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07 October 2009 Afghanistan Review This document is intended to provide an overview of relevant sector events in Afghanistan from 30 September -06 October 2009. More comprehensive information is available on the Civil- Military Overview (CMO) at www.cimicweb.org.1 Inside This Issue Letters to the Editor: Jonathan Hadaway, [email protected] /+1 757-683-4233: Letters to the Editor In Focus Dear Sir, if the US does not agree to General McChrystal's troop increase (Reference: Economic Stabilization 30 September 2009 CFC Afghanistan Review, „In Focus‟) it will undermine a crucial, first step in counterinsurgency: showing the population that you have the will to win. Governance & Participation Counterinsurgency operations require additional troops. The necessary focus, Humanitarian Assistance resources, strategy and troops have yet to be dedicated to Afghanistan. I think a new strategy with the required number of military forces deserves a chance to succeed. Infrastructure Justice & Reconciliation --Jesse Wilson, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Security Social Well-Being Response to Last Week‟s Question In Focus: Eide vs. Galbraith Jonathan Hadaway, [email protected] /+1 757-683-4233: Question of the Week Is it more important for The Deputy United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG) the United Nations to was removed from his post following a „private-turned-public‟ spat with his superior at fully support free, fair, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The UN Office of the inclusive and Secretary General in New York issued a statement recalling UNAMA DSRSG Peter transparent elections, or Galbraith, stating the decision to end his appointment was in the “best interest of the to remain as neutral as mission.” The disagreement between Galbraith and United Nations Special possible and allow Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Kai Eide stemmed from the disputed 20 August presidential elections and how UNAMA should address the widespread Afghan electoral allegations of fraud. Galbraith reportedly led one camp in the mission that wanted to institutions to mature publicize all reports of fraud and electoral mismanagement. Eide held that although and handle their own UNAMA had collected significant amounts of information on potential fraud, it could affairs? not be passed on to the Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) without verification and an official request. He accused Galbraith of going beyond what was Click here to answer legally afforded by the constitution in his quest to expose every individual incident of fraud. 1 A CMO user account is required to access some of the links in this document. 1 The dispute between the top UNAMA representatives reflects wider disagreement in the international community over how to proceed following the elections. Afghanistan is in the midst of an expanding conflict. The Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan has submitted a new counterinsurgency strategy and called for more troops, setting a 12 month timeline to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum. To implement portions of the new strategy a reliable Afghan partner is needed, yet uncertainty surrounding the elections is preventing that partner from materializing. The primary concern of some in the international community is to support the democratic process and make sure the Afghan elections are scrutinized to the same standard as western democracies, or as close as possible. Others feel “It can be argued that the that going through long, drawn-out electoral complaints procedures would only removal of Galbraith sends a succeed in undermining Afghanistan‟s stability at a critical stage in the conflict. Many confused message to the in the latter camp also see the re-election of Hamid Karzai as inevitable, and are Afghan population about the therefore reluctant to enter into a protracted confrontation with someone they anticipate having to work with in the coming months. In addition, if the electoral United Nations‟ role in their complaints period drags on past October and an eventual second round run-off is country.” called, winter weather will make it logistically impossible to organize. It can be argued that the removal of Galbraith sends a confused message to the Afghan population about the United Nations‟ role in their country. UNAMA‟s mandate [S/RES/1806(2008)] emphasizes the importance of free, fair, inclusive and transparent elections to sustain the democratic progress. If there is a failure to examine all allegations of electoral fraud and see the democratic process through to its fair conclusion, it is questionable whether the mission is fully carrying out its mandate. On the flip side, there are also provisions in UNAMA‟s mandate which call for support to Afghan institutions, stressing the need for international efforts to provide technical assistance. These institutions include the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the ECC, although the latter is not entirely Afghan, being headed by a five person commission which includes three internationals. It appears that the disputed elections have put the United Nations in a „Catch-22‟ of competing interests. While it is obligated to support free and fair elections, it has to walk a fine line in its support and guidance to Afghan electoral institutions like the IEC and ECC, so as not to appear to be interfering in an Afghan-led process. (Comments? Click Here) Economic Stabilization Giuseppe Magliulo, [email protected] /+1 757-683-4275: Back to top The Bactrocera Cucurbitae parasite, commonly referred to as the melon fly, is attacking the melon crop in the North. The Director of Agriculture in Balkh has “The Director of Agriculture alleged that the parasite was voluntarily introduced to the province by drug lords to in Balkh has alleged that the persuade farmers to forego melons for more lucrative poppy cultivation. All attempts parasite was voluntarily made by the government to eliminate the parasite up to this point have failed, introduced to the province by leaving many farmers without the profits that usually carry them through the winter. drug lords to persuade ▪ At an Agricultural Research and Development Centre ceremony in Laghman province, the Director of Agriculture announced that saffron has been introduced to farmers to forego melons for the Mehtar Lam district with support from the Kansas National Guard Agribusiness more lucrative poppy Development Team. The first saffron harvest is expected to take place within 40 cultivation.” days. ▪ With the support of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), a tourist information office has been established in Bamian 2 province. A workshop was also organized at the end of September focused on the protection of monuments and the promotion of tourism in the province. New Zealand has also funded an eco-tourism programme which attempts to improve tourism with little negative effects on the environment or local population. If successful, the programme is expected to bolster the provincial economy and provide an income to portions of the local community. ▪ Saifodin Saihun, a lecturer on economics at Kabul University, presented several points on the economic situation of Afghanistan in a recent interview with Aina TV. He emphasised the lack of proper economic planning in the country, the control of the sector by foreigners and the need for improved infrastructure to take advantage of Afghanistan‟s favourable position in the region. He also noted the huge disparity between imports and exports (USD 5.7 billion compared to USD 1.7 billion respectively), highlighting the dependence of Afghanistan on foreign aid despite having suitable resources to supply food, water and livelihood opportunities for the entire population. The interview ended with an examination of the correlation between security and the economy, emphasising the fact that the restoration of security in the country is a precursor to a stable economy. Correction: In last week‟s Economic Stabilization input, it was reported that the Asian Development Bank and United Kingdom would extend a grant of approximately USD 90 million to the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project to develop irrigation systems and provide flood protection in Afghanistan. The grant will actually go to the Water Resources Development Investment Program, not to the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. (Comments? Click Here) Governance & Participation Amber Ramsey, [email protected] /+1 757-683-4368: Back to top The sample audit of 3,498 suspect ballot boxes has begun in Kabul. The IEC is leading the audit, counting 10% of the ballots in each box. The winner is expected to be announced according to the findings, but with the audit process already behind schedule, the final results will not be available for another two weeks. ▪ Local Afghan leaders are questioning whether a centralised government is the best way forward for the country. Primarily due to obstacles faced during the 20 August elections, some “[T]he alleged widespread have suggested that Afghanistan needs to redistribute power from the central fraud, which for the most part government to the regions. They hold that the alleged widespread fraud, which for favoured the President, is a the most part favoured the President, is a clear indicator that Afghanistan isn‟t suited clear indicator that to have a strong presidential system with power rooted in the capital. ▪ Accusations made by former UNAMA DSRSG Peter Galbraith related to UN oversight of the Afghanistan isn‟t suited to have a strong presidential elections have led to a public outcry against what the Afghan population sees as international interference. Presidential runner-up Abdullah Abdullah has also argued system with power rooted in that the Galbraith accusations raise serious questions about the neutrality of the the capital.” United Nations. At a news conference on 01 October, Afghan parliamentarians accused the organization of bias, calling for renewed criminal investigations into the alleged electoral fraud.
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