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Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 2–27 May 2005 New York 2005 NPT Review Conference 2–27 May 2005, New York C O N T E N T S 1. THE 2005 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE 2. ACTIVITIES OF THE IAEA IN RELATION TO THE NPT 3. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 4. DECISIONS AND RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE 5. FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE 2000 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE 6. LIST OF STATES THAT HAVE RATIFIED OR ACCEDED TO THE NPT AS OF 1 MARCH 2005 7. TEXT OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 2005 NPT Review Conference 2–27 May 2005, New York Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte (Brazil) President-designate of the 2005 NPT Review Conference Media Contacts for the 2005 NPT Review Conference Mr. Michael Cassandra Mr. Nikolai Rogosaroff United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs S-3151A S-3170F Telephone: (212)963-7714 Telephone: 917-367-2158 Fax: (917)367-5369 Fax: 212-963-8892 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] 2005 NPT Review Conference 1 2–27 May 2005, New York THE 2005 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the terminated in 1949 without the achievement of this Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons objective, due to serious political differences between (NPT) will meet at the United Nations in New York from the major Powers. By then, both the United States and 2 to 27 May 2005. The President-designate of the the former Soviet Union had tested nuclear weapons, and Conference is Mr. Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte, were beginning to build their stockpiles. Ambassador-at-large of Brazil. In December 1953, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower The Treaty, particularly article VIII, paragraph 3, in his "Atoms for Peace" proposal, presented to the envisages a review of the operation of the Treaty every eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, five years, a provision which was reaffirmed by the and urged that an international organization be estab- States parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension lished to disseminate peaceful nuclear technology, while Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference. guarding against development of weapons capabilities in additional countries. His proposal resulted in 1957 in the At the 2005 Review Conference, States parties will establishment of the IAEA, which was charged with the examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions dual responsibility of promotion and control of nuclear since 2000. technology. IAEA technical assistance activities began in The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose 1958. An interim safeguards system for small nuclear objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and reactors, put in place in 1961, was replaced in 1964 by a weapons technology, to promote co-operation in the system covering larger installations and, over the follow- peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of ing years, was expanded to include additional nuclear achieving nuclear disarmament and general and com- facilities (INFCIRC/66 and revisions). In recent years, plete disarmament. The NPT represents the only binding efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disar- efficiency of the IAEA safeguards system culminated mament by the nuclear-weapon States. in the approval of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) by the IAEA Board of Governors in May Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered 1997. (For detailed information see Fact Sheet No. 2.) into force in 1970. Since its entry into force, the NPT has been the cornerstone of global nuclear non-proliferation Within the framework of the United Nations, the regime. Adherence to the Treaty by 188 States, including principle of nuclear non-proliferation was addressed in the five nuclear-weapon States, renders the Treaty the most negotiations as early as 1957 and gained significant widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement. momentum in the early 1960s. The structure of a treaty to uphold nuclear non-proliferation as a norm of interna- History of the Treaty tional behaviour had become clear by the mid-1960s, and by 1968 final agreement had been reached on a Treaty From the beginning of the nuclear age, and the use that would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, enable co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy it has been apparent that the development of nuclear and further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament. capabilities by States could enable them to divert tech- The Treaty provided, in article X, for a conference to be nology and materials for weapons purposes. Thus the convened 25 years after its entry into force to decide problem of preventing such diversions became a central whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely, issue in discussions on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Initial efforts, which began in 1946, to create an interna- Accordingly, at the NPT Review and Extension tional system enabling all States to have access to Conference in May 1995, States parties to the Treaty nuclear technology under appropriate safeguards, were agreed—without a vote—on the Treaty's indefinite 2005 NPT Review Conference extension, and decided that review conferences should accepted only as a non-nuclear-weapon State, regardless continue to be held every five years. of its nuclear capabilities. The most critical and delicate achievement was the The NPT Review Process incorporation in the Document of a set of practical steps Conferences to review the operation of the Treaty for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement have been held at five-year intervals since the Treaty article VI of the Treaty. These steps provide benchmarks went into effect in 1970. Each conference has sought to by which future progress by the States parties can be find agreement on a final declaration that would assess measured. One of the most frequently quoted among the implementation of the Treaty's provisions and make them is the nuclear weapon States' agreement, for the recommendations on measures to further strengthen it. first time, to undertake unequivocally to accomplish the Consensus on a Final Declaration was reached at the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to 1975, 1985 and 2000 Review Conferences, but could not nuclear disarmament. be achieved in 1980, 1990, and 1995. Differences cen- Despite these major achievements of the tred on the question of whether or not the nuclear- Conference, the Final Document was the result of a com- weapon States had sufficiently fulfilled the requirements promise between divergent and partly conflicting posi- of article VI (nuclear disarmament) as well as on issues tions; sensitive issues were put aside for the sake of the such as nuclear testing, qualitative nuclear-weapon developments, security assurances to non-nuclear- Conference and the Treaty. weapon States by nuclear-weapon States, and on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful Towards the 2005 Review Conference purposes. The Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference Conference, established pursuant to General Assembly had two objectives: to review the Treaty's operation and resolution 56/24 O of 29 November 2001, held three to decide on its extension. While not being able to agree sessions in the period April 2002 to May 2004. It devot- on a consensus review of the Treaty's implementation, ed most of its meetings to a substantive preparation of States parties adopted without a vote a package of deci- the Conference and considered principles, objectives, sions. These decisions consisted of (a) elements for a and ways to promote the full implementation of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, (b) principles Treaty as well as its universality. In this context it took and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarma- into account the decisions and the resolution on the ment, and (c) the indefinite extension of the Treaty; as Middle East adopted in 1995, as well as the outcome of well as a resolution on the Middle East. the 2000 Review Conference. According to the agree- ment reached in 2000, the Preparatory Committee was The 2000 Review Conference was expected to test expected to make every effort to produce a consensus both the strength of the new review mechanism and the report containing recommendations to the Review concept of accountability which had been agreed upon Conference. However, due to the persistence of diver- when States parties accepted the "permanence of the gent views, the Committee was unable to reach agree- Treaty" and extended it indefinitely. The Conference was ment on the substantive issues under consideration. successful in concluding its deliberations with agreement Furthermore, it was also unable to agree on the provi- on the Treaty's past performance and on a number of key sional agenda for the 2005 Conference. Nevertheless, on issues pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation and disar- some organizational and procedural matters for the mament, nuclear safety and the peaceful uses of nuclear Conference, the Committee was able to make recom- energy. This marked the first time in 15 years that the mendations, such as on the draft rules of procedure as States parties had been able to achieve an agreed Final well as chairmanship of the three Main Committees to be Document. established at the Conference. Accordingly, Main The Final Document reaffirmed the central role of Committee I should be chaired by a representative of the the NPT in ongoing global efforts to strengthen nuclear Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, i.e., the non-proliferation and disarmament and reflected consen- Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory sus language dealing with virtually all the major aspects Committee (Indonesia); Main Committee II should be of the Treaty.
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