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Npr 5.1: the Duma-Senate Logjam on Arms Control

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Npr 5.1: the Duma-Senate Logjam on Arms Control George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander here is a growing logjam of arms control treaties pro quo promised to these non-weapon states for for- waiting for approval in both the Russian State swearing nuclear weapons for all time may well be seen TDuma and the U.S. Senate. Without decisive ac- as being denied. With both the nuclear negotiations prom- tion, this logjam will probably prevent approval by the ised for the Middle East peace process and U.S.-Rus- world’s two largest military powers of the Strategic Arms sian nuclear reductions stymied, the seven Islamic Reduction Treaty (START II) governments that strongly of 1993, the Comprehensive criticized the NPT decision Test Ban Treaty of 1996 after it was made—Egypt, (CTBT), amendments to the VIEWPOINT: Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, Ma- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) laysia, Nigeria, and Syria— Treaty, and the protocols of THE DUMA-SENATE could form the nucleus of a the Treaty of Pelindaba (cre- LOGJAM ON ARMS Non-Aligned Movement ating an African nuclear- (NAM) group threatening weapon-free zone (NWFZ)) CONTROL: WHAT CAN withdrawal from the NPT.1 and the Treaty of Rarotonga Such a threat could rupture (creating a South Pacific BE DONE? the near consensus that was NWFZ) before the end of the achieved within the NPT on century. It will also prevent by George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander indefinite extension and progress towards START III that has supported joint ac- and further bilateral nuclear tion in cases such as Iraq reductions. (For a list of treaties affected, see the Ap- and North Korea, resulting in a crisis for the NPT. Al- pendix.) ready, at the April 1997 Preparatory Committee (Prep- The reasons for this logjam can be found both in the Com) meeting of NPT parties, attempts by the five NWS domestic politics of each country and in broader changes to block substantive recommendations on disarmament wrought by the end of the Cold War: new crops of post- united almost all non-nuclear weapon parties temporarily 2 Cold War legislators are focused more on domestic prob- against the NWS, including allies of the Five. It is too lems than on international relations; many remain early to say whether this will recur at the PrepComs suspicious of the other country’s intentions and therefore scheduled for 1998 and 1999 or at the review confer- have adopted highly nationalistic attitudes towards arms ence in 2000, but a continued Duma-Senate logjam will control; finally, reforms in the Russian government have provide even more reason for dissent than was present created an unprecedented ability to block treaties, as the in 1997. If Duma-Senate action to reverse current trends newly formed State Duma begins to exercise its inde- does not occur, are there any alternative means of show- pendence from the executive branch. For these rea- ing U.S.-Russian progress on arms control and nonpro- sons, both the U.S. Senate and the Russian Duma have liferation in order to avoid a potential NPT crisis? been unwilling to follow the lead of their presidents in This essay first examines the roots of the current arms control. The threat implicit in the continued inaction of these George Bunn is Consulting Professor at Stanford two national bodies, however, is that it could derail much University’s Institute for International Studies and of the progress that has been achieved in post-Cold War Center for International Security and Arms Control. arms control and nonproliferation efforts. If extended He was the first general counsel of the U.S. Arms further, the logjam could cause a severe reaction by non- Control and Disarmament Agency and one of the nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty on the Non- negotiators of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which believe Nuclear Weapons. John B. Rhinelander is senior that they made a “pact” in 1995 with the nuclear weapon counsel in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Shaw, states (NWS) in agreeing to the indefinite extension of Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge. He was formerly deputy the treaty. Thus, if ratification of the CTBT, further steps legal adviser to the Department of State and served as in the START process, and other arms control measures the legal adviser to the U.S. delegation that negotiated remain blocked by the Duma and the Senate, the quid the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 73 George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander Duma-Senate logjam in the area of arms control and two bodies today. In order to understand the current log- nonproliferation treaties. It then considers a series of al- jam, we must examine these in detail. ternative measures to direct treaty ratification that have been taken in the past by U.S. and Russian leaders to Current Conditions in the Russian Duma and