Conflict in Kosovo Through the Conceptual Framework of Stakeholders
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Violence Against Kosovar Albanians, Nato's
VIOLENCE AGAINST KOSOVAR ALBANIANS, NATO’S INTERVENTION 1998-1999 MSF SPEAKS OUT MSF Speaks Out In the same collection, “MSF Speaking Out”: - “Salvadoran refugee camps in Honduras 1988” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [October 2003 - April 2004 - December 2013] - “Genocide of Rwandan Tutsis 1994” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [October 2003 - April 2004 - April 2014] - “Rwandan refugee camps Zaire and Tanzania 1994-1995” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [October 2003 - April 2004 - April 2014] - “The violence of the new Rwandan regime 1994-1995” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [October 2003 - April 2004 - April 2014] - “Hunting and killings of Rwandan Refugee in Zaire-Congo 1996-1997” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [August 2004 - April 2014] - ‘’Famine and forced relocations in Ethiopia 1984-1986” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [January 2005 - November 2013] - “MSF and North Korea 1995-1998” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [January 2008 - 2014] - “War Crimes and Politics of Terror in Chechnya 1994-2004” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [June 2010 -2014] -”Somalia 1991-1993: Civil war, famine alert and UN ‘military-humanitarian’ intervention” Laurence Binet - Médecins Sans Frontières [October 2013] Editorial Committee: Laurence Binet, Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, Marine Buissonnière, Katharine Derderian, Rebecca Golden, Michiel Hofman, Theo Kreuzen, Jacqui Tong - Director of Studies (project coordination-research-interviews-editing): Laurence Binet - Assistant: Berengere Cescau - Transcription of interviews: Laurence Binet, Christelle Cabioch, Bérengère Cescau, Jonathan Hull, Mary Sexton - Typing: Cristelle Cabioch - Translation into English: Aaron Bull, Leah Brummer, Nina Friedman, Imogen Forst, Malcom Leader, Caroline Lopez-Serraf, Roger Leverdier, Jan Todd, Karen Tucker - Proof reading: Rebecca Golden, Jacqui Tong - Design/lay out: - Video edit- ing: Sara Mac Leod - Video research: Céline Zigo - Website designer and webmaster: Sean Brokenshire. -
UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order Online
UNDER ORDERS: War Crimes in Kosovo Order online Table of Contents Acknowledgments Introduction Glossary 1. Executive Summary The 1999 Offensive The Chain of Command The War Crimes Tribunal Abuses by the KLA Role of the International Community 2. Background Introduction Brief History of the Kosovo Conflict Kosovo in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Kosovo in the 1990s The 1998 Armed Conflict Conclusion 3. Forces of the Conflict Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslav Army Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs Paramilitaries Chain of Command and Superior Responsibility Stucture and Strategy of the KLA Appendix: Post-War Promotions of Serbian Police and Yugoslav Army Members 4. march–june 1999: An Overview The Geography of Abuses The Killings Death Toll,the Missing and Body Removal Targeted Killings Rape and Sexual Assault Forced Expulsions Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions Destruction of Civilian Property and Mosques Contamination of Water Wells Robbery and Extortion Detentions and Compulsory Labor 1 Human Shields Landmines 5. Drenica Region Izbica Rezala Poklek Staro Cikatovo The April 30 Offensive Vrbovac Stutica Baks The Cirez Mosque The Shavarina Mine Detention and Interrogation in Glogovac Detention and Compusory Labor Glogovac Town Killing of Civilians Detention and Abuse Forced Expulsion 6. Djakovica Municipality Djakovica City Phase One—March 24 to April 2 Phase Two—March 7 to March 13 The Withdrawal Meja Motives: Five Policeman Killed Perpetrators Korenica 7. Istok Municipality Dubrava Prison The Prison The NATO Bombing The Massacre The Exhumations Perpetrators 8. Lipljan Municipality Slovinje Perpetrators 9. Orahovac Municipality Pusto Selo 10. Pec Municipality Pec City The “Cleansing” Looting and Burning A Final Killing Rape Cuska Background The Killings The Attacks in Pavljan and Zahac The Perpetrators Ljubenic 11. -
Kosovo's New Political Leadership
