The Difficult Stabilization of Afghanistan the Situation in Afghanistan Has Deteriorated in Recent Months

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich Vol. 2 • No. 11 • April 2007

The difficult stabilization of Afghanistan The situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in recent months. While the Taliban and al-Qaida have re-formed in the tribal areas on the Afghan-Pakistani frontier, the Afghan government has been unable to increase its tenuous domestic legitimacy, and the drug trade is booming. It is proving extremely difficult to bring about a sustainable stabilization of the country, which would require the international military engagement to be complemented by a more constructive attitude on the part of Pakistan, economic investments in the Afghan-Pakistani border areas, and political reforms in Afghanistan.

since the US invasion and the subsequent redistribution of power, they feel discrimi- nated against. Also, most of the Taliban are ethnic Pashtun. But there are also attacks and kidnappings in the more quiet north- ern and western areas of the country that are inhabited by ethnic Persian and Turkic populations. Overall, more than 4,000 people were killed in the conflict during 2006. This number includes not only insurgents, Afghan security forces, foreign troops, reconstruction workers, and journalists, but also a large number of civilians. Violence is both a cause and an outcome of the disparate economic development in dif- Reuters/Abdul Qodus ferent parts of the country. The national Roadblock after a suicide attack on NATO troops in southern Afghanistan, 13 March 2007 budget of Afghanistan, one of the world’s poorest countries, is almost completely (92 The stabilization of Afghanistan is a key of al-Qaida out of Afghanistan, and the per cent) externally financed. security policy challenge for the interna- international community has taken on tional community and its efforts to fight the obligation to rebuild the country. The Instability factors terrorism in a sustainable manner. If it challenges to stabilization still remain sig- A number of factors have complicated the should fail, the states of the West might nificant, however. The fundamentalist Tali- stabilization of Afghanistan. In terms of become reluctant to participate in inter- ban who ruled most of Afghanistan from domestic policy, in addition to the com- national crisis intervention and peace 1998–2001 have returned as a force to be plex structure of this 30-million multi- support operations. Furthermore, large reckoned with. Together with local rulers, ethnic state, the main problem consists consignments of heroin would continue drug dealers, and the equally resurgent al- in the rampant nepotism and corruption to be shipped from Afghanistan to Europe. Qaida, they are waging an asymmetric war that President Karzai has accepted in or- Conversely, a sustainable peace would against the Afghan government and the der to secure his power. Furthermore, on also – and primarily – benefit the Afghans foreign troops in the country. The influence the national level, the political integration themselves, who are now experiencing of the government of Hamid Karzai, elected of former warlords, who undermine de- their third decade of warfare and whose in 2004, is weakest in the south and east of mocracy and human rights and enjoy little country has often been instrumentalized the country, where it has only very limited trust among the population, has proven by external actors for their own purposes. control. The Pashtun who dominate these counter-productive. While such a strategy areas represent 40 per cent of the popula- may offer short-term successes in terms More than five years ago, the US toppled tion in Afghanistan, making them the coun- of stability, the price is a long-term loss of the Taliban regime and pushed members try’s largest single ethnic group; however, legitimacy on the part of the government.

