Military Authoritarianism and Political Change in Uruguay by Howard Handelman

19781No. 26 South America

The militarization of Uruguayan politics represents a sharp break with the nation's d~mocraticpast. Despite economic iation and signs of disagreement within ~drmedforces, there is no reason to sxpect an early return to civilian rule. [HH-1-78] ISSN 01 61 -0724 The American Universities Field INSTITUTIONAL MEMBERS Staff, Inc., founded in 1951, is a non- American profit, membership corporation of University of Alabama American educational institutions. It The Asia Society universities- em~lovsa full-time staff of foreign Aspen Institute for Humanistic area specialists who write from Studies abroad and make periodic visits to Brown University Field Staff member institutions. AUFS serves Dartrnouth College the public through its seminar pro- Indiana University grams, films, and wide-ranging pub- Institute for the Study of World lications on significant develop- Politics ments in foreign societies. University of Kansas Michigan State University Ramapo College of New Jersey University of Pittsburgh University of Wisconsin

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THE AUTHOR HOWARD HANDELMAN, a Faculty in the Andes: Peasant Political Mobiliza- Associate for Latin America, has been tion in Peru and has contributed articles involved in the study of that region since to the Latin American Research Review, 1968 when he spent a year conducting Journal of Inter-American Studies and his doctoral dissertation research in Peru. World Affairs, Studies in Comparative In 1972 and 1973 he conducted field re- International Development, Industrial search in Mexico City and Guadalajara on Labor Relations Review, and Worldview the Mexican labor movement and in 1976 as well as a chapter in Political Participa- hespent six months in Uruguay studying tion and the Poor in Latin America. the political activities of that nation's economic elite (under a grant from the Midwest Universities Consortium for International Activities). He received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the Uni- versity of Wisconsin and is currently on leave from the University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee where he is an Associate Professor of Political Science and a @ 1978, American Universities Field member of the Center for Latin America. Staff, Hanover, NH Dr. Handelman is the author of Struggle 1978INo. 26 by Howard Handelman Military Authoritarianism and South America [HH-1-'781 Political Change in Uruguay

Nearly 20 years ago, political corre- tarian model,"4 identifying as char- politics consistently ranked Uruguay spondent Tad Szulc wrote optimis- acteristic of most of the new military as the most democratic nation in that tically of the "twilight of the tyrants" regimes their efforts to suspend region.6 Yet Uruguay today, like in Latin ~merica?In the oeriod earlier expansion of mass political Chile, has become a symbol of polit- immediately preceding publication participation; repression of labor ical repression and military dictator- of Szulc's book, military rulers had unions, peasant associations, and ship. relinquished power to elected civilian other organizations expressing mass- governments in Argentina, Colom- based economic and political de- The militarization of Uruguayan bia, Peru, and Venezuela. By 1961 mands; suspension of political party politics represents a sharp break only one military dictatorship, Para- activity; placing of political and eco- from a long armed forces tradition of guay, remained in South ~merica.~ nomic decision-making in the hands nonintervention in the nation's polit- The inauguration of President John of military and civilian technocrats, ical affairs. During the twentieth F. Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" rather than politicians (most of century, only once had the country inspired the hope that socioeco- whom the military holds in con- been subjected to dictatorial rule nomic reforms might buttress tempt); heavy reliance on foreign (1933-1938). Even then, power was already existing political trends, investment as the basis of economic seized by an elected civilian presi- accelerating and strengthening the growth; implementation of con- dent (Gabriel Terra) whose backing development of democratic, civilian servative economic policies often came not from the military but from regimes in the hemisphere. drawn from Milton Friedman and the police. During the 1960s, when other "Chicago School" economists; Uruguay's leading scholars pub- The promise of easy democratiza- and enforcement of economic aus- lished the Enciclopedia Uruguaya, a tion, however, soon proved illusory. terity programs whose burdens fall series of monographs analyzing the Increased political participation by most heavily on the shoulders of the country's political and economic peasants, the urban poor, and the urban working class, often sharply structure, they failed to include a industrial working class produced reducing their real income. Clearly section on the armed forces. Carlos demands for economic redistribution such policies were extremely un- Real de Azua, the nation's foremost and social justice in traditionally popular among large setments of the historian, noted that, owing to its hierarchical societies. Not surpris- population and could often only be traditionally minor role in national ingly, such demands were fiercely implemented through the suppres- politics and society, virtually nothing resisted by entrenched political and sion of basic civil liberties, the arrest had been written on the Uruguayan economic elites and, often, by an of political dissidents, and, ulti- military7 already satisfied middle class. From mately, the use of torture and other 1964 through 1973, Brazil, Argentina, repressive techniques5 Uruguay's current military regime Ecuador, Chile, and Uruguay all has significance in two respects. experienced conservative military Of all the South American nations First, it illustrates the possibility of coups. fitting this bureaucratic-authoritarian military authoritarianism in even the pattern, Uruguay presents one of the most apparently well-entrenched Analysts of Latin American politics most sobering pictures. Throughout democracies. And, second, the Uru- were forced to abandon the op- most of the twentieth century this guayan armed forces differ in many timism of the early 1960s and to nation ranked with Chile as the most ways from their counterparts in Chile focus their attention on the harsher stable democracy in Latin America. or Argentina, and contradict several realities of "corporatism" and Indeed, a series of polls conducted stereotypes of Latin American mili- "authoritarianism." They began to from 1945 through the mid-1960s tary rule. The following Report describe the "bureaucratic-authori- among experts on Latin American reviews briefly the origins of Uruguay's military government, dis- America. Through 60 years of nearly activities and exposes of govern- cusses its development since 1973, uninterrupted democratic, civilian ment corruption elicited a surprising and analyzes possiblefuture trends. government, Uruguayans enjoyed level of sympathy from Montevideo's an extraordinarily high level of civil disenchanted middle and working The Fall of Uruguayan Democracy liberties. To foreign observers and classes. While all Latin American nations are Uruguayans alike, the country came undoubtedly "atypical" of the region to be known as "the Switzerland of As Uruguay became increasingly in some way, Uruguay particularly Latin America." polarized-workers against em- violates almost all the stereotyped ployers, Tupamaros against police- images of socioeconomic and Expanding world demand for meat the ruling Colorado Party moved political underdevelopment. The and wool during the Korean War sharply to the right of its usual re- economic base of Uruguayan devel- produced the last of Uruguay's eco- formist stance. Colorado Presidents opment was forged during the nine- nomic booms, and the war's end Jorge Pacheco Areco (1967-1971) teenth century when the nation's ushered in two decades of economic and Juan aria Bordaberry (1971- sparsely populated countryside was stagnation. The failure of the 1976)-backed by the military-re- converted into rich sheep and cattle nation's rural elite to modernize their sponded to the growing unrest by ranches. Subsequently, in the ranches, an overly protected and imposing a series of restrictions on closing decades of that century, a