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F a S T Update Kosovo Semi-Annual Risk Assessment May 2006 To F A S T Update Kosovo Semi-annual Risk Assessment May 2006 to October 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (relative) 5 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (relative) 7 Appendix: Description of indicators used 9 The FAST International Early Warning Program 10 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 02 Dr. Florian Bieber Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 70 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • The stability of Kosovo and key events in the region remain a function of the ongoing status discussions. Both developments over the past six months, as well as the stability of Kosovo in the foreseeable future are primarily dictated by the nature and possible outcome of the status negotiations. While the talks themselves have failed to yield any tangible results to date and remain largely deadlocked, the Country Stability, as well as Conflictive Events, have been greatly fluctuating recently, as they have over the past years. Most worrying is the sharp, if temporary, decline of Country Stability in late 2006, as well as the increase in relative Conflictive Events, indicating increased tensions in the face of an expected conclusion of the status talks in early 2007. • In Serbia, the authorities have continuously emphasized their rejection of independence for Kosovo and in extension any imposed solution which would not be based on a compromise incorporating Serbian demands. This position has increased tensions between Serbia and Kosovo and reduced the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. At the same time, in summer 2006, the Serbian president Tadic hinted at the possibility of a solution which would not satisfy Serbian demands. • As all key Albanian parties are involved in the status negotiations, the degree of conflict and tension among the majority has been relatively low in recent months. The dominant status talks have temporarily subdued political conflicts, but by no means resolved them. In the absence of any concrete plans for a post-status Kosovo, political tensions are likely to resume, in particular if the status offered is less than independence. • Suggestions that a status for Kosovo might in fact not entail full independence and even avoid the term ‘independence’ have increased in the second half of 2006. As a key power at the UN Security Council, Russia has noted that independence for Kosovo would set a precedent it would apply to a number of other disputed territories in the former Soviet Union, most notably Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova. While it remains unclear whether Russia would genuinely apply such a precedent, this position has damped the prospect of full independence in the foreseeable future. While any solution will most likely result in de-facto independence, a solution which continues the status quo and fails to offer a clear prospect of independence might increase tensions within Kosovo and with international actors. © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 4 • Tensions in Mitrovica after the re-opening of the bridge between Serb inhabited north and Albanian inhabited south in October 2006 and continued interethnic violence are a reminder of the high tensions in Kosovo. In the environment of the status talks parties have sought to reduce incidents which might negatively affect their desired outcome, but an escalation of violence continues to be possible, in particular if a decision is taken which, as will certainly be the case, dissatisfies either one or both parties. © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 5 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 70 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • Domestic Conflictive and Cooperative Events have been highly volatile in recent months, as they have been earlier. Relative Conflictive Domestic Events continue to exceed cooperative ones. In recent months, compared to earlier, less domestic conflict has taken place among the Albanian majority political actors. Conflictive Domestic Events are rather a consequence of broader tensions between Albanian and Serb political actors. • The status talks have not yielded any results to date, which does not imply they are meaningless. In particular, discussions over decentralization and the creation of new Serb municipalities have been crucial. The Kosovo authorities have accepted the establishment of additional Serb municipalities with substantial autonomy, but the degree of autonomy and the number and size of these municipalities have proven to be insurmountable obstacles to compromise. • Politics within the Albanian majority have been relatively stable in recent months, despite the turmoil in the first half of 2006 which led to the replacement of the entire political leadership resulting from the death of Rugova and the dismissal of Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi. Agim Ceku, who prior to being nominated as Prime Minister headed the Kosovo Protection Force, has been able to be a more forceful Prime Minister than his predecessor. With him coming to office and the death of Rugova, power shifted clearly from the President to the Prime Minister. • Political and ethnically motivated violence continues to plague Kosovo and fuel domestic tensions. Among the most serious incidents was a car bomb targeting the Minister of Interior in Gjilan/Gnjilane and a series of bombings in Kline/Klina injuring four Kosovo Serbs, both events taking place in September 2006. Such attacks have been regular occurrences over recent years and the absence of a further escalation, despite or because of the status talks, might suggest more effective preventive measures by international and domestic authorities. • Among the Kosovo Serb population, recent months brought about a more confrontational and radical policy. This has been fostered by the intransigent policy of the Serbian government and the new constitution’s promise to keep Kosovo part of Serbia. Turnout for the Serbian referendum in Kosovo (presumably overwhelming Serbs) for the constitution was over 90 percent, as opposed to 53.3 percent in all of Serbia. © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 6 The success of the referendum was met with supportive demonstrations in Mitrovica, reflecting (unrealistic) expectations among many Kosovo Serbs of protection by the Serbian state. The non-cooperation of most Kosovo Serb politicians with Kosovo institutions has exacerbated the community’s isolation in recent years. This development suggests a further hardening of positions following a decision on the status and continued control of the Serbian state over territories inhabited mostly by Serbs. © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 7 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 70 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • The international environment of Kosovo remains volatile. While Cooperative International Events have remained stable, Conflictive International Events have fluctuated and increased in recent months. The latter trend can been seen as a reflection of the volatile environment of Kosovo in the context of the status talks, which have failed to yield results to date and further increased tensions with Serbia. • In the midst of the status talks, in June 2006, the head of the UNMIK mission, Soren Jessen Petersen, left his position. This marked the end of a high-profile UNMIK leadership. His successor, Joachim Rücker, was previously his deputy responsible for economic reconstruction. This was the first transition of the UN Special Representative to Kosovo within the mission in Kosovo. While signalling continuity, it also signifies a more toned down UN mission on the ground, as the primary arena of international efforts shifted to the international mediations led by Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo. Petersen was perceived as a forceful representative who was frequently criticized for his support of Kosovo Albanian politicians, in particular Ramush Haradinaj. The change at the top of the mission symbolizes the transition of UNMIK itself. More fundamentally, the mission will undergo a transformation after the decision on the status. Whereas a powerful international mission will most likely continue to operate, such a mission might be led by the European Union and is probably going to be structured differently from UNMIK, bearing closer resemblance to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia. • Amidst a broad international consensus on the need to find a more permanent status for Kosovo, differences on the substance of the status and the timing remain large. Whereas the United States has argued in favor of determining the status by the end of 2006, European countries have argued for negotiations to extend into 2007, whereas Russia has shown no urgency to decide the status. After a meeting with the Contact Group on 10 November 2006, Martti Ahtisaari announced that the issuing of his proposal on the future of Kosovo will
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