Another problem is the Afghan economy’s 0km 200km UZBEKISTAN lopsided focus on the opium and heroin TAJIKISTAN trade: Afghanistan produces more than 90 CHINA h TURKMENISTAN s per cent of the world’s raw opium as well Shir Khan u K as large quantities of heroin. Kondoz u d Mazar-e i n Sharif H The regional environment has also pre- Bagram vented successful peacebuilding efforts. Towraghondi Progress in Afghanistan depends largely on Jalalabad Herat KABUL the cooperation of Pakistan, but relations ISLAMABAD between the two countries are extremely Ghazni INDIA Shindand 1972 tense. There are numerous indications that Line of Islamabad is helping insurgent groups in Contol Afghanistan to operate from the provinces across the Pakistani border. For instance, Kandahar the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Zaranj PAKISTAN service is alleged to have supported the Tal- IRAN iban leadership in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani province of Balochistan. However, Quetta INDIA Pakistani leader General Pervez Musharraf © Fabian Furter, ETH Zurich 2007 has denied these charges, pointing to his Afghanistan and its neighbors successes in combating militants in the remote Pakistani-Afghan frontier provinces. The role of the international sequent prioritization of the Iraq war by Other factors obstructing regional stabili- community the US, has had negative repercussions for zation are the Pakistani-Indian rivalry and The international community is employ- reconstruction. After the military opera- the struggle between Islamabad, New Del- ing both military and civilian instruments tions of 2001, the US relied on Afghan war- hi, and Tehran for influence in Afghanistan. to stabilize Afghanistan. The NATO-led In- lords and deployed only a relatively small For example, Pakistan has accused India of ternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contingent that was not expanded until a trying to enhance its regional clout by sup- has now reached a force level of approxi- later date. The Europeans were also fairly porting infrastructure projects in Afghani- mately 33,000 soldiers from 37 countries. It slow to enhance their military deployment stan and by backing groups that are fight- is legitimized by several UN Security Coun- from 3,000 troops in 2002 to today’s force ing against the government in Islamabad. cil resolutions. Security is to be provided by level of 15,800 soldiers (from 23 EU mem- 27 civil-military Provincial Reconstruction ber states). Accordingly, the Taliban and As far as the general international frame- Teams, which contribute to rebuilding the al-Qaida fighters were able to withdraw to work is concerned, the stabilization of Af- country. In addition, another 10,000 US remote and inaccessible tribal areas. Broad ghanistan has been impeded in particular and other foreign troops have been de- swathes of territory were left unoccupied by the occupation of Iraq. On the one hand, ployed that are not under ISAF command, by international forces, and must now be this conflict has been tying down troops but are tasked with fighting terrorists and reconquered by them in painstaking opera- and funds that are urgently required in Af- insurgents as part of “Operation Enduring tions. This made it easy for warlords, insur- ghanistan. Since 2003, the struggle against Freedom”, which began in 2001. These are gents, and drug dealers to retain or secure terrorism in Afghanistan has been over- also engaged in training the approximately their positions of power. shadowed by the insurgency in Iraq. On 25,000 troops of the Afghan armed forces. the other hand, there are indications that Overall, about 27,000 US soldiers are de- Secondly, even today, national caveats re- insurgent groups in Iraq may be in touch ployed in Afghanistan. In terms of troop main as obstacles to military stabilization with their counterparts in Afghanistan, and contributions, the UK and Germany occupy efforts. For instance, Germany has provided the Afghan resistance groups have adopted second and third place, respectively. ISAF with Tornado reconnaissance aircraft, a number of lessons learned in Mesopota- but has declined to deploy combat units mia. This is particularly true for tactics such A review of the military engagement in to the less secure areas of Afghanistan. as suicide attacks and improved bomb- Afghanistan since the overthrow of the European governments are under increas- making techniques. The number of suicide Taliban exposes two shortcomings: First of ing public pressure to justify their engage- attacks in Afghanistan has increased from all, the UN has been pursuing a strategy of ment in Afghanistan. The US, on the other 27 in 2005 to 139 in the past year. Another limited engagement (a “light footprint”). hand, demands that the Europeans make negative influence on peace support efforts The intention was to generally leave sta- stronger military commitments. has been the stigmatization of Iran as part bilization and reconstruction tasks to the of an “Axis of Evil” in 2003. This move by the Afghans themselves. In doing so, the UN It is true that efforts have been under- administration of US President George W. was primarily accommodating the posi- taken since 2001 in the field of civilian Bush ensured an untimely ending for the tion of the US, which was skeptical as far peace support. However, despite initial pragmatic cooperation between Iran and as nation-building was concerned. The generous commitments, the financial en- the US in Afghanistan immediately after international community’s choice of lim- gagement remained moderate compared the 2001 invasion. ited engagement, together with the sub- to the response to the conflicts in Bosnia