inefficient industrial sector, declining traditional civil liberties. Under an wave of Spanish and Italian immi- world demand for wool, and a greatly almost continual "state of siege," grants flooded into Montevideo, the overbloated bureaucracy, all con- strikes were repressed, radical union capital, and other urban areas. Those tributed to a downward economic leaders were imprisoned, and free- immigrants gave the country a popu- spiral. From 1954 to 1972 the coun- dom of the press was restricted. lation that was ethnically European, try's Gross National Product (GNP) urban (80%), skilled, heavily middle declined 12 percent-making Uru- Opposition to these measures was class (40% to 60%), and literate guay one of the few countries in the centered in the Congress, particu- (over 90%). world to experience "negative eco- larly from two sources: first, the nomic growth." Economic decay traditionally conservative, rural- based, opposition party, the Blancos, Early in the twentieth century, Jose was marked by rising unemployment now led by liberal Senator Wilson Batlle y Ordoriez, Uruguay's most and staggering inflation rates of 60 to Ferreira Aldunate, a staunch de- outstanding political leader, coa- 135 percent annually during the fender of civil liberties; and, second, lesced the urban middle and working 1960s. a newly formed coalition of Christian classes behind his reformist Colo- Democrats, disaffected Colorados, rado Party. Using revenues from the These economic pressures rapidly Socialists, Communists, and other country's vast wool and meat destroyed the nation's delicate social left-of-center parties, called the exports, Batlle and his successors equilibrium and precipitated a rising Frente Amplio (Broad Front). created a welfare state featuring ex- level of class conflict. Beleaguered tensive medical care, free public workers, faced with declining living With the police totally incapable of education through the university standards, turned to militant trade controlling the Tupamaros and other level, government-generated em- unionism. From the mid-1960s political unrest, the size and budget ployment, and a generous (if not onward, the country was wracked of the nation's armed forces in- excessive) pension system. To be with continual strikes, lockouts, and creased dramatically. While the ulti- sure, the country's rural wealth was other forms of labor-management mate size of the military-23,000 left in the hands of a small but power- conflict. Growing government in- men-was not large, the armed ful ranching aristocracy, areas of efficiency and corruption further forces were supplemented by some serious poverty remained in the exacerbated the situation. 20,000 paramilitary (state police, urban slums and countryside, and Out of this background of economic etc.), largely committed to internal the rural poor were excluded from security. Given the country's small the welfarestate's benefits. Through and political decay emerged the National Liberation Movement, a population (less than three million), the middle of this century, however, the combined military and para- most Uruguayans enjoyed the skilled group of urban guerrillas military force as a percentage of the highest standard of living in Latin better known as the Tupamaros. Dis- illusioned by the government's population made it the second America, a level comparable to that highest in Latin America. Between of Western Europe.8 failure to enact meaningful reforms, the "Tupas" insisted that armed 1968 and 1973 the armed forces' share of the national budget rose Economic development was accom- struggle was the only means of from 13.9 to 26.2 percent. While the panied by an impressive record of breaking the deadlock of Uruguayan exact size of the current military political stability and democracy. democracy. Ironically, most of the budget is unknown (even to the U.S. With a small, depoliticized armed guerrillas were not drawn from the poorest classes, but were, instead, Embassy's economic and military forces, the nation escaped the cycle sections), it is believed to constitute of coups endemic to most of South generally the children of the urban elite and middle class.,Their daring 40-50 percent of government expen- ditures. Within South America, During the 1960s the nation's polit- radio and television stations to Uruguay and Peru currently devote ical leaders-once respected for broadcast attacks on government the highest percentage of their GNPs their high level of honesty- had corruption. Only the navy's loyalty to to military outlays? become tainted by currency specu- constitutional order prevented the lation, smuggling, and other illegal army and the air force from ousting By 1972, the combination of in- activities.^ In 1971, the large "Mer- Bordaberry at that point. creased military might and excep- cantile Bank," headed by the brother tional powers assumed by the gov- of President Pacheco's close political As the price for retaining office, ernment turned the tide against the adviser and Foreign Minister, Jorge, however, President Bordaberry was urban guerrillas. From May through Peirano, collapsed in a major finan- forced to accept a list of military November of that year, an all-out cial scandal. Peirano himself was demands. Known as Communiqu6s war, featuring mass arrests and the forced to resign. Some officers saw 4 and 7, the demands called for land torture of guerrilla suspects, broke the corruption issue as a convenient redistribution, the elimination of cor- the back of the Tupamaro move- wedge for weakening civilian auth- ruption, and other reforms. Borda- ment. Yet the success of the anti- ority. Others, including air force berry also conceded that the armed guerrilla campaign failed to bring a captains investigating illegal cur- forces would "oversee the running corresponding reduction in govern- rency transactions, were genuinely of the country in close contact with ment repression. To the contrary, shocked by what they found. Ironi- the executive" and would combat strong military pressure induced cally, some of their most explosive political ideas that were "incom- Congress to pass a draconian information came from Tupamaro patible with the people's traditions "Public Order Law" and to extend captives who sought to justify their and ideals." A National Security the "state of internal war." The revolutionary position by furnishing Council (COSENA) was created to movement toward military authori- their military captors with proof of review all important government tarianism had achieved a momentum government corruption. In October decisions. Although officially a of its own, divorced from the cam- 1972, as the captains' investigations civilian-military body, COSENA was paign against the Tupamaros. Dis- moved toward high-ranking Colo- dominated by its military com- gusted with the civilian leadership's rado politicians, the officers defied ponent. "Bitter February," as these apparent ineptitude, the colonels President Bordaberry's orders to events came to be known, estab- and generals became increasingly terminate their investigation and turn lished unquestioned military domi- politicized. over their evidence to civilian authori- nance- through ESMACO and ties. COSENA-over both the executive As the military moved toward center and the legislative branches. From stage in the political arena, the more Conversely, the armed forces were that point on, civilian authorities astute officers created institutions to equally sensitive about congressional served at the generals' pleasure. facilitate their involvement in the investigations into mistreatment of decision-making process. in 1971, political prisoners. In October 1970, Subsequent events were almost General Gregorio Alvarez, the army's congressional criticism intensified anticlimatic. On June 27, 1973, the most ambitious and articulate com- when three doctors, arrested by the last vestiges of civilian democracy mander, organized and led the military security forces as Tupa- came to an end when President Supreme Military Command maros, publicly testified that they Bordaberry, in close collaboration (ESMACO). Composed of 22 officers had been tortured. While there is with the armed forces, dissolved drawn from all the services, little reason to believe that Borda- Congress. That act was soon fol- ESMACO gradually became the berry objected to such practices, the lowed by the prohibition of political central political and economic combination of congressional pres- party activity, the dissolution of all