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A Diplomatic History of the 1998–99 Kosovo Conflict

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A Diplomatic History of the 1998–99 Kosovo Conflict FROM DAYTON TO ALLIED FORCE: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE 1998–99 KOSOVO CONFLICT by Christian Novak A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences University of Sydney 2017 ii I declare that the research presented here is my own original work and has not been submitted to any other institution for the award of a degree iii Abstract This thesis reconstructs the diplomatic response of the international community to the Kosovo conflict of 1998–99. It outlines the process which resulted in the failure of negotiations involving outside agencies and individuals as well as the recourse to air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Using primary sourced material from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, personal interviews and other carefully selected primary sources, this thesis explores why international attempts to find a negotiated solution failed. iv Acknowledgements Numerous people have assisted in the completion of this thesis. I would firstly like to acknowledge my research supervisor, Professor Glenda Sluga, for her guidance over the years. My gratitude is also extended to John Drewienkiewicz, Josef Janning, Richard Miles, Klaus Naumann, and Lord David Owen, all of whom took out time from their busy schedules to answer my questions. In particular, I wish to thank Wolfgang Petritsch. His accessibility and willingness to explain the events of 1998–99 considerably enhanced my own understanding of the crisis. Special thanks is reserved for my parents, Anne and David, who have gone above and beyond to support me. To them, I hope the end product makes all those years of study seem worth it. v Author’s Note Kosovo gained independence in 2008. To this day, Serbia refuses to acknowledge this. In Kosovo’s politically charged atmosphere, the spelling of names and places is a contentious issue. For consistency’s sake, and the fact that I refer to many archives from the time of the conflict, place names follow pre-war nomenclature (Kosovo rather than Kosova, Uroševac not Ferizaj and Račak not Reçak). The absence of accessible scholarly works in English is another factor I took into account when making this decision. As far as the term ‘Kosovar’ is concerned, I follow common usage. ‘Kosovar’ refers to the country’s ethnic Albanian inhabitants. I, alone, am responsible for the opinions and errors in this study. Out of respect to those interviewed, no part of the appendix may be reproduced, or transmitted in any form, without the author’s prior permission. vi Table of Contents Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iii Acknowledgements...................................................................................................................... iv Author’s Note ............................................................................................................................... v Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................... vi List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ viii Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................... ix Dramatis Personae ....................................................................................................................... xi Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 17 Chapter I: The International Community .................................................................................... 23 The Breakup of Yugoslavia ................................................................................................ 23 International Institutions ..................................................................................................... 24 Emergence of the Contact Group........................................................................................ 30 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 34 Chapter II: The Historical Setting ............................................................................................... 35 The Rise of Slobodan Milošević ......................................................................................... 38 The Kosovars’ Parallel State .............................................................................................. 40 Disappointment at Dayton and ‘Track Two’ Talks ............................................................ 50 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 53 Chapter III: The Escalating Crisis .............................................................................................. 56 NATO’s Show of Force and the Arrival of KDOM ........................................................... 65 UN Security Council Resolution 1199 and the ‘October Agreements’ .............................. 73 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 80 Chapter IV: Račak to Rambouillet.............................................................................................. 82 The Die is Cast ................................................................................................................... 92 Rambouillet ........................................................................................................................ 93 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 97 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 99 Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 112 John Drewienkiewicz........................................................................................................ 113 Richard Miles ................................................................................................................... 116 Klaus Naumann ................................................................................................................ 117 vii Lord Owen ........................................................................................................................ 119 Wolfgang Petritsch ........................................................................................................... 121 Josef Janning ..................................................................................................................... 130 viii List of Figures Figure 1: “Former Yugoslavia: 1945–1991.” Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries. Accessed September 20, 2016, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/fm_yugoslavia_pol96.jpg ........................................... xiii Figure 2: “Former Yugoslavia Ethnic Majorities, 1992.” Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries. Accessed September 20, 2016, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/balkans.jpg .................................................................. xiv Figure 3: International Affairs and Defence Section. "Kosovo." Dodd, Tom, and Tim Youngs. Research Paper 98/73. House of Commons: 7 July 1998. 50. ...................................................... xv Figure 4: Brunborg, Helge. "Report on the Size and Ethnic Composition of the Population of Kosovo." Report. ICTY, 2002. United Nations ICTY Court Records (Trial No. IT-02-54, 14 August 2002). ............................................................................................................................... xvi Figure 5: Reuters Pictures, “Serbian President Milošević at Rally in Kosovo,” Reuters, 25 June 1997. ...................................................................................................................................................... 55 Figure 6: Reuters Pictures, “Riot Police Block Ethnic Albanian Demonstrators,” Reuters, 2 March 1998............................................................................................................................................... 81 Figure 7: Reuters Pictures, “Contact Group Members at News Conference in Bonn,” Reuters, 25 March 1998. .................................................................................................................................. 81 Figure 8: Barney Kelly. "Crime Scene Photographs of Račak." 1999. United Nations ICTY Court Records (Trial No. IT-02-54, Exhibit P156. 7, 21 May 2002). ..................................................... 85 Figure 9: Finnish Defence Force Topographic Service. "Aerial Photography of Štimlje/Račak" 2000. United Nations ICTY Court Records (Trial No. IT-02-54: Exhibit P156.4, 21 May 2002). ........ 86 ix Abbreviations ACTORD Activation Order – the third and final stage in the NATO authorisation procedure for military action ACTWARN Activation Warning—first stage in the three stage NATO authorisation BST/CAP
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