and Kosovo, at least until the Afghanistan secular Pakistani military regime should the fate of the so-called Musa Qala Agree- Compact that was announced in January step down, conservative religious parties ment. In September 2006, ISAF attempted 2006. The establishment of an efficient and could seize power in the nuclear-armed to involve local Taliban forces in the stabi- democratically accountable police and jus- country. Irrespective of the “Musharraf lization process in one region in southern tice system has been sluggish so far, which question”, continued détente in Indo-Paki- Helmand province. Fighting between ISAF has made it difficult for the Karzai govern- stani relations would significantly reduce and the local Taliban earlier this year ter- ment to translate its formal legitimacy into the importance for Pakistan of the Taliban minated this attempt at locally negotiated domestic political clout. Many police forces and of the strategic depth provided by conflict resolution, which had been regard- are simply militias that are maintained by Afghanistan. ed with suspicion from the very start by the local potentates and exploit the popula- US and parts of the Karzai government. tion. At the economic level, attempts to In order to bring stability to the Pakistani- reduce the one-sided dependence on the Afghan frontier provinces, it would be use- In the context of drug policy, the Europe- drug trade have proven extremely difficult. ful for the Afghan government to recog- ans should convince the US not to transfer For many Afghans, cultivating opium pop- nize the so-called Durand Line, the de-facto its failed policy of repression from South pies is the only viable business option. demarcation line between the countries America to Afghanistan. Chemical spray- that was created by the British Empire in ing of poppy fields in Afghanistan would The international community is further 1893. It constitutes a border between Pa- not only be ineffective, since it would only handicapped by a loss of credibility in the shtun tribes, albeit only at a formal level, cause drug production to be displaced geo- Afghan population. This is due to civilian since the trans-border traffic of people and graphically. This strategy, which is favored casualties caused by the military opera- goods (including arms and drugs) is quite by the US, would also prove to be counter- tions of foreign troops, the low compensa- considerable. Acknowledging the border productive by prompting more farmers tions paid out to victims or their families, would make it easier, among other things, to join the Taliban. The key precondition reports of human rights violations at the to deploy Afghan border guards. Interna- for reducing the supply of drugs is eco- US military base in Bagram and elsewhere, tional investment would also be very help- nomic recuperation. Alternative develop- the distortion of the economic playing field ful in these border regions, where poverty ment projects can support the transition through the presence of foreign personnel, and illiteracy are inordinately prevalent. from opium poppies to other agricultural and the lack of improvements in everyday Trade agreements between Afghanistan produce. Repressive measures are also life for the large majority of Afghans. and Pakistan, support for economic and so- required; however, they should not be di- cial development, and the construction of rected against farmers, but against those What next? roads and communication infrastructure who pull the strings in the drug trade, even The experiences of the British colonial em- are more promising than the militarization if they have political influence. pire and of the Soviet Union underscore the and mining of the Pakistani-Afghan border limitations of military counterinsurgency area as favored by Islamabad. Stabilizing Afghanistan is a long-term task in Afghanistan. The tactical successes of that mainly requires an integrated use of foreign and Afghan troops are thwarted Importance of democratization political, military, law enforcement, and again and again by the asymmetrical In Afghanistan itself, strengthening de- economic instruments as part of a net- strategy employed by militant opposition mocratic structures and the rule of law is worked security concept, as well as better forces. Military operations are a necessary, of paramount importance. The Taliban are coordination between the various institu- but not a sufficient condition for stabiliz- winning support not because they have tions involved. ing Afghanistan. The launching of spring so much to offer, but because the govern- offensives should therefore not detract ment in Kabul has so little to offer. The attention from the overriding importance international community should try to of political initiatives. counteract the marginalization of the Afghan parliament, in particular by One important key to long-term stabiliza- strengthening the country’s party system. tion is likely to be found at the diplomatic It is equally important to strengthen the level. Sustainable progress will hardly be hands of democratic actors at the local and achieved unless efforts for conflict resolu- regional levels. The struggle against cor- tion are increasingly regionalized by involv- ruption should initially focus on the police Author: ing Iran, India, and especially Pakistan. In and the judiciary. The planned civilian ESDP Cornelius Friesendorf the case of Pakistan, the US is confronted mission agreed by the EU in February 2007 [email protected] with the delicate question of whether to could help to enhance the efficiency and Responsible editor: continue to support General Musharraf legitimacy of the Afghan police. Daniel Möckli on the same scale (Pakistan has received [email protected] approximately US$10 billion in US aid since In view of the fact that the foreign armed Translated from German: 11 September 2001). Washington’s confi- forces will not be able to control the entire Christopher Findlay dence in the ability and determination of territory of the country in the foreseeable the Pakistani leader to end the infiltration future, it would be worthwhile to exam- other CSS Analyses / Mailinglist: of rebel groups and militants into Afghani- ine the option of concluding agreements www.isn.ethz.ch stan has been shaken. At the same time, at the local and district levels. Such agree- german and French versions: the Bush administration fears that if the ments are fragile, however, as evidenced by www.ssn.ethz.ch