planning board for the armed forces. sures and an opportunity to assert political parties in the Frente Amplio, hisauthority over the military led him total repression of the opposition At first the generals pressured Con- to demand the doctors' release. press, the destruction of the National gress on behalf of repressive Once again he was defied by his Labor Congress (the CNT), and the measures requested by Presidents generals. arrest of left-of-center political and Pacheco and Bordaberry. Later, as union leaders. The last voices of they established control over the The confrontation between Presi- effective political opposition had guerrillas and, thereby, increased dent Bordaberry and the armed been stilled. their own prestige, they challenged forces reached a climax in February the executive branch as well. While 1973. Again the conflict centered on Political Thought among the Military President Pacheco had been fairly military investigations of political While the march toward military con- adept at controlling his generals, corruption. When the President trol was apparent at least five months before the June "presi- Bordaberryfound himself more hard- sought to strengthen his position by dential COUP," the political outlook of pressed. Conflict centered in two appointing a new defense minister, areas: civilian political corruption and the commanders in chief refused to Uruguay's new military rulerswas far military torturing of political sus- recognize the new minister's author- less clear, although at least three ten- dencies could be distinguished: the pects. ity. The army and air force seized "legalists," the "hard-liners," and (and still are) obsessed with the important Colorado Party leader the "populists." In fact, the lines dangers of the "international com- closely allied with Montevideo's in- between the groups were not always munist conspiracy" within which dustrial barons, and the detention of distinct; some officers seemed to they included progressive priests, several politicians, industrialists, and overlap in two, even three, groups, or most intellectuals, liberal politicians, landowners, suggested to some to jump from one to another. The Amnesty International and, more Uruguayan leftists that the populists fuzziness of many officers' political recently, Senator Edward Kennedy shared their own antipathy toward ideas simply defied categorization. and President Carter. Unlike either the nation's economic and political the legalists or the populists, the elite. Indeed, there was a sense of The first faction, the legalists, were hard-liners cared little about garner- antagonism and mutual disdain definitely on the wane in the months ing public support. On reading their between many officers (who fre- preceding the June coup. Concen- official pronouncements, one is re- quently came from rural, lower- trated in the navy, these officers minded of the opening scene of middle-class backgrounds) and the were committed to maintaining Costa Gravis' film, "Z," in which landed aristocracy.11 some semblance of civilian rule. The Greek officers receive a lecture about armed forces would serve as watch- the need for fanatical vigilance in While the Peruvianists were a dogs against subversion and corrup- rooting out the persistent "weeds" minority within the officer corps, tion rather than govern directly. In of subversion from the healthy they compensated for their small November 1972, naval troops had garden of society. numbers by having greater ability. taken to Montevideo's streets to Most Uruguayans with whom I Beyond its concern for internal order prevent President Bordaberry's spoke viewed Gregorio Alvarez as and security, the Cristi faction lacked ouster by the other military branches. the most articulate, intelligent, and a well-defined program or ideology. persuasive of the generals. Through Overall, its members tended to favor At first glance, the virtual military the institution which he created, the Brazilian model of economic takeover in June seemed to signal ESMACO, he exercised considerable development based on linkages with the legalists' defeat. Yet, backed by influence over military policy on eco- foreign investment and technocratic the long Uruguayan tradition of nomic issues. His ally, General decision-making conducted without civilian rule, this faction was partially ~bd6nRaimundez-later to head concern for public opinion or for the responsible for preventing a full- adverse effects some decisions the central bank-was also a key scale coup. Unlike Argentina, Brazil, economic strategist. Other populists might have on the population. and Chile-where the military like Colonel Carlos Trabal, head of removed elected civilian presidents military intelligence, were among the The third of Uruguay's military from office-in Uruguay, President army's more politically astute offi- factions is the most perplexing. The Bordaberry remained in office after cers.12 populists-"Peruvianists" (peruanis- he (not the military) had dissolved tas), or nationalists-were led by Congress. Both Bordaberry and the In the early days of 1973, then, as General Gregorio Alvarez (then Head generals insisted that the President Uruguay moved steadily toward mili- of the Fourth Military District and had acted within the emergency tary rule, portions of the nation's left since February 1978, Commander in powers granted him by the constitu- viewed developments with consid- Chief of the Armed Forces). This tion. Furthermore, they vaguely sug- erable equanimity. Members of the group loosely adopted its ideology gested that presidential elections of Communist Party and some Social- from the nationalist, reformist some type would be held on ists and Christian Democrats felt that generals who have ruled Peru since schedule when Bordaberry's legal Alvarez's "Peruvianist" faction was 1968. Alvarez and the populists term of office expired in November on the ascent and that it was a group seemed to feel that the only long- 1976. with which they could deal. Monte- term solution to Uruguay's economic video's active rumor mill indicated stagnation, labor unrest, and guer- Arrayed against the legalists were that a dialogue had been established rilla subversion was a series of social two interventionist groups centered between captured Tupamaros and reforms. In the months preceding the in the army. The hard-line or "Bra- young populist officers of the June coup, they issued several pro- zilianist" faction subscribed most military intelligence. Allegedly, these nouncements (including Communi- closely to the bureaucratic-authori- officers were impressed and deeply ques number4 and 7) calling for land tarian model described earlier in this concerned with their guerrilla reform, full employment, stimulation prisoners' revelations about corrup- Report. Led by General Esteban of exports, reduction of the foreign tion in national politics. Thus, when Cristi, commander of the critical first debt, and elimination of government the June coup was followed by a military region (which includes 27 corruption. general strike, a few communist Montevideo), these ultra-right-wing leaders within the CNT urged their officers were committed to destroy- In their campaign against corruption, followers to return to their jobs so ing all vestiges of "subversion" in the these alleged reformers seemed to that an accommodation could be nation's political, economic, educa- be giving proof of their sincere inten- reached with progressive elements tional, and cultural life. They were tions. The arrest of Jorge Batlle, an of the armed forces. In the weeks following the closing of The Generals in Power the military, it did symbolically repre- Congress, however, such hopes The dissolution of Congress formally sent the civilian influence. were soon dashed. On July 2, the marked the end of Uruguayan CNT was dissolved. Hundreds of democracy, but the officers who The most important instrument of CNT and Frente Amplio leaders were commanded the armed forces were remaining civilian influence was the arrested. Shortly thereafter, a gov- not prepared to assume full respon- Cabinet. All ministerial positions, ernment decree permitted public and sibility for governing the nation. The with the exception of the interior private employers summarily to legalist faction and other officers, ministry-charged with the mainte- dismiss without compensation any recognizing that direct military gov- nance of internal security -con- worker who continued to support ernment usually leads to divisiveness tinued