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The Reality of Britain's War in Afghanistan

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The Reality of Britain's War in Afghanistan The reality of Britain’s war in Afghanistan Table of contents 01 Preface 02 Crisis in Afghanistan 06 The human costs of the war 09 Britain’s dirty war 12 Militarising aid 15 The privatisation of war 18 Take action Preface 01 War on Want was founded 60 years set back development prospects still further ago when The Guardian published a in one of the poorest countries in the world. letter from Victor Gollancz calling for people to join him in an urgent In publishing this report, War on Want seeks campaign against world poverty and to open a new debate on the occupation of militarism. At that time Britain was Afghanistan. All three major political parties fighting an unwinnable war in Asia – in the UK favour keeping British forces in the Korean War – and Gollancz asked Afghanistan until 2015, and maintaining a all who agreed with his call for a strategic presence in the country for years negotiated end to that war to send him after that. Yet it is becoming increasingly a postcard marked with the single word clear that the US and UK military presence ‘yes’. Within a month 10,000 people had is a central part of the problem in Afghanistan, responded, and War on Want was born. not the solution. War on Want calls on the UK government to withdraw British troops Today the UK is mired in another unwinnable from Afghanistan immediately, and to support war in Asia, this time in Afghanistan. As the a political solution under UN auspices based US-led occupation enters its 10th year, on the Afghan people’s self-determination, casualties have risen among Afghan civilians security and human rights. and NATO forces alike, making the last 12 months the bloodiest of the conflict to date. The future of Afghanistan must not be The intensified militarisation of Afghanistan determined by the self-interest of the USA, over recent months has led not to more UK and other occupying powers. We owe security but to greater insecurity, both in it to the Afghan people to stand up for their Afghanistan itself and increasingly in rights and to end the occupation of their neighbouring Pakistan as well. Coalition country, so that the process of reconstruction commanders are now openly voicing their can at last begin. Just as with Korea 60 doubts as to the future. years ago, War on Want is calling for an immediate negotiated settlement to the While the Afghan people pay the highest war in Afghanistan. We invite all those who price for the continuing foreign occupation, believe in human dignity and justice to join not everyone has been made poorer by the us in this call. war. Private military and security companies – many of them British – have profited greatly from new coalition contracts, while the privatisation of key sectors of the economy is designed primarily to benefit multinational investors rather than the Afghan people. John Hilary Aided by the World Bank and other donors, Executive Director this ideologically driven strategy threatens to War on Want Crisis in Afghanistan 02 n 6 a Afghanistan is the UK government’s £11 billion. At a time of economic crisis, t s i n “most important” foreign policy and with massive cuts being planned across the a h g national security issue, according to public sector in the UK, more and more f A 1 n Prime Minister David Cameron. The people are questioning why NATO member i r a current war in Afghanistan has now countries are spending such sums fighting an w s ’ entered its 10th year, longer than both unwinnable war in Afghanistan, and what they n i a t the First World War and Second World hope to achieve. i r B War combined. According to the latest f o y t timetable for withdrawal, British i l of British people support a a combat forces could still remain in the e r 2 withdrawal of British troops e country for a further four years. Over h 7 T 74% either ‘soon’ or ‘immediately’. e 1,450 US service personnel and 350 m a British personnel have been killed in G t of Americans say the war a Afghanistan to date. The most recent e 8 r is ‘not worth fighting’. G year, 2010, was the bloodiest for foreign e 53 % h T troops, with 711 killed compared with 521 during 2009. 3 of Afghans in the south 70 % of the country, where the Afghanistan has borne the brunt of decades majority of NATO troops of foreign intervention and conflict, and as a are based, say military actions result is now one of the poorest countries in in their area were bad for the world. For ordinary Afghans, the situation the Afghan people, and 74% resulting from the war is terrible. Thousands believe it is wrong to work 9 of civilians have been killed and injured since with foreign forces. 