese examinations of the High Frontier concept, do

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the authors capture Graham’s statement of intent, Future war must combine information, firepower, which was to break away from the strategic nuclear and mobility.”20 They believe that future latent mili- calculus of mutually assured destruction (MAD) in tary threats will primarily come in aerospace. which the United States and the Soviet Union were Like these authors, other military theorists are once locked.13 Graham advocated replacing “the convinced that “the atmosphere and space will dangerous doctrine of MAD with a strategy of become the primary battlefields [in high technology assured survival” for the United States and its war], and the dividing line between them will be allies.14 Cai focuses instead on Graham’s concepts blurred.”21 Some are convinced that in future , of high-performance space planes and directed space will be used to “carry out war between space energy weapons. platforms and to attack strategic surface and air tar- The PLA has reacted to what its officers observed gets.”22 In order to conduct warfare in space, attack in military operations in the Balkans, the first Gulf targets in space, or conduct surface or air attacks War, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where joint operations from space, theorists in the PLA and other Chinese and command were so effective because of U.S. research institutes advocate research into forms of space assets.15 It also has studied U.S. military lit- weapons, particle beam weapons, and other erature about space operations. The PLA, like the forms of directed energy and electromagnetic sys- U.S. Air Force, fully expects any future conflict to tems.23 And not all of this research is limited to include forms of war in space integrated with other military theory. There are also PLA organizations military operations. One should note that it does not conducting basic and applied research into space-to- take espionage to survey the PLA’s collection of ground kinetic weapons systems.24 American doctrine.16 Moreover, the PLA’s terminol- Senior Colonel Zhang Zhiwei and Lieutenant ogy often flows from what its officers read in U.S. Colonel Feng Zhuanjiang, both of the Nanjing Army doctrine. What is impressive—and bears close Command Academy, argue that “space supremacy” watching—is how rapidly the PLA has developed must be an integral part of other forms of supremacy advanced capabilities to engage in warfare in space. over the battlefield.25 They see this as a necessary and logical extension of other forms of military conflict. The bottom line is that the PLA sees war in Space Warfare and Other Forms space as an integrated part of military operations of Military Operations and that and defensive operations are blending.26 pace operations and warfare in space are compo- Snents of what the PLA calls “informationalized,” or information age, warfare.17 In general, PLA strategists Legal Considerations in China are convinced that space will be one of the natural domains of war and that war in space will be an inte- ustifying China’s actions in international law and gral part of other military operations.18 Moreover, Jestablishing positions in domestic law are PLA authors are convinced that “future enemy mili- increasingly important for the PLA as its strategists tary forces will depend heavily on information sys- and planners think about space warfare. Some offi- tems in military operations.” Therefore, they believe, cers in the PLA’s General Political Department are China needs to break through the technological bar- setting out positions that China could use to justify riers and develop information system counter- attacks on “space bodies” such as and other measures in space.19 Two authors writing in China installations, while other scholars and military Military Science, the PLA’s premier military theory thinkers deal with the nuances, and limits, of national journal, believe that “it is in space that information sovereignty. This section explores some of these age warfare will come to its more intensive points. debates. The Communist Party’s senior leadership

2 THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AND SPACE WARFARE sees achieving a leading position in space as key to authoritative PLA doctrine texts, the legal prepara- becoming a military and economic power with tion for a is part of the “psycho- global impact. China’s 2006 White Paper on Space logical operations” that complement the use of Activities sets out China’s space power priorities. In military force.31 The major PLA text explaining how PLA doctrinal books, however, senior PLA officers this legal warfare process would work was validated make it clear that they see the ability to control at a critique session attended by senior legal repre- space during any conflict as “controlling the ‘high sentatives of the Central Military Commission, all ground’ of future warfare.”27 the general departments of the PLA, and the Acad- emy of Military Science.32 Preparation for War and “Legal Warfare.” While In fact, since the establishment of the People’s students of warfare are thinking through Beijing’s Republic of China (PRC), the Communist Party military doctrine in space, other Chinese strategists leadership has been careful to establish a casus belli and legal scholars are engaged in an internal debate before taking military action. Such justification has on how traditional ideas of sovereignty and the laws been in legal or political terms. Prior to the entry of of war apply in space. It is critical for those who fol- PLA troops into the Korean War, the PRC low China’s military development to consider these telegraphed its actions publicly through the Indian internal debates because they imply that before government and with a declaration from Mao using military force in space, China will telegraph its Zedong.33 In the case of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, intentions or justify its planned operations through Chinese diplomats and military leaders carefully political or legal action. staked out their legal positions as early as three years One authoritative volume on the military legal before the conflict.34 They did the same in 1969 system, Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe (The with the Soviet Union and in 1979 prior to the “self- New Revolution in Military Affairs and Building a defensive counterattack” on Vietnam. Thus, this con- Military Legal System), explored the importance of cept of legal warfare has roots in China’s diplomatic ensuring that the PLA sets out legal justifications for practice that have been reinforced by the observation military actions in advance of any conflict.28 These of modern war. studies imply that even now, as these debates take Zhang Shanxin and Pan Jiangang, two officers place in China, the General Political Department is from the PLA’s Xian Political Affairs College, believe developing ways to justify its potential military that prior to any conflict, a nation must “muster actions in domestic law. Such activities and actions in public opinion in its favor,” conducting propaganda, domestic law are intended to have a future impact on psychological, and legal campaigns to ensure sup- international law and international opinion. Beijing port for military action.35 They also suggest devel- did this in the 1992 Maritime Law adopted by the oping domestic law that justifies military action in National People’s Congress, which extended sover- international legal terms. These authors see this as a eign claims over some three million square miles of means of developing “comprehensive national the East and South China Seas, marking it as Chinese power.” They argue that the United States demon- territory on its maps.29 The 2005 Anti-Secession Law strated the importance of such actions in the period is another example of how domestic law is used by before the 2003 attack on Iraq. Beijing to justify potential military action in the Lu Hucheng and Zhang Yucheng of the General future—in this case against Taiwan. Department Political Department classify legal In today’s international system, PLA officers warfare as a “special form of military operations” to explain, setting forth clear legal arguments for military be undertaken in preparation for a conflict.36 Lu and action is necessary if a nation is to get international Zhang define these legal actions as “political prepa- support for military action. They call the process of ration of the battlefield.” They consider legal argu- justifying military conflict “legal warfare.”30 In ments, propaganda, and international agreements

