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Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts

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CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker ARROYO CENTER The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kelly, Terrence K. Security force assistance in Afghanistan : identifying lessons for future efforts / Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-5211-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Afghanistan. Afghan National Army. 2. Military assistance, American— Afghanistan. 3. National security—Afghanistan. 4. Internal security—Afghanistan. I. Bensahel, Nora, 1971- II. Oliker, Olga. III. Title. UA853.A3K45 2011 355'.0325810973—dc23 2011019199 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Cover photo by SSgt Ryan Whitney. © Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand. org/publications/permissions.html). Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsur- gency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghani- stan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces, and the extent to which the armed elements of tribes, sub-tribes, and clans can be brought under government control. Yet senior U.S. military and civil- ian officials have posed many questions about the effectiveness of SFA in Afghanistan, and few empirically rigorous assessments exist to help answer these questions. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time. It documents the U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009, focusing primar- ily on the lessons and themes that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army. As part of our research, we also examined Soviet approaches to SFA in Afghan- istan from the 1920s until 1989. That research will be published sepa- rately in a forthcoming companion document by Olga Oliker entitled Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience, MG-1078-A. The findings of this monograph should be of interest to U.S. mili- tary and civilian officials involved in preparing and executing secu- rity force assistance, both in Afghanistan and beyond. It should also interest those both inside and outside the U.S. government who seek iii iv Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan a deeper understanding of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and the key challenges that those efforts face. This research was sponsored by the Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and was -con ducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Cor- poration, is a federally funded research and development center spon- sored by the United States Army. For comments or further information, please contact Terrence Kelly (412-683-2300, x4905; [email protected]). The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is ASPMO09157. For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the Director of Operations (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6419; fax 310-451-6952; email [email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s web- site at http://www.rand.org/ard.html. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii Abbreviations .................................................................. xxxv CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 The Challenges of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan ................................................................. 1 Afghanistan in Context ......................................................... 2 The Threat ........................................................................ 5 Reasonable Expectations for the ANSF ......................................... 7 Research Approach ................................................................10 Initial Research Approach .....................................................10 Data Availability ................................................................12 Revised Research Approach ...................................................15 Organization of This Monograph ...............................................15 CHAPTER TWO Overview of Security Force Assistance During the Coalition Era, 2001–2009 ...................................................................17 The Bonn Agreement and the Establishment of the ANSF ..................17 Relative Security, 2002–2003 ...................................................19 The Afghan National Army .................................................. 20 v vi Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan The Afghan National Police .................................................. 27 Rapid Buildup, 2004–2005 ......................................................32 The Afghan National Army ...................................................32 The Afghan National Police ...................................................35 Worsening Security, 2005–2007 ................................................39 The Afghan National Army .................................................. 40 The Afghan National Police ...................................................47 Crisis, 2007–2009................................................................ 54 The Afghan National Army .................................................. 56 The Afghan National Police .................................................. 60 CHAPTER THREE Observations About Recent SFA Efforts in Afghanistan .................67 SFA Scope and Context in Afghanistan ........................................67 Assistance to Afghan Ministries and Generating Forces .....................74 Advisors and Partners in Afghanistan ..........................................79 The Afghan National Army ...................................................79 The Afghan National Police .................................................. 84 Concluding Observations ....................................................... 86 CHAPTER FOUR A Framework for SFA and Assessing SFA During Conflict ..............89 Conclusions ...................................................................... 103 CHAPTER FIVE Implications of SFA in Afghanistan for the U.S. Army ................. 105 U.S.
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