ASSEMBLY SUPPORT INITIATIVE asiNEWSLETTER Kosovo’s new political leadership ASSEMBLYasi SUPPORT INITIATIVE NEWSLETTER юѦȱŘŖŖŜǰȱќȱŘŘ Strengthening the oversight role of the Kosovo Assembly oces Mission in Kosovo ASSEMBLY SUPPORT INITIATIVE 2 NEWSLETTERasi Editorial Editorial 2 Kosovo has a new political leadership. Within one Mr. Kolë Berisha’s speech on the occasion ǰȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱ of assuming the Assembly Presidency 3 ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĜǯȱȱ Fatmir Sejdiu succeeded the late President Ibrahim President Fatmir Sejdiu talks to BBC 6 Rugova. Former TMK Commander Agim Ceku succeeded Bajram Kosumi as prime minister. Mr. “There is no full freedom in Kosovo Kole Berisha succeeded Nexhat Daci as president unless all of Kosovo’s citizens can enjoy it” 7 ȱȱ¢ǯȱ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱǯȱȱŘŚȱȱŘŖŖŜǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ Kosovo Serb Leaders Meet Premier Çeku, ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ ȱ Consider Joining Government 9 rounds of talks on decentralization. Recent Developments in the Assembly 10 ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ sessions in the Assembly on various policy issues. The new president Let’s learn to hear the voice of the citizen 12 ȱȱ¢ǰȱǯȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ a new democratic atmosphere and to strengthen co-operation with Presidency of the Assembly 14 international institutions. Transparency and full adherence to Rules Why we asked for a new dynamic in of Procedure are high on his agenda. Assembly’s Work 16 In light of the current changes at the Assembly one can hope that this ȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱĴǰȱ Our Vision of an Independent Kosovo 17 to further enhance their role in overseeing the work of the government ȱ ¡ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Pay off Time 18 Consolidated Budget (KCB). -
A Diplomatic History of the 1998–99 Kosovo Conflict
FROM DAYTON TO ALLIED FORCE: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE 1998–99 KOSOVO CONFLICT by Christian Novak A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences University of Sydney 2017 ii I declare that the research presented here is my own original work and has not been submitted to any other institution for the award of a degree iii Abstract This thesis reconstructs the diplomatic response of the international community to the Kosovo conflict of 1998–99. It outlines the process which resulted in the failure of negotiations involving outside agencies and individuals as well as the recourse to air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Using primary sourced material from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, personal interviews and other carefully selected primary sources, this thesis explores why international attempts to find a negotiated solution failed. iv Acknowledgements Numerous people have assisted in the completion of this thesis. I would firstly like to acknowledge my research supervisor, Professor Glenda Sluga, for her guidance over the years. My gratitude is also extended to John Drewienkiewicz, Josef Janning, Richard Miles, Klaus Naumann, and Lord David Owen, all of whom took out time from their busy schedules to answer my questions. In particular, I wish to thank Wolfgang Petritsch. His accessibility and willingness to explain the events of 1998–99 considerably enhanced my own understanding of the crisis. Special thanks is reserved for my parents, Anne and David, who have gone above and beyond to support me. -
Violence in Kosovo
VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO: Who's Killing Whom? Amended version ICG Balkans Report N°78 Prishtinë/Pristina - London - Washington, 2 November 1999 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1 II. RADICALISED KOSOVO ALBANIANS................................................................ 3 III. THE KLA TARGETING MINORITIES ................................................................... 5 IV. SERB PARAMILITARIES ..................................................................................... 8 V. CRIMINALS FROM ALBANIA ............................................................................ 10 VI. POLITICAL RIVALS............................................................................................ 12 A. Bujar Bukoshi and the LDK......................................................................................12 B. The KLA and its Political Adherents......................................................................... 13 VII. THE SECURITY SHORTFALL............................................................................ 14 VIII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 15 IX. RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 17 A. Internal Security.......................................................................................................17 B. Deradicalising the Albanian Majority ....................................................................... -
Southern Balkan Challenges After the Hague Indictment