in civilian hands. No junta of the general strike. Many large cor- within the armed forces, hesitated. the kind found in Chile or Peru was porations, such as FUNSA (Uru- For the Uruguayan military, with no ever established. Indeed, the current guay's largest firm, manufacturing clearly defined leader, the danger Uruguayan regime does not officially tires, auto batteries, etc.) and Gen- was very real. In addition, the coun- admit that a coup took place in 1973 eral Electric, used the decree as a try faced a difficult and uncertain and refers merely to the dissolution pretext for firing many union acti- economic future. Because unpopu- of Congress. This "line" sometimes vists. Since 1973 the right to strike or lar decisions and unforeseen diffi- proves difficult to maintain, how- bargain collectively has been termi- culties could only hurt its image and ever, as in 1976, when a powerful nated and unionization has been vir- lower its legitimacy, the armed army colonel in the labor ministry tually eliminated. forces preferred civilian "front men" spoke to me of the "1973 coup." to take the responsibility.14 Among all the reforms called for in Raising my eyebrows with feigned the military's progressive pre-coup More important, unlike their counter- surprise, I asked, "Did you say a communiquds, in only one area- parts in Argentina, Peru, and other 'coup'?" elimination of civilian political cor- South American nations, the Uru- ruption-has the military made the guayan military command had vir- "Oh yes," he replied, "I guess we slightest effort. But whatever prog- tually no political experience. Most never use that word, but you and I ress has been made in that area has officers came from lower-middle- know what it was." been negated by legal and illegal class, rural backgrounds and had "rakeoffs" by military officers limited educations. A friend of mine Yet the distinction is not merely coupled with huge increases in mili- who had taught briefly at the Uru- semantic. During the past five years tary salaries, pensions, and fringe guayan Air Force Academy was the Uruguayan armed forces have benefits. shocked by its low academic stan- continued to increase their power dards. The officers were well aware while insisting on maintaining the The Uruguayan populists' program that they lacked the technical train- fine line between military domination and ideology had never, in fact, been ing available to the graduates of and military rule. as well formulated as that of the Brazil's Superior War College or Peruvian officers with whom they Peru's Center for Higher Military In the months following President were being compared.l3 Communi- Studies (CAEM). Consequently, Bordaberry's dissolution of Con- ques number 4 and 7 were vaguely even the most interventionist military gress, the generals moved against all worded and full of contradictions. men were prepared to leave the potential sources of opposition Moreover, what many Uruguayan foreign service and the economics within Uruguayan society. Step by leftists had failed to realize was that, ministry to civilian experts. step, the government's internal whatever their reformist aspirations, security apparatus suppressed all the populists shared the hard-liners The civilian-military coalition that institutions that had housed any fanatic hostility toward the left. governed following the June "presi- substantial leftist political sentiment; General Alvarez himself had seen his dential coup," however, was clearly the parties of the Frente Amplio, the brother killed by the Tupamaros and dominated by the military. Juan unions, the high schools and univer- was second to none in his torture of f aria Bordaberry, the legally elected sities, and the press were all purged. suspected guerrillas and union civilian president, remained in office. Periods of calm were (and still are) activists under his jurisdiction. More- Congress was dissolved and even- interrupted by waves of arrests. By over, while the populist officers were tually replaced by a 25-member mid-1976, Amnesty International more politically astute and aggres- civilian body (appointed by the Presi- estimated that over 50,000 people- sive, General Cristi and the hard- dent) called the Council of State one of every 30 adult Uruguayans- liners controlled more troops and fire (Consejo del Estado). Council mem- had suffered interrogation or im- power. Once in power, the opposing bers were primarily drawn from the prisonment of varying duration. This hard-line and Peruvianist factions far right of the two "traditional" (i.e., gave Uruguay the dubious distinc- seemed to compromise their differ- nonleft) political parties, the Blancos tion of having the highest proportion ences over economic and social and Colorados. While this new legis- of political detainees in the world. policy, with most proposed populist lative branch merely rubber-stamped reformsfalling by the wayside. decisions made by the executive and While most people picked up by the in small plants, who cannot readily politically "tuned in" Montevideans security forces are "only" held for a send in anonymous complaints knew of several policy clashes few days or weeks, families and against their employer are unlikely to between the President and his gen- friends can never be sure whether "cause trouble." When I interviewed erals. In May 1975, for example, he the incarceration will be short or the chief of the Labor Office, he tried to remove a civilian favorite of long. Approximately 6,000 political seemed to be rather unsophisticated General Alvarez from the powerful, prisoners have been brought before regarding labor-management prob- government meat board. Shortly military tribunals-in Uruguay all lems, seeing his main function as thereafter, Bordaberry came into political suspects are subject to mili- guaranteeing the workers clean conflict with General Abd6n Rai- tary "justice"-and sentenced to bathrooms and cafeterias. Finally, mdndez, head of the nation's central extended terms. Initially, suspected the minimum wage levels decreed by bank, in his attempt to raise the price Tupamaros and CNT labor officials the Ministry of Finance-even when of meat paid by the slaughterhouses were singled out for the longest sen- enforced by ESMACO - have fallen to the nation's ranchers. tences. In recent years, former Com- far behind the cost of living and munist Party members have been workers' real incomes have fallen The President greatly overestimated subjected to the most intense repres- over 30 percent since the coup. In his power base. Even with the sup- sion. Tortures of the most heinous short, military populism, such as it is, port of the rural aristocracy he was kind are routinely used on political has proved to be no substitute for no match for the military. In each of prisoners and suspects. Approxi- unions in protecting workers' rights his open confrontations he was mately 40 to 50 persons have died and incomes. forced to back down. Indeed, the during interrogation. only factors preventing the armed Having silenced potential opposition forces from removing him from In some areas, however, the military outside the government, the gen- office were the lack of a clearly has exercised a curious mix of hard- erals next sought firmer control over defined reason for ousting him and line and populist policies. This is the civilian component within their internal divisions within the military. most vividly demonstrated in the regime. In every important govern- field of labor-management relations. ment agency and every ministry In December 1975, however, as Having destroyed the National Labor (save one), they placed an officer, Bordaberry approached his last con- Congress and denied Uruguayan usually a colonel, at the second or stitutional year in office, he over- workers the right to strike or bargain third highest position in the admin- stepped his bounds. In a "secret" collectively, the armed forces sought istrative hierarchy. Given the Uru- memorandum circulated among some mechanism for protecting guayan military's lack of political and high-ranking civilian and military workers' rights. In the wake of the administrative experience, this was a officials, the President called for the mass dismissals that followed the convenient means of training officers banning of all remaining political par- coup, the officers (or, at least, their for assuming greater future respon- ties, cancellation of the 1976 elec- populist wing) established the sibility. In addition the colonels and tions, return of