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Glossary Military Acronyms Pertaining to the War in Afghanistan

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Glossary Military Acronyms Pertaining to the War in Afghanistan Glossary Military Acronyms Pertaining to The War In Afghanistan Acronym Meaning (number)IN Infantry group (number)US Number of US personnel (number)V Vehicles (Time)L Local time (Time)Z Zulu time - GMT 42 CDO RM 42 Commando Royal Marines 508 STB 508th special troops battalion 81 81mm mortar round 9-liner 9 Line MEDEVAC Request A/C aircraft AAF anti-afghan forces ABP Afghan Border Police AC-130 Gunship adapted from Hercules ACK Acknowledge ACM Anti-Coalition Militia AFG Afghans AH-1W Attack helicopter 1W - US Marines Super Cobra gunship AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Right Commission AK-47 Assault rifle ANA Afghan National Army ANAP Afghan National Auxiliary Police ANBP Afghan National Border Police ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces AO Area of operation AQ Al Qaida ARSIC Afghan regional security integrated command ASG Area Support Group ASV armoured security vehicle ATT At this time ATTK Attack AUP Afghan uniform police B-HUTS Semi-permanent wooden structures used in place of tents BAF Bagram Air Field BCT Brigade combat team (US) BDA Battle damage assessment BDE Brigade Beaten zone Area where spread of rounds fired BFT Blue Force Tracking: identifying friendly forces in area BG Brigadier General Blue forces Nato/ISAF forces Page 1 of 8 Military Acronyms Pertaining to The War In Afghanistan Acronym Meaning Blue on Blue Friendly fire BN Battalion BP Blood Pressure BPT Be [ing] prepared to BRF Brigade Reconnaissance Force BSN (Camp) Bastion BSSM Border Security Subcommittee Meeting BTG Basic target graphic BTIF Bagram theatre internment facility BTL Battalion buzz saw Signalling method by waving light stick in circle C//NF Confidential, no foreign nationals C/S Call sign CAS Close air support CAT C Category C patient - priority CCA carrier-controlled approach CCIR commander's critical information requirements CD Command CDN Canadian CDR Commander CF Coalition Forces CG Coldstream Guards CGBG Coldstream Guards Battle Group cgbg 1 coy 1 company, Coldstream Guards battle group CHOPS Chief of Operations CIV Civilian CIVCAS Civilian casualties CJ2 US intelligence and security command, afghanistan CJ3 Joint special ops CJSOTF combined joint special operations task force CJTF Combined Joint Task Force Combined Joint Task Force-82: HQ of US Forces in ISAF and Regional Command East, March CJTF-82 2007-April 2008 CLP Combat logistics patrol [supply convoy] CO Commanding officer CoP Chief of Police COP Combat outpost Coy Company CP Check point cpt Captain Csh combat support hospital CTC ? counterterrorist center CWIED Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device DBC database code DC District Centre DF Direct fire DOI Date of incident Page 2 of 8 Military Acronyms Pertaining to The War In Afghanistan Acronym Meaning DoS Department of State DSHKA Soviet-origin heavy machine gun ECP entry control point EKIA Enemy killed in action Element Part of a task force e.g. "Puma element" = part of Task Force Puma ENG BDE Engineer Brigade EOC Emergency Operation Centre EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal [bomb defuser] eof Escalation of Force [also 'exchange of fire'] ETT embedded training team evac Evacuation EVACD Evacuated F-15 Fighter /bomber FB Forward Base (context -"Do China FB") FF Friendly Forces FFIR Friendly Forces Information Requirement FIR First Impressions Report FO Forward observer FOB Forward Operating Base FP Firing point fps Facility protection service FRA BG French battle group FSB Forward Support Base GBU Guided Bomb Unit GBU-12 500lb laser-guided "smart bomb" GBU-31 2,000lb "smart bomb' GBU-38 GPS/laser guided 500lb 'smart' bomb GCTF Global Counter Terrorism Forces GEN General GHZ Ghazni GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GMLRS Multiple rocket launcher Green on green Fighting between Afghan forces GSW Gunshot wound GT R2RR Canadian troops: tactical group:2nd bn 22nd royal regiment helos Helicopters HHB Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion HIMARS latest GPS-guided multiple rocket system, mounted on v. mobile truck [carries GMLRS qv] HLZ helicopter landing zone HMG UK government (HM Government) HMLA-169 US Marines light attack helicopter sqadron HRT hostage rescue team HVI High-value Individual HWY Highway IAW In accordance with IAW EOF SOP in accordance with escalation of force standard operating procedure ICOM Radio Page 3 of 8 Military Acronyms Pertaining to The War In Afghanistan Acronym Meaning IDF indirect fire IED Improvised explosive device Illum Illumination mortar, fired to provide light INFIL Infiltrate INS Insurgents INTSUM Intelligence summary IO Information operations IOT In order to IR Incident Report ir infrared IR STROBE Infrared Strobe IRoA Islamic Republic of Afghanistan IRT Incident Response Team? ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISN Internment [or Insurgent] serial Number ISO In support of ISR Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance IVO In vicinity of J COY 42 CDO J company 42 Commando Royal Marines JAF Jalalabad Air Field JAG Judge Advocate General (Army legal team) JBAD Jalalabad JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition JDCC Joint District Coordination Center JDOC Joint Defense Operations Center JEL Joint Effects List [hit list] Jingle trucks Brightly decorated trucks covered in bells common across central Asia JOC joint ops centre JPEL Joint Prioritised Effects List [hit list] JTAC Joint terminal air controller JUGROOM Fort, Garmsir, Afghanistan KAF Kandahar Air Field KAIA Kabul international airport KDZ Kunduz KIA Killed in action KJI Kajaki KMTC Kabul military training cetnre KPRT Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team L: Location (in relation to S, A, L, T) LEP Law Enforcement Professionals Line 1 Location of the pick-up site. Line 2 Radio frequency, call sign, and suffix. Line 3 Number of patients by precedence: A to E with A being most urgent Line 4 Special equipment required Litter Stretcher used by medics LKG Lashkar Ghar LN Local national Page 4 of 8 Military Acronyms Pertaining to The War In Afghanistan Acronym Meaning LNO Liaison Officer LTC Lieutenant Colonel Luna German drone LZ Landing Zone m240b Type of machine gun M249 light machine gun M4/M-4 Type of gun MAJ Major MAR Marine MED OPS Medical Operations MED TM Medical Team medevac Medical evacuation MEY PRT Meymaneh provincial reconstruction team MG Machine Gun MHL Mehtar Lam MM Military Message MOD Ministry of Defence MOI Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior MP Military Police MS Military support MSN Nurse (with a masters) Msr main supply route MTF More to follow MTT military training team N/I C Nato/ISAF Confidential NAI Named areas of interest NC non-combatant NCO Non-commissioned officer NDS Afghan intelligence [national directorate of security] NFI Not Further Identified NFTR Nothing further to report NMC non mission-capable NOFORN no foreigners [secrecy classification] NSTR Nothing significant to report OBJ Objective OC Outcome OCC- P operational command centre - provincial OCCD Operational Coordination Center District ODA Operational Detachment (Alpha) - special forces OGA Other Government Agency (usually CIA) OIC Officer in charge OMF Opposing Militant Forces Op Operation OP Observation Post OP grid Operation/Observation post map coordinates OPSUM Operations Summary ORSA operations research and systems analysis Page 5 of 8 Military Acronyms Pertaining to The War In Afghanistan Acronym Meaning PA Physician Assistant PAK Pakistan PAKMIL Pakistan military PAO Public Affairs Officer PAX Passengers/People PB Patrol Base PBG Polish battle group PEF poppy eradication force [afghan police] PEN Penich (outpost) PHQ Police headquarters (in reference to ANP) PID positive i.d. PKM Russian-made machine gun PL Platoon PLT Platoon PLT SJT Platoon Seargant PMT Police Mentor Team PoA President of Afghanistan poc point of contact POI point of impact POO Point of origin PRED Predator drone PRO COY protection company PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team PRT CDR Provincial Reconstruction Team Commander PSO Post Security Officer PT Patient PTS Peace Through Strength (PTS) reconciliation process QRF Quick Response Force RB Road block RC (N) Regional Command North RC CENTRAL Regional Command Central RC(E) / RC East Regional Command East RC(W) Regional Command West RC=S / RC(S) Regional Command South RCAG Regional Corps Assistance Group RCC / RC(C) Regional Command Capital RCP Route clearance Patrol rds/RDS Rounds rfs Resident Field Squadron RG US armoured vehicle RGR Royal Gurkha rifles ROE Rules of engagement Role 3 Surgical facility RPG Rocket propelled grenade RPK Light machine gun, Kalashnikov (Ruchnoi Pulemyot Kalashnikova) RPT Report RTB Return to base Page 6 of 8 Military Acronyms Pertaining to The War In Afghanistan Acronym Meaning RTE Route RTF Reconstruction Task Force [Australian at TF Uruzgan] S-2 Intelligence staff officer S-5 Staff member responsible for civil-military operations S, A, L, T Size, Activity, Location, Time (military report) S, A, L, T, U, R Size, Activity, Location, Time, Unit, Result (military report) S: Size (in relation to S, A, L, T) S//REL Secret or Selective release? (context - "S//REL TO USA, AFG, GCTF, ISAF, NATO") SAF/Safire Small ams fire/Surface to air fire SAW Squad Automatic Weapon [ machine gun] SC-26 Scorpion 26 - US special forces unit in Helmand SCIDA Site Configuration and Installation Design Authority? SEWOC Sigint Electronic Warfare Operational Centre SFG special forces group Shura Meeting of tribal elders and Afghan leaders SIED Suicide IED SIGACT Significant activity SIR Serious Incident Report sof Special ops force SOG Special ops group Solatia Payments to civilian victims of US attacks (or their families) SOP Standard Operating Procedure SOTF Special Operations Task Force SOTG Special ops taskgroup SPC Specialist SQD Squadron sqn Squadron Squirter Someone running for cover SSE Sensitive site exploitation SVBIED suicide vehicle-borne IED SWO Surface warfare officer SWT Scout weapons team T: Time (in relation to S, A, L, T) TB Taliban TBC To be confirmed TBD To be decided TCP Traffic control point TERP Interpreter TF Task force TF373 task force 373 [special ops] TFK Task Force Kandahar TG Tactical Group TG AREs Tactical group Ares Thready Pulse that is very fine and scarcely perceptible.
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