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What Are the Four Scenarios for the New Afghan Government Under Taliban? Publish Date: 01/09/2021

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What Are the Four Scenarios for the New Afghan Government Under Taliban? Publish Date: 01/09/2021 Artical Name : Four Scenarios Artical Subject : What are the Four Scenarios for the New Afghan Government Under Taliban? Publish Date: 01/09/2021 Auther Name: Future for Advanced Research and Studies Subject : After the Taliban took over the Afghan capital of Kabul on August 15, 2021, and former president Ashraf Ghani fled the country, Hamid Karzai -who led the first Afghan government after the Taliban was ousted in 2001 and served as president until 2014- announced that he was forming a three-person ³coordination council´to secure a peaceful transition of power. The other two members of the council are Abdullah Abdullah, the former vice president and head of the government¶s peace delegation, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the most notorious warlord who bombed Kabul during the Afghan civil war, which lasted from 1992 to 1996. Conceptual Outline of the Taliban¶s Rule Information derived from statements made by former officials affiliated with the Taliban is being circulated now about the form of the militant group¶s new government, the outline of which can be presented as follows: <!--[if !supportLists]-->1- Establishing an Islamic Emirate:The Taliban¶s reiteration that it is planning to establish an Islamic emirate is not new and is only natural, given that the group insisted on this demand during negotiations in Qatar with the former Afghan government. Despite this, today¶s Taliban seeks to emphasize that it is different from the Taliban that ruled Afghanistan two decades ago. It says it is now more open to, and seeks international recognition. That is why it is expected to present a model of a moderate Islamic emirate. <!--[if !supportLists]-->2- A council and not a president:The Taliban is working on forming a 12- member caretaker council to run the country after the former government collapsed. The new council will include leaders from the Taliban along with former government officials who are the most open to cooperating with the group. <!--[if !supportLists]-->3- Three Taliban leaders on board: The three most prominent Taliban figures who will join the new council are Mullah Abdulghani Bardar, the group¶s military commander and the second-in-command after his brother-in-law Mullah Mohammed Omar; Mullah Mohammed Yakoub, son of the group¶s late founder and spiritual leader Mullah Mohammed Omar; and Khalil Ur-Rahman Haqqani, a leader in Taliban-allied group, the Haqqani Network, which the US and the United Nations designated as a terror group. <!--[if ! supportLists]-->4- Appointment of a central bank governor: The Taliban appointed Hajji Mohammad Idris, a leader in the group, as governor of Afghanistan¶s central bank, replacing Ajmal Ahmady, who fled the country along with other officials on August 15th. The appointment reflects the Taliban¶s willingness to take control of the country¶s economy. <!--[if !supportLists]-->5- Opening up to the international community: The Taliban desire to receive international recognition was evidenced in the group¶s announcement that it will secure all foreign embassies and diplomatic missions, and its pledge that their representatives will not be abused by any of the group¶s members. The group also promised that Afghan soil would not be used against any country, indicating that they will not allow Afghanistan¶s territory to be turned to a safe haven for terrorist organizations planning to wage attacks on other states, although a recent United Nations report concluded that up to 10,000 fighters associated with ISIS and al-Qaeda have poured into Afghanistan in recent months.The Taliban also called upon the international community to help boost Afghanistan¶s economy by pumping foreign investments, aid and grants into the country to help it generate additional income to ban the production and sale of drugs.It should be noted that the international community will have to wait three months before recognizing the Taliban so as to assess the group¶s commitments to the principles of the republic, elections and respect for human rights, women and freedom of expression. In their quest for international recognition, the Taliban are being highly responsive to such pressures. <!--[if !supportLists]-->6- Amnesty for all:The Taliban declared amnesty not only for Afghans who worked for the US government as interpreters and soldiers who fought against the group, but also for all former Afghan government officials, including runaway president Ashraf Ghani. The group reiterated that all those granted clemency can come back and live in Afghanistan.Despite the declaration, which shows tolerance from the Taliban, information coming from Afghanistan shows otherwise. There is talk that the Taliban is searching for specific persons to execute them. In Ghazni, Balkh, Faryab and Herat, people who joined militant groups that fought the Taliban are being executed. Additionally, because foreign media are leaving Afghanistan, it is difficult to verify whether these are isolated incidents or are part of a deliberate policy pursued by the Taliban. <!