2001, human rights are deteriorating and millions of Afghans rely on food aid to avoid starvation. 4 The impact of military A decade of war intervention can be seen in figures from the The current phase of US and British military United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, operations in Afghanistan began in October which reveal that one in four of all refugees 2001, when US-led forces destroyed al-Qaida the agency deals with worldwide comes bases in the country and removed the Taliban from Afghanistan. 5 from power. There are at present two military operations ongoing in Afghanistan: The Afghan government remains mired in corruption and unwilling or unable to • Operation Enduring Freedom , satisfy people’s basic needs. Meanwhile, a US operation in the east and south of the USA and Britain are turning Afghanistan Afghanistan along the Pakistan border; and into one of the most militarised countries • International Security Assistance in the world, while privatising the economy Force (ISAF) , a NATO-led operation and outsourcing warfare to private armies to which the USA and Britain are the and militias. The combined effect of these largest troop contributors. There are actions is to undermine any development currently around 135,000 NATO troops prospects for the next generation. in Afghanistan. 10 The USA has spent over $223 billion on the In May 2006 British forces, acting as part of war since 2001, while Britain has spent over ISAF, were deployed to the southern province A camp for internally displaced people in Kabul 03 P h o t o : G u y S m a l l m a n of Helmand, a mainly desert region bordering In 2006-07 public opinion began to shift Pakistan. Since then the war has steadily in favour of anti-government elements escalated. There are currently around in unstable areas, and by late 2008 the 10,000 British troops in Afghanistan. 11 population was voluntarily providing support to anti-government forces. 13 Soon after the British deployment to Helmand, in summer 2006, there was a major These forces comprise a variety of escalation in the conflict. The following year groups, not just the Taliban. The major witnessed a further deterioration in the groups are the Quetta Shura Taliban security situation, and by 2008 nearly half the (based in Quetta, Pakistan); the Haqqani country was effectively a no-go area for the Network, named after Jalaluddin international aid community. One academic Haqqani, a leading warlord; and the paper by two members of the UN mission in Hezb-e-Islami, led by another veteran Afghanistan, UNAMA, notes that ISAF’s warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. military operations since 2001 have “pushed” US intelligence describes the different anti-government elements “towards active forces as “localised”, with nearly all groups insurgency”. 12 During the four years of 2001- not so much religiously motivated as 05, evidence suggests that the Afghan vying for control of territory, mineral population largely supported the government. wealth and smuggling routes. 14 04 n a A confidential August 2009 report by US The Taliban now has ‘shadow governors’ t s i n General Stanley McChrystal, at that time the in 33 out of 34 Afghan provinces, and a a h 18 g overall military commander in Afghanistan, permanent presence in 80% of the country. f A n stated that “the overall situation is The NGO Safety Office, which advises i r a deteriorating” and that NATO faced a organisations working in Afghanistan, w s 15 ’ “resilient and growing insurgency”. Attacks describes the Taliban as “a movement n i a t using improvised explosive devices (IEDs, anticipating authority and one which has i r B or roadside bombs) have increased from already obtained a complex momentum f o 16 19 y t 308 in 2004 to 7,155 in 2009. From July to that NATO will be incapable of reversing”. i l a September 2010 attacks on coalition forces Indeed, ISAF’s Director of Intelligence notes e r e were up 59% compared with the same period that “the Afghan insurgency can sustain h T 17 e the previous year. itself indefinitely” since small arms are m a available throughout the region and IEDs G t 20 a are easily made. e r G e h T Map of Afghanistan provinces and neighbouring countries © N e w L e f t R e v i e w 5 0 , M a r c h - A p r i l 2 0 0 8 Why is Britain really in Afghanistan? 05 In order to justify the cost in human life intervention is necessary to uphold our and resources expended in Afghanistan, interests, like for example free trade British government officials have routes, for example to prevent regional repeatedly said they are fighting the instabilities which could have a negative war for reasons of UK national security impact on our chances in terms of and to prevent terrorist attacks in the trade, jobs and income.” Koehler was UK.
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