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02 Klasnja.Indd THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION The EU and Kosovo Time to Rethink the Enlargement and Integration Policy? Marko Klasnja The EU’s approach to the HE European Union has been hailed for its contri- Tbution to the largely successful post-communist Western Balkans has been transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Exerting its well-known “soft power” advantages by of- plagued with inconsistencies fering the possibility of membership, the EU encouraged and half-baked measures. The the partners in the ongoing process of integration and “Europeanization,”1 here meant to connote the processes situation in Kosovo demonstrates and mechanisms by which European efforts to build political, economic, legal, and social institutions cause that the EU needs to rethink its changes at the domestic level.2 This success story has so policy arsenal if it is to achieve far not been replicated in the Western Balkans, another region undergoing transition where the EU’s ambitions its goals. and pledges seem to mirror those of the earlier “Eastern Enlargement.” The results in the Western Balkans have so far been much more limited and by no means assure an equally successful outcome. This may be a consequence of the much wider range of challenges faced by the region than was the case with Central and Eastern Europe, given the recurring conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the late start of transition in many countries, and the unsolved territorial and ethnic issues, not to mention other prob- lems. The intricacies of the status-settlement process for Kosovo—that is, whether the province will become an independent country or remain part of Serbia—exemplify the multi-faceted nature of the transition process in the region. However, the correlation between this insufficient MARKO KLASNJA is an M.A. candidate at the School of International Service, progress and the current institutional crisis and “enlarge- American University, Washington, DC. He thanks two anonymous reviewers ment fatigue” in the EU hardly seems coincidental. Taken for substantive and editorial suggestions, Rebecca Johnson for substantive discussion and help on issues relating to this project, and Ron Linden for sup- together, these two dilemmas raise some questions. Can port and encouragement. the lure of EU membership adequately address the chal- Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 54, no. 4, July/August 2007, pp. 15–32. © 2007 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2007 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216540402 Klasnja The EU and Kosovo 15 lenges in the Western Balkans? Are the complexities of with the enactment of the new Serbian constitution in the transition in this region posing new challenges to the September 1991. This prompted an unofficial, locally EU’s capacity as a soft power, and more particularly to organized referendum in Kosovo, in which a large ma- its enlarment, as well as Common Foreign and Security jority voted for the independence and sovereignty of the Policy (CFSP)? Does the EU need to change its integra- Republic of Kosova (the preferred spelling in the local tion strategy? Albanian language). Before long, an autochthonous gov- This article addresses these questions by examining ernment, president, and parliament were elected, but the EU-Kosovo relations following the 1999 war. As the occupants of these posts were soon forced into exile or status-settlement process nears completion, the role of underground by the authorities in Belgrade. Nevertheless, the EU before and during the negotiations, the short-term an elaborate parallel party-state apparatus, run by the larg- plans for its engagement in the post-status developments, est indigenous political party—the Democratic League of and its medium to long-term approach to Kosovo and the Kosovo (LDK)—managed to function quite effectively, region are examined in turn. Overall, the EU’s approach even if informally, for much of the 1990s.6 It stopped to Kosovo, and to the region in general, is not character- short of assertively pursuing independence for Kosovo, ized by a well-thought-out strategy, but rather is plagued however, thus generating an aggressive, guerrilla-like with inconsistencies and half-baked measures. This is opposition in the form of the Kosovo Liberation Army, in stark contrast with the pervasive expectations in both whose campaign against the Serbian authorities and the the international community and the region itself that LDK party apparatus alike had assumed a systematic pat- the EU is the key international actor to help the region tern by the beginning of 1998. Isolated fighting turned into successfully navigate the transition onto a sustainable widespread repression by the Serbian police and military, path of democratization, marketization, and, hopefully, substantial civilian casualties, and a massive exodus of Europeanization. In this respect, it may be time to rethink non-Serbs from Kosovo, prompting active involvement the existing enlargement and CFSP arsenal. In Misirolli’s by members of the international