Conflict Studies Research Centre Balkans Series 0 5/12 Southern Balkan Challenges After The Hague Indictment James Pettifer Key Points * The Hague indictment of Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj offers both opportunities and dangers for the international community. * The US, while supporting the general principle of Kosovo independence, is currently letting the Europeans take the lead on the issue. * There is a short window of opportunity for political progress if a major conference can be arranged to progress the political status issue. * In the medium term, if political progress is not forthcoming, the risk of conflict in the region, in Kosovo, Macedonia, Preshevo and Cameria increases substantially. 05/12 Southern Balkan Challenges After The Hague Indictment James Pettifer The indictment sending Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj to the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) had been long expected after a period of preparation of Kosovo and international public opinion. The fact that he has accepted the indictment and has gone to the Hague voluntarily has provided a good public relations coup for the Kosovo Albanian leadership by contrast to the intransigence and lack of cooperation with ICTY in most other Balkan countries, and is likely to increase the pressures for rapid progress towards independence within Kosovo. But it is not seen that way in Serbia, and the Serbian position is increasingly closely linked to the residual influence of Greece and its associated orbit within the EU. The party of Hardinaj is in general seen in Kosovo and the world in general as very much aligned to the Anglo-American axis within Kosovo and had only about 8% of the votes. -
Violence in Kosovo
VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO: Who's Killing Whom? ICG Balkans Report N°78 Prishtinë/Pristina - London - Washington, 2 November 1999 Table of Contents I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 1 II. RADICALISED KOSOVO ALBANIANS................................................................ 3 III. THE KLA TARGETING MINORITIES ................................................................... 5 IV. SERB PARAMILITARIES ..................................................................................... 8 V. CRIMINALS FROM ALBANIA ............................................................................ 10 VI. POLITICAL RIVALS............................................................................................ 12 A. Bujar Bukoshi and the LDK......................................................................................12 B. The KLA and its Political Adherents......................................................................... 13 VII. THE SECURITY SHORTFALL............................................................................ 14 VIII. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 16 IX. RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 18 A. Internal Security.......................................................................................................18 B. Deradicalising the Albanian Majority ....................................................................... -
02 Klasnja.Indd
THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION The EU and Kosovo Time to Rethink the Enlargement and Integration Policy? Marko Klasnja The EU’s approach to the HE European Union has been hailed for its contri- Tbution to the largely successful post-communist Western Balkans has been transition in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Exerting its well-known “soft power” advantages by of- plagued with inconsistencies fering the possibility of membership, the EU encouraged and half-baked measures. The the partners in the ongoing process of integration and “Europeanization,”1 here meant to connote the processes situation in Kosovo demonstrates and mechanisms by which European efforts to build political, economic, legal, and social institutions cause that the EU needs to rethink its changes at the domestic level.2 This success story has so policy arsenal if it is to achieve far not been replicated in the Western Balkans, another region undergoing transition where the EU’s ambitions its goals. and pledges seem to mirror those of the earlier “Eastern Enlargement.” The results in the Western Balkans have so far been much more limited and by no means assure an equally successful outcome. This may be a consequence of the much wider range of challenges faced by the region than was the case with Central and Eastern Europe, given the recurring conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the late start of transition in many countries, and the unsolved territorial and ethnic issues, not to mention other prob- lems. The intricacies of the status-settlement process for Kosovo—that is, whether the province will become an independent country or remain part of Serbia—exemplify the multi-faceted nature of the transition process in the region. -
Decentralization Should Not Imply Enclavization
