Norge I Afghanistan 2001–2014 Privat Sektor: Internett: E-Post: [email protected] Telefon: 55 38 66 00

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Norge I Afghanistan 2001–2014 Privat Sektor: Internett: E-Post: Offpub@Fagbokforlaget.No Telefon: 55 38 66 00 NOU Norges offentlige utredninger 2016: 8 Bestilling av publikasjoner NOU 2016: 8 NOU 2016: Offentlige institusjoner: Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon Internett: www.publikasjoner.dep.no En god alliert – E-post: [email protected] Telefon: 22 24 00 00 Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014 Privat sektor: Internett: www.fagbokforlaget.no/offpub E-post: [email protected] Telefon: 55 38 66 00 Publikasjonene er også tilgjengelige på www.regjeringen.no Trykk: 07 Oslo AS – 6/2016 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014 Norges offentlige utredninger Norges offentlige utredninger 2016 2015 og 2016 Seriens redaksjon: Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon Informasjonsforvaltning Statsministeren: Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet: NOU 2015: 3 Advokaten i samfunnet Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet: NOU 2015: 13 Digital sårbarhet – sikkert samfunn NOU 2015: 6 Grunnlaget for inntektsoppgjørene 2015 NOU 2016: 1 Arbeidstidsutvalget Klima- og miljødepartementet: NOU 2016: 6 Grunnlaget for inntektsoppgjørene 2016 NOU 2015: 16 Overvann i byer og tettsteder 1. Arbeidstidsutvalget 5. Omgåelsesregel i skatteretten Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet Finansdepartementet Barne-, likestillings- og Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet: inkluderingsdepartementet: NOU 2015: 7 Assimilering og motstand 2. Endringer i verdipapirhandelloven 6. Grunnlaget for inntektsoppgjørene 2016 NOU 2015: 4 Tap av norsk statsborgerskap NOU 2016: 4 Ny kommunelov – flagging og periodisk rapportering Arbeids- og sosialdepartementet Finansdepartementet Finansdepartementet: Kulturdepartementet: 7. Norge i omstilling – karriereveiledning for individ NOU 2015: 1 Produktivitet – grunnlag for vekst og 3. Ved et vendepunkt: Fra ressursøkonomi til og samfunn velferd Kunnskapsdepartementet: kunnskapsøkonomi Kunnskapsdepartementet NOU 2015: 5 Pensjonslovene og folketrygdreformen NOU 2015: 2 Å høre til Finansdepartementet IV NOU 2015: 9 Finanspolitikk i en oljeøkonomi NOU 2015: 8 Fremtidens skole 8. En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014 NOU 2015: 10 Lov om regnskapsplikt NOU 2016: 7 Norge i omstilling – karriereveiledning 4. Ny kommunelov Utenriksdepartementet og Forsvarsdepartementet NOU 2015: 12 Ny lovgivning om tiltak mot hvitvasking for individ og samfunn Kommunal- og moderniseringsdepartementet og terrorfinansiering NOU 2015: 14 Bedre beslutningsgrunnlag, Landbruks- og matdepartementet: bedre styring NOU 2015: 15 Sett pris på miljøet Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet: NOU 2016: 2 Endringer i verdipapirhandelloven – flagging og periodisk rapportering Olje- og energidepartementet: NOU 2016: 3 Ved et vendepunkt: Fra ressursøkonomi til kunnskapsøkonomi Samferdselsdepartementet: NOU 2016: 5 Omgåelsesregel i skatteretten Utenriksdepartementet: Forsvarsdepartementet: NOU 2016: 8 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan NOU 2016: 8 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014 2001–2014 Helse- og omsorgsdepartementet: NOU 2015: 11 Med åpne kort NOU 2015: 17 Først og fremst Forsidefoto: hjk/Forsvaret Grafikk: Nyhetsgrafikk.no NOU Norges offentlige utredninger 2016: 8 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014 Utredning fra et utvalg nedsatt ved kongelig resolusjon 21. november 2014 Lagt fram for Utenriksdepartementet og Forsvarsdepartementet 6. juni 2016 Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon Informasjonsforvaltning Oslo 2016 ISSN 0333-2306 ISBN 978-82-583-1273-1 07 Oslo AS Til utenriksministeren og forsvarsministeren Ved kongelig resolusjon av 21. november 2014 ble det oppnevnt et uavhengig utvalg (Afghanistanutvalget) som skulle evaluere og trekke lærdommer av Norges sivile og militære innsats i Afghanistan for perioden 2001–2014. Utvalget legger med dette fram sin rapport. Utvalget står samlet om til- rådingene. Oslo, 6. juni 2016 Bjørn Tore Godal (leder) Mats Berdal Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv Torgeir Hagen Kristian Berg Harpviken Gro Nystuen Sten Rynning Astri Suhrke Rolf Tamnes Torunn Wimpelmann Paal Sigurd Hilde (sekretariatsleder) Elisabet Eikås Harald Høiback Anni Røe Ellen Svendsen Helene F. Widerberg Innhold 1Sammendrag ................................ 9 3.5.5 Pakistan og regionale 1.1 Rammer og kostnader ................... 9 dimensjoner ................................... 36 1.2 Tre hovedmål ................................. 10 3.5.6 Valg og økt mistro til det 1.2.1 Forholdet til USA og NATO ........ 10 demokratiske prosjektet ............... 37 1.2.2 Internasjonal terrorbekjempelse .. 10 3.6 Fjerde fase: Afghansk eierskap, 1.2.3 Statsbygging og utvikling ............. 