the colonels in the ESMACO Labor Office to enforce majors served as ESMACO's eyes ministries to a more distant "watch- minimum wage levels and industrial and ears, "keeping tab," on their dog" position, and the creation of a health and safety codes, protect civilian superiors. new single-party corporatist state workers against arbitrary dismissal, with Bordaberry at its head. The and investigate individual worker By 1974 the military was in control of memorandum, with its shrill, clas- complaints. most areas of public decision- sically-fascist tone, alienated vir- making. Only two civilian officials re- tually all the politicized sectors of the To many observers' surprise, the tained enough power to challenge civilian population, including most of Labor Office has gone about its task total military dominance. The first Bordaberry's cabineti5 with a great deal of energy and has was President Bordaberry himself. offered workers some degree of pro- Essentially Bordaberry represented The President undoubtedly expected tection, I know personally of one two political power bases: the Colo- his memorandum's tribute to the case where the colonel heading the rado Party's right wing and the armed forces' role in "saving the Labor Office responded to an nation's large, rural landowners. He country's honor," to win their favor. anonymous tip that a large firm was had no qualms about the authori- Instead, his suggestion for limiting not paying the legal minimum wage. tarian measures which the military the military's role in politics not only He arrested the company's president had introduced. In fact, he exceeded antagonized hard-line officers but his that same day. Workers in larger most officers in his zeal for political proposals' totally "unpolitical," in- companies do occasionally lodge repression. Bordaberry, however, sensitive tone also offended the complaints against their employer wished to maintain his presidential moderates. On June 12, 1976- with the Labor Office and sometimes powers independent of the armed almost a year to the day from his receive satisfaction. But the office forces and he hoped eventually to dissolution of Congress- Borda- also clearly shows the limits of the reassert his control over the military. berry was removed from office. He military's populist ideology. Workers Despite total media censorship, returned to private life where he quickly became a "nonperson," to control inflation. His programs ical parties and the creation of a never mentioned by the Uruguayan paralleled those already in force in corporatist state, Vegh was the most mass media. After a two-months Brazil and Chile and subsequently outspoken Cabinet Minister in his interim with the government in the introduced to Argentina: reducing opposition. In his own counter- hands of an 80-year-old president, corporate taxes, encouraging foreign memorandum, he argued that the Aparicio Mendes, a 72-year-old investment, removing restrictions on best way to prevent the resurgence right-wing law professor, was named imports, reducing government of "Marxist subversion" was to allow President. Mendeswas keenly aware spending on welfare measures (but a gradual return to party politics and that he served at the military's not on the military), and introducing some limited form of democracy. pleasure. It is said that since October wage controls that severely cut the Vegh's record of service for authori- 1976 (after the U.S. Congress cut off real income of the urban working tarian military regimes in three dif- military aid to Uruguay), when the class. ferent countries suggests that he is President made an intemperate no Jeffersonian democrat. As an speech accusing the U.S. Demo- Many of these policies conflicted intelligent pragmatist, however, he cratic Party of being an arm of inter- with the goals of the military's popu- recognized the need for some move- national communism, Mendes list wing. Generals Alvarez and Rai- ment toward democracy (if only a allegedly "cannot talk to anybody mundez in particular saw themselves cosmetic one) to stifle internal and but his wife without an officer at his as the protectors of workers' jobs international criticism of the regime. side." and salaries (apparently seeing no His position was strongly backed by contradiction between that self- the American Embassy. A far more formidable challenge to image and the military's imprison- military dominance than Borda- ment and torture of union leaders). The extent of disagreement between berry's was posed by another civilian On several occasions they vetoed the Finance Minister and the gen- political leader, Finance Minister Vegh's plans to dismiss large num- erals should not be exaggerated. Alejandro Vegh Villegas. A brilliant bers of government employees.^ Vegh insisted to me that the foreign and articulate Harvard-trained econ- Similarly, in an effort to preserve jobs press had overemphasized areas of omist, Vegh ranks with General and foster Uruguayan national indus- policy difference and neglected Alvarez as the most powerful per- tries, the populists were far more in- broad areas of agreement. But given sonality to emerge since the 1973 clined than Vegh Villegas to maintain his supporters within and, more im- coup. If Alvarez represents the mili- protectionist policies. In 1976, when portant, outside Uruguay, Vegh tary's nationalist wing-suspicious the Finance Minister suggested facili- Villegas could far more successfully of foreign investment and of the tating the importation of automo- challenge the military than could international economic and diplo- biles-a policy that would have soon Bordaberry. On a number of occa- matic community-Vegh is the destroyed the country's small and sions the military forced the Finance consummate multinational. Born in inefficient auto assembly industry- Minister to modify his policies, yet, at Brussels and educated in the United he was checked once again by the other times, Vegh felt sufficiently States, he speaks fluent Spanish, generals. Finally, the populists mod- strongly that he threatened to resign French, and English. In earlier years erated Vegh's wage control policy so unless he could have his way. In he served as an economic adviser to as to soften the decline in workers' August 1975, for example, he authoritarian military regimes in living standards. Ironically, the mili- announced his resignation after the Argentina and Brazil. His close links tary populists were more concerned military sought to overturn the terms with the Uruguayan banking com- with maintaining some degree of of a debt refinancing agreement that munity, Argentine and Brazilian popular legitimacy than was Vegh he had negotiated with the IMF. On banks, multinational corporations, Villegas. In this respect, the Uru- that occasion, and several others, the International Monetary Fund guayan military has differed sharply the generals backed down. (IMF), and the U.S. Embassy, made from their Argentine and Chilean him the only civilian in the govern- counterparts who have given the The delicate two-year accommoda- ment capable of standing up to the civilian, "Chicago School" techno- tion between Vegh Villegas and the generals. Thus, Vegh Villegas was crats a far freer hand and have facili- military came to an end in August the only Cabinet member without an tated more drastic reductions in em- 1976-less than two months after ESMACO officer in his ministry. ployment and real income. Bordaberry's removal. The source of When I asked a friend of Vegh's at conflict this time was not economic the American Embassy why this was If Vegh's harsh economic policies but political. Vegh strongly objected so, he replied, "Oh, Alejandro simply brought him into conflict with the to a decree (Decree number 3) refused to allow one." populists, his more liberal political stripping most middle-of-the-road policies antagonized General Cristi political leaders, including some of Basically Vegh pursued a series of and the hard-liners. When President the Finance Minister's close asso- economic policies consistent with Bordaberry circulated his afore- ciates, of their political rights. Once Milton Friedman's laissez-faire mentioned memorandum advo- again Vegh tendered his resignation. philosophyand with the IMF's desire cating the abolition of existing polit- This time it was accepted. But, unlike Bordaberry, Vegh Villegas was not me that the Foreign Minister and the and wool). Anticipated foreign in- relegated to political oblivion. He Agricultural Minister had both vestment had