Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

War of Resolutions Parliamentary Blockades in the Negotiations

Dušan Reljić SWP Comments

The approaching start of the future status negotiations for Kosovo is marked by a hardening of positions in and Belgrade, as well as mounting violence in Kosovo itself. At the same time, differences are arising between the United States, which leans toward independence for Kosovo, and Russia and China, which oppose secession.

On October 24 the UN Security Council tiations will not be the final phase of the (UNSC) gave a green light to the beginning process as a whole but rather would pave of negotiations following the recommenda- the way for the next stage of the inter- tions of the Norwegian diplomat, Kai Eide. national presence in Kosovo. Since early summer 1999 Kosovo has been a Since the report’s publication, the protectorate of the UN. The UN General security situation in Kosovo, according to Secretary requested that Eide prepare a the UN administration (UNMIK), has report for the UNSC on the situation in worsened. UNMIK members and vehicles, as Kosovo. In the report, the UN special envoy well as the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), have describes the situation in the province on been the target of a series of terrorist at- the ground as extremely grim. Eide point- tacks. A bomb injured many shoppers at a edly remarks upon the critical situation of market in a predominately Serb-inhabited the non-Albanian population there. Yet, village. On December 3 outside the city of Eide concludes that there will never really Prizren, a tour bus en route to Belgrade was be “any good moment for addressing attacked with hand-held rocket launchers. Kosovo’s future status.” In order to avoid Although the discharged projectiles hit the stagnation the talks must start soon. Any bus, no one was injured. In the south and further postponement of finding a new west of the province uniformed and armed status for Kosovo would only lead to a new men have periodically set up illegal check- round of disturbances. Eide concludes his points in order to inspect the passengers of report with the observation that in light of passing vehicles. They said they are the the dire political, economic and social members of a hitherto unknown “Army for conditions in Kosovo, and especially the the Independence of Kosovo (AIK).” Accord- deep animosity between Serbs and Kosovo ing to UNMIK, these attacks are aimed Albanians, that the onset of status nego- at influencing the negotiations over the

SWP Comments 59 December 2005

1 future status of Kosovo. In addition, leading Referendums to politicians received anonymous threats Prevent Compromises warning them of “consequences” if they Belgrade’s basis for negotiations was laid betray “national interests” in the course of out in a November 21, 2005, parliamentary the status negotiations. In particular, the resolution that expressly ruled out relin- Movement for Self-Determination (Vetven- quishing ’s legal possession of dosje), headed by the former student leader Kosovo. At the same time, the resolution , exerts pressure on political implies, in barely veiled form, Belgrade’s parties. Kurti is mobilizing young followers preparedness to make far-reaching com- for an extraparliamentary opposition promises. The text reads: “The parliament against the continued existence of the UN notes that there could be different forms of protectorate or the establishment of an political organization for the future status EU protectorate in Kosovo. In this endeav- of Kosovo and Metohija that do not call our he has the support of the organization either the sovereignty or the territorial of the former members of the Kosovo integrity of the state into question.” But the Liberation Army (KLA). Thus a further parliament also warned that any attempt to escalation of street protests and attacks in divide Serbia by legalizing a one-sided Kosovo can probably be expected when secession of Kosovo would mean not only international negotiators involved in the the use of force against a democratic state status negotiations ask the parties to aban- but also the violation of international law. don their maximal initial positions. Such a solution will be declared illegiti- The chief UN negotiator, Finland’s mate and void by the parliament. former president Martti Ahtisaari, began By resolutely rejecting an imposed settle- talks with Belgrade, Pristina and other ment Belgrade obviously wants to circum- regional political centers on November 21, vent a scenario like the one at the Ram- 2005. He warned beforehand about setting bouillet negotiations over Kosovo in 1998 “artificial deadlines” or expecting “quick and 1999. Then, the US and its allies threat- results in four or five months.” He de- ened the strongman Milošević with force scribed his chances of success “as greater should he not agree to the western terms than when one buys a lottery ticket.” for Kosovo. His refusal to comply in early Ahtisaari set the date for the first unmedi- 1999 led ultimately to the NATO war ated talks between Belgrade and Pristina for against the former Federal Republic of early 2006. The leadership of the Kosovo . There is the oft-expressed con- Albanians rejects direct talks with Belgrade, cern in Belgrade government circles that while the Serbian side, with Russia’s sup- the Kosovo Albanian side could undermine port, insists upon direct talks. Pristina’s the upcoming negotiations deadlocking view is that Serbia has no right to partake them for so long that the United States in decisions over Kosovo’s future. From finally loses its patience and tries to impose Belgrade’s perspective, unmediated negotia- a settlement. tions would confirm Serbia’s ownership The parliamentary resolution was based of Kosovo. What’s not yet clear is how the on a proposal authored by the head of the actual negotiations will proceed. Also, minority government, Vojislav Koštunica, nobody has expressed an opinion about the who is also the head of the national con- possible consequences of the collapse of servative Serbian Democratic Party (DSS). negotiations, although, especially in Bel- Koštunica only received parliamentary grade, there is palpable fear of collapse approval for the resolution with the sup- resulting in a settlement imposed by the port of two opposition parties, the Serbian United States. Socialist Party (SPS) and the strongest faction in the parliament, the national populist Serbian Radical Party (SRS). The