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negotiated in advance to justify any necessary mili- control of its territory. PLA officers believe that tary action. “space control today is the way to guarantee the con- Why is this concept of legal warfare important? trol of airspace . . . and is an absolute necessity for In the recent past, Chinese scholars have set out conducting modern ‘informationalized’ warfare.”38 their views on national sovereignty, sovereignty in When satellite images of China’s new Jin-class sub- space, and the need for “space control” in modern marine appeared on Google Earth on July 5, 2007,39 war. These actions are consistent with this concept the revelation in the international press sent shock of legal warfare and, should any conflict come waves through portions of the PLA. But the military about in space, they will provide the outlines of any had already been thinking about the implications of PLA justification for military action. Monitoring the the open availability of space imaging before this outlines of the PLA’s legal warfare arguments is happened.40 One commentator, Mao Yuan, suggests important. It is also critical that American military in a Second journal that “China’s traditional theorists interact with Chinese scholars and diplo- ‘security vaults’ are evolving and remote areas of the mats whenever possible to limit their ability to country are less secure.”41 He also suggests passive, define the justifications for conflict and evolving defensive responses to these threats: “The PLA needs international law on their own terms. better camouflage and concealment to counter The PLA is also aware of the deep political imaging from space, and better computer network schisms in the United States over renewed nuclear security to keep secrets.” Other Chinese researchers testing and the placement of even defensive have suggested decoys, space-based alarms to warn weapons systems in space. Debate on these issues of imaging, and multi-spectrum stealth camouflage rages in the U.S. Congress, the scientific community, systems to mask China’s activities.42 Thus, there is a academia, and the policy community. It is likely that range of defensive measures under consideration in the concept of legal warfare will be applied to these China to respond to space-based imaging and intel- disputes. We can expect Chinese scholars and mili- ligence collection.43 tary officers to exploit legal objections to any U.S. Nonetheless, some PLA officers have sought to space-based defense initiative. improve security by suggesting active, offensive By way of example, I was invited in 2002 to an measures and not the passive, defensive counter- international conference in England run by a group intelligence programs suggested by Mao Yuan. There of British pacifists to debate issues related to arms is a debate in China focused on concerns about the control and space. The English group’s partner from freedom of other nations to undertake military activ- China was the Chinese Association for Peace and ities in—or over—sovereign Chinese territory.44 Disarmament. When I met the members of the Chi- In addition, elements of this debate broaden the nese delegation, however, four of them were either interpretation of sovereignty from that normally PLA officers or Ministry of State security officers I accepted in international law and practice. To had met in China at other arms control events. In respond, some researchers at PLA academies argue England, they operated under cover and identified that modern technology is driving the main battle- themselves as disarmament researchers. field for future “informationalized” warfare into outer space. To meet that challenge, they believe that Anti-Access Strategies and “Sovereignty Control.” the Chinese military must rapidly build up its mili- China’s nineteenth-century history of foreign inva- tary space power.45 sion and extraterritorial zones is the basis for China’s Military thinkers in China are also debating how sensitivity to and strong concerns sovereignty affects warfare in space. Legal scholar about questions of sovereignty.37 As noted earlier, Ren Xiaofeng summarizes Beijing’s sensitivity to PLA military and legal thinkers see the control of reconnaissance and military activities in its exclusive outer space as a natural extension of a nation’s economic zone (EEZ) and its adjacent airspace this

4 THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AND SPACE WARFARE way: “Freedom of navigation and overflight does not as the Kármán line—ought to be the ceiling of sover- include the freedom to conduct military and recon- eignty, there is none.53 naissance activities. These things [military recon- The dominant argument in China seems to be naissance activities] amount to forms of military that even though outer space is undivided and “the deterrence and intelligence gathering as battlefield common domain of all mankind, space security is a preparation.”46 These activities in the EEZ, accord- necessary part of a nation’s security and it is neces- ing to Ren, connote preparation to use force against sary to develop defensive mechanisms” over one’s the coastal state. When Ren refers to the “adjacent territory.54 Indeed, Cai Fengzhen and his coauthors airspace,” he includes outer space and space recon- make the argument in the most detail: naissance. Not all PLA authors, however, set out the same broad claims for sovereignty in space. There is The area above ground, airspace and outer ambiguity—even disagreement—among thinkers space are inseparable and integrated. They are in the PLA over the extent to which a nation may the strategic commanding height of modern extend its sovereignty into outer space. Two scholars informationalized warfare. . . . The airspace from the Wuhan College over territorial waters and territorial land are believe that “one advantage of warfare in space is protected, but there is no clear standard in that once in space a nation is free from the restric- international law as to the altitude to which tions imposed on military operations by inter- territorial airspace extends.55 national borders; therefore, there are no restrictions on operations because of territorial airspace.”47 Cai acknowledges a debate and discusses various The official position of the United States on this interpretations of whether sovereignty extends only matter is set forth in the National .48 In to the Kármán line or whether a nation can defend the policy, “the United States rejects any claims to sov- its sovereign airspace overhead up to an altitude of ereignty by any nation over outer space or celestial thousands of miles.56 His bottom line, however, is bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejects any limita- that a nation can defend itself and seek to control tions on the fundamental right of the United States to space as far (or more correctly, as high) as its weapons operate in and acquire data from outer space.” can reach.57 These views from China stand in direct That position was not always set out so clearly. A contrast to the legal positions set forth in U.S. policy legal note published after the Soviet Union downed and practice. a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft in 1960 discussed There are also strong differences in the positions the concept of national sovereignty as applied to set forth by Chinese and American strategists and outer space.49 The note acknowledged that “airspace legal scholars on the conduct of reconnaissance. sovereignty implies a sovereign air zone limited to a Since 1958, “the United States maintains that vertical projection from the underlying national ter- ‘peaceful’ in relation to outer space activities was ritory.”50 In fact, in 1958, the legal advisor to the interpreted . . . to mean ‘non-aggressive’ rather U.S. Department of State suggested, “American sov- than non-military.”58 ereignty may extend upward for ten thousand miles, For some time, the Soviet Union and the United while some Soviet commentators claimed that Soviet States mutually recognized that the ability to con- airspace “extends to infinity.”51 duct reconnaissance from space provided strategic Formally, however, both the Soviet Union and the stability in the . The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Mis- United States refused to define the upward extent of sile Treaty agreed by the two nations provided that airspace or otherwise differentiate airspace from outer “each Party undertakes not to interfere with the space.52 Although some commentators on the subject national technical means of verification of the other have suggested that the end of the atmosphere— Party operating in” a manner consistent with gener- about 100 kilometers or 62 miles up, a zone known ally recognized principles of international law.59