nevertheless failed to was appointed to the nation's new wished to resign in protest with materialize, the national debt-fed legislative body, the Consejo de la Vegh, but had backed down under by excessive military spending- Nacion, and continued to influence military pressure. The developments cotinued to rise steadily, the GNP economic policy through the new were also a blow to the many Uru- was growing less than one percent Finance Minister, one of his own dis- guayans who had recently seen annually, and domestic purchasing ciples. hopeful signs of a quicker return to power was so low that the business some form of limited democracy. community's complaints were The public attacks that the military clearly audible. The Uncertain Future had leveled at Bordaberry's "anti- In a variety of ways, 1976 marked a democratic memorandum" (words The departure of Alejandro Vegh major watershed for Uruguay's military regime. With President used by the generals) earlier in the Villegas had removed the military's year, and the President's subsequent most competent technocrat and cut Bordaberry's removal and Vegh dismissal, had raised hopes that the Villegas's resignation, the generals off their primary link to the national faced no serious civilian competition military's legalist and populist fac- and international business commu- tions were about to return the coun- for power. In addition, two institu- nities. Starting on the left and try to civilian democracy. Borda- tional changes signed into law by the moving toward the center, the gen- newly inaugurated President, Apa- berry's legal term of office ended in erals had isolated themselves from ricio Mendes, further consolidated 1976. The armed forces had sum- virtually all the nation's civilian polit- armed forces control. marily rejected his suggestion that ical leaders. In August they had his term be extended indefinitely. destroyed what little credibility they Alejandro Vegh Villegas, with the First, the nation's quasi-legislative had by accusing exiled Blanco leader branch, the Council of State, was American Embassy backing, had Wilson Ferreira Aldunate of being a replaced by the Council of the Nation urged the military high command to subversive in league with guerrillas. allow a contested presidential elec- (Consejo de la Nacion). The new Ferreira, a member of the nation's tion in 1976 between two moderate body is composed of the previous landed elite, had run a liberal, re- (i.e., nonleftist) candidates. Follow- 25-person Council (with some per- formist campaign in the 1971 presi- ing Bordaberry's removal, rumors sonnel changes) and the 22 members dential election and had amassed the filled Montevideo that Vegh would of the Supreme Military Command largest number of votes of any soon be appointed interim president (ESMACO),thus converting a purely candidate in Uruguayan history.18 until the elections. Now all these civilian legislature into a body nearly The constant announcements of hopes were dashed. The hard-liners half military. Second, under the new arrests, the destruction of a seemed in control and they showed once-flourishing press (newspaper terms of Decree number 3, almost all no willingness to make concessions. the people elected to Congress in circulation in 1976 was less than half 1971 were prohibited from holding that in 19721, stories of inflated mili- public office for at least 15 years.17 Despite their consolidation of power, tary salaries and fringe benefits, and Finally, General Julio Cesar Vadora, however, the military's position was the "grapevine" reports of torture, Commander in Chief of the Armed shakier than it had ever been. At the had all stripped the military of public Forces, dropped the remaining shoe center of their problems was the support. by announcing that the newly nation's poor economic perform- "elected" President and Council of ance. The generals had seized power If the domestic situation was not the Nation would serve until 1981. At in 1973 just as the European Eco- bright, the external picture was even that time, Vadora declared, presi- nomic Community (EEC- Uruguay's bleaker. Uruguay had come to rank dential elections would be held, but primary export market) was about to with Chile as an international symbol with only a single candidate who terminate meat imports. After two of repression and torture in the would have to be satisfactory to the disastrous years (1974-751, in which Americas. Amnesty International, a military! Should the "battle against Brazil had become Uruguay's chief group viewed by the Uruguayan subversion" and the restoration of market, the volume of meat exports military as the anti-Christ incarnate, the nation's economy continue to go rose sharply in 1976. But the world had mounted a worldwide campaign well, said the general, the 1986 presi- price per ton was still far lower than it on behalf of Uruguayan political dential election would involve two had been in 1973. With the tripling of prisoners. In September the United candidates. the country's petroleum import bill States Congress terminated military (Uruguay has no hydrocarbon aid to Uruguay because of human Vadora's announcement and the energy), the trade deficit was still rights violations. At the time promulgation of Decree number 3 staggering. Vegh's economic poli- Uruguay and Chile were the only drove a sharp wedge between the cies had lowered inflation to an South American countries to have military and the leading civilian annual rate of "only" 40 percent and suffered such censure.19 The elec- Cabinet members. Sources close to had stimulated nontraditional ex- tion of Jimmy Carter in November, Finance Minister Vegh Villegas told ports (i.e., products other than meat with his strong commitment to human rights, brought gloom to intensify popular discontent. Finance mounted, there were rumors in Uruguayan government authorities. Minister Arismendi announced a Montevideo throughout 1977 of an Thus, at the very time they had con- record balance of payments deficit imminent transfer of power to a solidated their power to its highest for 1977 and declared "debt is de- civilian-military transition govern- point, the military were more isolated vouring this nation." According to ment, to be followed by democratic than they had ever been since the the Inter-American Development elections in 1978. Such predictions 1973 coup. Bank (IDB), Uruguay now holds the were, at the very least, premature. heaviest short-term debt obligations Since President Carter's inaugura- (as a percentage of trade and GNP) Faced with mounting internal and tion, external pressures on the of any Latin American nation. The international criticism, the military Uruguayan regime have intensified. EEC's decision at the end of 1977 to regime seemed to have two options: The American Embassy, once a once again terminate imports of an orderly return to the barracks, source of "aid and comfort," has meat from Uruguay and Argentina preserving as much "military honor" become a lobbyist for the restoration put further pressure on the economy. as possible; or greater repression and of civil liberties and of elected civilian a hardening of the lines. The government. A series of emissaries Not surprisingly, even previously government response has tried to from the United States, including a quiescent Uruguayan voices have combine both strategies. Pentagon delegation, have tried to initiated criticism of the military convince the apparently uncompre- regime during the past 18 months. With rare exception, the military has hending Uruguayan hard-liners that The long-dormant press has sharply made no concessions to interna- President Carter and the Congress attacked President Mendes (appar- tional pressures in the areas of will not restore aid until progress is entlv with clearance from military human rights and basic civil liberties. made toward the restoration of censors), though they have not On the contrary, a siege mentality democratic norms. The Organization dared to criticize the military directly. has seemingly produced a more re- of American States (OAS), with the In February 1977, the right-wing pressive off en~ive.2~Press censor- United States and Venezuela in the Montevideo daily El pais, previously ship has been formalized in the lead, has also intensified pressures a strong government supporter, hands of the military's National on the Uruguayan regime. called for an end to press censorship. Office of Presidential Public Rela- Subsequently, both El Pah and the tions (DINARPI. Under the terms of Even