-- [if !supportLists]-->7- Vowing to Respect for Women¶s Rights: A Taliban spokesperson, in a press briefing, reiterated that the group would honor women¶s rights to work and education within the norms of Islamic law. The Taliban was accused of wide-scale violations against women during its first term in power between 1996 and 2001. A number of women who spoke to foreign TV channels said the Taliban militants banned women from going to work, and that other women fearing for their lives preferred to stay at home. Scenarios for the Islamic GovernmentUp to date, some aspects of the Taliban¶s practices continue to show that their words and actions do not match, and it is not clear whether this contradiction reflects the behavior of some members who act against the group¶s general line, or that its rhetoric aims solely to reassure foreign countries, while it seeks to establish its grip on the whole state. Taking this factor into consideration, the scenarios for the future Taliban government can be outlined as follows: <!--[if !supportLists]-->1- First Scenario: A broadly representative government: The Taliban is likely to take this trajectory in the short term. That is, the group would opt for engaging in negotiations with the newly-formed coordination council and meeting some of its demands, attempting to establish an inclusive administration to run the country¶s affairs that is representative of various 9/30/2021 3:43:00 AM 1 / 6 components, including former government members. Through this, the Taliban seeks to receive international recognition after it tried to allay the concerns of key powers. For example, the group reassured China and Russia that it will not allow Afghanistan to be turned to a safe haven for terrorist groups. It also vowed to western countries that it will preserve women¶s rights, and declared comprehensive amnesty for all employees of the ousted government and those who collaborated with the US armed forces. The group furthermore announced the formation of a committee responsible for reassuring the media. Potential benefits that this scenario holds for the Taliban entail accessing international funds, where two thirds of the government revenue come from international aid and grants. Afghanistan was entitled to USD 440 million worth in Special Drawing Rights from the International Monetary Fund, but the Taliban has not received any funds because of ³a lack of clarity within the international community regarding recognition of a government in Afghanistan,´according to the IMF. Moreover, USD 7 billion of Afghanistan¶s official gross foreign exchange reserves of over USD 9 billion was frozen by the United States and is held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Consequently, reaching a political settlement and forming a broadly representative government will be a must to save the already collapsing Afghan economy, and secure these financial resources. Such a government is likely to include figures like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the Hezb-e-Islami, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Afghanistan, who is close to Pakistan. Figures like ethnic Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Atta Mohammad Noor, the powerful governor of northern Balkh province, are unlikely to join the new government because they fought fierce wars against the Taliban after the U.S. occupied the country. On the other hand, the Taliban are expected to engage with Ahmad Masoud, son of former leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, who led the resistance against the Taliban and the Soviets, and Amrullah Saleh, former vice president, who both held out in Panjshir Valley where they lead armed resistance against the Taliban. Masoud admitted that there are ongoing talks with the Taliban to create a fair system. <!--[if !supportLists]-->2- Second Scenario: An extremist Islamic Emirate: This is a less likely scenario in the short term. It would entail the Taliban pursue, once again, a hardline approach as it did back in 1996, and alienate all other parties to rule Afghanistan single handedly. Additionally, the country would turn to a safe haven for terror groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, leading to international isolation of the Afghan state. This scenario, however, would stand out due to allegations that the Taliban pursues a hardline approach to women in some regions under their control, despite their statements. Additionally, the group executed some opponents even though it declared amnesty across Afghanistan. Although this scenario would deprive the Taliban from international recognition and funds, they still have their own resources. The group generates USD 464 million in revenue from mining, collecting taxes from miners working in copper, cobalt, gold, iron, lithium and lapis lazuli mines in areas under the group¶s control. It made an additional USD 1.6 billion from taxing the opium and methamphetamine trade, and USD 160 million in protection money collected from shop owners.
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