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In Chinese texts, for the most part, questions of The Laws of War Apply. Cai and Tian also examine sovereignty in space are treated as analogous to the the “legal environment” surrounding the application extension of national sovereignty into the EEZ and of the laws of war in space. They believe that many of are viewed as an inherent right of a nation, like the the concepts surrounding the conduct of war on the control of its airspace. Nevertheless, the advocates “common seas” apply in space, just as they do in air- for “sovereignty control” recognize that they cannot space above the common seas.64 They note that just continuously control the passage of space bodies as belligerents have the right to conduct warfare at sea through what they see as their territory. They seek a beyond their territorial waters, they should have the more limited and temporal ability to control right to attack the space bodies of belligerents.65 space.60 In their writing on integrated aerospace In their 2004 text on space and the PLA Air Force, operations, Cai Fengzhen and Tian Anping give per- Cai and Tian establish that they see no restrictions on haps the most complete explanation of how space defending one’s nation in space or protecting the control relates to the PLA’s military theory on outer space bodies of allies.66 They note in the 2006 text space operations: that, on common seas, acts of war by belligerents should not interfere with normal commerce for non- Space control is the capability of one belliger- combatants, but that a belligerent can make war on ent in a state of war, in a specified period of commercial ships supporting the war effort.67 There- time, in a defined area of space, to carry out its fore, they reason, similar rules should apply in outer own operations with freedom while hindering space. Two other Chinese scholars argue that because or preventing an enemy from carrying out its they are so vital for the conduct of war, in times of own operations or using space.61 conflict the space installations and of a bel- ligerent nation are valid targets for attack anywhere The most senior PLA Air Force officer who has in the common skies, just as ships of a belligerent can written authoritatively on the matter of space and be attacked on the common seas.68 One scholar has China’s national security interests is General Zheng argued that in the event of a conflict, the satellites of Shenxia, commandant of the PLA Academy of Mili- third parties can be attacked if they are carrying the tary Science. Writing with his political commissar, military data streams of a belligerent nation.69 Lieutenant General Liu Yuan, Zheng accuses the The Chinese interpretation of the laws of war as United States of maintaining a “policy of contain- they may apply in space is generally consistent with ment” (Meiguo dui Hua ‘E- zhi’ Zhanlue).62 Zheng American and Western legal views.70 Still, as legal and Liu’s recommendation to meet this challenge is scholar He Qishi pointed out in a 1993 article, “[t]he that, to preserve China’s own national interests, Bei- question of transit flights of foreign space objects jing must be capable of controlling the electromag- through ‘national airspace’ and other matters” still netic spectrum as well as traditional sovereignty need to be defined in law.71 He leaves open the control, including the land territory, the maritime question of what constitutes national airspace. domain, airspace, and space.63 Should Beijing decide to attack commercial space- Based on the preponderance of policy positions craft because they are carrying military data streams, advocated by senior PLA officers, it is likely that Bei- it would severely affect international commerce as jing will develop capabilities to control or act in well as China’s own use of space. space up to the limits of its technical capabilities. The succinct suggestion by Cai and Tian above that Reconnaissance or “Battlefield Preparation?” As such control be exercised only in a defined area and noted earlier, there is deep disagreement between period of time, however, will probably prevail. Bei- China and the United States about the nature of— jing will likely exercise sovereignty control in space and intent behind—the conduct of reconnaissance only in times of serious crisis or war. and surveillance.72 Objections to aerial and maritime

6 THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AND SPACE WARFARE reconnaissance in common seas and airspace by Chi- Also, now that China has a number of military nese military leaders are not new. During the years I reconnaissance satellites in continuous orbit—even was a military attaché in Beijing (1988–1990 and if Beijing does not acknowledge them as military— 1995–1997), I took part in a number of meetings at China’s positions on this matter may evolve.77 There which senior Chinese and defense officials com- is fertile ground for bilateral discussions in aca- plained to U.S. commanders or defense officials about demic, quasi-governmental, and private “Track II” peacetime reconnaissance by the United States inside (that is, government) dialogue. China’s EEZ. Indeed, the 2001 collision between a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a pursuing Chi- nese F-8 fighter—in which the fighter crashed, killing The PLA Considers Tools of Space Warfare its pilot—raised new objections from Beijing over military reconnaissance in the EEZ. Recent legal arti- he PLA is exploring a variety of space weapons cles that equate reconnaissance with battlefield prepa- Tthrough theoretical, basic, and applied research.78 ration puts the EP-3 incident into perspective. These include:79 Chinese commentators are extending this thinking into considerations about space reconnaissance. • satellite jamming technology In an international law journal, one Chinese • collisions between space bodies writer acknowledged the disagreement between the United States and China on the matter, noting that • kinetic energy weapons the U.S. position on outer space takes “peaceful use” • space-to-ground attack weapons to mean “non-aggressive,” whereas the Chinese inter- pretation is that to be peaceful use, it must be “non- • space planes that can transit and fight “up military.”73 One author in a collection of essays on or down” in the upper atmosphere or space information age warfare in China for popular reading • high-power laser weapons notes that “battlefield situational awareness is the core of information age warfare . . . which means that • high-power systems one must be able to destroy or jam the systems that • particle beam weapons are fundamental to that situational awareness.”74 • Other PLA authors believe that the “intelligence war” (Qingbao Zhan) has to be fought before the start of PLA authors credit the United States with having armed conflict, which includes various means of the most advanced capabilities in the areas of kinetic reconnaissance and information-gathering.75 energy weapons, particle beam weapons, and These differences between the United States and directed energy in general. However, the PLA does other countries on the nature of surveillance, espe- well at various forms of jamming and has done a lot cially from space, are not new. The Soviet Union’s of work on the concept of colliding space bodies. students of space theory and law generally inter- The dilemma here for the military theorists and preted “peaceful” to mean “non-military.” Soviet and planners in the United States is that this is really Chinese scholars have also argued that the use of space science and science. Although Chinese surveillance satellites constitutes an aggressive use of military theory and basic and applied research into outer space, while the U.S. position maintains that these areas are transparent, the weapons systems such surveillance is a “non-aggressive use” of outer that may emerge as formal programs are not. It is not space.76 Thus, we can expect that any future dia- clear to theorists and policymakers whether current logue between the United States and China on these science will support many of these space war sys- strategic issues will spend a great deal of time on the tems. Therefore, the United States must apply question of the nature of reconnaissance activities. resources toward engaging people with scientific,

