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The Jackal is ffiding in Syria I I Finale is important, not START Alexei Arbatov and Thomas Cochran trategic Arms Reduction Tre- aty (START) was signed last July after many years of negotiations. The targets set in the Treaty can hardly in- spireSeven optimists, however. The slashing of the strategic arsenals of each of the two powers by the year 2000 . from more than 10,000 nuclear warheads to 6,000 does not accord much with the widely declared aim of pannership. It can be re- peated hundreds of times that Moscow and Washington no longer regard each other as enemies. The bipolar military confronta- tion will remain a fact, however, if the two powers continue to keep thousands of nuc- lear warheads aimed at each other. Semi-partners, semi-enemies Since the nuclear missile potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States remain at high levels their missiles are aimed at each other simply because there are not so many targets in the rest of the world. The two countries do not have political or strategic reasons to attack each other, and are not expected to have such in the near fu- ture. The White House and the Kremlin obvi- ously see this contradiction, as is evident from President Bush's initiative and Moscow's consent to devise anon-nuclear Mikhail Gorbachev's reply in September anti-missile system jointly with Washington is a and October which proposes a faster arms mistake. The two countries have more promising Alexei ArbatoV is Director of the Centre for Ois- ~ and Strategic Stabilityat the Foreign areas of cooperation Policy Association ofthe USSR. T'hom8a Cochran isa senior researcher ahhe Natund Resouroes Defence Council ofthe umtii:f States. ";nl . , START does nOl at all envisage the re- duction of nuclear weapons in this wav .• Another approach could be based on t"'::o. Superfluous weight In the next ten years it will not be easy to de- principles. First, it is a qualitative exchange By 1995 the United States could remove two cide on taking deep cuts in the ground- and as regards destabilizing systems and. sec- of the three wartleads from 400 out of the sea-based ballistic missiles. First of all, the 500 Minuteman-3 missiles installed in silos ond, a broader use of the method of "un- processes of dismantling, elimination and and reduce from eight to four the number of loading': ballistic missiles, that is, removal conversion involved in the reduction of warheads on each of the 480 Trident-1 mis- some of the warheads from the multiple weapons are economically expensive and siles, including those that will go to sub- warhead instead of eliminating missile car- marines instead of Trident-2 missiles. It technically complex. Even cuts under riers and their launchers. would then have 1,760 wartleads on 440 Tri- START, modest by present standards, will dent-1 missiles, the five remaining sub- require considerable expenditure. marines of the Poseidon (Lafayette) class, Secondly, a sharp reduction in the and 15 new Ohio-class submarines. number of warheads will call for a more The Soviet Union could "unload" 150 silo- Mutual elimination of destabilizing drastic reduction in the number of carriers, based 55-19 missiles to be left after cuts systems. Moscow should at last agree to under START. Today it has 300 missiles of for a large part of missiles have multiple a reduction of heavy silo-based SS-18 this class, with 130 of them in the Ukraine warheads. As a result, the Soviet Union and missiles not by half, as specified in and the rest in Russia, where this system is the United States would retain a small START (to 154 units), but to zero. These assembled. The measure would provide for amount of ground-based missile launchers reducing the number of wartleads on each missiles, each carrying ten warheads of a and a considerably shrunken fleet. Mutual missile from six to four. The number of megaton class, are a cold-war legacy . vulnerability would increase, thereby un- monoblock ground-mobile 55-25 missiles, They are regarded in the West as silokiJ- dermining strategic stability. The situation which are assembled in Russia and de- lers, first strike weapons, particularly be- ployed in Russia and Byelorussia, is likely to could be corrected by way of deploying mis- cause they are not fit for a retaliatory increase from 300 to 400, and 200 more mis- siles with monoblock heads instead of lIlul- blow since they will not "survive" in their siles of the same class could be placed in tiple warhead missiles with a large part.of silos. silos. At present 104 SS-18 missiles are forces consisting of mobile launchers. It is a Together with the removal of obsolete deployed in Kazakhstan and the rest 204 very expensive undertaking, however, and systems from the sea-based forces it would