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Global Witness with Sincere Thanks to All Those Who Contributed to This Report

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Global Witness with Sincere Thanks to All Those Who Contributed to This Report global witness With sincere thanks to all those who contributed to this report. WAR IN THE TREASURY OF THE PEOPLE | JUNE 2016 1 “We are at risk of the curse of plenty, [the] curse of resources.” Ashraf Ghani, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan1 “The mine belongs to the whole nation. It is for all of us.” ‘Haji Anwar’, a miner from Badakhshan2 “This mine is itself a general (…) It will make people fight.” ‘Haji Bashir’, an elder from the district of Kuran wa Munjan3 2 WAR IN THE TREASURY OF THE PEOPLE | JUNE 2016 Contents Executive Summary 6 Lapis and tourmaline: jewels in the crown 6 Signs of hope? 8 Recommendations to the Afghan government 8 Recommendations for Afghanistan’s international partners 9 I. Introduction 12 Box 1: Key Players 14 II. A prize worth fighting for: mining as a direct source of conflict 15 Box 2: Zulmai Mujadidi and the levers of power in Badakhshan 16 The Malek coup 16 Box 3: Fighting since the coup: an overview 18 A lost chance for peace? 19 A game of networks 19 A target for the Taliban: mining and the insurgency 20 Diagram: Links between Badakhshan and national political actors 21 Mines and the Islamic State 22 III. Fueling conflict: abuses and resentment around mining 24 Kuran wa Munjan: a people’s uprising? 24 New faces, same system 24 ‘Like a lion hunting’: tourmaline mining and abuses in Deodarra 25 Abuses by Afghan Local Police forces 27 Fuel on the Fire: Abuses and the Insurgency 28 “The government is more rotten than the Taliban” 30 IV. A treasury for violence: who gains and who loses from the mines 31 Money for Malek 31 The Mujadidi brothers and ‘pro-government’ armed groups 32 Funding the Insurgency 34 Diagram: Payments to the Taliban 36 Box 4: The Onward Trade 38 WAR IN THE TREASURY OF THE PEOPLE | JUNE 2016 3 V. Contracts and Corruption 41 Pamir Badakhshan International Mining 41 Diagram: The PBIM tourmaline contract 42 The Baharak ‘contract’ 45 The Lajwardeen contract and the Ministry of Mines 45 Diagram: Lajwardeen lapis Contract 47 Box 5: Weaknesses in the Lajwardeen lapis contract 48 The final insult: $2.4m missing from one convoy 51 Timeline 52 VI. Policy Implications and Recommendations 55 Recommendations to the Afghan Government 57 Recommendations for Afghanistan’s international Partners 61 Annex A: Lapis mining in Kuran wa Munjan 63 Annex B: Prices cited for lapis and tourmaline 71 Annex C: Cast of characters, contracts and companies 75 Annex D: Glossary of unfamiliar words and terms 80 Endnotes 83 4 WAR IN THE TREASURY OF THE PEOPLE | JUNE 2016 70°30'0"E 71°0'0"E Kokcha River Faizabad District Arghanjkhwa R Faizabad District RAryan Baharak RArgo Shuhada Argo District Baharak District N N " " 0 0 ' District R ' 0 M 0 ° Khash ° 7 7 3 R 3 Deodarra n a l h Ì M Pul e Ali Mughul g Darayem a Teshkan R Khash B R Darayem Jurm & District Keb z R ( u District d n u Keshem K R a i v l Warduj u Pul e Such M b Teshkan a Keshem Firgamiru Jurm District K District ( District Ob e Roghak M District Teer Garan Khostak valley R Ob e Khestak M Ob e Djokham M Yamgan N N " M R " 0 0 ' ' 0 0 3 Tagab 3 ° ° 6 Mir Kan Kokcha River 6 3 R District Yamgan 3 District B a d a k h s h a n Zebak B a d a k h s h a n District Farkhar P r o v ii n c e District Robat e Bolo ( Jangalak block Sar e Sang Junduk and Petawuk M Ì block T a k h a r P r o v ii n c e ( Lajwardshoh Ì Chelemuk block Warsaj PAKISTAN Kuran wa Munjan Chitral District District Skazer( N R N " " 0 0 ' ' 0 0 ° ° 6 6 3 3 ( Anjuman Kuran wa Munjan Anjuman Pass District N u r ii s tt a n P a n jj s h ii r P r o v ii n c e Barg e Matal r e P r o v ii n c e h s District j n a P a i Paryan District v l Mandol District u b a K 70°30'0"E 71°0'0"E Legend 0 10 20 30 40 50 Km M Checkpoints/incidents (2014) Primary road network ° Projection/Datum: Geographic/WGS84 Ì Mining sites Major rivers/water R District Center Rivers/streams Date Created: 27 April 2015 Data Source(s): ( Town/village mentioned in text Provincial boundaries UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), Lajwardeen contract concession blocks District boundaries AGCHO, CSO, AIMS, MISTI. http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/datasets Map production: Panagiotis Nyktas WAR IN THE TREASURY OF THE PEOPLE | JUNE 2016 5 60°0'0"E 62°0'0"E 64°0'0"E 66°0'0"E 68°0'0"E 70°0'0"E 72°0'0"E 74°0'0"E UZBEKISTAN N N " " 0 0 ' TAJIKISTAN CHINA ' 0 0 ° ° 8 8 3 3 TURKMENISTAN Kundu.z N N " " 0 0 ' ' 0 0 ° ° 6 6 3 3 KabuZl N N " Peshawar " 0 0 ' ' 0 . 