10 exit-strategi og forsøk 1.3 Tre sentrale områder ..................... 11 på forsoning .................................... 37 1.3.1 Faryab-provinsen ........................... 11 3.6.1 Norsk exit ....................................... 38 1.3.2 Spesialstyrker og etterretning ...... 11 3.7 Afghanistan ved utgangen av 2014 40 1.3.3 Norsk fredsdiplomati ..................... 11 1.4 Noen lærdommer ........................... 12 Del II Temaer ........................................... 43 2 Innledning .................................... 13 4 Forsvarets innsats ..................... 45 2.1 Utvalgets analyse ........................... 13 4.1 Oppstartsfasen – OEF og 2.2 Utvalgets arbeid og kilder ............ 14 bilaterale anmodninger fra USA ... 45 2.3 Disposisjon ..................................... 14 4.2 ISAF – NATO og alliansens engasjement .................................... 49 Del I Historien ....................................... 15 4.3 Mot nord ......................................... 52 4.4 Hvorfor disse bidragene? .............. 54 3 Afghanistan, det internasjonale 4.5 Hva har engasjementet kostet? ..... 55 samfunnet og Norge 4.6 Forsvaret i utvikling ....................... 56 2001–2014 .................................. 17 4.7 Oppsummering ............................... 58 3.1 Norske mål .................................... 17 3.2 Historien og Afghanistan i 2001 ... 19 5 Norske spesialstyrker og 3.3 Første fase: Opptakten. OEF og etterretning .................................. 59 et lett fotavtrykk ............................. 20 5.1 OEF (2002–2006) ........................... 59 3.3.1 Regjeringsskifte, beslutninger 5.2 ISAF (2007–2014) ........................... 64 om å bidra og opprettelse av 5.3 Etterretningstjenesten roller ......... 66 ambassade i Kabul ........................ 21 5.3.1 Taktisk nivå ..................................... 67 3.3.2 Bonn-prosessen: Grunnlaget 5.3.2 Operasjonelt nivå ............................ 68 for en ny afghansk stat ................. 23 5.3.3 Strategisk nivå ................................ 68 3.4 Andre fase: Statsbygging med 5.3.4 Etterretningssamarbeid økende ambisjoner militært i Afghanistan .................................. 69 og sivilt ............................................ 25 5.4 Joint Prioritised Effects List .......... 70 3.4.1 NATO overtar ISAF-ledelsen, 5.5 Oppsummering .............................. 73 ISAF utvides og Norge overtar et PRT ............................................. 25 6 Utviklingspolitikk og forvaltning 75 3.4.2 Utvidelse av ISAF gjennom PRT ... 26 6.1 Overordnede utfordringer ............ 75 3.4.3 Regjeringsskiftet ........................... 28 6.2 Innretting og volum ....................... 76 3.5 Tredje fase: Opprøret tiltar, 6.3 Koordinering .................................. 78 helhetlig tilnærming og et norsk 6.4 Multilateral bistand ........................ 80 «taktskifte» .................................... 28 6.4.1 Støtte til Verdensbanken og FN .... 80 3.5.1 Helhetlig tilnærming .................... 29 6.5 Samarbeidet med ikke-statlige 3.5.2 «Taktskiftet» .................................. 30 organisasjoner (NGOer) ............... 82 3.5.3 Det omstridte spørsmålet om å 6.6 Likestilling ..................................... 83 bidra i sør ........................................ 31 6.7 Humanitær innsats og det 3.5.4 Nye amerikanske strategier: humanitære rom ............................. 84 Sivile tap, COIN og regionale 6.8 Resultatmåling ............................... 87 dimensjoner .................................... 34 6.9 Oppsummering .............................. 88 7 Norske prioriteringer og 9.2.1 Økende interesse og ulike resultater av bistanden ............ 89 motiver ............................................ 141 7.1 Prioriteringer ................................. 89 9.2.2 Tre spor ........................................... 143 7.2 Utdanning ....................................... 92 9.3 Norsk fredsdiplomati 7.3 Styresett, statsbygging og i Afghanistan ................................... 145 menneskerettigheter .................... 93 9.3.1 Norske interesser, tilnærming 7.3.1 Valg ................................................ 93 og roller ........................................... 145 7.3.2 Lokalt styresett ............................... 95 9.3.2 Bakgrunnen for norsk kontakt 7.3.3 Justis- og politiinnsatsen .............. 95 med Taliban ................................... 146 7.3.4 Støtte til afghansk sivilsamfunn: 9.3.3 Norge og intra-afghansk dialog ... 147 et tydelig norsk fotavtrykk? ........... 97 9.3.4 Quetta-sporet .................................. 148 7.3.5 Grunnleggende menneske- 9.3.5 Kontakten med USA ..................... 151 rettighetsdilemmaer ...................... 99 9.3.6 Doha-sporet ..................................... 152 7.4 Landsbygdutvikling ...................... 100 9.3.7 Saksorientert dialog ....................... 153 7.5 Tverrgående tema .......................... 102 9.4 Den regionale
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