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2 nominal heads of these two parties, Slobo- rejected at once, it charged that they con- dan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj, are at the stituted yet another division plan for Koso- moment on trial before the International vo. These charges were made by Kosovo’s Tribunal for Crimes in former Yugoslavia prime minister, Bajram Kosumi, and the (ITCY) in the Hague. It was under pressure leading opposition figure, Hasim Thaçi, as from the SRS that the mention of the pos- well as other Kosovo Albanian politicians, sibility of a referendum over the results of just as they rejected other western pro- the negotiations was inserted in the text of posals that suggested either “conditional the resolution. The intention was to limit independence” or “limited sovereignty” for the negotiating latitude of the delegation Kosovo. Such inventions, so it is concluded in order to prevent it from backsliding. The in Pristina, mirror the Belgrade rhetoric opposition Democratic Party (DS) of Serbian over “more than autonomy but less than President Boris Tadić abstained in a vote on independence” for Kosovo. The standard the resolution. Its MPs however took part in argument is that only full independence the session although they had steered clear can guarantee social progress in Kosovo and of the parliamentary debate since early lay the grounds for regional stability. Never- October, protesting against what they per- theless the MPs of the Kosovo parliament ceived to be manipulation with the man- have heeded the urgent warnings of the dates of MPs. Koštunica appears to set in- United States and UNMIK representatives creasingly less store in finding a consensus about declaring Kosovo’s independence with Tadić. After numerous public debates, before the onset of negotiations. In the end, the president and the prime minister could according to the accepted resolution in only agree that they would act as the co- which the Kosovar Albanian negotiating equal co-chairman of the Belgrade nego- position is spelled out, independence is tiating delegation. “not negotiable.” Just as in the Belgrade In his meeting with the Russian presi- resolution, the possibility of a referendum dent Vladimir Putin on November 15 in over the result of the status negotiations Moscow, Tadić suggested a settlement for was left open. This is supposed to make it Kosovo in line with the model of the Day- possible for the negotiators to act with the ton agreement for . alibi that “the will of the people” prevents According to it, there should be in Kosovo them from accepting major compromises. ethnic Serbian and ethnic Albanian entities while the Serbian side would have a special relationship to Belgrade. Simultaneously Dardania instead of Kosovo? Belgrade would preserve nominal sover- The leading Kosovo Albanian politicians eignty over Kosovo. Tadić rationalized his have until now not been able to unite on proposal with the rejection of drawing new more than that they stand for the indepen- borders in the territory of former Yugo- dence of Kosovo. Although they were ex- slavia, pointing out that if the Kosovo Alba- pressly asked by Washington to settle upon nians could do this, then other regional a common position within the delegation— actors would be emboldened to invoke the and US experts were helpful with training right to self-determination themselves. This in negotiating methods—Kosovo Albanian could lead to the disintegration of other actors remained mired in arguments over countries, like Macedonia and Bosnia and the competencies of the group’s coordina- Herzegovina. tor, journalist Blerim Shala. The nominal Tadić’s Moscow proposal appeared at leader of the negotiating delegation is first to be his doing alone, but eventually Kosovo’s terminally ill president, Ibrahim after some hesitation it found approval in Rugova. He is of the opinion that the Koso- Serbian government circles. In Pristina, the vo Albanians have already demonstrated proposals of the Serbian president were willingness to compromise when they ruled