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mathematical, and engineering backgrounds in intel- the capabilities it is developing—that is, when ligence research and analysis on China. The PLA is researchers consider a form of space warfare, or serious about space warfare. Moreover, the destruc- develop capabilities to be applied in space weapons, tion of its own and the blinding of a are there also PLA officers in the policy or planning U.S. satellite mean it is achieving some success. spheres thinking through the implications of In general, PLA theorists think internal lines of employing that capability? If not, an incident could communication and support are most favorable for quickly escalate and get out of control, leading to an successful military operations, whether offensive, exchange of fire or a deeper crisis. defensive, or logistical.80 They see internal lines as For example, four officers from the PLA’s Second superior to external ones.81 Thus, they see their Artillery Command College have published an analy- regional position in Asia as superior to that of the sis of how to jam or destroy the space-based ballistic United States because the latter has to fight, com- missile advanced warning systems of the United municate, and resupply along extended external States.82 In their article, the officers note, “a space- lines, while China enjoys internal lines of communi- borne missile early warning system will play a pivotal cation within the range of its aircraft, missiles, and role in future space wars.”83 They set out the capa- submarine fleet. This means that in a conflict, they bilities and parameters of the U.S. Defense Support would probably use their jamming and anti-satellite Program (DSP) early-warning satellites, including the systems to disrupt American lines of communica- geosynchronous orbits of the satellite sets, their axis tion, , situational awareness, of look, the infrared bands they cover, and their and efforts at military coordination. shortcomings. The authors discuss how to destroy One of the most disruptive things the PLA could do the DSP satellites with other satellites, ground-based would be to neutralize the U.S. ability to use tracking , or weapons.84 They also discuss and data relay satellites, which provide global, real- how to jam the satellites and their satellite-to-ground time sensor and communications capabilities for net- transmissions and how to camouflage the infrared worked operations. The PLA believes that the United radiation emitted by a missile to make it more diffi- States is heavily dependent on its satellite systems— cult for the warning satellite to detect an attack.85 at least, more dependent than the PLA is on its own. In their conclusion, the authors find that main- But that is changing. As the PLA modernizes its own taining a strategic ballistic missile capability is a command, control, communications, computers, powerful deterrent to prevent the United States from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) launching a large-scale military attack or interven- systems, it is becoming as dependent on space and tion aimed at China’s own military operations on its information systems as the United States already is. southeast coast (say, to intervene in potential Chi- Therefore, its policies of space control and space deter- nese military operations against Taiwan).86 Their rence for military purposes are no longer forms of view is that “destroying and jamming space-borne . Rather, the contest will be over missile early warning systems not only can paralyze which force can most effectively disrupt the other’s such anti-missile systems, but also will help [the military operations. Space warfare may well become PRC] win the war in space.”87 an integral part of traditional conflict. The problem in this reasoning is that there is no consideration of a likely American reaction to the disruption of its missile early warning systems. One The Implications of Attacks possible reaction by the United States is that it might on Reconnaissance Satellites well think it is coming under immediate attack and launch its own strike against China’s strategic ne question that begs an answer is whether the missile forces. Another reasonable—and perhaps OPLA is considering the implications of exercising equally escalatory—reaction by U.S. forces might be 8 THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AND SPACE WARFARE to strike the source of the Chinese attack, particu- and other countries know that they do not have free larly if it came from a ground-based laser or direct reign in space or over China. We may see the PLA ascent launch. Thus, even if such a reaction by the demonstrate various forms of jamming. In doing so, United States would use conventional weapons, the the PLA would conduct operational tests of the work PLA may find it had created a deeper crisis leading being done on jamming synthetic aperture radar to an American strike on Chinese soil. These four satellites. Much of the work in Chinese journals dis- PLA authors do not seem to have considered the cusses maneuvering space bodies to intersect in ramifications of their own research. orbit. This type of maneuvering lends itself to “acci- dental” collisions between space bodies. China could then deny the hostile intent of such accidents, but Space Deterrence they would still have a “space deterrent” capability.

pace power theorists like Cai Fengzhen advocate Sthe ability to control parts of space for limited Conclusions periods. Huang Zhicheng, in reaction to the U.S. Air Force manual section AFM 2-2.1 n the event of conflict with China, we can expect on space warfare and countermeasures, develops the Ito see military operations carried out across all the concept further, advocating a regime of “space deter- domains of war: land, sea, air, space, and the electro- rence” to counter American “space superiority.”88 magnetic spectrum (that is, and For Huang, this shift toward “space deterrence” - cyber-warfare). Any military operations in space will rors a trend in U.S. space theory.89 Huang defines be part of a more coordinated attack on an enemy’s this as “the use of strong aerospace power to create knowledge and command systems. There will prob- or demonstrate a threat to an opponent’s space ably be a strategic warning, even if there is opera- power to deter that opponent in a practical way.”90 tional or tactical surprise—that is, the PLA and the The goal of this deterrence is to increase the PLA’s Chinese Central Military Commission will likely jus- power in weapons systems, information gathering, tify any of its actions in advance by conducting what and command and control to improve national it calls “legal warfare.” The PLA will seek to exercise warning systems in China, create fear in an adver- “space control” in a limited area of conflict, and it sary, and degrade the adversary’s power.91 will probably observe the internationally accepted The key to achieving this level of deterrence, definitions of “commons” in space (above the Kár- according to Huang, is to concentrate one’s own eco- mán line) in peacetime and during periods of ten- nomic, military, and science and technology power sion. If conflict breaks out, however, altitude limits to “ruin an opponent’s economy and ability to func- on space control will be off, and any systems carry- tion in space.”92 The intention behind the December ing adversaries’ military traffic or signals will prob- 2006 blinding of a U.S. satellite by a Chinese laser ably be fair game for the PLA. The PRC’s foreign and the January 11, 2007, destruction of a Chinese ministry, security services, Communist Party liaison weather satellite by the PLA’s own direct ascent vehi- department, and the PLA will likely exploit political cle is clear when interpreted as “space deterrence.”93 divisions in the United States over nuclear testing For a deterrent to be credible, one must demonstrate and space-based weapon systems by applying the the capability to carry it out. It is also important to concept of “legal warfare.” note that Huang’s vision of effective space deterrence U.S. Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter, on a includes crippling attacks on information networks visit to Australia in August, said that the United and C4ISR systems. States still wants to “understand what the Chinese In the future, we may see other examples of intention is” in its military modernization.94 This “space deterrence” intended to let the United States concern over how China will engage in military