Decentralization should not imply enclavization Bajram Kosumi1 Kosovo is in the process of an assessment standards as required by both the UN Security Council of and the Contact Group. We expect that the assessment will show that Kosovo has made major progress. In other words, we expect this assessment to be realistic and to open the door to starting a discussion on the final status of Kosovo. As is known, there have been several political and technical assessments so far, and all of them have been positive. There were some difficulties at the beginning. However, the Kosovo government and its agencies have relied on all their potential and have managed to make an initial breakthrough. These are the arguments that guarantee ongoing assessment. We do not see standards as something which the international community imposes on Kosovo. I have said many times that those were the standards of freedom and human rights, and that is how we perceive them. We will build a better democracy and show more respect for human rights and freedoms not because the international community required this, but because of our future. We want to create a democratic society, a free society that guarantees equality among all its citizens. Kosovo has established democratic institutions invested with new powers. With their four years experience, these institutions have proved that they are up to the Kosovo challenge, even in difficult times such as in the past several months. Both the Kosovo institutions and politicians have demonstrated wisdom and resoluteness in making decisions and taking over responsibility. A positive evaluation by international political factors testifies to this. -
Kosovo After Haradinaj
KOSOVO AFTER HARADINAJ Europe Report N°163 – 26 May 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE RISK AND DEFLECTION OF REBELLION................................................... 2 A. MANAGEMENT OF THE HARADINAJ INDICTMENT ..................................................................2 B. SHADOW WARRIORS TEST THE WATER.................................................................................4 C. THE "WILD WEST" ON THE BRINK ........................................................................................6 D. DUKAGJINI TURNS IN ON ITSELF ...........................................................................................9 III. KOSOVO'S NEW POLITICAL CONFIGURATION.............................................. 12 A. THE SHAPE OF KOSOVO ALBANIAN POLITICS .....................................................................12 B. THE OCTOBER 2004 ELECTIONS .........................................................................................13 C. THE NETWORK CONSOLIDATES CONTROL ..........................................................................14 D. THE ECLIPSE OF THE PARTY OF WAR? ................................................................................16 E. TRANSCENDING OR DEEPENING WARTIME DIVISIONS?.......................................................20 IV. KOSOVO'S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND FINAL STATUS.................................. -
F a S T Update Kosovo Semi-Annual Risk Assessment May 2006 To
F A S T Update Kosovo Semi-annual Risk Assessment May 2006 to October 2006 T S A F © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 2 Contents Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) 3 Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (relative) 5 Conflictive and Cooperative International Events (relative) 7 Appendix: Description of indicators used 9 The FAST International Early Warning Program 10 FAST Update Subscription: www.swisspeace.org/fast/subscription_form.asp Contact FAST International: Country Expert: Phone: +41 31 330 12 02 Dr. Florian Bieber Fax: +41 31 330 12 13 mailto:[email protected] www.swisspeace.org/fast © swisspeace FAST Update Kosovo | May 2006 to October 2006 | Page 3 Country Stability and Conflictive Events (relative) Average number of reported events per month: 70 Indicator description: see Appendix Risk Assessment: • The stability of Kosovo and key events in the region remain a function of the ongoing status discussions. Both developments over the past six months, as well as the stability of Kosovo in the foreseeable future are primarily dictated by the nature and possible outcome of the status negotiations. While the talks themselves have failed to yield any tangible results to date and remain largely deadlocked, the Country Stability, as well as Conflictive Events, have been greatly fluctuating recently, as they have over the past years. Most worrying is the sharp, if temporary, decline of Country Stability in late 2006, as well as the increase in relative Conflictive Events, indicating increased tensions in the face of an expected conclusion of the status talks in early 2007. • In Serbia, the authorities have continuously emphasized their rejection of independence for Kosovo and in extension any imposed solution which would not be based on a compromise incorporating Serbian demands. -
NEWEPAPER CLIPPIGN's TOPICS\Europe\1-Europe\EU-6.PDF
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