on the territory of the Russian Federa- it will take much time to implement these be necessary to "unload" 120 missiles on six tion. They are produced at the Dnep- already built submarines of the Typhoon measures. The Soviet Union, with its ropetrovsk missile plant in the Ukraine. class (from ten to four warheads on each economy in a deplorable state, has little, if Strategic armaments of this type are like a missile). The sea-based forces would also any, possibility of puning this idea into ef- stumbling block in the way of radical disar- retain 80 triple-wartlead missiles on five fect. older, Delta-3 submarines (our name Kal- mament. They impel the United States to Lastly, a more drastic reduction would mar) and 160 such missiles on ten new. develop countersystems: 50 silo-based call for new talks and, since we are living in Delta-IV submarines (or Delfin submarines, Peacekeeper missiles, eaeh carrying ten the nineties, it would overlap the time limits of which we have seven now) by reducing warheads, and 96 Trident-2 ballistic missiles the number of warheads on them from four of S1'ART. The finished treaty would be based on submarines. Trident-2 missiles, to two. put off again for the sake of a more attrac- each carrying eight warheads, are deployed tive but unfeasible objective. on four new submarines of the Ohio class. reduction compared with that envisaged by Thanks to their high accuracy they are in- START. It is a half-measure, however. tended to hit Soviet silos. Soviet SS-24 missiles are similar to the Washington proposed large-scale mea- There is a way out nevertheless. During the Peacekeeper system. Ten of these missiles sures. One of them is elimination of all nineties the strategic nuclear forces of the (the weapons are produced in Pavlograd) ground-based intercontinental ballistic mis- two powers could be reduced not to 6,000 or are based in silos in the Russian Federation siles \\;th independently targeted warheads 5.000 but to 10 percent, to 1,000 warheads and 46 in the Ukraine. They would have to which constitute up to 60 percent and about for each party, without undermining stabil- be dismantled, too, especially since they are 20 percent of the total in the Soviet Union ity and national security and without addi- a tempting and vulnerable targets and are fit and the United States respectively. Simul- tional excessive expenditure, without dis- for the first strike only. taneously. Washington announced mea- carding START, which was worked out Thus, Mosoow would dismantle two sys- sures for dismantling and placing in depots with great difficulty. tems - 364 missiles (3,640 warheads) and nuclear arms from heavy bombers, lower- Signing START in the summer of this Washington would do the same - 146 mis- ing the degree of their take-off readiness, year, the two parties intended first of all to siles (1,268 warheads). Moreover, it would and removing old missiles to be scrapped cut obsolete armaments while continuing to give up plans of deploying 336 more Tri- from combat alertness (four percent reduc~ deploy new expensive systems (multiple- dent-2 missiles (2,688 warheads) on the tion in the total amount of warheads). warhead missiles, heavy bombers, mobile other 14 submarines of this class. land-based intercontinental ballistic mis- The method of complete -unlo8ding" Instead of going further, Moscow made siles, both with monoblock and individually (to zero) could help to withdraw much more only a timid half-step by proposing to CUt targetable heads). As a result, by the year quickly and cheaply all the obsolete ground- the strategic arsenals of the two countries to 2000 the two powers would have cut their and sea-based missiles whieh were to be de- 5.000 (not 6.000) nuclear warheads, remove forces by 30 percent. However. they would stroyed under the Treaty. Otherwise, the nuclear weapons from bombers, and with- have completely modernized them by en- statements on their removal from the state draw slightly more obsolete missiles, to be hancing their striking power. Moreover, of alertness cannot be verified. If the parties scrapped under the Treaty, from the they would have to spend money on the concerned detaeh all the warheads from state of combat alertness within a shorter modernization of missiles, the elimination these missiles and put them in storage, time. .of old ones, and measures of control. agree on additional procedures of control NEW TIMES 45.11. As a result. the United States wi\! re!~"11I! ., silo-based monoblock ICBM, of tn •.· I\ pc "~ "unloaded" Minuteman·3 or new. I\lidg..:-t. man missiles and 400 missiles in silo~. hUl .without warheads. Its naval forcc would consist of 18 Ohio-class submarines equIp- ped with Trident-Is (or a missile of ;1 nc" type).

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