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3 out unification with proper. In Macedonia, large parts of the Slavic Rugova demands the “direct” recognition population allege that the ethnic Albanian of Kosovo by the United States. Because of minority in the country (25 percent) wants the hefty infighting over Rugova’s succes- to secede. The government in Skopje, how- sor, none of the other leading political ever, has signalled its readiness to accept figures in Kosovo can afford to show any Kosovo’s independence, not least because it flexibility on the independence issue. hopes for even more support from the US to In addition, within the Albanian discus- bolster the survival of its own state. In sion over Kosovo's future there have recent- spring 2005 Washington recognized the ly been still further-reaching demands ex- Republic of Macedonia under its constitu- pressed that before had only been whis- tional name, while the EU still uses the of- pered behind closed doors. For example, ficial UN approved name “Former Yugoslav the leader of the opposition Albanian Republic of Macedonia.” Skopje demands Democratic Party (DPA) in Macedonia, that before the future status of Kosovo is Arben Xhaferi, proposed renaming Kosovo defined that the border with its neighbour- as Dardania and linking it to Albania. ing state Serbia and Montenegro is also Xhaferi takes the view that Kosovo, with its demarcated in the section on Kosovo. In re- two million inhabitants, will never make a sponse, the government in Pristina said functioning state. Also, the name “Kosovo” that it would do so only after indepen- is Slavic. “Dardania,” in contrast, is a name dence. with Illyrian heritage that corresponds to the historical narrative propagated by to- day’s Albanians. In the on-again off-again US and Russian Friends discussion over “Greater Albania,” the head Albanians have not hidden their hope, that of one of Kosovo’s smaller opposition the US will provide the decisive support for parties “Ora,” Veton Surroi, also the West’s Kosovo’s secession from Serbia. These hopes favoured interlocutor, argued that the received a further boost when the Assistant question of “national unification” will Secretary of State Nicholas Burns, at a Sen- remain a “real option” as long as the ate Committee for Foreign Affairs hearing, “strivings of the Albanian people in the asked the Kosovo Albanians to understand Balkans remain unfulfilled.” that “independence must be earned.” Also, Behind Xhaferi’s statements is above all in contrast to the terminology of the UN an attempt to score points as a fighter for and the EU, which speaks of Kosovo’s Albanian national goals with the ethnic Al- “future status,” Burns consistently used the banian constituency in Macedonia. In Alba- expression “final status.” He also avoided nia itself, there have only been isolated ruling out the possibility of an imposed cases of demands for the unification of all settlement. Burns emphasized that “the US of the ethnic Albanian inhabited territories. at this point expressly supports no one These territories, virtually ethnically homo- specific outcome” and that it is important genous, border Albania proper and have that the US and it allies “remain neutral”; grown into a single economic, cultural and yet, most of the hearing dealt almost political sphere. But Albania’s new govern- exclusively with the question of how ment under the leadership of Prime Min- Kosovo’s independence could be reached. ister Sali Berisha, a years-long ally of Senator Joseph Biden, a key figure in Rugova’s, has publicly given its support formulating Washington’s Balkan policies only to independence. This situation during the Clinton administration, stressed threatens to undermine the painstakingly that Pristina was one of the few “Muslim brokered normalization between cities” in the world in which the US is “not and Belgrade, as well as between Tirana only respected, but revered.” “If we get and Skopje. Kosovo right, Muslims around the world