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operations in space is really about intentions. Many with the other’s free passage in space. Both countries of China’s activities and policy positions make it also agreed that the ability to conduct strategic veri- hard to interpret Beijing’s intent. Among these are: fication from space stabilized the nuclear balance. No such dialogue has taken place with China. • China’s expansive territorial claims, com- Indeed, the PLA has either ignored or rebuffed bined with periodic incidents of the use of American efforts at such a dialogue. Often, senior force to reinforce these claims95 military or Communist Party leaders have told • the justification for extending the territorial Americans that to engage in such a dialogue is an claims of China into the reaches of outer example of a “cold war mentality.”96 I believe that space, as outlined in this paper discussions on these issues will help clarify the rationale for U.S. space policy and help reduce the • the shaping of the “space battlefield” with threat of space warfare. legal arguments that would justify China’s Although we do not know China’s intentions, we actions to prevent space observation over can infer them from Beijing’s actions—the attack on its territory a U.S. satellite with a laser and the destruction of its The United States has taken a course with China own weather satellite as a demonstration of capa- far different from the isolationist and confronta- bility. We can also infer Beijing’s intentions from a tional approach it took with the Soviet Union. The judicious review of its military literature. By observ- United States is heavily involved in trade and eco- ing the military capabilities China is acquiring nomic and political engagement with China. and reading its literature, we know that China’s Nonetheless, each country is wary of the potential leaders are preparing as though they might have to for conflict with the other, and they have some fun- fight the United States. Furthermore, the PLA is damental differences of national interest. busily preparing the “space battlefield” in advance Whether one is a proponent of arms control with legal arguments, just as called for in its doc- agreements or not, the dialogue between the United trine. There are thus sound reasons to prepare to States and the Soviet Union over arms control and defend American interests in space, to engage in treaties produced a body of mutual understanding mutual threat reduction measures, and to pursue that holds up today. Both countries seemed to realize programs that will ensure that the U.S. military will that it is potentially destabilizing to define the upper have access to space—and space-based logistical limits of sovereignty. Thus, neither country interfered support—in any future conflict.

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Notes

1. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Yiti 9. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Zhan- Zuozhan Xue [Integrated Aerospace Operations] (Beijing: chang yu Zhongguo Kongjun [The Aerospace Battlefield and PLA Press, 2006), 58. China’s Air Force] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004). 2. “U.S. Military Sees Looming China Threat to Satel- 10. Huang Zhicheng, “Taikong Wuqihua yu Taikong lites,” Space War, August 14, 2007, available at www. Weishe” [The Weaponization of Space and Space spacewar.com/reports/US_military_sees_looming_China Threats], Guoji Jishu Jingji Yanjiu [Studies in International _threat_to_satellites_999.html (accessed October 5, Technology and Economy] 9, no. 1 (January 2006): 27. 2007). 11. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 12. Liu Jixian, “Junshi Hangtian Lilun de Yanjiu yu 4. See, for example, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chaungxin—dui Junshi Hangtian Xue de Renshi yu Publication 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations Pingjia” [Study and Originality in Military Space (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 9, Theory—Understanding and Commentary on Military 2002); Secretary of the Air Force, Air Force Doctrine Docu- Space Theory], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 19, no. 6 (June ment 2-2, Space Operation (Washington, DC: Department 2006): 147. of Defense, November 27, 2006) (superseding a Novem- 13. Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A New National ber 27, 2001, publication); and Secretary of the Air Force, Strategy, x, 1. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Counterspace Operation 14. Ibid., 1. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, August 2, 15. Fu Quanyou, “Make Active Explorations, Deepen 2004). Reform, Advance Military Work in an All-Around Way,” 5. See, for instance, Yu Kunyang, Mao Zhaojun, Li Qiushi, no. 6 (March 6, 1998), in FBIS-CHI-98-093, April Yunzhi, “Mei, E, Hangtian Budui Zuzhi Tizhi Fenxi Ji 3, 1998; Shen Weiguang, “Xinxizhan: Mengxiang yu Qishi” [Analysis of the United States’ and Russia’s Space Xianshi” [Information Warfare: Dreams and Reality], Organization Systems and Their Inspiration], Zhuangbei Zhongguo Guofang Bao [China Defense News], February ZhihuiJishu Xueyuan Xuebao [Journal of the Academy of 14, 1997; Wang Huyang, “Five Methods in Information Equipment Command and Technology] 16, no. 6 (2005): Warfare,” Jiefang Junbao, November 7, 1995, in FBIS- 70–75; Meng Lang, “Weilai Zhanzheng Shemma Yang” CHI-96-194; Deng Raolin, Qian Shi Xu, and Zhao Jincun, [What Is Happening on the Future Battlefield], Renmin eds., Gao Jishu Jubu Zhanzheng Lilun Yanjiu [Theory and Ribao [People’s Daily], January 8, 2001, available at www. Research in High Technology Warfare under Limited people.com.cn/GB/junshi/62/20010108/372946.html Conditions] (Beijing: Military Friendship and Literature (accessed October 5, 2007); and Tian Taoyun, “Yingjie Publishers, 1998); and Li Jijun, “Xin Shiqi Jundai Jianshe Xin Tiaozhan: Zhongguo Junshi Zhuanjia Tichu Junshi de Zhidao Gangling” [Guiding Doctrine on Military Hangtian Lilun” [Meeting a New Challenge: China’s Mili- Building in the New Age], in Junshi Lilun yu Zhanzheng tary Experts Propose Military Aerospace Theory], Xin- Shijian [Military Theory and Practice in War] (Beijing: huauwang, December 13, 2002. Military Science Publishers, 1994). 6. Dipindra Nalan Chakravarthi, “Future Aerospace 16. U.S. space warfare documents are available at Power,” New Delhi Force, September 1, 2007, in Open www.fas.org and www.dtic.mil/doctrine/. Source Center (OSC) SAP20070912342003. 17. “Informationalized” is an awkward term in English. 7. See Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A In Chinese (xinxihuade) it makes more sense, but the PLA New National Strategy (Washington, DC: High Frontier, uses it consistently in its own translations. The best Eng- 1982), quoted in Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kong- lish equivalents would be “information age warfare” or tian Yiti Zuozhan Xue, 58. “war in the information age.” See Zhao Erquan, “Lun Xix- 8. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Yiti ihua Zhanzheng dui Wuzhuang Chongtu Fa de Shenyuan Zuozhan Xue, 58. Yinxiang” [A Discussion of the Far-Reaching Effects of