U.S. implement arms control and nonproliferation measures Senate by other means: 1) reciprocal unilateral measures; 2) Overriding all arms control and nonproliferation is- political commitments; and 3) executive agreements that sues in Russia is the decision of the United States and its do not require legislative ratification. While these mea- allies to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization sures do not replace treaties, this essay argues that they (NATO) by including, in the first wave, Poland, the Czech can, in some instances, provide meaningful temporary Republic, and Hungary. Without question, this move has steps until political conditions are ripe for formal legis- increased hostility in the Duma toward the West and to- lative action. Interestingly, none of these measures are ward arms control agreements with the United States.3 new to the arms control field. But, as shown below, it The NATO-Russian charter or “Founding Act” negoti- appears likely that U.S. and Russian leaders will have to ated to reduce this hostility may not be voted on by either make active and creative use of these alternative means the Duma or the Senate because it is considered to be a if they are going to survive the current logjam without “political” agreement, not a treaty.4 No Duma member causing damage to broader post-Cold War arms control publicly supports NATO expansion. The Founding Act and nonproliferation efforts internationally. seems to have reduced only slightly the Duma members’ hostility to NATO expansion and to have countered their REASONS FOR THE CURRENT LOGJAM argument that expansion justified their decision to put off At its most basic roots, the causes of the Duma-Sen- a vote on START II again—though it has been pending ate logjam can be found in the nature of the treaty ratifi- in the Duma for over two years.5 cation process in Russia and the United States. Although At the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, Presidents treaties are generally negotiated by the executive branch Clinton and Yeltsin attempted to deal with serious Duma (and are often signed by the presidents themselves), in- objections to START II. The first was NATO expansion. ternational treaties in the two countries must be ratified The Founding Act had not been completed when they by their respective legislatures. In both countries, legis- met, and they simply agreed to disagree on expansion.6 lative consent has become extraordinarily difficult to ob- In a later radio address to the Russian people, Yeltsin tain in recent years. This situation stands in sharp contrast described the Founding Act as an effort “to minimize the to the typically easy process of treaty approval in many negative consequences of NATO’s expansion and pre- other states, either because their governments are au- vent a new split in Europe.”7 thoritarian (and all power resides in the executive branch—as was the case in the Soviet Union) or because They dealt with a second important Duma objection, they are parliamentary democracies (where the prime American plans for theater missile defenses (TMD), by minister automatically controls a majority in the parlia- authorizing two agreements relating to the ABM Treaty ment—as in much of Western Europe). Neither condi- to provide “demarcation” criteria to distinguish permitted tion holds today in Russia and the United States. Instead, TMDs from prohibited ABMs.8 Later, as part of the price both presidents find themselves beholden to a legisla- for getting the Senate to vote on the Chemical Weapons tive majority not of their own parties, and yet they re- Convention (CWC), the Clinton administration consented quire their legislatures’ consent for the ratification of to having these two demarcation agreements go before international treaties. In the United States, this process the Senate after they had both been completed.9 But, requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate alone. In Russia, there is little prospect that the two will be approved by the ratification process requires a majority vote of first the Duma or the Senate.10 Indeed, on the American side, the State Duma (lower house) and then the Federation because of the hostility of conservative Republicans to Council (upper house). If the Federation Council rejects the ABM Treaty, the Senate, as a condition to approving the treaty, the State Duma can override it with a two- the “flank” amendment to the Conventional Forces in thirds majority. Yet, these legalistic parameters provide Europe (CFE) Treaty, required the Clinton administra- little insight into the political issues that dominate the tion to promise the Senate another ABM agreement. This 74 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1997 George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander new agreement will simply recognize that Russia and The CTBT will also become part of the Duma-Senate several other former Soviet republics—now independent logjam since Clinton submitted it to the Senate on Sep- states with ABM related equipment on their territories— tember 22, 1997.
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