the government's erstwhile conservative weekly Bdsqueda legislation passed late in 1976, the allies have not given the military (closely tied to Alejandro Vegh media may be prevented from much support. In late 1976 the mili- Villegas and the business commu- printing news that "might harm the tary journal El Soldado ("The nity) have been shut down for external [foreign] image of the gov- Soldier") proposed that the country varying lengths of time because they ernment." Even the president must join Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, had printed articles unacceptable to have all his statements cleared by and Paraguay in a joint effort to resist the government. ESMACO. A "Brazilian style" "pressure groups that wish to use judiciary act passed last year re- United States influence against us." Criticism and pressure have also moved the executive branch (includ- In effect, the article was calling for an mounted from middle-of-the-road ing the interior ministry and other alliance of right-wing, neofascist Blanco and Colorado Party leaders- internal security agencies) from states to protect bureaucratic- the only two parties that still exist review by the courts, which are now authoritarian regimes along South legally. In April 1977, officials of the controlled by the newly formed America's lower tier. In May 1977 the two parties allegedly met secretly Ministry of Justice. El ~h,Monte- foreign ministers of Argentina and outside Montevideo. They appar- video's most independent daily, has Brazil indicated that their countries ently branded the present govern- editorially lamented, "the judiciary is were not interested in such an alli- ment illegal (a position that most dead." And, under the terms of the ance. The Brazilians in particular Colorados had not previously taken) new "Law of a State of Emergency," wanted to disassociate their govern- and lauded the pressures being Uruguayans may be imprisoned for ment from the more internationally exerted on the regime by the Carter holding "antigovernment ideas" censured regimes of Uruguay, Para- administration. Several months later even if those ideas produce no con- guay, and Chile. Colorado leader Jorge Batlle called crete action or even written mani- for an alliance with the Blancos to festation. Within Uruguay the situation has work for the restoration of civil also continued to deteriorate. The liberties. Meanwhile, in Caracas, There is a note of desperation and 1977 inflation rate of 70 percent (up Venezuela, exiled Blanco leader increased fanaticism in the generals' sharply from the previous year) and Wilson Ferreira, undoubtedly the public pronouncements. When unemployment of nearly 13 percent nation's most popular political asked at news conferences to com- (augmented by extensive under- figure, announced an exile coalition ment on the state of the economy, employment) belie the regime's with the leftist parties of the Frente ESMACO spokesmen prefer to talk promises of economic recovery and Amplio. As the clamor for change about "combating moral decay, loss of faith in human values, and the The moderate's position within the Villegas and other civilian "moder- breaking of the principles of author- military was expressed in May 1977 rates"), General Alvarez-a man of ity.. .." There is also frequent by the retiring commander of the great personal ambition-wishes to rhetoric about the need for "civic second military region, General run as the favorite son of a trium- purification," correcting "false Eduardo Zubia, in his farewell phant military. thinking" planted in the people's speech. Because of the past threat of minds by years of Marxist infiltration subversion, said Zubia, the military It is not clear how strong Alvarez's into the educational and cultural had needed to call upon the Uru- position is. The limits which he and systems, and the need to cleanse the guayan people to make many sacri- other populists placed on Vegh nation of two generations of corrupt fices, including that of "obligatory Villegas's conservative economic politicians. Nor is this hardening silence." Now that internal security policies helped to preserve the jobs position restricted to rhetoric. In was being restored, he continued, and income levels of both govern- mid-1977 and in the early months of the need for such sacrifices would ment bureaucrats and the working 1978, new waves of arrests swept the soon end. Thus Zubia simultaneously class. For that reason, and because country. justified past military repression of his more dynamic style, he is the while extending hope for an apertura only military figure with any signifi- But there were also clear signs of in the near future. cant support from the civilian popu- dissent within the officer corps. Early lation. Yet his hands are as tainted by in 1977 more than 20 officers were While as many as 70 percent of the torture as are those of any hard- arrested for issuing a critical ap- officer corps may subscribe to this liner. Consequently, his candidacy praisal of the regime and advocating moderate line, until recently they would be unacceptable to Wilson a return to civilian government. have lacked the military strength to Ferreira and other progressive Several months later a military edict implement change. The hard-liners, civilian leaders. Many of his military made mandatory the retirement of particularly General Cristi, com- colleagues, whatever their orienta- officers who fail to maintain the mander of Montevideo's first military tion, view him as an opportunist with armed forces' "coherent line" or region, maintained the critical little concern for broader military "whose activities compromise the troops. Following Cristi's retirement interests. Consequently, when Este- purposes which inspire their ac- last year and his replacement by ban Cristi retired as commander of tions." Under the terms of that General Rodolfo Zubia, Eduardo's the first military region last year, decree, 46 officers-including an brother, the balance of power shifted Alvarez was blocked from assuming admiral and two generals-were somewhat toward the center. But command. In February 1978, how- purged. the moderates still suffer from a lack ever, he succeeded retiring General of leadership and organization. Nor Julio Vadora as Commander in Chief The arrests and purges touched do they have a well-defined plan for of the Armed Forces. Though pres- most heavily on the navy where the the transition to civilian government tigious, the position actually holds legalist tradition remains strongest. that will satisfy all the contending less direct power than the first region But it is likely that the majority of military and civilian factions. command. Still, General Alvarez officers throughout the armed hopes it will serve as a stepping stone forces, particularly the younger ones, Meanwhile, General Alvarez and the to the presidency. are looking for some kind of apertura populists remain apart from both the "opening"-a word frequently moderates and the hard-liners. Predictions about the future are heard today in Montevideo) to Alvarez also recognizes the utility of hazardous. The military is divided, civilian rule followed by an orderly a military withdrawal from politics, not only by differing philosophies, "military retreat." They do not like but, as one Uruguayan political but also by interservice and personal the public enmity which the torture analyst put it to me, "Alvarez rejects rivalries. In the words of one and repression has brought the the moderates' plan for a 'quiet re- observer, "few officers are accepting armed forces and would prefer to treat.' For him the withdrawal must ordersfrom one another and the four hand the reins of government over to be triumphant." Rather than silently military regions are now virtual fief- civilian politicians while the military sneaking back to its tents, the armed doms ruled by commanding officers maintains a "watchdog" position forces must make clear to the people who appoint all civilian officials in against the "resurgence of subver- that the military has positively re- their jurisdiction." Many issues sion." They realize that in the long organized Uruguayan society and remain to be resolved. Most officers run the military's position is unten- saved it from subversion. are insistent that any withdrawal able. The regime has virtually no from power be accomplished "with base of domestic or international Alvarez's interests go beyond pro- honor" and that no trials be held for support, ruling largely by sheer force