Philipp Münch Local Afghan Power Structures and the International Military Intervention A review of developments in Badakhshan and Kunduz provinces EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since the beginning of the 2001 intervention in The power structures of Kunduz and, to a lesser Afghanistan, the contributing nations to the extent, Badakhshan had already fragmented International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have before the intervention in 2001. In contrast to declared that their aim is to ‘assist the Islamic Badakhshan, the distribution of power among Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority’ Kunduz’ commanders of armed groups changed over the whole territory of Afghanistan. This report considerably because of the fall of the Taleban. attempts to answer whether and to what extent Affiliates of Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic ISAF forces have been successful in accomplishing Society of Afghanistan) became slightly superior to their task in the two northeastern provinces of those of other politico-military parties. Mainly Kunduz and Badakhshan. To answer the question, Pashtuns, but also members of other ethnicities this report maps the power distribution and the without affiliation to the groups in power, were constellations between the most-significant marginalised. In Badakhshan, Jamiat affiliates political actors of both provinces and relates them clearly dominated but were split between to actions of the central government and the supporters of former President Burhanuddin international actors working in Afghanistan. In Rabbani and the party’s Shura-ye Nazar-e Shomal unprecedented detail, this study takes the first (Supervisory Council of the North) faction. Since step toward assessing ISAF’s effects and uncovers the mid-2000s in Kunduz and since the late 2000s developments on the grassroots level that have to a much lower degree in Badakhshan, the been largely unnoticed. It hopes to encourage Taleban received major support from those parts further research on other regions and thereby kick- of the population excluded from the provincial start a more-comprehensive lessons-learned patronage networks. In Kunduz, they were process that goes beyond mere technicalities and therefore able to severely challenge existing power acknowledges the social realities of power and rule brokers in some districts at the end of the decade. in Afghanistan. AAN Thematic Report 03/2013 2 Münch: Local Afghan Power Structures and International Intervention The government of Hamed Karzai has never been brokers were therefore forced to achieve their united. It has always consisted of several factions aims without openly using mass violence – though with patronage ties to the local level that compete they still applied it in a covert and limited way – for influence. To exert control over the provinces, and to transform their military power into a President Karzai shifted positions to proxies in a formalised and non-violent form. Also, the ‘divide and rule’ manner or tried to create international community’s Afghanistan project counterweights against opposing factions. Karzai’s created incentives to refrain from large-scale main competitors in Kunduz and Badakhshan were violence and instead peacefully compete for the power brokers affiliated to the Jamiat party and rents accessible in different forms from foreign especially its Shura-ye Nazar faction. In both donors. Many local commanders therefore directly provinces, he therefore cooperated with actors of or indirectly profited from international projects. the second-most-important groups: the Hezb-e Local power structures in Badakhshan and Kunduz Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Party of fluctuated but as a whole remained largely Afghanistan), sometimes Rabbani’s Jamiat faction unchanged over the course of the intervention. and strongmen of the Ittehad-e Islami bara-ye This is confirmed by a detailed analysis of the Azadi-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the distribution of major provincial and district Liberation of Afghanistan), later renamed Tanzim-e positions. Though some actors were more Dawat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Organisation for successful in transforming their civil-war role into the Islamic Call of Afghanistan). one suitable for the Karzai period, and a new class Since 2004, Germany has led both provincial of educated intermediaries emerged, the reconstruction teams (PRT) in Kunduz and differences were not decisive overall. This was Badakhshan and therefore provided most forces in especially true after the build-up of pro- these areas. In contrast to representatives of other government militias in the late 2000s again nations, the Germans attempted only in a few strengthened the major commanders. instances to actively influence the major power Furthermore, Karzai’s efforts did not enable him to structure. Once they tried to replace provincial rule both provinces. However, he did succeed in chiefs of police in the context of police pay and denying his Jamiat competitors unchallenged rank reform (PRR). However, they did not domination over both areas. intentionally target the power structures as such, The approach of the mainly German PRT forces – but aimed at illegal and unprofessional behaviour to focus on the official as well as, in some cases, of police officials in general. Generally, they kept to the most powerful strongmen – cemented the the legalistic principle of cooperating with official existing power distribution. In addition, though the power holders and otherwise tried to stay neutral. underprivileged segments of the population in But in some cases, they also worked with the both provinces initially greeted German efforts to strongest unofficial actors to prevent conflicts and prevent ‘collateral damage’, because they trouble for the PRTs. In 2009, the Americans cooperated with government officials, locals saw significantly reinforced their troops in Kunduz them as accomplices of the ruling class. The because the insurgency in the northeast had grown Americans’ counterinsurgency approach had the tremendously. They focussed on fighting the same effects since to fight the insurgents they Taleban and their allies. To this end, they allied with established power brokers and finally supported militias who belonged to local power helped them to fight back attempts to challenge brokers. A lack of strategy, related to the different the latter’s rule. Any changes of the local power interests involved, hampered all of ISAF’s efforts, structure the internationals attempted only including those to actively influence the local worked in cooperation with local allies. The results power structure. of this study show that the post-2001 international Comparable to the civil-war period, power brokers intervention did not significantly change the power in Kunduz and Badakhshan constantly tried to structure of Kunduz and Badakhshan province. balance each other’s power assets by forming Rather, it affected how the actors dealt with each alliances or gaining similar advantages. The other and strengthened some pre-2002 trends. international military presence, however, changed Mostly, however, the local power brokers, who the rules of the power games, preventing open were mostly (former) commanders, determined large-scale violence, common from the 1990s until the result of the power struggles. the early years of the intervention. Afghan power AAN Thematic Report 03/2013 Münch: Local Afghan Power Structures and International Intervention 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction 4 2. Terminology, methods and sources 6 3. Power structures in rural Afghanistan 7 3.1 History of local power structures 7 3.2 Afghan state formation 8 4. Kunduz 10 4.1 History of power structures in Kunduz 10 4.2 Power structure after the fall of the Taleban 11 4.3 Early international military efforts in Kunduz 16 4.4 Distribution of official positions 21 4.5 International key leader engagement in Kunduz 27 4.6 Power structure and growing insurgency 34 5. Badakhshan 43 5.1 History of power structures in Badakhshan 43 5.2 Power structure from 2001 to the establishment of the PRT 45 5.3 International military efforts in Badakhshan 49 5.4 Power structure since the first presidential elections 55 5.5 The Badakhshan insurgency 61 6. Conclusion 64 6.1 Failed centralisation of rule 64 6.2 Changes in the nature of power struggles 65 6.3 Limited efforts to influence the power structure 66 6.4 Changing power structures through intervention 68 Annex 70 November 2013 4 Münch: Local Afghan Power Structures and International Intervention not reach their goals by limiting their efforts to the 1. INTRODUCTION capital, they expanded their area of responsibility over Kabul in 2003 and put ISAF forces under NATO Roughly two months after the beginning of the command. Using so-called provincial 2001 international military intervention in reconstruction teams (PRTs), ISAF representatives Afghanistan, representatives of major Western tried to ‘assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan states, the winning Afghan anti-Taleban alliance, as to extend its authority’ into the periphery.4 well as other leaders of non-Taleban armed groups, followers of the last king Zaher Shah and As the growing insurgency and low level of tax exiled Afghan technocrats gathered at the Bonn collection shows, however, the Afghan Conference to decide upon the future political government has obviously not yet achieved order of the country. The US delegates, especially, thorough control over the periphery with the help significantly influenced the meeting’s outcome, of the