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4 will be reminded how the United States where since the outbreak of the Yugoslavia came to the aid of Kosovo’s Muslim popula- crisis 15 years ago Moscow took a back seat tion and helped them build a strong, in- to the West and now finally has the oppor- dependent, multi-ethnic democracy,” tunity to prove itself an equal on the geo- he said. political world stage. At the same time In the American discussion over Kosovo, Russian commentators see Washington Russia’s and China’s position play almost weakened because of the escalating crisis in no role. But Moscow has made itself clear Iraq and and possibly also Iran, that Russia is no longer content to play a and thus in need of Moscow’s cooperation. secondary role in the Balkans. In early Finally, it is pointed out that Moscow and November 2005 the Russian Foreign Minis- Beijing have common interests on the ter Sergei Lawrow visited Belgrade, Pristina Kosovo question. (where he opened a Russian government Indeed, during recent visits of Serbian office) and Podgorica. In his statements he politicians to China, Beijing rejected the underlined that in coming to a settlement possibility of independence for Kosovo on for Kosovo an imposed settlement was not the grounds of the right of states to terri- an option. Shortly afterwards, President torial integrity guaranteed in the UN Char- Putin met with the Serbian president Tadić ter. Beijing thus appears to have given up in Moscow. In their discussion, the Kremlin the timidity that it had shown earlier in the chief stressed the determination of Moscow Balkans. In this context China’s concerns to prevent a further “disintegration” in the over separatist strivings in Tibet and the Balkans, hinting in his statement to the ongoing controversy over the status of secessionist movement in Chechnya and Taiwan play obviously a role. stressing the necessity to prevent similar In spite of nationalist voices now declar- disintegration worldwide. At the end of ing that “Serbia is no longer alone” because November, the foreign minister of Serbia it has Moscow on its side, most people in and Montenegro, Vuk Drašković, was also Serbia are thoroughly aware of Belgrade’s in Moscow to consult with Russian inter- experiences with the durability of Russian locutors. In an interview with a Russian and Chinese support during the disintegra- newspaper, Drašković signalled Belgrade’s tion of Yugoslavia and, above all, during readiness to accept a solution for Kosovo the NATO intervention. In addition, it is along the lines of the Chinese model for Serbia’s expressed top priority to integrate Taiwan: one state but with two political into the Euro-Atlantic structures in order to systems. catch up with the other transition coun- Some Russian Kremlin observers are of tries after its years-long isolation and the opinion that the Putin administration, general collapse during Milošević rule. in contrast to the Yeltsin government in Whether these interests are powerful 1999, is ready to use Russia’s veto power in enough to move Belgrade to give up a part the UNSC in the event of a disagreement of its territory in exchange for accelerated with Washington over Kosovo’s status. They entry into the EU is highly questionable. base this assessment on Moscow’s insis- Also, on the other side, the strivings of the tence not to accept precedent cases for re- Kosovo Albanians for independence def- gional secession which might have implica- initely outweighs the perspective of EU tions for separatism in the Caucasus. In membership. Finally, one must also take addition, they now see Russia as politically into consideration that within the EU today and economically stronger—and considera- there is no consensus that the stabilization bly more independent from the US—than it of the region of former Yugoslavia will had been under Yeltsin. And, not least, necessarily be expedited by its integration there is the effort to show “ideological” into the EU’s structures. determination, especially in the Balkans,

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5 The EU Position: A Settlement Should “Contact Group”: Negotiated Settlement Guarantee Long-term Development Has Priority On November 7, the European Council In a November 10 published document, (EC) established the EU’s positions the UNSC lay down the “guiding prin- toward the approaching negotiations ciples” of the so-called Contact Group over the future status of Kosovo. Next to (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Great the general demand that democratic Britain and the US) for the negotiating standards and human rights should be process over the future status of Kosovo. recognized, as well as the maintenance In addition to the EU positions it men- of the character of the region as well as tions the following: several other specific positions. The  A negotiated solution should be a most important points: priority.  The agreement on status should  Once the process has started, it cannot ensure that Kosovo does not return to be blocked and must be brought to a © Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2005 the pre-March 1999 situation. conclusion. All rights reserved  Any solution which was unilateral or  The Contact Group calls on the parties resulted from the use of force, as well to engage constructively, to refrain SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und as any changes to the current terri- from unilateral steps and to reject any Politik tory of Kosovo would be unaccept- form of violence. German Institute for International and able.  The Special Envoy can take appropri- Security Affairs  There can also be no partition of ate action within his UN mandate to

Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 Kosovo, nor any union of Kosovo with suspend or exclude any individual or 10719 Berlin another country or with part of an- group, if he judges that their actions Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 other country following the resolu- are not conducive to progress. www.swp-berlin.org tion of the status of Kosovo.  The process should provide for the [email protected]  The territorial integrity and the effective participation of the Kosovo

ISSN 1861-1761 internal stability of neighbouring Serbs and other Kosovo citizens and countries must be fully respected. communities.  Kosovo's future status should enable it  Regional neighbours and other inter- to develop in a way which is both ested parties should also be consulted economically and politically sustain- as necessary. able and ensure it does not constitute  The implementation of the democracy a military or security threat to its standards laid down by the UN must neighbours. continue during the status process  The resolution of Kosovo’s future and will be a factor in determining status must enable both Belgrade and progress. Pristina to make progress towards the  The Contact Group reaffirms the im- European Union portance which it attaches to con-  The resolution should include specific structive and sustained dialogue at all safeguards to protect cultural heri- levels between Belgrade and Pristina tage and religious sites. and between the different communi- ties in Kosovo. It asks the authorities in Belgrade to actively encourage the Serbs of Kosovo to take their place in Kosovo’s institutions.

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