tecting the military's honor. A presi- political crimes, such as torture, of arms. Moreover, as a small and dential election of some sort is committed by the military while in economically weak nation, Uruguay scheduled for 1981. Whether there is control. They are haunted by the is less able to resist external pres- a single candidate for the position (as specter of a "Greek style resolution." sures than are Brazil, Argentina, or called for by the military's current Some important civilian leaders such even Chile. plans) or two (as favored by Vegh as Wilson Ferreira, however, insist that at least the most serious vio- traditional political parties who wish resistant to external pressures than lators of human rights be held to achieve some kind of aperture at many observers had thought pos- accountable. almost any price. So far most sible. Moreover, in an effort to secure Blancos have remained loyal to broader military backing for his Since assuming the post of Armed Wilson Ferreira and have rejected presidential aspirations, Alvarez has Forces Commander in Chief, Gre- this solution. Colorados may be more tried to demonstrate to the hard- gorio Alvarez has continued to pur- receptive. At the same time, former liners that he can be as repressive as sur his presidential ambitions. An Commander in Chief Julio Cesar they are. Arrests and other forms of April "civil-military unity" rally in Vadora (currently Ambassador to political repression have not let up in Minas (base of Alvarez's old fourth Paraguay) has shown some indica- 1978 (if anything, they have inten- military region command) was, in tion that he would not mind being sified) and there is no longer much fact, a virtual presidential campaign the military-designated presidential reason to expect meaningful social rally for the general. What Alvarez candidate. reform from the populists, even if and many other officers seem to en- Alvarez does achieve the presidency. vision for Uruguay is a transition to- In short, the optimistic expectations Ultimately, the military will probably ward "Brazilian style" elections in held by many Uruguayans in have to make some concessions to which a military-designated candi- mid-1977 that a meaningful transi- external pressuresand to the need to date either runs unopposed (1981 or tion to civilian government was at improve the still stagnant economy. with nominal opposition (1986). Un- hand have faded considerably. The The question is, "how and when?" der such a plan, a limited role would generals have been far more be offered to those leaders of the two (June 1978)

NOTES

1. Part of the research for this Report 5. Not all Latin American military 9. Figures are drawn from Marcha was conducted in Montevideo, Uruguay regimes fit this model. For example, the (Montevideo), November 2, 1972, p. 7, from June-December 1976 under grant Peruvian military government-particu- and the International Institute for from the Midwest Universities Consor- larly from 1968-1975-was reformist and Strategic Studies (London). tium for International Activities nationalist. The bureaucratic-authori- (MUCIA). Dr. Oscar Maggiolo, former tarian model applies most directly to 10. Obviously not all political leaders Rector of Uruguay's national university, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. In were dishonest. But standards had and other Uruguayan exiles living in the past few years, the Peruvian regime dropped sharply from the days, early in Caracas, Venezuela have been very has moved somewhat in this direction. the century, when Jose Batlle y Ordonez helpful in discussing recent develop- fired one of his ministers for accepting a ments with me. 6. See, for example, Russell Fitzgibbon watch as a gift. and Kenneth Johnson, "Measurement 2. T. Szulc, The Twilight of the Tyrants of Latin American Political Change," 11. In my interviews with officers and (New York: 1959). American Political Science Review large landowners, I found that many (September 1961). military men viewed the rich ranchers as 3. Of course there were other military effete, nonproductive playboys. The dictatorships in Central America and the 7. C. Real de Azua, "~j6rcitoy ~olftica ranchers, in turn, often saw the Caribbean. en el Uruguay" in El Militarism0 officer corps as a bunch of ignorant and (Montevideo: Cuadernos de Marcha, uncouth bunglers. 4. There is a growing literature in this March 1967). For an account of the area. See especially: Guillermo O'Don- military through 1973, see Ronald 12. After the coup, Trabal was appointed nell, Modernization and Bureaucratic- McDonald, "The Rise of Military Politics to the Uruguayan Embassy in Paris. In Authoritarianism (Berkley: University of in Uruguay," Inter-American Economic 1974, he was assassinated in Paris by California Institute of International Affairs (Spring 1975). McDonald notes unknown assailants. Studies, 1973); James Malloy (ed.), ,that in 1965 Uruguay only ranked 91st of Authoritarianism and Corporatism in 121 countries in the world in percent of 13. See Patrick Knight, "Hopes Fade for Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of GNP spent on the military. Uruguay's Forced March," The Man- Pittsburgh Press, 1977); and David chester Guardian (February7,1975). Collier, "Industrial Modernization and 8. Friends of mine who traveled in Political Change," World Politics (July Western Europe several years after the 14. The Peruvian and Brazilian regimes 1978); for an excellent review of writings end of the second World War told me seem to be realizing this now. Eric on the military in Latin America, see that they were struck by the fact that Nordlinger argues that this is true Abraham Lowenthal, "Armies and living standards there seemed lower than throughout the developing world and Politics in Latin America," World Politics in Uruguay. helps explain why military rulers (at least (October 1974). juntas) usually don't stay in power very long. See, Nordlinger, Soldiers in 17. The decree had complex provisions 19. Subsequently, Congress terminated Politics: Military Coups and Govern- that stripped politicians from leftist aid to Argentina. Brazil has refused to ments (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- parties of more political rights, for a accept further military assistance and Hall, Inc., 1977). longer period of time, than it did for last year Uruguay turned down eco- Blancos or Colorados. In effect the nomic aid. The Uruguayan regime 15. Montevideo is a tremendously tight- decree, if enforced, would ban most reacted strongly against the earlier cut- knit society where it is impossible to keep Uruguay political leaders from holding off of military assistance and launched a a political secret even in an authoritarian office until 1991 and would make the large media campaign against "inter- state. Copies of Bordaberry's memo- next two proposed presidential elections national interference in Uruguayan randum had been leaked, and Xerox rather meaningless. affairs." copies were available all over the city. All the Frente Amplio parties were already 18. Under the terms of Uruguay's elec- 20. Only a few concessions were made to illegal. Theonly partiesstill legal were the tion laws (prior to 1973) each party could foreign criticism. Shortly before Jimmy Blancos and the Colorados which could run multiple presidential candidates. The Carter took office, the government not actively engage in politics. votes of all candidates in each party were accounted for a number of Uruguayans added together and the winner was the who had disappeared in Buenos Aires or 16. In an interview, Vegh Villegas told me greatestvote getter within the party with Montevideo. They had been presumed that his two greatest disappointments as the most votes. Thus, although Ferreira dead, but surfaced in Uruguayan jails. Finance Minister were his inability to sell had more votes than Bordaberry, Borda- government enterprises (such as the berry was declared the winner because state oil refineries and cement plants) to the total vote of all Colorado candidates foreign, private enterprises and his was slightly higher than that of the inability significantly to reduce the Blancos. Given his courageous stance number of public employees. He against the current regime (for which he indicated that "powerful forces in the was almost murdered by a death squad in government" had stopped him in both Buenos Aires), Ferreira would un- these areas but refused to name these doubtedly easily win any free election in "forces." which he were allowed to run.