0 ° ° 4 4 3 AFGHANISTAN 3 IRAN N N " " 0 0 ' PAKISTAN ' 0 0 ° ° 2 2 3 3 INDIA N N " " 0 0 ' ' 0 0 ° ° 0 0 3 3 60°0'0"E 62°0'0"E 64°0'0"E 66°0'0"E 68°0'0"E 70°0'0"E 72°0'0"E 74°0'0"E Badakhshan Province 0 100 200 300 400 Km Date Created: 27 April 2015 Data Source(s): U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geographer ° Map production: Panagiotis Nyktas Projection/Datum: Geographic/WGS84 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations AK-47 Avtomat Kalashnikova, aka Kalashnikov 7.62 x 39mm assault rifle ALP Afghan Local Police ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police Afs Afghanis (Afghan currency) bn Billion DDR Demobilisation, Disarmament, and Reintegration IED Improvised Explosive Device IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IS Islamic State – also known as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), and ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham) LMC Lajwardeen Mining Company m Million MPF Mining Protection Force (kita e muhafizat e mahdan) OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PBIM Pamir Badakhshan International Mining PK Pulemyot Kalashnikova, a Russian-made 7.62 x 54 mm machine gun (acronym can also be used as a generic term for a light machine gun) RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade trn Trillion A rate of US $1=56 Afghanis was used for the majority of currency conversions in the report – a rough average of the rate from June 2013 to early 2015. The Afghani began significant depreciation from about April 2015, and for data from this date to May 2016 an average rate of 62.5 Afghanis was applied. For data prior to June 2013 a rough average of $1=50 Afghanis was used.4 6 WAR IN THE TREASURY OF THE PEOPLE | JUNE 2016 Summary The mines of the rugged northeastern province of foreign aid, rely on their development. But they Badakhshan are one of the richest assets of the threaten to do the opposite – to be a chronic source Afghan people, an extraordinary national treasure of conflict and corruption, while generating little that should be a powerful resource for development. revenue. Improving the governance of the whole Instead, as a two year investigation reveals, they sector is not just a matter of legality or of morality: are a major source of conflict and grievance, supply it is of fundamental importance to the future of the millions of dollars to armed groups, insurgents, and country. strongmen, and provide a tiny fraction of the benefit that they should to the Afghan people. Without a That urgency has not so far been adequately reflected coherent response, these mines – and others like in the policy of either the Afghan government or them across Afghanistan – represent not just a lost its partners – despite some encouraging recent opportunity, but a threat to the whole country. announcements. They should make it a first-order priority, first of all by increasing accountability, The direct rivals in the violent competition for transparency, and local engagement around mining Badakhshan’s ancient lapis lazuli mines are two local (notably in the mining law), and by prioritising strongmen. Both have exploited the mines, both have security in mining areas. Badakhshan, where both links to national politics, and both have allegedly the scale of the threat and the potential reward are had back-door ties to the Taliban. According to rough disproportionately high, is worth particular attention but plausible estimates, the revenue going to these – but reform is needed for the whole country. With strongmen and the Taliban from just one small area some basic safeguards yet to be implemented, of Badakhshan rivals the government’s declared effective action is possible. income from the entire Afghan extractive sector. For now, the lapis which supplies much of the world market is, by any reasonable definition, a conflict Lapis and tourmaline: jewels in the crown mineral. Global Witness’ research covered two of the most This struggle is one of resources, not ideology: a important minerals in Badakhshan, lapis lazuli and “business war.” But it has nonetheless created the tourmaline – semi-precious decorative stones mainly conditions in which the Taliban – who have a close relationship with the local affiliate of the Islamic State – threaten to take the mines, and already control much of their revenue.
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