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Informationalized Warfare on the Laws of Armed Con- (February 2006): 33–37, in OSC CPP20070104424009; flict], in Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe [The Tseng Ming-Yi, “Taiwan Investigation of PRC’s ‘Directed New Revolution in Military Affairs and Building a Military Energy’ Weapons Research,” Kuo-Fang Tsa-Chic Legal System], eds. Liu Jixian and Liu Zheng (Beijing: [National Defense Magazine], January 1, 2007, in OSC PLA Press, 2005), 498–505; and Pan Youmu, “Zhuoyan CPP200702161132008, April 5, 2007. Kongtian Yitihua Tansuo Guojia Kongtian Anquan Zhan- 25. Zhang Zhiwei and Feng Zhuanjiang, “Analysis of lue” [Focus on Air-Space Integration and Exploring a Future Integrated Air and Space Operations”: 1. National Air-Space Strategy], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 26. Liu Jixian, “Junshi Hangtian Lilun de Yanjiu yu [China Military Science] 19, no. 2 (2006): 64. Chaungxin—dui Junshi Hangtian Xue de Renshi yu 18. Zhang Qinghai and Ji Xiaohai, “Tai kong zhan: You Pingjia”: 145, 147. gouxiang dao xianshi” [Space Warfare: From Vision to 27. Sun Laiyan, “White Paper on Space Activities,” Reality], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue [China Military Science] October 12, 2006. 18 (January 2005): 34–36; and Huang Tie Gang, Zhou Xin 28. Liu Jixian and Liu Zheng, eds., Xin Junshi Geming yu Chu, Chen Jun, and Liu Ya Jing, “Weilai di si zhanchang— Junshi Fazhi Jianshe [The New Revolution in Military taikong” [The Fourth Battlefield in Future—Outer Affairs and Building a Military Legal System] (Beijing: Space], Xiandai Fangyu Jishu [Modern Defense Technol- PLA Press, 2005); and Zheng Shenxia and Liu Yuan, eds., ogy] 32, no. 1 (February 2004): 8–14. A similar position Guofang he Jundui Jianshe Guanshe Luoshi Kexue Fazhan can be found in Zhang Zhiwei and Feng Zhuanjiang, Guan Xuexi Tiyao [Study Materials for Completely Build- “Analysis of Future Integrated Air and Space Operations,” ing the Military and National Defense] (Beijing, PLA China Military Science 19, no. 2 (2006), in OSC Press, 2006), 192–94. CPP20061208478002, December 8, 2006. 29. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territor- 19. Yang Jinhui and Chang Xianqi, “Kongjian Xinxi ial Sea and the Continuous Zone (February 25, 1992), avail- Duikang Wenti Yanjiu” [Research and Problems of Space able at www.zhb.gov.cn/english/law_detail.php3?id=32 Information Warfare], Wu Xiandian Gongcheng [Radio (accessed October 5, 2007). Engineering] 36, no. 11 (2006): 9. 30. One of the most important case studies in the PLA 20. Zhang Jiali and Min Zengfu, “Shi lun jubu texts that the authors use to justify the concept was U.S. zhanzheng kong zhong hua” [On Extending the Regional justification in the United Nations Security Council for its War into the Air and Space], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue actions in Iraq in 2003 on United Nations Resolutions [China Military Science] 18 (January 2005): 41. 1373 and 1368. See Xu Ou and Tong Yunhe, “Cong 21. Pan Youmu, “Zhuoyan Kongtian Yitihua Tansuo Yilake Zhanzheng Kan Guoji Fa Zai Weilai Zhanzheng de Guojia Kongtian Anquan Zhanlue”: 60. Zuoyong” [From the Standpoint of the Iraq War Examine 22. Cheng Yong and Guo Yanlong, “Fan Weixing the Utility of International Law in Future Warfare], in Xin Jiguang Wuqi Fazhan Xianzhuang yu Dongtai Fenxi” [An Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, eds. Liu Jixian and Analysis of Present Day Trends in Anti-Satellite Laser Liu Zheng, 475–79. Weapons], Dimian Fangkong Wuqi [Ground Air Defense 31. Zhang Yuliang et al., eds., Zhanyi Xue [On Military Weapons] 312, no. 4 (2004): 51–54. Campaigns] (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 23. Li Naiguo, Xinxizhan Xinlun [A New Discussion on 2006), 205–07. Information Warfare] (Beijing: National Defense Univer- 32. Liu Jixian and Liu Zheng, eds., Xin Junshi Geming yu sity Press, 2004), 67–68. Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, 581. 24. Shen Shilu, Feng Shuxing, and Xu Xuefeng, “Tian 33. See Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Ji Dui Di Daji Dongneng Wuqi Zuozhan Nengli yu Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New Kexing Xing Fenxi” [The Analysis of the Operational York: Columbia University Press, 1967). Capability and Feasibility of Space-to-Ground Kinetic 34. See Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, “PLA Oper- Weapons], Zhuangbei Zhihui Jishu Xueyaun Xuebao [Journal ational Principles and : The Sino-Indian War of the Academy of Command and Technology] 17, no. 1 of 1962,” in Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since