community. adept phrasing, “If the membership is the ‘golden carrot’ In the wake of the unsuccessful Organization for Se- but is [currently] not on offer, what silver and/or bronze curity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO carrots can be devised for the EU . to carry out effec- Kosovo Verification Missions deployed in late 1998, tive policies?”3 three ineffective UN Security Council Resolutions,7 and the Raèak massacre of Albanian civilians in Janu- ary 1999, the Contact Group of interested international Autonomy, Assimilation, Protectorate negotiators—revived once again to deal with the conflict Kosovo’s current administrative status was established in the Balkans8—sponsored peace talks at Rambouillet in with the creation of the Socialist Federal Republic of February 1999. As a result, Kosovo regained a substantial Yugoslavia. From 1946 to 1973, Kosovo was officially degree of autonomy modeled largely on the relevant 1974 an autonomous area (oblast) within the Republic of constitutional provisions, Serbian military and police Serbia, but it enjoyed little genuine autonomy. With the forces withdrew, international peace-keeping troops enactment of Yugoslavia’s 1974 constitution, Kosovo entered the area, and a civilian mission was established was given the status of autonomous province, with the for a period of three years, after which an international same level of representation in the federal organs as meeting was to be held to “determine a mechanism for the six republics,4 an autochthonous executive, judicial, a final settlement for Kosovo.” 9 The conference was a and legislative structure, its own police force, a set of failure, however, because the Serbian side refused to sign enhanced cultural and educational rights, complete fiscal the accords, which paved the way for the 78-day NATO independence, and a rudimentary capacity to connect air campaign against Yugoslavia. with other regions on a bilateral basis.5 Following the The war ended when Belgrade agreed to sign the Ku- death of President Josip Broz Tito in 1980 and amid the manovo Agreement, a platform for the ensuing UNSC beginning of the identity crisis of Titoist Yugoslavia, Resolution 1244, which established the United Nations Kosovar Albanians took to the streets to demand republic administration (UNMIK) and the NATO peace-keep- status for Kosovo. ing force (KFOR) in Kosovo. Despite some changes in Along with the rise of Serbian strongman Slobodan wording, UNSCR 1244 restated the major conditions Miloševiæ in the late 1980s, however, Kosovo was as- stipulated in the Rambouillet Accords, with the exception similated (back) into a unified Serbian political system of the “three-year-period” provision, making Kosovo an 16 Problems of Post-Communism July/August 2007 effective protectorate, despite formally keeping it within the international community, leading to a comprehen- the sovereign territory of Yugoslavia. sive standard-implementation review by the UN special envoy, Kai Eide. Following the recommendations of the Eide Report, and given the eagerness of UNMIK and Post-1999 Kosovo: Standards–Status NATO to avoid the embarrassment of renewed outbreaks Combinations and Permutations of violence, the strategy was redesigned into that of In May 2001, following the first two years of immedi- “Standards and Status,” setting the agenda for status ate reconstruction, UNMIK adopted the “Constitutional negotiations, to be led by another UN special representa- Framework of Kosovo,” which led to the “Provisional tive, Martti Ahtisaari of Estonia. This effectively marked Institutions for Self-Government” (PISG) framework a U-turn in the international approach to Kosovo, away in February 2002. PISG initiated the (re-)creation of from the hopes that the tension between the Albanians a subset of indigenous institutions (an assembly, some and the Serbs would be done away with bit by bit through elements of the executive branch, and the presidency), constructive actions within the status quo. Therefore, while keeping some of the more sensitive powers to the UN-brokered talks between Priština and Belgrade itself (justice, security, external affairs, privatization, began in February 2006 under the negotiating guidelines etc). In April 2002 UNMIK articulated a set of policy spelled out by the Contact Group.13 targets for the PISG to pursue in order for Kosovo to be “functioning, stable, and on its way to Europe.”10 It could EU Engagement in the Run-up to the be argued that this “Standards before Status” strategy implicitly marked the end of the three-year time-out pe- Status Talks: Subtle Dictation? riod envisaged by the Rambouillet Accords but omitted The Contact Group and the UN Security Council are from the UNSCR 1244 text. More important, it sought widely seen to have been the most instrumental of the to launch a much-needed dialogue between Prishtina international players that shaped post-conflict develop- and Belgrade regarding such ethnic-sensitive issues as ments in Kosovo, especially with respect to the afore- the return of refugees, protection of minority rights, and mentioned U-turn.
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