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1949, eds. Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finklestein, and Michael in OSC CPP20070104424011; Huang Shiqi and Liu A. McDevitt, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), 173–97. Daizhi, “Fan Chengxiang Weixing Zhencha Jishu yu 35. Zhang Shanxin and Pan Jiangang, “Fazhizhan de Fangfa Celue Yanjiu” [Study of Anti-Imaging Spy Satellite Hanyi yu Yunyong” [The Utility and Implications of Legal Technology and Tactical Methods Research], Second Warfare], in Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Fazhi Jianshe, eds. Artillery Engineering College, 104–07. Liu Jixian and Liu Zheng, 428–34. 43. “China: PLA Training Emphasizes Imagery Recon 36. Le Hucheng and Zhang Yucheng, “Faluzhan Zai Evasion,” OSC Analysis, July 31, 2007, in OSC Junshi Douzheng Zhunbei Zhong de Diwei he Zuoyong” CPF20070731534001. [The Utility and Position of Legal Warfare in the Prepara- 44. Ren Xiaofeng, “Zhuanyu Jingjiqu Junshi Liyong de tion for Military Conflict], in Xin Junshi Geming yu Junshi Falu Wenti: Zhongguo de Guanjiao” [Legal Issues Fazhi Jianshe, eds. Liu Jixian and Liu Zheng, 355–62; Liu Regarding Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities Zhongshan, “Ziweiquan yu Zhuquan” [Sovereignty and in the EEZ and Adjacent Airspace: A Chinese Perspective], the Right of Self-Defense], Zhanlue yu Guanli [Strategy Chinalawinfo.com. and Management], no. 1 (2002): 50. 45. Zhang Hualiang and Song Huaren, “Luelun Xinxi- 37. See the discussion on “sovereignty security” in Liu hua Zhanzheng Zhu Zhanchang Xiang Taikong Zhuanyi Jingbo, 21 Shiichu Zhongguo Guojia Anquan Zhanlue [China’s de Biranxing” [Discussion on the Inevitability of the Main National Security Strategy in the Early Twenty-First Cen- Battlefield in Information War Transferring to Outer tury] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 2006), 2–3. John W. Space], in Zhuangbei Zhiui Jishu Xueyaun Xuebao [Journal Garver has an excellent discussion on this sensitivity and of the Academy of Equipment Command and Technol- relates it to what he calls the “myth of national humiliation” ogy] 15, no. 5 (October 2004): 14, 17; and Gao Qingjun, in John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic “Characteristics and Limitations of Space Reconnaissance of China (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993), 4–8. in High-Tech Local War,” Zhuangbei Shihui Jishu Xueyuan 38. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Zhan- [Journal of the Academy of Command and Technology], chang yu Zhongguo Kongjun, 2. They make essentially the February 1, 2005, 52–56, in OSC CPP20070105424011. same point in their 2006 text. (Cai Fengzhen, Tian 46. Ren Xiaofeng, “Zhuanyu Jingjiqu Junshi Liyong de Anping, et al., Kongtian Yiti Zuozhan Xue, 58.) Falu Wenti: Zhongguo de Guanjiao.” 39. Aria Pearson, “China’s New Submarine Spotted on 47. Cheng Yong and Guo Yanlong, “Fan Weixing Google Earth,” NewScientistTech, July 6, 2007, available Jiguang Wuqi Fazhan Xianzhuang yu Dongtai Fenxi.” at http://technology.newscientist.com/article/dn12204 48. White House, Office of Science and Technology (accessed October 5, 2007). Policy, “U.S. National Space Policy,” August 31, 2006, 40. Mao Yuan, “Gegediqiu yinfa de Sikao” [Thoughts available at www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20 Prompted by Google Earth], Huojianbing Bao [Rocket Troops Space%20Policy.pdf (accessed October 5, 2007). Daily], June 1, 2007, in OSC CPP20070723478006. A 49. National Sovereignty of Outer Space, 74 Harv. L. Rev. number of blogs by soldiers on PLA websites complained 1154–75 (1960–61). that China’s secrets were open to observation from space. 50. Ibid. at 1164. See Wang Guobo and Yang Chen, “Google Earth Prompts 51. Ibid. at 1167nn98–99. Heated Discussion among Grassroots Level Military Per- 52. Ibid. at 1168–69. sonnel,” Kongjun Bao [Air Force Daily], April 19, 2007, in 53. See Michel Bourbonniere, National Security Law in OSC CPP20070706478005. Outer Space: The Interface of Exploration and Security, 70 J. 41. Mao Yuan, “Gegediqiu yinfa de Sikao.” Air L. & Com. no. 1, 3–62 (2005). 42. Li Yong, Wang Xiao, Yi Ming, and Wang Long, 54. Pan Youmu, “Zhuoyan Kongtian Yitihua Tansuo “Threats to Space-Borne Optoelectronic Imaging and Guojia Kongtian Anquan Zhanlue”: 60–66. Telemetry Systems and Countermeasures Technology,” 55. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Yiti in Hongwai yu Jiguang Gongcheng [Infrared and Laser Zuozhan Xue, 90–91. Engineering] 34, no. 6 (December 2005): 631–35, 640, 56. Ibid., 91–92.

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57. Ibid., 57, 216–17. Jingjiqu Junshi Liyong de Falu Wenti: Zhongguo de 58. Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Fron- Guanjiao.” tier: The in Space, 49 Air Force L. Rev. 44 73. Chen Qiang, Chinese Practice in Public International (2000). Law, 3 Chinese J. Int’l L. no. 591, 17–28 (2003). 59. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United 74. Wang Pufeng, “Xinxizhan Yanjiu zhong Ruogan States and the Soviet Union, quoted in Robert A. Ramey, Wenti de Wo Jian” [My Views on Basic Questions in Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Research on Informationalized Warfare], in Zhongguo Xinxi Space 52n454. Zhan [China’s Information Warfare], eds. Shen Weiguang 60. Li Daguang, “Taikong Zuozhan de Zhidao Sixiang” et al. (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2005), 42–43. [Thoughts on Aerospace Operations Command and Con- 75. Li Naiguo, Xinxizhan Xinlun, 35–45, esp. 43. trol], Guoji Taikong [International Aerospace], no. 3 76. There is an excellent discussion of this disagree- (2004): 27–30; Liu Jixian, “Junshi Hangtian Lilun de Yan- ment and the U.S., Soviet, and Chinese positions in jiu yu Chaungxin—dui Junshi Hangtian Xue de Renshi yu Michel Bourbonniere, National Security Law in Outer Pingjia”: 145–47; and Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Space: The Interface of Exploration and Security. A good Kongtian Yiti Zuozhan Xue, 57–58. overview can be found in Robert A. Ramey, Armed Con- 61. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Yiti flict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space. The Zuozhan Xue, 57. Chinese position is outlined in Chen Qiang, Chinese Prac- 62. Zheng Shenxia and Liu Yuan, eds., Guofang he Jun- tice in Public International Law. dui Jianshe Guanshe Luoshi Kexue Fazhan Guan Xuexi 77. For data on Chinese satellites, see Bill Sweetman, Tiyao, 25. Zheng and Liu consider Japan to be allied with ed., Jane’s Space Directory 2006–2007 (Couldson, Surrey: the United States in seeking to contain China. Jane’s Information Group, 2006). 63. Ibid., 25–26. 78. Cheng Yong and Guo Yanlong, “Fan Weixing 64. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Yiti Jiguang Wuqi Fazhan Xianzhuang yu Dongtai Fenxi.” Zuozhan Xue, 90–91. 79. Yang Yonghui and Xiao Siwei, “Jamming Tech- 65. Ibid., 90. nique Against Satellite TTC Channel,” Hangtian Dianzi 66. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Zhan- Duikang [Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures], Octo- chang yu Zhongguo Kongjun, 76. ber 1, 2006, 22–24, in OSC CPP20061227424003; 67. Cai Fengzhen, Tian Anping, et al., Kongtian Yiti Zhang Liying, Zhang Xixin, and Wang Hui, “Preliminary Zuozhan Xue, 90–91. Analysis of Anti-Satellite Weapon Technology and Defen- 68. Zhang Hualiang and Song Huaren, “Luelun Xinxi- sive Measures,” Feihang Daodan [Winged Missile Journal], hua Zhanzheng Zhu Zhanchang Xiang Taikong Zhuanyi March 2004, 28–30, in OSC CPP20070404424001; de Biranxing”: 14–17. Zhang Yongwei, “Xiao Weixing zai Junshi Zhong de 69. Ren Xiaofeng, “Zhuanyu Jingjiqu Junshi Liyong de Yingyong” [The Military Uses of Small Satellites], Xiandai Falu Wenti: Zhongguo de Guanjiao”: 5–7. Junshi [Modern Military Affairs]; Xu Xiaofeng, Zhu 70. See, for example, M. J. Peterson, “The Use of Analo- Xiaosong, and Liu Liyuan, “Jiyu Mou Weixing Tongxin gies in Developing Outer ,” in International Xitong de Ganrao Yanjiu” [Jamming Analysis Based on Organization 541, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 254–74; Nina a Certain Satellite Communications System], Hangtian Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Dianzi Duikang [Aerospace Electronic Counter- Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 Yale J. measures] 22, no. 5 (October 2006): 28–29, 45, in OSC Int’l L. (2004); and Jayson Haile, Comment, The New Age CPP20061227424008; and Tang Yuyan and Huang of and Colonialism: How Admiralty Will Be Used on Peikang, “Jiaohui Duijie Zhong Leida Celiang Xinxi de the Final Frontier, 29 Tul. Mar. L. J. 353–67 (2005). Zui You Guji” [Optimal Estimation of Radar Measure- 71. He Qizhi, Legal Progress of Space in China, 18 Air ment Information in Rendezvous Docking], Xiandai Fang- and Space Law 289 (1993). wei Jishu [Modern Defense Technology] 34, no. 6 72. See the earlier note on Ren Xiaofeng, “Zhuanyu (December 2006): 98–102.

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80. Mao Zedong, Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare, 83. Yang Hua, Chen Changming, Ling Yongshun, and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Ma Donghui, “Analysis of Jamming of Space-Borne Mis- 1961), 52–53. See also Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, sile Early Warning System,” 5. eds. The Science of (Beijing: Military Sci- 84. Ibid., 6. ence Publishing House, 2005), 280–82. 85. Ibid., 7. 81. Mao Zedong, Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare, 86. Ibid., 7, 37. 88–90, 110–11, 113–17. See also Zhang Xingye, ed., 87. Ibid., 37. Zhanyi Sixiang Fazhan Shi [The History of Thinking on 88. Huang Zhicheng, “Taikong Wuqihua yu Taikong Campaign Development] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Weishe”: 24. Chubanshe, 1997), 336–41; Yu Yongzhe, Gao Jishu 89. Ibid. Zhanzheng yu Houqin Baozhang [High Technology War- 90. Ibid., 26. fare and Ensuring Logistics] (Beijing: Junshi Kexue 91. Ibid., 26–27. Chubanshe, 1995), 70–74; and Li Bingyan, Da Moulue yu 92. Ibid. Xin Junshi Biange [ and the Revolution in 93. Warren Ferster and Colin Clark, “NRO Confirms Military Affairs] (Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 2004), Chinese Laser Test Illuminated U.S. Spacecraft,” Defense 287–97. News, October 2, 2006. 82. Yang Hua, Chen Changming, Ling Yongshun, and 94. Rob Taylor, “China Must Be Transparent in Naval Ma Donghui, “Analysis of Jamming of Space-Borne Mis- Buildup,” Reuters, August 15, 2007. sile Early Warning System,” Hangitan Dianzi Duikang 95. Barry Wain, “All at Sea over Resources in East Asia: [Aerospace ], no. 4 (2001): 5–7, 37, Competing Claims over the South China Sea Among in OSC CPP20070105424012; Xiao Yuxiang, Zhou China and its Neighbors Could Destabilize the Region,” Wenjiong, and Wu Shiqi, “Distributed Jamming System Yale Global Online, August 14, 2007. and Its Key Technologies Based on Pico-Satellite,” 96. During my experience as a military attaché in China, Hangtian Dianzi Duikang [Aerospace Electronic Counter- on the staff of the Department of the Army and on the staff measures] 22, no. 5 (October 2006): 25–27, in OSC of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Chinese officials CPP200671227424004; Zhou Wenzhong, Xiao Yuxi- often deflected requests to engage in various forms of stra- ang, and Wu Shiqi, “Delay Analysis and Simulation of tegic dialogue with the objective of confidence building by Micro-Satellite Repeater Deception Jamming,” Dianzi stating that such measures reflected a “cold war mentality.” Xinxi Duikang Jishu [Electronic Information Counter- They argued that such talks were relevant only for the measures Technology], 21, no. 6 (November 2006): United States and the Soviet Union. For an example of this 27–30, in OSC CPP20070103424011; and Lu Jiuming argument, see Wang Xingfeng, “Zhong-Mei Taikong and Zhu Kai, “Junshi Tongxin Weixing Ji Qi Xinglian Lu Chongtu Lun Zhiyi—Jian Lun Zhong Mei Taikong Hezuo” Xingneng Yanjiu” [Research on Military Communica- [Calling into Question the Theory of a Sino-U.S. Conflict tions Satellites and the Performance of Downlinks], over Space—Two Theories of Sino-U.S. Space Coopera- Xiandai Fangwei Jishu [Modern Defense Technology] 34, tion], Dongnan Ya Yanjiu [Southeast Asian Studies], no. 2 no. 3 (June 2006): 48–51. (2004): 60–63.

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About the Author

Colonel Larry M. Wortzel (U.S. Army, retired) is the former director of the Asian Studies Center and vice president for foreign policy at the Heritage Foundation. He has also served as director of the Strategic Studies Insti- tute at the U.S. Army War College and as the Army attaché at the U.S. embassy in Beijing. He is currently serving his third term as a commis- sioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, and he served as the commission’s chairman during the 2006 report cycle.

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